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INDEX-DIGESTS OF AGRARIAN RELATED JURISPRUDENCE

A
ABANDONMENT
For abandonment to occur, the tenant must have unequivocally and absolutely
relinquished his occupation and cultivation of the lots. This is not so in this case.
Petitioner continued to occupy Lot No. 2679 for residential and small backyard farming
purposes, despite the fact that the eruption of Mr. Pinatubo made it impossible for him to
continue with its cultivation. Moreover, under Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of
1983, the alleged abandonment of the land by the tenant does not automatically terminate
the tenancy relationship as there must be a proper court declaration of such fact. In this
case, such court declaration of abandonment is wanting.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
SOBREVIAS
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. No. 138289

AND

TOMAS

ABANDONMENT; Requisites:
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent
of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297

ACCOUNTING; What includes


We have ruled in Yusay vs. Alojado, that accounting includes the determination,
adjudication and settlement of what is due the landholder and the tenant under the law.
Moreover, Sec. 38, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be

barred if not commenced within three (3) years after such cause of action accrued".
Construing this provision is Dolofino vs. Court of Appeals (SCRA), we rule that "the law
does not specifically require a judicial action, hence it can be an administrative action.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos".
DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON
-versusLEONARDO ARELLANO
Promulgated: November 6, 1992
G.R. No. 77104

ACQUISITION; Mode of
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land:
compulsory and voluntary.
STA.
ROSA
REALTY
CORPORATION
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

DEVELOPMENT

ACQUISITION; Procedure for Compulsory Acquisition


In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer
beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of
acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the
offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowners accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution
of the deed of transfer, the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner,
the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the
DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just
compensation.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF


"Under this rule, only a person who is interested 'under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an
action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument
or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.' This means that the
subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a
statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein
is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
NATALIA REALTY, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 12, 2002
G.R. No. 126462

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF LAND; Prescription thereof


In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals we observed that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applied only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for
the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

ACTION; Must be prosecuted in name of real party in interest


We, therefore, take exception to the literal application of Section 17 of P.D. 946 for as
stated in Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. (88 Phil. 125 (1951), an action is
brought for a practical purpose, may obtain actual and positive relief. If the party sued
upon is not the proper party, any decision that may be rendered against him would be
futile, for it cannot be enforced or executed. The effort may be employed will be wasted.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action
must be brought a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein
(Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial
Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 (1917).
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
SCRA No. 207

ACTION; Nature of
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of
the action.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276

ACTION; Party not impleaded not bound by the decision rendered therein
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 (1990), a person who
was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then
of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or
whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusIAC & BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT; When can it be assailed


Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law. A grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. In this regard, it may stressed that the function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law of putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the land and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provision of the law.
And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.
LAND
BANK
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. Nos. 118712 & 118745

PHILIPPINES

and

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only
respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions
are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law
for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and
central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded
Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 6, 2002
G.R. No. 132048
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a department
head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to
support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versus-

ADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies


The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
Note: The doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 80719

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Interpretation thereof; rule on


It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269
SCRA Vol. No. 201 p. 536

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS; Effect


Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations
and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269
SCRA Vol. No. 201 p. 536

It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations


and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269

AGENT; Personality
Erilla as an agent of the landowner(s) was not an independent personality who could
provide insulation for the landowners from their obligations to private respondents as
tenants or agricultural lessees. To hold that the landowner(s) did not give their consent
because private respondents had been hired or give their consent because private
respondents had been hired not give their consent because private respondents had been
hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the landowner(s) with too easy an
escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple expedient of hiring an
employee or overseer to stand between the landowner(s) and the tenants or agricultural
lessees. To sustain this particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the force and
effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, well nigh to the vanishing point.
SPS. AMADEO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159

AGRARIAN CASES; Appeal


In appeals in agrarian cases, the only function required of the Court of Appeals is to
determine whether the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations are supported
by substantial evidence. And substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, and where the findings of fact of the agrarian court are supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court
(Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226 (1986); Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. vs.
Tolentino, 167 SCRA 334 (1988). In such cases, the appellate court cannot make its own
findings of fact and substitute and same in lieu of the findings of fact of the agrarian
court.
ANGELES MALATE, NORBERTO ESGUERRA AND
BENEDICTO ESGUERRA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELINO GEMANIL

Promulgated: February 9, 1993


G.R. No. 55318

AGRARIAN CASES; Prescriptive period of action for accounting


Unfortunately, private respondent's claim has already prescribed. Under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1199, an action for accounting may be filed by the tenant within three
(3) years from the date of the threshing of the crop in question.
DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, LEONARDO ARELLANO
Promulgated: November 6, 1992
G.R. No. 77104

AGRARIAN CASE; Quantum of evidence required


In agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the trial court
findings of fact which attained the minimum of evidentiary support demanded by law,
i.e., by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be disturbed by the
appellate tribunals.
Moreover, in agrarian case, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial
evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in Section 18 , P.D. No. 946
which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989).
These findings are supported by substantial evidence on record particularly in his rebuttal
testimony on October 20, 1970 (October T.S.N., pp. 68-70, which are not sufficient in
this case being an agrarian case where all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
This court has consistently ruled that in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which attained the
minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial
evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.
NICOLAS REYES, ET AL.
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489
ROMEO REYES, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 26, 1992
G.R. No. 96492
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ

-versusIAC, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

AGRARIAN CASES; Resolution


The rationale of the rule requiring a defendant in an agrarian case to file an answer and
not a motion to dismiss is to expedite the proceedings. The filing of the motion to dismiss
and the granting thereof by the lower court based upon indubitable grounds precisely
expedited the proceedings and conforms with the spirit and intention of P.D. No. 946
which requires courts trying agrarian cases to employ every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure and empowering the Court to adopt any appropriate
measure or procedure in any situation or matter not provided for or covered by the
Decree (Section 116, 3rd and 4th sentences, P.D. No. 946).
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

AGRARIAN DISPUTE; Defined


Section 3, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6657 defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to
controversy relating to tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworker's
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 6, 2002
G.R. No. 132048
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCA AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Definition

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP
Law), as:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS
Represented by his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA.
DE SANTOS
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 7, 2000
G.R. No. 109992

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Resolution


The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties
since it is in a better nay presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction
over this case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of
private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismondo vs. Court of
Appeals (SCRA), the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage to the parties since it
is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings
therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be
adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCA AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093

AGRARIAN LAW; Powers of the President


The promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of
his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we
find no reason to modify or reverse it in that issue. As for the power of President Aquino
to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 342

IN

THE

AGRARIAN LAW; Rationale for the enactment


The agrarian law was established in the light of the social justice precept of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to promote the common
weal (Primero vs. CIR, L-10594, May 29, 1957; Pineda, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., L23773-74, December 29, 1967).
DOMINGO AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

AGRARIAN REFORM; Objectives


Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by Congress to establish ownercultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of Phil. Agriculture; to achieve a
dignified for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and practices; to
make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of a genuine strength in our democratic society.
In other words it was enacted to help the small farmers and to uplift their economic status
by providing them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's needs for
food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities.
ANACLETO DE JESUS
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
175 SCRA 559

AGRARIAN REFORM; Raison d'tre

Agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that there is an urgent
need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our country.
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY; Defined


Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting
of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586

AGRICULTURAL LABORER; Defined


Agricultural laborer works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives salary
or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.
COCONUT COOP. MARKETING, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 568

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Coverable under CARL


Be that, as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, noted in an opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation
No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for
townsite purposes to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing
agency, are not deemed agricultural lands within the meaning and intent of Section (3) of
R.A. No. 6657. Not being deemed "agricultural", they are outside the coverage of CARL.
NATALIA REALTY, INC., ET AL.
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: August 12, 1993

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Defined


Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, "all public and
private agricultural lands." Section 3(c) defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."
Respondent vehemently insists that its lots had been classified as residential prior to June
15, 1988, the date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. As earlier mentioned, Engineer
Gregorio Bermejo, Municipal Engineer and Deputized Zoning Administrator of
Dasmarias, Cavite, certified that respondent's lands are within the residential zone of
Dasmarias, based on the Land Use Plan of that municipality duly approved by the
HLURB in its Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981. We observe, however,
that this factual issue was never determined below. Thus, we cannot conclude that
respondent's parcels of land are residential.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422
As a preliminary point, we note that the landholding in dispute is a mango
plantation. We consider that and there appears no dispute on this point this
plantation is covered by the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Section 166 (1)
of which defines agricultural land as "land devoted to any growth, including but no
limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle lands and abandoned lands as defined
in pars. 18 and 19 of this Section, respectively". It is worth noting also that R.A. No.
1199, the earlier statute known as "The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines",
effective 30 August 1954, although it did not expressly define agricultural land, did
not limit its scope to rice land, to the contrary, Chapter III, Section 41 of the Statute,
among other provisions, expressly recognized share tenancy in respect of crops other
than rice.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusRENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Effect of transfer


The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferees is simply subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, R.A. 3844).

SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO AND MONINA FULE


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545
Note: Deliberate refusal of lessee to pay rent for two years carries with it the
penalty of forfeiture.

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Establishment


The present dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No.
3844, which, except for Section 35 thereof, was not specifically repealed by the passage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657), but was intended
to have suppletory effect to the latter law. Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for
in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in
accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either
express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural
share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold
relations. The other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be
oral or in writing. In the instant case, it is not disputed that an agricultural leasehold
contract was entered into between petitioner and Ramon Castro. Respondents, however,
insist that an agricultural leasehold contract over a one-hectare portion of the landholding
arose as a result of the actions of Ramon's overseer, who must be viewed as the latter's
agent. They conclude that because of this implied leasehold, the application of the
contract between petitioner and the landowner should be limited to the remaining portion
of the property.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versusRICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 2002
G.R. No. 140164

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; How established


An agricultural leasehold relationship exists by operation of law when there is a
concurrence of an agricultural lessor and an agricultural lessee. As clearly stated in
Section 5 of the Code:
"Sec. 5.
Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relations.
The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law
in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly."

In other words, in the case at bar, from the moment Benigno, as legal possessor (and,
therefore, an agricultural lessor) granted the cultivation and use of the landholding to

Bernas in exchange or consideration for a sharing in the harvest, an agricultural leasehold


relationship emerged between them "by operation of law.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD RELATION; Extinguishment


Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844, on the other hand, states that once the agricultural leasehold
relation is established, the same shall confer upon the lessee the right to continue working
on the landholding until such relation is extinguished, and the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court and for causes provided by law. It is worthy to note that the sale
or alienation of tenanted land is not among the causes of extinguishment of the
agricultural leasehold relation provided under the law.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 24, 2002
G.R. No. 125063

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary


Extinguishing Agricultural Leasehold

Surrender

as

Mode

of

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of


extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the
landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural
lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 3844.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Agricultural Lessee Installed by Legal Possessor


Cannot be Ejected by Landowner on the Land's Return to the Latter

Clearly, the return of legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the
rights of Bernas as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an
agricultural leasehold are provided for by law. The enumeration is exclusive and no other
grounds can justify termination of the lease. The policy and letter of the law are clear on
this point.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD
BITO-ON DEITA
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Defined


As defined in Section 166 (3) of the Code, an agricultural lessor is a natural or juridical
person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor lets or
grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. Nothing in said
Section, it will be noted, requires that the civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor
should have the prior authorization of the landowner in order to let or grant to another the
cultivation or use of the landholding.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041
"Agricultural Lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to,
or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a
price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee
as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines".
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Right in a contract of mortgage


The right of redemption vested in agricultural lessees is superior to the right of the
mortgagee of the land. The land was, in the hands of the two (2) daughters of Andres
Cruz and of petitioner Cuao spouses, already subject to the right of redemption vested in
private respondents. It follows that when the Cuao spouses mortgaged the same land to
secure a loan obtained from PAIC, PAIC's right as mortgagee was subject to, and junior

to, the prior right of private respondents to redeem the said property. Put a little
differently, what the Cuao spouses mortgaged to PAIC was not absolute or unqualified
dominium plenum over the land, but rather a right of ownership qualified by and subject
to the right of redemption of private respondents. PAIC, of course, could not have
acquired rights superior to those of its mortgagors.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Right, to whom it is enforceable


This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals where this court further
held that the agricultural lessee's rights are enforceable against the transferee or the
landowner's successor-in-interest. Therefore, as the adjudged legitimate tenant on the
land in question, private respondent Montano may enforce his right of possession against
petitioner PNB, whose contention that private respondent Montano is illegally occupying
the property lacks basis in fact and in law.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND HON. JUDGE OF THE RTC
OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, BR. 34 AND ILDEFONSO
MONTANO
Promulgated: July 7, 1997
G.R. No. 105760

AGRICULTURAL SHARE TENANCY


Under identical facts, Republic Act No. 6389 (September 10, 1971) which later amended
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3844, by providing for an "automatic conversion" from agricultural
share tenancy to agricultural leasehold, was held to be applicable to presidential
proclamations to the effect that measures have been adopted to insure efficient
management of the agricultural and processing phases of crops covered by marketing
allotments, it would be nothing short of regressive to deny sugarland share tenants of
their right to elect the leasehold system. Considering the policy of the government as
enunciated in Section 4 of the Code as amended, which mandates the automatic
conversion of share tenants to leaseholders, individual sugarlands should not be
discriminated against. Hence, any share tenant in sugarlands tenants who do not avail of
said option may still be subject to existing lawful arrangements with the landowner in the
absence of the Presidential Proclamation adverted in Section 4 (Wilfredo David vs. CA,
supra).
CARLOS DAYRIT

-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 30, 1988
G.R. No. L-57675

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Defined


Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the member of his immediate farm household in consideration
of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
GUERRERO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
142 SCRA 136
CARAG
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
151 SCRA 44

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites


One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by
the landowner and tenant, of the produce. There is no basis for the petitioner's claim that
he is an agricultural tenant. No proof of sharing has been shown in this case.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND ARMANDO ANGELES
Promulgated: July 4, 1994
G.R. No. 111179

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Requires consent


It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent
of the true and lawful owner is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where

an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her
will or permission to work on the farm land.
SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI
Promulgated: October 23, 1992
G.R. No. 88113

AGRICULTURAL WORKER; Defined


A farmhand or agricultural worker is any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly
states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not
obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

AMORTIZATION PAYMENTS; Credited


We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land
reform area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after
21 October 1971 by the private respondent tenant-farmers constituted amortization
payments on the cost of the land that they were required to apply under Presidential
Decree No. 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the former
landowners as part of the compensation for the dominion over land of which they were
deprived by operation of P.D. No. 27. Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals
like those which had been paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation
of P.D. No. 27 and prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer.
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333
Pending full payment of the cost of the land to the old landowner by the Land
Bank of the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally maintained" by the
"lease rentals" paid by the tenant-farmers prior to such full payment by the Land Bank
to the old landowner, would be credited no longer as rentals but un-amortized portion
being payable by the Land Bank. In respect of lands brought within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold system was legally and effectively terminated

immediately on 21 October 1972 (notwithstanding the curious statement in


Department Circular No. 8 that it was subjected to the terms and effects of Operation
Land Transfer that the leasehold system did continue to govern the relationship
between the "landowner and his tenant-tillers".
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333

APPEAL
The failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity
in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a
petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the
category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts
do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 [13] (precursor to
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later
on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial
agency.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275

APPEAL; Appeal to the Office of the President


The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18, Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7.
Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases."

It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

APPEAL; Change of theory, not allowed


The long settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory
of the case or his cause of action on appeal. The Court previously held that "courts of
justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue" and that a
judgment something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental tenets of fair play and, in
the present case, the Court is properly compelled not to go beyond the issue litigated in
the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano
Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation as such by Benigno
Bito-on, the legal possessor of the landholdings at the time Bernas was so installed and,
consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for the
dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and
only then can be the private respondent (landowner) initiate a separate action to
dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she must allege and prove compliance
with Section 36 (1) of the Code which consist of, among others, a one year advance
notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land involved being less than 5 hectares)
and readiness to pay him the damages required also by the Code.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041

APPEAL; Decisions of the Regional Director


Pursuant to DAR Administrative Orders Nos. 9-94, 10-94 and 12-94, the remedy of a
party aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Director is to file a motion for
reconsideration, and in the event the motion is denied, to appeal to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless, we agree that in the instant case a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of respondent Regional Director would have been
useless. It appears that upon the issuances of the Resolution of respondent Regional
Director denying petitioners' Application for Exemption on 27 November 1996 or
thereabouts, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform proceeded to cancel their title over the
disputed property and transferred it to designated beneficiaries through the issuance of a
collective CLOA. Hence, considering that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had already
canceled petitioners' title to the property and caused its distribution to designated

beneficiaries even before the pending incidents with respondent Regional Director could
be resolved, it would indeed be futile to expect the latter to reconsider his earlier posture
and contradict or reverse the position taken by his superior, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA
-versusHON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 20, 2001
G.R. No. 133806

APPEAL; Decisions of the secretary of DAR appealable to the office of the


president
The question as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his
landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary of Agrarian
Reform) whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the
Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the
then CAR, now the Regional Trial Court.
Failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusMIN. OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND SULPICIO
BOMBALES
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719

APPEALS; From decisions of special agrarian court


It is relevant to mention in this connection that
(1) Appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or
notice of the decision, and
(2) Appeals from any "decision, in order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to
the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof", the "findings of fact of the DAR (being) final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence". (This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is the
only instance when an appeal by certiorari may be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Heretofore, appeals by certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court).

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, UDK No. 9864
Promulgated: December 3, 1990

APPEAL; How Appeal Taken


We note that at the time of the promulgation of the DARAB decision on June 1, 1995,
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR were governed by Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91). As ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the remedy should have been a petition for review, filed by petitioner in seven
legible copies, without impleading the DARAB, the agency a quo as required by Circular
No. 1-95. As found by the respondent court, not only did petitioner implead the DARAB,
all his annexes other than the assailed resolutions of the DARAB were not certified true
copies. In addition, it did not state the date petitioner received a copy of each resolution,
such that it could not determine if the appeal was filed on time. Petitioner's failure to
comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal merited the dismissal of his
petition before the Court of Appeals.
ROBERTO MITO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 12, 2001
G.R. No. 126099

APPROPRIATION LAW; Purpose


An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the
release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to
the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343

AUTHORITY OF DAR SECRETARY


P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the
transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA
-versus-

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.


Promulgated: March 6, 2002
G.R. No. 132048

B
BACK RENTALS; Payment
The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold rental is an issue which
is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal competence of
the Regional Trial Court to resolve. Consequently, there is exists an agrarian dispute in
the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable y the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondents
is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093

BENEFICIARIES; Determination of
At this juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded only that the identification and selection
of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
LOLIHALA SABERON LERCANA
-versusPORFERIO JALANDONI, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 1, 2002
G.R. No. 132286

BENEFICIARIES; Qualification
SEC. 22.
Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the
absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority:
(a)

agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b)

regular farmworkers;

(c)

seasonal farmworkers;

(d)

other farmworkers;

(e)

actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f)

collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g)

others directly working on the land.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to


cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of
monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, that any beneficiary guilty of
negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to
continue as beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the performance of the
beneficiaries to the PARC.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
SOBREVIAS
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. No. 138289

AND

TOMAS

BENEFICIARY; Woman
Neither is their argument that Plaintiff-Appellee, being a woman, is not capable of
discharging the demands of farming, valid. This Board finds said argument anachronistic
with the changing times of great awareness of the potentials of women. Women today are
found manning our commerce and industry, and agriculture is no exception.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versusRICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 2002
G.R. No. 140164

BILL; Requires one subject


The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall
have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is
settled that the title of the bill does not have a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.

-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM


Promulgated: July 14, 1989

B.P. 129; CAR was integrated into the RTC


In the 1980, upon the passage of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the
Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former as vested in the latter courts.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 95664

C
CARETAKER; Construed
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the
cultivator of the land.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

CARL PROVISION ON LIVESTOCKS, POULTRY AND SWINE; Declared


unconstitutional
Section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as it deals the inclusion of the
raising of livestocks, poultry and swine raising in its coverage as well as in the
implementing rules and guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued is hereby made permanent.
LUZ FARMS
-versusTHE HON. SECRETARY OF THE DAR
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889

CARP; Limitations
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law itself provides for recognition, subject to
limitations, of existing contracts, like lease, even when the lands covered by lease, were
subjected to CARP and were transferred to owner-beneficiaries.
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC.
-versusDOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Promulgated: December 1, 2000
G.R. No. 134431

CARP; Objective
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of
poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who
seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.
The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will
receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move on the nation
toward sound rural development and industrialization.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.
-versusTROPICAL HOMES, INC.
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER


It must be stressed, however, that the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does
not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the
certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party
qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land
titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with
his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a
period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of
his certificate of land transfer (Section 2, P.D. No. 816).
PAGTALUNAN
-versusTAMAYO
Promulgated: March 19, 1990
G.R. No. 54281

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Cancellation, jurisdiction of the DAR


Secretary
Petitioner's contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or
jurisdiction to cancel the Certificate of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the
tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of CLT fall
within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27. Having
found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which do not
exceed seven (7) hectares and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico
properly ordered the cancellation of the CLT which had been erroneously issued to the
petitioners.
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 29, 1992
G.R. No. 93045

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Effect of issuance


It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer has been issued to a tenant
covering the property under the supervisions of and in compliance with the implementing
rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, he is thereby deemed to be
the owner of the agricultural land in question. There is no more landlord and tenant
relationship and all that remains is for the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine
the valuation of the land in accordance with existing rules and regulations for purposes of
compensation to the landowner.
GENEROSO QUIBAN
-versusHON. WALERICO B. BUTALID
Promulgated: August 27, 1990

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Ground for forfeiture


Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his
lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to
the landowner or the agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land
transfer.

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; How to nullify


The records show that the CLT had already been issued over the landholding in question
to Perdoe Doe. Nullification of said certificate may be had only in a case directly
attacking its validity but never collaterally.

MIRANDA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 11, 1986
G.R. No. L-59730

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Issuance thereof, purpose


The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee of
the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's
recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for
the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under Presidential
Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Rights of beneficiary thereof


It is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to
an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the
landholding a right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy [See definition of "vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic of the Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866,
June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these
conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the
landholding
CELSO
PAGTALUNAN
AND
PAGTALUNAN
-versusHON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 19, 1990
G.R. No. 54281

PAULINA

P.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; Evidence


Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property sought to be
recovered as required by Art. 434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where
the land in question is located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal,
and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the
parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. But private respondent's

title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. A
certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but
also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050.
Accordingly, petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed within
its boundaries.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 4, 1994
G.R. No. 111179

CERTIFICATIONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES


We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding
of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in
favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers
that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This
Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions
that are not supported by substantial evidence.
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versusPATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829

CERTIORARI; As a mode of appeal


A petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. In this proceeding only questions of law may be raised. Petitioner's
claim for damages is a factual issue which may not be entertained. The findings of facts
of the appellate court to the effect that there is no proof of actual damages are conclusive
and binding on this Court.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500

CERTIORARI; Cannot be taken as a substitute for lapsed appeal


As ruled by this Court, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to as a
substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.

JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.


-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
SCRA Vol. No. 189 p. 194

CERTIORARI; Issues to be entertained


This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In this proceeding only questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner's claim for damages is a factual issue which may not be entertained. The
findings of facts of the appellate court to the effect that there is no proof of actual
damages are conclusive and binding on this Court.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500

CERTIORARI; Not a substitute


Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is
a statutory privilege and it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law.
ROBERTO MITO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 12, 2001
G.R. No. 126099

CERTIORARI; Not a substitute for a lost appeal


As ruled by the SC, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal (Distillera & Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 706
(1988).
JULIO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415

CERTIORARI; Requisites
At the outset, it should be stated that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative
in accordance with centuries of both civil and common law traditions and that the grave
abuse of discretion must be shown.
JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
SCRA Vol. No. 189 p. 194

CERTIORARI; When Applicable


The petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court
of Appeals comes within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to wit: (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a
deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process; and (3) where the
question involved is a purely legal one. The petitioner further contends that certiorari, not
appeal, is the proper remedy as a question of jurisdiction prescinding from the alleged
denial of due process is raised in the petition; and that the question Orders are merely
interlocutory and hence unappealable. Moreover, the Orders issued by the Regional
Office of the DAR are void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction based on
the following: (1) the orders are baseless as the petitioner never filed any land transfer
claim with the DAR; (2) they were issued in violation of the petitioner's right to due
process as the latter was never notified of the approved final survey plan, the land
valuation summary and the farmer's undertaking; and (3) the orders fixed just
compensation based on the provisions of P.D. 27 which is inconsistent with, and
therefore has already been repealed by, Republic Act No. 6657.
LILIA Y. GONZALES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: May 9, 2001
G.R. No. 106028
Certainly, certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination of what
constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and
depends on the particular circumstances of each case. In the case before us, we find
that an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform would appear to be a useless
exercise because he had already canceled petitioners' title to the property, which
simply means, he concurred in the decision of respondent Regional Director denying
the application for exemption; hence, an appeal would no longer be deemed an
adequate remedy in the instant case.
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA

-versusHON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, ET AL.


Promulgated: April 20, 2001
G.R. No. 133806

CIVIL LEASE; Establish


The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the
landholding should be personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate members
of his farm household, indicates the intent of the parties to establish only a civil lease
relationship.
This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners, as a way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign contracts or agreements intended to
camouflage the real import of their relationship. But in the case at bar, the grounds cited
in the decision of the respondent court indicate that the contracts entered into were bona
fide civil lease in nature, and that they were entered into by the petitioner voluntarily.
EVANGELISTA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 23, 1988
G.R. No. L-37736
The written agreement subscribed to by both parents in this case is in the
nature of a civil lease and not one of agricultural tenancy. There is no sharing of
harvests and the landowner has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of
production. Instead, there is a fixed consideration regardless of the volume of the
produce of the land. In the fourth paragraph of the agreement, it is stated that the
amount of P1,000.00 shall first be paid before the respondent may work on the land.
The fifth paragraph even provides a stipulation as to a possible increase in
consideration, provided it is first communicated to the respondent. Moreover, the
succeeding paragraphs provide that the petitioner may terminate the agreement and
recover the possession of the land at any time after the harvests.
ROSALINA MAGNO-ADAMOS, ET AL.
-versusHON. AGUSTIN O. BAGSAO, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1988
G.R. No. 63671

CIVIL LIABILITY
Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2) breach of contract or (3)
tortious act. The first is governed by the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by
the Civil Code.
LEONARDA L. MONSANTO

-versusJESUS and TERESITA ZERNA and CA


Promulgated: December 7, 2001
G.R. No. 142501

CLASSIFICATION; Defined
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each others
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid,
it must conform to the following requirements:
1.

it must be based on substantial distinctions;

2.

it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

3.

it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4.

it must apply equally to all the members of the class. . . .


ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
SCRA Vol. No. 175 p. 343

CLASSIFICATION OF LAND; Lands within poblacion presumed to be


residential, not agricultural
The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in
a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It should be the
other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or
commercial or non-agricultural unless there is clearly preponderant evidence to show that
it is agricultural.
HILARIO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 16, 1987
G.R. No. 70736

COMMISSION; Creation of
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore
material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals
constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not
object to the creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey

and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the
subject parcels of land. it is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour.
The team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons who
were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the
survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the
commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the
reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Promulgated: October 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139592

COMMISSIONER; Findings not conclusive


Even so, the report and recommendations of the panel of commissioners were not
conclusive upon the trial court, which had the right and discretion to arrive at its own
assessment of the land. The findings of the commissioners were at best only advisory and
persuasive and by no means final or binding.
B.H. BERKENKOTTER & CO.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND REP. OF THE PHILS.
Promulgated: December 14, 1992
G.R. No. 89980

COMPENSABLE TAKING; Conditions


As held in the Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when
the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned the measures before us.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742

COMPENSATION; Land Bank of the Philippines, Role of


The act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a high degree
of discretion. The compensation to be approved was not trifling but amounted to as much
as P62 million of public funds, to be paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller
only one month earlier for only P3 million.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 4, 1991
G.R. No. 93661

COMPLAINT; Party not impleaded not bound by decision


A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new
owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
SCRA Vol. No. 207

COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM; Scope


Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the CARP. It states that the
program
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including
whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture".

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
UDK No. 9864

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; Validity

It is apparent that despite the pendency of this case, the parties have endeavored and
managed to resolve the dispute among-themselves. The only thing left for us to do is to
put our judicial imprimatur on the compromise agreement in accordance with Article
2037 of the Civil Code.
Finding the Compromise Agreement to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy, the same is hereby approved.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CUETO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CONSOLACION COMPUESTO
Promulgated: October 9, 2001
G.R. No. 141182

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION; Identification of Land


Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in
his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a
Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The
MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a
"conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to
the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views,
suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is
asked to indicate his retention area.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION; Priority Mode of Land Acquisition


The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to
hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification
of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

CONSTITUTION Construction thereof; aids


It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention
as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent
of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the
adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what
was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when
they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
LUZ FARMS
-versusHON. SEC. OF DAR
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889
SCRA Vol. No. 192 p. 51

CONSTRUCTION; Rules in Constitutional Construction


The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution.
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language
of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails.
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention
as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent
of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the
adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what
was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when
they ratified it.
LUZ FARMS
-versusHON. SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited
Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt"
filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: [24]
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional
Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the
PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the
PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and
the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent's "Motion
for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January
3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusSEVERINO LISTANA, SR.
Promulgated: August 5, 2003
G. R. No. 152611

CONVERSION ORDER; Final and Executory


We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that
the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no
more case to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore,
correctly dismissed pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case, as in
fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable. A
perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private
respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the final
fixing of the disturbance compensation to legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-inintervention, however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security
of tenure which the DARAB does not have any jurisdiction.
Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition not
intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not
even recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. as observed by the
DAR, "members of petitioner are merely holding on to an expectancy that they will
become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still CARPable." The fact, however,
remains that the land in question has already been excluded from the purview of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which
had long become final and executory.

KOOPERATIBA NG SANDIGAN NG MAGSASAKANG


PILIPINO, INC. (KSMP)
-versusDEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 2000
G.R. No. 139051

CO-OWNER; Effect of sale of the entire property without consent of other coowners
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the
portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by
laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
"As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923). This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the things owned in common. (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909). . . . For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

CO-OWNERSHIP; Rights of an heir


In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, this Court rules that the heirs, as co-owners, shall each
have the full ownership of his parts and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir
may therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

COVERAGE; Homestead Patents

The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of
1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or
corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably,
petitioner's parcels of lands, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth
Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of
land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versusDIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 2001
G.R. No. 139083

COVERAGE; Notice of
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power
of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL retention limits to the landowners, there
is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum are allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of
the land. what is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

D
DAMAGES, Actual, burden of proof
The argument of petitioner that assuming there is no evidence of actual damages, the
Court of Appeals should have asked petitioner to present the evidences in this aspect as it
authorized to receive evidence in accordance with Section 18, P.D. No. 945 and Section
9, B.P. Blg. 129, is untenable. The burden of proof of the damages suffered is on the
party claiming the same. It is the duty of proof of the damages suffered is on present

evidence to support his claim for actual damages. If he failed to do so he has only himself
to blame if no award for actual damages is handed down.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500

DAR; Authority of
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is
granted with a fusion of governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasijudicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subject of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such delegation.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of
functions between agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various
agencies upon whom these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are
supposed to serve. It divides the agencies resources and prevents them from devoting
their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is
evident in the various laws distinct delineation of the functions of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, the Court must
reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold
that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974

DAR SECRETARY; Powers and Functions


It should be pointed out that identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under
CARP is vested in the DAR Secretary. Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989
provides:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10
Series of 1989
SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REGISTRATION OF
BENEFICIARIES
I.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This
Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said
registration.
II.

OBJECTIVES.
A.

General
1.
Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of the
CARP for the effective implementation of the program.

B.

Specific
1.
Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
(Underscoring ours.)

DEOGRACIAS MUSA, ET AL.


-versusSYLVIA AMOR
Promulgated: April 9, 2002
G.R. No. 141396

DARAB
Apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the
Adjudication Board of the DAR), the law strives to make resolution of controversies
therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board "shall not
be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence", but also that, as explicitly stated
by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however,
that when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or
group before any DAR proceedings".
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
UDK No. 9864

DARAB; Creation of

SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated
by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary as members. A
Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive
Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions may be delegated to
the regional office of the Department in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974

DARAB; Jurisdiction
. . . the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in Section 50 of the CARL] is
exercised through hierarchically arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and
PARAD. The latter who exercise "delegated authority" while the first exercises appellate
jurisdiction over resolutions, orders, decision and other dispositions of the RARAD and
the PARAD.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
Rule II, Section I of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. (italics supplied)
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition
for injunction in the first place.

HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS


Represented by his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA. DE
SANTOS
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 7, 2000
G.R. No. 109992

DARAB JURISDICTION; Easement


For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In Heirs of Herman Rey Santos vs. Court of Appeals, citing Morta,
Sr. vs. Occidental, we held:
"For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.

Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy
relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue.
Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
LAGUNA ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 2000
G.R. No. 119357

DARAB; Quasi-judicial function


We do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater
authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-juridical body
finds that the complainants/petitioners, are not entitled to the rights they are demanding,
it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private
property to be awarded to future beneficiary.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
-versusDARAB, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 22, 1992
G.R. No. 100091

DARAB; Quasi-judicial powers


The quasi-judicial powers of the DARAB are provided in Executive No. 129-A, quoted
hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Sec. 13.
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD There is hereby created
an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. . . .. The Board
shall assume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of Agrarian Reform
cases under E.O. No. 229 and this E.O.
Sec. 17.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR The DAR is hereby vested
with quasi-judicial powers to determine the adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian
Reform.

Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determined and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform . . ..
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
-versusDARAB, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 22, 1992
G.R. No. 100091

DARAB RULES; Intervention


Thus, for such a motion for intervention to be entertained, two (2) requisites must concur.
First, the would-be intervenor must show that he has a substantial right or interest in the
case and that second, it cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding. The absence of even one requisite will warrant its denial. Acting on this
provision, the PARAD in fact denied the motion for intervention, ruling that "their
(petitioners-intervenors) rights over the property . . . can be properly threshed out in a
separate proceeding duly instituted for the purpose. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we
held that the discretion of a court (in this case a quasi-judicial agency) to allow
intervention, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by
mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.
-versusTROPICAL HOMES, INC.
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799

DECISION; President, no appeal but can be reviewed by courts thru certiorari,


prohibition and mandamus
There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be
reviewed by the courts through a civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as
the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719

DEED OF DONATION; Registration necessary when 3rd persons are affected


Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights
over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
Property shall not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be
inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
requires is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not
necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of
Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not
affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title
thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Section
51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides:
SEC. 51.
Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. . . . But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as
a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, . . .
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335

DEEMED OWNER CONCEPT

Reading the foregoing provisions, we observe that under Presidential Decree No. 27, the
basic statute, the tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size farm of five (5) hectares
or, if the land was irrigated, three (3) hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to pay for
the cost of the land within fifteen (15) equal annual amortization payments. Thus, it
appears clear that ownership over lands (lie Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected to OLT moved
from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new landowners). The
fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenant-owners were intended to
replace the landholdings which the old landowners gave up in favor of the new
landowners , the tenant-owners. It follows that in respect of land subjected to OLT, the
tenant-farmers became owners of the land they tilled as of the effective date of P.D. No.
27, i.e., 21 October 1972.
RAMONA R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
It will, however, be observed that from the outset under P.D. No. 27, the
tenant-farmer as of October 21, 1972 has already deemed in a certain sense, to be the
owner of a portion of land, subject of course, to certain conditions (Association of
Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 390).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991

DEFINITION FOR CERTIORARI; When may be Resorted


In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, [6] we held that the aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it
had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official
indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the
landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for
certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the
same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve
its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to
alienate respondent's lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals
did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent
need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422

DELIVERY, ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE


With respect to the non-delivery of the possession of the subject property to the private
respondent, suffice it to say that ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from the
time of delivery thereof either actual or constructive. Article 1498 of the Civil Code
provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. The execution of the public
instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor
to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same. In the
instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owners certificate of title to herein private
respondent. It is not necessary that vendee be physically present at every square inch of
the land bought by him, possession of the public instrument of the land is sufficient to
accord him the rights of ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land may be done by
placing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale
in a public instrument (constructive). The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a
requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied
in a public instrument.
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of
the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract
does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in
default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1996
G.R. No. 109410

DEPOSIT AS CONTEMPLATED IN SECTION 16 (E) OF R.A. NO. 6657;


Meaning thereof
Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be
made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LPB
BONDS", to wit:
"Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands . . .
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank deposited by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . ".

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of the term "deposit". Accordingly we must adhered to the well-settled rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which
allow the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16 (e) of R.A. No.
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118712
DAR, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16 (e) of R.A.
No. 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening
of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust
account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgated rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of R.A. No. 6657.
The contention is untenable, it is very explicit therefrom from Section 16 (e) of R.A. No.
6657 that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it
can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. No. 118745
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. No. 118745

DISPOSITION OF LAND COVERED BY P.D. 27


Obviously, the land in question is covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and its
disposition is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform which had
issued the corresponding Certificate of Land Transfer and Original Certificate of Title in
favor of the petitioner.
GENEROSO QUIBAN
-versusHON. WALERICO B. BUTALID
Promulgated: August 27, 1990

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
The remedy is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever
agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Conversion


In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to section 36 of Republic Act No.
3844, the only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding during the last
five preceding calendar years.
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versusLOURDES AQUINO, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 9, 2000
G.R. No. 138979

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Payment


In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No.
3844:
"SEC. 36.
Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement
as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been

authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years;
xxx
xxx
xxx
the only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years. The award of 75
square meters of land originally granted by the Regional Adjudicator and
subsequently affirmed by the DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance
compensation for the dispossession of respondents of 2,500 square meters of
land.
. . . Notwithstanding, from 1976 until 1995 respondent never sought the payment of
disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844, an action to enforce any cause of action under such law shall be
barred if not commenced within three years after such case of action accrued.
Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square
meters of land of which their father was dispossessed in 1970 has prescribed. Thus,
respondents are only entitled to disturbance compensation for their dispossession of 2,500
square meters of land and we find that, in the absence of adequate data on the land's
harvest, the award of 75 square meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief.

ERNESTO BUNYE
-versusLOURDES AQUINO, CITA AQUINO and
ROBERTO AQUINO
Promulgated: October 9, 2000
G.R. No. 138979

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Prescription


A cause of action for disturbance compensation arose from the time the tenants were
ejected.
The collection of the disturbance compensation is within the three-year prescriptive
period prescribed by Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended.
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; When to avail thereof, how computed


The landholding is declared by the Department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
some other urban purposes; Provided, that the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on
his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.
LOURDES PEA QUA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318

DOCKET FEES; Failure to Pay Required Docket Fees


Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less gravely, when it refused to
dismiss the complaint filed by petitioner directing him instead to complete payment of
the required docket fees. This is conformably with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. V. Judge Asuncion where we said that if the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. The disposition of the trial court is likewise in conformity with De
Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that the court may allow the
payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999

DOCKET FEES; Legal Fees in Action Involving Real Property


In Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte we decreed that when an action involves
real property the legal fees for the filing thereof shall be assessed on the basis of its value.
We have no reason to deviate therefrom.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 117439

DOCKET FEES; Liberal Interpretation in Certain Case

While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules, may have been liberally
construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action
and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest it scatches and prejudice the
other party's substantive rights. The payment of the docket fee in the proper amount
should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which should be strictly construed.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 117439

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As to whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the execution of the writ of possession issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the answer is in the negative.
The doctrine is undisputed that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by injunction (Investor's Finance Corp. vs. Ebarle, 163
SCRA 61 (1988). In fact, the doctrine is applied by analogy even to a body statutorily at
par with the Regional Trial Court.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293

DOCTRINE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
A sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378

DONATION
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

DONATION; Mode of acquiring ownership


In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 (1191), a
donation as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

DUE PROCESS
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a consideration of the action or ruling
complained of (emphasis supplied).
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196

DUE PROCESS; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies


Time and again, this court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of
available administrative remedies is unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial
relief outright.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Promulgated: March 25, 1999


G.R. No. 103953

E
ECONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm
family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and
corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size
farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land
can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the
farm family's basic needs.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214

EJECTMENT; The primary and only issue in an ejectment suit is material


possession
The primary issue in an ejectment suit is material possession of the realty only, not
possession de jure. Here, the MCTC did not pretend to resolve issues other than the
question of physical possession. The trial judge referred to petitioners registration as
agricultural tenant only for the purpose of determining who, as between Teofila and her
brothers, was the actual prior possessor of the property.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND
FLAVIANO DE LUNA
Promulgated: May 11, 1993
G.R. No. 97788

EJECTMENT; Jurisdiction

Where the answer files asserts agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties,
which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold, and even of this assertion per
se does not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, in
view of the defense asserted, the MCTC should hear and receive the evidence for the
precise purpose of determining whether or not it possesses jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, while it may said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Civil Case No. 262 since Bayog's complaint for ejectment therein
suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and Magdato, it should not
have refrained from taking cognizance of Madato's answer. Although filed late, the
answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the
agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and Magdato, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
se did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case,
nevertheless, in view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received
the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over
the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
ALEXANDER BAYOG AND JORGE PESAYCO, JR.
-versusHON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique and ALBERTO
MAGDATO
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118691

EMANCIPATION PATENT
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area.
(emphasis supplied)
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the
prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer grantee to an emancipation patent by

which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right
which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and
controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these conditions,
merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.
(Ibid.).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269

EMINENT DOMAIN
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowner, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative, the taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power
but of the power of eminent domain.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Defined


Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under term
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interests on the time-honored justification, as in the cause of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Limitations


But for all its primary and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute
(as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in
the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2)
just compensation.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Police power, property condemned under police power is


noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the
same subject. In the case of City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange
for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercise was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or absence materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Requisites


As held in Republic of the Philippines vs. Castellvi there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur:
1.

the expropriator must enter a private property;

2.

the entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3.

the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

4.
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and
5.
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

EMINENT DOMAIN; When it can be exercised


Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
demands of the public interest on the time honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS.,


INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742

EQUAL PROTECTION; Defined


Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners
have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of the other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between those two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion
is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS.,
INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742

EQUITY
The application of the trial court of its equity jurisdiction is misplaced. As often held by
this Court, equity is available only in the absence of law not as its replacement. All
abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, (judicial rules of
procedure) which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions (Aguila vs. CFI of
Batangas, L-48335, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 352; Zabat vs. CA, L-36958, July 10,
1986). Moreover, a court acting without the jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption
thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401

ESTOPPEL

Thus, it was held that an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though
without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in
fact it was relied upon and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
It has been consistently held by the court that while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court
without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
It is no argument either that the Government is bound by the official decisions
of Secretary Juico and cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is
never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are
erroneous, let alone irregular.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 4, 1991
G.R. No. 93661

ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place,
they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the
proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case
to contest the adjudicator's exercise of jurisdiction. Not once did they register a hint of
protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction
during the eight years this case was under litigation.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS

Promulgated: March 7, 2002


G.R. No. 144817

EVIDENCE; Doctrine of res inter alios acta


The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet", found in Section 28, Rule 130,
Rules of Court applies, for as stated in Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (189
SCRA 201 (1990) the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028

EVIDENCE; Quantum of evidence required


It was also found that Raymundo was motivated by hatred and vindictiveness against
private respondent Canuto Damaso who blamed for the loss of his carabao. These
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record particularly in his rebuttal
testimony on October 20, 1970 (Original T.S.N., pp. 68-70), which are sufficient in this
case being an agrarian case where all that is required is mere substantial evidence (Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 383) (1989).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495

EVIDENCE; Substantial evidence required in agrarian cases


As pointed out in Hernandez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 1990), in
agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian
court's findings of fact which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded
by law, that is supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be
reversed by the appellate tribunal.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 1992
G.R. No. 98028

EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT


One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence
of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment
has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the
judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of
prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.
NATALIA REALTY, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 12, 2002
G.R. No. 126462

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the
prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender
possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer
should oust him. There is no need for an express order to his effect to decision that in
such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of
time. Precisely, the law requires in cases where there are improvements on the land that a
special order be issued by the court, directing the removal of such improvements. It is
apparent petitioners confuse the order of demolition with the decision ordering the
eviction of the defendant.
SPS. FELIPE BUAG AND IRMA BUAG
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 107364
It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a
judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date
it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary action.
Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years
counted from the time the judgment becomes final.
The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution filed by
private respondents. Said Court, acting on the motion for execution had no jurisdiction to
entertain propositions outside of the scope of the agreement sought to be executed.
Further, the agreement sought to be enforced was approved by the Court on December
22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight (8) months from the time the motion for execution
was filed on August 22, 1984. It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, execution of judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5)
years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and

before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an


ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment of a final order of the court must be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the right if action accrues [(Article 1144 (3)] or within
ten (10) years counted from the time the judgment became final (see PNB v. Deloso, L28301, March 30, 170; Rosensons, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Jose Jimenez, et al., L-41225,
November 11, 1975). Furthermore, it is indubitable that the agreement sought to be
executed had already been executed by the parties. The obligations of spouses De Vera,
the original lessees, and of Roman Soriano, under the sub-lease agreement had already
been complied with. Possession and rentals under the contracts were already delivered. In
fact, at the time the motion for execution was files the sub-lease contract had already
expired. Hence, there was nothing more to execute.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, BRAULIO
AQUILINA ABALOS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401

ABALOS

and

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229; RTC divested of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters
However, with the enactment of E.O. No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987,
fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette 14/ the regional
trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 95664

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407; Said law cannot have retroactive effect
The CARL (R.A. No. 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. Nor is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner must
E. O. No. 407 be regarded. It was enacted two (2) months after private respondents had
legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of conditional sale by the payment of all
installments on their due dates. These laws cannot have retroactive effect unless there is
an express provision in them to that effect.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, NORMY D. CARPIO and
CARMEN ORQUISA
Promulgated: September 20, 1996

G.R. No. 118180

EXEMPTION AND RETENTION; Two Different Concepts


Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage
of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of
retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one
does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural
impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject
4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied
in a decision that became final and executory.
EUDOSIA DAEZ and/or HER HEIRS, REP. BY
ADRIANO D. DAEZ
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 17, 2000
G.R. No. 133507

EXEMPTION FROM CARL COVERAGE


The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that
the properties are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission
showed that the land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an
average of 28 degree slope containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34
hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares.
The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of the land of private respondent
have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent reason to exempt these
portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point
when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act".
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Promulgated: October 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139592

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The failure to appeal to the office of the President from the decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; When not required


It is settled rule that on purely legal question that aggrieved party need not exhaust
administrative remedies (Malabanan vs. Malabanan, 129 SCRA 359 (1984); Linorco vs.
Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 133 SCRA 43 (1984);
National Housing Authority vs. C.A. 121 SCRA 777 (1983). This is because "Nothing of
an administrative nature is to be done or can be done" (Dauan vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 18 SCRA 223 91967) in the administrative forum.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293

EXPROPRIATION
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on
this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdiction.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon
its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation
may be employed in raising the amount.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742

EXPROPRIATION; Requires payment of just compensation


The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence
on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742

EXPROPRIATION UNDER CARP


The issue of the constitutionality of the taking of private property under the CARP law
has already been settled by this Court holding that where the measures under challenge
merely prescribe the retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power
by the government, but where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, then there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269

EXPROPRIATION
UNDER
THE
LAND
REFORM
PROGRAM
DISTINGUISHED FROM ORDINARY EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING
Even if Section 17 of the CARL were applied, the market value paid by the government
in expropriating other lands in Agusan del Norte cannot be the basis for fixing the
compensation to be paid in this case since the lands are not agricultural lands. What is
more, those lands were taken by the government under ordinary expropriation
proceedings, whereas the taking of agricultural lands under the government's land reform
program is based on the combined exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and
police power. The 1973 Constitution enjoined the State to "regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and (to) equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits" (1973 Const. Art. II, Sec. 6), even as it mandated the
State "to formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil". (Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 12) Similar provisions are found
in the present Constitution, (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. 2 and Sec. 4). Thus, to the extent that
agrarian laws limit the size of the lands which landowners may retain, they partake of the
exercise of police power. On the other hand, to the extent that they require the payment of

just compensation, they reflect the nature of the taking as an exercise of the State's power
of eminent domain.
FELIPE GALEON
-versusHON. EDELWINA PASTORAL & DAR
Promulgated: April 8, 1991
CA-G.R. No. 23168

EXTINGUISHMENT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS


A court approved compromise agreement to vacate an agricultural landholding entered
into by the lessee in consideration of condonation of all his back rentals and his right to
all crops harvested for the main crop, is valid and enforceable.
JASMIN
-versusVALERA
137 SCRA 213

EXTINGUISHMENT OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP


Anent second issue as to whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the
vendee a retro has been extinguished by the repurchase of the subject landholding, it has
been held in analogous cases that pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends
to assure a greater degree of security of tenure for tenants, further promoting the
constitutional objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacasi vs. CAR, L23704, July 29, 1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the tight of
the tenant is not severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the
preservation of the tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure
the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land.
Upon the repurchase by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he
stepped into the shoes of the previous landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted
respondents Sevilla as tenant-tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that
generally once a tenant, always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

F
FINDING OF FACTS; Conclusive upon the court, exception

In Talavera v. Court of Appeals, (182 SCRA 778), we held that a factual conclusion
made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum
evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the
appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find
with the respondent court that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination
of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it ruled
that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186

FINDING OF FACTS; Exceptions


Court ordinarily accords respect to factual findings of Administrative Tribunals,
exceptions:
1)

the factual findings are not supported by evidence;

2)

the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;

3)

the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular;

4)
palpable errors are committed, or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness
or capriciousness is manifested.
RELUCIO III
-versusMACARAIG
173 SCRA 635

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
A mortgage who has foreclosed upon the mortgaged real property of a delinquent debtor
and has purchased the same at the foreclosure sale, can be granted a writ of possession
over the property despite the fact that the premises are in the possession of a lessee
thereof and whose lease has not yet been terminated, unless the lease has been previously
registered in the Registry of Property or with prior knowledge of the mortgagee.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-

LEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.


Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; Amount of payment


In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, we have ruled that
the right of redemption by the mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor
bank all the amounts owing to the latter "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total
indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date". In the case of
foreclosure by the Philippine National Bank particularly, Section 20 of its own charter
provides:
"SEC. 20.

Right of Redemption of property foreclosed.

The mortgagor shall have the right, within the year after the sale of real estate as a result of
the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the
court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage,
and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the Bank by reason of the
execution and sale and for the custody of said property." (Republic Act No. 1300).

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK


-versusFILEMON REMIGIO AND CA
Promulgated: March 21, 1994
G.R. No. 78508

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; Redemption period


In the foreclosure of real property by banking institutions, as well as in the extrajudicial
foreclosure by any other mortgagee, the mortgagor could redeem the property within one
year from date of registration of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of Deeds
(Santos vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 38 SCRA 42; Reyes vs. Noblejas, 21 SCRA
1027). In Medida vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 887), we ruled that the "title to the
land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains with the mortgagor or his grantee until
the expiration of the redemption period".
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
-versusFILEMON REMIGIO AND CA
Promulgated: March 21, 1994
G.R. No. 78508

FORECLOSURE SALE OF MORTGAGE

It is already a well settled rule that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of mortgage
property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex parte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser.
JULIO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
Promulgated: August 30, 1990

FORECLOSURE SALE; Application of surplus money


Surplus money in case of a foreclosure sale, gains much significance where there are
junior encumbrances on the mortgaged property. Jurisprudence has it that when there are
several liens upon the premises, the surplus money must be applied to their discharge in
the order of their priority. A junior mortgagee may have his rights protected by an
appropriate decree as to the application of the surplus, if there be any, after satisfying the
prior mortgage. His lien on the land is transferred to the surplus fund. And a senior
mortgagee, realizing more than the among of his debt on a foreclosure sale is regarded as
a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrances.
CESAR SULIT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 17, 1997
G.R. No. 119247

FORECLOSURE SALE; Effect of the price


The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a foreclosure
sale is based on the theory that the lesser the price the easier it will be for the owner to
effect the redemption. The same thing cannot be said where the amount of the bid is in
excess of the total mortgage debt. The reason is that in case the mortgagor decides to
exercise his right of redemption. Section 30 of Rule 39 provides that the redemption price
should be equivalent to the amount of the purchase price, plus one percent monthly
interest up to the time of which the purchase may have paid thereon after purchase, and
interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.
CESAR SULIT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 17, 1997
G.R. No. 119247

FORUM-SHOPPING; How to Determine If There is Forum-Shopping

There is a forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a


party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits file in the courts but also in connection
with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as
in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, had no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum-shopping has
been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34) . . . and that is,
forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

FORUM-SHOPPING; Test in Determining Violation Against Forum-Shopping


The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum-shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the
civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR , in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's
title used documents while were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the
cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just compensation; (3)
without notice to NQSRMDC's for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "winwin" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution
was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

I
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a court to modify its judgment and its
jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or
alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment.
NATALIA REALTY, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 12, 2002
G.R. No. 126462

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS; Not subject to appeal


We find here to state the rule, once more, that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition
for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law
by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. This is exactly what petitioner should have done in this
case after his prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21-88 was denied by the trial
court. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, that
vitiating error is indubitably not present in the instant case.
MODESTO G. ESPAO, SR.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 17, 1997
G.R. No. 123823

ISSUANCE OF EPs OR CLOAs; Does not bar the landowner from retaining the
area covered
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner
from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.
EUDOSIA DAEZ and/or HER HEIRS, REP. BY
ADRIANO D. DAEZ
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 17, 2000
G.R. No. 133507

JUDGMENT; Conclusiveness
Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the
owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed
fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the
question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well
said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important
principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept
in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.

RAMON D. OCHO
-versusBERNARDINO CALOS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 22, 2000
G.R. No. 137908

JUDGMENT; Error of Judgment Distinguished from Error of Jurisdiction


An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasijudicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

JUDGMENT Execution Thereof; Prescription


It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a judgment
(or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date is becomes
final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment or a final order of the court must be ordinary action. Actions,
upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be brought within ten (10) years from

the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years counted from the
time the judgment became final.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401

JUDGMENT, FINAL AND EXECUTORY; When it may be set aside


It is a settled rule that a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three way viz..
(1) by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) when the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction, by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack; and (3)
when the judgment was obtained by fraud and Rule 38 cannot be applied, by civil action
under Article 1114 of the Civil Code. The fraud must be extrinsic or collateral.
ALEJANDRO BAYOG, ET AL.
-versusHON. ANTONIO M. NATINO
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118691

JUDGMENT; Finality of Judgment or Resolutions of a Court or Quasi-Judicial


Body
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations.
The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately
be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision
of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as
aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is a "a lawless thing, which can
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head."
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

JUDGMENT; Land Registration


A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the
DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be
placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 128177

JUDGMENT OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS; Mode of Appeal


We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal
from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects
substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP's
right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed
outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would
be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already
invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said
doctrine.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON
JUDICIAL POWER; Essence
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and
which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148
SCRA 208, 1987).
LUZ FARMS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889

JUDICIAL REVIEW; Requisites; Constitutional question, when SC will assume


jurisdiction

It has been established that the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question
is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Ass'n of Small Landowners of
the Phil., Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777, 14 July 1989,
175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and
discover its purpose. Personal motives and political consideration are irrelevances that
cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is a ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the
hammer fall heavily", where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the
people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Ass'n of Small Landowners of the Phil.,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310;
Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777, 14 July 1989).
LUZ FARMS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889

JURISDICTION
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or
agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or
diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action. This kind
of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such
us understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
Promulgated: March 7, 2002
G.R. No. 144817

JURISDICTION; Active participation in proceeding, effect


It was been consistently held by the Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed
at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction will stop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

JURISDICTION AS DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE


An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos,
such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its
jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of
an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1
of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of
letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of
estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the
estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted
the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse jurisdiction with
venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides that actions involving
title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the
time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA
-versusHON. ANGELITO C. TEH, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 14, 1997
G.R. No. 122646

JURISDICTION CONCURRENT ON SC, CA & RTC, OVER PETITIONS


FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this
is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals
has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions
seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versus-

COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.


Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719

JURISDICTION; DAR
Having found therefore, that the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the
said previous case for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor of herein
respondent, we believe and so hold that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the
same. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.
-versusIGNACIA CENTENO
Promulgated: October 13, 2000
G.R. No. 140825

JURISDICTION; DARAB
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee", on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is
absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both
parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert
ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation
Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show any juridical tie or
tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest.
RODOLFO ARZAGA AND FRANCIS ARZAGA
-versusSALVACION COPIAS and PRUDENCIO CALANDRIA
Promulgated: March 28, 2003
G.R. No. 152404

Petitioners, in raising the issue, is in effect questioning the factual findings of


the DARAB, contrary to the doctrine that findings of facts by administrative agencies
are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts because of the special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. It must be
stressed at this point that the DARAB has the jurisdiction on all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of agrarian laws, including PD 27.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO
-versusSPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA, ET
AL.
Promulgated: December 19, 2001
G.R. No. 134741
The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. (underlining supplied)
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides:
Section 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive
Order No. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

f)
Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Paten (EP) and the administrative
correction thereof; (underlining added)

RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE


-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.
-versusIGNACIA CENTENO
Promulgated: October 13, 2000
G.R. No. 140825

JURISDICTION; Decision or Order Appealable to DARAB

It is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of
DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject
CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.
Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent
court on a petition for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in
question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, decisions and awards of
the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 25, 1999
G.R. No. 103953

JURISDICTION; Determination
What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1)
Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of
Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay
of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby
both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant
relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents
attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not
presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
JAIME P. CORPIN
-versusAMOR S. VIVAR and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Promulgated: June 19, 2000
G.R. No. 137350

JURISDICTION; Determination of Just Compensation


As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the
DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, ?11,
the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for
determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate
jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative

law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine


in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), but such determination is subject
to challenge in the courts.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 18, 2000
G.R. No. 132767

JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATION


It is basic that whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
is determined from the allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational Village
Homeowners Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: "Jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein
a matter resolved only after and as result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant."
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586

JURISDICTION; Estoppel apply


Once a party to a case submits to the jurisdiction of the Court and participates in the trial
on the merits of the case, he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause,
take a total turn about and say that the condition precedent of compliance with P.D. No.
1508 has not been met. One cannot have the cake and eat it, too.
LEONIDA LANTICAN, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 22, 1993
G.R. No. 97929

JURISDICTION; Involving tenancy issue


Respondent claim that they were co-tenants of their father, Martin de Luna, who was
apparently the original tenant or lessee with whom landholder Atty. Redor had entered

into contract of agrarian tenancy or landholding. This allegation, however, in their


answer, did not divest the MCTC of jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of
the cause of action and the relief alleged and sought in the complaint, and not by the
avertments in the answer. The complaint by the petitioner in the MCTC did set forth a
cause of action for ejectment and damages.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versusCA, CASIANO DE LUNA AND FLAVIANO DE LUNA
Promulgated: May 11, 1993
G.R. No. 97788

JURISDICTION; Land registration court


A Certificate of Title is, in general, conclusive evidence only of the ownership of the land
described therein and as to the matters which were actually contested and determined or
could have litigated and decided, in the land registration proceeding. A Land Registration
court cannot adjudicate the existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship since
exclusive jurisdiction over such relationship was vested in the Court of Agrarian
Relations and later in the Regional Trial Court.

JURISDICTION; Over special civil actions


Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this
is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals
has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions
seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719

JURISDICTION; Over tenancy issue


Under Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 (as amended by Republic Act No. 1409) creating
said court (Court of Agrarian Relations), it is given jurisdiction to consider, investigate,
decide and settle all questions xxx involving those relationships established by law which
determine the varying rights of person in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
where one of the parties works the land. The Court is thus empowered to act where there
is a legal relationship between the parties fighting before it. Such relationship must
necessarily be that of agricultural tenancy.

TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND
FLAVIANO DE LUNA
Promulgated: May 11, 1993
G.R. No. 97788

JURISDICTION; RTC
The jurisdiction of the RTC is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question
is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of
the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed
on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 18, 2000
G. R. No. 132767

JUST COMPENSATION
Now, in the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42
insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation
cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the subject property,
accruing to respondent VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with
Section 2 of Rule 67, i.e., there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial
Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained
and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
JAIME T. PANES, ET AL
-versusVISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 27, 1996
G.R. No. 56219-20 & 56393-94

JUST COMPENSATION; Payment in cash and bonds


However, it is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be
paid "in the manner provided by R.A. No. 6657. pursuant to Section 18 of the same law,
payment was to be in cash and bonds, as indicated below:
"Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and

LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
"The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1)

Cash payment under the following terms and conditions

(a) For lands above fifty (50)Twenty-five percent (25%) cash the hectares, insofar as the
excess balance to be paid in government hectarage is concerned financial instruments
negotiable at anytime
(b) For lands above twenty -Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the four (24) hectares and
upbalance to be paid in government to fifty (50) hectares financial instruments negotiable
at anytime."

We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997
judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay
in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not
compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the
final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken
in conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bask had already given petitioner
the entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be
deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.
EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-in-fact
ROMEO L. SANTOS
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ,
ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO
Promulgated: September 7, 2000
G.R. No. 137431

L
LACHES; Defined
Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising
from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.
MARILOU RIVERA
-versus-

COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.


Promulgated: May 22, 1995
G.R. No. 107903
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which be exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one and
does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with
whether or not be reason of plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should
be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of
time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches deals
with the effect of unreasonable delay.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

LACHES; When not applicable


While petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property, and
jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title,
there is equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we
categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the
possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 14, 1996
G.R. No. 112519

LAND TITLES; Effect of annotation


The Court hold that such annotation cannot be regarded as conclusive upon the courts of
justice so as to the legal nature and incidents of the relationship between the landowner(s)
in this case and private respondents. Firstly, the annotations serves basically as notice to
all persons of the existence of the Certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo, but
neither adds to the validity or correctness of that certification nor converts a defective and
invalid instruments into a valid one as between the parties. Secondly, the certification
issued Mr. Eugenio Bernardo of the MAR is very much like the certifications issued by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other officials of the Ministry and later the
Department of Agrarian Reform concerning the existence of tenancy relationship in

respect of agricultural lands from which persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought to
be ejected. It is well settled at the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties is merely
preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts.

LAWS AND OTHER ISSUANCES; Requires publication


But for all their peremptoriness these issuances from President Marcos still had to
comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera.
Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code they could have any force and effect if they were among those enactments
successfully challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was published though, in the Official
Gazette dated November 29, 1979.)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY; Requisites


It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the property party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
LUZ FARMS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF DAR
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889

LAWS; Prospective
We categorically rule that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied
retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.
-versusHON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 1989
G.R. No. 79416

LAW; Prospective application


The Court of Appeals evidently erred in applying retroactively Republic Act No. 6389
particularly with respect to personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment. It is wellsettled that R.A. 6389 which removed personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of
tenant/lessee, cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for
retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect (Castro v. Castro, 128 SCRA
519 (1984), Diga v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421 (1984); Gallardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA
500 (1988); Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 (1989).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495

LAWS RETROACTIVITY THEREOF; Rule


Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. According to
this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an
express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law.
PIO BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition


Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee
to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so
specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say
that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant
thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the
law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this
tenant would technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself.
This tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land
by operation of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who
entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can
no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil
law lessee.

VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363

LEASE TERMINATION OF LEASE CONTRACT; Effect on tenant


Whether the tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite the termination
of the lease, or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him,
upon the expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor, was answered in the
affirmative, not so much because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court but
pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Section 3 of R.A. 2263.
The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto, a 1974 case, and this Court
declared that the question had been definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al.
v. Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein (it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the
leased property to the lessor upon the expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal
possession of the land, the termination, therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not
divest the tenant of the lessee of the right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the
land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY, ET AL.
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 71217

LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP
The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being
a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial.
ANGEL CHICO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 2000
G.R. No. 134735

LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
As correctly observed by the Regional Adjudicator, to give petitioners the right to
exercise that choice would merely result in the unnecessary displacement of respondent
who, after years of labor, now has an undeniable stake on the land. given the practical
circumstances as well as the legal and equitable considerations in this case, we are in

agreement with the Court of Appeals, the DARAB, and the Regional Adjudicator that
respondent's leasehold rights deserve to be protected and maintained.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509

LEASEHOLD TENANCY; Requisites


Court of appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. Reasoning:
First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met. There
was no consent given by the landowner. The consent of former civil law lessee,
Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy relationship. Second, when Malabanan
engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them as mere overseers and did
not make them "permanent tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew that his contract with
Candelaria prohibited sublease. Third, the contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas
and Victoria, by its very terms, expired after one year. The contract did not provide for
sharing of harvest, means of production, personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing
of harvest was not proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is selfserving. Fifth, the element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa
himself admitted that he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:
(1)

the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2)

the subject is agricultural land;

(3)

there is consent;

(4)

the purpose is agricultural production;

(5)

there is personal cultivations; and

(6)

there is sharing of harvests.

After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no
tenancy relationship between the party.
REYNALDO BAJASA and ERLINDA BEJASA
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special
Sixteenth Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and JAIME
DINGLASAN
Promulgated: July 6, 2000
G.R. No. 108941

LEGAL ETHICS; Remission of duty as a lawyer


Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior
dispute had been existing between the parties before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB), thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate
appreciated of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as
appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable.
It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership.
Yet respondents dares raised the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly
registered certificate of title. Any lawyer would know that a Spanish title would have no
legal leg to stand on in the fact of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of
land.
RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO
-versusATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
Promulgated: February 2, 2000
Adm. Case No. 3808

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 474


More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of
Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella
to undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to
P.D. No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to
landowner's who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate
areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. It was held
that LOI 474 is neither a class legislation nor does it deprive a person of property without
due process of law or just compensation (Zurbano v. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333 (1985).
Moreover, LOI 474 was duly published in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976
and has therefore complied with the publication requirement as held by this Court in
Taada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 444 (1984)) Assn. Of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 369 (1989).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269

LIS PENDENS; Effect of notice thereof

Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the
title of the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would
have to be subject to the outcome of the suit. In other words, a purchaser who buys
registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a
third party xxx stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents
and result of the pending litigation . . ..
JULIETA V. ESGUERRA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 119310

M
MANDAMUS; When available
Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. For, it is essential for the
writ to issue that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. The legal right of the
plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and
specific.
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty
that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of
public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body
discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to
approve or disapprove a specific application (B.F. Homes, Inc. v. National Water
Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154 SCRA 88). Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act (Mata v. San Diego, L-30447 March 21, 1975; 63 SCRA 170).
It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion. The writ may issue to
compel the exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself. Mandamus itself can
require action only but not specific action where the act sought to be performed involves
the exercise of discretion.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 04, 1991
G.R. No. 93661

MANDAMUS; When it should be exercised


Mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public officer to perform a duty
specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public officer has
unlawfully neglected the performance thereof. A court neglects the performance of its
duties only when after demand has been made upon it, it refuses to perform the same.
ROSALINDA MAYUGA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1996
G.R. No. 123899

MODES OF APPEAL
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three
modes of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a)
Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served
in like manner.
(b)
Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c)
Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275

MORTGAGE; Right to rely on Certificate of Title of Mortgaged Property


The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of
any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation.

Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of or does not have a valid title to
the mortgaged property, the mortgagee or transferee in good faith is nonetheless entitled
to protection. Although this rule generally pertains to real property, particularly registered
land, it may also be applied by analogy to personal property, in this case specifically,
since ship owners area, likewise, required by law to register their vessels with the
Philippine Coast Guard.
CEBU INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 13, 1997
G.R. No. 107554

N
NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL; Effect
The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with
the hearing of June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their
counsel to inform them is untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and the client is bound by the negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify
him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v. Sec. of Agriculture & Nat. Resources,
G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 719). The client cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently (Vivero v. Santos,
52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500), although he may have the right of action against the attorney
if prejudiced by the latter's negligence.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHONORABLE PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the Notice
of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter's old address. Petitioner
explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those notices upon
respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and Financing
Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that personal service could
not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner caused the service of the
notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657. On this point,
petitioner claimed that the notices were sent "not only by registered mail but also by
personal delivery" and that there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the
signature appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of petitioner's copies of the notices.
But petitioner could not identify the name of respondent's representative who allegedly

received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible. It is
thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of
the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422

NOTICE TO COUNSEL; Effect on client


The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with
the hearing of June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their
counsel to inform them us untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and the client is bound by the negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify
him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v. Santos, 52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500),
although he may have the right of action against the attorney if prejudiced by the latter's
negligence. (Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279).
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

NOTICES; Required
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice
of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

O
OCCUPATION BY TOLERANCE; Effect

More than one has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of
the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,
where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant its undertaking to buy
the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite
demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing
possession** became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the **
(plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her
legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 24, 1997
G.R. No. 110427

ORDER OF EXECUTION; Order of Demolition Issued Pursuance Thereof


It is settled that, generally, an order of execution is not appealable because otherwise a
case would never end. If the order of execution cannot be appealed, neither can the order
of demolition issued in pursuance thereof be appealable. Neither can an order of
demolition be set aside through a special civil action for certiorari except upon a showing
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the same. In the instant case,
the Court of Appeals correctly found that there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order of demolition.
SPS. FELIPE BUAG AND IRMA BUAG
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 107364

P
P.D. NO. 27 CONSTITUTIONALITY
P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been
repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the
aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, [24] P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional,
and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:

"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What
is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That
would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our
duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal
postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because
any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away
with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated
with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a
presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance
with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that
tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created.
There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical
norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals."

ROLANDO SIGRE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES
Promulgated: August 8, 2002
G.R. Nos. 109568 and 113454

P.D. NO. 316; Referral to DAR mandatory


Denial of referral of the case to the DAR is in violation of the express mandate of Section
2 of P.D. No. 316.

PETITION FOR REVIEW


Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition
for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is
exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for review before the Special Third
(3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary
appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of
Appeals.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275

POLICE POWER; Elements

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have
been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve
the Constitutional goal.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILS., INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

POLITICAL QUESTIONS; Concept


A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments
when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: The term "political question" connotes what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitutions, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILS., INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742
SCRA Vol. No. 175 p. 343

POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP; Distinct Concepts


Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, among which are he right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other
persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be
declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the
hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon

of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses
to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not
necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 128177

POWER OF APPELLATE REVIEW; DARAB


In agrarian cases, the power of appellate review is limited to questions of law and
findings of fact of the DARAB, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding
upon the Court of Appeals. Hence, the appellate court cannot make its own findings of
fact and substitute the same in lieu of the findings of the DARAB, unless there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DARAB.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versusRICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 2002
G.R. No. 140164

POWER OF EXPROPRIATION; Requirements


But for all of its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means
absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional
injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation
of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION


The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation
be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.

ROLANDO SIGRE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND LILIA Y. GONZALES
Promulgated: August 8, 2002
G.R. Nos. 109568/113454

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; Requisites, Purpose and Objective of Injunction


Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.
The writ of preliminary injunction is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied
and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of the two requisites, namely:
the existence of a right to be protected and acts which are violative of said right. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for
an injunction.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN ASUNCION rep. BY DEMETRIA
DUROLFO ASUNCION
-versusHON. MARGARITO GERVACIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 9, 1999
G.R. No. 115741

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; When it will be Issued


Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control
of one party and place it into that of another whose titles has not clearly been established
by law.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN ASUNCION
-versusHON. MARGARITO GERVACIO, JR. ET AL.
Promulgated: March 9, 1999
G.R. No. 115741

PUBLICATION; Indispensable
Petitioners insist that the rules are not applicable to them because they do not own more
than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were
intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they

have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Taada vs.
Tuvera.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
ERFE
-versusFORTUN
36 SCRA 552

Q
QUESTION OF LAW V. QUESTION OF FACT
Two types of questions: there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO
-versusSPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA, ET
AL.
Promulgated: December 19, 2001
G.R. No. 134741

R
R.A. NO. 3844; Prescriptive period
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that "an action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within 3 years after such cause
of action accrued." The law does not specifically require a judicial action, hence, it can be
an administrative action. Ubi les non distinquit nec nos distinquere debemos (Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish).
SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545

R.A. No. 6389; Prospective in application


R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule that
statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.
-versusHON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 1989
G.R. No. 79416
Republic Act No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a
statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.
Congress failed to express an intention to make R.A. No. 6389 retroactive, it may not
apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts.
GALLARDO
-versusBORROMEO
161 SCRA 500
The Court of Appeals evidently erred in applying retroactively Republic Act
No. 6389 particularly with respect to personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment. It
is well-settled that R.A. No. 6389, which removed personal cultivation as a ground
for ejectment of tenant/lessee, cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a
statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495

R.A. No. 6657; Constitutionality


Wherefore, the court holds as follows:
1.
R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proclamation No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
are sustained against all the constitutional objections in the herein petitioners.
2.
Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3.
All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4.
Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS


-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; Defined


The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. If the suit is not brought against the real partyin-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action (Section 1 (g) Rule 16, Rules of Court).
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; Meaning of


The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real property in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest
over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

REDEMPTION OR PRE-EMPTION
In time, both the court of origin and the appellate court could have found for petitioner
were said courts not unduly swayed by the circumstance that petitioner presented as his
own evidence the deed of sale wherein it was stated that the land involved is not tenanted.
Such conclusion having been rejected and the identity of the landholding as well as the
fact of tenancy thereon of petitioner been established matters, there is no further
hindrance to the exercise by petitioner of the right of redemption or pre-emption extended
and granted to him by law.
VICENTE PALO-PALO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 19, 1992

G.R. No. 75584

REDEMPTION PRICE; Must be reasonable


The purpose of applying the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended,
which specifies that the "redemption price" shall be the "reasonable price" of the land at
the time of the sale".

REDEMPTION; Right is Transmissible


The issue on damages and share of harvest was not raised before the CA for failure of
RUPA to file his memorandum, hence, we cannot pass upon the same. It is well-settled
that a party is not permitted to raise before the Supreme Court an issue which he did not
raise in the Court of Appeals.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN
SALIPOT
Promulgated: January 25, 2000
G.R. No. 80129

REFERRAL; Effect
The referral of a case for preliminary determination to the MAR refers to pending
agrarian or civil cases of those pending decision or execution where the issue of actual
tenancy is raised. And even if the said issue was properly raised a case that was
terminated and duly executed cannot be reopened much less referred to such
administrative body as the MAR (now DAR) for a preliminary determination of the
relationship of the parties and a certification if the case is proper for trial in court.
GRACIANO B. VALLES, ET AL.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SAMAR, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1989
G.R. No. 61297

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; Acting as special agrarian courts


The Regional Trial Court have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters. However, it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts
have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section
56 of R.A. No. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts", which

are Regional Trial Court designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within each
province to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b)
the prosecution of all criminal offense under the Act.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093

REGISTRATION; Reckoning date


The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the motion, pleading, or
any other papers, which may included instruments as the deed of donation, is considered
the date of filing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
The Court therefore finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an instruments to the
Register of Deeds for purposes of registration should be considered the date of filing and
receipt thereof by the Register of Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds which shall be regarded as the date of its
registration.
Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by registered mail to the
Register of Deeds on September 09, 1988, said date is in effect the date of filing, receipt
and registration of the instrument, although the instrument was actually received by said
office only on September 20, 1988.
ATTY. PLARIDEL M. MINGOA
-versusLAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR
Promulgated: August 16, 1991
G.R. No. 97282

REINSTATEMENT; Remedy for failure to carry out conversion


Petitioner may not invoke Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides that
"when the lessor-owner fails to substantially carry out the conversion of his agricultural
land into a subdivision within one year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee
shall be entitled to reinstatement and damages," for the petitioners were not agricultural
lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into residential subdivision in 1955.
Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential subdivision,
they may not claim a right to reinstatement.
FELIX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES
-versus-

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.


Promulgated: June 29, 1989
G.R. No. L-36213

REMAND; When it can be dispensed with


The normal course of action to take would be to remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings. However, noting that this case has long been pending, we resolve to
end the entire controversy. This is in line with jurisprudence that the remand of a case to
the lower courts for reception of evidence is not necessary if this court could receive the
dispute on the records before it (See Hechanova v. CA, 145 SCRA 550). In the case of
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Hon. Ruiz, et al. (148 SCRA 326, 341), this court
further held that: . . . such time consuming procedure may be properly dispensed with to
resolve the issue (Quisumbing v. CA, L-60364, June 23, 1983, 122 SCRA 709-710)
where there is enough basis to end the basic controversy between the parties here and
now, dispensing with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the
merits of their respective claims (Velasco v. CA, L-47544, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 621622).
ROSALINA MAGNO-ADAMOS, LAURO C. ADAMOS
AND ANGEL GATMAYTAN
-versusHON. AGUSTIN O. BAGASAO, MELY DE JESUS,
FRANCISCA DE JESUS AND GLEN DE JESUS
Promulgated: June 28, 1988
G.R. No. 63671

RES JUDICATA; Rationale


Civil Case No. 5379 cannot be reviewed or reopened on the merits because res judicata
had already set in. The trial court may have jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings
because the incident arose out of the execution of a final and executory judgment, but
certainly the trial court cannot reopen a case already decided by final judgment, otherwise
there will be no end to litigations.
GRACIANO B. VALLES
-versusCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAMAR
Promulgated: August 28, 1989
G.R. No. 61297

RETENTION; Homestead Grantees


With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct
descendants," the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands

have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them
provided the original homestead grantees who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate the homestead. [50] The right to choose the area to be retained,
which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule.
[51] However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct descendants"
have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the
seven (7)-hectare retention limit provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical
expertise of the administrative agency concerned.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363

RETENTION LIMITS
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
This section declares: Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, nay public or private agricultural land,
the size which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family sized farm, such
as commodity produced, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) the he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by P.D. No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder further, that original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

RETENTION LIMIT; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 in its entirety deals with
retention limits.

As earlier stated, Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits
allowed by law to small landowners. Since the property here involved is more or less ten
(10) hectares, it is then within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to determine whether or not the property can be subjected to agrarian reform. But
this necessitates an entirely different proceeding.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NORMY D. CARPIO AND
CARMEN ORQUISA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 118180

RETENTION; Right to Retain


Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the
condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually
cultivate it upon the effectivity of the law.
"SEC. 6.
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) the he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep
an area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

FLORENCIA PARIS
-versusDIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 2001
G.R. No. 139083

RETENTION; Under P.D. No. 27


It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D.
No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No.
6657. This should counterbalance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that
"the landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retains the same areas as long as they continue
to cultivate said homestead.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versus-

HON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM


Promulgated: July 14, 1989
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are
disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural land of the estate for failure to
comply with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such area, or will
now cultivate it". The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in
the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall
remain as agricultural lessees therein. Which means, that while ownership of the
exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain to the concerned Heirs of Sison
therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas, unless the
petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation
and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs".
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 29, 1992
G.R. No. 93045

RIGHT OF THE AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Redemption


The right of the agricultural lessee to redeem the land he has been working on that has
been disposed of without his knowledge is statutory in character. It is created by and rests
upon the provisions of a particular law, and attaches to a particular landholding by
operation of law.
LAURA SARNE, ET AL.
-versusHON. VIVIAN O. MAQUILING, ET AL.
Promulgated: May 9, 2002
G.R. No. 138839

RIGHTS OF A LESSEE
As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters
affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 24, 2002
G.R. No. 125063

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Full Amount of the Redemption


Price

It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be
consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to
redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain
an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is
willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer
open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of
the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid
prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation
of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay
at the proper time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered
insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law
and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against him.
ANICETO M. QUIO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Redemption Price


An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with
consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the
redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed however that in making
a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his
desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to
repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase
price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. As to what constitutes
reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and
respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable
price and consideration.
ANICETO M. QUIO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Exist by operation of law


In view of the conclusion that private respondents were share tenants and later
agricultural lessees of the owner(s) of the land, it follows that private respondents were
entitled to redeem the land upon the alienation thereof by the two(2) daughters of Andres
Cruz in favor of the petitioner Cuao spouses. When right of redemption is statutory in
character, that is to say, it is created by and rest upon the provisions of a particular law. It
attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Purpose of Written Notice


The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quite any doubts that the alienation is not definitive.
The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying he redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale
and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start running. The letter
received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain
the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in
an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof.
Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic
document on 02 March 1987. the amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within
the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days.
ANICETO M. QUIO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF RETENTION: Constitutionality


The right of retention is a constitutionality guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing
the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to
anymore leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would
be a pointless process.
EUDOSIA DAEZ and/or HER HEIRS, REP. BY
ADRIANO D. DAEZ
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 17, 2000
G.R. No. 133507

S
SALE; Effect on agricultural relationship
The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferee is simply subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Sec. 10, RA 3844).

SPOUSES ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE


-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545

SALE; PERFECTION
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of
the contract, and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract
does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in
default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1996
G.R. No. 109410

SALE, NON-PAYMENT; Effect


Devoid of any stipulation that "ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until
he has fully paid the price, ownership in the thing shall pass from the vendor to vendee
upon actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not
yet been fully paid. The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law,
cause the ownership to revest to the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first
rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-payment only
creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1996
G.R. No. 109410

SECURITY OF TENURE
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on
their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the
rights of an agricultural tenant.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO

-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.


Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 128177

SECURITY OF TENURE; Concept


What is thus depicted by the evidence is not the figure of "a mere tenant of the land", as
the court of Appeals characterizes Leopoldo Clarito, but of an entrepreneur or
independent contractor, developing and managing fishponds belonging to other persons,
hiring and paying wages to laborer for the purpose, and who is himself the owner of a
fishpond larger than that of the Oportos, his latest clients, and in the process receiving not
inconsiderable revenue, either as co-partner of the fishpond or in some other manner.
Leopoldo Clarito is not in any sense a small partner within the contemplation of the
Agricultural Reform Code, entitled to its beneficient provisions. His activities cannot in
any sense be described as owner-cultivatorship by a small partner of a family-size farm
for his economic upliftment, the establishment and protection of which is among the
objectives of the law. He is a businessman, pure and simple, who has absolutely no claim
to that of security of tenure guaranteed by the law to tenants or owner-cultivators of
family-size farms. As this Court has had the occasion to observe in a strikingly similar
case (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 1989), in ruling on the assertion "that the
cultivation of another fishpond is irrelevant as the law does not require or prohibit the
total absence of other sources of income.
It is of much significance to look into the spirit of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
First and foremost, the law is meant to assist and help the small farmers as enunciated in
its declaration of policy. In the case at bar, petitioner De Jesus is not a small farmer but a
businessman. To consider him as agricultural lessee despite the fact that he does not
cultivate the fishpond personally and/or with the help of his immediate farm household as
defined by law, would render nugatory the letter and intent of the Agricultural Reform
Code.
TIRSO OPORTO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98258

SECURITY OF TENURE; Guaranteed


In Ponce vs. Guevarra (10 SCRA 649) for instance promulgated on March 31, 1964, this
Court, upon substantially identical facts, held that regardless of the extinction of the
contractual relations between petitioner (lessor) and Donato (lessee), and between Donato
and respondents herein (as agricultural tenants), the latter cannot be ejected from
petitioner's land except upon judicial authority and for one of the caused specified by law,
reference being had to Joya V. Pareja (a 1959 case, 106 Phil. 645), where the question,
whether the tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite termination of
the lease, or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon

the expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor, "was" answered in the affirmative,
not so much because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court but pursuant to
Section 3 Republic Act No. 2263. The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto,
a 1974 case (58 SCRA 186, 191) and this Court declared that the question had been
definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al. v. Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein
(it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the lease property to the lessor upon the
expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal possession of the land, the termination,
therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not even vest the tenant of the lessee of the
right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 71217
On both justiciable and equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian
justice, has generally upheld the tenants' security of tenure (Primero V. Court of
Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil 675 (1957); Pineda v. De Guzman,
21 SCRA 1450 (1967); Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294 (1972) or the
right of the tenant to the enjoyment and possession of his farmholding which has been
created, conferred, protected and guaranteed by the police power of the state in
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution expressed in Article II, Section 5 of
the 1935 Constitution (as well as in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CALIXTO BLAZA and CANUTO
DAMASO
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495
The new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A. No.
3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the
agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship
is established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can
only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this Court has guaranteed the
continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere transfer of legal
possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernanrdo vs. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA
439 (1988), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law
explicitly provides that the livelihood relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the
agricultural leasehold relationships is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36
of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not
terminate the tenancy relationship. The donation itself is valid.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Promulgated: March 31, 1992


G.R. No. 76225
The Court of Appeals opined that the Municipal Trial Court had correctly
dismissed the Oportos complaint against the Claritos on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Invoking COCOMA vs. CA, decided in 1988 by this Court, the Appellate
Tribunal ruled that under the circumstances in the case at bar . . . there exists a
tenancy relationship between the parties notwithstanding the label of joint venture
used in the written agreement. It set out its reasons as follows:
"The records of this case show sufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. It is
undisputed that the land involved in this case is a fishpond which is considered under the
law as an agricultural land (Section 166 (1), R.A. No. 3844, as amended. Moreover, as to
the fish and other fishpond products raised, produced and harvested in the premises, the
contract states that these shall be divided in equal proportion between the contracting
parties . . .. Furthermore, having granted to the petitioners (Claritos) the use or cultivation
of their fishpond for a consideration in shares of the harvests thereof the petitioners are
considered in law as landholders (Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 1199). Lastly, since petitioners
be themselves and with the aid of their immediate family household occupied the land of
the private respondents (Oportos), converted developed the same into a fishpond,
cultivated the same by raising and maintaining the fish and other fishpond products
therein, all these with the owners consent, and the net produce or harvest from said
fishpond is, by agreement, shared equally between the parties, the petitioners (Claritos) are
undoubtedly de jure tenants on the land subject of the dispute and therefore they are
entitled to security of tenure (Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199).

TIRSO OPORTO, ET AL.


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 98258

SECURITY OF TENURE; Rights of an Agricultural Lessee


Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can take place
only for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of
R.A. No. 3844.
LAURA SARNE, ET AL.
-versusHON. VIVIAN O. MAQUILING, ET AL.
Promulgated: May 9, 2002
G.R. No. 138839

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION; Rule

The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
-versusGOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET
AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 122156

SEPARATION OF POWERS; Limitations


Although holding neither purse now sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable
to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of
judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The
doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down
the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy indeed, is a
blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or
both, to insure that the Constitution would no be breached.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

SETTLEMENT; Encourage
The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
CELESTINA G. DE GUZMAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 7, 1996
G.R. No. 110122

SHARE TENANCY AND AGRICULTURAL WORKER (DISTINCTION)

Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other, his labor, with either or
both contributing any one or several times of production, the tenant cultivating the land
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their
respective contributions (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 1199; Sec. 166 (25), R.A. No. 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural worker is any agricultural wage, salary or piece
worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless the
Agricultural Land Reform Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a cement agrarian dispute or
an obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

COURT,

SHARE TENANCY; Changed to leasehold, effects


Share tenants enjoys security of tenure even where relationships is change to leasehold.
Where a share tenant surrendered his landholding and them was instituted as a share
tenant by the civil lessee of the same land, said tenant's status did not change, vis--vis,
the landowner, after the civil lease terminated.
A share tenant who surrendered his landholding, who thereafter became the share tenant
of the person who lease the land from the owner for three years, and who thereafter
continued the said lease on a 3-year basis which was periodically renewed, is not a civil
lessee, but an agricultural lessee.
There is no leasehold tenancy where alleged lessee never intended to cultivate the land
personally.
NOVESTERAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
149 SCRA 47

SHARE TENANCY; Defined


Share tenancy is defined as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in

consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money or in both. (Sec. 3, R.A. No.
1199, Agricultural) Tenancy Act, as amended).
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN JR., ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

COURT,

Share tenancy - exist whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for
agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other is labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.
GUERRERO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
142 SCRA 136

SHARE TENANCY OF POWERS; Limitations


Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
department of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul
the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for that some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine
of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of
their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of
the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of
courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or
the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to
insure that the Constitution would not be breached.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

SHARE TENANT; Concept


The share tenant participates in the agricultural produce; his share is necessarily
dependent on the amount of the harvest.
COCONUT COOP. MKTG. ASS'N INC.

-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 568

SHARING CROPS; Basis


Share of his labor in the production shall not be less than 30% of the harvest, after
deducting the expenses for harvesting and/or initial processing.
DR. JOSE TONGSON, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 06, 1992
G.R. No. 77104

SHARING OF CROPS; Principles


Dean Jeremias U. Montemayor, in his book, "Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation,"
points to some sharing arrangements and principles approved by the courts for crops
other than rice: "3. Coconuts: 70-30 in favor of the landholder after deducting expenses
for harvesting, processing, hauling and premiums (Abdon v. Malolos, CAR Case No. 33Quezon '56, August 14, 1956). 4. Corn 1/3 2/3 in favor of the tenant if he owns the
carabao and 50-50 if the landholder provides the work animal (Ybaez v. Camboya, CAR
Case No. 70-Leyte 56, October 12, 1957; Aguilar v. Rosaroso, CIR Case No. 5670Leyte, March 14, 1956). 5. Tobacco: . . . The Supreme court has upheld a 50-50 sharing
arrangement for this crop . . . 6. Onions. 50-50 basis (Serrano v. Torres, CAR Case No.
188-NE, '56, January 11, 1957)."
DR. JOSE TONGSON, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 06, 1992
G.R. No. 77104

SITUS OF BRINGING PERSONAL OR REAL ACTIONS


It is fundamental that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the
rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by
affording them maximum accessibility to the courts of justice. The choice of venue is
given to the plaintiff but is not left to his caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a resident
defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.
JOSE BARITUA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997

G.R. No. 100748

SOCIAL JUSTICE; Concept


This court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for that matter is
for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the
poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never
is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law.
GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186

SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT; With jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian


related cases
1.

petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners

2.

prosecution of all criminal offenses under the same law


FRANCISCO BERNARTE, ET AL.
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 18, 1996
G.R. No. 107741

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It must be stated that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law and
construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them (National Federation of Labor vs. Bisma, 127
SCRA 419, 425 (1984). The aforequoted provision of PD 946 is clear and unambiguous.
It provides, as an exception to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the subject matters exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform among which are the classification and identification of landholdings,
the parcellary mapping in question and the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLTs.
Accordingly, it should be taken to mean exactly what is says. It is elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says (Insular Bank of Asia and American
Employees Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 673 (1984). Where the

provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's
seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition for
subtraction.
FAGEL TABIN AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION
-versusTHE HONORABLE EMILIO A. JACINTO, ET AL
Promulgated: October 28, 1991
G.R. No. 55393

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF R.A.


NO. 6389
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that:
Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. According to
this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an
express provisions to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that
a law is a rule established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted,
wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is
said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator
may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow,
40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:
The Act contains, as in seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive
effect, nor is there anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an
effect.
Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment, prospective.
It is the rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect.
The cases supporting this rule are almost without number.
The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case entitled Segovia v. Noel (47
Phil. 543). Thus -- A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates
prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more
strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless
the words used so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will
hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. x x x (Farnel v.
Pingree (1988), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Ashville (1894), 114 N.C.,
495, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co, (1907), 209 U.S., 306)

Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength
from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is
impressed with social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his
property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides
under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. The Constitution also ensures that the
worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family
an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life
(Sections 7 & 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,
78 SCRA 194).
PIO BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378

SUBROGATION
Subrogation of Land Bank to the obligation of farmer-beneficiaries for payment of price
of the land brought under land reform does not mean the Bank has to pay interest on the
acquisition price prior to the payment of said price (partly in cash and bonds) to the
landowner.
Land Bank may deduct from acquisition price the rents paid by tenant-farmer to
landowner from October 21, 1971 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
VDA. DE ORTIZ
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
148 SCRA 685

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Defined


Substantial Evidence to be such material evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining wherein
lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
VELASQUEZ, ET AL.
-versusNERY, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 3, 1992

G.R. No. 64284

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Explained


In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what
substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in
an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate it support conclusion and its absence is not shown by
stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
ROMEO REYES, ET AL.
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 26, 1992
G.R. No. 96492

SUCCESSION
The Respondent who is the only heir interested in succeeding his father who died, had the
right to take over as agricultural tenant in petitioner's land.
Nature of work performed by the respondent's father is that of tenant on the land.
ROBLES
-versusBATACAN
154 SCRA 644

SUGARLANDS; Covered
Sugarlands are not mentioned as among the areas neither by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, and neither they are included in the exempted lands.
Any share tenant in sugarlands may exercise his option to change his relationships with
the landowner into the leasehold system.
Agricultural Land Reform Code should be given liberal interpretation.
DAVID
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
161 SCRA 114

T
TAKING; When it Takes Effect
The seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation, judicially
determined.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, as of August 29, 1991, when it decreed the
coverage of the landholding in question under CARL (R.A. No. 6657) had not paid or
even determined the just compensation for the taking of the landholding.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 19, 2001
G.R. No. 131216

TAX DECLARATION; Effect on the status of landholding


The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the land merely on the basis
of the tax declaration, in the absence of further showing that all the requirements for
conversion of the use of land from agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the
controversy in this case have been fully satisfied.
LOURDES PEA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAIME
QUA
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIV.), ET
AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318

TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it
is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone
who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing
or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is
only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an
industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a
parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.

Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements,
provided there are complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 03, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
We are not impressed with the argument that the private respondent could both
have been a mere share tenant and agricultural lessee because he has several children
who are professionals. That will not necessarily make him prosperous himself nor
does it mean he can stop making his own living. A man does not have to depend upon
his children for his livelihood even if they are well off as long as he retains his
strength and his pride to continue charting his own life and earning his own keep.
There are thousands of such proud parents who are able to provide their children with
a good education and a brighter future while themselves remaining as humble tillers
of the soil and beholden to no man for their sustenance.
On the fixed yearly rentals of P1,000 from the fishpond, we have held that the use of the
land by the tenant for a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both as consideration
is an element of tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. In the present case, the
consideration was stipulated between the parties pursuant to the aforementioned Section
46 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.
Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. C.A. 164 SCRA 433 (1988) citing and Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), we rule that there is no concrete evidence on
record sufficient to establish that the element of consent is present. But even assuming
arguendo that the element of consent is present, we declared in Delos Reyes v. Expineli
(30 SCRA 574 (1969) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a
tenant even of he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028

"TENANCY"; Absence of any of the requisites; effect on relationship


That the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Wellsettled is the rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant.

GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY; Cannot be established by mere tolerance


The petitioner's tactic of entering the subdivision as lessee of a homelot and thereafter
cultivating some unsold lots ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly
for the purpose of later claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls the fable of the
camel that sought shelter inside, kicked its master out of the tent. Here, the private
respondents tolerance of the petitioner's supposedly temporary use of some lots in the
subdivision was seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the respondents of their land.
FELIX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 29, 1989
G.R. No. L-36213

TENANCY; Consent is indispensable


Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land.
Consent of the landowner is necessary. From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazon
Pengson did not give her consent to Baltazar to work on her land consisting of only
P1,740.00 square meters. We agree with the CAR when it said, "the law accords the
landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to work on his land. For this reason,
tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. So the mere
cultivation of the land by the usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the
land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law (Sps. Tiongson v.
Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)".
No tenancy can be formed where alleged tenant does not pay any rental or share of
harvest to the landowner. The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant
pays no rental or share to the landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared
70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in his favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever
received anything from him.

TENANCY; Created by the act of overseer


The overseer Evaristo Erilla had hired or retained private respondents as tenants and later
as agricultural lessees with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landholders. That his
knowledge and acquiescence on the part of the landholders validated the relationship

created (hypothetically) by the overseer and private respondents. For this reason, Evaristo
Erilla is properly considered as an agent of the landowner(s) who acted as such with at
least implied or apparent authority and whose principal(s) were accordingly bound to
private respondents.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159

TENANCY; Determination of whether a person is tenant or not, is a question of


fact
In an analogous case of Guerrero vs. CA, 142 SCRA 130 (1986), it was held that whether
a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of fact and the
findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally entitled to respect and
non-disturbance except for unusual reasons (Macaraeg vs. CA, G.R. No. 48008, January
20, 1989; Anderson Co., et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 65928, January 21, 1988; Tarunez vs.
IAC, 134 SCRA 414 (1985); Gagolar vs. CAR, 18 SCRA 992 (1966); Chavez vs. CAR, 9
SCRA 412 (1963), none of which is present in the case at bar.

TENANCY; Effect of non-payment of rentals


The deliberate refusal of the agricultural lessee to pay the rentals for a period of two (2)
years carried with it the grave penalty of forfeiture of the landholding, it is imperative
under the law that every opportunity must be given the lessee to be heard on his side of
the controversy relating to non-payment of rentals.
MAGNO
-versusBLANCO
174 SCRA 398

TENANCY; How established


Whether or not a person is a tenant is an issue of fact reviewable on appeal or petition for
review when the conclusion arrived at by the court below has no support in the evidence
on record. The respondent court, in judging the private respondent as the bona fide tenant
of the petitioner spouses, relied completely on the DAR's certification. There is no
reference to any reliable investigative report or other supporting papers justifying the
finding that there was a tenancy relationship between the landowners and the alleged
tenant. In fact, there was a failure to appreciate the following testimony in open court of
the alleged tenant before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
ROSINA C. GRAZA, ET AL.

-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS


Promulgated: June 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-48368

TENANCY; Personal cultivation is shown


Petitioner spouses also aver that such cultivation as was done by private respondent
tenants or lessees was not "personal" in character, considering that private respondents
had availed themselves of the services of farm laborers hired by the overseer. Under the
statutory definition of an agricultural lessee quoted earlier, an agricultural lessee is a
person "who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household" cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another. The fact, however,
that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may have been assisted by farm laborers, on an
occasional or temporary basis, hired by the landowners, does not preclude the element of
personal "cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. In De
Guzman v. Santos, the mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work himself but
temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the services of others to assist him, was not
taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement imposed by the
statute. We do not consider that the statute prohibits the tenant or agricultural lessee who
generally works the land himself or with the aid of members of his immediate household,
from availing occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159

TENANCY; Reinstated tenants deemed "actual tiller"


Where a tenant is ordered reinstated, the person instituted as "tenant" by the landowner
acquires the status of an "actual tiller" only.
CUANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
143 SCRA 417

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving
statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship.
[43] The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of

the existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be
established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the
element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing
of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements
are deemed inadequate. [46]
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson,
and subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later
Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding
of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract
between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms
the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without
the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating for the
record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr.
Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this
relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of
harvest or payment of rental.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR SOLIS
Promulgated: December 3, 2001
G.R. No. 138781
Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. Although
petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by
allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from
him the landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162 SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a

legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial
court on the basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be
reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons.
Where persons cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce
or the cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and the landowner
is one of tenancy and not employment.
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Absence of


The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that
respondent did not personally cultivate and riceland portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its
harvest proceeds with petitioner. Petitioner did not consent to a leasehold agreement with
respondent over Lot No. 2025, as shown by petitioner's filing of complaint below to
enjoin respondent from encroaching and planting thereon. Accordingly, respondent is not
a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he is not entitled to security of tenure relative to
this lot.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR SOLIS
Promulgated: December 3, 2001
G.R. No. 138781

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; All requisites must concur


The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it
is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone
who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This,
however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when
the area tilled is only 60, or even 500 square meters and located in an urban area and in

the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, that all these
requisites are necessary in order to created tenancy relationship between the parties
and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.
LOURDES PEA QUA, represented by her husband,
JAIME QUA,
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIV.), ET
AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA
247 (1988)), that the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished
from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua vs. Court of
Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482 (1984)).
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER


RELATIONSHIP, DISTINGUISHED
1.
in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof;

2.
the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the
lessee of agricultural land;
3.
the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received
a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and
4.

the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Concept


Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; De jure status


The Court reiterates the ruling on Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, that
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor he is covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
LOURDES PEA CUA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Determination by DAR Secretary is only


preliminary

The findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certificate as to the supposed
tenancy relationship between the contending parties are not binding on the lower court
pursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 and Section 12, sub-paragraph (r) of
P.D. No. 946. The Secretary's determination of the relationship between the parties is
only preliminary. The same cannot be final and conclusive on the lower court. The last
paragraph of Section 12 of P.D. No. 946 supplements Section 2 of P.D. No. 316 and
Section 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 583 cited earlier. P.D. No. 946 provides that when a case
involving an agricultural land is certified as a proper case for trial, the preliminary
determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform does not bind the court assuming jurisdiction over said case. It is
evidently with more reason that when the Secretary certifies that an agrarian case is nor
proper for trial, the Court before which an appeal is ventilated regarding the effect of said
certification must look into the bases of the Secretary's preliminary determination.
Otherwise, the party adversely affected by the DAR's certification is left without any
judicial recourse. Definitely, such an unjust and absurd result could not have been the
intent of P.D. No. 946.
ROSINA C. GRAZA, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEAL
Promulgated: June 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-48368

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Effect of repurchase


The issue as to whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the vendee a retro
has been extinguished by the repurchase of the subject landholding, it has been held in
analogous cases that pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends to assure a
greater degree of security of tenure for tenants, further promoting the constitutional
objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacassi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29,
1972), specifically Section 49 of RA 1199, as amended, the right of the tenant is not
severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation of the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the
tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase
by the repurchase by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped
into the shoes of the previous landholder, vendee a retro, who had instituted respondents
Sevilla as tenant-tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that generally once a
tenant, always a tenant. Thus, the agrarian law was established in the light of the social
justice a precept of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to
promote the common weal (Primero vs. CIR, L-10594, May 29, 1957; Pineda, et al. vs.
de Guzman, et al., L-23773-74, December 29, 1967).
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Ejectment Case Filed in Relation to Tenancy


Relationship
The ejectment case is the proper forum for the full ventilation of the tenancy issue.
Although rulings of the DAR may be assailed before the higher appellate courts (CA or
SC), a definite resolution by this court at this time, that petitioner is indeed a tenant of
private respondents as petitioner wants this court to do would render nugatory the
ejectment case still pending in the trial court. In the same vein, a reversal by this court of
the "preliminary determination" by the DAR would result in an absurd and circuitous
scenario where the findings of this Court on an incidental matter of the case may be
reviewed and probably reversed by the trial court since whatever is the outcome hereof,
the case will still be remanded and disposed of by the latter whose ruling may again be
reviewed by this Court on appeal. Also, from the records, the Court is not in a position to
resolve the dispute since the evidence required in courts is different from that of
administrative agencies.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 124516

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Elements must concur


Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and
private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and
not as a "tenant". Petitioner can not, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father
because "the spring cannot rise higher that its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation
regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. What the parties
agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for petitioner to pay private respondent
a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case
obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as
this falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR
FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: March 28, 2001
G.R. No. 110012

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites


Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:
1.

the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration. It is also understood that

5.

there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that

6.
there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing
the harvests.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
LOURDES PEA QUA
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
HILARIO
-versusIAC
148 SCRA 573
JULIO BARANDA AND ROBERTO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF BACOLOD, RURAL BANK OF
HINIGARAN, INC.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-41835


PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586
JULIO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
Promulgated: August 30, 1990

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP;How is it established


The alleged testimony of the administratrix of Marietta A. San Buenaventura, Rosario
Vda. de Arriola, that respondent Sevilla was hired as a laborer on daily wage basis
(Rollo, p. 13) cannot prevail over the following evidence supporting the existence of
tenancy relationship in the instant case: (1) the vendee a retro, thru the administratrix, is
the landholder and respondent's Sevilla are the tenants; (2) the subject landholding is
agricultural; (3) consent between the vendee a retro thru, the administratrix, and spouses
Sevilla is not disputed; (4) the purposes which are rice and coconut production are
agricultural; and (5) spouses Sevilla have physically possessed the landholding
continuously from 1973 and performed faithfully and religiously their obligations as
tenants until petitioners Salen took possession of the landholding and cultivated the same
means of force and intimidations sometime in June 1977; hence, respondents Sevilla have
personally cultivated the said landholding and there is a sharing on a 50-50 basis between
Arriola and Sevilla from the riceland and 1/3-2/3 on the coconut land.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
Where private respondents cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a
share in the produce or the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is

one of tenancy and not employment. The fact that respondents have huts erected on
the landholding shows they are tenants.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusTHE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Existence


Where private respondents cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in
the produce or the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is one of tenancy
and not of employment. The fact that respondents have huts erected on the landholding
shows they are tenants (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 650350, May 15, 1984, 129
SCRA 222).
Further, this Court has consistently ruled that in agrarian cases all that is required is mere
substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which attained the
minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial
evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal
(Bagsican vs. CA, G.R. No. 62255, January 30, 1986, 141 SCRA 226).
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Jurisdiction, where no tenancy relationship is


shown
In a considerable number of cases, that where no agricultural tenancy relationship exists
between the contending parties and the situation is one merely for forcible entry, the
RTC, acting as an agrarian court, has no jurisdiction. And in Pabustan vs. de Guzman,
109 Phil. 278, when there is no tenancy relationship between the contending parties, the
agrarian court has no jurisdiction.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Not shown by sharing of harvest


Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationships.
Certainly it is not unusual for landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait
of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This,
however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specifically when
the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, sq. meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an

occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: December 05, 1988
G.R. No. 78214

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Preliminary Determination by DAR of Tenancy


Relationship Pursuant to P.D. No. 316
When the trial court referred the ejectment case to the DAR, it only acted in accordance
with the requirement of P.D. No. 316 before it was expressly repealed by R.A. No.
6657 that the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform or his authorized
representative shall make a "preliminary determination of the (agrarian) relationship
between the parties." The same decree further provides that:
"If the Secretary finds that the case is proper for the court, . . ., he shall so certify and such
court, . . . may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy."

The determination by the DAR concerning the tenancy relationship between the parties is
only preliminary. After making its determination, the DAR can issue the appropriate
certification for court action. There is nothing in the decree which vested in the Secretary
the final authority to rule on the existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship
whenever a case is referred to it by the courts pursuant to P.D. No. 316. The DAR's
preliminary determination, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, does not even
foreclose a further examination by the courts nor is the latter bound by the former's initial
appreciation of the relationship between the parties as provided in P.D. No. 1038.
Moreover, with the express repeal of PDs 316 and 1038 by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657,
the preference to the DAR become unnecessary, as the trial court may now process to
hear the case. The reference requirement under the decree is merely a procedural matter,
the repeal of which did not cause any prejudice to petitioner. Besides, there is nothing in
the decree which says that if the DAR determine the existence of a tenancy relationship,
an ejectment case cannot prosper.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 124516

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites


The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy
relationship: [36] (a) the parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is

agricultural land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural
production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of
harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in
question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. [38]
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship
does exist between petitioner and private respondents.
The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1)

the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2)

the subject is agricultural land;

(3)

there is consent;

(4)

the purpose is agricultural production;

(5)

there is personal cultivation; and

(6)

there is sharing of harvests. [9]

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 30, 2002
G.R. No. 138016

The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the
landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create
tenancy relationship and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR
FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: March 28, 2001
G.R. No. 110012
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versusPATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1.

the parties are the landholder and tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.

In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator


thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA
247).
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO AND EDUARDO M.
BUENCAMINO HILARIO, PETITIONERS
-versusHONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND SALVADOR BALTAZAR, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 70736
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
LOURDES PEA QUA assisted by her husband JAMES
CUA

-versusCOURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), ET AL.


Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.
-versusHON. PEDRO M. S.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there
resided, with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would.
Secondly, private respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of
plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary
hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself
had control in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy.
Thirdly, the management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who
defrayed the cultivation expenses. Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of
the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans
of palay per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed rice miller of Taloc, attested the
cash value of the rental payments from "the first crop of 1979 and each crop thereafter
up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive". The rental payments made thereafter were
received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, court appointed police officers, or to the
barangay captain.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, ET AL
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and FEDERICO ARMADA
Promulgated: June 17, 1996
G.R. No. 103103
One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is
sharing, by the landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this fact has
been shown in this case. As held:
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de
jure tenant as contra-distinguished from a de facto tenant.

DAVID ODSIGUE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: July 4, 1994

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Sharing Harvest


However, we agree with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission that
petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of "sharing harvest" is
assumed as a factual element in that admission.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 30, 2002
G.R. No. 138016

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Source of income determines


As significantly held in Qua vs. Court of Appeals, the fact that the source of livelihood of
the private respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting is
indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.
Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent Ignacio is a businessman by occupation
and this is his principal source of income. He manufactures hollow blocks. He also has
piggery and poultry farm as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject
land. To add to that, the respondent farms are riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos.
It is this evident that the working hours of the respondent as businessman and his other
activities do not permit him to undertake the land obligations of a real tenant. This is
further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally
perform the work of a gardener because on October 22, 1996 the respondent hired some
20 people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of
the subject land.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY; Remedy of the mortgagee is against the mortgagor


At all events, PAIC's right of recourse, insofar as its mortgage loan is concerned, is not
against the land itself nor against its mortgagee, but rather against its mortgagors, the
petitioner Cuao spouses.

TENANCY; Security of tenure


Private respondent are entitled to security of tenure as they are legitimate tenants of the
lands.
Alleged agreements executed by the respondent purportedly relinquishing possession of
their landholdings are not enforceable, as it would violate the Code of Agrarian Reform
on security of tenure of tenants.
Private respondent having been already listed as farmer beneficiaries of the Land
Transfer Program, strengthens the security of tenure of tenants.
DON PEPE HENSON
-versusPANGILINAN
161 SCRA 687

TENANT; Defined
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landowner under the share tenancy system, or in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above
definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN
SALIPOT
Promulgated: January 25, 2000
G.R. No. 80129
JOSE MATIENZO
-versusMARTIN SERVIDAD
Promulgated: September 10, 1981
G.R. No. L-28135

TENANT; Right over the landholding


Whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the vendee a retro has been
extinguished by the repurchase of the subject of that landholding, it has been held on
analogous cases that pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends to assure a
greater degree of security of tenure for tenants, further promoting the constitutional

objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacasi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29,
1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the right of the tenant is not
severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation of the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the
tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase
by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of
the previous of the landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted respondents Sevilla as
tenant tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that generally once a tenant,
always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082

THIRD PARTY; Construed


The "third party" mentioned in the said Section 21 should be construed to mean a person
who is neither landholder nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for
the landholder. For instance, a sheriff enforcing as execution sale against the landholder;
or a purchaser or transferee of the land, or a mere dummy of the landowner.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versusCA, CASIANO DE LUNA and FLAVIANO DE LUNA
Promulgated: May 11, 1993
G.R. No. 97788

TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS; Not disposable until released


It should be remembered that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable or
alienable, neither the Bureau of Lands not the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sale or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales, patents, leases for
grazing purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
THE HEIRS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA
-versusSPS. SEVERO BARZA and ESTER P. BARZA and CA
Promulgated: May 7, 1992
G.R. No. 79167

TITLE; Condition for the transfer


The CARP law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the

deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989

TORRENS TITLE; Indefeasibility thereof


The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who
takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. (Anonuevo vs. Court of
Appeals). The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that
attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

U
USUFRUCT; Extinguished
As to the question of what rights, if any were retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary,
after the effectivity of P.D. No. 27. We believe that the usufruct which had theretofore
existed as jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by P.D.
No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct
was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new
owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. P.D. No. 27
was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption
that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather
than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue
enjoying, usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be set at
naught the major purpose projected by P.D. No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order
No. 228.
RAMONA LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P.
CARLOS PANALIGAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333 & 52289

VALENZUELA

and

V
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Mode of Extinguishment
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private
person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the
private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws.
Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of Government (now the Department
of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative
Development (Section 8, PD 175).
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Proof needed


Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require
any court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. (see Jacinto
v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 263 (1978). To protect the tenant's right to security of
tenure, voluntary surrender as contemplated by law, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the
landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise,
the right of a tenant to security of tenure becomes an illusory one.
VICTOR TALAVERA, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 27, 1990
G.R. No. 77830

W
WAIVER OF RIGHTS; Null and Void
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a
farmer-beneficiary because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land.
they also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a

reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land,
thus negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the
soil.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297

WRIT OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; Concurrent


Jurisdiction to Issue Writ
The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule
65 which reads:
"SEC. 4.
Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if
the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves
the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the
Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

WRIT OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; Discretionary


Power of the Supreme Court
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in

subsequent case, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres v. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
". . .. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket."

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition on the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457

WRIT OF POSSESSION; Enforcement


It would be a gross error for the judge to suspend the implementation of the writ of
possession. Once the writ has been issued, the court has no alternative but to enforce it
without delay (PNB vs. Adel, 118 SCRA 116 (1982). In fact in a later case, even the
Court of Appeals was not allowed to restrain the implementation of a writ of possession.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293

Z
ZONING ORDINANCE; Defined
"A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.


-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

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