The lawyer and the moneys or properties of his

clients
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the client's interest are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.
Rule 138 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys;
agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. xxx
Rule 138 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds;
contempt. - When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded,
he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions;
but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to
a criminal prosecution.
Rule 138 Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens. - An attorney shall
have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client which have lawfully come into his possession
and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the
time when he shall have caused a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the

court rendering such judgment, or issuing such

execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof
to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements.
Lawyer took custody of 2 cars subject of
preliminary attachment
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of
Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the
court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los
counsel.
Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of
taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed
the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had
no business using it. He did not inform the court or at
least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car.
What is worse is that he took custody of them without
so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its
authority. - Atty. Salomon Jr. v. Atty. Frial, A.C. No. 7820
[2008]
Lawyer withdraw money deposited to the Branch
Clerk of Court without informing his client
Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D.
Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final
demand letter for the accounting and return of the
P255,000. Respondent failed to reply.
Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath
when he received the sum of money representing the
monthly rentals intended for his client, without
accounting for and returning such sum to its rightful
owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity
as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held
the money in trust for complainant.
Respondent should have immediately notified
complainant of the trial courts approval of the motion
to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the
funds to him, respondent could have collected any lien
which he had over them in connection with his legal
services, provided he gave prompt notice to
complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere
fact that the client owes him attorneys fees. In this
case, respondent did not even seek to prove the
existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to
retain the money.
Respondents failure to turn over the money to
complainant despite the latters demands gives rise to
the presumption that he had converted the money for
his personal use and benefit. - Almandrez Jr. v. Atty.
Langit, A.C. No. 7057 [2006]

Business transaction between lawyer and client

is discourage
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to
exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard that is required in business dealings where
the parties trade at "arms length." Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are
disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorneys favor. - Chua and Hsia v. Atty. Mesina Jr.,
A.C. No. 4904 [2004]
No services rendered,
money must be returned
It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take
any step to assist complainant in her case, charging
P56,000.00 is improper. While giving legal advice and
opinion on complainants problems and those of her
family constitutes legal service, however, the
attorneys fee must be reasonable. Obviously,
P56,000.00 is exorbitant.
We cannot understand why respondent initially
demanded P8,000.00 as filing fee from complainant
when he very well knew that the docket fee for Civil
Case No. 00-044 had been paid. If it was intended as
a docket fee for another case, why did he not file the
corresponding complaint?
Respondent lawyer did not return the money to
complainant despite demand following his failure to file
the case. - Dalisay v. Atty. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 5655
[2006]
Issuing and keeping of receipts are practices of
accountability

Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the

course of his professional employment, [a lawyer] had
the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients
(a) when they became due, or
(b) upon demand.
- Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]
Lawyer should not deposit the funds in his
personal account
For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his
personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and
not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the
memorandum and yet not return the amount of
P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach
of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on
his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing
that he had spent the amounts for the particular
purposes intended. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No.
8253 [2011]
Depositing it in his personal account with the consent
of client is ethical?
Lending money to client
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture
with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his
client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such
as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672
[2009]
Purpose of prohibiting lending of money to client

Ethical and practical considerations made it both

natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if
not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for
his own records. He was all too aware that he was
accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the
clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts. Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers

independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
the clients cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C.
No. 6672 [2009]

When to deliver funds of clients

Ill-effects of lending money to clients

If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an

interest in the subject matter of the case or an

additional stake in its outcome.

Appropriating the entire award is a violation of

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01

Either of these circumstances may:

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be

paid for the legal services he has extended to his client
but such right should not be exercised whimsically
by appropriating to himself the money intended
for his clients. There should never be an instance
where the victor in litigation loses everything he
won to the fees of his own lawyer. - Rivera v. Atty.
Angeles, A.C. No. 2519 [2000]

a. lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery

rather than that of his client, or
b. to accept a settlement which may take care of his
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672
[2009]
Rule 16.01 includes money judgment in favor of
client
There is no question that the money or property
received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to
the latter. Conformably with these canons of
professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer
is obliged to render an accounting of all the property
and money she has collected for her client. This
obligation includes the prompt reporting and
accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by
reason of a favorable judgment to his client. - Bayonla
v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808 [2011]
Lawyer and client must agree
with the amount before retaining lien
is validly applied
In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the
client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of
attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when
the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer
for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not
arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to
the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove
the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or the proper motion with the proper
court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a
lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the
funds in his hands in payment of his claimed
compensation even when there is a
disagreement between him and his client would
not only be violative of the trust relationship
between them but can also open the door to possible
abuse by those who are less than mindful of their
fiduciary duty. - J.K. Mercado and Sons v. Atty. De Vera
and Atty. Bandalan, A.C. No. 3066 [2001]
Misuse of filing fee violates the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of
respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint
on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for
himself of the money given for the filing fee. - Burbe v.
Atty. Magulta, AC No. 99-634 [2002]

Obligation of lawyer once the money or property

intended for his client is received should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own
or be used by him. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,
A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000
Misappropriation is not required
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy
had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs.
Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on
February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that
respondent failed to promptly report that
amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his
professional responsibility.
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the
rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether
the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the
bar. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April
6, 2000
Avoid keeping the money of client
Keeping the money in his possession without his
client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the
money belonging to his client. This situation should, at
all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like
judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also
appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice
system would remain undisturbed. - Judge Angeles v.
Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000
Acquisition of properties subject of litigation
Contingent fee arrangement does not violate
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client
stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said
prohibition under because the payment of said fee
is not made during the pendency of the litigation
but only after judgment has been rendered in
the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the
1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
may have a lien over funds and property of his
client and may apply so much thereof as may be

necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.

- Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]
Limitations of contingent fee
As long as the lawyer does not exert undue
influence on his client, that no fraud is committed
or imposition applied, or that the compensation is
clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a
contract for contingent fee is valid and
enforceable. Moreover, contingent fees were
impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client
relationships when the contract of services was
entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]
Appearance of impropriety if judge purchase
property after litigation
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not
violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which
was in litigation in his court, it was, however,
improper for him to have acquired the same. He
should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but
also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "...
it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
respondent to have purchased or acquired a
portion of a piece of property that was or had
been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife
were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J [1982]
The property must be the very subject of
litigation for Article 1491 to apply
It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics prohibits the lawyer from
purchasing any interest in the subject-matter of
the litigation which he is conducting, and Article
1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code prohibits
him from acquiring by purchase or assignment the
property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his
profession. But in those cases where these provisions
were applied, the rights or properties purchased
by the lawyer were the very subject of the
litigation handled by him. - Guevara v. Calalang,
A.M. No. 681 [1982]
Levied property in satisfaction of damages can
be properly acquired by lawyer

In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired

rights by assignment was not the subject of Civil Case
No. 2171 in which he approved (sic) as counsel for
Bernabe Flores and others. The said case was purely
one for damages and did not involve the lot in
question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution
after judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Therefore Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did
not apply. Consequently, respondent had not violated
the said provision of law. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M.
No. 681 [1982]
It was not professional misconduct or unethical
practice for the respondent to acquire the rights and
interests of his client to the 439 square meter parcel of
land subject of the administrative charges because the
land was not involved in the litigation he was handling.
The land was acquired by Bernabe Flores in an
execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment
secured in the course of Civil Case No. 2171. The case
handled by the respondent was for damages. Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]
Withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to
pay attorneys fees violates Article 1491 of the
NCC
The withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to
pay attorneys fees to petitioners counsel, Atty. De
Guzman, Jr., violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code
which forbids lawyers from acquiring by assignment,
property and rights which are the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession. Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting. The assailed
transaction falls within the prohibition because the
Deed assigning the amount of P672,900.00 to Atty. De
Guzman, Jr., as part of his attorneys fees was executed
during the pendency of this case with the Court of
Appeals. In his Motion to Intervene, Atty. De Guzman,
Jr., not only asserted ownership over said amount, but
likewise prayed that the same be released to him. Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]
Even if litigant voluntarily assigned the amount
That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned
the subject amount to his counsel did not remove
their agreement within the ambit of the prohibitory
provisions. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846
[2004]
Assignment of property violates
Article 1491
We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's
opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer
has not paid money for it and the property was merely
assigned to him in consideration of legal services

rendered at a time when the property is still the

subject of a pending case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte,
A.M. No. 3216 [1992]

delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall

within the purview of Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty.
Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210 [2004]

Prohibition still applies even if lessee is a

separate juridical person

Certiorari proceeding still bars purchase of

property under Article 1491

Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the

assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose
Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS,
and respondent signed merely as an agent of the
latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are
covered by the prohibition against any
acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties
involved in litigation in which he takes part. To
rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial
approval on an arrangement which, in effect,
circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law.
For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate
juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the
obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs
of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS
DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the
contractual relationship created between his
client Felix Leong and his family partnership
over properties involved in the ongoing testate
proceedings. - Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No.
93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer.

Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A
thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to
the judicial action of the judge. - Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, A.M. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 [1991]

Mortgage contract included in the prohibition

To state that mortgages are not included within the
prohibition is to open the door to an indirect
circumvention of that statutory injunction, acquisition
of the property being merely postponed till
eventual foreclosure.
Respondent asserts further that Article 1491[5] does
not apply to judgment creditors of which, he claims, he
was one. Under ordinary circumstances, the argument
of respondent could be considered plausible.
Unfortunately, however, as heretofore explained, the
mortgage was executed in violation of Article
1491[5] so that this Article has a direct bearing on this
case and respondent cannot escape its provision.
Having violated the same, he cannot be considered in
the general run of a judgment creditor. - Fornilda, et.
al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No. L-72306 [1989]
Mere demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not
violate the rule
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of
the property in litigation since the respondent only
made a written demand for its delivery which the
complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for
delivery of the litigated property does not cause
the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
Even assuming arguendo that such demand for

Criticisms against the courts and judges

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly
attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court
hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS
OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY
WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Duty of Lawyers
As part of the machinery for the administration of
justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore
irregular and questionable practices of those
sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information
that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is
incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court
so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or
even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity
of, and the publics trust in, the judicial system. Fudot

v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008

October 24, 2008
Requirements when raising grievances against
judges
The Court is not against lawyers raising
grievances against erring judges but the rules
clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure
for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty.
Bagabuyo A.C. No. 7006 [2007]
A scurrilous attack
We recall his use of the following words and phrases:
abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the
judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.
Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March
10, 2006
Offensive language
They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a court of
technicalities for validly dismissing their defectively
prepared petition.
They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting,
in their view, an incompetent judge.
The Court of Appeals dismissal of the case shows
itsimpatience and readiness to punish
petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity
and such dismissalsmacks of retaliation and
does not augur for the cold neutrality and
impartiality demanded of the appellate court.Asean Pacific Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al.,
G.R. No. 162525 [2008]
Intemperate language
His characterization of the decision of the respondent
Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the
winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in
plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it
was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with
"perfidious character," although the petitioners as
plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in
the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his
charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused
with that confusion which is the natural
product of having been born, nurtured and
brought up amongst the crowded surroundings
of the non-propertied class. - Sps. Tiongco v. Hon.
Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995
Foul language
The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant
against the respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in

Robe," "Swindlers in Robe," "corrupt justices who

were only sowing judicial terrorism," as well as
his vilification of the Chief Justice whom he called
"Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of
acceptable behavior. Complaint of Mr. Aurelio
Indencia Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30SC, June 9, 2005
Proscribed language
Proscribed then are, inter alia:
1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes
high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration or
2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the integrity of the members of this Court
and to degrade the administration of justice by this
Court of offensive and abusive language or
3. abrasive and offensive language or
4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter
addressed to the judge or
5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for
remarks. - Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No.
115932 January 25, 1995
Not disrespectful, abusive or slanderous
We cannot say that the use of the adjective
"insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful, abusive or
slanderous. Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et.
al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October 18, 2007
Constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution
Purpose of parliamentary immunity
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one,
however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense.

Defensor-Santiago case

Statements of an accused lawyer

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered

on the Senate floor:

Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked

because of his failure to appear for a criminal trial
wherein he was charged as a defendant with driving
while intoxicated. Upon his release from jail Polk issued
to the news media from his law office the following
written statement:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in

the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that,
I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x. - Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399
[2009]
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court
would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that
non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not
be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case,
the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court.
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon
8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,
DISMISSED.

I consider this one more awkward attempt by a

dishonest and unethical district attorney and a
perverse judge to assure me an unfair trial.
Questionable conduct on the part of those
charged with administration of justice does little
to foster respect for the law.
- Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]
Statements were made as a citizen
The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in
response to the manner in which he was treated
as a citizen and not as an attorney. At no time was
Polk an attorney of record or in any way acting in his
capacity as an attorney in the criminal
proceedings against him, nor do the remarks
purport to be made in his capacity as an attorney. Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]
There is no dichotomy of a lawyers personality
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in
his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and
a mere citizen at another. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty.
Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004
Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11
Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing
on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No.
2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his
motion. Judge advised him to tone down his voice
but instead, the respondent shouted at the top
of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for
direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite
me!. Judge cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent reentered the courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file
gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you! Judge ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent
out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt
of court for the second time.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom
completely disregards the latters role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent

publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge

Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of
the law against the latter, the respondent effectively
acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in
his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a
matter that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad
light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September
28, 2011

should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but

respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyers
arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and
should be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a
"sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive
congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. N.H.
Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004

Intention and disclaimer not a defense

While most of her statements were in the form of

questions instead of categorical assertions, the
effect is still the same: they constitute a stinging
affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend
to undermine the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.

Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is

that he acted in good faith and was merely motivated
by his duty to defend the interest of his client. His
disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is not a
ground for exoneration. His intent must be
determined by a fair interpretation of the language
employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any reader
must have understood them to mean. Borromeo v.
CA, G.R. No. L-39253 November 24, 1978
Making threats
In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon
11 of Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge
that if his motions were not granted, respondent
judge would be administratively charged. To be
sure, the threat made against respondent judge was
not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it was
a threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and
abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded
accusations, or intemperate words tending to obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the court in administering
justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a
pleading. Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, A.M.
No. RTJ-00-1528, March 28, 2000
Threat of Impeachment
It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the
members of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a
judge or justice with investigation and prosecution for
official acts done by him in the regular exercise of
official duty subverts and undermines the
independence of the judiciary.
- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against
Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005
Offensive language against complainant
proscribed
Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language

Statements in form of questions still proscribed

She posed the query, "Nasaan ang katarungan?

(Where is justice?)," implying that this Court failed to
dispense justice in her case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v.
Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009
Direct contempt if submitted in the same court
In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading
containing derogatory, offensive and malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is
direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable
summarily. - Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]
Post litigation criticisms
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a postlitigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the
court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed.
However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication
is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1)
where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in
other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there
is a clear and present danger that the administration of
justice would be impeded. PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos.
115908-09 March 29, 1995
Contempt and Disciplinary proceeding are not
the same
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is
designed to vindicate the authority of the court;
on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary
proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to

preserve and protect the court and the public

from the official ministrations of persons unfit or
unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose
of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to
safeguard the functions of the court and should
thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on
the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the
exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme
Court is to assure respect for orders of such
court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are
responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as
a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered
res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct. In the same manner an
attorney's conviction for contempt was not
collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent
disbarment proceeding in which the court found in
his favor on essentially the same facts leading to
conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice
to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as
a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering
that they have distinct objects and for each of them a
different procedure is established. Contempt of court
is governed by the procedures laid down under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the Practice of law are governed by
file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos.
115908-09 March 29, 1995
The test of allowable criticisms of a judges
decision
Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in
good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., et. al. v.
Distribution Management Association of the
Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
Degree of lawyers remark or comment

enhance respect.- Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,

270-271 (1941)
Admonition to judges
More than once in the past, we had occasion to
admonish judges not to be onion-skinned when
confronted by dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their
power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to be
used for the purpose of exacting silent submission to
their rulings and orders however questionable or unjust
they may be. - Sesbreo v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ88-272 February 6, 1990
Free speech in democratic government
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. - Texas v
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)
Limited freedom of expression?
It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen
surrenders his right to freedom of expression when he
becomes a licensed attorney in this state. The Supreme
Court has built a substantial line of cases where the
Constitution has been read to limit and restrain the
state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for
attorneys. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp.
784 [1974]
Doctrine of privilege communications in
pleadings and judicial proceedings
Concept of privileged communication [speech]
1. Privileged communication as rule of evidence
2. Privileged communication as basis to keep
confidential the secrets or confidences of client
3. Privileged speech in congress

Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude

of remark or comment in the furtherance of causes
they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be
pardoned some infelicities of phrase. In re: Complaint
against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263, October 28, 1958

4. Privileged communications made in the course of

juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions

Is the judiciary onion-skinned?

Rule 130 Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of

privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:

The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be

won by shielding judges from published criticism
wrongly appraises the character of . public opinion.
For it is a prized . privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions. And an enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would

1. Privileged Communication as rule of evidence

(b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his

client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client

and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge

of which has been acquired in such capacity;
Essential factors to establish the existence of
the attorney-client privilege communication
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
- Ma. Luisa Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda, A.C.
No. 6711, July 3, 2007
2. Privileged communication as basis to keep
confidential the secrets or confidences of client
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences
or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him
of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend
himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of
his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents
thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written
consent of his client, give information from his files
to an outside agency seeking such information for
auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a
client of the firm to partners or associates thereof
unless prohibited by the client.

Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures

as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or
using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet
conversation about a client's affairs even with
members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has
been consulted about a particular case except to
avoid possible conflict of interest.
RPC Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or
solicitor. Revelation of secrets. In addition to the
proper administrative action, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging
from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional
duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall
prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of
the latter learned by him in his professional
capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorneyat-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or having received
confidential information from said client in a case, shall
undertake the defense of the opposing party in the
same case, without the consent of his first client.
Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Limit of privileged communication between
client and lawyer
It is well settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it
must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of
a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the privilege from attaching.
In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that
the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney
and client will not be permitted under the guise of
privilege, and every communication made to an
attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is
not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose
at once in the interest of justice. PP v.
Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July
16, 1997
3. Privileged speech in congress

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted

primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides:

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable

criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court.

A Senator or Member of the House of Representative

shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.

In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon

8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Defensor-Santiago case
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered
on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in
the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that,
I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x. - Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No.
7399 [2009]
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court
would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that
non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not
be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case,
the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre

against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,
DISMISSED.
Purpose of Privilege Speech
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and
success for it is indispensably necessary that
he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of
every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]
4. Privileged communications made in the course of
juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions
Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American
jurisprudence is the rule that for reasons of public
policy, utterances made in the course of juridical
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions are absolutely privileged
when pertinent and relevant to the subject under
inquiry, however false or malicious such utterances
may be. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L59161 January 30, 1982
CPR CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF
WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL
AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Certificate of meritorious case
Rue 7 Section 3. The signature of counsel constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and

belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is

not interposed for delay.
Honest beliefis a claim of good faith.- Alfonso C.
Choa vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. No.
MTJ-95-1063. August 9, 1996
Pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered
privileged
Pleadings have become part of public record
open to the public to scrutinize, but also due to the
undeniable fact that said...
Pleadings are presumed to contain allegations
and assertions lawful and legal in nature,
appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated
before the courts for the proper administration of
justice and, therefore, of general public concern.
Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain
allegations substantially true because they can be
supported by evidence presented in good faith, the
contents of which would be under the scrutiny of courts
and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties
and illegal statements contained therein. Cuenco v.
Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
Counsel, parties or witnesses are exempted from
liability in libel or slander
It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties
or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or
slander for words otherwise defamatory published in
the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the
statements are connected with, or relevant,
pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or
subject of inquiry.
For as aptly observed in one case, while the doctrine of
privileged communication is liable to be abused, and
its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal
sanction to such suits as the present would, we think,
give rise to far greater hardships. - Cuenco v. Cuenco,
et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
Effect of privileged matters
For, although every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, the presumption does
not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the
privilege destroys the presumption. - GMA Network,
Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17,
2006
Privileged matters may be
absolute or qualified
Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In
absolutely privileged communications, the mala or

bona fides of the author is of no moment as the

occasion provides an absolute bar to the action.
Examples of these are speeches or debates made
by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or
in any of its committees.
On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally
privileged communications, the freedom from
liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is
conditioned on the absence of express malice or
malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine,
renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or
finding of libel provided the prosecution established the
presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this
genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and
true report without any comments or remarks" falling
under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et.
al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006
Importance of doctrine of privileged
communications
The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon
public policy, which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer.
- PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16,
1984
All doubts should be resolved in favor of its
relevancy
In order the matter alleged in a pleading may be
privileged, it need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the pleadings.
All doubts should be resolved in favor of its
relevancy or pertinency, and for the purposes of
relevancy the court will assume the alleged
slanderous charges to be true, however false they
may have been in fact. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R.
No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
There is no absolute privilege in pleadings
Absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an
attorney in a pleading filed with the court, as long as
the statements alleged to be defamatory were
relevant and pertinent to the issues in the case.
We relied heavily on our earlier decision xxx, in which
we recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to
make statements in pleadings regardless of their truth
or the existence of actual malice on the part of the
attorney so long as the statements were relevant
and pertinent to the pleadings. Selby v. Burgess,
712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)
All forms of communications are privileged

The privilege is not confined to verbal or written

communications made by the client to his attorney but
extends as well to information communicated by the
client to the attorney by other means. - PP v.
Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July
16, 1997
Professional discipline may still apply
Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we
consider it to be a privilege narrowed closely by the
"relevancy" and "pertinency" requirements, and
we note that while the privilege will prohibit an
attorney from being subject to litigation it will not
make him immune from professional discipline,
when it is appropriate. Selby v. Burgess, 712
S.W.2d 898 (1986)
...makes a lawyer liable for false allegations in a
pleading since the rule states that a lawyer's signature
on a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that to
the best of his knowledge, there is good ground to
support the pleading. Pogue v. Cooper, et. al., 680
S.W.2d 698 (1984)
Restriction to the privilege
The Court defined the restriction to the privilege
enjoyed by pleadings thus:
The pleadings should contain but the plain and
concise statements of the material facts and not the
evidence by which they are to be proved. ...
If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the
statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is
libelous, he loses his privilege.
The requirement of materiality and relevancy is
imposed so that the protection given to individuals in
the interest of an efficient administration of justice
may not be abused as a cloak from beneath
which private malice may be gratified. - Gutierrez
v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30,
1982
Example of slanderous matters in a pleading
Repeated litigations between the same parties might
indeed be tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is
not sufficient cause for calling another "dirty-minded",
and of a "limited mind", "twisted mind" or to
characterize his act as a "devise of wickedness as
earmarks of plaintiff's traits.
It is noted that far from being isolated statements,
these slanderous matters pervade the entire
dimension of the defendants' answer, with almost
every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful
imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations
constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and

moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and

they certainly achieve no purpose except to gratify the
defendants' rancor and ill-will.
The aforementioned personal opinions of the
defendants, expressed in vituperative and intemperate
language, are palpably devoid of any relation
whatever to the subject of inquiry and have no
place in a pleading. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R.
No. L-59161 January 30, 1982
Admonition to lawyers
While indeed lawyers should be allowed some latitude
of remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes
they uphold such remarks or comments should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and
propriety. Besides, the language vehicle does not run
short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161
January 30, 1982
Partners who signed the pleadings are liable
In view of the derogatory implications of that
observation, which was couched in intemperate
indecorous and vicious language and which was
baseless, since it was belied by the resolution itself
that stated the reason for requiring the Solicitor
General to proceed with the investigation of the
disbarment case, the Court in that aforementioned
October 1 resolution required Attys. Salandanan and
Zosimo G. Linato, who signed the motion under
the firm name of "E. M. Salandanan, Aguilar, Linato &
Associates" to show cause why they should not be
adjudged in contempt of court. Yangson v.
Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347. November 12, 1975
Balancing act
While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse
may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal action to
such libel suits would give rise to greater hardships.
Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great
latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the
causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients,
they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Test to be applied
A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid
being considered libelous. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R.
No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Metes and bounds of relevancy or pertinency

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary

to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the
courts are inclined to be liberal.
The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety.
In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be
privileged, it need not be in every case material
to the issues presented by the pleadings, It must,
however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may
become the subject of the inquiry in the course
of the trial. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449
July 16, 1984
Legitimate answers to accusations are
privileged
Although the language used by defendant-appellee in
the pleading in question was undoubtedly strong,
since it was made in legitimate defense of his own
and of his client's interest, such remarks must be
deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be the
basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra).
- PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Unprofessional conduct
Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this
Court. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16,
1984
Proper conduct of lawyers
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be
the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not
be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct
and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in
the case.
All personalities between counsel should be
scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is
indecent to allude to the personal history or the
personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies of
counsel on the other side.
Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay
and promote unseemly wrangling should also be
carefully avoided. Lawyers owe respect not only to
the courts and their clients, but also to other
members of the Bar. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No.
L-62449 July 16, 1984
Doctrine of Privileged communications not
applicable when the courts are criticized using
abrasive and offensive language

Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in

the preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from
using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v.
Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a
desirable trait also of practising attorneys. PP v. Atty.
Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984Privileged
Statements made to the media
Appellant sued respondent's companies for wrongful
termination, making a number of allegations in the
complaint against respondent personally. After
respondent published a response to the
allegations in the media, appellant sued him for
defamation.
Whether or not statements made to the media
regarding ongoing or contemplated litigation are
covered by absolute privilege. - Jacobs v. Adelson,
325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Whether or not the absolute privilege
applies when the media is the recipient of the
statement
These courts have concluded that the policy
considerations underlying the absolute privilege rule
are not applicable to statements made to the
media. Statements made to the media "do little, if
anything, to promote the truth finding process in a
judicial proceeding.... [They] do not generally
encourage open and honest discussion between the
parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes;
indeed, such statements often do just the opposite.
"Communications made to newspapers and during
press conferences have been almost universally found
to be excluded from the protection of absolute
privilege.- Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282
(2014)
Not related to judicial proceedings
We have, however, recognized that communications
are not sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when
they are made to someone without an interest in the
outcome.
We conclude that assessing the significant interest of
the recipient requires review of the recipient's legal
relationship to the litigation, not their interest
as an observer.
Moreover, the nature of the recipient's interest in or
connection to the litigation is a "case-specific, factintensive inquiry" that must focus on and balance the
underlying principles of the privilege.
We conclude that the newspaper does not have a
direct interest in, or connection to, the outcome of the

proceedings, other than as a spectator. - Jacobs v.

Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

publications by virtue of initially being spoken in a

privileged proceeding.

A few jurisdictions have held that, under certain

circumstances, an attorney's statements to the
media are absolutely privileged

Even an "absolute" privilege does not permit an

individual to categorically republish possibly
defamatory statements without consequence.
Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (2003)

extending the privilege to statements made by an

attorney to a reporter after the dismissal of the
first lawsuit. Other jurisdictions have found
exceptions to the majority rule based on unique
circumstances. ,
applying absolute privilege to a statement to a
newspaper when all signs pointed to emerging
litigation and the newspaper was a potential
party); ,
applying absolute privilege to a lawyer's statements to
the press denying allegations and questioning the
plaintiff's motives, where the plaintiff publicly
solicited a response; ,
holding that an attorney's prelitigation statements
to the press are absolutely privileged if a class action
lawsuit is contemplated. Jacobs v. Adelson, 325
P.3d 1282 (2014)
Communications made to the media
We adopt the majority view that communications made
to the media in an extrajudicial setting are not
absolutely privileged, at least when the media holds
no more significant interest in the litigation than the
general public.
In order for the absolute privilege to apply to
defamatory statements made in the context of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, "(1) a judicial
proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration, and (2) the
communication must be related to the litigation.
The privilege applies to communications made by
either an attorney or a non-attorney that are related to
ongoing litigation or future litigation contemplated in
good faith. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282
(2014)
Defamatory statements not privileged when
made on radio and television programs
Stating the judicial proceedings privilege protects
statements by parties and their attorneys related to
litigation but does not extend to protect allegedly
defamatory statements made on radio and television
programs. Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593
(2003)
A privileged statement, such as one made in a judicial
proceeding, is not privileged for all subsequent

When pleadings are published in newspaper

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the
matter should be that a fair and true report of a
complaint filed in court without remarks nor
comments even before an answer is filed or a
decision promulgated should be covered by the
privilege.
This Court ruled before that:
Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions belong to the class of communication that are
absolutely privileged. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R.
No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
Statements to third party
But we have also recognized that "[a]n attorney's
statements to someone who is not directly
involved with the actual or anticipated judicial
proceeding will be covered by the absolute privilege
only if the recipient of the communication is
significantly interested in the proceeding." - Jacobs
v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Terminating and Establishing attorney-client
relationship
Nature of attorney-client relationship
An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a
lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the
consultation of a person, who in respect to a
business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.
It is not essential that the client should have
employed the lawyer on any previous occasion or
that any retainer should have been paid,
promised or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation
was had, for as long as the advice and assistance
of the attorney is sought and received in matters
pertinent to his profession. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin
A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advise regarding the former's business. To

constitute professional employment, it is not essential

that the client employed the attorney professionally on
any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case
for which his service had been sought.- Hadjula v.
Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711
July 3,
2007
Verbal agreement
There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is
sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863
[2001]
Court finds that no attorney-client relationship
exists
The relationship of complainant and [counsel] is mainly
personal or business in nature, and that whatever legal
services may have been rendered or given to them by
Atty. Amorin for free were only incidental to said
relationship. Noteworthy also is the fact that
complainant was not able to specify any act or
transaction in which [counsel] acted as her or her
husband's counsel. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No.
7861 [2009]
There are instances, however, when the Court finds
that no attorney-client relationship exists between the
parties, such as when the relationship stemmed from a
personal transaction between them rather than the
practice of law of respondent or when the legal acts
done were only incidental to their personal transaction.
- Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

misconduct. - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C.

No. 4863 [2001]
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort
to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
Implied duty to finish the case
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory. Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421
[2007]
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March
14, 2006
Terminating the attorney-client relation
CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has
the absolute right to terminate the attorneyclient relation at anytime with or without cause.
ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at
liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the clients written
consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty.
Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

Duty once a lawyer-client relationship exist

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS

SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any

of the following case:

Non-payment of fees does not diminish a

lawyers duty

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral

course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling; [see Rule 19.02]

Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure

should not be a reason not to inform the client of
an important development, or worse, to withhold
vital information from her. - Somosot v. Atty.
Lara A.C. No. 7024 [2009]
Remedy for deliberate refusal to pay
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just
compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper
remedy is to institute an action before the proper
court and such actuation of the respondent herein did
not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross

(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue

conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will
not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the
lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the
fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;

(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to

public office [see Rule 3.03]; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he
shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall
be dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law concurrently.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is
able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information
that his client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and
failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Changing lawyer does not need the approval of
the Court
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with
or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer
who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been
held that a client is free to change his counsel in a
pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to
represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer
does not need the consent of the lawyer to be
dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the
court. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303,
June 15, 2006

Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped

practicing law, he still could not ignore the directives
coming from the Court. It does not appear from the
records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has
withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn
his appearance in the case, the Court would still
consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant
and he is expected to comply with all its orders and
directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C. No.
5486. August 15, 2001]
The only way to be relieved as counsel
Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have
either the written conformity of his client or an
order from the court relieving him of the duties
of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No.
1666, April 13, 2007
Duty of lawyer once he is discharged as counsel
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged
shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn
over all papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and shall cooperative with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that
the name of the new counsel is properly recorded
and the records properly handed over. - Balatbat
v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666 [2007]

Termination of services without the written

consent of client

A simple turnover of the records does not end a

lawyers duty

A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without

the written consent of his client must file a petition
for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his
petition upon his client and the adverse party - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15,
2006

Contrary to respondents contention, his professional

relations as a lawyer with his clients are not
terminated by the simple turnover of the records
of the case to his clients. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty.
Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

A lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is

recorded before terminating his services

xxx and shall cooperative with his successor in

the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the
matter. - Rule 22.02

An attorney may only retire from a case either by

written consent of his client or by permission of
the court after due notice and hearing, in which
event the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15,
2006
Cessation of law practice is not a good cause
to withdraw
Neither is the cessation of his law practice an
excuse for his failure to file the required brief.

Client refusal to give his consent is still subject

to Courts discretion
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding with the written consent of his
client filed in court and with a copy thereof served
upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to
give his consent, the lawyer must file an application
with the court. The court, on notice to the client and
adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer
ought to be allowed to retire. The application for
withdrawal must be based on a good cause. -

Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421

[2007]

extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between

said firm and petitioner.

Consent to withdraw must be given by the

litigant

Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm

should have re-assigned the case to another
associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel
in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA,
G.R. No. L-41862 [1992]

Respondents defense completely crumbles in face of

the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in
Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to
withdraw the records of the said case from respondent
or to terminate the latters services. - Venterez, et.
al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
Pendency of petition for withdrawal does not
relieve lawyer of his duty
The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his
withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his
clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests
of his clients require. He must still appear before the
court to protect the interest of his clients by availing
himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until there
is a withdrawal of record. - Venterez, et. al. v.
Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
A valid cause to withdraw must still be subject to
formalities of withdrawing as counsel
Without a proper revocation of his authority and
withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of
record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and
whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from
the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave
his clients without representation. - Venterez, et.
al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
Verbal substitution of counsel not allowed
A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly
granted by respondent judge, contravenes Section 26
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the
requirements for change of attorneys. Said
provision requires that the written consent of the client
should be filed in court and the adverse party should
be given written notice of the substitution. As correctly
pointed out by the OCA, if her intention was to obviate
delay, then she should have ordered the counsel of
record, Atty. Nueva, who was present during the
hearing, to file the required comment or opposition. Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-981427. November 27, 2000
Death of a partner
Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin
Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not

Grounds to withdraw from a case before its final

adjudication
A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its
final adjudication arises only from the clients
written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco
v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Written contract is not essential in establishing
lawyer-client relationship
A written contract is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal,
A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Perceived insufficiency of remuneration not a
ground to diminish professional zeal
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated
in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation
embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering.
The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case
should neither diminish nor cease just because of his
perceived insufficiency of remuneration. - Francisco v.
Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Close personal relationship will not bar a lawyerclient relationship
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. - Hadjula v. Atty.
Madianda, A.C. No. 6711
July 3, 2007
Heavy workload
Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient
reason for the withdrawal of her services. - Ceniza v.
Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166 [2009]
Lost of confidence
Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that
"there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between
them and that there had been "serious differences
between them relating to the manner of private
prosecution.- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773
September 24, 1997

Hurt feelings is not a valid ground to automatically

withdraw
Complainant's words and actions may have hurt
respondent's feelings considering the work he had put
into the case. But her words were uttered in a burst of
passion. And even at that moment, complainant did
not expressly terminate respondent's services. She
made this clear when she refused to sign his
"Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. - Orcino v. Atty.
Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
Withdrawal must be granted by the court
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified
in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do
so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his
withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the
interests of his client require. He must still appear
on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation
does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal
of record.- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773
September 24, 1997
Lawyers responsibility
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
Client should not file the Notice to Withdraw
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the
one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and
not the accused. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C.
No. 6155 [2006]
Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformity
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even
to substitute for respondent but to act as additional
counsel. Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an
additional lawyer did not necessarily mean
conformity to respondents desire to withdraw
as counsel. Respondents speculations on the
professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs.
Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas

professional engagement on her behalf despite
respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter
of the consequences of his unprofessional
conduct. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, A.C.
No. 5303 [2006]
Grounds for disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers
Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings
of the IBP
Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound
by the findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to
accept the same as a matter of course because as the
Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions
to be imposed on errant members of both bench and
bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own
findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof
rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to
whom an administrative complaint has been referred to
for investigation and report. Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000
Continuous display and use of the title
Attorney-at-lawafter disbarment
Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented
himself as an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his
son, and a signboard hanging outside the
respondent's office display the title "Attorney-atLaw under respondent's name.
Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had
received reports that respondent continues in the
practice of law by making other lawyers sign the
pleadings that he prepares for cases involving his
clients. Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U.
Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014
Resolution
On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title
"Atty." preceding respondent's name in his son's
wedding invitation, and the signboard outside his office
bearing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law" are
not evidence sufficient to convince this Court
that respondent continues in the practice of law,
in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that
ordered his disbarment.
Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's
allegations of respondent's continuous practice of law
based on mere "reports." Without more, these reports
are pure hearsay and are without evidentiary value.
Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to
remove the signboard outside his office showing his
name and the words "Attorney-at-Law. - Resolution

A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S.

Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

further investigation. They may be summarily

dismissed for utter lack of merit.

Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of

an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law

The Court normally refers administrative cases to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Considering, however,
that the question being raised is simple and that
no further factual determination is necessary, the
Court resolves to dispense with such referral and to
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings
already on record, which all show the lack of merit of
the Complaint. - Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No.
4700 [2000]

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be

suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the

decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to
file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein
that he or she has desisted from the practice of law
and has not appeared in any court during the period of
his or her suspension;
Cont
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to
the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge
of the courts where respondent has pending cases
handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has
appeared as counsel;

Confidentiality
Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and
confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme
Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.
Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of
proceedings. Proceedings against Judges of regular
and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and
confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of
the court shall be attached to the record of the
respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE:
DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES [took
effect on October 1, 2001]

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of

respondents compliance with the order of suspension;

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements

made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for
the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted. - Maniago v. Atty.
De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the

Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of
Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the
Supreme Court in the case.

Lifting of a lawyers suspension

is not automatic
The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not automatic
upon the end of the period stated in the Courts
decision, and an order from the Court lifting the
suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession. Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No.
7472, March 30, 2010
Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint
to IBP
In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant. Administrative
complaints that are prima facie groundless as
shown by the pleadings filed by the parties need not be
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for

Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of

Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such
certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall
make a full investigation of the case and may revoke,
shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the
attorney as the facts may warrant.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution
dated February 13, 1992
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the

bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as

attorney by the Supreme Court for:
1. any deceit,
2. malpractice,
3. other gross misconduct in such office,
4. grossly immoral conduct,
5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude,
6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice,
7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie
evidence
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he
has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for
his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court
or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re:
Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]
The basis of the foreign court's action must
include any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction I
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's
judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the
practice of law in Guam does not automatically
result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines.
Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam
are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension
in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793
[2004]
The basis of the foreign court's action must
include any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction II

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of

suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the
acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for
disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the
Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts
action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We
likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.
6697 July 25, 2006
Defenses
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section
48, of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48.
Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(b)
In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera,
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
Ex parte investigation valid
Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam
only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's
unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due
process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to present
testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter
in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule
mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases
be notified of the charges against him. It is only after
reasonable notice and failure on the part of the
respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an investigation
may be conducted ex parte. - In re: Atty.
Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]
Misconduct pertaining to another profession
Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing
both professions. He is the senior partner of his law
and accounting firms which carry his name. He is

charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent

two creditors of the estate and, at the same time,
allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were presented.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there
was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before
this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his
accounting practice.
Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to
his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this
Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even
if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040
[1998]
Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the
corporate veil
This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the
separate personality of the corporation to
absolve him from exercising these duties over the
properties turned over to him by complainant. He
blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his
fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant.
Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the
reason for the creation of said corporate fiction. Cordon v. Atty. Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October
4, 2002
Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP
investigation
The Court need not delve into the question of whether
or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a
matter which apparently is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough
that the records of this administrative case
sufficiently substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman,
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured
honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]
Private phone call to litigant prohibited
If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of
judicial indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly
made a private phone call to, or sent for, the
complainant, and talked to him in the chambers.

It need not be overemphasized that making private

phone calls to, sending for and talking to the
complainant in the judges chambers, as in this case,
undermines even more the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v. Judge
Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000
Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not
immoral
All these taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as
it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Moreover, for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
A single member of a collegial court cannot be
charged for rendering unjust judgment
Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that
a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a
single member of a division of the appellate
court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice
Hakim S. Abdulwahid, Court of Appeals, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006
Anonymous complaints
Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with
caution. They should not be dismissed outright,
however, where their averments may be easily verified
and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and
established by other competent evidence. - Sinsuat
and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133,
August 6, 2008
Forum shopping
Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II, A.C.
No. 6971, February 23, 2006
Retirement from office
The Court emphasizes at this point that respondents
retirement from office does not render the
present administrative case moot and academic;
neither does it free him from liability. Since
complainant filed the case when respondent was still in

the service, the Court retains the authority to

investigate and resolve the administrative complaint
against him. - City of Cebu v. Judge Gako Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2111, May 7, 2008
Infraction committed by judge before
appointment
This step finds support in Heck v. Santos where the
Court held that while the infraction was committed
before the respondents appointment as judge,
the Court may still discipline him therefore. RE:
Application for retirement/gratuity benefits xxx.,
A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008
Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is
not a bar to administrative proceedings.
The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal
charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover,
this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original).
(Joselano Guevara v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no.
7136, August 1, 2007)
Administrative complaint against a member of
the bar does not prescribe
Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan
Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634,
August 23, 2007)
Indefinite suspension
This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but
also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can
be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the
fact that it will then be left to [respondent] to
determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law. - (In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654
February 18, 1970)
Censure or reprimand
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an
isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty

to the court or the client. - Cynthia Advincula v.

Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]
Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly
immoral
Moreover, while respondent admitted having
kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through
a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text
message. The exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a
place where there were several people in the
vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major
jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have
brought her to a private place or a more remote place
where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances,
respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor
highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]
Non-injured party can file a complaint
The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the
person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge.
The evidence submitted by complainant before the
Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its
resolution and recommended sanctions. - Atty.
Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313.
January 30, 1998
Alternative penalty not allowed
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the
resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof
provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty
Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution.
Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n his
DISBARMENT.
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either
a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on

whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to

complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs
that he shall only be suspended, subject to the
condition that he should make restitution as
prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty.
Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the
imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long
been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment
cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides
for alternative penalties, not can such penalty be
subject to a condition. There is no reason why such
legal principles in penal law should not apply in
administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this
case, also involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. Navarro
v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January
30, 1998]
Misconduct as a government official
As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if that misconduct as a government official is
of such a character as to affect his qualification
as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
ground. Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995.
Noveernment officialmber 27, 1996
Disbarment or suspension in a foreign
jurisdiction
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where
he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated [Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of
Court]. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July
25, 2006
Res judicata does not apply in administrative
proceeding
The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
the exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers.Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November
27, 1996
While respondent is in effect being indicted twice
for the same misconduct, it does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. - Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C.
No. 2995. November 27, 1996
A finding of grave misconduct in the

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE would not be

determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in a criminal proceeding
The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not
the SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning in violation of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. Dinsay v. Cioco and Atty.
Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12, 1986
Definition of Unprofessional conduct
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which
violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that profession. Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25,
2006
Indirect contempt does not involve moral
turpitude
The act for which he was found guilty of indirect
contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing
ones opinion on a public interest issue can be
considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity.
Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause
undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his
views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as
evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality. In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C.
No. 6052. December 11, 2003
No final judgment yet
On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was
rendered by the California Supreme Court
finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered
his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at
the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find
these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he
who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same.
In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras
moral fitness to run for governor. In re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052.
December 11, 2003
Sexual relations between two unmmaried and
consenting adults
Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried
and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The

Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy

between a man and a woman who are not married,
where both are not under any impediment to marry
and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor
an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official
conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is
not within our authority to decide on matters
touching on employees personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their familys future. We
cannot intrude into the question of whether they
should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute,
A.M. No. P-11-2922, 2011
Estrada v. Escritor case
Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was
investigated for living with a man not her husband,
and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Complainant believes that [the court
interpreter] is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act. Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing
"disgraceful and immoral conduct. - Estrada v.
Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Cont
She admitted that she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more
than twenty years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She also admitted
that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious
beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation.
Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral
standards of her congregation, she asserts that her
conjugal arrangement does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she
should be held administratively liable. - Estrada
v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4,
2003
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under
these distinct circumstances, respondents conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in
order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may
be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable

to an authority higher than the state, and so the state

interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state
that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v.
Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4,
2003
Penalties imposed in administrative cases
[judiciary] are immediately executory
We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect
immediately", this Court means that the period of
suspension should commence on the day respondent
judge receives notice of the decision suspending him
from office.
While this does not preclude the filing by respondent
judge of a motion for reconsideration, the filing and
pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of
staying the suspension order. Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. February 4, 2002
Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of
lawyers] are
NOT immediately executory
Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory. Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March
30, 2010
Res Judicata applies
The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed
the complaint in this case on the ground of res
judicata, it appearing that it involves the same
incident and the same cause of action as
Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it appears that
on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court
dismissed a similar complaint filed in Administrative
Case No. 3835. Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C.
No. 3825. February 1, 1996
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative
Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled Re:
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts;
and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar.

Under the same rule, a respondent may forthwith be

required to comment on the complaint and show cause
why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the
Bar. xxx In other words, an order to comment on
the complaint is an order to give an explanation
on why he should not be held administratively
liable not only as a member of the bench but
also as a member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic
conversion of administrative cases against justices
and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as
lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 029-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative
complaint filed against a member of the bench also as
a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by
mere operation of the rule. Campos, et. al. v. Atty.
Campos, A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014
Definition of Unbecoming conduct
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but
of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.- ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong,
et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011
Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a good
condition precedent to the practice of law but also a
good qualification for all members of the bar.
-Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564,
August 20, 2008
To ensure competence after reinstatement
Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since
1959, respondent movant should offer some
guarantee of his ability to render adequate
service to his prospective clients; the Court
resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be,
as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass,
regular fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school. - In Re: Administrative
Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City.
A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974
SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot
review the trial courts decision
At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court,
acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the
trial courts decision. Belga v. Buban, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1512. May 9, 2000

Breached of promise to marry not subject to

sanction
Complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child
out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent
did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner
of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not
for any other reason. Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr.,
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary
investigation
The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by
reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. - Section 5, Rule
139-B, Rules of Court
Ex-parte investigation allowed
An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable
notice. Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834
February 29, 2000
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation.
Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the
respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the
case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and
administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
Affidavit stands in lieu complainants testimony
As for complainants failure to testify on her own
behalf, this is of no moment. Complainants affidavit
stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge
even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn
statement and let the same be adopted as part of
complainants evidence. Liwanag v. Judge Lustre,
A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999
Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action
It is imperative to first determine whether the matter
falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of
judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves
violations of the lawyers oath and code of conduct,
then it falls within the Courts disciplinary authority.

However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil

or criminal liability, and which do not directly require
an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the
matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action
which is understandably outside the purview of the
Courts disciplinary authority. Felipe, et. al. v. Atty.
Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 02, 2013
WON the money should be returned to complainant
It is imperative to first determine whether the
matter falls within the disciplinary authority of
the Court OR whether the matter is a proper subject of
judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v. Atty.
Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012
If the matter involves violations of the lawyers oath
and code of conduct, then it falls within the Courts
disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil
or criminal liability, and which do not directly require
an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the
matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action
which is understandably outside the purview of the
Courts disciplinary authority.
Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the
inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the
respondent to remain as member of the legal
fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be
directed to return the amount received from his client
shall be deemed within the Courts disciplinary
authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No.
9074 August 14, 2012
Sui generis principle
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding
of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate
him administratively.
In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably
lead to a similar finding in the administrative action
before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of
the lawyer.
The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such
that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably
govern the third and vice versa. - Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,
A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
Indefinite suspension

The indefiniteness of respondents suspension, far from

being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own
hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own
good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting
appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
Xxx the indefiniteness of respondents suspension
puts in his hands the key for the restoration of
his rights and privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag
v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000
Beso-beso is merely a form of greeting, casual
and customary in nature
Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her
cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and
customary in nature. No evidence of intent to
sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that
the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. Atty. Aquino v.
Justice Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002
Quantum of evidence
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is
the rule where the charges on which the removal is
sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in
regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials
apply.- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93783. July 29, 1996
Quantum of evidence
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all
that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings. Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,
A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
Quantum of evidence
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only

substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided

for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and

the application for reinstatement,

Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.- Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No.
MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent

to his disbarment,

Absolute pardon
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from
the conviction. In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok,
the Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding
against the respondent therein, who had been
convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude,
upon the ground that the respondent had been granted
plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a
person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it
were, a new man and gives him a new credit and
capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M. No. 126
December 29, 1980
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may
impose its authority upon erring judges whose
actuations, on their face, would show gross
incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.
Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-971375 October 16, 1997
Judicial clemency and reinstatement
Forms of clemency
Reinstatement
Commutation
Lifting of disqualification
Reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed
under the following criteria
1. the person appreciates the significance of his
dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary
to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the
practice of law

4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and

religious organizations
5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as well as the local government
officials and citizens of his community.
6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the
future of his family. Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44
February 10, 1989
Cont
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is
entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney
has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that
the court may require a greater degree of proof than in
an original evidence.
The decisive question on an application for
reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral
character. In re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439
September 30, 1982

Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving

requests for judicial clemency
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members
of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case
for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition
of the penalty1 to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development
of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and

circumstances that may justify clemency. Re: Letter
of Judge Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC September
19, 2007
Absolute and unconditional pardon
Thereafter, complainant in the criminal case, instituted
before this Court disbarment proceedings against
petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on
April 12, 1961.
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines
granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional
pardon" and restored him "to full civil and
political rights.
True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by
the President does not of itself warrant his
reinstatement.- In re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439
September 30, 1982
Effects of pardon
"When proceedings to strike on attorneys name from
the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a
statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and
is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of
the attorney after the pardon has been granted.
In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for
the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense.
Effect of conditional pardon
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such
conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of
the penal consequences of his act, but did not
operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so
when he is being disbarred on the ground of
professional misconduct for which he had been
convicted by final judgment. In re: Atty. Jose
Avancea, A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967
Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term. It does not reach the offense
itself. - In re: Disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962
Pardon granted before conviction

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for

the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. If granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if
granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it
makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a
new credit and capacity.- In re: Disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L363. July 31, 1962
Pardon granted after conviction
If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it
makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a
new credit and capacity. - In re: Disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L363. July 31, 1962
Legal issues pertaining to judges and justices
Resolution to protect members of judiciary from
baseless complaints
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine
the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a
Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect
Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and
Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which
took effect on November 3, 2003.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or
malicious administrative or criminal cases
against members of the judiciary for purposes of
harassment, we issued said Resolution, which
provides:
Cont
2. If the complaint is
(a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or
Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred
at least a year before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to
harass the respondent, it must forthwith be
recommended for dismissal.
If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to
file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt
of the complaint, and submit to the Court a

report and recommendation not later than thirty

(30) days from receipt of the comment. The
Court shall act on the recommendation before
the date of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, or, if it is not possible to do so,
within six (6) months from such date without
prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may
order to be withheld, taking into account the
gravity of the cause of action alleged in the
complaint.
When to file administrative case against judges
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door
to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have
opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AMMTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003
Cont
Prosecution of the judge can be had only if
there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and also evidence of malice
or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering
said judgment or order or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311.
October 3, 2003
Anonymous complaint
First, we clear the objection of respondent judge
that the letter-complaint should not be given
due course because it is only anonymous.
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that the disciplinary proceedings
against judges and justices may be instituted
under either of three ways:
1.

by the Supreme Court motu proprio;

2.

upon a verified complaint; or

3.
upon an anonymous complaint, supported
by public records of indubitable integrity.
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge
Gedorio, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007
Lack of verification is
only a formal defect
As to the contention of respondent that the
Court should not have taken cognizance of the
complaint because the letter-complaint was not
verified, as required in Rule 139-B, 1 of the
Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes
only a formal defect and does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter
of the complaint. "The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it
and waive strict compliance with the rules in
order that the ends of justice may be served."
(Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394,
December 02, 2002)
Effect of retirement of respondent judge
Respondent's retirement from office did not
render the present administrative case moot and
academic. Neither does it free him from liability.
(Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August
2, 2007)
Death of respondent judge
The dismissal of the administrative case against
Judge Butacan by reason of his demise is in
accordance with Bote v. Judge Eduardo where
the Court held that in view of the death of Judge
Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is
inappropriate to impose any administrative
liability of a punitive nature; and declared the
administrative complaint against the respondent
Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. - RE:
Application for retirement/gratuity benefits xxx.,
A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008
Judge also liable if court employee fraternized
with litigant
Unfortunately, these standards were not met by
respondent Judge Alagar in this case having
tolerated unknowingly his employee to
fraternize, receive or give personal favors no
matter how small, with party litigants in a case
pending before his sala.
Thus, while this Court finds the respondent
Judge to have acted with impartiality and

propriety in dealing with the complainants in

Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his
part in failing to supervise the conduct and
behavior of his court employee for the latters
improper use of his vehicle, to the detriment of
the courts image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449. January 18, 2002
Having lunch with counsel
For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel
is not wrong per se. The Canons, however,
provides that as much as possible he should be
scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that
his social or business or friendly relationship is
an element in determining his judicial course.
Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the
petitioner in an annulment case pending before
him, the respondent judge should have thought
twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially
in the courtroom at that. - Pertierra v. Judge
Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12,
2003
Effect of reconciliation of the parties
The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to
an administrative proceeding does not strip the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case until its resolution.
Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties and
does not extend to erase the offense that may
have been committed against the public service.
(Flores v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499,
October 6, 2008)
Conviction in a criminal case
Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal
case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondent in an
administrative case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case.
Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will
not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in
the administrative case. We emphasize the wellsettled rule that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters,
and each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to it. In other words,
the disposition in the first two will not
necessarily govern the third, and vice versa.
(Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1908, August 15, 2007)
Effect of resignation from office
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which
was accepted by the Court without prejudice

does not render moot and academic the instant

administrative case. The jurisdiction that the
Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere
fact that the respondent judge by his resignation
and its consequent acceptance without
prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in
office during the pendency of this case. The
Court retains its authority to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the
charges against him. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. (Nondisclosure before the JBC of the administrative
case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC no.
013, August 22, 2007)
Grounds for outright dismissal
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint
against a retiring judge or justice to be
dismissed outright, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six
months from the compulsory retirement of the
judge or justice;
(2) the cause of action must have occurred at
least a year before such filing; and
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended
to harass the respondent. (Miguel Colorado v.
Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658,
July 3, 2007)
Warning is not a penalty
A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not
a penalty. - Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A.
Mangrobang, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1665,
November 29, 2001
Gross ignorance of the law
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the
subject decision, order or actuation of the judge
in the performance of his official duties must not
only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the case before us, the
administrative complaint does not even allege
that the erroneous decision of respondent was
thus motivated. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge
Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27,
2000
Rendering an unjust judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both

a criminal and an administrative charge. As a
crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the
Revised Penal Code the elements of which are:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to
him for decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust; and
(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
The gist of the offense therefore is that an
unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in
bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. - Sps.
Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-991447. September 27, 2000
There is no liability at all for a mere error
An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to
law or is not supported by evidence or both. The
source of an unjust judgment may be error or illwill. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It
is well-settled that a judicial officer, when
required to exercise his judgment or discretion,
is not liable criminally for any error which he
commits, provided he acts in good faith.
Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in
rendering judgment the judge fully knew that
the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then
he acted maliciously and must have been
actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy,
revenge, greed or some other similar motive. Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ99-1447. September 27, 2000
Mere error therefore in the interpretation or
application of the law does not constitute the
crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
When good faith will not be applied
We need not belabor jurisprudence to
accommodate respondents argument which in
effect posits that not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction. So we have ruled and so
we have acted, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable judgment.
Where, however, the issues are so simple and
the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible
margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to
ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was not
merely feigned to subserve an unworthy

purpose. Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M.

No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is
impermissible if case is appealed
The main issue for our resolution is whether the
instant administrative complaint for gross
ignorance of the law is permissible in light of the
filing by complainants of a notice of appeal and a
petition for certiorari assailing respondent
judges decision and his order of execution.
In the present case, the complainants filed this
administrative case against respondent judge
while their appeal and petition for certiorari
challenging his decision and order were still
pending with the RTC. Following our settled
pronouncements cited above, the instant
complaint is impermissible. Camacho v. Judge
Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17,
2002
Period to decide or resolve the case submitted
for decision
The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case
submitted for decision, fixed no less by the
Constitution, is a mandatory requirement.
Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the
erring judge to administrative sanction as this
Court may deem appropriate.
It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those
involving difficult questions of law or complex
issues or when the judge is burdened by heavy
caseloads, that a longer period to decide may be
allowed but only upon proper application made
with the Supreme Court by the concerned judge.Dr. Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160
November 22, 2000
Judge attended the hearing of his brother
Judge Dojillo sat beside the counsel of his
brother and actively coached, aided, assisted,
and guided said counsel by now and then saying
something, handing piece of writing, reminding,
and or stopping the counsel from manifesting
something to the court, and other similar acts.
Respondent, in his defense, stated that he
attended the hearing of his brothers election
protest case just to give moral support and, in
the process, also observe how election protest
proceedings are conducted. Although concern
for family members is deeply ingrained in the
Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge,
should bear in mind that he is also called upon to
serve the higher interest of preserving the
integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the

Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to

avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591.
July 14, 2005
Comment on Certiorari filed by public
respondent judge in behalf of private respondent
Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a
comment with the court on behalf of one of the
parties, engaged in the private practice of law.
Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are prohibited from engaging in
the private practice of law.
In filing such comment, respondent judge
violated the provision in the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer
or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If either party elevates the case to a
higher court, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall
not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein. - Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-Purugganan,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]
Can the members of the Supreme Court be
removed from office only by impeachment?
Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the
Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment. Since removal from office is a
disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows
that there is no manner by which a Justice of this
Court may be disciplined for acts done during his
incumbency. Considering that the power to
impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the
legislative branch of the government, the Court
is without authority to proceed against and
discipline its former Member. He added that
what constitutes impeachable offenses is a
purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage
is not one of the impeachable offenses. - In Re:
Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo,
Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19SC : August 11, 2009
When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon
reaching the mandatory age of 70, his perceived
mantle of protection and immunity, that the

mode of his removal from office can be done only

through impeachment, no longer exists. His
duties and responsibilities as a Justice having
ceased by reason of his retirement, he is
reverted to the status of a lawyer and,
consequently, can be subjected to appropriate
sanctions for administrative offenses,
particularly, an act of misconduct. The fact that
the Investigating Committee, created per
Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the
Court, commenced the investigation during the
incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no moment, as
he was then not yet a respondent in an
administrative matter against him. - In Re:
Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner in
Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.
No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11,
2009
Res ipsa loquitor
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court
may impose its authority upon erring judges
whose actuations, on their face, would show
gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or
misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M.
No. RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997]
Res ipsa loquitor
In several cases, the Court has disciplined
lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record
sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.
Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No.
08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009
Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his
actions based on records showing his unethical
misconduct. - In re: Complaint against Atty. Asoy,
Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re:
Complaint against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No.
2655 July 9, 1987
Quantum of evidence
It is likewise a settled rule in administrative
proceedings that the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint with substantial
evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v.
Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J
[2006]
Quantum of evidence required for removal of
judge from office
Jurisprudence dictates

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer

should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Such is the rule where the charges on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful
neglect, corruption or incompetence. The
general rules with regard to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge
Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]
Acts of a collegial court
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution
dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice
Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The
Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose
members reach their conclusions in consultation
and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that a collective
decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a
single member of a division of the appellate
court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice
Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
The act of a single member, though he may be its
head, done without the participation of the
others, cannot be considered the act of the
collegial body itself. ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August
24, 2010
Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not
apply to a collegial court
Respondents should know that the provisions of
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to
an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it
is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment
on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by
him but the proper appellate court with
jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court
of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said
penal article has no application to the members
of a collegiate court such as this Court or its
Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It
also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act on the ground that such a collective decision
is "unjust" cannot prosper. - Bautista v. Justice
Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
Preventive suspension pending resolution of the
administrative case

The mere existence of pending criminal charges

against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a
ground for disbarment or suspension of the
latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to
harassment of attorneys through the mere filing
of numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's
conviction by the RTC does not necessarily
warrant her suspension. We agree with
respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal
before the CA, the same has not yet attained
finality. As such, she still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence. - Re:
Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545RTC January 31, 2008
Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt
of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence
It must be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating the guilt of the accused
does not in itself destroy the constitutional
presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or
the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves
the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner,
the presumption of innocence continues. - Re:
Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545RTC January 31, 2008
Preventive suspension not applicable
Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is
of the resolve that, while it is true that
preventive suspension pendente lite does not
violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having
been expressly included in the Rules of Court,
are amorphous at best. Re: Conviction of Judge
Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008
Collegial court needs to
act as one body
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved
the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite
their having separately conducted hearings,
considering that the three of them were in the
same venue and were acting within hearing and
communicating distance of one another.
The information and evidence upon which the
Fourth Division would base any decisions or
other judicial actions in the cases tried before it
must be made directly available to each and
every one of its members during the

proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full

participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of
the Fourth Division were within hearing and
communicating distance of one another at the
hearings in question, as they explained in
hindsight, because even in those circumstances
not all of them sat together in session. - ASP
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No.
08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010
Preventive suspension for erring lawyer
Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's
answer or lapse of the period therefor, the
Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance
of the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Investigator, may
suspend an attorney from the practice of his
profession for any of the causes specified in Rule
138, Section 27, during the pendency of the
investigation until such suspension is lifted by
the Supreme Court.
CA or RTC may suspend an attorney
Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by
the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until
further action of the Supreme Court in the case.
Judge acted as lawyer for complainant and
father-in-law
Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant
and her father-in-law when he drafted
complainants affidavit which became the basis
of a complaint for estafa filed against Heidi
Navarra. By acting as counsel for complainant
and the latters father-in-law in a case filed in
his court, respondent compromised his
neutrality and independence.
Respondents misconduct in this case is further
compounded by the fact that he rendered the
legal services in question using government
facilities during office hours. - Biboso v. Judge
Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356 [2001]
Grounds for voluntary inhibition and
disqualification of judges
Judges family
Includes a judges:
1. spouse,

2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the sixth civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the
judge and who lives in the judges household.
Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section
1
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made
and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party
objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with
the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor,
and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial,
or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification.
His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed
with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in
favor of his own competency, until after final judgment
in the case.
Rules contemplate
two kinds of inhibition
1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges
cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned.
2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the
judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just
and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.
173057-74 [2010]
Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality was
committed
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on
this point of law is the necessity of proving bias and

partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in

question. The proof required needs to point to some
act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought
for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not
even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice
Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or
partiality can be derived or appreciated. Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.
173057-74 [2010]
Evidence required
We find the above explanation well-taken and thus
uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so
stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be
presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma
of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice
Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]
Proof of clear and convincing evidence
The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this
case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
that the judge will undertake his noble role of
dispensing justice in accordance with law and
evidence, and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]
"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise...."
The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant
only when such spouse or child of the judge is
"pecuniarily interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to
show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is
financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases
before the Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice
Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

trust; and he should not allow outside matters or

his private interests to interfere with the prompt
and proper performance of his office.Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of
Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval v. Justice
Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]
Meaning ofruling in a lower court is the subject
of review or
in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review.
Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the
case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that
finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he
cannot be said to have been placed in a position
where he had to review his own decision as
judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not
legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657
[1996]
CNevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more
prudent and circumspect and declined to take on
the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the
case. The Court has held that a judge should not
handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly
or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality,
which axiom is intended to preserve and promote
public confidence in the integrity and respect for the
judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline
from taking part in the case, it is our considered view
that his active participation in the case below
constitutes a just or valid reason, under Section 1 of
Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from
the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No.
106657 [1996]
Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary
inhibition improper
Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for
voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a
form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be
allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their
cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and
fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543
[2010]

A summary of judicial obligations

Utang na loob per se not a ground for

inhibition

3.1 A judges conduct should be above reproach and

in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be
conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous,
patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of
public clamour, and regardless of private influence
should administer justice according to law and should
deal with the patronage of the position as a public

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend,

classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge
appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to
a case. "Utang na loob", per se, should not be a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor
should recognition of such value in Philippine society
prevent the performance of one's duties as judge.

Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-93918-RTC October 26, 1987
Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an
attorney of record is no ground for
disqualification
It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or
friendship between a judge and an attorney of
record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground
for disqualification. xxx We held that the fact "that
one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the
trial judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification
of said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden
other trial judges to whom the case would be
transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for
under a different rule, a judge would be barred from
sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates
(and he could have many) appeared." - Query of
Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC
October 26, 1987
Personally approaching the judge to disqualify
himself not contempt
We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court
when petitioner asked his counsel to see
respondent Judge in his chamber and request
him to disqualify himself upon a ground which
respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It
is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules,
and another thing to act in a manner which would
amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of
the court or judge. - Austria v. Hon. Judge
Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967
Former associate in practice of law
We are in accord with the statement of respondent
Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself
from further trying the case that Atty. Sicat was his
former associate in his practice of law is not
one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for
disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent
Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the
fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate,
was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him,
may constitute a just or valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case
on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule
137. Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L22536 August 31, 1967
Father-in-law of the judge present in the
proceeding
The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the
father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein

respondent, was conspicuously present in the

proceedings during which time he gave consultation
to the complainant who was reportedly his political
leader and protge.
In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to
recuse himself from cases in which his relatives were
either involved or interested, the record shows he
did so to favor or protect the parties. Siawan v.
Judge Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May
21, 2001
Judges nephew is the husband of the daughter of the
counsel for the accused
It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited
himself from Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled
People v. Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Manuel M. Villasor,
SG Fernando Tagle, and SG Ronan Guerrero because
respondents nephew, Atty. Cris Pascua Zafra, is
married to the daughter of Atty. P. M. Castillo,
complainants defense counsel in that case.
Complainants claim that although respondents
relationship is to the husband of the daughter of their
counsel, they did not want respondent to try their case
because they wanted to [avoid] any stigma and/or
cloud of doubt on any order/decision which
respondent may render on the case.
In this case, respondent judge failed to take into
account the loss of trust on the part of the
complainant as to his impartiality.
When a judge exhibits actions that give rise,
fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith
and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but
to inhibit himself voluntarily. A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt on
his honest actuation and probity in favor of
either party, or incite such state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the
peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself.
- Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563
[2001]
In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants
to support their motion, i.e., that respondents
nephew is the husband of the daughter of the
counsel for the accused; that they lacked confidence
in respondents impartiality xxx have no merit.
The first is not a ground for mandatory
disqualification of judges under Rule 137, par. 1 since
respondent is not even related to counsel for the
accused. - Yalung v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ01-1342 [2001]

Judge was the former public prosecutor who

handled the same case

disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R. No.

112884 August 30, 1994

The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by

the undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding
Judge of this sala last November 12, 1996. It was only
after 4 months herein undersigned discovered and
remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal
case as public prosecutor years back. Hence, for all
intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his
previous participation in the above-cited criminal case,
up to the present, the undersigned never heard
nor tried nor conducted any full-blown trial in the
same. Besides the private prosecutor did not interpose
any objection.

Should a judge whose decision was reversed by the

appellate court voluntarily inhibit herself when the
case is remanded to her sala

WON respondent judge should be administratively

sanctioned.
The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a
judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as
well cases where he acts by resolving motions,
issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done
in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to
prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the
appearance of impropriety on the part of the
judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in
Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to
April 13, 1998 without securing the written
consent of both the prosecution and the defense
and entering the same upon the record of the
case. For almost one and a half years, he issued
various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of
the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution
and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he
sat in and acted on the case. - In Re: Inhibition of
Judge Rojas A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC [1998]
Justice of CA had acted as counsel for
respondent but no sanction
Considering that Justice Montenegro had so
represented the National Power Corporation in CA G.R.
CV No. 34524 in his then capacity as the Acting
Solicitor General, he should have really begged off
from any participation in the decision process by,
indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate
court.
In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he
explained such failure to promptly inhibit himself
as one of mere inadvertence and oversight on
his part, and when reminded that he, in fact, had
acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then
Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith
disengaged himself from further involvement in the

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely

against petitioner in the resolution of the motion to
dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R. No.
160753, is not enough reason, absent any
extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to
conclude that the judge was biased and partial
against petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in
Webb v. People, the remedy of erroneous interlocutory
rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright
disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come
a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are
always infallible. The courts will close shop if we
disqualify judges who err, for we all err. - Barnes v.
reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583 [2009]
Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in
the practice of law a ground for automatic
disqualification
We are in accord with the statement of respondent
Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself
from further trying the case that Atty. Sicat was his
former associate in his practice of law is not one of
the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court
for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that
respondent Judge may not be compelled to
disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat,
admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a
party in the case being tried by him, may constitute
a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily
inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial,
if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the
second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.
Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536
August 31, 1967
Is being a former classmate of the judge a
ground for inhibition or disqualification?
Appellants stress that the trial court should be held
disqualified because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees
had been a classmate of the trial judge.
Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for
disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily
burden other trial judges to whom the case would be
transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for
under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred
from sitting in a case whenever one of his former
classmates (and he could have many) appeared.
Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L26810. August 31, 1970

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or

friendship between a judge and an attorney of
record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for
disqualification. - Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26,
1987
Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed
against the decision of a judge, after he had voluntarily
inhibited himself from further sitting in the case?
The administrative matter before us differs from most
petitions involving a judge's disqualification here, a
judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a
party or both parties filing a motion on the matter, it is
another judge who insists that he continue with
the case.
However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a
case is transferred should not resist too much
the order of recusation unless the motives for
inhibition are suspect. - Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26,
1987
Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused
settle their dispute amicably considering that they are
brothers and the wife of the accused is his first
cousin
Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may
be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first
sign that complainant was not willing to listen to
respondent's counsel, the latter should have recused
himself from the case without further delay. He cannot
sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the
chance that complainant might relent and agree at last
to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two
(2) months is more than enough for respondent
to make use of his good office. After a reasonable
time trying his ability to bring the parties to an
amicable settlement and using his moral influence on
them without success, he should have inhibited
himself from the case and continued his peace
efforts in a private capacity.
Judge is reprimanded. Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M.
No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998
Would mandamus lie to compel respondent
Judge to proceed with hearing the case
On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr.
issued an order denying the motion for inhibition
but voluntarily inhibited himself and
subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of inhibition.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel
respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed
with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the

motion to inhibit involves the exercise of discretion.

The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been
imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to
any matter brought before him. Furthermore,
petitioners have no vested right to the issuance of the
motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature.
Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 124760 July 8,
1998
Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not
proper
Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer
to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days
from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he
suspended the arraignment of the accused. However,
the private prosecutor did not file the required
motion for inhibition, an omission which was
interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the
complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge
from hearing subject cases. Villanueva v. Judge
Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000
Rule 65 as remedy where the trial judge rules in
favor of her competency
Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal
or stay of the proceedings where the trial judge rules in
favor of her competency to sit in a case is not an
absolute rule in civil cases, and has not precluded a
resort in appropriate cases to the special civil
action of certiorari before the higher courts for
determination, this will apply only in cases where
the denial of the motion for inhibition or
disqualification was made ahead of the trial
courts judgment on the merits and there is a
clear showing that the case is an exceptional
one. This is not true in the case of the present
petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R. No. 167899 August
6, 2008
Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court against appeal or stay of the proceedings when
the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself
and rules in favor of his own competency
Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary
impression, that such restriction against appeal or stay
of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a
motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his
own competency does not apply in criminal cases
where such disqualification is sought by the
prosecution or offended party. - Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969
When the accused seeks inhibition or
disqualification
Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal
case who seeks the disqualification of the trial
judge, the general restriction provided in the rule

against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the

judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his
own competency would apply, as it does in civil
cases. In such case, the accused, in the event of his
conviction, could raise the correctness of the judge's
ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal from
the decision on the merits; and were he to be
acquitted, he would have no cause for complaint
against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of nondisqualification of himself from trying the case and
rendering such verdict. - Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969
Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that
affects his jurisdiction
This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to
petitioners' contention, holds that the disqualification
of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction
and power to act such as to render his decision null
and void, so much so that failure on the part of a party,
to timely interpose such an objection of disqualification
prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal
obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes
v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September
30, 1969
When to file a motion for disqualification?
The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is
one that should be timely raised in the first
instance, so that it may properly be raised and
considered on appeal.
At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case,
supra, if this Court were of the opinion upon a review
of the case that the litigant had not had a fair
trial, it would grant a new trial, although the judge
may not have been disqualified under Rule 137, not on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the best
interests of justice. This we did in Dais vs. Torres,
where we ruled that: "Although a judge may not have
been disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it
appears to this court that the appellant was not given a
fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias
or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it
deems it necessary, in the interest of justice."
Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710
September 30, 1969
Written consent of all the parties is required in
Remittal of Disqualification
From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge
cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel
without the written consent of all the parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
The respondent alleged that since there was no
objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to
preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear
violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must

secure the written consent of all the parties, not a

mere verbal consent much less a tacit
acquiescence. More than this, said written consent
must be signed by them and entered upon the record. Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123
June 27, 1988
Definition of affinity
Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse
because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other.
The connection existing, in consequence of marriage
between each of the married persons and the kindred
of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the
canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and
wife one. The husband has the same relation by
affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa. PP v. Raul Berana,
G.R. No. 123544 July 29, 1999
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of
a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity
therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws,"
or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like. - PP
v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998
Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to
the blood relatives of the other spouse." It is a
relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting
from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created
by law in connection with the institution of marriage
and family relations. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]
Blood relatives
Relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives
encompassed the following:
(1) an ascendant;
(2) a descendant;
(3) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10,
1998
No affinity
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives
of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A
husband is related by affinity to his wifes brother, but
not to the wife of his wifes brother. There is no
affinity between the husbands brother and the
wifes sister. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M.
OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]
Is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as
between the wife and the blood relatives of her
husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse,
thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity?
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to
the blood relatives of ones spouse, does the

extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse

dissolve the relationship by affinity?

Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ

[2013]

The second view (the continuing affinity view)

maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not. Under this
view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result
of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated
an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of
affinity between these people and their relatives-bymarriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the
death of one of the married parties. Intestate
Estate of Gonzales vda. De Carung cong v. PP,
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

Beingmagbalaes is not a ground for automatic

disqualification

Common law relationship not a relationship by

affinity
The law cannot be stretched to include persons
attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no
blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant
to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of
relationship cannot be considered against him. PP v.
Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998
Case 1
Judge is respondents second cousin by affinity, the
formers [judge] aunt is married to an uncle of
respondent. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge
did not inhibit himself from hearing said electoral case.
Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree
by affinity in that the aunt of the judge is married to
the uncle of respondent.
WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.
Judge not disqualified
In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is
related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third
degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt
to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the
nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a
relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge
Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of
the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and,
thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like
manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of
Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood
relatives of Judge Wacas aunt, like Judge Wacas. In
short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each
other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec.
1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case. - Tiggangay v.

Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty

of impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself from the
case despite the fact that one of the accused, Lope
Panti, Sr., is the father-in-law of respondent judges
daughter.
To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti,
Sr. are not, strictly speaking, relatives within the
meaning of Rule 137, 1 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, the close personal relations between
them as parents of their respective children, being in
our culture known as magbalaes, should have
cautioned respondent judge to inhibit himself
from the case, lest his impartiality be placed in doubt.
Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M. No. MTJ-991236. November 25, 1999
Complainant is the judges wife
Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of
complainant, knowing that the private complainant
therein was his wife, Atty. Ester Flor. Tenenan v.
Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995 September
25, 2007