Professional Documents
Culture Documents
:37-1A-KST-F15-00026
Originator: AET
Tag No. : NA
Document Title:
Rev.:01
System No. : 00
Page: 1 of 35
Project name:
01
05.04.2013
XG
KA
HAS
Rev.
Issue date
Description
Orgd
by
Chk'd
by
Disc.
Appr.
SHELL networkcode.:
Subcontractor:
Contractor:
www.kvaerner.com
Proj.
Appr.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Abreviations
1.2
Revision History
1.3
Scope
2.1
General
2.2
Safety lifecycle
PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS
12
3.1
12
3.2
SIL allocation
12
3.3
Reliability data
12
3.4
13
3.5
13
3.6
14
3.7
15
3.8
15
3.9
Vendor interface
15
3.10
16
DOCUMENTATION
17
4.1
Introduction
17
4.2
17
4.3
17
4.4
17
4.5
17
4.6
18
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SIL Working Method Report
Document no.:
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MANAGEMENT OF FUNCTIONAL
ONAL SAFETY
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21
5.1
General requirements
21
5.2
21
5.3
22
5.4
23
5.5
23
5.6
23
5.7
23
5.8
23
24
6
6.1
24
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6
6.2.7
6.2.8
27
27
27
27
28
28
29
29
30
VERIFICATION, VALIDATION
TION AND FSA
31
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.1
Verification
General
SIS verification
31
31
31
7.2
Validation
31
7.3
32
REFERENCES
33
APPENDIX A
34
34
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1 INTRODUCTION
To prevent escalation of unstable situations into hazardous situations or accidents, as well as to reduce the
consequences of accidents, safety barriers shall be installed on equipment, process segments and as
protection between different areas
eas on an installation. These barriers can be mechanical barriers (relief
valves, fire walls, etc.), or barriers controlled by instrumentedsystems
ystems (such as F&G systems, automatic
PSD/ ESD isolation valves and automatic fire extinguishing systems).
The quality
ity of the safety barriers is essential for achieving acceptable risk levels on an installation. Hence
Hence,
relevant Safety Integrity Level (SIL) analysis activities (incl. management of functional safety) shall be
established and performed as an integrated part
rt of the design development for the Nyhamna
Nyhamnaexpansion
installation. For this project, design of all electrical, electronic, programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety
systems shall meet requirements specified in IEC61508 and IEC 61511 standards, ref. /1// &/2/.
&/ The
implementation of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 shall be according to the requirements given in the Company
documents DEP 32.80.10.10- Gen / 3/ and OLF GL 070 /4/in addition to the IEC standards61508
61508 and 61511.
1.1 ABREVIATIONS
CSU
DEP
E/E/PES
EPCm
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
EV
EUC
F&G
FAT
FEED
FMECA
FSA
FW
Fire Water
HIPPS
HVAC
HWFT
HZV
I/O
Input / Output
IEC
IPF
ISO
MTTR
NORSOK
OLF
OREDA
P&ID
PDS
PFD
Document title:
SIL Working Method Report
PRE
PSD
Process Shutdown
PSF
QA
Quality Assurance
SAR
SAS
SAT
SFF
SIF
SIL
SIS
SRS
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Definitions:
SIS Safety Instrumented System:
Instrumented system used to implement one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). A SIS is
composed of any combination of Initiator(s), Logic Solver(s), and/or Final Element(s).
SIF Safety Instrumented Function:
Safety function with a specified safety integrity level which is necessary to achieve functional safety and
which can be either a safety instrumented protection function or a safety instrumented control function.
function
SIF used in this report is referred to an Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) in
n DEP 32.80.10.1032.80.10.10 Gen /3/.
Operator/Company:
When Operator/Company is referred to in this report, reference is made to Shell.
Contractor:
When Contractor is referred to in this report, reference is made to Kvrner who is the main engineering
engin
(EPCm) contractor in the Nyhamna
hamna onshore EPCm
EPCmproject.
Reference is made to IEC
C 61508 Part 4 (/1/)
(/ /) for other relevant definitions and abbreviations.
Modifications
01
First issue for IDC// Company Comments for Nyhamna expansion project
1.3 SCOPE
The FEED phase
The SIL assessment on local Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) for the Nyhamna Expansion Project was
carried outby Company during FEED phase.
The FEED review consists of SIL classification for the SIFs. In total 99 SIFswere
were classified and a NYX
NYX-SIL
report /5/ was produced by Company during FEED phase
phase.
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Verify and establish updated/additional SIL requirements where required by using the SIFpro
software tool. According to the design basis for this project /12/, the SIL facilitator used for FEED
shall also be used for detail engineering,
The commissioning phase
Company (and/or Commissioning Contractor) will be responsible for the following SIL activities:
Validate functions (SIFs).
Verify that the actual performance of the systems (SISs) and functions (SIFs) are as specified in the
SRS documents.
Develop test procedures and check that the systems (SISs) and functions (SIFs) can be tested as
required.
Establish organisation and responsibilities for follow-up
follow
SIL activities in operation.
Establish system and procedures for follow up SIL in operation.
operatio
The operational phase
Company (Operator) will be responsible for the following SIL activities:
Test systems (SISs) and functions (SIFs) according to procedures.
Monitor the performance of the systems (SISs) and functions (SIFs).
All tests, successful
sful operations and fails to be logged (e.g. as part of a dedicated SIL application in
the Information Management System IMS).
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SIL parameters such as failure rates, Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) and Safe Failure
Fraction (SFF) to be checked regularly.
reg
Take appropriate actions if systems (SISs) and functions (SIFs) deviate from requirements.
Provide SIL feedback to the Contractor(s) and vendors.
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PROCESS SECTOR
SAFETY
INSTRUMENTED
SYSTEM
STANDARDS
Manufacturers
Manufacturers
andsuppliers
suppliersof
of
and
devices
devices
IEC61508
61508
IEC
Safety
Safety
instrumented
instrumented
systemsdesigners,
designers,
systems
integratorsand
and
integrators
users
users
IEC61511
61511
IEC
Figure 2.1-1 Relationship between IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 (Figure 2 in IEC 61511, Clause 1)
Guidance on when to apply IEC 61511 or IEC 61508 is shown in Figure 2.1-2;
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Process sector
hardware
Developing
new
hardware
devices
Using
Proven-inuse
hardware
devices
Follow
IEC 61508
Follow
IEC 61511
Process sector
software
Using
hardware
developed
and
accessed
according
to IEC
61508
Follow
IEC 61511
Developing
embedded
(system)
software
Developing
application
software
using full
variability
languages
Follow IEC
61508-3
Follow IEC
61508-3
Developing
application
software
using limited
variability
languages or
fixed
programs
Follow
IEC 61511
Figure 2.1-2Guidance
Guidance on when to apply IEC 61511 or IEC 61508 (Figure 3 in IEC 61511, Clause 1)
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Figure 2.2-1Lifecycle
Lifecycle from IEC 61511 (Figure 8 from IEC 61511-1),
61511 1), with reference to relevant chapters in
OLF GL 070 (in brackets)
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Figure 2.2-2Lifecycle
Lifecycle from IEC 61508 (Figure 2 from IEC 61508-1)
61508
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3 PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 RISK AND INTEGRITY LEVEL
VEL CATEGORIES
According to DEP 32.80.10.10- Gen /3//, the required SIL is established based on:
The probability of occurrence of the hazardous situation if the IPF is not installed and
The severity of the consequences expressed in terms of:
o Personnel health and safety
o Environmental impact
o Production and equipment loss
The SIL decision matrixes in DEP 32.80.10.10
32.80.10.10- Gen, section 4.2.1,, shall be used to determine the
associated safety integrity level.
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The project shall establish a preliminary reliability data dossier in order to perform reliability calculations
during early detail engineering. The data applied in calculations shall prior to available vendor data be based
on relevant generic data.
Since vendor data will normally not be available at an early stage of engineering, the generic data (preferably
from SINTEFs PDS Data Handbook /11
11/ and/or OREDA data handbook /10/)
/) shall be used to perform
preliminary reliability calculations. The main purpose of such preliminary reliability calculations will be to
identify possible
le safety functions that might fail to achieve the required SIL. This will allow potential redesign
of systems and/or barriers (if found required) at an early stage of the design development, minimising project
cost and schedule impact.
In early detail engineering phase preliminary
reliminary rreliability
eliability calculations shall preferably be based on PDS
TM
methodology and formulas as recommended by OLF GL 070 / 4/.How to use SIFpro for the reliability
calculation has to be agreed between Company and Contractor after all SIFs have been registered in
TM
SIFpro .
Evaluation of vendor data shall be performed prior to use in final SIL compliance calculations. Vendor data
shall be used only if found qualified and sufficiently documented by approved SARs in the project. Company
and Contractor shall during the final SIL compliance calculations agree upon an approach for utilization of
reliability data from the available sources
ces such as generic failure data (e.g. PDS reliability data) and/or
qualified vendor data and/or relevant experience from operations. The reliability data shall be evaluated and
as far as possible be ensured to be qualified for the given application.
The reliability data dossier as well as preliminary SIL compliance calculations shall be documented as part of
the SIL Identification and Allocation Report in the early detail engineering phase, and be updated during the
detail engineering phase.
The final SIL compliance calculations including an updated Data Dossier shall be established as soon as
vendor data (i.e. approved SARs) becomes available. This final SIL compliance documentation for all SIFs
related to a specific SIS shall be included as part of the
th respective System SRS / 8/.
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ensure that acceptable risk represented by the Equipment Under Control (EUC) is achieved. Hence, it is
assumed that MTTR can be disregarded and PFD calcu
calculations
lations can be based on the dangerous undetected
(DU) failures only.
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Contractor
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Vendors
Figure 3.9-1Main
Main principles for vendor SIL interface within the Nyhamnaexpansion
Nyhamnaexpansion project
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4 DOCUMENTATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are specifying requirements for documentation of implementation of
requirements. A SIL working method report (this
(
report),, a compliance report, safety requirement
specifications, and safety analysis reports from each equipment package supplier will be produced to
document how these requirements have been implemented.
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There are no requirements that components or systems shall be certified to IEC 61508 or IEC 615
61511. A
certificate will not relieve a vendor from documenting IEC 61508/ 61511 compliance and supplying a SAR.
However, a vendor supplying a certified component/system will only have to document the following parts of
the SAR;
I Abbreviations
II References
III Summary
1. Introduction
2. System Description
3. System Topology and Block Diagram
4. Operational description of the system
5. Assumptions
6. Failure rate of the components*
7. Diagnostic Coverage & Safe Failure Fraction*
8. Architectural constraints
nstraints (HWFT and voting principles)
9. Common Cause failures*
10. Behaviour of system/components on detection of a fault
11. Mean Time To Repair*
12. Factory testing
13. Operational testing (included test procedures and recommended functional test interval)
interval)
14. NA
15. NA
16. Results
Appendices
E.g.Certificates
* Note that background/supporting documentation for the claimed figures in these chapters is not required for
a certified component/system.
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5 MANAGEMENT OF FUNCTIONAL
FUNCTIO
SAFETY
The objective of the requirements in this section is to identify the management activities that are necessary
to ensure that all functional safety objectives are met. With reference to Clause 6 in IEC 61508
61508-1 and clause
5 in IEC 61511-1,
1, management activities to comply with functional
functional safety according to IEC 61508 and IEC
61511 will be based on the following;
General requirements
Organisation and resources
Risk evaluation and risk management
Planning and follow up
Implementing and monitoring
Assessment and auditing (Verification
(Verifi
/ Validation / FSA)
It will also be important to ensure correct handling of:
Potential contractual challenges
Potential non-conformances
Relevant interactions with other project activities.
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follow up and ensure that SAR(s) will be issued by relevant supplier(s) for project review and acceptance in
due time (as specified in the supplier document list), i.e. allowing for comments and updating of the SAR if
found required prior to achieving project approval. It is also the responsibility of the PRE to make sure that
each
h SAR is sent to relevant disciplines for review (as a minimum, the Safety discipline shall review the SAR
but preferably also the relevant System SRS owner(s)).
All SAR(s) must be ensured to have the required quality for approval (i.e. the quality required
required for achieving
Status Code 1) in due time before final compliance calculations are to be performed within the EPCm
EPC
project. SAR reports found to have non-compliance
non compliance with relevant format and content requirements as
specified in the SAR Supplier Requirements
Requireme
document / 9// will not be accepted. It is not sufficient to only
deliver a SIL certificate, since all required documentation as specified in the SAR Supplier Requirements
document shall be included in the
he SAR in order to achieve project approval.
Figure 5.2-1below gives a coarse overview of multidiscipline involvement and responsibilities related to the
main SIL activities and deliverables during EPC
EPCm.
Figure 5.2-1Coarse
Coarse overview of multidiscipline involvement and responsibilities related to the main SIL
activities and deliverables during EPCm
m.
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Notes
Requirements given in
Contract & Regulations
Scope definition.
definition Define
responsibilities &
organisation. Define
acceptance criteria.
criteria
Hazard identification
identification,
HAZOP & risk analysis
Operator
SIL Working Method
Report
1
Operator
SAR Supplier
Requirements
D
E
T
A
I
L
4
2
5
Perform reliability
calculations for SIFs using
generic data from data
dossier
6
Operator
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G
Vendors
&
2
Allocate SIL to SIFs - use
SIFpro
SRS
(1st. rev.)
Establish detailed
requirements for SIS
realisation
3
10
Vendors
C
O
N
S
T
R
U
C.
SARs
(1st. rev).
5
Overall safety validation
planning
P
R
O
C.
&
SIS realisation
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Project
phase
Interface
Documentation
Rev.:
01
6
Input to operation 6
& maintenance
plan
SARs
(Final rev.)
Interface vs. other project
documentation (functional
specs, FAT and operational
procedures, etc.)
Operator
Vendors
SRSs
(2nd. rev.)
13 5
10
To Operational phase
Verification
Validation
FSA
Figure 6.1-1 SIS Working process for implementation of SIL in the FEED and detail engineering phases for
Nyhamna expansion project
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Project
phase
Interface
Handover to Operator /
Commisioning team
Commisioning and
installation planning
Operator /
Commisioning
team
8
Operation and
maintenance
plan / procedures
Installation and
12
mechanical complete (MC)
&
Handover to operations
9
Commisioning / testing of
SIS & SIFs
12
13
5
10
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
A
L
SRSs
rev. X
Data collection and
analysis
Testing of performance
Operation, maintenance
and repair
Update failure data and
test intervals as required
14
15
SRSs
rev. X
Feedback to
contractors/
vendors
10
Handover to
decommissioning
Decommisioning
16
S
T
A
R
T
U
P
Verification
Validation
10
Figure 6.1-2 SIS Working process for implementation of SIL in the Commissioning, Operation and
Decommissioning phases for Nyhamna expansion project
P
H
A
S
E
D
E
C
O
M
M
I
S
I
O
N
I
N
G
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DEP 32.80.10.10- Gen,, The consequences were based on three categories, which are personnel safety
impact, environmental impact and commercial/economic impact. In case where SIL(Safety Integrated level),
EIL(Environment Integrated
tegrated level) and AIL(Asset Integrated level) are different from each other, the most
stringent requirement shall be applicable for the SIF as an SIL requirement. Note that not all SIFs will be
allocated a SIL; however, this is only relevant in case of low
l
criticality of the SIF. The likelihood considered
possible
ssible failures that could cause the hazardous event, as well as independent protection layers and
conditions that would help to prevent or mitigate the hazardous event. Prevention and mitigation layer
layers were
only considered if they were deemed sufficiently reliable to provide at least one order of magnitude risk
reduction.
With a given SIL requirement, an overall maximum allowable average PFD is given. Since a SIF consists of
several elements, the PFD should
hould be distributed between these based on the specific configuration and in
accordance with the expected unavailability (i.e. based on historical failure data) for the involved
components. Typical allocation will be performed as described in Section3.2.
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Specification of which reliability data that should be collected and analysed during
during the operational
phase.
From SIS realisation point of view, these bullet points should be established as early as possible to establish
relevant premises as input to the SRS. However, this may not be practicable, hence, the above list should be
reviewed,
d, and information essential for robust & safe SIS development and realisation must be established
in a SIL operational strategy.
The contents of the SRS indicate the issues required that is covered by the SIL operational strategy. The
following table showss the sections of the SRS where the SIL operational
operational strategy has inputs (compared to
Table E.1 in OLF GL070)
Lifecycle
phase (ref.
refer 6.1 in this
report)
Assumed sources of demand and demand rate of the safety instrumented function
Pre- execution
Pre- execution
12
SRS rev. 1
14
SRS rev. 1
19
Description of the modes of operation of the plant and identification of the safety
instrumented functions required to operate within each mode
SRS rev. 2
21
Requirements for overrides/ inhibits/ bypasses including how they will be cleared
SRS rev. 1
22
Specification of any action necessary to achieve a safe state in the event of faults
being detected by the SIS. Any such action shall be determined taking account of
all relevant human factors
SRS rev. 1
23
Minimum worst-case
case repair time, which is feasible for the SIS, taking into account
the travel time, location, spares holding, service contracts, environmental
constraints etc.
SRS rev. 2
26
Identification to normal and abnormal modes for both the plant as whole and
individual plant operational procedures (for example, equipment maintenance,
sensor calibration and/or repair)). Additional safety instrumented functions may be
required to support these modes of operation.
Pre- execution
ID
17
SRS rev. 1
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7.2 VALIDATION
There are two main validation activities:
1. The SIS safety validation should be performed at the end of the design phase and check the design
against the SRS.
2. The overall safety validation should be performed during commissioning
commissioning in order to demonstrate that
the SIS meets the SRS.
The validations will be performed by activity independent personnel in the project and project independent
personnel.
Contractor is responsible for execution of validations in the detail engineering
engineering phase. Validation of design is
during engineering normally combined and covered by the Functional Safety Assessments (FSA).
The commissioning responsible will own the overall safety validation. Reference is made toSection
to
9 in OLF
GL 070 for definition of scope for overall safety validation. The validation planning related to commissioning
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shall generally follow normal project routine related to commissioning procedures. Engineering scope is
therefore limited to providing additional
al requirements to existing procedures in form of e.g. SIL related
Commissioning Check Lists (included as appendices to each System SRSs) The results from the overall
safety validation shall be documented in commissioning to ensure that a change made to SIS by
commissioning is included in the relevant System SRSs (see document listing in Appendix A).
In case the validation results in a non-conformance
conformance with the applied SIL requirements, the project shall either
implement changes as required or apply for deviation to Company (ref. Section 3.10 and Section 5.7.
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8 REFERENCES
1. IEC 61508: Functional
Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related
safety related systems,
systems
2010.
2. IEC 61511: Functional
Functional safety: Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector,
sector
International Electro technical Commission, 2003.
3. DEP 32.80.10.10-Gen: Instrument
Instrument Protective Functions
Functions, 2011.
4. OLF GL 070: Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry
Industry, The
Norwegian Oil Industry Association, rev. 02, October 2004.
5. 37-1A-SHA-I15-00009: NYX-SIL
SIL report.
report Rev.03E.
6. 37-1A-KST-F15-00026: SIL
SIL working method report.
report
7. 37-1A-KST-F15-00027: SIL
SIL Identification and Allocation Report.
Report
8. 37-1A-KST-F15-00028: Safety
Safety Requirement Specification (SRS)
(SRS).
9. 37-1A-AK-F15-00009: SAR
SAR Supplier Requirement
Requirement.
10. OREDA 2009 Handbook: Offshore
Offshore Reliability Data,
Data SINTEF, 5th Edition.
11. PDS Data Handbook: Reliability
Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems,
, SINTEF, 2010 Edition.
12. 37-1A-SHA-X02-00010: Basic
Basic Design and Engineering Package Part VIVI Contractor Service.
Service
13. 37-1A-KST-F15-00020: Nyhamna
Nyhamna Expansion QRA Report.
Report
14. 37-1A-NS-D50-66000: Nyhamna
Nyhamna Projects Onshore Engineering Design Standards.
Standards
15. 37-1A-SHA-F15-00005: Safety
Safety Critical Elements Identification and Performance Standards
Standards.
16. NORSOK S-001: Technical
Technical Safety,
Safety Edition 4, 2008.
17. Company response to TQ-AET-KST
KST-KS-0017.
Document title:
SIL Working Method Report
Document no.:
37-1A-KST-F15-00026
APPENDIX A
SRS RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX
Rev.:
01
Page:
34 of 35
Title
System
37-1A-KST-F15-00028
SRS Main
document
N.A. for
expansion
SRS- System 43
Flare, ventilation and
blowdown
43 - Flare, ventilation
and blowdown systems
SRS System 67
Process shutdown
67 - Process shutdown
systems
SRS System 69
Distributed
control/
monitoring (HIPPS)
69 - Distributed control/
monitoring (HIPPS)
systems
SRS System
70F&G detection
70 F&G detection
systems
SRS System 77
HVAC
77 HVAC systems
78&79 Emergency
shutdown and
depressurisation
systems
SRS system 85
Emergency power
85 Emergency power
systems
Nyhamna
Safety
www.kvaerner.com
Instrument
Process
Electrical
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HVAC
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Telecom
Piping
Mechanical
Operations/
Maintenance
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