Professional Documents
Culture Documents
14
15
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de
Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that
P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the
Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a
complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to
compromise suits between family members, lacking
which the case can be dismissed.
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D.
No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay
and their disputes does not fall under any of the
excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so
16
in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:
the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the
Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the
petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the
weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their
grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed
tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a
complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement of the
20
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." Yet,
in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not
applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner
and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said
cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted
enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral
to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the
Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on
the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken
judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of
"the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
21
rules. He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done
so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention
and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled
mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May
1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the
MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was
premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking
refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4)
of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may
go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because,
as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of
sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their
complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that
the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
24
the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The request is
25
dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this
was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any event,
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical
injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight
physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal
22
Code, considering that per the medical certificates the injuries sustained
by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of
complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated
them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two monthspursuant to Article
90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22
June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said
period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there
was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception
provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role
which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of
justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress
therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should,
with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with
it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions
for non-compliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent
Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are
hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to
DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
decision.
Costs against the private respondents.
CASE DIGESTS:
ISSUE:
WON THE CASE FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
FAILURE TOCOMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIRMENT OF P.D. NO.
1508, NOW EMBODIED INSECTION 412 OF THE LGC OF 1991.
HELD:
Yes. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code
of 1991,the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the
lupon as a pre-condition tothe filing of an action in court remains
applicable because its provisions on prior referralwere substantially
reproduced in the Code. The precise technical effect of failure to
complywith the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the
same effect produced bynon-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy
there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Moreover, having brought the dispute
before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents
are stopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they
themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the
lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings
and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation
system. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity,
exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors
should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial
courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for noncompliance thereof.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals211 SCRA 753
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building.
Two units were leased (now unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T.
Dizon. Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for
the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were
impliedly renewed on a month to month basis. One of the terms of the
lease, that of monthly payments, was
violated by respondent. Upon failure of respondent to honor the demand
letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation
Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several occasions from
January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia
Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from
petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by
receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's
Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval
and the latter set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to
appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but
they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly,
3
the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Petitioners
then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial
Court of Naval.
4
However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling against the
admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which are the receipts of good
marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners' manifestation therein, for not
7
having been properly identified in court.
On private respondents' counterclaims, said trial court also ruled that the
same had been settled when the contending parties entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved on January 9, 1989 by the
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Branch 16, in another action between them,
8
that is, Civil Case No. B-0719.
Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the
aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary
to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the merits. Modifying
the decision of the lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that:
Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:
It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay
captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in
view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement.
If no conciliation or settlement has been reached
pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be
brought to the regular courts.
In the case at bar, it has been established that there was
no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The
efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran
to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed,
the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been
constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However,
the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification
to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor
of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case of Ramos
vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court
ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that
referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely
because he himself has failed to work out an agreement
between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute
should not end with the mediation proceeding before
the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a
settlement . . . . In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA
566, it was held that "failure to avail of conciliation
process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders the complaint
vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss." Inasmuch as
petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of
action of respondent, objection to the complaint has
11
been timely made.
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the
confrontations before the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the
requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court finds for
petitioners.
It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by
12
codification in the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on
January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the
trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been
substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the
latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.
(b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation
effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of
the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for
the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.
Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of
Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed or
instituted in court . . . unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman
or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat
chairman . . . .
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations
before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were not sent to
the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with
said barangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was
reached. This prompted the issuance of the following Certification to File
13
Action.
This is to certify that:
Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness
with complainant but she refused to pay because
according to her, complainant has also an unsettled
accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no
settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the
corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be
filed in court.
Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991.
(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZ
The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and,
as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are
clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is
also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree
No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local
Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the
validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case.
Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
16
retrospective in that sense.
To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a
circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay
and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the complaint
and require the parties to meet before the pangkat, only to bring the case
all over again through the hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for
decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private
respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent
court, they did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for
the sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has
been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case
alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right
to confrontation before the pangkat.
However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to
show or evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their
obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to
submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their
insistence on technical compliance with the requirements of
the barangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident
and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this
petition is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with
the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of
their indebtedness.
We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that
inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack
of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been
timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of
the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in single short sentences in
private respondents' Answer in the court a quo, running the implausible
gamut from supposed defects in parties to res judicata and up to capacity
to sue, without any statement of the facts on which they would rely to
support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings
betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be
countenanced.
The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no
compliance with the barangayconciliation procedure constitutes a waiver
of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer in the trial court was
that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even the
semblance of any reason to support or explain that allegation. On the
other hand, they admitted the confrontations before
17
the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer.
Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense
founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they actually did not
pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation
procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and
18
private respondents as defendants therein.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE,
and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in
Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]
CARLITO D. CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO ALVARADO, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court of
1
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.
Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent
Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,
docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room
being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for
their own use.
Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo
who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to
economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed
an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any
person who can afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold
his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy
relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that
he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of
Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room
as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.
Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said
3
court rendered its decision which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision
on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was
the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing
Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also
concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo
was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for
unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from
the subject premises.
His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack
4
of merit by the RTC on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the
assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed
5
decision dated July 14, 1994. A subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
6
September 1, 1994. Hence, this petition.
The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful
detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended
until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of
said property, and whether the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and
Barredo was authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion
challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground
7
to divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment
8
cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is,
9
possessionde facto. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
10
In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged
"Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery;
and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.
Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila
handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate
2
the room. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the
ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by
Presidential Decree No. 1508.
Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale,
title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same
11
property. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general
short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held
14
in Dui v. Court of Appeals that failure of a party to specifically allege the
fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's
answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his
allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113615. January 25, 1996]
BIENVENIDO VELARMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA
PANSACOLA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lot owners agreement to sell the property to the
government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang
Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a
forcible entry suit? This was the main question raised in this petition for
review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision dated January
1
26, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution
dated October 25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was
transferred from the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on
the submissions of the parties, it was assigned to undersigned ponente for
the writing of the Courts Resolution.
2
NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the
1
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 1990 ordering
the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila Metropolitan
Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with Sections
6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the
2
Resolution of January 7, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of said Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum
are as follows:
Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building
located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two
(2) units of said apartment building were leased (now
being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at
monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment
located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and
P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802
Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of
lease both dated December 10, 1984 and except for the
rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said
contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-tomonth" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of
Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated by
private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said
private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in
3. In giving undue weight and credence to the selfserving allegations of the private respondent that
summons was not served him, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that
barangay authorities are presumed to have performed
their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing
the certificate to file action and grossly and manifestly
erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect,
contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence
on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated,
contrary to law and evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of noncompliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for
review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to
erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:
Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided
in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
10
16
However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived
with Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido,
Maximina Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to
be the sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by
the latter and sold to private respondent Mila Contreras in whose name
said properties are now registered under TCT No. T-120656-M.
On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against
Sagraria Lozada, Gorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido,
Eduardo Candido, Register of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent
Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private
respondent and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito
Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on
the ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory
conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the
same municipality with the petitioners.
On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1 dated
July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court dismissing the complaint
of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent
Mila Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint
instituted by the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other
defendants in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities
and cities.
[5]
Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 18 of the
[6]
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
[7]
concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.
FIRST DIVISION
The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995 denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably
invoke the non-referral of the cases to theLupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure
to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by
petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the
[9]
cases.
[8]
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order granting
private respondents Motion to Revive. Petitioners filed a Motion for
[16]
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
[17]
municipal trial court.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order
dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the
said Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against
them had long become final and executory considering that the
[18]
prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order. In
[19]
response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment, arguing that
the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly
[20]
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective
[21]
contentions, the Regional Trial Court rendered the assailed Decision
denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as
follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and
respondents comment thereto, the Court regrets that it
cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the
records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of
the private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases
was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that
the questioned order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Sdaamiso
SO ORDERED.
[22]
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
[29]
has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely,
[30]
but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without
[31]
prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,
[32]
we stated thus:
xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action
does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action
still remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff
may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive
his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal
has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day
reglementary period, the only way by which the action
may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of
a subsequent action through the filing of another
complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law.
This is so because upon attainment of finality of the
dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period,
the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can
no longer make a disposition in respect thereof
[37]
inconsistent with such dismissal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only
[38]
to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco, the Court
defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal
becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
[39]
offense." Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition
for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality
and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules
[40]
regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court do not
apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for
failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government
Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential
[41]
It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only where the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
12
of law. It is also the rule that this special civil action should not be
allowed as a substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there are other
13
remedies available.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case lodged by the private
respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his
answer to the complaint. The only question is whether that court, in
continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation
as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a
mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an
error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law provides:
The above finding is now final and conclusive in view of the private
respondent's withdrawal of his appeal therefrom. As the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City observed:
bond; and
c) periodically depositing with the appellate court
the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
These remedies are expressly provided for in Rule 70, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court, reading in part as follows:
Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay
same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files
a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court
and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the
Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the
appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any,
as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court
to exist. . . .
Although an order for the execution of the judgment in favor of the private
respondent had already been issued and Felizardo's ejectment from the
leased property was imminent, he could still prevent the implementation
of the said order by availing himself of the above remedies. But he did not.
His reason was that "there is no way that Mr. Jose can lose in Olongapo
City and there is nothing to prevent him from securing a writ of execution
notwithstanding the filing of a supersedeas bond. This had happened
before in the very same MTCC and in the very same RTC in the first case
between him and herein petitioner."
It appears, though, that the petitioner's apprehensions are unfounded. The
record shows that in the earlier case between him and the private
respondent, he was in fact able to obtain the suspension of the adverse
judgment against him during the pendency of his appeal with the Regional
15
Trial Court by filing a supersedeas bond.
The petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Echaus vs. Court of
16
17
Appeals which reaffirmed Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
The above observations are not squarely applicable to the case at bar
because what were sought to be reviewed in the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the petitioner in those cases were the orders of execution
pending appeal, which were interlocutory and unappealable. Moreover,
the orders of execution in those cases were for the collection of damages
and attorney's fees and were issued pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court. This section requires good reasons to support the issuance
of the writ. Certiorari was available to challenge the orders, which were
annulled because there was no showing of such good reasons to sustain to
sustain the execution pending appeal.
By contrast, what was challenged in the special civil action
for certiorari filed by the herein petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
was not merely the order of execution but the judgment of the court a
quo on the merits of the case. This was final and appealable. Besides, the
writ in this case was issued under Section 8, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court,
under which it is not necessary to show good reasons for the immediate
execution of the judgment against the defendant. This is an ejectment
Besides, as already pointed out, the petitioner had other plain, speedy and
adequate remedies available to him under Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
HEIRS OF FERNANDO VINZONS, represented by LIWAYWAY VINZONSCHATO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MENA
EDORIA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
[1]
[2]
the January 27, 1993 Decision and September 10, 1993 Resolution of
[3]
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23948. The Court of Appeals (CA)
[4]
set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet,
Camarines Norte in Civil Case No. 5832, affirming that of the Municipal
[5]
Trial Court (MTC) in Civil Case No. 2137 , which ordered the ejectment of
herein private respondent.
The factual antecedents of this case are:
Petitioners Heirs of Vinzons are co-owners of a parcel of land in
Barangay 5, Daet, of which a portion measuring 148.5 square meters is
being occupied by respondent Mena Edoria as lessee since
1951. Respondent built thereon a residential house worth P40,000.00. He
started paying a monthly rent of P4.00 which by 1986 had reached P13.00.
Sometime in 1986, an ejectment suit was filed by petitioners against
respondent and several others also occupying the same lot owned by
them, docketed as Civil Case No. 1923, on the ground, among others, of
non-payment of rentals. After trial, however, the case was dismissed on
the finding that respondent was not in arrears but was even advance in his
Petitioners argue that the CA was duty-bound, under the rules and
jurisprudence, to give weight to the findings of fact of the MTC since the
same had already been affirmed in toto by the RTC. Further, it is argued
that the action is not barred by prior judgment and the principle of litis
pendentia does not apply; that the petitioners complied with the
requirements of PD 1508; and that demand to vacate is not necessary for
judicial action in case of expiration of the lease contract.
The petition is devoid of merit, we find that the MTC had improperly
assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed
within one year from the date of last demand with the Municipal Trial
Court,
otherwise
[7]
it is an accion publiciana cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. The rule
is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
[8]
of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed
[9]
should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate. Accion
publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when
[10]
dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
There is no question that the petitioners dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. In their Complaint and Position paper, petitioners
[11]
alleged that the lease contract expired in 1984 ; that thereafter, private
[12]
respondent became a lessee on a month-to-month basis ; and that
before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, demand to vacate
[13]
had already been made to defendant. Since Civil Case No. 1908 was
instituted in 1986; Civil Case No. 1923 in 1986; and Civil Case No. 2061 in
April 1988, the alleged demands to vacate to abort an implied renewal of
the lease on a month-to-month basis were made between 1986 and 1988,
the last one, before April 1988. Verily, the instant Complaint for ejectment
filed by petitioner in October 1989, was filed more than one year from the
termination of the month-to-month lease some time before April 1988. It
is well-established that what determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it is the allegation
[14]
made by the plaintiff in his complaint.
Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for
failure of the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to avail of the barangay
conciliation process under PD 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse. The
Court of Appeals had found that there is no clear showing that it was
brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay 5, Daet,
Camarines Norte, where the parties reside and the property subject of the
have been coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on
the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider
the same as compliance with the law.
Third, petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial
courts deserve to be respected and affirmed by appellate courts. Almost
as well-recognized as the general rule is the exception that the factual
findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of
Appeals if by the evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the
[20]
trial court erred. Considering that the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals arrived at different factual findings, we have reviewed the
evidence on record and have found as aforesaid, the improper assumption
by the MTC of the case due to non-recourse to barangay conciliation and
the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for unlawful
detainer.
Having arrived at the above conclusion, the Court finds no need to
discuss the other issues, specifically, those bearing on the application of
the principles of litis pendentia and/or res judicata. Moreover, the records
of Civil Cases Nos. 1923 and 2061 are not before us to enable us to
determine the presence of the elements thereof in the instant case.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated June 18, 1992, Engineer Edgardo C.
Garcia charged Judge Meljohn de la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte with partiality, abuse of authority and
grave abuse of discretion in connection with Crimimal Case No. 2577 for
grave oral defamation which was filed against his wife, Ignacia G. Garcia, a
supervising nurse of Naval District Hospital, by respondent judge's brother,
Dr. Melencio de la Pea. Respondent judge, while acting as the presiding
judge of the MTC of Naval, Leyte, is the incumbent presiding judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte.
Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia, husband of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2577, claimed that respondent judge took cognizance of the
criminal case without the requisite certification from the Lupon
Tagapayapa; that he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case
because private complainant Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea is his brother; that
he issued a warrant of arrest without the accompanying copy of the
complaint and affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses; that when
complainant sought the approval of the cash bail bond he posted for the
Order of Release dated June 8, 1992 duly signed by respondent judge that
the accused was released from detention. Complainant was informed that
before respondent judge left for Cebu City, he entrusted the Order of
Release to his wife, Lolita de la Pea, whose whereabouts, however, were
unknown in the afternoon of June 8, 1992 despite efforts by the Clerk of
Court to look for her. The delay in the release of his wife from detention by
one day because the Order of Release could not be obtained as
respondent judge left for Cebu City despite proper posting of the cash
bond of P2,000.00 for her provisional liberty on the same day of her arrest
on June 8, 1992, prompted complainant to file on July 22, 1992 this
administrative case against respondent judge.
Earlier, or on July 16, 1992, a complaint containing the same charges was
filed by complainant with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
docketed as OMB VIS-92-397.
In his comment, respondent judge stated that he is adopting his
counter-affidavit and memorandum filed with the Ombudsman as part of
his comment, wherein he asserted that the certification to file action from
the Lupon Tagapayapa was not necessary for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2577 because the imposable penalty of
the crime of grave oral defamation (4 months and 1 day to 3 years and 4
months) is not within the coverage of the Lupon Tagapayapa; that even if
the private complainant is his brother, he need not inhibit himself to
"mobilize the machinery of justice" because the case has been deferred for
quite a long time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the nondesignation of a presiding judge from April to May 1992; that there is no
room for bias or partiality in the issuance of a warrant of arrest which is
both a mandatory and ministerial duty provided the complaint and the
supporting affidavit engender a probable cause; that to show his
neutrality, he issued an inhibition order dated June 15, 1992; that the cash
bond posted was defective for there was no written undertaking as
required under Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; that his Clerk of
Court was informed in the morning of June 8, 1992 that he would be going
to Cebu City that afternoon for his pre-scheduled medical check-up and
that he is preparing an order of release which could be obtained from his
wife, Lolita de la Pea, in case the accused actually files a bail bond, after
determining that the same is in order.
It is at once clear that the administrative charges against respondent judge
focused mainly on the fact of his taking cognizance of the criminal case of
grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pea, against
complainant's wife, Ignacia Garcia, which, as a consequence, gave rise to
days after he caused the arrest and detention of the accused. Clearly, the
damage and intrusion on the liberty of the accused were already fait
accompli.
Respondent judge likewise violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides: "A judge shall not allow family, social, or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige
of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge."
Respondent judge in the instant case tainted the image of the judiciary to
which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied
and worthy of the people's trust. As this Court has had occasion to declare:
"As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the
visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From
them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law." If
judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall
conduct themselves as respondent did, in wanton disregard and violation
of the rights of the accused, then the people, especially those who have
had recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the
members of the Bench and the judiciary itself shall lose the high moral
ground from which it draws its power and strength to compel obedience to
the laws.
Worthy of note is the fact that respondent judge had been previously
charged in A.M. No. R-48-MTJ (Ragir v. de la Pea) with ignorance of the
law and incompetence, for having taking cognizance of, and having
decided, a case for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 5926) over which
his court has no jurisdiction. To rectify the error, respondent judge, three
days after the rendition of judgment, recalled his decision and remanded
the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Naval, sub-province of
Biliran, Leyte, now province of Biliran. In the resolution of October 15,
1985, the Court, giving credence to respondent's allegation of good faith in
the rendition of the judgment and the fact that he took steps to rectify his
mistake three days after the rendition of the erroneous judgment,
imposed on him a fine equivalent to a month's salary with the warning that
repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealth with more severely.
From all indications, it is clear from the facts on record and, in the absence
of evidence to negate the perceived bias and partiality which resulted in
undue prejudice to the accused, that respondent judge, through his
oppressive and vindictive actuations towards the accused arising from his
The dismissal of the criminal aspect of the same complaint (OMB-VIS-92397) by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in its resolution of March
23, 1993 will not affect the resolution of this case which basically relates to
the power of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnel's
compliance with all laws and pertinent rules and take proper
administrative action against them, in the event that they commit any