Nacar v Nistal

GR L-3306, December 8, 1982

Facts:
Nacar filed a petition for certiorari etc to annul order of respondent judge Nistal.The
order directed attachment of seven carabaos & stop judge from proceeding with case.
Japitana filed a claim against estate of Nacar with preliminary attachment. It was said
that Nacar about to dispose the property with intent to defraud. Nicar filed motion to
dismiss to dissolve writ of the preliminary injunction & attachment, Judge denied the
motion. The Supreme Court directed issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Japitana can file claims against estate of Isabelo Nacar.
Held:
No filing of money claim, ex-contracts by action against the admin is not allowed. It
should be filed in the administration proceeding of the estate of the deceased in the
case at bar, the claim of the respondent arising from a contract may be pursued only
in the same administrative proceeding tha t maybe taken to settle the estate of the
deceased.

Dora Perkins Anderson vs. Idonah Slade Perkins

GR L-15388 January 31, 1961

FACTS

On May 10, 1956, Dora Perkins Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the
supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins who allegedly
possessed of personal and real properties with a probate value of P5,000.00 and Dora
also filed an urgent petition for the estate. On the same day, the court issued an order
appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator.

Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased, opposed to the said
probate and the special administrator submitted an inventory of the assets of the
deceased at the time of his death.

ISSUE
Whether or not the special administrator may sell the properties of the late
Eugene Arthur Perkins

Two years later, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition
seeking authority to sell or give away to some charitable institution/s certain personal
properties. Court required the administrator to submit an inventory of the properties
and thus, he likewise submitted it. Idonah Perkins opposed to the said proposed sale.

Plaintiffs contention:
The special administrator has the authority to sell the properties of the late
Eugene Arthur Perkins. That the special administrator claims that
oppositor/defendant should allege on the properties which she did not want to
sell and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim.

HELD
No, the Supreme Court held that the special administrator can not sell the
property of the late Arthur Perkins.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. Both
the estate and and its value should be preserved.

Records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceeding has yet been taken or even started, to segregate the alleged
execusive property of the defendant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by
the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property.

Defendants contention:
Idorah Perkins contention was that the special administrator has no legal
authority to sell the properties because it was perishable in nature.
. That such properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself
and her deceased husband and the unauthorized removal of fine pieces of
furniture belonging to the estate had been made. because it was perishable in
nature.

Lower courts decision:

The lower court approved the proposed sale and also authorized the Sheriff of
Manila to conduct the same. Despite of the defendants Motion for Reconsideration,
the lower court denies such MR. (Motion for Reconsideration)

It does not appear that defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to point
out in which items in the inventory she did not want to sold. Also, it did not even
show that an inquirty was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

Lower courts decision was set aside and with costs against the special administrator.

Wills and Succession

Rights to Succession transmitted from the moment of death

in favor of the respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the lots subject of the
judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon; and
to surrender to private respondents the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens
title and other pertinent documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower court.

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I.

SUAREZ, JR.,EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON AND REGINIO I. SUAREZ,
PETITIONERS,

Issue:

VS.

Whether or not petitioners acquire rights over the property?

THECOURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO,

MA.CONCEPCION VITO AND VIRGINIA BANTA RESPONDENTS.
Decision:
G.R. No. 94918, September 02, 1992

Facts:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father, Marcelo Suarez died in 1955,
leaving five parcels of land located in Pasig and Metro Manila. Unfortunately,
the estate of Marcelo Suarez has not been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the
consolidated cases for rescission of contract, and were ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the
aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. Thus, the five the
parcels of land in Pasig and Metro Manila, were levied and sold, in favor of the
private respondents as the highest bidder. In 1984, before the expiration of the
redemption period, petitioners filed a an action against private respondents for
the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the
levied pieces of property. Petitioners allege that their rights were prejudiced
when the parcels of land are levied and sold. Because being strangers to the
case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable and that the five
parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution. On the contrary, Private respondents claim that the sale was valid
and that petitioners do not have the legal capacity to annul the sale because
they dont exercise any right over the property. The Court of first instance ruled

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners are co-owners of the parcels of land,
and they have rights over the property. Thus, the auction sale is invalid. Article
777 of the Civil Code provides that The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Hence, Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through
their own right as children of their deceased father. Furthermore, Article 888 of
the civil code provides that The legitime of the legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided. Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides: If there are two or more
legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.
Therefore, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to
the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied
and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interest.

Nelia Constantino, petitioner vs CA, respondent.

FACTS:
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan.
Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A.
Constantino, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total
land area of two hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot, owned in common
by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners mother and sister. An adjoining
lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and Consuelo
Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the
necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted - with several spaces left blank including the
specification as to the metes and bounds of the land - petitioner asked the heirs to
affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the
understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present
when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land
surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was
subsequently surveyed, subdivided. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan
and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of
Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to
petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included
the portion being occupied by the spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim. On 2 June
1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to
them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the subdivision plan and the
certificates of title; but to no avail. Thus, the case for annulment of the sale

Private respondents said that all the heirs signed the document before the land was
surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that
could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they
were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they
could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent
heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected
in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which
was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their
predecessor.
LOWER COURTS DECISION:
The trial court had doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into account that she was
not able to enumerate all the signatories to the document; while petitioner claimed
that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on
10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who testified that the
survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984; and, while petitioner alleged that the
document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the
same could not have been signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public
abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned.
Additionally, the trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as
reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot
4-B. Thus, on 27 September 1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
APPELLATE COURTS DECISION:
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial
court, and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its decision.

PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:

ISSUE:

Petitioner presented the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10
October 1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among
themselves the inherited property. In the same document, they caused the
subdivision of the property into two (2) lots and acknowledged the sale to petitioner
of the said lot. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued
TCTs in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and of petitioner.

Whether or not the sale of the subject property was valid

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:

HELD:
The Supreme Court stated that it is not whether the notary public had the authority to
acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether
respondents indeed appeared before him and signed the deed. However, evidence
shows that they did not.

They also found the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the
survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the
contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As
found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioners own witness
who positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October
1984 or six (6) days after the signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their
signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be
prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the
property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon the
assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding,
would be present when the property would be surveyed after obtaining permission
from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a
ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed without which the latter
would not have given their conformity thereto.
Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed,
having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer
certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus all the elements
of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was
employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to
enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to
the party seeking annulment. Another compelling reason for the annulment of the
document of settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly
manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A
and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were
typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were
not available at the time the document was formalized. The petition was DENIED.

G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999.

Facts:
The petitioners in the present claim alleged that they are the legal heirs of
the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 and Lot
No. 1132 with an located in Carmona, Cavite. They executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay on March 17,
1994. They also discovered that a portion, of the mentioned properties were titled in
the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation or Golden
Bay under Transfer Certificates of Title, on August 26 1994. Due to this, they filed a
complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF Regional Trial Court
in Imus, Cavite. They filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to implead new and
additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled upon learning that
Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in question. The Amended
Complaint was dismissed by the respondent court. They moved for reconsideration of
the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the. The
private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on August 12, 1995, [3] on the
grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, they have not established
their status as heirs, that the land is different from that of the defendants and that
the claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
respondent court dated October 25, 1995. The petitioners Petition for Certiorari
before this Court is an improper recourse. Appeal should have been made. The trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Plaintiff's contentions:

CASE DIGEST of Heirs of Yaptinchay et al v. Court of Appeals, Hon. Del Rosario,

Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation

The petitioners claimed are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 and Lot No. 1132 in Carmona,
Cavite. They discovered that a portion, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the
name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay).
They learned that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in question. They
also contended that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case
could proceed. It is their submission that the respondent court should have
proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same

case
Defendant's contentions:
The private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of
action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being
claimed is different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred
by laches.
Lower Court's decision:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Amended Complaint. . The motion for
reconsideration by the plaintiffs was granted by the RTC in an Order dated July 7,
1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended
Complaint. The petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail.
The same was denied by the RTC in its Order of February 23, 1996.
Appellate Court's decision:
The appellate court held that petition is not impressed with merit. To begin
with, petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse.
Their proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or
wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of
certiorari. Where appeal is available as a remedy, certiorari will not lie. Neither did
the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are legal heirs of said deceased and that they
have a right of the subject property.
Held:
The Court ruled that hold that the respondent court did the right thing in
dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, which stated no cause of action. In Travel
Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that: xxx If the
suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to

dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In
the case at bar, the petitioners are not heirs and that they do not have a right over
the subject property. The petitioners were not able to present sufficient evidence to
prove that they are the legal heirs of the deceased and that they were entitled to
inherit said property. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.The Petition under consideration is hereby dismissed

VALENTE RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE

SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I.
SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez' marriage was blessed with both
material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,Eufrocina,
Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo, all surnamed Suarez. During their
marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired
numerous properties, After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and
herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, Curiously, despite the
partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime,
remained in the couple's name. In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal
Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's
shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta,
Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito in consolidated cases for Rescission
of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739.
Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1,
rendered judgment against Teofista. When the judgment of the CFI became
final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on

execution on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal
Realty. Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June
21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, for the annulment of the
auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties.
PETITONERS CONTENTION: Petitioner Valente insists however that,
following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents
must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to
annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista
and Marcelo Sr.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law

applicable at the time of the institution of the case: The rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
LOWER COURT: issued an Order directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject
properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or alienating the
improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and
Maria Concepcion in peaceful possession thereof, and (4) to surrender to them
the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.

COURT OF APPEALS: CA dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents'

petition for two reasons. First, as purported case for certiorari it fails to show
how the respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Secondly, as far as Teofista Suarez is concerned,
she cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the
consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal
capacity. Since she did not appeal from the decision, she cannot say that the
judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong to the corporation.

Issue: Whether or not respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr.
before they can file action to annul the judicial sale of what is the conjugal
property of teofista and Marcelo, Sr.

Held: SC reversed the decision of RTC and Court of Appeals.

It is no longer needed. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the
petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had
been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay.
In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same
document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's
paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with
her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became
owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover
Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's,
and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties
not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal
properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to
Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession,
Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of
law to his compulsory heirs.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ELLA GAGARANI ASOK et.al.

G.R. No. 172248 | September 17, 2008
FACTS:
The spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land which were
inherited by their eleven children upon their death. One of the lands inherited was a
lot covered by a free patent issued on July 19, 1967, located at Misamis Oriental with
an area of 39,552 sq. m.
Pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with quitclaim executed by the
spouses children, the subject property was inherited by Denison Asok (Asok). As a
result, the title was cancelled a new one was issued and registered in his name.

On August 31, 1989, Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok,
borrowed P100,000 from petitioner DBP and mortgaged the subject lot as collateral
to guarantee payment of the loan. On due date, however, they failed to pay the loan
and the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135. DBP emerged
as the highest bidder with a bid of P163,297.
Asok died on in 1993 and was succeeded by his surviving spouse and children
(respondents). Respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against DBP invoking
their right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141 which states that
every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance. It was later on
dismissed by the RTC stating that the one-year-period should be reckoned from the
date of sale or on August 28, 1991 then the five-year period should be counted from
the expiration of the redemption period, i.e., November 28, 1992. Therefore,
respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase.
However, the complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which was beyond the prescribed
period.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. It held that the period of redemption started from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus,
respondents had until December 24, 1998 to repurchase the property and the
complaint was seasonably filed.
DBP contends that Asoks cannot claim the right under Sec. 119 which covers
homesteads and free patents because the free patent issued to Asoks parents had
already been cancelled and a new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the
property mortgaged to it was no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT.
ISSUES:
(1) whether Sec. 119 of CA 141 is applicable in this case;
(2) whether respondents are the legal heirs of the patentees and
(3) whether the right to repurchase has already prescribed.
HELD:
1. YES. The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it. Hence,
the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees son (and a new title in his

name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy
behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee.
Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call
for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but
those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full
advantage of the benefits the law confers.
2. YES. DBP argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because
respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren. This is not true.
In line with the rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal
heirs. It is used in a broad sense and the law makes no distinctions. The term "legal
heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person
who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.
Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether
succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily
compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn
inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of
the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the
land.
3. NO. The issue was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land
acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx
If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem
the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of
sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the
property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period.
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his
or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate
of sale. The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the
one-year redemption period. Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December
24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993.
Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24,
1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently,
the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.

Aluad vs. Aluad

FACTS:
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised
by the childless spouses Crispin and Matilde Aluad.
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and
682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the
lots to herself. On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a "Deed of Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria
covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin on the
condition that it will be effect upon Matildes death and that she will retain the right to
use and dispose of such properties during her lifetime. On August 26, 1991, Matilde
sold Lot 676 to Zenaido. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last
will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her
"remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC,
for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and
damages against respondent.
PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:
That Maria Aluad is the sole daughter of Crispin and Matilde Aluad and that they
succeeded their right by inheritance and that the six lots have been donated inter vivos
to their mother.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
That Lot 674 is owned by the respondent as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last
Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad while Lot 676 was purchased by him from
Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof

respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to
Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and testament had not yet been probated.

ISSUE/S:
WON the donation is mortis causa and should comply with the formalities of a will.
HELD:
The Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having the
following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her
(Matildes) lifetime. Matilde also continued to exercise acts of possession over the
property while she was still alive.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed but they were not, as:
(a) it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of
the Civil Code
(b) the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of which clause
is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of
signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will; and
(c) the requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.
Respondent is the rightful owner of lot 674.

LOWER COURT DECISION:

Matilde could have not transmitted any right over Lot 674 and 676 over to respondent,
Zenaido, because she have previously alienated said lots over to Maria via Deed of
Donation. The donation is inter vivos.
APPELLATE DECISION:
The CA reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will (Art. 805). While the appellate court declared

Agustin Barrera, et. al. vs. Jose Tampoco, et. al.

G.R. No. L-5263, February 17, 1954

Facts:
Olivia Villapaa died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On December
31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Barrera in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by Olivia Villapaa and for the
appointment of the petitioner as executor. According to the petition the
properties left by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and the heirs instituted are
nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line.
Oppositors - Appellees Contention:
Jose Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the testatrix
in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was not executed
and attested in accordance with the law, that the testatrix lacked testamentary
capacity, that there was undue influence and pressure in its execution, that the
signature of Olivia Villapaa was obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the
testamentary provisions are illegal.
Appelants Contention:
It was established through evidence that the niece of the decedent, Pilar
Taedo asked and requested Modesto Puno, a lawyer and justice of the peace
of Concepcion Tarlac, to have a conference with her aunt Olivia Villapaa in
Manila. In their meeting, Villapaa sought the assistance of Atty. Puno in the
preparation of her will, giving him the names of the heirs and the properties to
be left. She then asked Atty. Puno to secure the description of the properties
from Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and Pilars husband. Atty. Puno noted
the wishes of Villapaa and prepared the will in his office in Concepcion as
there was then no available typewriter. On July 17, 1948, Atty. Puno returned
to the house of Villapaa carrying with him one original and three copies, in
typewritten form, of the will he drafted in accordance to the instructions of
Villapaa. He read the will to Villapaa and she said that it was all right. After
lunch, Atty. Puno manifested that two other witnesses were necessary. Hence,
Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were then living in the first floor of
the house, were requested to serve as witnesses. Both of them agreed. All four

of them, the testatrix Villapaa, Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio, were seated
around a small rectangular table in the sala. At this juncture, Atty. Puno gave a
copy of the will to Villapaa, Lacson and Antonio while he retained one. The
lawyer again read the will out loud, advising the rest to check their respective
copies. As Villapaa agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four
copies on the lines previously placed by Atty. Puno, followed successively by
Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio, all in the presence of each other. After the
signing, Atty. Puno gave the two copies to the testator and retained the two
other copies. The testator left her will to Barrera for safekeeping on October 17,
1948 when she was taken to the UST Hospital.
Lower Courts Decision:
After protracted trial, and more than a year after submission of the case, a
decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on August 11,
1951, disallowing the will. The court found that Olivia Villapaa had
testamentary capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud, trickery or undue
influence in the execution of the will, and that petition of forced heirs is not a
ground for denying probate; but the will was disallowed because it was not the
personal last will and testament of the deceased and it was not based on the
finding that Olivia Villapaa did not furnish the names of the persons instituted
as heirs and that the will was not read to her before she signed it. The second
ground is premised on the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio
was not present when Olivia Villapaa and attesting witness Honorio Lacson
signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by attesting witness
Modesto Puno; and that Olivia Villapaa saw Antonio sign only two or three
times.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the probate of the will proper?
Appelate Courts Decision & Decision:
No. After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the
conflicting evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in
denying probate of the will.
Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno, Honorio Lacson,
and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified positively that the will was signed

by the testatrix and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, and that
it was read to the testatrix before being signed. Antonio testified that when he
arrived, Atty. Puno was half through affixing his signatures, and that the
testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. Intrinsically, we
cannot state that Antonio spoke the truth, since, in the first place, the
attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in the second
place, there is enough evidence on the record to show that Antonio never gave
the slightest indication that he was not present when the testatrix left before
Antonio finished signing. Modesto Puno is a lawyer and at the time a justice of
the peace, and it is improbable that he would unnecessarily risk his honor and
reputation. Indeed, the trial court gave the impression that Atty. Puno was
anxious to strictly meet the requirements of the law and in the absence, as in
the case at bar, of any reason for a hasty completion, we do not believe that
Atty. Puno would have allowed the signing of the will to be proceeded with
unless three attesting witnesses were already present.
In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court believed the testimony
of Antonio to the effect that he arrived at the place of the signing at about 2:30
in the afternoon, and thereby found that a greater part of the proceeding was
already finished. We are of the opinion that the specification of the time of the
signing refers to an immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse
of time, might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the
execution of Oliva's will. What is important and decisive and this should be
impressed in the mind of an attorney preparing and taking charge of the
signing of will, is that the testatrix and each of the three attesting witnesses
must affix their signatures in the presence of one another. In the case before
us, Atty. Puno and Honorio.
Another point invoked by the trial court against the probate of the will is the
circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified that he placed the lines on which
the testatrix and the witnesses were to sign before he read the document to the
testatrix whom he gave the original witness Lacson testify that Atty. Puno read
the original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty. Puno
placed the lines for signatures. The discrepancy again refers to a minor detail
which is not sufficient to negative the truthfulness of Atty. Puno and Honorio
Lacson on the main and important fact that the will was signed by the testatrix
and the three attesting witnesses in the presence of each other.

In the holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaa, the trial court found
that it was not read to her; and this finding was premised on the alleged
contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson regarding the sequence of the
reading of the will and the placing of the lines for signatures, and regarding the
question whether a copy or the original was handed to the testatrix. As we
have already observed, the discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which
cannot vitally detract from the credibility of Atty. Puno to the effect that upon
arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaa at about noon, he read the will to her
with a view to finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is not necessary
that said will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the
witnesses.
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva
Villapaa in leaving her properties to the person named in the will, and omitting
therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court itself
found the will to have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a
situation it becomes our duty to give expression to her will.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by Oliva
Villapaa on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed.
Montinola vs CA
FACTS:
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F.
Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional
Trial Court) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola
executed on January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless
on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real
properties to specified persons.
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an
urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all
the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May
5, 1981 6 appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate
of deceased.
PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:

Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez contended that the will was executed according to the
formalities set by law without undue influence. (not really stated on the case.
Assumed lang bec. wala naman siyang contention. hehe)

Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without
rhyme or reason, being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares
an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of
testatrix.

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24 it was held
Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner) who passed away during the pendency of the
case and was substituted by her heirs , the only surviving sister of the deceased but
who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging
that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself
and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full
possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue
influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries
named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder
of the estate.
LOWER COURTS DECISION:
The probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the petition to be
conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.
APPELLATE COURTS DECISION:
It affirmed the decision of the probate court. It also subsequently denied the motions
for new trial and reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed according to the formalities of law
without any undue influence.
HELD:
(Since petitioner's motion was filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of
the period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the
following day, September 25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
was filed on October 30,1986, it was obviously filed out of time.)
Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory because of the
expiration of the period to appeal by the petitioner, it is no longer within the province
of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due
execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now conclusive.
But assuming that the case can still be reviewed on merits, the Supreme Court ruled
that the petition is bound to fail.

The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly
knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's estate is an exceptional case. It is
true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889... (baka
itanong niya lang to hehe)
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may
dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity
to succeed.
With regard to petitioners insistence that the fact that in her holographic will the
testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of
her mind, the court ruled on the negative, citing Art. 841 of the Civil Code which
provides that
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or
such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so
instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be
complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her
real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was
of unsound mind. The portion of the estate not disposed of shall pass on to the heirs
of the deceased in intestate succession.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines,
it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs
are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate.

The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or
improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on
mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise
of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence
that it was actually exercised. The petition was DENIED.

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE

SAND
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS:
On November 25, 1982 Annie Sand died, leaving behind a holographic
will. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto
and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah
Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr.,
and their children.

The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. This
probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure
to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix. While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question
was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix.
Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the
handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and
categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in
question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the
testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the
holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been complied with.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown
any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the
testatrix.
APPELLATE COURTS DECISION:

PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,
fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of
her estate by will.

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the
decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code,
which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that neither
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero, who contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del
Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
LOWER COURTS DECISION:

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration

in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same
by his full signature.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Annie Sands holographic will was executed in

accordance with the formalities prescribed by law?

and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen.

HELD:

Appellants Contention: Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was

filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen Garcia, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. But
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which
is as follows:

YES. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the

requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw
vs. Relova, this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have
not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself.

Testate of Edward Christensen

Facts: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California,
where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he
came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will
executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared as acknowledged natural
daughter. It is in accordance with the provisions that the executor in his final account
and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia.

"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal

property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile."
Lower Courts Decision: The court ruled that Edward Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law
of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable.
Issue: WON the Philippine laws will govern in the succession
Held: There is no question that Edward Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that
at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following
facts admitted by the executor himself. In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile
of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in
New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came
to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired
a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately
abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California. The law that
governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State
of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the above-cited case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of in

which he was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one
for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that the court should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of law
rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
express mandate. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides
no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced
heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.

CRISTINA BELLIS, MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,or $40,000.00 each, and

c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives EDWARD A.
BELLIS, HENRY A. BELLIS, ALEXANDER BELLIS, and ANNA BELLISALLSMAN, EDWARD G. BELLIS, WA LTER S. BELLIS, and DOROTHY E.
BELLIS in equal shares.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
The LOWER COURT issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executors final account, report and administration, and project of partition.
Relying upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is which did not provide for legitimes
ISSUE:
Which law must apply in executing the will of the deceased Texas Law or
Philippine Law?
HELD:

Bellis vs. Bellis

G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
FACTS:
AMOS G. BELLIS was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death.
He executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner

The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law(which is the national law of the deceased), here are no legitimes. The
renvoi doctrinecannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country ad a domiciliary of another. In the said
case, it is not disputed that the deceased was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.

a) $240,000.00 to his first wife MARY E. MALLEN

Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the
intrinsic validity of provisions of will, and (d) the capacity to succeed.

b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate childrenAMOS BELLIS, JR., MARIA

They provide that

ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country to where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.

Lourdes Dorotheo vs. CA

Facts:
Private respondents, Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintanawere are the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. After Alejandro's
death, petitioner, Lourdes Legaspi/Dorotheo, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the
latter's will and testament. The probate court admitted the will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a
"Motion to Declare The Will Intrinsically Void."
Lower Courts Decision:
The trial court granted the motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration.
Appellate courts decision:
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for
failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period granted. The dismissal
become final and executory and a corresponding entry of judgment was
forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals. The lower court, to implement the
final and executory order, issued a writ of execution. Judge Zain B. Angas set
aside the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence, not final in character. Private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which nullified the
assailed Orders of Judge Zain. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners Contention:
Petitioner contended that in issuing the assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot
be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear
the case.Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to
some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although she admitted that they were not married to each other.
Defendants Contention:
That a last will and testament admitted to probate court that was declared
intrinsically void in an order and has become final and executory cannot be
given effect

Issue:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that a final decision
or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be. In setting aside the Order that had attained finality, the trial court in
effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. The Court
stressed that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a
superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of the courts and
nullify the essence of review. The Court also reiterated the rule that a judgment
on a probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. With respect
to the last will and testament, the Court upheld the trial court in holding that the
rules of intestacy shall apply. According to the Court, although the will is
extrinsically valid, its provisions however are not in accordance with the laws of
succession rendering it intrinsically void, hence, the law mandates that the
rules of intestacy shall apply.
In addition to this, under the law of Succession, EVEN IF A WILL WAS
VALIDLY EXECUTED, IF THE TESTATOR PROVIDES FOR DISPOSITIONS
THAT DEPRIVES OR IMPAIRS THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF THEIR LEGITIME
OR RIGHTFUL INHERITANCE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS ON
SUCCESSION, THE UNLAWFUL PROVISION/DISPOSITIONS THEREOF
CANNOT BE GIVEN EFFECT. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a

determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity
is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that
an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if
the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that
deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already
determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void.
Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had
the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should
no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its
belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to
have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.

FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO,

substituted
by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by
Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In
refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is
provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of
notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will
is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which
does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of

these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just
aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS:
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on
the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix
Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which
was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the
decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read
in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc,
Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at
memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at
binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sangayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat
(Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa
akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking
pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang
panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at
nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat
ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block
24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang
lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block
24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang
pasubalit at kondiciones;

Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng

huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang maglagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo,
1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling
Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat
at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga
saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng
lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod

ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
1
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-8
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of
the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was
alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and
that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:
The plaintiff and appellee contends that the attestation clause is "a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of
the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.

LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981

Azuela also contends that the signatures of the three witnesses on the lefthand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures
are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the lefthand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three
witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to
add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.

JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.

He also argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause
is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he
termed as the substantial compliance rule.

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed
by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed
their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She
also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with
law. She pointed out that the decedents signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature
did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
petition.
LOWER COURTS DECISION:
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the
modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a willwith
the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under
the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left
margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the
purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
APPELATE COURTS DECISION:
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered
the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of probate.

HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which
the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most
importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate.
A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal
requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant
therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of
the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of
interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation
clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said
Section 618.
Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a
more liberal construction through the substantial compliance rule.
However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses
are three or the will was notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether
all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.
The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May
28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781): the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of
resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with law (attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it
was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof, and it
was not acknowledge before a notary public) and, hence, should be
admitted to probate

However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence

aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately,
of the will itself. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This
requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible interpolation or

omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or
decrease in the pages.
Following Caneda case, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if
the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case, however, there could have
been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the
Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in
the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted
for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank
was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses
appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of
the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the
will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner
of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures
to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation
clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed
the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause,
such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards
a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his
act or deed.
The case of Cagro v. Cagro is material on this point. As in this case, "the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin." While three (3) Justices considered the
signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six
(6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had
not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does

not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit
where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed
and sworn to by the executor. It may not have been said before, but a notarial
will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements
under Art. 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806.
The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be acknowledged, and
not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator
and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they
had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides
a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the
will.
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in
the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of
each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign
each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both
pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the socalled "logical end" of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with
Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that
these two requirements be construed as mandatory. Taken in isolation, these
omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet
even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they
need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due
regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from
makes the probate denial inexorable.

probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On
April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan.
PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.

Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
Defendant Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York
law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law
should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and
sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings,
which Salud failed to give.
LOWER COURTS DECISION:

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ vs TOLETE G.R. No. 76714

FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans
lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children,
Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to
his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated. In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his
property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee.
He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the

The last will and testament was subsequently denied probate and on April 30, 1985,
the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the
reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and
testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders
theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February
21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried
property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and
proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances
and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in
question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the
law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills.
APPELLATE COURTS DECISION: None, it was filed directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws
or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of them.
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of
wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is
too literal and simplistic an approach.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since
the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in
all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the

executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The order of the respondent Judge
was SET ASIDE.