Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 Wigmore
ISSUE:
Whether Dimat guilty of fencing.
ISSUE:
RULING:
HELD:
No, thus, he is guilty of violating the anti-fencing law.
Under Presidential Decree 1612, fencing is the act
of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and
assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of
petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato
Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these
items were previously owned by it gave rise to a
presumption of fencing under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao
succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioners contention,
intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612.
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity.
The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On
HELD:
No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the
"practice of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law."
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. The acceptance of
the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver
of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible
administratively liable.
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this
case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on January 19,
1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.
PEOPLE VS TADULAN
(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)
FACTS:
Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where she
resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter A. Beside their house is an apartment building
wherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan along
with his family.
One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A was
playing outside the apartment, accused Tadulan brought
called her and brought her upstairs where he eventually had
intercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform her
mother about the incident, and it was only when the laundry
woman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that they
knew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to
the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands
sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and that
she would not take legal action against the accused if he
would vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife
promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was still
coming home to the apartment every night.
Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in the
apartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accused
arguing with his wife. B called the police, and when they
came, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police
that he raped the minor daughter of Complainant B, in
which he was thereafter arrested. The trial court found the
accused guilty of rape, and upon appeal, raised the
contention that he was pardoned by the mother of the
victim.
ISSUE:
W/ N pardon granted by the mother of the minor offended
party without the concurrence of the offended minor is valid
HELD:
PEOPLE VS NERY
FACTS:
Accused Soledad Nery received 2 diamond rings
from Federico Matillano to be sold by her on commission on
Nov 15, 1954. In their agreement, Nery should deliver Php
230.00 to her principal, to whom she represented having a
ready buyer, and whatever excess money obtained by her
be retained as her commission. She failed to comply with
their agreement, and was thus brought to the police station
where she promised to pay the price of the rings.
After failing to pay, a complaint was filed against
her. This was however withdrawn/dismissed following her
partial payment of Php 40.00. After failing again to pay the
balance of Php 190.00, an estafa case was filed against her.
During the pendency of the case, she paid Php 50.00, but
the remaining balance was never paid. She was eventually
convicted for estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement made between
the accused and Matillano (with partial payments) novated
her criminal liability into a simple civil liability.
HELD :
NO. the court held that novation does not apply
in the case at bar, wherein a criminal information has
already been filed by the complainant. Furthermore, said
liability cannot already be novated since this is a public
offense, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish
the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense.
B.)
B.)
ISSUE:
Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or
Legal Holidays.
HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop
the running of the prescriptive period as a matter of
statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only
exception is the offenders physical absence and no other
cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in.
The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following
working day as it would tantamount to extending the
prescriptive period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution
was granted on the valid ground of prescription.
CABRAL V. PUNO 1976
70 SCRA 606
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of
Public Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948
the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a
deed of sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
charge, since the said document of sale was notarized on
August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused
the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new
transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,
1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of
prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according
to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal information. The
Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted
his comment expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in
the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to
ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their
total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of
motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for
reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for
correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case
No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This
motion was denied, as well as the second motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975
(granting the motion to quash and dismissing the
Information) based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense
HELD:
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the
revival of the Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and executory. When
the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or
about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of
dismissal, the same had already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a
motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
ISSUE:
1.
2.
DECISION:
1.
2.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees with the court
administrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instant
case is concerned. The respondent judge was correct in
stating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arresto
menor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, the
crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.
Article 91 of RPC provides the period of
prescription shall be interrupted by filing the complaint of
information. In the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of the
complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running
of the statute of limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vs
Cuaresma).
In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule on
Summary Procedure which provides that cases covered
thereby, the prosecution commences by filing the
complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MTCC cannot be taken to mean that prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said court. In case of conflict between Rule on
Summary Procedure and RPC (which is a substantive law),
latter prevails.
Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime of
slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of
the complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or
suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
The matter however is judicial in nature and the
rule is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of a
judge given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewing
court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by
means of administrative complaint.
An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed
aberrant or irregular. Administrative liability for ignorance of
the law does not arise from the mere fact that a judge
issued an order that may be adjudged to be erroneous.
Rule: Only when a Judge acts fraudulently or
with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are
called for.
Wherefore, administrative case is dismissed.
REPUBLIC VS COJUANGCO ET AL
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not respondents alleged violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
Held:
Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the
offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years.
Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on
March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10
years. Since the acts complained of were committed before
the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such
acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as
originally enacted.
Assuming the offense charged is subject to
prescription, the same began to run only from the date it
was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year
prescriptive period should be computed in accordance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Two rules for determining when the prescriptive
period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is
known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known,
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
discovery of such loans.The reason for this is that the
government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that
those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to
such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against
the government. They could only have been discovered after
the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted
President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no
person would have dared question the legality or propriety
of the loans.
PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respondent) with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of P9,658,592.00 in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment. Consequently the case was modified, and only on
February 3, 2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22
were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000,
respondent filed anOmnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her
PANGAN v GATBALITE
GR No. 141718 January 21, 2005
Petitioner : Benjamin Pangan y Rivera
Respondents : Hon Lourdes F. Gatbalite Col. James D.
Labordo
FACTS
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a
criminal case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of the
case, Atty. Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case
for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioners constant absence at hearings.
HELD
NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the
this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
It is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
The Probation Law requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the
result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory
the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction. Here,
however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a
choice between appeal and probation.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for
a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought
from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level
where the law would allow him to apply
for probation. Arnel was convicted of a wrong crime,
frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6
years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He
only committed attempted homicide with its maximum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for
probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent
offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation.
TOLINTENO V ALCONEL
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Tolentino was charged wih Section 4,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on
September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented
part of its evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to
change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser
offense of possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana], under
Section 8 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425.
As no objection was interposed by the fiscal, the court
allowed petitioner to withdraw his former plea of guilty and
to enter a plea of guilty to said lessor offense. Petitioner was
thereupon sentenced to imprisonment of six [6] months and
one [1] day to two [2] years and four [4] months, to pay a
fine of P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation.
Respondent judge forthwith directed the probation officer
of the City of Manila to conduct a post sentence
investigation on said application and to file said report
thereon within 60 days. After conducting such investigation,
the probation officer submitted its report, recommending
that petitioner be placed on a two-year probation upon the
claim that the latter was already on his way to reformation
and that a prison cell would turn him into a hardened
criminal.
Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent
judge issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying
petitioners application on the ground that it will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.
RULING:
"SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation. No person shall be
placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality of the
offender to reform is not the sole, much less the primordial
factor, that should be considered in the grant or denial of an
application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8
of P.D. 968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an
offender on probation, as follows:
"Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In
determining whether an offender may be placed on
probation, the court shall consider all information, relative
to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and
physical condition of the offender and available institutional
and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the
court finds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) . . .
b) . . .
c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed" is
based principally on the admission by the petitioner himself,
as reflected in the report of the probation officer, that he
[petitioner] was actually caught in the act of selling
marijuana cigarettes. Petitioner did not deny or dispute the
veracity of the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify
his criminal act by explaining in his motion for
reconsideration that "he did it only to make some money for
the family during Christmas. Such admission renders a
hearing on the application for probation an unnecessary
surplusage and an idle ceremony.
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon
the discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. v. Durken,
this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.
Thus, while under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by P.D. 44,
possession or use of marijuana was punishable by
imprisonment of 6 mouths and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months and a fine ranging from P600.00 to P6,000.00 - the
penalty imposed upon petitioner herein -possession and use
thereof is now punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and fine ranging from P6,000.00
to P12,000.00 under B.P. Blg. 179.
The observation of the Solicitor General on this increase of
penalty is apropos:
"The implication is clear. The penalties were increased to
take it out of the range of probationable offenses. Thus, the
State has spoken and considers that this is one case where
probation will depreciate the offense committed, and will
not serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the
community, particularly, the innocent and gullible young."
Petition dismissed..
CABATINGAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 102 SCRA 187 [1981]
Criminal Law 1: Probation Law (PD 968)
FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia Cabatingan was convicted for operating an
illegal Jai-Alai betting station. She applied for probation, but
the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds
that there is undue risk of her committing another crime
and that the granting of the petition will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense she committed. The decision was
mainly based on the probation officers recommendation for
dismissal of the said application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
Sandiganbayans act of denying petitioners application for
probation.
HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, it was established by ample evidence
that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
Moreover, it was not established that she is a hardened
criminal beyond correction or redemption. Furthermore,
the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the probation officers
report, which is mostly speculative and misleading.
PABLO C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his
employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation
in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely
maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12
April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner
Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four
(4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him
to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in
the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda
Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of
the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Unsatisfied with the decision of MeTC, the petitioner
appealed to the RTC.
After failure to interpose an appeal, the RTCs decision
became final.
Before he was arrested, we filed a certiorari to the CA, and
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation
even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which
affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the
penalties imposed.
HELD:
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits
cannot extend to those not expressly included.
FACTS:
Petitioner allegedly falsified an Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition Agreement, as the
signatures contained therein were not the signatures of the
true owners of the land. Petitioner and Ildefonsa also
FACTS:
On August 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay
private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Petitioner was not
present during the promulgation of the judgment and was
represented by his counsel instead.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 23,
2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation on
November, 5, 2009 but is denied on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. 968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of
probation.
HELD:
This court held that the RTC that the Motion for Probation
was filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the Court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1
day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional
penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light
felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of
imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
(P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light
felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was
therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment.
FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to
disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayonv. Mutia,
the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby
suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge
of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of
the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil
rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right
to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary
hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running
for Punong Barangay. The Comelec First Division adopted
this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed
with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en
banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local
position. The grant of probation to Moreno merely
suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect
his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Moreno argues that the disqualification under
the Local Government Code applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation
Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies
only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon
of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on
behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec definitively
settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an
offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment dated March
27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out
material differences between his case
and Dela Torre v.Comelec which allegedly warrant a
ISSUE:
WON Morenos sentence was in fact served.
HELD:
Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable.
the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence
should have been interpreted and understood to apply both
to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. It has been held
that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the
purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism
on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did
not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing
in his appeal.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an
order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation. It appears then that during the period of
probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration
of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is
under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution
of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
When Moreno was finally discharged upon the
courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
were restored to him, including the right to run for public
office.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere
privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted. Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Banisa is considered a co-conspirator in the case;
2. Whether the civil indemnities awarded by the RTC were
proper and justifiable
HELD:
1. NO. From the testimony of the victims as well as
from the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1
Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa
merely stood behind him with his gun drawn. Thus,
as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that
both witnesses were positive only as far as
Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that
they only concluded that Banisa participated in the
shooting because he was also holding a gun. The
failure of the surviving victims to assert with
confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises
reasonable doubt as to whether he participated in
the shooting.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to
commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising
from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and
that each of the participants is liable only for his
own acts. Consequently, Banisa was absolved from
criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims.
2.
PEOPLE VS MALLARE
FACTS:
On October 4, 1999, an Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and
Elizabeth M. Gosudan (Gosudan), Mayor and Treasurer,
respectively with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the accused
were public officers and that an audit report was made.
There was also restitution in the amount of 110,000.00.
Additionally, there was a written demand on the accused to
pay the shortage amount of 1,487,107.40.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court is correct in convicting Mallare and
Gosudan of Malversation of funds
HELD :
The essential elements of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds are the following:
(1) That the accused is a public officer;
(2) That he/she had custody and/or
control of funds by reason of his/her
office;
(3) That the funds involved were
public funds for which he/she is
accountable; and
(4) That he/she appropriated or
consented, or through abandonment
or through negligence, permitted
another person to take said public
funds.