Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vietnam’s Submarine Force
Carlyle A. Thayer
December 28, 2009
[client name deleted]
ANSWER: Vietnam’s acquisition of six Kilo‐class submarines over the next six years
will be an extremely challenging one. The Vietnamese military is primarily a land
force with limited experience in coordinating operations in two let alone three
dimensions – land/surface, air and sub‐surface. The acquisition of six submarines
does not automatically translate into an effective war‐fighting capability. Vietnam
needs to develop a naval doctrine that incorporates the capabilities the Kilos will
have. But more importantly, Vietnam will need to make a sustained commitment of
resources, including funds, to make its submarine force combat ready. One key
question is how long the transition period from acquisition of submarines to
effective absorption of their capabilities into the existing force structure will take.
In Southeast Asia the examples of Indonesia and Singapore point to a spectrum of
likely possibilities. Indonesia was the first Southeast Asian country to introduce
submarines into the region and has found it difficult to maintain and fund this force.
Indonesia has repeatedly put off upgrades and modernization. Singapore, on the
other hand, provides an example where submarines have been quickly and
efficiently integrated into its current force structure. These examples illustrate the
importance of the commitment of national leaders to provide the broad spectrum of
political and financial support needed to sustain a submarine fleet.
Vietnam will probably fall somewhere between Indonesia and Singapore in its ability
to integrate a submarine force into its force structure. Vietnam lacks Singapore’s
basic support infrastructure and financial resources. Therefore the process of
effectively integrating submarines will take much longer in Vietnam. Vietnam’s
leadership has exhibited a marked capacity to implement strategic decisions and is
therefore likely to be more successful than Indonesia. Vietnam’s success is also
dependent on sustained support and servicing from Russia.
Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam’s Naval Air Arm
Carlyle A. Thayer
December 30, 2009
[client name deleted]
QUESTION: Do you think that Vietnam’s development of a naval air wing is a simpler
process than integrating submarines into its Navy?
ANSWER: On Vietnam’s prospective naval air wing: In the just released White Paper
there is one reference. It reads, “In the future, the Navy will be further equipped
with modern weapons and enhanced combat power to be sufficiently capable of
successfully accomplishing the task of protecting Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign
rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea.”
The Sukhoi 30‐MKs are configured for maritime operations. These craft are likely to
remain with the Air Defence‐Air Force.
The White Paper does not give any details of what weapons will be purchased. This
reference could refer to on‐board ship armaments such as anti‐ship missiles.
It could possibly refer to the acquisition of more modern anti‐submarine helicopters
armed with appropriate missiles. They might be embarked on a surface combatant
such as the Gepard frigate (export models support helicopters) based on shore, or
even on an airstrip on one of the occupied features in the South China Sea. The Navy
might acquire fixed wing aircraft that operate from a land based naval air station.
I think it would far easier to absorb helicopters and land based aircraft in the navy
than submarines. Vietnamese pilots regularly fly over the South China Sea and they
do have an ASW capacity to build upon. Training to land and take off from a ship at
sea is demanding but is a skill that can be acquired a lot faster than learning to drive
a submarine with a crew of fifty plus.