Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A
ABANDONMENT
For abandonment to occur, the tenant must have unequivocally and absolutely
relinquished his occupation and cultivation of the lots. This is not so in this case.
Petitioner continued to occupy Lot No. 2679 for residential and small backyard farming
purposes, despite the fact that the eruption of Mr. Pinatubo made it impossible for him to
continue with its cultivation. Moreover, under Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of
1983, the alleged abandonment of the land by the tenant does not automatically terminate
the tenancy relationship as there must be a proper court declaration of such fact. In this
case, such court declaration of abandonment is wanting.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
SOBREVIAS
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. No. 138289
AND
TOMAS
ABANDONMENT; Requisites:
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent
of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297
barred if not commenced within three (3) years after such cause of action accrued".
Construing this provision is Dolofino vs. Court of Appeals (SCRA), we rule that "the law
does not specifically require a judicial action, hence it can be an administrative action.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos".
DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON
-versusLEONARDO ARELLANO
Promulgated: November 6, 1992
G.R. No. 77104
ACQUISITION; Mode of
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land:
compulsory and voluntary.
STA.
ROSA
REALTY
CORPORATION
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
DEVELOPMENT
ACTION; Nature of
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of
the action.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
ACTION; Party not impleaded not bound by the decision rendered therein
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 (1990), a person who
was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then
of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or
whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusIAC & BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
PHILIPPINES
and
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only
respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions
are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law
for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and
central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded
Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 6, 2002
G.R. No. 132048
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a department
head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to
support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versus-
ADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
AGENT; Personality
Erilla as an agent of the landowner(s) was not an independent personality who could
provide insulation for the landowners from their obligations to private respondents as
tenants or agricultural lessees. To hold that the landowner(s) did not give their consent
because private respondents had been hired or give their consent because private
respondents had been hired not give their consent because private respondents had been
hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the landowner(s) with too easy an
escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple expedient of hiring an
employee or overseer to stand between the landowner(s) and the tenants or agricultural
lessees. To sustain this particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the force and
effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, well nigh to the vanishing point.
SPS. AMADEO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
-versusIAC, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP
Law), as:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS
Represented by his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA.
DE SANTOS
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 7, 2000
G.R. No. 109992
IN
THE
Agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that there is an urgent
need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our country.
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335
In other words, in the case at bar, from the moment Benigno, as legal possessor (and,
therefore, an agricultural lessor) granted the cultivation and use of the landholding to
Surrender
as
Mode
of
Clearly, the return of legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the
rights of Bernas as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an
agricultural leasehold are provided for by law. The enumeration is exclusive and no other
grounds can justify termination of the lease. The policy and letter of the law are clear on
this point.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD
BITO-ON DEITA
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041
to, the prior right of private respondents to redeem the said property. Put a little
differently, what the Cuao spouses mortgaged to PAIC was not absolute or unqualified
dominium plenum over the land, but rather a right of ownership qualified by and subject
to the right of redemption of private respondents. PAIC, of course, could not have
acquired rights superior to those of its mortgagors.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 30, 1988
G.R. No. L-57675
an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her
will or permission to work on the farm land.
SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI
Promulgated: October 23, 1992
G.R. No. 88113
APPEAL
The failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity
in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a
petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the
category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts
do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 [13] (precursor to
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later
on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial
agency.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
beneficiaries even before the pending incidents with respondent Regional Director could
be resolved, it would indeed be futile to expect the latter to reconsider his earlier posture
and contradict or reverse the position taken by his superior, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA
-versusHON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 20, 2001
G.R. No. 133806
B
BACK RENTALS; Payment
The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold rental is an issue which
is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal competence of
the Regional Trial Court to resolve. Consequently, there is exists an agrarian dispute in
the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable y the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondents
is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093
BENEFICIARIES; Determination of
At this juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded only that the identification and selection
of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
LOLIHALA SABERON LERCANA
-versusPORFERIO JALANDONI, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 1, 2002
G.R. No. 132286
BENEFICIARIES; Qualification
SEC. 22.
Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the
absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority:
(a)
(b)
regular farmworkers;
(c)
seasonal farmworkers;
(d)
other farmworkers;
(e)
(f)
(g)
AND
TOMAS
BENEFICIARY; Woman
Neither is their argument that Plaintiff-Appellee, being a woman, is not capable of
discharging the demands of farming, valid. This Board finds said argument anachronistic
with the changing times of great awareness of the potentials of women. Women today are
found manning our commerce and industry, and agriculture is no exception.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versusRICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 2002
G.R. No. 140164
C
CARETAKER; Construed
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the
cultivator of the land.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
CARP; Limitations
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law itself provides for recognition, subject to
limitations, of existing contracts, like lease, even when the lands covered by lease, were
subjected to CARP and were transferred to owner-beneficiaries.
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC.
-versusDOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Promulgated: December 1, 2000
G.R. No. 134431
CARP; Objective
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of
poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who
seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.
The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will
receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move on the nation
toward sound rural development and industrialization.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.
-versusTROPICAL HOMES, INC.
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799
MIRANDA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 11, 1986
G.R. No. L-59730
PAULINA
P.
title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. A
certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but
also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050.
Accordingly, petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed within
its boundaries.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 4, 1994
G.R. No. 111179
CERTIORARI; Requisites
At the outset, it should be stated that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative
in accordance with centuries of both civil and common law traditions and that the grave
abuse of discretion must be shown.
JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
SCRA Vol. No. 189 p. 194
CIVIL LIABILITY
Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2) breach of contract or (3)
tortious act. The first is governed by the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by
the Civil Code.
LEONARDA L. MONSANTO
CLASSIFICATION; Defined
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each others
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid,
it must conform to the following requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
COMMISSION; Creation of
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore
material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals
constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not
object to the creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey
and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the
subject parcels of land. it is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour.
The team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons who
were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the
survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the
commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the
reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Promulgated: October 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139592
It is apparent that despite the pendency of this case, the parties have endeavored and
managed to resolve the dispute among-themselves. The only thing left for us to do is to
put our judicial imprimatur on the compromise agreement in accordance with Article
2037 of the Civil Code.
Finding the Compromise Agreement to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy, the same is hereby approved.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CUETO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CONSOLACION COMPUESTO
Promulgated: October 9, 2001
G.R. No. 141182
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited
Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt"
filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: [24]
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional
Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the
PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the
PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and
the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent's "Motion
for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January
3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusSEVERINO LISTANA, SR.
Promulgated: August 5, 2003
G. R. No. 152611
CO-OWNER; Effect of sale of the entire property without consent of other coowners
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the
portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by
laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
"As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923). This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the things owned in common. (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909). . . . For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of
1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or
corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably,
petitioner's parcels of lands, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth
Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of
land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versusDIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 2001
G.R. No. 139083
COVERAGE; Notice of
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power
of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL retention limits to the landowners, there
is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum are allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of
the land. what is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
D
DAMAGES, Actual, burden of proof
The argument of petitioner that assuming there is no evidence of actual damages, the
Court of Appeals should have asked petitioner to present the evidences in this aspect as it
authorized to receive evidence in accordance with Section 18, P.D. No. 945 and Section
9, B.P. Blg. 129, is untenable. The burden of proof of the damages suffered is on the
party claiming the same. It is the duty of proof of the damages suffered is on present
evidence to support his claim for actual damages. If he failed to do so he has only himself
to blame if no award for actual damages is handed down.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500
DAR; Authority of
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is
granted with a fusion of governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasijudicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subject of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such delegation.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of
functions between agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various
agencies upon whom these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are
supposed to serve. It divides the agencies resources and prevents them from devoting
their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is
evident in the various laws distinct delineation of the functions of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, the Court must
reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold
that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This
Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said
registration.
II.
OBJECTIVES.
A.
General
1.
Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of the
CARP for the effective implementation of the program.
B.
Specific
1.
Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
(Underscoring ours.)
DARAB
Apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the
Adjudication Board of the DAR), the law strives to make resolution of controversies
therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board "shall not
be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence", but also that, as explicitly stated
by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however,
that when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or
group before any DAR proceedings".
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
UDK No. 9864
DARAB; Creation of
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated
by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary as members. A
Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive
Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions may be delegated to
the regional office of the Department in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
DARAB; Jurisdiction
. . . the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in Section 50 of the CARL] is
exercised through hierarchically arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and
PARAD. The latter who exercise "delegated authority" while the first exercises appellate
jurisdiction over resolutions, orders, decision and other dispositions of the RARAD and
the PARAD.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
Rule II, Section I of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. (italics supplied)
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition
for injunction in the first place.
Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy
relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue.
Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
LAGUNA ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 2000
G.R. No. 119357
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determined and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform . . ..
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
-versusDARAB, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 22, 1992
G.R. No. 100091
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, . . .
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335
Reading the foregoing provisions, we observe that under Presidential Decree No. 27, the
basic statute, the tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size farm of five (5) hectares
or, if the land was irrigated, three (3) hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to pay for
the cost of the land within fifteen (15) equal annual amortization payments. Thus, it
appears clear that ownership over lands (lie Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected to OLT moved
from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new landowners). The
fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenant-owners were intended to
replace the landholdings which the old landowners gave up in favor of the new
landowners , the tenant-owners. It follows that in respect of land subjected to OLT, the
tenant-farmers became owners of the land they tilled as of the effective date of P.D. No.
27, i.e., 21 October 1972.
RAMONA R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
It will, however, be observed that from the outset under P.D. No. 27, the
tenant-farmer as of October 21, 1972 has already deemed in a certain sense, to be the
owner of a portion of land, subject of course, to certain conditions (Association of
Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 390).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of the term "deposit". Accordingly we must adhered to the well-settled rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which
allow the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16 (e) of R.A. No.
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118712
DAR, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16 (e) of R.A.
No. 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening
of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust
account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgated rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of R.A. No. 6657.
The contention is untenable, it is very explicit therefrom from Section 16 (e) of R.A. No.
6657 that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it
can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. No. 118745
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. No. 118745
DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
The remedy is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever
agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years;
xxx
xxx
xxx
the only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years. The award of 75
square meters of land originally granted by the Regional Adjudicator and
subsequently affirmed by the DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance
compensation for the dispossession of respondents of 2,500 square meters of
land.
. . . Notwithstanding, from 1976 until 1995 respondent never sought the payment of
disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844, an action to enforce any cause of action under such law shall be
barred if not commenced within three years after such case of action accrued.
Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square
meters of land of which their father was dispossessed in 1970 has prescribed. Thus,
respondents are only entitled to disturbance compensation for their dispossession of 2,500
square meters of land and we find that, in the absence of adequate data on the land's
harvest, the award of 75 square meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief.
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versusLOURDES AQUINO, CITA AQUINO and
ROBERTO AQUINO
Promulgated: October 9, 2000
G.R. No. 138979
While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules, may have been liberally
construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action
and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest it scatches and prejudice the
other party's substantive rights. The payment of the docket fee in the proper amount
should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which should be strictly construed.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 117439
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As to whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the execution of the writ of possession issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the answer is in the negative.
The doctrine is undisputed that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by injunction (Investor's Finance Corp. vs. Ebarle, 163
SCRA 61 (1988). In fact, the doctrine is applied by analogy even to a body statutorily at
par with the Regional Trial Court.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
DOCTRINE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
A sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378
DONATION
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
DUE PROCESS
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a consideration of the action or ruling
complained of (emphasis supplied).
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
E
ECONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm
family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and
corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size
farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land
can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the
farm family's basic needs.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
EJECTMENT; Jurisdiction
Where the answer files asserts agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties,
which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold, and even of this assertion per
se does not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, in
view of the defense asserted, the MCTC should hear and receive the evidence for the
precise purpose of determining whether or not it possesses jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, while it may said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Civil Case No. 262 since Bayog's complaint for ejectment therein
suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and Magdato, it should not
have refrained from taking cognizance of Madato's answer. Although filed late, the
answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the
agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and Magdato, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
se did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case,
nevertheless, in view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received
the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over
the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
ALEXANDER BAYOG AND JORGE PESAYCO, JR.
-versusHON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique and ALBERTO
MAGDATO
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118691
EMANCIPATION PATENT
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area.
(emphasis supplied)
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the
prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer grantee to an emancipation patent by
which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right
which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and
controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these conditions,
merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.
(Ibid.).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269
EMINENT DOMAIN
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowner, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative, the taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power
but of the power of eminent domain.
2.
3.
4.
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and
5.
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
EQUITY
The application of the trial court of its equity jurisdiction is misplaced. As often held by
this Court, equity is available only in the absence of law not as its replacement. All
abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, (judicial rules of
procedure) which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions (Aguila vs. CFI of
Batangas, L-48335, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 352; Zabat vs. CA, L-36958, July 10,
1986). Moreover, a court acting without the jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption
thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401
ESTOPPEL
Thus, it was held that an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though
without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in
fact it was relied upon and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
It has been consistently held by the court that while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court
without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
It is no argument either that the Government is bound by the official decisions
of Secretary Juico and cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is
never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are
erroneous, let alone irregular.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 4, 1991
G.R. No. 93661
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place,
they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the
proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case
to contest the adjudicator's exercise of jurisdiction. Not once did they register a hint of
protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction
during the eight years this case was under litigation.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the
prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender
possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer
should oust him. There is no need for an express order to his effect to decision that in
such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of
time. Precisely, the law requires in cases where there are improvements on the land that a
special order be issued by the court, directing the removal of such improvements. It is
apparent petitioners confuse the order of demolition with the decision ordering the
eviction of the defendant.
SPS. FELIPE BUAG AND IRMA BUAG
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 107364
It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a
judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date
it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary action.
Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years
counted from the time the judgment becomes final.
The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution filed by
private respondents. Said Court, acting on the motion for execution had no jurisdiction to
entertain propositions outside of the scope of the agreement sought to be executed.
Further, the agreement sought to be enforced was approved by the Court on December
22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight (8) months from the time the motion for execution
was filed on August 22, 1984. It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, execution of judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5)
years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and
ABALOS
and
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229; RTC divested of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters
However, with the enactment of E.O. No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987,
fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette 14/ the regional
trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 95664
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407; Said law cannot have retroactive effect
The CARL (R.A. No. 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. Nor is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner must
E. O. No. 407 be regarded. It was enacted two (2) months after private respondents had
legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of conditional sale by the payment of all
installments on their due dates. These laws cannot have retroactive effect unless there is
an express provision in them to that effect.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, NORMY D. CARPIO and
CARMEN ORQUISA
Promulgated: September 20, 1996
The failure to appeal to the office of the President from the decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719
EXPROPRIATION
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on
this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdiction.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon
its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation
may be employed in raising the amount.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742
EXPROPRIATION
UNDER
THE
LAND
REFORM
PROGRAM
DISTINGUISHED FROM ORDINARY EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING
Even if Section 17 of the CARL were applied, the market value paid by the government
in expropriating other lands in Agusan del Norte cannot be the basis for fixing the
compensation to be paid in this case since the lands are not agricultural lands. What is
more, those lands were taken by the government under ordinary expropriation
proceedings, whereas the taking of agricultural lands under the government's land reform
program is based on the combined exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and
police power. The 1973 Constitution enjoined the State to "regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and (to) equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits" (1973 Const. Art. II, Sec. 6), even as it mandated the
State "to formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil". (Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 12) Similar provisions are found
in the present Constitution, (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. 2 and Sec. 4). Thus, to the extent that
agrarian laws limit the size of the lands which landowners may retain, they partake of the
exercise of police power. On the other hand, to the extent that they require the payment of
just compensation, they reflect the nature of the taking as an exercise of the State's power
of eminent domain.
FELIPE GALEON
-versusHON. EDELWINA PASTORAL & DAR
Promulgated: April 8, 1991
CA-G.R. No. 23168
F
FINDING OF FACTS; Conclusive upon the court, exception
In Talavera v. Court of Appeals, (182 SCRA 778), we held that a factual conclusion
made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum
evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the
appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find
with the respondent court that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination
of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it ruled
that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
2)
3)
4)
palpable errors are committed, or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness
or capriciousness is manifested.
RELUCIO III
-versusMACARAIG
173 SCRA 635
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
A mortgage who has foreclosed upon the mortgaged real property of a delinquent debtor
and has purchased the same at the foreclosure sale, can be granted a writ of possession
over the property despite the fact that the premises are in the possession of a lessee
thereof and whose lease has not yet been terminated, unless the lease has been previously
registered in the Registry of Property or with prior knowledge of the mortgagee.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
The mortgagor shall have the right, within the year after the sale of real estate as a result of
the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the
court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage,
and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the Bank by reason of the
execution and sale and for the custody of said property." (Republic Act No. 1300).
It is already a well settled rule that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of mortgage
property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex parte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser.
JULIO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
I
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a court to modify its judgment and its
jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or
alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment.
NATALIA REALTY, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 12, 2002
G.R. No. 126462
ISSUANCE OF EPs OR CLOAs; Does not bar the landowner from retaining the
area covered
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner
from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.
EUDOSIA DAEZ and/or HER HEIRS, REP. BY
ADRIANO D. DAEZ
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 17, 2000
G.R. No. 133507
JUDGMENT; Conclusiveness
Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the
owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed
fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the
question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well
said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important
principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept
in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.
RAMON D. OCHO
-versusBERNARDINO CALOS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 22, 2000
G.R. No. 137908
the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years counted from the
time the judgment became final.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401
It has been established that the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question
is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Ass'n of Small Landowners of
the Phil., Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777, 14 July 1989,
175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and
discover its purpose. Personal motives and political consideration are irrelevances that
cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is a ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the
hammer fall heavily", where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the
people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Ass'n of Small Landowners of the Phil.,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310;
Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777, 14 July 1989).
LUZ FARMS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889
JURISDICTION
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or
agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or
diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action. This kind
of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such
us understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
Promulgated: March 7, 2002
G.R. No. 144817
JURISDICTION; DAR
Having found therefore, that the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the
said previous case for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor of herein
respondent, we believe and so hold that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the
same. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.
-versusIGNACIA CENTENO
Promulgated: October 13, 2000
G.R. No. 140825
JURISDICTION; DARAB
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee", on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is
absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both
parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert
ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation
Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show any juridical tie or
tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest.
RODOLFO ARZAGA AND FRANCIS ARZAGA
-versusSALVACION COPIAS and PRUDENCIO CALANDRIA
Promulgated: March 28, 2003
G.R. No. 152404
xxx
xxx
f)
Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Paten (EP) and the administrative
correction thereof; (underlining added)
It is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of
DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject
CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.
Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent
court on a petition for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in
question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, decisions and awards of
the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 25, 1999
G.R. No. 103953
JURISDICTION; Determination
What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1)
Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of
Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay
of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby
both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant
relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents
attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not
presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
JAIME P. CORPIN
-versusAMOR S. VIVAR and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Promulgated: June 19, 2000
G.R. No. 137350
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND
FLAVIANO DE LUNA
Promulgated: May 11, 1993
G.R. No. 97788
JURISDICTION; RTC
The jurisdiction of the RTC is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question
is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of
the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed
on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 18, 2000
G. R. No. 132767
JUST COMPENSATION
Now, in the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42
insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation
cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the subject property,
accruing to respondent VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with
Section 2 of Rule 67, i.e., there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial
Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained
and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
JAIME T. PANES, ET AL
-versusVISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 27, 1996
G.R. No. 56219-20 & 56393-94
LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
"The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1)
(a) For lands above fifty (50)Twenty-five percent (25%) cash the hectares, insofar as the
excess balance to be paid in government hectarage is concerned financial instruments
negotiable at anytime
(b) For lands above twenty -Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the four (24) hectares and
upbalance to be paid in government to fifty (50) hectares financial instruments negotiable
at anytime."
We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997
judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay
in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not
compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the
final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken
in conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bask had already given petitioner
the entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be
deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.
EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-in-fact
ROMEO L. SANTOS
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ,
ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO
Promulgated: September 7, 2000
G.R. No. 137431
L
LACHES; Defined
Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising
from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.
MARILOU RIVERA
-versus-
respect of agricultural lands from which persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought to
be ejected. It is well settled at the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties is merely
preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts.
LAWS; Prospective
We categorically rule that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied
retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.
-versusHON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 1989
G.R. No. 79416
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP
The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being
a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial.
ANGEL CHICO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 2000
G.R. No. 134735
LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
As correctly observed by the Regional Adjudicator, to give petitioners the right to
exercise that choice would merely result in the unnecessary displacement of respondent
who, after years of labor, now has an undeniable stake on the land. given the practical
circumstances as well as the legal and equitable considerations in this case, we are in
agreement with the Court of Appeals, the DARAB, and the Regional Adjudicator that
respondent's leasehold rights deserve to be protected and maintained.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509
(2)
(3)
there is consent;
(4)
(5)
(6)
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no
tenancy relationship between the party.
REYNALDO BAJASA and ERLINDA BEJASA
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special
Sixteenth Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and JAIME
DINGLASAN
Promulgated: July 6, 2000
G.R. No. 108941
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the
title of the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would
have to be subject to the outcome of the suit. In other words, a purchaser who buys
registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a
third party xxx stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents
and result of the pending litigation . . ..
JULIETA V. ESGUERRA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 119310
M
MANDAMUS; When available
Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. For, it is essential for the
writ to issue that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. The legal right of the
plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and
specific.
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty
that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of
public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body
discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to
approve or disapprove a specific application (B.F. Homes, Inc. v. National Water
Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154 SCRA 88). Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act (Mata v. San Diego, L-30447 March 21, 1975; 63 SCRA 170).
It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion. The writ may issue to
compel the exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself. Mandamus itself can
require action only but not specific action where the act sought to be performed involves
the exercise of discretion.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 04, 1991
G.R. No. 93661
MODES OF APPEAL
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three
modes of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a)
Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served
in like manner.
(b)
Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c)
Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275
Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of or does not have a valid title to
the mortgaged property, the mortgagee or transferee in good faith is nonetheless entitled
to protection. Although this rule generally pertains to real property, particularly registered
land, it may also be applied by analogy to personal property, in this case specifically,
since ship owners area, likewise, required by law to register their vessels with the
Philippine Coast Guard.
CEBU INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 13, 1997
G.R. No. 107554
N
NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL; Effect
The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with
the hearing of June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their
counsel to inform them is untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and the client is bound by the negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify
him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v. Sec. of Agriculture & Nat. Resources,
G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 719). The client cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently (Vivero v. Santos,
52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500), although he may have the right of action against the attorney
if prejudiced by the latter's negligence.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHONORABLE PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the Notice
of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter's old address. Petitioner
explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those notices upon
respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and Financing
Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that personal service could
not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner caused the service of the
notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657. On this point,
petitioner claimed that the notices were sent "not only by registered mail but also by
personal delivery" and that there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the
signature appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of petitioner's copies of the notices.
But petitioner could not identify the name of respondent's representative who allegedly
received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible. It is
thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of
the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422
NOTICES; Required
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice
of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
O
OCCUPATION BY TOLERANCE; Effect
More than one has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of
the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,
where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant its undertaking to buy
the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite
demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing
possession** became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the **
(plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her
legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 24, 1997
G.R. No. 110427
P
P.D. NO. 27 CONSTITUTIONALITY
P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been
repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the
aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, [24] P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional,
and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What
is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That
would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our
duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal
postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because
any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away
with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated
with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a
presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance
with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that
tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created.
There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical
norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals."
ROLANDO SIGRE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES
Promulgated: August 8, 2002
G.R. Nos. 109568 and 113454
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have
been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve
the Constitutional goal.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILS., INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses
to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not
necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 128177
ROLANDO SIGRE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND LILIA Y. GONZALES
Promulgated: August 8, 2002
G.R. Nos. 109568/113454
PUBLICATION; Indispensable
Petitioners insist that the rules are not applicable to them because they do not own more
than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were
intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they
have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Taada vs.
Tuvera.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
ERFE
-versusFORTUN
36 SCRA 552
Q
QUESTION OF LAW V. QUESTION OF FACT
Two types of questions: there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO
-versusSPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA, ET
AL.
Promulgated: December 19, 2001
G.R. No. 134741
R
R.A. NO. 3844; Prescriptive period
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that "an action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within 3 years after such cause
of action accrued." The law does not specifically require a judicial action, hence, it can be
an administrative action. Ubi les non distinquit nec nos distinquere debemos (Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish).
SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545
REDEMPTION OR PRE-EMPTION
In time, both the court of origin and the appellate court could have found for petitioner
were said courts not unduly swayed by the circumstance that petitioner presented as his
own evidence the deed of sale wherein it was stated that the land involved is not tenanted.
Such conclusion having been rejected and the identity of the landholding as well as the
fact of tenancy thereon of petitioner been established matters, there is no further
hindrance to the exercise by petitioner of the right of redemption or pre-emption extended
and granted to him by law.
VICENTE PALO-PALO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 19, 1992
REFERRAL; Effect
The referral of a case for preliminary determination to the MAR refers to pending
agrarian or civil cases of those pending decision or execution where the issue of actual
tenancy is raised. And even if the said issue was properly raised a case that was
terminated and duly executed cannot be reopened much less referred to such
administrative body as the MAR (now DAR) for a preliminary determination of the
relationship of the parties and a certification if the case is proper for trial in court.
GRACIANO B. VALLES, ET AL.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SAMAR, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1989
G.R. No. 61297
are Regional Trial Court designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within each
province to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b)
the prosecution of all criminal offense under the Act.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093
have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them
provided the original homestead grantees who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate the homestead. [50] The right to choose the area to be retained,
which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule.
[51] However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct descendants"
have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the
seven (7)-hectare retention limit provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical
expertise of the administrative agency concerned.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
RETENTION LIMITS
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
This section declares: Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, nay public or private agricultural land,
the size which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family sized farm, such
as commodity produced, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) the he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by P.D. No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder further, that original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
RETENTION LIMIT; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 in its entirety deals with
retention limits.
As earlier stated, Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits
allowed by law to small landowners. Since the property here involved is more or less ten
(10) hectares, it is then within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to determine whether or not the property can be subjected to agrarian reform. But
this necessitates an entirely different proceeding.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NORMY D. CARPIO AND
CARMEN ORQUISA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 118180
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versusDIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 2001
G.R. No. 139083
RIGHTS OF A LESSEE
As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters
affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 24, 2002
G.R. No. 125063
It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be
consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to
redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain
an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is
willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer
open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of
the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid
prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation
of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay
at the proper time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered
insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law
and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against him.
ANICETO M. QUIO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599
S
SALE; Effect on agricultural relationship
The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferee is simply subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Sec. 10, RA 3844).
SALE; PERFECTION
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of
the contract, and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract
does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in
default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1996
G.R. No. 109410
SECURITY OF TENURE
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on
their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the
rights of an agricultural tenant.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
the expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor, "was" answered in the affirmative,
not so much because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court but pursuant to
Section 3 Republic Act No. 2263. The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto,
a 1974 case (58 SCRA 186, 191) and this Court declared that the question had been
definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al. v. Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein
(it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the lease property to the lessor upon the
expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal possession of the land, the termination,
therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not even vest the tenant of the lessee of the
right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 71217
On both justiciable and equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian
justice, has generally upheld the tenants' security of tenure (Primero V. Court of
Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil 675 (1957); Pineda v. De Guzman,
21 SCRA 1450 (1967); Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294 (1972) or the
right of the tenant to the enjoyment and possession of his farmholding which has been
created, conferred, protected and guaranteed by the police power of the state in
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution expressed in Article II, Section 5 of
the 1935 Constitution (as well as in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CALIXTO BLAZA and CANUTO
DAMASO
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495
The new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A. No.
3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the
agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship
is established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can
only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this Court has guaranteed the
continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere transfer of legal
possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernanrdo vs. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA
439 (1988), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law
explicitly provides that the livelihood relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the
agricultural leasehold relationships is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36
of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not
terminate the tenancy relationship. The donation itself is valid.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
-versusGOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET
AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 122156
SETTLEMENT; Encourage
The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
CELESTINA G. DE GUZMAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 7, 1996
G.R. No. 110122
Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other, his labor, with either or
both contributing any one or several times of production, the tenant cultivating the land
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their
respective contributions (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 1199; Sec. 166 (25), R.A. No. 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural worker is any agricultural wage, salary or piece
worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless the
Agricultural Land Reform Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a cement agrarian dispute or
an obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
COURT,
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money or in both. (Sec. 3, R.A. No.
1199, Agricultural) Tenancy Act, as amended).
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN JR., ET AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
COURT,
Share tenancy - exist whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for
agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other is labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.
GUERRERO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
142 SCRA 136
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 568
2.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It must be stated that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law and
construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them (National Federation of Labor vs. Bisma, 127
SCRA 419, 425 (1984). The aforequoted provision of PD 946 is clear and unambiguous.
It provides, as an exception to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the subject matters exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform among which are the classification and identification of landholdings,
the parcellary mapping in question and the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLTs.
Accordingly, it should be taken to mean exactly what is says. It is elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says (Insular Bank of Asia and American
Employees Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 673 (1984). Where the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's
seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition for
subtraction.
FAGEL TABIN AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION
-versusTHE HONORABLE EMILIO A. JACINTO, ET AL
Promulgated: October 28, 1991
G.R. No. 55393
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength
from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is
impressed with social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his
property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides
under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. The Constitution also ensures that the
worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family
an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life
(Sections 7 & 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,
78 SCRA 194).
PIO BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378
SUBROGATION
Subrogation of Land Bank to the obligation of farmer-beneficiaries for payment of price
of the land brought under land reform does not mean the Bank has to pay interest on the
acquisition price prior to the payment of said price (partly in cash and bonds) to the
landowner.
Land Bank may deduct from acquisition price the rents paid by tenant-farmer to
landowner from October 21, 1971 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
VDA. DE ORTIZ
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
148 SCRA 685
SUCCESSION
The Respondent who is the only heir interested in succeeding his father who died, had the
right to take over as agricultural tenant in petitioner's land.
Nature of work performed by the respondent's father is that of tenant on the land.
ROBLES
-versusBATACAN
154 SCRA 644
SUGARLANDS; Covered
Sugarlands are not mentioned as among the areas neither by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, and neither they are included in the exempted lands.
Any share tenant in sugarlands may exercise his option to change his relationships with
the landowner into the leasehold system.
Agricultural Land Reform Code should be given liberal interpretation.
DAVID
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
161 SCRA 114
T
TAKING; When it Takes Effect
The seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation, judicially
determined.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, as of August 29, 1991, when it decreed the
coverage of the landholding in question under CARL (R.A. No. 6657) had not paid or
even determined the just compensation for the taking of the landholding.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 19, 2001
G.R. No. 131216
TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it
is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone
who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing
or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is
only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an
industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a
parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements,
provided there are complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 03, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
We are not impressed with the argument that the private respondent could both
have been a mere share tenant and agricultural lessee because he has several children
who are professionals. That will not necessarily make him prosperous himself nor
does it mean he can stop making his own living. A man does not have to depend upon
his children for his livelihood even if they are well off as long as he retains his
strength and his pride to continue charting his own life and earning his own keep.
There are thousands of such proud parents who are able to provide their children with
a good education and a brighter future while themselves remaining as humble tillers
of the soil and beholden to no man for their sustenance.
On the fixed yearly rentals of P1,000 from the fishpond, we have held that the use of the
land by the tenant for a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both as consideration
is an element of tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. In the present case, the
consideration was stipulated between the parties pursuant to the aforementioned Section
46 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.
Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. C.A. 164 SCRA 433 (1988) citing and Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), we rule that there is no concrete evidence on
record sufficient to establish that the element of consent is present. But even assuming
arguendo that the element of consent is present, we declared in Delos Reyes v. Expineli
(30 SCRA 574 (1969) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a
tenant even of he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
created (hypothetically) by the overseer and private respondents. For this reason, Evaristo
Erilla is properly considered as an agent of the landowner(s) who acted as such with at
least implied or apparent authority and whose principal(s) were accordingly bound to
private respondents.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving
statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship.
[43] The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be
established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the
element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing
of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements
are deemed inadequate. [46]
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson,
and subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later
Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding
of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract
between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms
the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without
the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating for the
record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr.
Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this
relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of
harvest or payment of rental.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR SOLIS
Promulgated: December 3, 2001
G.R. No. 138781
Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. Although
petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by
allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from
him the landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162 SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial
court on the basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be
reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons.
Where persons cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce
or the cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and the landowner
is one of tenancy and not employment.
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489
the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, that all these
requisites are necessary in order to created tenancy relationship between the parties
and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.
LOURDES PEA QUA, represented by her husband,
JAIME QUA,
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIV.), ET
AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA
247 (1988)), that the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished
from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua vs. Court of
Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482 (1984)).
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
2.
the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the
lessee of agricultural land;
3.
the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received
a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and
4.
the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
The findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certificate as to the supposed
tenancy relationship between the contending parties are not binding on the lower court
pursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 and Section 12, sub-paragraph (r) of
P.D. No. 946. The Secretary's determination of the relationship between the parties is
only preliminary. The same cannot be final and conclusive on the lower court. The last
paragraph of Section 12 of P.D. No. 946 supplements Section 2 of P.D. No. 316 and
Section 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 583 cited earlier. P.D. No. 946 provides that when a case
involving an agricultural land is certified as a proper case for trial, the preliminary
determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform does not bind the court assuming jurisdiction over said case. It is
evidently with more reason that when the Secretary certifies that an agrarian case is nor
proper for trial, the Court before which an appeal is ventilated regarding the effect of said
certification must look into the bases of the Secretary's preliminary determination.
Otherwise, the party adversely affected by the DAR's certification is left without any
judicial recourse. Definitely, such an unjust and absurd result could not have been the
intent of P.D. No. 946.
ROSINA C. GRAZA, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEAL
Promulgated: June 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-48368
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing
the harvests.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
LOURDES PEA QUA
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
HILARIO
-versusIAC
148 SCRA 573
JULIO BARANDA AND ROBERTO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF BACOLOD, RURAL BANK OF
HINIGARAN, INC.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
one of tenancy and not employment. The fact that respondents have huts erected on
the landholding shows they are tenants.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusTHE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: December 05, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
The determination by the DAR concerning the tenancy relationship between the parties is
only preliminary. After making its determination, the DAR can issue the appropriate
certification for court action. There is nothing in the decree which vested in the Secretary
the final authority to rule on the existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship
whenever a case is referred to it by the courts pursuant to P.D. No. 316. The DAR's
preliminary determination, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, does not even
foreclose a further examination by the courts nor is the latter bound by the former's initial
appreciation of the relationship between the parties as provided in P.D. No. 1038.
Moreover, with the express repeal of PDs 316 and 1038 by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657,
the preference to the DAR become unnecessary, as the trial court may now process to
hear the case. The reference requirement under the decree is merely a procedural matter,
the repeal of which did not cause any prejudice to petitioner. Besides, there is nothing in
the decree which says that if the DAR determine the existence of a tenancy relationship,
an ejectment case cannot prosper.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 124516
agricultural land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural
production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of
harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in
question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. [38]
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship
does exist between petitioner and private respondents.
The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
there is consent;
(4)
(5)
(6)
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 30, 2002
G.R. No. 138016
The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the
landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create
tenancy relationship and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR
FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: March 28, 2001
G.R. No. 110012
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versusPATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: July 4, 1994
TENANT; Defined
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landowner under the share tenancy system, or in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above
definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN
SALIPOT
Promulgated: January 25, 2000
G.R. No. 80129
JOSE MATIENZO
-versusMARTIN SERVIDAD
Promulgated: September 10, 1981
G.R. No. L-28135
objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacasi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29,
1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the right of the tenant is not
severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation of the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the
tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase
by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of
the previous of the landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted respondents Sevilla as
tenant tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that generally once a tenant,
always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
U
USUFRUCT; Extinguished
As to the question of what rights, if any were retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary,
after the effectivity of P.D. No. 27. We believe that the usufruct which had theretofore
existed as jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by P.D.
No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct
was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new
owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. P.D. No. 27
was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption
that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather
than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue
enjoying, usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be set at
naught the major purpose projected by P.D. No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order
No. 228.
RAMONA LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P.
CARLOS PANALIGAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333 & 52289
VALENZUELA
and
V
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Mode of Extinguishment
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private
person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the
private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws.
Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of Government (now the Department
of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative
Development (Section 8, PD 175).
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297
W
WAIVER OF RIGHTS; Null and Void
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a
farmer-beneficiary because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land.
they also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a
reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land,
thus negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the
soil.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if
the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves
the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the
Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
subsequent case, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres v. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
". . .. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket."
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition on the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
Z
ZONING ORDINANCE; Defined
"A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs.