GONZALES VS COMELEC

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that
the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in
the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the
courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the
contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing
so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act.
Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the
final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special
election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that
the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the
previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a
special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. They should
be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No.
991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the
peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-

plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature,
is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec.
15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has
not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue
of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to
pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that
time also sits as the legislature.
AGAN VS PIATCO EN BANC

G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of Congress; Police Power;
Delegation of emergency powers]
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in
accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security
Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated
into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997
Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and
maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other
charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25)
years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO
shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other
services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that
they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition
for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the
various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not honor
(PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded (as) null and
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional
provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay
reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the
exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with
public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the
temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the
government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as
there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner
affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the
said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its
police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of
the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to
temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover
is exercising its police power. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus,
requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property
pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
Republic vs. Tagle
Facts: Helena Benitez is a registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Bgy. Salwag, Dasmarinas,
Cavite. Sometime in Sept. 1982, the Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human
Resources Development Center (PHRDC), an agency under the Ministry of Human Settlements,
negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on
technicalities of the establishment of ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the
Philippines. Among the the 5 main programs of the proposed project was the Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an agency now under the Department of Trade and
Industry.
Several transaction and agreements were entered into between Benitez (together with
Philippine Womens University) and the PHRDC with regards to the lease and consequently, the
possible sale of the land which did not push through because of Benitezs desistance.
Thereafter, Benitez and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the
premises. Benitez later filed an unlawful detainer case against PHRDC. In turn, the state through
DTI (with GMA as undersecretary), to which CMDF is attached instituted a complaint for
Eminent Domain, pursuant to EO 1935. In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, DTI deposited with PNB in favor of Benitez
P708,490 an amount equivalent to the provisional value of the land sought to be expropriated.
Subsequently, DTI filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession which had been granted but
subsequently quashed by MTC Judge Tagle.

Issue: Whether Judge Tagle may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Held: No. Judge Tagle is required to issue a writ of possession in favor DTI pursuant to Sec. 7 of
EO 1035:
SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as
provided in the preceding section, the government implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned shall have authority to immediately institute expropriation proceedings through the
Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may be. The just compensation to be paid for the
property acquired through expropriation shall be in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No.
1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall
immediately issue the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government
implementing agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%)
of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533; Provided, That the period
within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days
from the date such deposit was made.
Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land.
Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable
taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute
ownership. The writ of possession is both necessary and practical, because mere physical
possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the
aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property.
Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the States power of eminent
domain. DTI has deposited not just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the whole
amount of the just compensation that private respondent is entitled to. Thus, there is no any
legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of DTI. Precisely, the purpose
of instituting expropriation proceedings is to prevent petitioner from being ejected from the
subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd and circuitous rulings would arise.

City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)

expropriation of Chinese cemetery
Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as
cemetery for the purpose of extending
Rizal Avenue
for public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public character
and many dead bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking
the land for public purpose since such is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb
the resting place of the dead. The plaintiff contends that under the Charter of City of Manila,
they may condemn private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive function of the

legislature and the only function of the court is to assess the value of the land expropriated.
Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.
Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the
inquiry of the existence of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands
for public purpose. The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the authority
conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be
public. The taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a
judicial question but the court is bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion
delegated by the legislature. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled
that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation
of the land by the City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of
the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use
of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled
to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System
can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require
the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow
inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.
P E O P L E V. FA J A R D O ( 1 9 5 8 )
Reyes, J.B.L.
Facts
Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the
municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or repair of any
building without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a building
adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated from public plaza by a
creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.

o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.
Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed that
they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating
Ordinance no. 7
o CFI Affirmed
o CA forwarded the case to the SC because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the
ordinance in question.
Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is
therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
Ratio:

The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the
discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.
o Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair
permits

Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare

Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not under the guise of police
power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
o IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they
are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance appellants constrained would be
constrained to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual
confiscation of their private land

Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code Sec.
2243 C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding
establishing fire limits in populous centers
empowers municipal government to require
construction/repair permits, to charge fees for such permits
o IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council
promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in
the public plaza.
CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA [106 Phil; G.R. No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]
Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation,
created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the
Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the
plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and
due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper
exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the
defendants to file an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to
private property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383
provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of
Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for

reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.

Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate,
destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all
water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be
transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of
an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing does not
confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property
held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a
municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.
NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ [193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.

Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case
will be entitled just compensation.

Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents
of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission
lines. Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life
and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a
lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP.
In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that
just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that
year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry
must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities,
4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of
court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that
a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express
provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant
case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The
Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of
the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases
the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out
that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be
fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners
report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from

further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel
wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government
did not give its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide
free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover,
the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of
private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of
just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national
emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA) (January 20, 2003)
Post under case digests, Political Law at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland
owned by the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the
expropriation is for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots with payment of just compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court

order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They
also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated lands which
violate the reason for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from
disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting
all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.
In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several
issues are already raised in the expropriation court.
The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose because
the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a contract
with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income
beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of the
petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based on the
value at the time the property was taken.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.
Held: The decision appealed is modified.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over
the private properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional
restraints are public use and just compensation.
The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties
for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project.
The public use is synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and
public convenience. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the
construction of low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking.
Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose
even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies and other private concerns.
The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized
sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the
Constitution.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession
of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15
percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed
pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when
public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law
because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing
authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring
the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,

exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress
did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or
private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter
of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of
action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate
private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use
whenever they need it.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized
agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with.
ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM
POSTED | 0 COMMENTS
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for
failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to
Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there
is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only
where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by
the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount
authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to
the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of
the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
ESLABAN VS. ONORIO [360 SCRA 230; G.R. NO. 146062; 28 JUN 2001]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South
Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The
parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the
area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which
respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently,
respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the
damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands
that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner

states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not
entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held
that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the
24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

Held: The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made
regarding the value of the just compensation. The following are the points to be considered in
arriving in this decision.
First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the certification against forum
shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The petition for review was
filed by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar Gonzales,
an administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for
they are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition.
Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the
government the easement of a public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have
been pre-determined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after
the property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings
must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken
for public use.
Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but
the reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating
that the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the
complaint in 1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the
NIA in 1981.
Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the
respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the
value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were
damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.
Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the
amount of P16, 047.61 per hectare.
De Knecht v CA [G.R. No. 109234. May 20, 1998]

J. Puno

Facts:
In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated a case for expropriation against the Knechts'
property. The government sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood
Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard.
The CFI issued a writ of possession. This SC, however, held that the choice of area for the
extension of EDSA was arbitrary. The SC annulled the writ.
In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes
on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold
the property at public auction on May 27, 1982 for the sum of P63,000.00, the amount of the
deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondents Babiera and Sangalang couples.
The petitioners failed to redeem the property. Babiera then filed for registration of the land to
his name. The trial court granted the petition. The Knechts, who were in possession of the
property, allegedly learned of the auction sale only by the time they received the orders of the
land registration courts.
The De Knechts also filed Civil Case No. 2961-P to prevent the titles from being given to the
contending spouses. They put up lack of notice to the sale as defense. This was dismissed for
lack of counsel to appear on the last hearing.
On March 12, 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment
Corporation (Salem) for P400,000.00.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the
national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The
just compensation for this purpose was docketed by the OSG under civil case 7327. The De
Knecht property was covered by the expropriation. On August 30, seven of the eight houses of
the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on
which the houses stood. Salem instituted against them Civil Case No. 85-263 for unlawful
detainer.
The SC allowed for the expropriation this time. Meanwhile, Salem conveyed 5,611.92 square
meters of the subject property to respondent spouses Mariano and Anacoreta Nocom. Part was
left to Salem.
As prayed for by Salem, the trial court issued an order on September 13, 1990 for the release of
P5,763,650.00 to Salem by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as partial payment of just
compensation.
The De Knechts filed a motion to intervene. On April 23, 1992, as prayed for by Mariano Nocom,
the trial court ordered the release of P11,526,000.00 as third installment for his 5,611.92 square
meters of the subject land. The De Knechts questioned this in the CA.
The CA quashed their motion to intervene due to the lack of legal interest. They filed an original
action for the annulment of TC judgments. Therein, the Knechts challenged the validity of the
orders of the land registration courts in the two petitions of the Sangalangs and Babieras for
registration of their names, the reconveyance case and the just compensation proceedings.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on November 24, 1992. Hence the
filing of G.R. No. 108015. In a Resolution dated February 1, 1993, the SC denied the petition
finding "no reversible error" committed by the Court of Appeals. The De Knechts alleged:
1. CA committed a reversible error when it claimed 7327 was not an eminent domain
proceeding
2. another error when CA upheld res judicata to bar the MFR
3. another error when CA refused for respondent judge to rule for the motion for inhibition

Issue:
1. Were the De Knechts denied due process when they were not sufficiently notified of the tax
delinquency, the auction sale, and the surrender of the owners duplicate for the tax lien?
2. Is the first civil case (2961-P) res judicata? Was there due process in this dismissal?
3. Is 7327 an expropriation case?
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. No.
The De Knechts claimed that they did not receive the notices for tax delinquency and the
auction sale. That was why they were unable to claim the property.
It has been ruled that the notices and publication, as well as the legal requirements for a tax
delinquency sale, are mandatory; and the failure to comply therewith can invalidate the sale.
The prescribed notices must be sent to comply with the requirements of due process.
The De knechts claim was a factual question and not to be answered in the SC. Moreover, the
question had already been answered in the previous cases in the appellate courts. Res judicata
had already set in.
Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from
relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law-- one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a
limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.
When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long
as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate.
2. Yes. Yes.
Petitioners claim it wasnt due to the lack of judgment on the merits in the said case. Moreover,
it was based by the court on their lack of interest.
Court- "Lack of interest" is analogous to "failure to prosecute." (S 3, R 17 of ROC)
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an
unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of
the court.
They also requested for postponments which prompted Salem to move for dismissal. The court
agreed. The order of dismissal was based on the following factors: (1) pendency of the
complaint for a considerable length of time; (2) failure of counsel to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite notice; and (3) lack of interest of the petitioners. Under Section 3, Rule 17, a
dismissal order which does not provide that it is without prejudice to the filing of another action
is understood to be an adjudication on the merits.
The Knechts contend, however, that the facts of the case do not call for the application of res
judicata because this amounts to "a sacrifice of justice to technicality." It must be noted that the
Knechts were given the opportunity to assail the tax sale and present their evidence on its
validity in Civil Case No. 2961-P, the reconveyance case.
3. Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation
case.
It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that

expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be
expropriated.
B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely
described the specific properties expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be
determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways as the
administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law
for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The complaint must join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying,
any part thereof or interest therein.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property
condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the
property including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory
contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is
entitled to share in the award.
The Knechts insist that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at
the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should
have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings. They claim that they still
occupied the land when it was expropriated and therefore had a share.
Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P for reconveyance was dismissed with
finality by this Court and judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost whatever
right or colorable title they had to the property after we affirmed the order of the trial court
dismissing the reconveyance case.
The Knechts' possession of the land and buildings was based on their claim of ownership not on
any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee.
Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation
proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in
denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties." Their intervention
having been denied, the Knechts had no personality to move for the inhibition of respondent
Judge Sayo from the case.
REPUBLIC VS. KER [383 SCRA 584; G.R. NO. 136171, 2 JULY 2002]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation
of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land
for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The
Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation.
However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be
reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax
declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and
unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the
fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price
in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking
or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct
in disregarding petitioner's claim.
Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained
by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on
the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a
religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was
born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,
as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable.
It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in
at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One
is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost
to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power,
of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.