#1 OPOSA versus FACTORAN

224 SCRA 792

FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents,
filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but
they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners
presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide,
otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants
have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to
cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth
RULING: Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec.16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:
Sec.15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who

has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence,
the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

MERIDA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

554 SCRA 366
FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705
for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which the
private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the
meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with
the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco
in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into
lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as
provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered the
seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's
finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in
the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even
though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer;
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
3. Whethere the narra tree is a timber.
RULING: 1. YES, DENR has jurisdiction.
(NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is
done by the prosecutor.]
Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer
assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating
forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by
law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development
or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in
the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod
Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to
determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."
At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's
alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original
jurisdiction.

2. YES. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a
narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However,
when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. The Court sustain the lower
courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.
3. YES. The closest the Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to
provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."
In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions
or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In
ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or
common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber."
The Court see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68
cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for
building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too
small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.
Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber"
fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended.
The complaint is dismissed.

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. v. HON. DEMETRIO BATARIO

FACTS: Provident Tree Farms, Inc. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial
tree planting. It supplies gubas trees to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in
industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities
like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products.
Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers of
matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs released and 2 more containers of
matches from Singapore.
PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and
AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the
Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.
AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Commissioner of Customs under Sec.
1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by
law for an importation have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention
or release of property affected;"
The court dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine
what are legal or illegal importations. Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal
importations.
RULING: No. A ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated product
is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code,
the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of
petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to
impound the imported matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order
of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and
declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and
an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not
foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the
power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this
(Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Finance." Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any
particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may
adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."

5. People of the Philippines v. CFI OF QUEZON, BRANCH VII

FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The named accused filed a motion to quash
the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form.
The trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and the
reconsideration sought was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the information charged an offense.
RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the information substantially
alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of
PD 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking
of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said
information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry
away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ."
Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization
of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the
asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the
consent of the state.
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other
forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any
private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without
authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or
remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the
just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under
the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No.
705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is
not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or
license from the government.

6. AQUINO versus People of the Philippines

FACTS: On behalf of Teachers Camp, Guzman filed with the DENR an application to cut
down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City to be used for
the repairs of Teachers Camp. Before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of
members from the CENRO and Mr. Cuteng, a forest ranger, conducted an inspection of said
trees.
Thereafter, Mr. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing
the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions: As replacement, the
permittee shall plant 140 pine seedlings and violation of any of the conditions set hereof is
punishable under s68 of PD 705 and that non-compliance with any of the above conditions
shall render this permit void. This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire 10 days from
issuance.
Forest Rangers received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers
Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found petitioner, a
forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest
rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The
volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees
cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. Hence an Information for violation of section
68 of PD 705 was filed against petitioner.
The sawyers alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he
was not given a copy of the permit. Because they were in possession of the necessary
permit. He stated that 3 of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not
fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were
present.
Cuteng testified that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Petitioner alleged that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the
vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were
accompanied by 3 men.
The RTC finds and declares the accused guilty because the trees cut exceeded the
allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the
cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit. Petitioner, appealed.
The CA ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had
the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the
terms of the permit which only he possessed. The CA further rejected petitioners
contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this
case there was a permit for cutting down the trees.
Issue: whether petitioner Aquino who supervised the cutting of the pine trees is guilty of
violating section 68 of the revised forestry code.
HELD: No. Aquino is not guilty of violating section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Section 68 of PD 705 clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or
remove forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by
CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,
gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD
705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers
Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the
offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from
cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section
68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as
he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting,
gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
The petition is granted.

Daylinda A. Lagua, et. al versus Hon. Vicente N. Cusi Jr., et al 160 SCRA 260
FACTS: Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to
the Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing them to prevent the passage of
Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks
hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was
disembarked. In compliance, Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and
other equipments and effectively prevented their passage while the vehicles and trucks of
other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passage on the same road. It
resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued.
Aspiras addressed a letter to the Resident Manager of Eastcoast with instructions to
open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them
(but not to others) by Eastcoast. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, resident manager of
defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to their chief security guard for the latter to comply
with the Aspiras letter. These events, however, took the whole day of January 2, 1976 so
that notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure no hauling of logs could be made by
Plaintiff Laguas on that day.
When plaintiff Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards
the Japanese Vessel, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be
opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by defendant Eastcoast's
security men upon a radio message order of defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S
"Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing
laws, rules, and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard.
The illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the
Eastcoast through the order of Maglana Laguas had to depart postpaste Davao Oriental,
from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance
of the PC thereat. Thus Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC
Detachment Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by Eastcoast.
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack
of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action. The private respondents extended that as the
acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent

Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in

the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally
within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705.
The trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners' complaint. The
Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest Development has
the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their use
is in violation of laws. Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiffs
arose from the alleged illegal closure of a logging road.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D no. 705 vests Bureau of Forest Development the power to
determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such
determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
RULING: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a
logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the
petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road.
Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the
petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should
appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority
of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity
inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

8. Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

257 SCRA 430
FACTS: Mustang Lumber Inc., was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD).
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during the Secretary of the (DENR) and the Chief
of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The SAID of the DENR were informed that huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, SAID organized a team of foresters
and policemen and conducted surveillance at the said lumberyard. Surprisingly, they saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents,
the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound in Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.

The team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
RTC of Valenzuela, and seized the Mustang Lumber Inc, lumberyard. The petitioner failed to
produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove
the legitimacy of their source and origin.
Counsel for the ML sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from
April 14,1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some
of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of
Quirino. Robles denied the motion. Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit and directing the petitioner to explain in
writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled. Petitioner
had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None,
however, was submitted.
Secretary Factoran ordered confiscation in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside MLs lumberyard.
RTC held that the warrantless search and seizure of the petitioner's truck, shows the
legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and
seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled
and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of
a moving vehicle. The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May
1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government.
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on
the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime."
CA rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal and
affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not
carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and
that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is
unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, CA further emphasized that a forest officer or
employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705
pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lumber cannot be considered timber and petitioner should not
be held liable for illegal logging.
RULING: The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No.
1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the first
civil case, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
The Court also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the search on April 4, 1990 was a continuation of the search on April 3, 1990 done under
and by virtue of the search warrant issued on April 3, 1990 by Executive Judge

Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of
ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day
or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was
interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is
still within the ten-day period.
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of
lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest
product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.

9. Alejandro Tan v. People of the Philippines

290 scra 117

FACTS: In the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards
Panadero and Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber
which was driven by petitioner Moreno, an employee of A & E Const., owned by Tan.
Four days after, on Brgy. Cambajao, Panadero and Rabino apprehended another
dump truck driven by Cabudol, an employee of the same company, consisting of tanguire
lumber. Both confiscated lumber are illegally obtained without proof of legal possession.
Tan, Moreno, Cabudol, and Ramilo was charged of violating Sec.68 PD No. 705, as
amended by EO No. 277 by virtue of separate information for the 2 apprehended trucks.
Prisco Marin, who claimed to have been the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Bureau of
Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the seized pieces of lumber were legally
obtained by Tan to an authorized dealer of lumber (Matzhou Devt. Co.)

ISSUES : 1. Whether or not Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended is constitutional.

2. Whether or not lumber is within the meaning of timber or other forest product
under PD 705, which requires the necessary legal documents.

RULING: 1. One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As respondent Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the unlawful possession of firewood, bark,
honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion
of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to
petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial
determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said
provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the
ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

2. The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals in which this
Court expressly ruled that, lumber is included in the term timber. We quote at length the
Courts discussion:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant, which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as
timber or logs after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log
or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar
as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither
do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

10. Amado Taopa versus People of the Philippines

571 SCRA 610
FACTS: On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver,
Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.
On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco
as the owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as
charged beyond reasonable doubt.Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.
Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the
truck when the lumber was seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taopa should be convicted and what is the appropriate penalty to be
imposed upon conviction.
HELD:
Taopa should be convicted because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active
participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found
that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and
Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber
were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control
over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)
constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the
police was likewise largely indicative of guilt.
However, as to the penalty imposed on Taopa, Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,
refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be
imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other
forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of
qualified theft.

11. Perfecto Pallada vs. People of the Philippines

385 PHIL 195
Facts:
In the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
Bukidnon received reports that illegally-cut lumber were being delivered to the warehouse
of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon, a company engaged in rice
milling and trading.
On the strength of a warrant issued by the RTC, the warehouse was raided and a
large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by chainsaw was found and later on seized.
Petitioner Perfecto Pallada, the general manager of Valencia, produced two receipts issued
by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard but the same were not given credence as R.L. Rivero's permit to
operate had long been suspended and moreover, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain
saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
During the trial, petitioner Pallada presented, among other documents, Certificates of
Timber Origin (CTO) to establish the legality of Valencia's possession of the seized lumber.
Petitioner Pallada and Francisco Tankiko, were found guilty by the trial court of
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, of willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally possess lumber without any authority, license or legal documents
from the government, in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The
Court of Appeals then affirmed the conviction of Pallada.
Issue:
Whether or not the Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO) was the proper document to
justify Petitioner's possession of the squared timber or flitches.
Held:
No. the CTO presented by the petitioner is not the proper document to justify his
possession since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of
Lumber Origin, in accordance with BFD Circular No. 10-83 which read in parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin
thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this
circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers .
xxx
5. Lumber xxx transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber
Origin (CLO) xxx as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from
illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.
The Court finds no merit to the contention that the term timber includes lumber
and therefore, the CTO and attachments of the petitioners would suffice to establish the
legality of their possession, invoking the ruling in Mustang Lumber Inc. v. CA. The
statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the
word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case
that the phrase "posses timber or other forest products" in section 68 of P.D. No. 705
means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents
required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the

other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be
issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber,
lumber and non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD
Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for
lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of
lumber...and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for
Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in
convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the
documents presented by the latter.

12. Lt. Gen. Alfonso Dagudag vs. Judge Maximo Padaranga

555 SCRA 217
Facts:
Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan,
filed a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge against
Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional
Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container
Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de
Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid
inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and
other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR.
Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable
period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) OIC, Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC
Container Lines, Inc. After notice sent to the company, nobody appeared during the
adjudication. Thus the adjudicating office recommended to DENR Regional Executive
Director that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed
that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and
others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendants to pay him moral damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. Judge
Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession
of the forest products.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge correctly issued the writ of replevin.
Held:
No. The forest products were legally and validly seized by DENR which is the agency
responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192
states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the countrys natural resources. Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that
possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A
states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or
abandoned. In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container
Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown
owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

13. FACTORAN VS CA, 320 SCRA 530

FACTS
On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station
III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of
narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck
driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel
Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR
Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAIDinvestigated
them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber
which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. Such
omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure
order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. On March 30,
1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO
into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00.
ISSUE
WON the court injunction on the DENR lies, considering that exhaustion of
administrative remedies were not followed.
RULING
NO. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall
be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department
Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in
the administrative forum.

14. BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, ET AL VS. DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN,

311 SCRA 259

FACTS
The forest employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region tasked with the
enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with narra flitches
wrapped in nylon sack. The driver of the van could not produce any legal permit authorizing
him to transport the narra lumber. The vehicle and its load of narra flitches were
confiscated. A criminal complaint against driver Martinez was filed for violation of Sec. 78 of
P.D.705 (2) as amended, and implemented by DENR Administrative Order No. 59. After due
notice and opportunity to be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was
issued by the DENR Regional Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority. Thereafter, San
Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, filed a case for recovery of personal property
and damages with application for writ of replevin with the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The
trial court issued a warrant of seizure of personal property which was enforced by Deputy
Sheriff Magumun despite the refusal of the DENR employees and officials on the ground that
it had already been forfeited in favor of the government and was now in custodia legis. The
sheriff took the van without permission and turned over to SMC representative.
ISSUE
Whether or not the deputy sheriff committed a grave misconduct in taking hold of the
personal property which is already in custodia legis confiscated by other government
agency.
RULING
Yes. The deputy sheriff is found guilty of grave misconduct and ordered to pay the fine
of P5,000 for arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal property and for
ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the personal
property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government
for violation of forestry laws.
A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the
parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property; much less does he have any
discretion to decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at
hand. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute
it according to its mandate.
However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in
instances where there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. In
this case, the prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the
warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.

15. PAAT VS. CA, 266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal,
private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and
Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter
alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
WON the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
WON an action for replevin propsper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to section 68-A of
PD 705.
HELD 1. The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded
when there is violation of due process, when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
when there is irreparable injury, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, when it would
amount to nullification of a claim, when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

2. No. A crime was committed and the tools of the crime are under custodial egis.
With the introduction of EO 277 amending section 68 of PD 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes
a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under article 309.
It is clear that a suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings pursuant
to section 68-A of PD 705 as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of
action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction
over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

16. ALVAREZ VS. PICOP

508 SCRA 498
FACTS:
PICOPS predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43. (TLA) No. 43, as amended, expired on April 26, 1997. It
was renewed on October 7, 1997 for another 25 years to terminate on April 25, 2002.
On November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297,
EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED
FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESRVATION AND AS
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA. The excluded consists of 8, 1000 hectares, more or
less, which formed part of PICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its application for IFMA
conversion.
On January 21, 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the
aforesaid presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order.
In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Oder (TRO) enjoining
respondents therein from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and
her co-respondents in said case filed on February 6, 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) to
Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated February 3, 2003; and (2) To Dismiss.
ISSUE:
WON the presidential warranty was a contract.

RULING:
NO. PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is supposed contract
entered into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated July 29, 1969
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refuses this
claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential
Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non- Impairment Clause.
The Supreme Court disagrees. Such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in
the countrys forest cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.

17. ALVAREZ VS. PICOP

606 SCRA 444 (December 3, 2009)
FACTS:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and
execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal
requirements for the automatic conversation of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The
cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then
President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) with PICOP.
ISSUE:
WON the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause
by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA).
RULING:
NO. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment
clause is edifying.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking
assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the
sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.

18. MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

263 SCRA 490
FACTS:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses
under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7
stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later
petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approvalof MLEs petition, Davao
Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)
alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber concession.
The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the
Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural
Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR
Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR
and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay
the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of
execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The

RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the
execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a
separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made
not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without
any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under
the due process clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.
RULING:
The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound
by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for
the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without
giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of awrit of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,
apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without
hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment
in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic
tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make
conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24).

19. SOLEDAD DY versus COURT OF APPEALS

304 SCRA 331
FACTS
On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01
creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of
and/or port of illegal cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products.
Respondent Lausa was a member of the team.

On July 1, 1993, members of the team received confidential information that 2

truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City. Accordingly, they set up
a checkpoint. The 2 trucks approached the checkpoint but instead of stopping, they
accelerated their speed hence, the team chased them and finally caught up the 2 vehicles.
The owner/caretaker however failed to produce any document as proof of the legality of the
possession of the forest products.
The DENR issued temporary seizure order, but the owner/caretaker refused to accept
them, so the vehicles as well as the seized forest products were taken and placed in the
custody of respondent Lausa. The CENRO issued a notice of confiscation. For lack of
claimants, DENR Regional Director issued forfeiture orders and after 2 months, petitioner,
claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the RTC of Butuan City
which was approved. Respondent then filed a motion for approval of counter bond which the
trial court denied. On appeal, the CA granted the petition to approve the duly qualified
counter bond.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appeal made by respondent Lausa is meritorious.

HELD
The appeal is without merit. As an established rule, the party must exhaust all
administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. As petitioner clearly failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioners application for a writ of replevin and
denying private respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited properly, the lumber
properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking recover possession
thereof should be directed to that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent
of the DENR to file a counter bond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be
disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For
indeed what should have been done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner
filing her claim before the DENR.

20. PICOP Resources vs BASE METAL

510 SCRA 400

FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines Operating
Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation Pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines
Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its
mining claimsSince a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner
PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to
the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its
mining claims Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its mining claims to applications for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements.

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to
sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven mining claims in favor of private
respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The
transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as
well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed
of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made
by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private
respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims On November 18, 1997, petitioner
PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an
Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the
following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS
WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty
of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the

timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the
Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The
Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did
not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the nonimpairment clause finds no application. Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP
the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If
that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control
and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the impairment of contracts apply.
HELD:
No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement an examination of the Presidential
Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment
to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful
and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw
materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut,
collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of
other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The
Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking
assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the
sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.

21. ASAPHIL versus TUASON

488 scra 126
FACTS
Respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of
Perlite Ore with Induplex, Inc., wherein Induplex agreedto buy all the perlite ore that may
be found and mined in Tuasons mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange,
Induplexwill

assist

Tuason

in

securing

and

perfecting

his

right

over

the

mining

claim.Thereafter, Tuason executed on May 29, 1976, an Agreement to Operate Mining

Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction andDevelopment Corporation.Later on,

Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), a complaint against Asaphiland Induplex for declaration of nullity of the two
contracts, namely, the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, and the Agreementto
Operate Mining Claims. Tuason alleged in his complaint that the stockholders of Induplex
formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources, Inc. (Ibalon), an entity whose purpose is to
mine any and all kinds of minerals, and has in fact been mining, extracting andutilizing the
perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim; that this is in violation of the condition imposed by the
Board of Investments (BOI) onInduplex in its Joint Venture Agreement. The DENR, through
the Regional Executive Director, found merit in Induplexs arguments and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE
Does the DENR have jurisdiction to rule on the claim?
HELD
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the DENR Regional Executive Director opined
that the DENR does not have jurisdiction over thecase, while the MAB ruled that the DENR
has jurisdiction.The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional Executive Director that
the DENR does not have jurisdiction over Tuasonscomplaint.At the time of the filing of the
complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed
by P.D. No.1281, entitled "Revising Commonwealth Act No. 136, Creating the Bureau of
Mines, and for Other Purposes." Particularly, P.D. No. 1281vests the Bureau of Minesof
the DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or
applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,
including mining service contracts and service contractorsinsofar as their mining activities
are concerned. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281, the Bureau of Mines also has quasijudicial powersover cases involving the following:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the
claim holder thereof with several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an
operating agreement has not been placed into actualoperations within the
period stipulated therein; and

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal

of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms andconditions thereof.
The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or
controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR.While the Agreement to Operate Mining
Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is
notdue to Asaphils refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due
to Induplexs alleged violation of the conditionimposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture
Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale
andPurchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a
judicial question, which is proper for determination by the regular courts. A judicial question
is raised when the determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial function;
thatis, the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights
of the parties are with respect to the matter incontroversy

22. Dipidio Earth-Savers versus Elisea Gozun

485 SCRA 586
Facts:
In 1987, President Cory Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 279 which employed
DENR to stipulate with foreign companies regarding technical or financial large scale
exploration or mining. In 1995, President Ramos signed into law Republic Act (RA) 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act. On 1994, Pres. Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining
Co., an Australian Company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000
hectares of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy. Dipidio. After the passage of
law, DENR then issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In seeking to nullify RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners
reasoned that these in effect allow the unlawful and unjust taking of property for private
purpose in contravention with section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, mandating that
private property shall not be taken except for public use and with the corresponding
payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the
Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot on its own, permit entry into
a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
Public respondents on the other hand, avers that section 76 is not a taking provision
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the State may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general

welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and it endeavours potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all circumstances
would compel the government to regulate by purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State, through the Philippine Mining Act and the CAMC FTAA,
abdicated its primary responsibility to the full control and supervision over natural
resources.

RULING: No. The State has full control and supervision over natural resources. In La BugalBLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Mining
Act provides for the States control and supervision over mining operations. Sections 8, 9,
and 66 provide for the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations
as well as reportorial requirements. The Philippine Mining Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations provide the stipulations confirming the governments control over mining
enterprises, such as the following:
-For violation of any of its terms and conditions, the government may cancel an FTAA.
-An FTAA contractor is obliged to open its book of accounts and records for inspection by
the government.
-MGB is mandated to monitor the contractors compliance with the terms and conditions of
the FTAA; and to deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of the Philippine National
Police, the barangay, or the DENR-accredited nongovernmental organization to police
mining activities.
-An FTAA cannot be transferred or assigned without prior approval by the President.
-A mining project under an FTAA cannot proceed to the construction/development/utilization
stage, unless its Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility has been approved by the
government.
-The FTAA contractor is obliged to submit reports (on quarterly, semi-annual, or annual
basis as the case may be; per section 270, DAO 96-40) pertaining several matters.
-An FTAA pertaining to areas within government reservations cannot be granted without a
written clearance from the government agencies concerned.
- An FTAA contractor is required to post a financial guarantee bond in favour of the
government in an amount equivalent to its expenditures obligations for any particular year.
This requirement is apart from the representations and warranties of the contractor that it
has access to all financing, managerial, and technical expertise and technology necessary to
carry out the objectives of the FTAA.
It is readily apparent that the requirements, regulations, restrictions, and limitations
do not support petitioners contention that the State is a passive regulator of the countrys

natural resources. The Philippine Mining Act and its IRR grant the government with sufficient
control and supervision on the conduct of mining operations.

23.
Republic versus Rosemoor
426 SCRA 517
FACTS:
Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel,
Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial
quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly
thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating that their
license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there
was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license.
The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this
law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by
Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national
park.

ISSUE :
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

HELD:
Yes. The Court cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder;
that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that
QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription
against bills of attainder.

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is
settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national
park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was
still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section
1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution,
granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in
Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

24. La Bugal-B-Laan v Ramos

421 SCRA 148
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100, 000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative
Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its
implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to
exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, MMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company,
sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while
40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed
the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the president may execute with foreign
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty
between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian
investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreignowned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit Philippine mineral resources.
RULING:
1. RA 7942 is Unconstitutional. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine
natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the
Regalian doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that,
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilization
of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Under the concession system, the concessionaire
makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource
within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over
the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms
of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and
financial assistance. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said
act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to thefundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation,
RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to
these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of
the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural
resources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions
that are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
2. RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract. The FTAA between WMCP and the
Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
device contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be
produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP
shall provide all financing, technology,management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken
together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to
the State and are intended for thebenefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to
the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid,
the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must
be struck down.

25. La Bugal-B-Laan V Ramos

445 SCRA 1

FACTS:
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited
by the 1987 Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though
permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:

Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of

petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only?

HELD:
Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for largescale activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided
that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and
actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of
directors of a private corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and
other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board
retains full residual control of the business

26. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. WMC RESOURCES

INTERNATIONAL PTY. LTD., and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
Facts:
In a contract denominated as Tampakan Option Agreement dated April 25, 1991,
WMC Resources International (WMC), a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining
Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration
company, through its local subsidiary Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, acquired the mining claims in
Tampakan, South Cotabato of Southcott Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation,
and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Tampakan Companies).
The Tampakan Option Agreement was amended by subsequent agreements
including Amendatory Agreement dated July 15, 1994 under which the Tampakan
Companies were given preferential option to acquire the shares of WMC in WMCP and
Hillcrest Inc. in the event it (WMC) decided to sell them.On March 22, 1995, then President
Ramos on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines entered into a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP for the large scale exploration, development and
commercial exploitation of mineral resources in 99,387 hectares of lands in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao Del Sur and North Kotabato.
On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement sold to herein petitioner
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for
$10,000,000.00. The sale was subject to certain conditions including the Tampakan
Companies failure to accept WMCPs offer to sell the same shares, under the companies
right of first refusal provided for in the Tampakan Option Agreement and its amendments.
By letter of July 13, 2000, WMCP tendered to the Tampakan Companies its offer for
the latter to purchase WMCs shares of stock in it (WMCP) and Hillcrest, Inc.

In the meantime or by letter of August 28, 2000, petitioner requested the approval
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer
to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on account of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs
shares of stock in WMCP, which approval of transfer was required in the FTAA agreement
forged between then President Ramos and WMCP.
As the Tampakan Companies later availed of their preferential right under the
Tampakan Option Agreement, a Sale and Purchase Agreement was concluded on October
6, 2000 between WMC and the Tampakan Companies over the same shares of stock priory
purchased by petitioner.
On October 12, 2000, the Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of their preemptive right to buy
WMCs equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc., seeking at the same time the MGB Directors
formal expression of support for the stock transfer transaction.
Petitioner, getting wind of the Sale and Purchase Agreement between WMC and
Tampakan Companies, wrote, by letter of October 13, 2000, the DENR Secretary about the
invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of
the disputed shares.
The MGB accordingly informed the Tampakan Companies of
petitioners position on the matter and required the submission of a comment thereto.
WMCP and WMC, respondents herein, by letters to the MGB, proffered their side.
Several other letters or position papers were filed by the parties with the MGB or the DENR.
The Tampakan Companies later opted to acquire the disputed shares of stock
through Sagittarius Mines, Inc. WMC and Tampakan Companies thus entered into a Sale
and Purchase Agreement dated January 10, 2001 which paved the way for the forging of
two deeds of absolute sale of the shares of stock, those of WMC in WMCP and in Hillcrest,
Inc., both in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
On January 22, 2001, petitioner filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against
herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three corporations comprising the Tampakan
Companies, for specific performance, annulment of contracts, contractual interference and
injunction (Civil Case No. 01-087). The suit principally sought the enforcement of the July
12, 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement between petitioner and WMC and the consequent
nullification of the latters agreements with the Tampakan Companies.
Issues: Which party possesses the better right to acquire the mining rights.
Held:
It is clear from the proceedings before the DENR, specifically before the MGB, that the
issue of which between petitioner and respondent Tampakan Companies possesses the
better right to acquire the mining rights, claims and interests held by WMC through its local
subsidiary WMCP, especially with respect to the 1995 FTAA, had been brought to the
fore. The MGB cannot just assess the qualifications of petitioner and of the Tampakan
Companies as potential transferee or assignee of the rights and obligations of WMCP under
the FTAA without also resolving the issue of which has priority of right to become one.

True, the questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and
between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of
stock from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining
rights or interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the
validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the
DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has
jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from
both the MGB and the RTC.

27. benguet corporation v DENR

545 SCRA 196
FACTS:
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP, wherein J.G.
Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims respectively named as BonitoI, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total are of288.8656 hectares, situated in
Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.
Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims.
However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent
a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP
on the following grounds:
a. The fact that your company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP,
i.e., to undertake development works within 2 years from the execution of the Agreement;
b. Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our claim.
c. No stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the RAWOP.
d. Non-payment of the royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.
On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of
the RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and
entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
Issues:
(1) Did the Honorable Board exceed its jurisdiction when it sustained the cancellation
of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach of contract despite the absence of evidence?
(2) Did the cancellation of the RAWOP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G. Realty at
the expense of Benguet?
Held:

As a rule, no action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute, except to

enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators. A contractual stipulation that requires
prior resort to voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal
and is in fact promoted by the State. To reiterate, availment of voluntary arbitration before
resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid
contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.

In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary
arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the
defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual
provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasijudicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.
In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntary
arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed
by RA 876, the arbitration law.There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case. There is no
unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that
a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is
derived at another's expense or damage.
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the
RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further developing the
mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one
to blame but itself for its predicament.

28. metro Iloilo water district v CA

Facts:
Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of PD 198 as
amended. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional
Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its service areas encompasses the entire
territorial areas of Iloilo City and the Municipalities of Ma-asin, Cabanatuan, Santa
Barbara, and Pavia. Sometime between April and May 1993, petitioner filed nine
(9) individual yet identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against herein private respondents
for their act in continuing to extract or withdraw ground water without a Water
Permit therefor, is in violation of Article XIII of PD 1067 of the Water Code of the

Philippines, and unless such act is restrained, will definitely cause great loss upon
the petitioner as a Water District.
Private Respondents uniformly invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court, contending that the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council) under PD 1067. The trial
court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within the original
jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as it did, the appropriation,
exploitation, and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within the
Water Councils competence. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
thereafter denied. A petition seeking a review of the trial courts order of dismissal
was referred to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the
merits of the Resolution.
Petitioner sought the review of the order of the trial court dismissing the
petitions and denying its motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the trial
court failed to adhere to this Courts ruling in Amistoso v Ong and Santos v Court
of Appeals which upheld the regular the regular courts jurisdiction over disputes
which involved not the settlement of water rights but the enjoyment of the right to
water use for which a permit had already been granted. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction as it was the Water Council which had jurisdiction over the case. The CA also
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now contends that the extraction or withdrawal of ground water as well as
the sale thereof within its territorial jurisdiction is a violation of its rights as a water
district. Being a violation thereof, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the dispute. On
the other hand, private respondents unanimously maintain that it is the Water Council which
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
Private respondents, for their part, staunchly invoke Article 88 of the Water Code, which
grants original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters to the Water
Council.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents extraction and sale of ground water within petitioners
service area violated petitioners right as a water district.
RULING
The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against respondents.
In essence, the petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by
virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within
petitioners service area, visa-a-vis petitioners vested rights as a water district.

The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws
and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents actions violate
petitioners rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much
provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it
necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension to
the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e., the appropriation of
water which the Water Code defines as the acquisition of rights over the use of waters or
the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose
allowed by law, in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the
petitions.
On the other hand, in the analogous case of Amistoso v. Ong, petitioner had an
approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant petitioner the right to use but to
compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, we declared that the trial courts
jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights
dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted.

29. Amistoso v ong

130 SCRA 228

FACTS:
Petitioner as plaintiff, filed before the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
a conplaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and Damages. The
complaint alleged, that petitioner and private respondents are the owners of adjoining
parcels of agricultural land situated in Cauayanan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; that an
irrigation canal traverses the land of defendant Neri through which irrigation water from the
Silmod River passes and flows to the land of the petitioner for the latter's beneficial use and
that respondent Neri, owner of the land on which said irrigatrion canal exists and Senecio
Ong, the cultivator of the said property, despite repeated demands refused to recognize the
rights and title of the petitioner to the beneficial use of the water passing through the
aforesaid irrigation canal and to have petitioner's rights and/or claims annotated on the
Certificate of Title of respondent Neri. Hence, the filing of the said complaint.
Private respondents alleged that petitioner's complaint states no cause of action and
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the same.

Private respondents instead of presenting their evidence, filed a motion to dismiss. In the
said motion, respondents contend that the instant case, involving as it does development,

exploitation, conservation and utilization of water resources falls within the exclusive
jursidiction of the National Water Resources Council pursuant to P.D. NO. 424. Plaintiff
contends that the present action does not involve water dispute and that since the present
action was filed before the court prior to the effectivity of the Presidential Decree No. 424, it
is the old law on the matter that should be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the beneficial use of the water.

HELD: Yes. As correctly postulated by the petitioner, the court a quo is not being asked to
grant petitioner the right to use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right
and have the same annotated on respondent Neri's Torrens Certificate of Title. The record
clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of petitioner. Dr. Bienvenido V.
Amistoso, which was approved on November 13, the Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Commission David M. Consunji. The grant was made three (3) years before the
promulgation of P.D. 1067 on December 31, 1976, known as the Water Code of the
Philippines.

30. Loney, et al v People of the Philippines

482 SCRA 194

Facts
Loney, et al., are officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. In one of Marcoppers operations, the
corporation discharged millions of tons of tailings (mine waste) into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. The DOJ separately charged Loney et al. For violating various laws (The
Water Code, The Mining Act, RPC, and the National Pollution Control Decree). Loney et al
moved to quash the informations claiming that the informations were duplications as the
DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.
The MTC held that Loney et al. is liable under the Philippine Mining Act but dismissed the
violation of other laws. On petition to the RTC, it affirmed the decision and ordered the
other charges reinstated. The RTC said that there can be no absorption by one offense of

the three other offenses, as the acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from
each other.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not all the charges filed against the petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only charged for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Damage to Property should stand.
2. Whether or not Branch 94s ruling as affirmed by the Court of Appeals contravenes
People v Relova.
RULING:
1. No duplicity of charges.
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules
prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with
each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.
The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of the same

code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
2. People versus Relova is not in point
In the case of People v Relova, the Court held that a person charged with theft of
electric power under the RPC after being acquitted of violating a city ordinance penalizing
the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring violates the right against double jeopardy
because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national
statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act.
However, such is not the case here because Loney et al. are being prosecuted for an act or
incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute.

31. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

Facts:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the

allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among
others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
Issues:
1. Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate
only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general.
2.

Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can
be compelled by mandamus.

RULING
The Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is ministerial in
nature and can be compelled by mandamus.
Sec 3 (c) of RA 7924( the law creating MMDA) states that MMDA is mandated to put
up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area
of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code ( PD1152) and RA 903,
but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled by
mandamus.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and
pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a
matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to
the clean-up, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay.

32. Public Hearing Committe of the LLDA v SM Prime Holdings, Inc.

G.R. No. 170599

Facts

The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002 by the
Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected from herein respondent's
SM City Manila branch. The results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from
the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in
accordance with law. On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation,
directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the
said company and ordering the latter to pay a penalty of "One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per
day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 4 February 2002, the date of
inspection, until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater. On January 10, 2003, the
LLDA issued an Order denying respondent's request for a waiver of the fine imposed on the
latter. On April 21, 2003, respondent submitted another letter to the LLDA requesting for
reconsideration of its Order dated January 10, 2003. On May 27, 2003, the LLDA issued another
Order to Pay denying respondent's request for reconsideration and requiring payment of the fine
within ten days from respondent's receipt of a copy of the said Order. Aggrieved, respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying for the nullification of the Orders of the LLDA
dated October 2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003. On June 28, 2004, the CA rendered
its Decision granting the petition of herein respondent and reversing and setting aside the
assailed Orders of the LLDA. Ruling that an administrative agency's power to impose fines
should be expressly granted and may not be implied, the CA found that under its charter,
Republic Act No. 4850 (RA 4850), the LLDA is not expressly granted any power or authority to
impose fines for violations of effluent standards set by law. Thus, the CA held that the assailed
Orders of petitioner, which imposed a fine on respondent, are issued without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the CA via its Resolution dated November 23, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not SM Manila is liable for the penalty.
RULING

The Court rules for the petitioners.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to
a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her

jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones
cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to several
exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them.

33. Pacific Steam Laundry v LLDA

608 SCRA 442

FACTS
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. is a company engaged in the business of laundry
services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from
petitioner's plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA
conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner's
laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River.
Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner's plant was operating without LLDA
clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the
Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of
petitioner's effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent
standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD),
Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of
Violation dated 30 October 2001
Issues:

Whether or not the respondent LLDA has the implied power to impose fines as set forth
in PD 984? Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delegation of legislative powers?
RULING:
Yes. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the
Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution
Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and
functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. Under Executive Order
No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its
role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement.
The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of the Pollution
Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of the members of the Pollution Adjudication Board.
Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner, the Environmental
Management Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdiction over the pollution complaint against
petitioner.
No. The Court does not agree. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to
impose fines is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against
petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after the
investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent
quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. LLDA then imposed upon
petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater. TheP1,000 penalty
per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984.

34. The Alexandra Condominium Corp. versus LLDA

599 SCRA 452

34.) The Alexandra Condominium Corp. v. LLDA, 599 SCRA 452

FACTS:

On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission issued

a Development Permit to Phil Realty to develop Cluster A of the project. In the
Development Permit, Phil Realty was required to submit its condominium plans to the
Building Official of Pasig City. A building permit was issued Shortly after Laguna Lake

Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet
government effluent standards provided in Sections 68 and 69 of the 1978 National
Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations (NPCC) as amended by
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
34. LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for
its effluent discharge to meet government standards. In a Notice of Violation dated 6
May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit corrective measures to abate or control its
water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay. LLDA likewise imposed upon TACC
a daily fine of P1,000 from 26 March 1999 until full cessation of pollutive wastewater
discharge. TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals sustained
LLDAs contention that the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should have been to resort to an administrative
remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to judicial action.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding TACCs exhaustive efforts in
complying with the governments standards on effluent discharge;

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the transfer of LLDA to the DENR under
Executive Order No. 149[10] (EO 149), TACC should have first resorted to an
administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to filing a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a

court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible. EO 149 transferred LLDA from the
Office of the President to the DENR for policy and program coordination and/or
administrativesupervision 13] Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over
LLDA. Administrative power is concerned withthe

work

of

applying

policies

and

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[14]However, Executive

Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to
promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution and to
promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the
allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 created the Pollution
Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers
and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including
NPCCs function to serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution
of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.Hence, TACC has an administrative
recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

35. LLDA v CA, et al.

231 SCRA 292

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No.
4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake

area

and

the

surrounding

provinces

and

towns.

PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay

Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or
therefore

charges

Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages
to

the

consternation

of

the

LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation
and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems

and

ecological

stress

of

Laguna

Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other
aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared
illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal
shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD
813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issues:

1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Ruling:

1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of
EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do
not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water
rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not
favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication.

36. LLDA versus Court of Appeals, et al.

251 SCRA 42

Facts:
The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a
complaint with theLaguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the
City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the
surrounding water. LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been

maintaining the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. They
also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the
dumpsite.LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and
other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite. RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during
the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that
the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage.
Issue:
Whether or not the LLDA has authority and power to issue a cease and desist" order.

Ruling:
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that
requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is
essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR
through a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy

of

promoting

and

accelerating

the development

and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution
. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake

region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes
from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region. Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to " make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make
whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

37. Tano versus Socrates

278 SCRA 154
FACTS:
On December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January
1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L.
Lucero issued an Office Order on January 1993 which authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto
Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of
destinations either via aircraft or sea craft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by
invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as
to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. Any cargo containing live fish
and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper disposition.
On February 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
a Resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years in and coming from Palawan Waters.
The respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole
province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the
petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their
lawful occupation and trade.
Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio
Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay; Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were
charged by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princess City.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Ordinances deprived the petitioners of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted from the practice of trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No. The instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order
issued on November 1993 is lifted.

It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely
recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
Section 7 of Article XIII speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources,
but of their protection, development and conservation. The ordinances in question are meant precisely
to protect and conserve marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only
for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called "preferential right" of
subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance
with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their mandated protection,
development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply
certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

38.
PEOPLE V VERGARA
270 SCRA 624
FACTS:
Renerio Vergara together with his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagao and
Ernesto Cuesta, Jr. was caught red-handed by the Bantay-Dagat patrol team onboard a pumpboat
catching, taking, and gathering fish belonging to the anchovies species known locally as "bolinao,"
with the use of explosives contained in a bottle and called in the vernacular as "badil", which bottled
explosives after being ignited and hurled to the sea, produced explosion and caused the death of the
said fish which were hit or affected by such explosion. The four accused were apprehended and taken
by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, Leyte and later to the police station in Palo,
Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of bolinao, were impounded.
The accused, however, refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts. Vergara alone
was arraigned and brought to trial as his co-accused escaped and remained at large.
On February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment
finding Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 33 of Presidential Decree No.
704, as amended by P.D. No. 1508 and is sentenced to a penalty of twenty years to life imprisonment
as punished under Sec. 2 of PD 1058. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
WON the lower court committed grave abuse of authority in convicting the accused.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of
the offense charged. The decision of the court a quo appealed from is affirmed in toto.

39. HIZON V CA
265 SCRA 517
FACTS:
Hizon et al. was apprehended by the Task Force Bantay-Dagat together with the PNP Maritime
Command following a report of a big fishing boat later identified as F/B Robinson and several
motorized sampans fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of Puerto Princesa. The police and the
Task Force Bantay-Dagat directed the boat captain to get samples of the fish from the fish cage for
testing. The fish brought for testing at the NBI head office in Manila for laboratory examination tested
positive for sodium cyanide. In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa
City filed the complaint against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen
Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain Silverio Gargar, the
boat engineer Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28
fishermen of the said boat. The case was prosecuted against thirty-one (31) of the thirty-five (35)
accused. Richard Hizon remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown. Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to
the charge. They claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a
domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and
line method.
On July 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and sentenced them to
imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day to a maximum of nine (9) years and
four (4) months. The court also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28
sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
The Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for petitioners
acquittal.
ISSUE/S
1. WON fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are
admissible in evidence.
2. WON Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances sodium cyanide.
RULING:
1. The Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial
warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these
are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a
moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted
on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this
reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their
search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery
laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting
ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery
laws.
The Court hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of
having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were
properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and
hence, waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and
seizure.

2. The Court agrees with the petitioners together with the Solicitor General that prosecution
evidence cannot convict them. Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections
33 and 38 of P.D. 704 which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in
illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch,
take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use
of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3
hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for
illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That
the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and
conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only,
the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather
fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use
of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery
practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as
the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided,
finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large
dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
Sec. 38. Penalties. -- (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products.-- Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:
xxx xxx
xxx
(2)
By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous
substances are used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical
injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12) years, or
2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from twenty (20) years to
life or death;
The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI
laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, that finding
does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four
specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The circumstances narrated by the witnesses
as well as the time interval from the taking of the fish samples and their actual examination fail to
assure the impartial mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were
the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor General, the
report received by the Task Force Bantay-Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through
muro ami on the waters of San Rafael. Muro ami according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with the
use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surrounding
the net. This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What
the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered
were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found
nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the
boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under
suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances.
The petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
defined under the Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.

40. Hilarion M. Henares, et al. v LTFRB and DOTC

505 SCRA 104

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB
and DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting
their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus
to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
ISSUE:
WON LTFRB can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of Mandamus?
HELD:
NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as
an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of
any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing
the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,
2004. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner
environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by
the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel
the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further,
mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. In the same manner that we have
associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of
"inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the
right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this
petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if
the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their

continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come."It is the firm belief of this Court that
in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution,
with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants
are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air
pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to
pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of
the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that
more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.

41. Province of Rizal, et al. versus Executive Secretary, et al.

477 SCRA 436
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for
lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635. At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro
Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the
Office of the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary
landfill and similar waste disposal applications.
The petitioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under
the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constituents. Moreso, the dump
site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation. Through their concerted efforts of the officials
and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed.
However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A
temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raise the question that
the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it
into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

HELD:
YES, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section
27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government
authorities and the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina, Jr.
v. Pao, Section 2 (c), and requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance
of the particular community implementing the project. Relative to the case, during the oral
arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA
Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had
conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to
the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of
petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province
of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality,
grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact ordinances, and
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section
447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the

municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the
basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects .and, subject to
existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source
of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water
supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one
hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

42. Baguio City versus Masweng

578 SCRA 88

Facts:
Respondents Judith K. Cario, Jacqueline Cario and the other heirs of Mateo Cario and
Bayosa Ortega are members of the Ibaloi tribe, an indigenous cultural tribe of Baguio City and
Benguet Province.Their ancestors were grantees of a survey plan approved by the Director of
Lands in 1920. Currently, they have pending petitions before the National Commission on
Indigenous People (NCIP) for the validation of ancestral land claims covering a parcel of land in

Resident Section J in Baguio City and Tuba, Benguet. A portion of the land being claimed by
petitioners overlaps with the Baguio Dairy Farm, a government reservation under the supervision
of the Department of Agriculture (DA).
On June 29, 2003, respondents filed a petition for injunction (with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or a writ of preliminary injunction) with the
NCIP seeking to enjoin the mayor of Baguio City and the head of the citys demolition team
from implementing Demolition Order No. 17, series of 2003.
In response, public respondent Brain Masweng, regional hearing officer of the NCIP in the
Cordillera Administrative Region, issued a 72-hour TRO.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of TRO by NCIP is proper?
Held: No. The NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction.
The claim of respondents on the subject land is still pending before the NCIP. Thus, their
rights are mere expectations, not the present and unmistakable right required for the grant of the
provisional remedy of injunction.

Hence, private respondents were not entitled to the

preliminary injunction issued by the NCIP.

43. Province of North Cotabato versus GRP Peace Panel

568 SCRA 402
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD
between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUE:
Is the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) unconstitutional?
HELD:
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). Petitioners assert that the powers granted to
the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go
beyond those of the present ARMM. The MOA-AD explicitly alludes to the international law
concept of association.
Association is referred to on the MOA-AD. It is used to describe the envisioned relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government. The relationship between the Central
Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared
authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial land administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive
compact. The MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies,
and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city,
or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State.

44. Bangus Fry Fisherfolk et al. versus Hon. Lanzanas, et al.

405 SCRA 530
FACTS:
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental
Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in
Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power
barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power
barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro
pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC
for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30
June 1999.
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Petitioners opposed the motion on
the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that
the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections
26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160, and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative
Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also
claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. TC
dismissed complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action
and lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint
shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the
ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government
participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that
involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary
consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not
construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local
ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of
granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitioners' complaint.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the
ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However,
since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the
validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.