Greenhouse Effect

by Thomas C Schelling
1. Introduction
The "greenhouse effect" is a complicated process by which the earth is becoming progressively warmer.
The earth is bathed in sunlight, some of it reflected back into space and some absorbed. If the absorption is not
matched by radiation back into space, the earth will get warmer until the intensity of that radiation matches the
incoming sunlight. Some atmospheric gases absorb outward infrared radiation, warming the atmosphere. Carbon
dioxide is one of these gases; so are methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The
concentrations of these gases are increasing, with the result that the earth is absorbing more sunlight and getting
warmer.
This greenhouse phenomenon is truly the result of a "global common" (see The Tragedy of the
Commons). Because no one owns the atmosphere, no one has a sufficient incentive to take account of the change
to the atmosphere caused by his or her emission of carbon. Also, carbon emitted has the same effect no matter
where on earth it happens.
2. How Serious Is It?
The expected change in global average temperature for a doubling of CO2 is 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade.
But translating a change in temperature into a change in climates is full of uncertainties. Meteorologists predict
greater temperature change in the polar regions than near the equator. This change could cause changes in
circulation of air and water. The results may be warmer temperatures in some places and colder in others, wetter
climates in some places and drier in others.
Temperature is useful as an index of climate change. A band of about one degree covers variations in
average temperatures since the last ice age. This means that climates will change more in the next one hundred
years than in the last ten thousand. But to put this in perspective, remember that people have been migrating great
distances for thousands of years, experiencing changes in climate greater than any being forecast.
The models of global warming project only gradual changes. Climates will "migrate" slowly. The climate
of Kansas may become like Oklahoma's, but not like that of Oregon or Massachusetts. But a caveat is in order: the
models probably cannot project discontinuities because nothing goes into them that will produce drastic change.
There may be phenomena that could produce drastic changes, but they are not known with enough confidence to
introduce into the models.
Carbon dioxide has increased about 25 percent since the onset of the industrial revolution. The global
average temperature rose almost half a degree during the first forty years of this century, was level for the next
forty, and rose during the eighties. Yet whether or not we are witnessing the greenhouse effect is unknown
because other decades-long influences such as changes in solar intensity and in the atmosphere's particulate matter
can obscure any smooth greenhouse trend. In other words, the increase in carbon dioxide will, by itself, cause the
greenhouse effect, but other changes in the universe may offset it.
Even if we had confident estimates of climate change for different regions of the world, there would be
uncertainties about the kind of world we will have fifty or a hundred years from now. Suppose the kind of climate

change expected between now and, say, 2080 had already taken place, since 1900. Ask a seventy-five-year-old
farm couple living on the same farm where they were born: would the change in the climate be among the most
dramatic changes in either their farming or their lifestyle? The answer most likely would be no. Changes from
horses to tractors and from kerosene to electricity would be much more important.
Climate change would have made a vastly greater difference to the way people lived and earned their
living in 1900 than today. Today, little of our gross domestic product is produced outdoors, and therefore, little is
susceptible to climate. Agriculture and forestry are less than 3 percent of total output, and little else is much
affected. Even if agricultural productivity declined by a third over the next half-century, the per capita GNP we
might have achieved by 2050 we would still achieve in 2051. Considering that agricultural productivity in most
parts of the world continues to improve (and that many crops may benefit directly from enhanced photosynthesis
due to increased carbon dioxide), it is not at all certain that the net impact on agriculture will be negative or much
noticed in the developed world.
3. Its Effects on Developing Countries
Climate changes would have greater impact in underdeveloped countries. Agriculture provides the
livelihoods of 30 percent or more of the population in much of the developing world. While there is no strong
presumption that the climates prevailing in different regions fifty or a hundred years from now will be less
conducive to food production, those people are vulnerable in a way that Americans and west Europeans are not.
Nor can the impact on their health be dismissed. Parasitic and other vectorborne diseases affecting hundreds of
millions of people are sensitive to climate.
Yet the trend in developing countries is to be less dependent on agriculture. If per capita income in such
countries grows in the next forty years as rapidly as it has in the forty just past, vulnerability to climate change
should diminish. This is pertinent to whether developing countries should make sacrifices to minimize the
emission of gases that may change climate to their disadvantage. Their best defense against climate change will be
their own continued development.
Population is an important factor. Carbon emissions in developing countries rise with population. For
instance, if China holds population growth to near zero for the next couple of generations, it may do as much for
the earth's atmosphere as would a heroic anticarbon program coupled with 2 percent annual population growth.
Furthermore, the most likely adverse impact of climate change would be on food production, and in the poorest
parts of the world the adequacy of food depends on the number of mouths.
About the Author
Thomas C. Schelling is a professor of economics at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs
in College Park. For most of his professional life he was an economics professor at Harvard University. In 1991
he was president of the American Economic Association. He is an elected member of the National Academy of
Sciences.