ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL vs.

CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on
June 14, 1963 by herein respondent Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor
of the City of Manila. The said ordinance was enacted to regulate the operation of hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, suppress the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila, to increase the income of the city government and to protect public morals.
Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc.,
and Mr. Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the latter company, filed at the lower court a
petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being unconstitutional and violative of the due
process. They assailed that Section 1 of the ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would
require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house
to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and
in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
The petitioners contended that Section 2 of the ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each
room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.
And insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of
the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. Later the lower court ruled
that Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, was unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents to restrain him
from enforcing the ordinance in question.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of City of Manila is unconstitutional and violative of the due process.

Held:
Supreme court ruled that Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional and not violative of the due process and
used the presumption of the validity principle. The petitioners were not able to prove the
unconstitutionality of the ordinance due to the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of its
validity. The court also ruled that there is no such factual foundation being laid in the case at bar, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance must be set aside.
As stated by Justice Laurel "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of
our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.
With costs.