THE

ARGUMENT

^ i H E proper Subjedl of this Dialogue is The Chief

Good of Man : the Defign of it is to fjew^ that
Mans chief Good is Moral Virtue The Subjefi is introduced, hy fati97g the different Opinions of Socrates and
Philebus, concernijig the Nature of That Good^ wherein the
Happinefs of Man is to be fou?td\ Opinio7iSy which^ it
fee7ns^ they had jufi before feverally avowed. Philebus,
a Man firongly prepoffeffed with the DoSirine ^Ariftippus,
had afferted^ that this Good was Pleafure, meani?tg Pleay^r^i^/i? Senfation, or Pleafure felt thro the outward SenCcs.
On the other hand^ Socrates had fuppofed the Sovereign
Good of Man to be placed in Mind, and iji the Energys
of Mind 071 Me7ital SubjeBs. Philebus, in fuppo?-t of his
own Affertion^ had been hara7igui77g^ for a long Tijne togegether^ after the Man7ier of the Sophifls ; until he fou7id
his Spirits and hiiagination.^ or perhaps his Stock of plaufible ArgtmientSi quite exhaufed. He had therefore defred

6 The A P. G U ]M E N T.
fired his friend Protarchus, a young Gentleman^ who appears to have been a Follo'wer of Gorgias, to take up the
Controverfy^ and carry it on in His Stead a/id Behalf
Protarchus had confeitted^ and had engaged himfelf fo to
do. Immediately on this Engagement^ at this very point
of time^ tlye prefent Dialogue commeiices : accordingly^ it
is carried o;z, chiefly betisceen Socrates and Protarchus.
Butj as Philebus is the Principal Perfon^ whofe Opinion
cofnhats againfl That of Socrates, a?id as no higher a
CharaSler is given to Protarchus, than That of AcceiTarj",
or Second to Philebus, i?i this argumentative Cofnbat^ the
Dialogue, now before us, very properly, and conflfle7ttly
with the Rule ', which Plato feems to have laid down t9
himfelf in naming his Dialogues, hath the Name given it
of Philebus. In all the printed Editio?is it is in tit led
A Dialogue concerning Pleasure. The general Account
of it, jufl now given, pjows, that with equal reafon it might
be intitled A Dialogue concerning Mind. Bt/t, in truths
neither Pleafure, nor Mind, (confdered as intelligent,) is
the principal SubjeB, herein treated of . Inquiry i?ideed is
made into the nature (?/" Pleafure, and the nature of '^1\nd ;
but this is do?ie with no other apparent or profejfed View^
than to make it evident, that Neither of them, fingly, and
fepdrately from the Other, can ever co?tflitute the Happinefs of fuch a Compound-Being as Man. Not, that the

^ See the Synopfis, or General View, page 22.

Drift

The argument. 7
Drift of thefe Inquiry s is ;//^^r/y Negative, or tends 07ily to
JJjow, What is not the Chief Good of Man. For thz InfuffLcic72Cy of eitherMmd alo?.'e^ or Pleafiire aloite^ to Human
Happinefsy beijig 'in the comfe of the Dialogue acknow^
leged by Both Partys, naturally leads them to inquire
into the efTcntial nature of that Chief Good ; and What
it is, which either conftitutes or produces the Happinefs of
Ma?i. If then this Inquiry appears to be made ijt the
Philebus, a77d if the Dialogue is found to end with the
Refult of fuch Inquiry^ we prefmne^ that the Title, given
to it in this 7ra72flation, is the fttefl^ and the 7nof worthy
of it, as hei?ig expreffve of the principal Subjed', therein
treated of. Ficinus, however, i7ititles it de Summo Bono,
concerni72g the Sovereign Good, (abfolutely a72d univerfally,) without fpccifying its particular reference to the
Human Nature. And it jnujl be ad7nitted, that he is
very excufable ifi fo doing. For the Principle of T'hat
which will appear to be the Chief Good of Man, will appear alfo to be the Effence of Good, G(?(7(^Univerfal, and
the Good of Every Being in Nature. Be it obfe7'-ved, however, that, if the properTixX^ of this Dialogue beThat, which
is given it by Ficinus, it will follow, that the peculiar
Defign of it is to i7ivefligate the Divine Nature; a7id
to foi7U out to us, in What the Eflence of the Supreme
Being co77ftfl,s. But This is the great Defign of Plato in
all his Writi7tgs : every One of them hath This End ultimately

8 The ARGUMENT.
mately in View ; and All of them confpire together to
accomplijfj it. Perhaps indeed The Philebus contributes
more to it thaji any Oite other Dialogue. For in IVhat
Part of Nature^ in What Rank of Things^ thro What
Medium, doth the Divi?ie Being appear fo co7ifpicuous^ as
he does in the Mind, Heart, aiid Life of a wife and good
Man ? No other Beings (with whom We are acquainted
here on Earth,) hejides Man, appears to partake of thofe
pure Forms, the OhjeSis of the Divi7ie Mind : 720 other
Beiiigy than Man, appears to be endued with Confcience,
that is, with a Feeli7ig of God within him, or i7i his
own Heart : arid the Life of no other Particular Bei7igy
befdes an honeft and good Man, is a vifibk D if play of
thorow Integrity and univerfal Benevolence. By purifying our Ideas, we are, in fo7ne i/ieafure, united to the
Divine Mind ; by purifying our Hearts, we are tmited to
the Divine Will ; and by the Purity of our Lives, led in
the conflant PraSlife of Univerfal Juftice, we partake of
the Divine Goodnefs, and e7ijoy the Happinefs of that
Participation. Thro Wifdom and thro Virtue, thus it is,

that a Ma7i k7iows and feels within hinfelf Truth and

Good, never ceajing tofpri7ig up ; and thus he not only draws
from, but co7itinually drinks at their pure Foimtai7t.
Now 'tis well known, that the rational and ufual way of
difcovering the Virtue of fo7ne particular River-waters,
and how far they are corrupted by any extraneous Filth,
6 gathered