Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48214 December 19, 1978
ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALFREDO T.
SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX,
Zamboanga City, respondent,
Ahmad D. Sahak for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez
and Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The first impression yielded by a perusal of this petition for certiorari is its inherent
weakness considering the explicit provision in the present Constitution prohibiting a suit
against the Republic without its consent. 1 Here petitioner Ildefonso Santiago 2 filed on
August 9, 1976 an action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City naming as
defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director
of the Bureau of Plant Industry. 3 His plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation
executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, 4 with the Bureau of Plant Industry
as the donee. As alleged in such complaint, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the
donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the property donated
and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. 5 That led him to
conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with such an
explicit constitutional command. The lower court, in the order challenged in this petition,
was of a different view. It sustained a motion to dismiss on the part of the defendant
Republic of the Philippines, now named as one of the respondents, the other
respondent being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II. It premised
such an order on the settled "rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent. This
is so, because the New Constitution of the Philippines expressly provides that the state
may not be sued without its consent. 6 Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 7 in the
comment on the petition filed with this Court, is for the affirmance of the order of
dismissal of respondent Court precisely to accord deference to the above categorical
constitutional mandate.

On its face, such a submission carries persuasion. Upon further reflection, this Tribunal
is impressed with the unique aspect of this petition for certiorari, dealing as it does with
a suit for the revocation of a donation to the Republic, which allegedly fatted to conform
with what was agreed to by the donee. If an order of dismissal would suffice, then the
element of unfairness enters, the facts alleged being hypothetically admitted. It is the
considered opinion of this Court then that to conform to the high dictates of equity and
justice, the presumption of consent could be indulged in safely. That would serve to
accord to petitioner as plaintiff, at the very least, the right to be heard. certiorari lies.
1. This is not to deny the obstacle posed by the constitutional provision. It is expressed
in language plain and unmistakable: "The State may not be sued without its consent. 8
The Republic cannot be proceeded against unless it allows itself to be sued. Neither
can a department, bureau, agency, office, or instrumentality of the government where
the suit, according to the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro in Del Mar v. Philippine
Veterans Administration, 9 may result "in adverse consequences to the public treasury,
whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. 10 Such a doctrine was
reiterated in the following cases: Republic v. Villasor, 11 Sayson v. Singson, 12 Director of
the Bureau of Printing v. Francisco, 13 and Republic v. Purisima. 14
2. It is contended by counsel for petitioner that the above constitutional provision would
be given a retroactive application in this case if the suit for the revocation of donation
were dismissed. That is not the case at all. In Republic v. Purisima, this Court made
clear that such a basic postulate is part and parcel of the system of government
implanted in the Philippines from the time of the acquisition of sovereignty by the United
States, and therefore, was implicit in the 1935 Constitution even in the absence of any
explicit language to that effect. This it did in a citation from Switzerland General
Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines: 15 "The doctrine of non-suability
recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a
logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates
the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on
which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all. Even if such a principle does give
rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to
engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. 16 That is the
teaching of the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre
Service, 17 promulgated in December of 1966. As a matter of fact, the Switzerland
General Insurance Co. decision was the thirty-seventh of its kind after Mobil. Clearly,
then, the contention that to dismiss the suit would be to give the applicable
constitutional provision a retroactive effect is, to put it at its mildest, untenable.
3. Petitioner's counsel invoked Santos v. Santos, 18 a 1952 decision. A more thorough
analysis ought to have cautioned him against reliance on such a case. It was therein
clearly pointed out that the government entity involved was originally the National
Airports Corporation. Thereafter, it "was abolished by Executive Order No. 365, series of
1950, and in its place and stead the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created and
took over all the assets and assumed all the liabilities of the abolished corporation. The

Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent
a party or parties from enforcing their proprietary rights under the cloak or shield of lack
of juridical personality, because to took over all the powers and assumed all the
obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the contract in question." 19
Then came National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 a
1963 decision, where the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion, as ponente,
stated that a government-owned and controlled corporation "has a personality of its own
distinct and separate from that of the government. ... Accordingly, it may sue and be
sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. (Section
13, Act 1459, as amended). 21 In three recent decisions, Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 22 Philippine National Bank v. Honorable Judge Pabalan, 23
and Philippine National Railways v. Union de Maquinistas, 24 this constitutional provision
on non-suability was unavailing in view of the suit being against a government-owned or
controlled corporation. That point apparently escaped the attention of counsel for
petitioner. Hence Santos v. Santos is hardly controlling.
4. It is to be noted further that the trend against the interpretation sought to be fastened
in the broad language of Santos v. Santos is quite discernible. Not long after, in Araneta
v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, 25 decided in 1957, it was held that an action [against]
Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, ... . 26 In the same
year, this Court, in Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers 27 Union, after
referring to the "basic and fundamental principle of the law that the Government cannot
be sued before courts of justice without its consent," pointed out that "this privilege of
non-suability of the Government" covers with the mantle of its protection "an entity," in
this case, the Angat River Irrigation System. 28 Then, in 1960, came Lim v. Brownell, Jr.,
29
where there was a reaffirmation of the doctrine that a "claim [constituting] a charge
against, or financial liability to, the Government cannot be entertained by the courts
except with the consent of said government. 30 Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing
Employees Association 31 came a year later; it reiterated such a doctrine. It was not
surprising therefore that in 1966, Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. was decided the
way it was. The remedy, where the liability is based on contract, according to this Court,
speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, is for plaintiff to file a claim with the general
office in accordance with the controlling statute, Commonwealth Act No. 327. 32 To
repeat, that doctrine has been adhered to ever since. The latest case in point is
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc. 33 Justice Aquino's
opinion concluded with this paragraph: "It is settled that the Bureau of Customs, acting
as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre
service, is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability of the State. The
claimant's remedy to recover the loss or damage to the goods under the custody of the
customs arrastre service is to file a claim with the Commission in Audit as contemplated
in Act No. 3083 and Commonwealth Act No. 327. 34 With the explicit provision found in
the present Constitution, the fundamental principle of non-suability becomes even more
exigent in its command.
5. The reliance on Santos v. Santos as a prop for this petition having failed, it would
ordinarily follow that this suit cannot prosper. Nonetheless, as set forth at the outset,

there is a novel aspect that suffices to call for a contrary conclusion. It would be
manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the conditions
under which it received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the
concept of non-suitability. That would be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to
one's sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or
governmental agency, is to be condemned. As a matter of fact, in case it is the latter
that is culpable, the affront to decency is even more manifest. The government, to
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, should set the example. If it is susceptible to the charge of
having acted dishonorably, then it forfeits public trust-and rightly so.
6. Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself snows a waiver. Where there is consent,
a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. So it was more than
implied in Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu: 35 "The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. 36 The fact that this decision arose from a suit against the Public Highways
Commissioner and the Auditor General for failure of the government to pay for land
necessary to widen a national highway, the defense of immunity without the consent
proving unavailing, is not material. The analogy is quite obvious. Where the government
ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, the failure to institute the necessary
condemnation proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the collection of
the just compensation due. Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under
which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action,
the consent likewise being presumed. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
while a donation partakes of a contract, there is no money claim, and therefore reliance
on Commonwealth Act No. 327 would be futile.
7. Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with
the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under
the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It
is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the
negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the
beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which
can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of
the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility
of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law.
Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of
the departments of a litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command
respect and be entitled to acceptance.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of dismissal of
October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with
this case, observing the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 According to Article XV, Section 16 of the Constitution: "The State may
not be sued without its consent.
2 He is represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alfredo T. Santiago.
3 Ildefonso Santiago v. Republic of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 249 of
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch 11.
4 The exact date is January 20, 1971.
5 Record on Appeal attached in the Petition for Certiorari, Their Amended
Complaint, par. 3, 40.
6 Order of October 20, 1977 by respondent Court, through District Judge
Alberto V. Seneris 1-2. This Order was included in the petition without
counsel for petitioner taking the trouble of Identifying it as one of the
annexes.
7 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and
Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez.
8 Article XV Section 16 of the Constitution.
9 L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340.
10 Ibid, 345-346. The quotation is from Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, L-25916, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 466.
11 L-30671, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 466.
12 L-30044, December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 282.
13 L-31337, December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 324.
14 L-36084, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 470.
15 L-27389, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 227.
16 Ibid, 228-229.
17 L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.

18 92 Phil. 281.
19 Ibid, 285.
20 118 Phil. 782.
21 Ibid, 788.
22 L-32667, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 314.
23 L-33112, June 15, 1978.
24 L-31948, July 25, 1978.
25 101 Phil. 328.
26 Ibid, 340.
27 102 Phil. 789.
28 Ibid, 801.
29 107 Phil. 344 (1960).
30 Ibid, 351.
31 110 Phil.952 (1961).
32 Cf. 18 Phil. 1120, 1127.
33 L-27019, May 6, 1977, 7 SCRA 10.
34 Ibid, 12.
35 L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464.
36 Ibid, 470.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14653

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF ALIEN CERTIFICATE

OF REGISTRATION.
RICARDO SANTIAGO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant.
Gaudencio Occeno for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On June 15, 1957 Ricardo Santiago filed in the Court First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition praying he be declared a Philippine citizen and that an order be
issued cancelling his alien certificate of registration, alleged by him to have been
erroneously entered in the Bureau of Immigration. The petition was subsequently
amended to make the Commissioner of Immigration a respondent..
During the hearing petitioner presented evidence prove the following: On September 28,
1904, in La Carlota, Negros Occidental, he was born out of wedlock to Apolonia
Andrade, Filipina, and Tomas Santiago, Chinese, who could not marry each other
because the latter had a lawfully wedded wife in China. When he was four, his father
sent him on a vacation to China. Upon return to the Philippines in 1915 he was issued
Landing Certificate Residence No. 13939 (Exhibit G) wherein it appears he is a Filipino.
In 1924 he went back to China and there married a Chinese woman, Ty Sek Nio, whom
he brought to the Philippines in 1925 and who was granted Landing Certificate of
Residence No. 69033 (Exhibit H), wherein it appears that she is the wife of a Filipino
citizen. Petitioner and his family lived in Hamamaylan, where operated a sari-sari store.
During the Japanese occupation, he and his family evacuated to the swamps. After
liberation they stayed for a short time in Andangan, Quezon, where they engaged in the
copra business. In 1956 he and his family returned to Bacolod. In August 1957 they
transferred to Sipalay, Negros Occidental, where they had been living up to the time of
the hearing. Aside from the sons born to him and his wife in China, they have five other
children born in the Philippines. In spite of petitioner's alleged Filipino citizenship, his
father, before the latter's death in 1928, erroneously registered him as an alien. The
registration was periodically renewed thereafter, the last being in 1950, when Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 97013, Exhibit M, the one now sought to be cancelled,
was issued to him.

Based on the above evidence, the lower court, on March 19, 1958, issued an order, the
dispositive part of which follows:
Wherefore, the Court finds that the petitioner has established the allegations
contained in his amended petition and following the ruling in U.S. vs. Ong Tian
Se, 29 Phil. 352; Santos Ko vs. P.P.I., 52 Phil. 562; and in the case of Luis Serra
vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-4223, May 12, 1952, it is hereby declared that the
petitioner Ricardo Santiago is a Filipino citizen,and it is hereby ordered that the
Commissioner of Immigration cancel the Alien Certificate of Registration of
Residence No. 197013 of the petitioner Ricardo Santiago in the files of the
Immigration Office, without pronouncement as to costs.
The provincial fiscal, in representation of the Solicitor General, moved for
reconsideration on the ground that an action for declaratory relief is not the proper
remedy for removing doubts as to citizenship. Finding this motion to be well-founded,
the court, on June 14, 1958, set aside its order of March 19. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of this second order and for reinstatement of the first, amending it,
however, by having the declaration of his Filipino citizenship eliminated.
On August 14, 1958, the court issued a third order, thus:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the order of this Court dated June 14, 1958,
is hereby revoked and declared of no effect, and the order of March 19, 1958, is
hereby reinstated and declared to be in full force and effect, with the slight
modification in its dispositive portion which should run as follows:
Wherefore, the Court finds that the petitioner has established the
allegations contained in his amended petition and following the ruling in
U.S. vs. Ong Tian Se, 29 Phil., 352; Santos Co. vs. P.P.I., 52 Phil. 562;
and in the case of Luis Serra vs. Republic, No. L-4223, May 12, 1952; it is
hereby ordered that the Commissioner Immigration cancel the Alien
Certificate of Registration of Residence No. 197013 of the petitioner
Ricardo Santiago in the files of the Immigration Office, without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Commissioner of Immigration appealed to this Court, ascribing error to the lower
court in taking cognizance of the petition and in declaring appellee a Filipino citizen
based on the allegedly meager evidence of record.
Appellant contends that appellee's petition is one declaratory relief, a remedy not
available in seeking a declaration of one's status or citizenship. On the other hand,
appellee argues that his suit is merely for the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration..
In his original petition appellee prayed, inter alia, that the court "declare him as a Filipino
citizen." This portion of the prayer was, however, omitted from his amended petition,

leaving only that asking for cancellation his alien certificate of registration. The original
petition appears to be in the nature of a proceeding for declaratory relief, although it is
not captioned as such. And while the amended petition does not ask for declaration
Filipino citizenship, the plea is implicit in the prayer for cancellation of the appellee's
alien certificate of registration, for the cancellation cannot be based on any other ground
other than that appellee is a Filipino citizen.
The lower court itself, in its original order, made such a declaration of appellee's
citizenship, although when it reinstated the order after having first set it aside, the
declaration was eliminated, thereby leaving without support its order for cancellation of
appellee's alien certificate of registration.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
In any event, whether or not appellee's suit is interpreted as one for declaratory relief,
what seems clear is that, directly or indirectly, he seeks a declaration of his supposed
Philippine citizenship.
There is no proceeding, by declaratory relief, 1 or otherwise,2 available for the express
purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration to that effect. This was the ruling of this Court
in Eleuteria Feliseta Tan v. Republic (G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1961):
Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only
when "any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or ordinance," demands
construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already
held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any
person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that
effect or in regard to his citizenship.
"Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration
of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of
justifiable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication
of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be
instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or
single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a
necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said
status. At times, the law permits the requisition of a given status, such as

naturalization by judicial decree. But, there no similar legislation authorizing the

institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our
citizenry." (Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R.
No. L-15775, April 29, 1961)
The lower court based the appealed order on the cases of U.S. v. Ong Tian Se, 29 Jur.
Fil. 352; Santos Co v. P.I., 52 Jur. Fil. 562; Luis Serra contra Republica de Filipinas,
G.R. No. L-4223, May 12, 1952, which appellee now invokes. The cited cases are
inapplicable herein. The Ong Tian Se case was for the deportation of one who,
however, successfully alleged that he was a Filipino citizen. The Santos Co and Serra
cases were both for naturalization of persons whose evidence showed they were born
Filipinos and therefore need not be naturalized. The nature of action or proceeding in
each of said cases is entirely different from the present one.
Having concluded that the remedy sought by appellee is not proper, it is unnecessary to
determine whether or not the evidence proves that he is a Filipino.
The order appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition is dismissed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Obiles v. Republic, 49 O.G. No. 3, 923; Delumen v. Republic, G.R. No. L-5552,
Jan. 28, 1954; Sen v. Republic, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955; Tiu Navarro v.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-15100, Dec. 29, 1960.
2

The only by which a declaration of Filipino citizenship may be had is the rather
circuitous one mentioned in Sen v. Republic, supra:
But petitioners are not devoid of any remedy if they really desire to have a
judicial declaration of their alleged Philippine citizenship for they could file
as they have done, a petition for naturalization with an alternative prayer
for declaration of their status as Filipino citizens. There is nothing that
prevents them from doing so, or from alleging that alternative claim in a
petition for naturalization, for if they succeed in proving their Philippine
citizenship, the court can make a declaration to that effect if the evidence
so warrants. This procedure has been followed in a number of cases by
persons whose status as citizens is clouded with doubt and petitioners
had been declared Filipino citizens in the same proceedings.Thus, in Sy
Quimsuan v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 O.G. (No. 2) 492, this Court
said: "When the evidence in the applicant's possession proved in his
opinion that he has already the status of a Filipino citizen as would make it
unnecesary to press further his petition for naturalization, he may be
declared Filipino citizen in the same proceedings. There is nothing in the

law which would prohibit this alternative procedure. This course has been
followed in a number of cases."

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