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David C. Witherington and Jennifer A. Crichton, Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico.
Portions of this article were presented at the biennial meeting of the
Society for Research in Child Development, Tampa, Florida, April 2003.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David C.
Witherington, Department of Psychology, Logan Hall, Room 112, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-1161. E-mail:
dcwither@unm.edu
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2006). Emotions are active, relational processes, not simply epiphenomenal products derived from single-cause mechanisms.
Although both approaches regard emotions as adaptive processes that regulate interchange between organisms and their environments (social and physical), some proponents of the dynamic
systems perspective contend that the functionalist perspective assigns formative priority to an emotions functionrelative to other
components of the emotion processwhen explaining what causes
emotion (Dickson et al., 1998; Fogel et al., 1992). According to
this contention, the functionalist approach fails to fully embrace
the principle of self-organization by essentially invoking function
(i.e., what the person is trying to do) as a central organizer of
pattern in emotion. In other words, an individuals goals directly
generate organization in the emotion system, driving, for example,
the individuals emotional evaluation of and action upon an event.
Certainly, the functionalist approach appeals to the functions emotions serve as a means of unifying the enormous behavioral and
situational variability inherent in the emotion process. When the
functionalist, however, invokes function as an organizational
framework for understanding emotion, what exactly is the nature
of explanation being offered? Is function being offered as an
antecedent condition, a propelling cause, for emotion? Does function dictate the generation of pattern in emotion? We argue to the
contrary that the functionalist approach operates at a different level
of explanation; the aim of the approach is to elucidate pattern in
organism environment relations, not to identify causal antecedents. In what follows, we will briefly review different forms of
explanation for understanding a given phenomenon and articulate
the different but complementary levels of analysis and modes of
explanation for emotion provided by the functionalist and dynamic
systems approaches.
Nature of Explanation
A full explanation of a phenomenon requires an understanding
of its form and its function, its material substrate and the surrounding contexts in which it is embedded, antecedent circumstances
and the processes that give rise to it, and its purpose and potential
future incarnations. This multifaceted nature of explanation is
captured in the Aristotelian framework of material, efficient, formal, and final causes. Explanations that appeal to the material
substance or substrate underlying a phenomenon are considered
material causes. When psychologists explain behavior by means of
the neurological structures associated with its production, they
invoke a material cause for the behavior. Efficient causes involve
an articulation of the antecedent conditions for a phenomenon,
those circumstances both extra- and intraorganismic that reliably
precede an outcome. Efficient causes are the classic, propelling
force kinds of causality that are considered the centerpiece of the
scientific enterprise (Bates, 1979). When psychologists explain
behavior by means of inertial forces and muscle interactions,
physiological or neurological processes, or particular stimulus
events, environmental factors, or even wider sociohistorical contexts, they invoke efficient causes for the behavior.
Material and efficient causes are concrete in their grounding.
Formal and final causes, in contrast, rely on abstraction as a means
of explanation. Formal causes abstract an organization, form, or
pattern from a specific, real-time phenomenon and treat that pattern as an explanation in its own right. Thus, pattern abstracted
from real-time actions in real settings constitutes a formal explanation because it introduces order and organization into the
domain under investigation (Overton, 1991, p. 220). When psychologists explain behavior by means of cognitive and personality
structures or mental schemes, they invoke formal causes for the
behavior. Final causes involve an explanation of phenomena in
terms of the end or purpose toward which the phenomenon moves,
that is, the reason for the phenomenon. In developmental terms,
final causes rely on ideal endpoints, final stages of development, or
directional sequences of organizational change as meaningful contexts in which to embed understanding of a phenomenon at any
given time. When psychologists explain behavior by means of the
function it serves or the goal sought and when they explain
development in terms of increasing differentiation and hierarchic
integration, they invoke final causes for the behavior or sequential
change in the organization of behavior. Final cause abstracts
pattern across periods of time, for example, directional changes in
organization over development, whereas formal cause abstracts
pattern within a given period of time, for example, organization of
behavior in 6-week-old infants.
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between organism and environment. Function unites these different actions and contexts in a more all-inclusive meaning context.
Lazarus (1991) established a set of what he termed core relational themes for characterizing organism environment relations
at this level of abstraction. For Lazarus, certain commonalities
mark the goal-mediated relation between person and environment
(see also Barrett & Campos, 1987; Campos et al., 1994). Anger,
for example, involves a demeaning offense against me and mine
(p. 222), whereas happiness involves reasonable progress toward
the realization of our goals (Lazarus, 1991, p. 267). In the case of
each discrete emotion, a generalized relation between goal and
event is identified. At the superordinate level of positive and
negative emotions, events that match or are congruent with goals
are associated with positive emotions, whereas events that mismatch goals are associated with negative emotions. Frijdas (1986)
notion of action tendency or action readiness reflects a similar
effort at abstract patterning, though more at the level of the
organism itself than at the organism environment level. For Frijda, action tendency is a higher order abstraction of specific
emotional responses. One may freeze, run, hide, or close ones
eyes in response to a threat, but all of these actions serve the
function of avoidance at the level of action tendency (Saarni et al.,
2006). As Frijda and Mesquita (1998) argue, What binds the
various components together is the goal or aim of establishing,
changing, or maintaining a particular relationship with the emotional object in the specific situation (p. 275).
From the vantage point of the functionalist approach, identification of abstract organism environment relations, in the character of formal and final causes, provides an essential starting point
for the analysis of any given action in context. The abstraction of
formal and final causes establishes a conceptual frame of reference
for the study of emotiona set of foundational categories for
defining the realm of emotion, for ordering our understanding of
emotional phenomena, and for guiding specific empirical investigation in that realm. The function an emotion serves renders the
variable and context-specific flow of emotional action coherent by
heuristically organizing it, via final cause, in terms of a directional
purpose. When confronted with a predator, some organisms will
flee, some will freeze, some will hide; for those who flee, there are
many ways to do so (e.g., zig-zag vs. beeline), just as there are
many ways to hide and possibly even to freeze. In terms of a
directional purpose, all of these actions, though variable in terms
of content, serve to avoid the threat posed by the predator. The
functionalist approach gives us a big picture of things and allows
us, in essence, to maintain our view of the forest (proximity
avoidance) in the midst of analyzing specific trees (fleeing, freezing, or hiding).
For the functionalist, the interpretive framework most useful for
characterizing the emotion process is the adaptational encounter,
the functional relation between organism and environment that
revolves around what the organism is trying to do (Campos et al.,
1994; Lazarus, 1991). By the functionalist account, emotion is
adaptation, and every adaptational encounter presents unique demands, resulting in unique action-in-context processes. The functionalist approach consequently grounds its analysis of action in
context when delineating the function an action or set of actions
serves (Barrett, 1998). It is, however, at the level of abstraction
that the functionalists explanatory efforts reside. Every adaptive
effort is unique and variable at the specific action-in-context level
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Indeed, Lewis incorporates intentionality and goal-directednessas final causesinto his model of emotion process, viewing
intentionality as both emerging from lower order cognitive and
affective subsystems and constraining those very subsystems.
Lewis (2000) writes the following:
If intentions or goal states are viewed as emergent (in real time), they
could be said to cause the lower-order coordination of cognitive and
affective elements that (circularly) cause those intentions. In fact, it
seems to be this emergent intentionality that locks onto the stream of
events in real time, exchanging energy with the world and thereby
fueling its underlying coordinations. (p. 45)
Explicit in Lewis writings on emotional development is a deepseated reliance on hierarchically nested self-organizing processes (Lewis & Ferrari, 2001, p. 189) and on multiple levels of
explanation, from the concrete emergence of patterning in the here
and now to the abstraction of structures stably maintained in
developmental time. For Lewis, abstraction as a means of explanation is as ontologically real as the material and efficient causes
he also articulates (Lewis, 2005).
Whether dynamic systems and functionalist approaches complement or conflict with one another depends on the acceptance of
formal and final causes as legitimate forms of explanation. Articulations of Fogels social process theory suggest a fundamental
incompatibility between the two perspectives, resting on the nature
of explanation that functionalists adopt; Lewis dynamic systems
perspective adopts an integrative framework inclusive of the functionalist approach in which all causes are viewed as necessary but
distinct components of explanation.
When dynamic systems and functionalist approaches complement one another, as they are allowed to do in Lewis model, they
engender an explanatory scope that neither can provide alone. The
dynamic systems approach establishes a comprehensive framework for explaining emotion in emergent process terms, as a
system arising from a confluence of component subsystems in
bottom-up fashion and as a system constraining in top-down
fashion the very components that give rise to it (Barrett at al.,
2007; Lewis, 2000). The dynamic systems approach is agnostic
with regard to the ontological issue of what comprises the emotion
process, of what makes an action or context an emotional as
opposed to a nonemotional phenomenon. As Camras and
Witherington (2005) suggest, The approach offers a content free
set of principles that are most usefully applied through specific
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Conclusion
Differences between functionalist and dynamic systems approaches to emotion and its development, we argue, exist at the
typical level of abstraction used to explain emotional behavior.
Both approaches regard emotion in self-organizing systems terms
and ground themselves in behavioral variability, flexibility, and
situational context. However, the functionalist approach moves
beyond the immediate content of an action in context to abstract a
more general set of organism environment relations. Functionalists rely on formal and final levels of explanation by abstracting
functional commonalities in the meaning of different actions
across different contexts. For the dynamic systems approach, evaluation of specific actions in context is the primary task of explanation. The dynamic systems theorist, in adopting efficient and
material causes, seeks to understand the processes underlying the
content of each emotional act by contextualizing the act in terms of
real-time, task-specific environments. Higher order abstractions
are indispensable to the functionalist, for they provide a meaning
context within which to view the particularities of action in context. Depending on the type of dynamic systems approach adopted,
such abstractions are either regarded as illegitimate forms of
explanation, as proponents of social process theory seem to suggest, or are regarded as important complements to the antecedent
consequent explanations of efficient and material causality.
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