Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110

brill.nl/seeu

The Crisis of Representative Democracy in the

Post-Yugoslav Region. Discrepancies of Elite Policies
and Citizens Expectations
Vedran Dihia, Dieter Segertb and Angela Wieserc

a)

Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International
Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington D.C.
b)
Professor for Transformation Processes in in Central-, South- and Eastern Europe
Institute of Political Science, University of Vienna
c)
Conflict Prevention Center of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna

Abstract
If free and fair elections repeatedly fail to respond to popular dissatisfaction, then a crisis of
representative democracy will emerge. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, such a crisis
is already undermining the legitimacy of their young democratic systems. Despite positive evaluations from democracy indices and EU reports, citizens are increasingly discontent and give little
support to the existing political options. Understanding the causes and characteristics of this
crisis requires revising the instruments for measuring democracy. More attention needs to be
focused on citizens expectations for a freer and more prosperous future after their experiences of
the crisis of state socialism. Measurements of institutional changes must also include peoples
attitudes towards institutions. In addition, main trends in the economy as experienced by the
average citizen need to be considered: evidence of an elite-captured economy, rising inequality,
and limited state capacity to redistribute resources are crucial factors in understanding discrepancies between formal democratic standards and the actual responsiveness of the system to the
wishes of its citizens. From the analysis of these post-Yugoslav societies, this article draws conclusions for general democracy theory.
Keywords
democratization, transformation, Former Yugoslavia, Western Balkans, legitimacy, responsiveness, representation, participation, inequalities

1.Introduction
In recent years, a wide range of scholars have analyzed the apparently positiveand quick democratic consolidation in post-communist countries. The
following article, however, takes the perspective that a crisis of representative
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012

DOI 10.1163/187633312X616995

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democracy seems to be on the way, at least in some ex-Yugoslav countries. This

crisis manifests itself mainly in a very low level of public trust in the politicians
and the state institutions. Our paper will focus on Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Croatia. In 2009, 44% of those polled in Serbia considered the governments performance as poor, whereas this number went up to 60% in BosniaHerzegovina and even 85% in Croatia. Only around 40% or less of the
correspondents had a lot or some confidence in the honesty of elections
(Gallup 2010). Despite this lack of trust in state institutions and the political
elites, these countries are generally classified as stable democracies. In the
democracy ratings of Freedom House, all three states were considered free or
at least partly free. This democracy score rating (Nations in Transit) places
our three cases between the new EU-member states and the post-Soviet states.
Anotherdemocracy index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI),
rated Croatia as being far advanced in transition. In the development of
democracy, the country received 8.85 points out of 10 in 2008 (and was
placed ahead of Bulgaria and Romania). Serbia received 7.75 points and is
placed in the same group of far advanced countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina
with 6.7 points is slightly better than Georgia and far ahead of Russia. In
2010, the respective countries received a slightly lower score but without
much essential difference: Croatia now has 8.55, one place behind Bulgaria;
Serbia was rated at 8.0, and Bosnia-Herzegovina received 6.5 points (Freedom
House 2009; 2010).
How can we explain the evident discrepancy between the generally positive
measurement of these indices and our observation of a latent crisis of representative democracy? The answer may be found in diverse understandings of
democracy as well as the use of different empirical resources.
In our understanding, the stability of democracy very much depends on
popular expectations and experiences. We selected popular hopes as the essential starting point for analyzing the sustainability of democracy. Norms and
interests create expectations towards democracy (see Eastons terms diffuse
and specific support, Easton 1976). In the whole region of the former Soviet
bloc as well as in the Western Balkans, the final crisis of the old order (state
socialism) shaped the place and time during which these expectations formed
towards democracy as an institutional order. In the case of states emergingfrom
the former Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism and the wars in the early 1990s
have been additional important factors: the uncertainty and the destruction of
everyday life shaped popular hopes towards the new system of democracy.
Ongoing failure to meet these expectations may undermine the responsiveness
of the system and thereby destabilize the system of democracy.

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 89

Democracy-rating scores attempt to break down democracy into categories and indices and thereby shed a comparative light on the general state of
democracy in various countries. These scores do not consider the legacies of
the predecessor regime, popular expectations towards the new democratic system, and the responsiveness of the system. By ignoring these elements of the
context, democracy ratings only describe the general path of implementing
democratic formalities and cannot accurately analyze possible crises and
threats to democratic stability. Although rating scores may provide a snapshot
on the state and issues of democracy in a country, they have limited ability to
explain why certain issues become important.
In order to go beyond the blind spots in the conventional democratization
indices of Freedom House, Bertelsmann, and Polity IV,1 we argue that there is
a need to consider citizens experience with democracy in view of the systems
responsiveness. Democracy consists of much more than elections of a certain
procedural quality. The level of participation (not only in elections) as well as
the practice of representation are crucial indicators for the responsiveness of
the whole political system and the durability of democratic order.
Based on this, the article is divided into three parts. The first section outlines the analytical frame and the regional context shaping the areas of expectations. The second part focuses on the systems political responsiveness
(including the form and practice of representation and participation) and analyzes the actual fulfillment of the social and economic expectations linked to
system transformation. Finally, we suggest possible lessons for general democracy theory that can be drawn from the post-Yugoslav experience.
The conclusions presented here are drawn from empirical findings of a
research project at the University of Vienna. In the first half of 2009 the
research involved fieldwork in Belgrade, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Zagreb,
which included 30 semi-standardized interviews with experts, scholars as well
as civil society representatives from the region, and also three focus groups.2
The interviews and focus groups add to a comprehensive study of scholarly

For correlation and variance between different democracy ratings see McMahon/ Kornheiser
(2009).
2)
The following quotations from the expert interviews (including scholars and civil society representatives) will cite name, date and location of the interview, whereas quotes from anonymous
focus groups refer to the following: Focus Group Zagreb, 10.03.2009, Human Rights Centre
Zagreb, number of participants: 9; Focus Group Belgrade, 26.03.2009, Dorol/Belgrade, number of participants: 10; Focus Group Sarajevo, 07.04.2009, Human Rights Centre, number of
participants: 8.
1)

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literature on the topic and the continuous analysis of public discourses and
debates. First findings of the research have also been discussed with renowned
scholars from the region at a workshop in Vienna in June 2009.3
2. Principles and practices of democracy An outline of measurable
discrepancies

2.1. Why the citizens perspective is crucial to our understanding

of representative democracy4
As mentioned above, the discrepancies between the institutional faade and
actual democratic practices point at the need to include a citizens perspective
in judging the state of democratic governance. Since the most salient political
fact in the Balkans today is the growing gap that divides the public from elites
and the growing mistrust that the public feels towards democratic institutions (Krastev 2002: 50), citizens need to be the main reference for understanding the functioning of democracy.5 The hopes that bind citizens to the
system are crucial to sustainable democracy.
Therefore, we use Fuchs definition (Fuchs 1997: 81) of government
accountability to its citizens as the core criteria for democratic legitimacy.
Democratic responsiveness considers how much or little public policies
correspond to citizen demands and preferences as aggregated through the
political process. (Diamond and Morlino 2005: 20) In order to judge a governments or a systems responsiveness, we need to look at concrete democratic
practices. When political elites repeatedly disappoint the wishes of citizens,
The workshop The State of Democracy in the Western Balkans Ambiguous Developments
of Democratic Change in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia took place on 26-28 June
2009 at the University of Vienna, with the participation of: Srdjan Dvornik, Vedran Dihi,
Svetlana Ceni, Vedran Horvat, Sinia Kusi, Duan Pavlovi, Solveig Richter, Irena Risti,
Dieter Segert, Jovan Teokarevi, Angela Wieser, a.o.
4)
We do not argue that the expectations of citizens are always realistic. Nevertheless, the citizens
perspective should be considered as the crucial starting point for the evaluation of democratic
responsiveness of a given regime. There are certainly other relevant indicators for a democratic
deficit in a given society such as the level of grand corruption or the willingness of the politicians to implement the rule of law into their own behaviour.
5)
Besides Ivan Krastev, a range of other scholars highlighted the need to re-include the perspective of citizens when judging the democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.
Among others see: Greskovits (2007); Kornai (2006); Rose (2009); Munigiu-Pippidi (2007).
3)

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 91

this undermines the quality and sustainability of democracy. Negative experiences with the actual reality of democracy can destabilize the system.
Here the important issue becomes what people expect from democracy.
A systems goals and norms stem from the expectations that citizens associate
with the system (Habermas 1999: 135-145). Political traditions and historic
specificities create these expectations. In the post-communist context, the
various crises of state socialism mainly shaped the hopes for the alternative
model of democracy and an improvement in the well-being of the majority.
With the crisis of state socialism, on the one hand, and the apparent supremacy of democratic capitalism, on the other hand, citizens expected the postcommunist transformation and the promise of EU accession to bring a freer
and wealthier society that could provide the same living conditions as enjoyed
by citizens in the West.6 The post-communist notion of democracy implied a
certain level of social security, which had been provided under communism
and which was the feature of the European welfare states before 1989. Yet, in
Eastern European post-communist countries, we see a clear social imbalance
of post-socialist transitions. While the political class in general has profited by
the transition and represents the winners of transformation, the majority of
the population has lost. That leaves a space open for all kinds of populist or
even authoritarian politicians promising a bright future for our people.
Before we contrast the citizens expectations to the actual political and economic practices, we would like to highlight certain regional conditions that,
apart from the general post-communist context, shaped the regions particular
development of democracy.

2.2. Understanding the regional specificities of democratization

Expectations that a freer and more prosperous society would emerge from the
crisis of the former order have been shaped by logics and practices that dominated the post-socialist process of democratization. Specificities of the postYugoslav context thereby simultaneously became sources for the main
problems that characterize discrepancies between citizens wishes and preferences, on the one hand, and the practice of democracy and behavior of elites,
on the other hand.
On the ambivalent legacy of state socialism for recent democracy in the region firstly, by
developing the societal preconditions of a democratic order in the respective country, secondly,
by backing the peoples needs in political freedom and participation see Segert (2002):
274-275.
6)

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We may sketch three main characteristics that shaped the post-Yugoslav

democratization process and define its main problems. Firstly, the issue of
stateness and its ethno-national interpretation dominated the transformation
and still directly hinder the fulfillment of basic democratic norms and expectations (Antoni and Pavlovi 2007; urak 2004; Golubovi 2007; Mujki
2007; Pusi 1999). Secondly, in the Western Balkans, the regimes of the 1990s
were defined by state capture and neopatrimonial structures that, along with
neoliberal policies, left a legacy that undermines democratic legitimacy
(Antoni 2002; Horvat 2002; Pugh 2002). Thirdly, the difficult engagement
of external actors in securing and stabilizing the region still has an ambiguous
influence on the development of democracy.
The question of stateness and the nationalist imperative served as grounds
for the armed dissolution of Yugoslavia. Regional authors have pointed to
the intrinsically undemocratic character of the national idea, how it developedin the Western Balkans, and its implications for democracy (Antoni
2002; Horvat 2002; Pugh 2002). Democracy in the Western Balkans came
to be understood as freedom of the whole collective, not as freedom and
equality of individuals. These nationalist ideologies characterized by an inherently authoritarian nature outlasted the wars of the 1990s; they are today
most saliently expressed in the democratic paradox of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
where the principle of freedom and democratic procedure serves to legitimizethe ethno-nationalist elite (Mujki 2007). Also, in Croatia and Serbia,
the ethno-national discourses survived consolidation of democratic formalities. The dilemma of persistence (Henritz 2007: 152) continuously challenges the harmonization of expectations to democracy and its reality in the
ex-Yugoslav countries. On the one hand, ethno-nationalism still co-shapes
citizens expectations that the collective rights as a nation should remain
an important norm of the young states. Yet, on the other hand, ethnonational discourses and a lack of political alternatives hinder the realizationofcitizens expectations regarding economic development or political
accountability.
In the economic sphere, due to the war, the Croatian GDP fell 9.3%
annually between 1990 and 1994; the Serbian GDP declined to half of its
pre-war size, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the war had reduced GDP to about
20 percent of its pre-war level (Antoni 2002; Stubbs and Zrinak 2009;
Pugh 2002). However, after the war, the disastrous economic situation was
aggravated through what we might call the second dilemma of persistence:
the continuation of clientelistic structures created by the political privatization (Bartlett 2000) of the 1990s. In other words, formal democratic as

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 93

well as market-oriented standards were foiled by illegitimate power centres

(Tilly 2007) that were created during the war and in political privatization
(Schnfelder 2008: 225). These clientelistic structures continue to influence
and challenge both the market economy and the democracy.
External actors involved in the regions transition have been another important, yet also ambiguous, factor for democratization. As an external variable,
the international actors became inherently linked to political change, as well
as to related transformations on the state and economic level. As a virtual
executive power in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a powerful external authority in
Croatia and Serbia, the EU and other international actors crucially shape citizens perceptions and expectations towards democracy (Dihi and Wieser
2008).
During recent years, the governing elites rhetorical and formal acceptanceof EU-mandated reforms resulted in relative progress towards EU
accession and sustained the picture of progress. By these means, these externalforces promoting democracy by setting conditions played an importantrole in co-shaping the expectations towards democracy. However, due
to their simple focus on formal procedures, external conditions are hardly
able to break elitist power circles and ethno-national logics that challenge
democracy.
In summary, the expectations towards the practices of the democratic system have been strongly influenced by issues of (nation-) stateness, economic
capture by elites, and the ambiguous engagement of external actors in securing
and stabilizing the region. These factors undermine the systems responsiveness. In the following section, we will provide empirical examples of these
challenges in order to emphasize the interplay of factors influencing democracy as experienced in the region.
3. The crisis of representative democracy three case studies
During our research, we have found non-responsive political actors and the
malfunctioning of institutions as main sources of the gap between expectations and the actual political system. Inefficient institutions and governmentactions without accountability undermine the responsiveness of the
system. Citizens complain over inadequate representation of their interests
as well as their inability to participate in or provide feedback to the government. As a result, they greatly mistrust politics and do not see any political
alternatives.

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3.1. Lack of adequate representation

Democracy does not only need competition between different political groups
for the right to govern but also depends on the popular conviction that there
is at least one reasonable alternative to the present government. Yet, in the
Western Balkans, a clear lack of this conviction may be observed. A Balkan
Monitor studies published in 2009 and 2010 the widespread opinion that
political options are lacking (Gallup 2009 and 2010). The survey indicated
very limited public support towards any political alternative and only a minority of respondents felt represented by any politician or party or their political
views.
This opinion is enduring and widespread: in 2008, seven out of ten respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina denied that any party or politician represented
their views. In addition, in Serbia, seven in ten respondents said there was no
political representation of their interests in their country. Croatia had the lowest ranking for affiliation with any political options (Gallup 2008: 23). A year
later, another Balkan Monitor study reveals that the satisfaction with political
representation continues to decrease among the Bosniak and Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the Bosnian Serbs, a positive increase
may be witnessed since 2008. In addition, only 29% of the respondents feel
adequately represented by any political option. However, in Croatia, after last
years low mark of only 18% finding a political option responding to their
concerns, the number has improved in 2009 to 36%. In Serbia, on the other
hand, only 20% of respondents felt represented (Gallup 2009: 24).
Other data confirms this general lack of adequate representation. In BosniaHerzegovina, the number of people sensing that politics are getting worse has
risen to over 50% during 2008 and reached up to 67% in the first half of 2008
(UNDP 2007; 2008). The trends continued in 2010 with almost 87% of
Bosnian citizens sharing the opinion that things in Bosnia-Herzegovina are
moving in the wrong direction. (NDI 2010) In Croatia, since July 2004, dissatisfaction with the government is higher (between 50% and 60% of the
respondents) than satisfaction (around 25%) (Puls Marketing 2008). Similarly,
in Serbia, in 2005, 63% of respondents were unsatisfied with the functioning
of democracy and only 39% were convinced that democracy represents the
only and best governing system (CESID 2005: 15). According to the findings
of Gallup Balkan Monitor Report published in late 2010, these trends in
Croatia and Serbia have not changed until now (Gallup 2010).
In addition to this general dissatisfaction with political options, one
observes an exceptionally high mistrust towards political elites in comparison

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 95

to other societal actors. The trust in national (as well as European) institutions
has been declining steadily during recent years (Gallup 2009: 4; Gallup 2010).
In Serbia, confidence in the government and satisfaction with its performance
has both decreased in 2009 by 13 percentage points (Gallup 2009: 14).
In 2010, only 22% of respondents stated they approved of their political leaders. (Gallup 2010: 16) In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the situation is not
better. Only a few respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia think
that their government is doing a good job (Gallup 2009; 2010). In all countries of the Western Balkans, the number of those disapproving their governments and political elites performance clearly outnumbered those who
approved (Gallup 2010: 26ff).
Our interviews also indicated a lack of passion for political alternatives and
specific mistrust towards political actors. The interviewees do not regard the
political opposition in Serbia and Croatia as an alternative that will bring
change; political parties are frequently understood as exchangeable.7 Citizens
perceive all existing political parties as suffering from the same clientist and
corruption diseases.8 Interviewees in all three countries pointed at malfunctioning institutions and the need for citizens to use personal connections and
alternative ways to satisfy administrative requirements or even receive healthcare.9 This seriously challenges the legitimacy of the democratic systems, since
responsive politics is undermined by the lack of alternatives to the political
status quo and dysfunctional state structures. Daily political life provides
many examples of discrepancies between normative expectations and actual
implementation.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UNDP evaluation of political developments
directly criticized the governing officials: Instead of dealing with reforms and
carrying out the tasks required for integration with Europe, the state-level
institutions were preoccupied throughout 2008 with themselves(UNDP
2008: 21). In 2008, civil society organizations also emphasized that politiciansin Bosnia-Herzegovina leave their citizens to struggle alone and
pointedat the alarming backlog in essential reforms such as the draft law for
the fight against corruption, the strategy of internal financial control of state
institutions or a draft law on state remedies (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2009d).
Focus Group Zagreb/Belgrade, cf. footnote 3.
Focus Group Zagreb/Belgrade, cf. footnote 3.
9)
Aleksandar Stulhofer (Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009; Sran Dvornik
(Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009; Adis Arapovi (Centar za civilne inicijative), in discussion with authors, April 2009; Focus Group Zagreb, cf. footnote 3.
7)
8)

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One can observe an increase in general disapproval with the work of the
Bosnian presidency and parliament as well as the parliaments of the entities
(UNDP 2008: Annex 8).
In Serbia, interviewees pointed out that the lack of political representationcan be linked to the perceived exchangeability of political options.
For example, the former party of Slobodan Miloevi, the Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS), and their long-time opponents, the Democratic Party lead by
Boris Tadi, have formed the ruling coalition because they now say they
understand each other as ideologically very close due to their common socialist character. Yet, both parties have unclear socialist orientations and their
cooperation merely involves their tactical political interests rather than ideological convictions. The public perceive the political actors as all the same
and as similarly corrupt; for example, a participant in a focus-group discussions, complained, that even the opposition leaders drive luxury Audis Q7
automobiles.10
In Croatia, democratically elected representatives also operate relatively
detached from the citizens. In comparison to the two neighboring countries,however, a lack of responsiveness is not characterized by an absence of
legislative reforms. On the contrary, the Croatian parliament quickly passes
legislation without substantial communication to the public. This is especially
the case for legislation necessary in the context of EU accession. With its
quick-adoption approach, the Croatian parliament, a traditionally marginalized political organ, misses substantial procedural authority due to an institutional arrangement that concentrates primarily on executive expertise and
reinforces problems in domestic representation and legitimization (Marsi
2006: 30). Apart from the parliament, citizens have minimal participation in
policymaking. In the words of civil society representatives in Croatia, citizen
control of the high-speed reform pushed through by the government is
restricted to affirmation.11 Some civil society organizations issued a public
letter expressing concern over this lack of communication between the
government and the public (Javno 2008). An example of the lack of communication is that half the requests of citizens to public authorities remains unanswered, although the law assures the right to information (Radio Slobodna
Evropa 2008).

Focus Group Belgrade, cf. footnote 3.

Sran Dvornik (Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009; Vedran Horvat
(Heinrich Bll Stiftung Croatia), in discussion with authors, March 2009.
10)
11)

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 97

3.2. Hindered participation political disenchantment and civil apathy

Apart from this crisis of representation, democratic responsiveness is undermined by the lack of civic dialogue and discussion that could influence the
political agenda and policymaking. One of the most important factors
limiting civil society is the domination of identity politics. In all three countries, state structures reflect an ethno-national understanding of citizenry,
which defines civic participation along ethnic lines. In Bosnia-Herzegovina,
this takes the form of dividing the entire state administration and voting
systems according to ethnic identity. Furthermore, ethnic logic constrains
general participation in societal life and wider social equality. This impedes
social inclusion, leads to social isolation, and has become a key factor
with regard to unemployment and poverty in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNDP
2008: 53).
As pointed out by our interviewees in the three countries, citizen control of
state action is additionally impeded by government elites who support specific
citizen groups in order to limit criticism or to ensure power positions.12 This
may also run along the line of nationality. For example, Croatias ethnonational definition of citizenship creates a whole group of voters not living
in Croatia who benefit from the Croatian governments high financial and
political attention. A constituent group of citizens in one country (BosniaHerzegovina) has a double citizenship in the neighboring country (Croatia).
Thus, Croatia has more citizens with the right to vote than residents (Radio
Slobodna Evropa 2009).
The ethno-national conception of citizenship and democratic participation
is further reflected in Croatian authorities behavior towards specific civil society organizations. The state makes some civil society organizations stronger
than others and makes it challenging for those not under state patronage to
be sustainable. The most influential civil society institutions remain those
organized around the Croatian Catholic Church and the former soldiers of
the homeland war, neither of which arena is known for exhibiting liberal and
tolerant attitudes (Freedom House 2008).
In addition to nationalism, we have learned in our interviews that the
unregulated market principles introduced during the transition to the mass
media have also negatively influenced democratization. An important e xample

Aris Arapovi (Centar za civilne inicijative) in discussion with authors, April 2009; Focus
Group Zagreb, cf. footnote 3.
12)

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includes the medias limited ability to provide public feedback and critiques
on the government. The media landscape is dominated by tabloid newspapers
that respond primarily to market dictates and direct intervention of media
owners.13 Powerful links between media consortia and political leadership also
aggravate the market constraint as well as decrease professional standards in
journalism. Government limits on public discourses may be strongest in the
Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where President Milorad Dodik, in
the words of an interviewee, established an authoritarian system of media control.14 Furthermore, the lack of transparency of media ownership makes it
difficult for the public to understand which interests are hidden behind which
newspaper. Formal owners often serve as covers for other direct political-economic interests (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008a).
As mentioned earlier in the case of Croatia, the Europeanization process
may also have the side effect of decreasing the space for civic activity. Previous
enlargement processes in Central and Eastern Europe have been characterized
by a strong executive bias and a top-down approach in promoting democratization (Grabbe 2006; Pridham 2005; Fagan and Ostoji 2008). In our interviews, civil society activists pointed at similar tendencies with issues such as
the additional financial resources needed when entering the Europeanization
process, the lack of cooperation between EU representatives and civil society
in the region, and the special danger of consultancies profiting from EU grants
provided to engage civil society. Furthermore, formalization and professionalization of civil-society work threaten grassroots and politically critical initiatives.15 Indeed, existing EU engagement in civil society could repeat mistakes
of previous international civil-society-promotion policies. In Serbia, EU
assistance for civil society has largely bypassed those organizations engaged in
criticism of the government. Instead, it has privileged an elite of professional
NGOs engaged in policy development and service provision. (Fagan and
Ostoji 2008) Policies have had limited success in supporting civil society to

Tarik Jusi (media analyst) in discussion with authors, April 2009; Aleksandar Stulhofer
(Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009.
14)
Tarik Jusi (media analyst) in discussion with authors, April 2009. Aleksandar Stulhofer
(Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009.
15)
Vesna Bajanski Agi (Fonacija Mozaik), in discussion with authors, April 2009; Sran
Dvornik (Sociologist), in discussion with authors, March 2009; Milan Mra (Centar za promociju civilnog drutva), in discussion with authors, April 2009; Vedran Horvat, (Heinrich Bll
Stiftung Croatia), in discussion with authors, March 2009.
13)

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 99

critically control the government and thereby help to bridge political apathy
of the citizenry.
These factors of dominating nationalistic discourses, logic of the private
market and paradoxes in external support of civil society or Europeanization
indicates that little space has been left for citizens to air their discontent and
criticisms. These challenges lead to various paradoxes of civil society participation. In Serbia, for example, the fatigue among the citizenry results in a
decrease of opportunities for protest and participation.16 Consideration of
Serbias October 2000 revolution and the current distancing and disengagement from politics reveals the paradoxical situation of political participation
in Serbia: The strongly expressed desire of citizens to be left alone by politics,
in combination with an equally strong desire to control state officials produced an irresolvable paradox of (non)involvement, which could have been
averted if political leaders had more carefully maintained the mutual respect
with citizens established in 2000 throughout the joint struggle against
Miloevi (Spasi 2010). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, repercussions from the economic crisis may help to unite civil society groups in their demands and protest against the government, but, according to some interviewees, may also
turn in the opposite direction and incite further (ethno-national) division in
the country.17 At the same time, it was mentioned that the complex governance structure limits opportunities to properly address the unwillingness and
seeming inability of the leading political class to resolve the societal deadlock.18 Therefore, the paradox in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that popular protest
could support the ethno-national political division in the country, whereas the
complexities of the division simultaneously limit any attempts to make civic
demands. Analysts in Croatia also point to the lack of a tradition of protest
(Radio Slobodna Evropa 2009a), despite some prominent protest actions
recently (e.g. in the Varavska street in Zagreb). Broad criticism cannot be
expected because the standard of living of individuals is not strongly deteriorating. At the same time, the already existing socioeconomic insecurity leaves
citizens preoccupied with satisfying basic needs and thereby also narrowing
time and space for actual participation in political and social matters.
Duan Pavlovi (Political Economist), in discussion with authors, March 2009; Focus Group
Belgrade, cf. footnote 3.
17)
Milan Mra (Centar za promociju civilnog drutva), in discussion with authors, April 2009;
Fikret auevi (Professor at the Economic Faculty Sarajevo), in discussion with authors, April
2009.
18)
emsudin Maljevi (Udruenje Graana Sarajeva), in discussion with authors, April 2009.
16)

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3.3. Frustrated by fragile welfare states between captured economy and

diminished redistributional capacities
As shown above, these countries socioeconomic status quo significantly
influenced issues of representation and participation. Socioeconomic wellbeing has always been an important political factor in history. Yet, in the postcommunist setting, issues linked to the new market economy become even
more important when considering the legitimacy of the new democratic system. When looking at post-communist democracy from a citizens perspective, we therefore have to pay greater attention to the socioeconomic field; the
old regimes economic failures coupled with the citizens expectations for an
alternative that would bring a wealthier future was one of the main incentives
for democratic transition throughout Eastern Europe. In the following section, we will therefore focus on the growing gap between the formally achieved
macroeconomic development and the socioeconomic reality of most citizens.
Democracy needs a government and administration able, at least, to partially satisfy basic popular expectations. From opinion polls, we know that the
citizens in our three cases perceive their main problem as their socioeconomic
insecurity and their low standard of living. Polls in all three countries indicate
no increase in life (and social and economic) satisfaction over the past four
years. During recent years in Croatia, citizens have identified the central social
problems as unemployment, precarious standard of living, low wages, and the
general economic status quo (Puls Marketing 2008). In a Gallup Balkan
Monitor poll in 2010, 64% believe that the economic conditions are getting
worse and 52% of the citizens have difficulties to manage on their household
income (Gallup 2009; 2010). In Serbia, this number is slightly higher. At the
same time, in a global comparison, Serbia ranks behind Cameroon when it
comes to high insecurity of the workplace, with 47% of workers sensing a
danger of losing their employment (Poslovni Magazin 2008). Furthermore,
between 2002 and 2006, unemployment has risen from 13.2% to 20.9%
(Antoni/Pavlovi 2007: 163). As a result, 22% of the citizens would like to
leave the country (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2008: 51). The most pessimistic
picture is, however, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recent data of the BiH Statistical
Bureau has shown that unemployment reaches 40% (Radio Slobodna Evropa
2009b). About 40% of the citizens depending in which area they live would
leave the country if they had the chance, 68% share the opinion that economic conditions are getting worse.
Generally, the people are very pessimistic about their countrys economic
development (UNDP 2008: Annex 4). An updated Gallup Balkan Monitor

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 101

2009 as well as Gallup Balkan Monitor for 2010 also found that the majority
of citizens in the Western Balkans remain dissatisfied with their material situation. With regard to the distribution of wealth, the Gini Coefficient in
Croatia has risen from 22.78 points in 1988 to 28.99 points in 2005 (World
Bank 2010). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 50.3% of the population in 2006 felt
excluded in some way and 21.9% suffered extreme social exclusion (UNDP
2007a: 31).

3.3.1. Legacies of the 1990s elite-captured economy in the region

One of the main reasons for persisting economic inequalities and high citizen
frustration with their economic and social situation lies in the 1990s and
the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which created a captured
economy.19
In Bosnias case, war turned to be a major factor in explaining the very bleak
economic performance. The widespread penetration of corrupt or criminal
networks into political and economic institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina
results from war and post-war economies based on exclusive claims for ethnonational rule within a given territory. Political elites managed to obstruct any
reform threatening their own sources of power and authority. This created an
economic space that lacked clear separation between (ethno-national) politics
and economics.20 Bosnias nationalist elites have resisted giving up their de
facto economic prerogatives. This resistance has been particularly visible in the
privatization process deeply compromised by domestic political and economic
ethno-nationalist actors who engaged in a kind of Wild West grab of property.
This privatization strengthened the rule of ethnocracy.
Finally, the clientelistic, criminalized war profiteers created an elitecaptured, post-war economy. The ethno-nationalist control of the economy
and resistance to reform keeps the state weak, undermines the formal social
safety net, and leads citizens to turn for subsistence support from localized,

We understand captured economy as the economic equivalent to state capture; it describes a

situation where individual and private interests dominate and manipulate social and economic
policymaking.
20)
An example (from many possible examples) would include the political leaders of the Bosnian
Croatian HDZ who used the partys considerable economic leverage including control over one
of the countrys most profitable industries, Aluminium Mostar to finance parallel (and illegal)
governmental structures that have persisted throughout much of the post-Dayton period (Pugh
2002: 472; Donais and Pickel 2003: 16; Solioz 2007).
19)

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nationalistic godfathers. This popular dependence on local elites, in turn,

helps sustain electoral support for nationalists.
In Croatia, the transformation of the 1990s created captured economic
structures that impeded a sustainable economic development with adequate
living standards and social security. Although the economic legacies of the war
should not be underestimated, primarily the wars interconnectedness with the
policy of politicized privatization hindered Croatias economic development
and is still felt today. The first post-socialist Croatian President, Franjo
Tuman, divided the previously state-owned (or rather, self-administrated)
companies among regime-close associates and 200 families (Horvat 2002).
In addition, state spending primarily went for regime followers and promotion of its populist policy of national unity. The regimes oligarchic structures
formed similar captured economic structures and reserved domains.21
Tumans economic policies, until his death in 2000, resulted in socioeconomic polarization. The social dialogue was patronized and backed exclusively
specific interest groups (Zakoek 1995). Even after the war, large military
expenditure sought to maintain national unity and to support to the leading
commander, President Tuman. The army had a very strong position in
Croatian society, with little civil control despite nominal oversight from a
parliamentary committee (Luki 2008: 205).
Serbia also experienced total economic and social collapse during the 1990s.
The almost complete breakup of the Yugoslav market, economic sanctions,
and the development of Miloevis criminal and elite-captured economy in
the 1990s led to a dramatic decrease of real wages and living standards, high
unemployment, disastrous social situation, brain drain, etc. Economic policies
during the Miloevi regime resulted in widespread socioeconomic polarization. Serbia has still not recovered from the effects of elite-captured economic
developments in the 1990s.
After the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran ini in March 2003, the
already belated transition process slowed down because political parties
increased their influence on state institutions. Thus, the complex transition
process in Serbia remained overloaded with specific problems of the past
decades, such as large-scale corruption, non-transparent political and
economic sectors, as well as establishment of oligarchic economic structures

On the structures of the Tuman regime see Kasapovi (2001); Pusi (1999); Zakoek
(2002).
21)

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 103

personalized in new mega-rich tycoons such as Miroslav Mikovi, Filip

Cepter, and Stanko Suboti. As a result, citizens lost confidence in public
institutions and in politicians. This led to a deepening gap between citizens
and the political elites (and their economic counterparts).

3.3.2. Socioeconomic weaknesses after 2000 Limited redistribution and

social inequalities and its aggravation in the course of the economic crisis
After 2000, the elite-captured economies as the worst legacies of the 1990s
have created unfavorable conditions for socioeconomic advances in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a crucial effect of
the elite-captured economy remains the distorted redistribution of the
countrys income, as reflected in general data on social inequality and low living standards. The political parties and a few business tycoons still control
most economic assets; this leads to a deepening gap between, on one side,
those elites and their clientele and, on the other side, common people suffering from difficult socioeconomic conditions. The dysfunctional state and
administrative structure designed in the Dayton Peace Accords also diminish
the states redistribution capacities. Even 16 years after the peace agreement,
Bosnia-Herzegovinas public sector spending remains at more than 60% of
GDP. Large amounts of the GDP and money dedicated for social benefits
were spent on war veterans, who constitute an important part of the electorate
for ruling political parties (Dihi 2009: 312-313).
The already very weak economic performance of Bosnia-Herzegovina significantly shrank because of the worldwide economic crisis in 2008. Foreign
direct investment has declined dramatically; the trade deficit is also growing.
Industrial production and commercial credits have been in constant decline,
while the number of unemployed has increased by more than 60,000 in the
first nine months of 2009. The BiH Statistical Bureau reports a 40% unemployment rate (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2009b). The poverty rate reflects this
discouraging data. Paul Stubbs notes, the decline in economic growth will be
more effective in increasing poverty rates than the six years of growth just
passed was in reducing them(Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso 2009). The
continuous aggravation of difficult socioeconomic conditions causes growing
general frustrations within the Bosnian population. This leads to increasingly
open disenchantment with politics and a deepening gap between the political
elites and citizens. Instead of reacting rapidly and trying to improve the economic situation, ethno-national political elites maintain the fearful atmosphere with an ethno-nationalist discourse that keeps traumatized, fearful and
uncertain electorates united behind their nationalist protectors.

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In Croatia, the polarization of the 1990s led to elite-captured economic

and political structures transferred to the social field in which some sort of
captured social policy continued to dominate after 2000. After the death of
Tuman, the Croatian states comparably high social expenditures gave a privileged position to some groups such as war veterans and pensioners, while
neglecting many others (Stubbs and Zrinak 2009). Croatias financial support of the Bosnian region of Herzegovina mainly populated by Bosnian
Croats provides another example of captured state structures adhering to
nationalist discourses and supporting specific societal groups, which results in
unfair, disproportional socioeconomic distribution among the population.
Today, the country suffers under the legacy of the politicized transformation
to market economy that took place in the 1990s and resulted in a socioeconomically polarized society where citizens rank bribery and corruption as the
greatest challenge of the country following unemployment (Puls Marketing
2008).
Serbia has similar developments to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia: redistribution of wealth to elites and continued social inequalities. From 2000
until 2008, the basic macro-economic indicators reveal clear signs of economic recovery and improved living standards. However, despite a good macroeconomic performance, Serbia did not manage to decrease the developmental
gap and social inequalities, because it did not succeed in developing coherent
and efficient and also sustainable modes of redistribution and social inclusion. The very limited ability of the state to fulfill its redistributive function
can be seen in the large regional disparities, significantly underdeveloped rural
areas, and the high poverty and unemployment rates. Large regional disparities stand out in Serbia with a variation index of 18.5% in the dispersion of
the regional employment rate as well as inter-regional differences regarding
the unemployment rate, measured by a variation coefficient of 17.5% in 2003
(ETF 2006). Regional differences within the national borders continue to
remain a main concern for Serbia (UNDP 2008a). In addition, inequality has
risen strongly in Serbia within the first years of transition. Although some
increase might be expected, the Gini coefficient rose from 28.3 in 2000 (similar to Germany) to 34.1 in 2002 (higher than Poland), which is a comparably
higher increase than in other transition countries (Pagliani and Vrbensky
2006). During the last years, the coefficient has stabilized.
The economic crisis emerging in 2008 further reinforced some crucial
weaknesses of the Serbian economy. In 2009, Serbia suffered a decline in
industrial production (industrial production dropped by 17.4% in the first
half of 2009) and a downsizing of foreign direct investment and exports

V. Dihi et al. / Southeastern Europe 36 (2012) 87110 105

(contracting by 23.8% in the first quarter of 2009). Growth projections for

2009 were revised, and according to the latest estimations, GDP fell in 2009
between 3% and 4% (Commission of the European Communities 2009).
Standing on the brink of financial and thus economic and social bankruptcy,
Serbian authorities had to negotiate a stand-by arrangement and a loan with
the IMF. The IMF agreement forced the Serbian government to introduce
new saving measures and to start restructuring the large, politically controlled
state administration.
Besides the widespread poverty and social exclusion of vulnerable groups
and minorities, the high unemployment rate remains one of the most important economic and social problems challenging Serbian government and indicates limited redistributional ability despite the improved macro-economic
performance. The economic crisis has also contributed to the increase of
poverty. Implementing a poverty reduction strategy, but also constant macroeconomic growth in Serbia contributed to decreasing the poverty in Serbia
until the 2008 worldwide economic crisis. Statistics indicated that 7.9% of
the population lived under the line of absolute poverty in 2008. However,
poverty rates increased significantly; according to the 2009 data provided by
the Statistical Bureau of Serbia, 9.2% of the current Serbian population or
700,000 people can be classified as poor (Slobodna Evropa 2009c).
In summary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia can be seen as clear
examples of countries where economic elites have captured the states and the
complex, belated transitions have large effects on the socioeconomic situation
of the population. These factors lead both to a diminished ability to redistribute wealth and to a rising gap between a formally achieved macroeconomic
level and the socioeconomic reality of many citizens. Bosnian, Croatian, and
Serbian economic and social data indicate that the persisting structural
inequalities and high socioeconomic vulnerability of citizens continuously
impedes development of a sustainable democracy.
To sum up our argument, we note a connection between the economic
situation of average citizens and their ability to participate politically. To put
it in a simple way: citizens struggling for the survival of their family do not
engage very much in politics. Additionally, the support for a democratic government shrinks when the citizens are permanently frustrated by the governments economic performance and they do not see their government working
to improve the situation. As a result, if a sustainable democratic system needs
to heed the wishes and hopes of citizens, then the very high level of frustrations and disappointments towards the socioeconomic responsiveness of the
system and elected leaders results in a crisis of representative democracy.

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4.Conclusions
The evidence presented has shown that a clear and deepening gap has
emergedbetween politics and the interest of the people in the former
Yugoslavia. In the three analyzed countries, double crises with regard to the
expectations of citizens may be observed: a developing crisis of representative
democracy is characterized by citizens not trusting in political elites; this is
accompanied by a crisis of the redistributional ability of the state apparatus,
which endangers citizens socioeconomic welfare. These crises are, however,
neither grasped by the conventional democracy indices nor by the EU evaluation of democracy in the three countries. So, what lessons for democracy
evaluation and democracy theory can be drawn from the presented cases?
Firstly, we would like to stress the need to look at regional specificities and
insights of scholars from the region, when analyzing democratic stability. Due
to the ethno-national mobilization during the wars in the 1990s, the Western
Balkans developed a specific understanding of democracy as freedom of the
whole collective, not as freedom and equality of individuals. Another peculiarity consists in the specific form of privatization in the 1990s that mainly
favored the elites and their clientelistic networks. The network woven between
economic and political power produced a clear gap between the aims and
interests of the political class and the majority of the citizens.
Secondly, we argue that the citizens perspective must be systematically
included when judging and promoting democratic governance. When evaluating the democratic stability of a country as well as in conventional democracy indices, the populations opinions often seem to be underestimated or
even ignored. When elites repeatedly and consciously fail to respond to the
needs and expectations of citizens, the quality and sustainability of democracy
becomes as the post-Yugoslav cases demonstrate undermined. The growing
gap that divides the public from elites results in decreasing public support and
leaves citizens less willing to participate in the political process. This again
undermines the legitimacy of the entire democratic order irrespective of the
formal functioning of institutions and promises given by the elites. This
declining legitimacy of the democratic order in the Western Balkans due to
limited participation and inadequate representation does not immediately
endanger democratic stability but opens the possibility of political discourse
becoming polarized along ethno-national lines.
The third lesson consists in the strong interdependence between democracy, economic developments, and the states performance in generating
public goods. Experience from the Western Balkans shows that specific
non-political structural, particularly socioeconomic, preconditions need to be

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fulfilled in order to make democracy sustainable and the only game in town.
As long as elites control the economy and limit the states capacity to act
against increasing inequality, a gap will continue between democratic institutions and the systems actual responsiveness to the needs and wishes of its citizenry. By considering citizens hopes and wishes concerning the post-socialist
setup, social equality (produced mainly through redistribution by the state)
becomes an indispensable precondition of a stable democracy.22 Therefore, the
main issues to consider when analyzing democratic stability should include
how citizens expectations towards democracy have been formed and which
dreams continually remain unfulfilled.
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