2014-Nov-20 GTMO Detainee Releases

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
10 February 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abul Khaled al-Baydani
Current/True Name and Aliases: Abd al-Khaliq Ahmad Salih
al-Baydani, Abd al-Khaleq al-Hosaisi, Abd al-Halak, Abu
Khalud, Abu Barak, Bara, Abu Ubaydah al-Asadi
Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA)
Date of Birth: 1983
Citizenship: Yemen (YM)
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000553DP
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.
3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD
Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD
Control (TRO) on 16 December 2006.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable
member of al-Qaida who admittedly traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to receive militant
training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora,
and possibly served as a fighter of Usama Bin Ladens (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade. 1 Detainee
1
Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBLs primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives,
with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi,
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330210
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was listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents and he has expressed his encouragement for and
desires to engage in further hostilities against US forces. Detainee admitted residing at
multiple al-Qaida and extremist guesthouses and was identified by al-Qaida members. JTFGTMO determined this detainee to be:
.
A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective.
Of LOW intelligence value.
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainees
assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by next to the footnote.)
Evaluated detainees membership to be probably al-Qaida
Added reporting of detainees desire to engage in jihad
Assessed detainees reported Afghan guesthouse to be the Daftar Taliban
4. (U) Detainees Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainees own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 1990, detainees family moved from Saudi Arabia to Yemen
to avoid the first Gulf War. 2 Detainee attended school in Sanaa, YM, but stopped attending
in the 6th or 7th grade in 1997. Approximately 1998, detainee gained employment as a
construction wood trader for two months. From 1998 to 2001, detainee worked in the
aluminum business. During this time period, detainee attended the Abu Bakr Mosque in the
al-Hassaba neighborhood of Sanaa. At the urging of his friend Abu Rahman, in
approximately May 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) to purchase fabric to
sell in Yemen. Abu Rahman gave detainee $500 US for the trip.3
aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026) had primary operational command of the Arab
Brigade, serving as UBLs military commander in the field.
2
Analyst Note: A visiting Saudi delegation to JTF-GTMO identified detainee as a Yemeni citizen. If an
individuals parents are Yemeni, even though he was born in Saudi Arabia, he does not automatically qualify for
Saudi citizenship; thus, making him a Yemeni citizen. Detainee has claimed both Saudi and Yemeni citizenship.
3
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, TD-314/29199-02, Analyst Note: Detainee provides a time frame based on the number
of days, months, or years from an event. Approximations are provided based on analysis of the dates.
2
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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In Karachi, detainee stayed at the Sarawan Hotel
where he met Abu Muhjin. 4 Abu Muhjin suggested detainee travel to Afghanistan for one
month of militant training. Detainee then traveled to Kandahar, AF, via Quetta, PK.
Detainee stayed in Quetta for approximately 20 days in an Afghan guesthouse. While in the
guesthouse, detainee met Abu Fidaa. Approximately June or July 2001, detainee, Abu Fidaa,
and a third, unidentified person traveled with an Afghan guide to a guesthouse in Kandahar,
where they stayed for about ten days. A Saudi named Zubayr operated this guesthouse. 5
While in Kandahar, detainee heard about a guesthouse in Kabul, AF, where individuals went
to coordinate training. 6
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Kabul and stayed at a guesthouse
operated by Hamza al-Ghamdi for approximately one month, where he met Abu Thabit. 7
The US bombing campaign began while detainee was in Kabul. 8 He was told if he tried to
return to Pakistan, he would be arrested. Detainee and Abu Thabit fled in Abu Thabits
vehicle to Jalalabad, AF, where they stayed for approximately ten days in a guesthouse. The
guesthouse was next to the Shaif al-Hana Hospital and was operated by a North African
named Abu Zubayr. Detainee stated when the bombing began in Jalalabad, about a week
before Ramadan, he and Abu Thabit fled with six or seven Arabs to a small mountain range
where they joined 20 to 30 people. Detainee stayed with these individuals for two days
before moving up the mountain range to enter Pakistan. Detainee spent two months
transiting what he believed was Tora Bora and stayed at several centers, including the
Markaz Qital and Markaz Hamza. 9 While in Tora Bora, detainee was told by the group of
Arabs if the Northern Alliance captured him, he would be killed. At Markaz Qital, detainee
was issued an AK-47. Detainee saw others carrying rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and
heard the group also had surface-to-air missiles. 10
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) According to detainee, at the end of Ramadan he and a group of approximately
60 other Arabs attempted to escape to the Pakistan border. Detainee was injured by shrapnel
4
Analyst Note: Abu Muhjin was an acquaintance of detainee from the al-Khayr Mosque in Sana. Reportedly, an
individual named Abu Muhjin was an al-Qaida or Taliban recruiter. It is possible detainees associate is this
recruiter.
5
Analyst Note: Zubayr is assessed to be Abu Zubayr al-Haili, the senior al-Qaida operative who was in charge of
guesthouses that supported al-Qaida trainees, fighters, and operatives in Afghanistan. This guesthouse was probably
the Hajji Habash Guesthouse.
6
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002, 000553 KB 12-MAY-2002
7
IIR 2 340 7121 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Thabit is Thabid.
8
IIR 6 034 0837 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Hamza al-Ghamdi is Hama al-Jamada.
9
Analyst Note: Literally center, markaz is translated as unit, position, and camp. Ramadan began 17 November
2001 and ended 16 December 2001.
10
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002
3
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in a US helicopter attack during the attempt. Detainee was arrested by Afghans and taken to
Shaif al-Hana Hospital for treatment. Detainee remained at the hospital for approximately
two and a half months before being transferred to US forces no later than 2 February 2002. 11
Detainees account describes the first attempt by al-Qaida forces to escape from Tora Bora.
Following failed negotiations with anti-Taliban Afghan commanders, UBL appointed
military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh
al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212, transferred), directed Afghan guides to lead a
large group of fighters out of Tora Bora into Pakistan to escape. The group of about 60-70
fighters departed and that night the group was attacked from the air. The guide and many
others were killed or wounded. The survivors straggled back and LY-212 instructed the
wounded that could walk to seek help with local villagers or enemy forces. 12
b. (S) Property Held:
Koran
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 5 May 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Arab extremist guesthouses in Kandahar, Kabul, and Jalalabad
Al-Qaida and Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator, Abu Muhjin
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainee has provided a logical, but unlikely
timeline, which includes gaps and contradictions that require further investigation. Detainees
extensive use of guesthouses and admitted intention to participate in training, which he claims he
never received, indicate he may be withholding information regarding his activities in
Afghanistan. Detainee spent two months in Tora Bora, but provides no details of his activities
beyond saying he was moved from one cave to another cave. Detainee has provided no
reportable intelligence and is routinely non-cooperative during interrogations. Although detainee
is identified as desiring to engage in hostilities against US forces, he is not assessed to possess
advanced training, special skills or leadership abilities.
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to
the US, its interests and allies.
11
12
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002
TD-314/14605-04, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis
4
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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer for Continued Detention in Host Country: Detainee is
an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable member of al-Qaida who traveled to
Afghanistan to receive militant training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and
Coalition forces and is listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents. Detainee has expressed his
encouragement for and desires to engage in further hostilities against US forces. Detainee
admitted residing at multiple al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses and was identified by al-Qaida
members.
(S/NF) Detainee is an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable member of alQaida. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and is listed
on al-Qaida affiliated documents.
(S//NF) Detainee acknowledged being in Tora Bora during hostilities. Detainee
spent two months in Tora Bora and stayed at several centers, including the known alQaida fighting positions he identified as Markaz Qital and Markaz Hamza. 13
(Analyst Note: Markaz Qital was commanded by both Qital and Abu Muhjin.
Markaz Hamza is probably the Hamza Fallata Center.)
(S//NF) Detainee stated he was wounded by a helicopter while attempting to
escape from Tora Bora along with approximately 60 other Arabs at the end of
Ramadan 2001. (Analyst Note: Detainees account mirrors those provided by JTFGTMO detainees Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, ISN US9YM-000627DP (YM627), and Walid Said Bin Said Zaid, ISN US9YM-000550DP (YM-550). YM-550
has photo-identified detainee.) 14
(S//NF) Detainee fled from Jalalabad to Tora Bora in a vehicle with Abu
Thabit. 15 Abu Thabit was second in command of a front line unit north of Kabul. It
is likely detainee retreated from the front lines with Abu Thabit indicating detainee
was a fighter in the 55th Arab Brigade. In Tora Bora, Abu Thabit commanded a
multi-national camp called the Thabit Center. The camp was occupied by a 20-man
group composed of Algerians, Yemenis, Saudis, and Kuwaitis. Detainee remained
under the leadership of Abu Thabit until Abu Thabits death. 16
(S//NF) Detainees alias was found on an al-Qaida associated document
recovered from raids on safe houses in Karachi. The list identified the contents of
detainees trust account as a Yemeni passport and a plane ticket. 17 (Analyst Note:
Detainee is listed as Abdul Khaleq al-Hosaisi, aka (al-Bara). Detainee acknowledged
13
Analyst Note: Literally center, markaz is translated to mean unit, position, and camp. Ramadan began 17
November 2001 and ended 16 December 2001.
14
IIR 2 340 6549 02, IIR 6 034 0857 04, IIR 6 034 0118 04, TD-314/16880-02, TD-314/14605-04, IIR 6 034 0925
02
15
IIR 2 340 7121 02, 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002
16
COLISEUM ANS-I005-04-0132, IIR 2 340 6120 02
17
TD-314/40693-02, number 153; 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002; 000533 KB 12-May-2002
5
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his alias was al-Bara and previously identified himself as Khaliq. Detainee reported
he belonged to the Hosasi Tribe, a sub-tribe of the Baydani.)
(S//NF) Such lists are indicative of an individuals residence within al-Qaida,
Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or
coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also
referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage
compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators
used to secure the individuals personal valuables, such as passports and plane
tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training
or other activity
(S//NF) A phone number possibly belonging to detainees family was found in
recovered al-Qaida documents in Kabul and Helmand Province, AF. These
documents included an entry reading 612604 al-Badani, a variant of the detainees
last name. 18
(S//NF) This phone number was also recovered in the telephone book
belonging to al-Haj Ali, leader of a radical Islamic cell in Frankfurt, Germany.
The entry in al-Haj Alis phone book read Ahmad Basari 612604. 19 (Analyst
Note: Provided these numbers belong to detainees family, detainee was probably
the source of the number found in Afghanistan, while his father would be the
most probable source for the one found in Germany. Detainees father is named
Ahmad. Basari can be a transliteration error for detainees name Baydani.)
(S//NF) Detainee has expressed his encouragement for and desires to engage in
further hostilities against US forces.
(S//NF) Abd al-Majid Muhammad, ISN US9IR-000555DP (IR-555, transferred)
reported detainee wished to perform jihad against the US. 20
(U//FOUO) A note addressed to Abd al-Hamid Ibn Abd al-Salim Ibn Miftah alGhazzawi, ISN US9LY-000654DP (LY-654), was recovered during a search of
detainees JTF-GTMO detention cell. The note contained a poem which included the
verse rise up against the infidels and kill them. 21 Detainee has directly threatened
to kill JTF-GTMO guard staff. 22
(U//FOUO) In a letter to Bakri Awad Bakri al-Sumayri, ISN US9SA-000274DP
(SA-274, transferred), detainee discussed SA-274s hunger striking and violent fights
with the guards, calling the events wonderful. (Analyst Note: Detainee addressed
the letter to his Paternal Uncle, sending it through probably SA-274s relatives in
18
TD-314/52648-03
TD-314/36021-02
20
000555 FM40 25-OCT-2002
21
JDG INTREP Dated 10-DEC-2007
22
JDG INTREP Dated 11-Jun-2003, 3-Nov-2003
19
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Saudi Arabia. There is no known familial link between detainee and SA-274 who
detainee identified with a previously unknown alias.) 23
(S//NF) In an act which could be interpreted as jihad against the US, detainee was
reported as attempting to hang himself in order to make a statement about his
religion. 24 (Analyst Note: Suicide is not condoned in Islam, however, suicide is
seen by Islamic extremists as a continuance of their jihad against the infidels.)
(S//NF) Detainee admitted residing at al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses.
(S//NF) Detainee stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar.25 The
Hajji Habash Guesthouse was also known as the Zubayr Guesthouse, the al-Ansar
Guesthouse and the al-Nebras Guesthouse. 26
(S) Hajji Habash was reportedly owned by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and
operated by Abu Zubayr al-Haili, a high-level al-Qaida operative, among others.27
(Analyst Note: The Hajji Habash Guesthouse served as an administrative inprocessing facility for new recruits en route training at the al-Faruq Training
Camp. The recruits surrendered their passports and valuables to the guesthouse
administrator for safe keeping. The guesthouse also served as a waypoint for
extremists traveling to and from Pakistan, or between east and west Afghanistan.
It was located across the street from the Islamic Institute operated by UBLs
religious advisor Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, aka (Abu Hafs al-Mauritani).)
(S//NF) Detainee stayed at Hamza al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Qaiti Guesthouses,
al-Qaida facilities in Kabul. Detainee claimed he was in Kabul to attend training
when the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks occurred.28
(C//REL USA AND GCTF) Hamza al-Ghamdi was an al-Qaida operative in
charge of the guesthouse. Hamza al-Ghamdi was also highly trained in battlefield
tactics and in charge of caring for wounded personnel coming from the
frontline. 29
(C//REL USA, AUS, CAN, AND GBR) Hamza al-Qaiti established a large
camp in Afghanistan for mujahideen and managed the guesthouse in the Wazir
Akbar Khan area of Kabul. 30 (Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area was a
former diplomatic district occupied by the Taliban and al-Qaida for quarters and
training.)
23
24
25
000553 GUAN 2007-T04630 18-Oct-2007

000274 SIR 14-Jun-2007
IIR 2 340 6543 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Hajji is Hagi.

001457 SIR 20-OCT-2004, IIR 2 340 6317 02, Analyst Note: A variant of al Nebras is Anabras.
27
000252 FM40 09-NOV-2004, IIR 6 034 0459 02
28
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, IIR 2 340 6528 02, IIR 2 340 6543 02, Analyst Note: Variant of al-Qaiti is al-Gayedi.
29
IIR 6 034 0297 05
30
IIR 6 034 0077 06, IIR 6 034 0088 05,
26
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(S) Detainee stayed at the Zubayr, aka (Mugharibah) Guesthouse in Jalalabad. 31
(Analyst Note: Mugharibah is a distortion of the Arab word Maghrebi, meaning
Western, used to identify the people and countries of North West Africa. Zubayr al
Maghrebi was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) security
committee responsible for production of false identification.32 )
(S//NF) Detainee reported he stayed in an Afghan guesthouse in Quetta for 20
days. 33 This is assessed to be the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse, a known transit point
for al-Qaida recruits. It was common for the recruits to spend an extended time at the
guesthouse in order to let their beards grow out, allowing the recruits to blend in with
the population in Afghanistan.
(S//NF) Detainee has been identified by al-Qaida members.
(S//NF) Qasim Yahya Mahdi Abd al-Rimi, aka (Abu Hurayrah), aka (Doctor
Hurayrah), identified detainee as an individual he believed was present at JTFGTMO. 34 (Analyst Note: Abu Hurayrah was associated with Abd al-Rahim Hussayn
Muhammad al-Nashiri, ISN US9SA-010015DP, the senior al-Qaida maritime gulf
operations planner responsible for the attack on the USS COLE. Abu Hurayrah
belonged to a cell that planned attacks against US citizens and an assassination plot
against the US ambassador to Yemen in retaliation for the death of senior al-Qaida
member Abu Ali al-Harithi. Abu Hurayrahs identification of detainee indicates an
association requiring further investigation.)
(S//NF) Assessed al-Qaida member Ranam Abd al-Rahman Ghanim al-Harbi alHuwaymadi, ISN US9SA-000516DP (SA-516, transferred), identified detainee as
Abdul Halak, a variant of detainees alias. 35
c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a
detention perspective. His overall behavior has been noncompliant and hostile to the guard
force and staff. He currently has 96 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with
the most recent occurring on 9 January 2008, when he participated in mass disturbance and
flooding his cell. He has 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most
31
IIR 2 340 6543 02, IIR 6 034 0355 05, Analyst Note: This is likely a reference to a guesthouse operated by North
African extremists associated with the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN), known to have operated in Jalalabad.
The GJSN and the LIFG are National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 counterterrorism targets.
Priority 1 targets are defined as Issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of
interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist
groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a
clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
32
IIR 6 034 0047 05
33
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002, 000553 KB 12-MAY-2002
34
TD-314/19614-03, Analyst Note: Abu Hurayrah was one of 23 detainees affiliated with the al-Qaida organization
who, on 3 February 2006, escaped from Yemen's Political Security Organization (PSO) detention center.
35
IIR 6 034 0925 02
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recent occurring on 24 September 2007, when he threw milk on a guard. Other incidents for
which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure
to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, threatening
guards, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of
food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 27 Reports of Disciplinary
Infraction and one so far in 2008.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of LOW intelligence value. Detainees
most recent interrogation session occurred on 19 December 2006.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and stayed in alQaida-affiliated guesthouses (Hajji Habash Zubair, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Gayedi, and
Zubair). Detainee had direct access to residents and training conducted in these locations.
Detainee traveled through Tora Bora during his attempted escape from Afghanistan and had
contact with several individuals who were affiliated with al-Qaida or the Taliban.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee possibly has information on individuals
using and managing al-Qaida guesthouses. As a result of his time in these guesthouses,
detainee could provide information on individuals en route to training camps, as well as
activities at guesthouses. Detainee probably can provide information on the groups he
traveled with while attempting to escape from Afghanistan.
d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
Guesthouses in Afghanistan
Terrorist recruiter and facilitator Abu Muhjin
Individuals involved in document forgery
Other detainees including as of yet un-attributed aliases
Al-Qaida commanders/operatives including Abu Thabit and Abu Hurayrah
Ingress and egress routes in Afghanistan
Support to terrorist organizations in Yemen
Terrorist biographical and psychological info
Terrorist recruitment of juveniles
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SUBJECT:Recommendation
for TransferOut of DoD Control(TRO)for Guantanamo
Detainee,
(S)
ISN US9SA-000553DP
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's
enemycombatant
statuswasreassessed
on 20 September
2004
andhe remainsan enemycombatant.
Ir
uln,
l !
1 l/////.
, l / , ,ltJl
/
/'/ rait At / la /
N-
-X
MARK H. BUZBY- {=_)

RearAdmiral,US Navy
Commanding
'
Definitionsfor intelligencetermsusedin the assessment

canbe foundin the JointMilitary IntelligenceCollege
October2001guideIntelligenceLl/arningTerminologt.
l0
S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O33O2IO
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20290903
OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT
JOINTTASKFORCEGUANTANAMO
BAY,CUBA
GUANTANAMO
APOAE 09360
REPLY TO
ATTENTIONOF
JTFGTMO-CG
2004
3 September
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthemCommand,3511NW 9lst Avenue,

M i a m i ,F L 3 3 1 1 2 .
SUBJECT: Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued
Detention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9SA-000572DP(S)
1. (FOUO) PersonalInformation:
o
o
o
o
o
JDIMSAtrDRCReferenceName: SalahMohammedDhab
Aliases and Current/TrueName: Abu Abdal Rahman. SalahMuhammad Salih Al Dhabi
Placeof Birth: Mecca. SaudiArabia (SA)
Date of Birth: 1972
Citizenship: YemenryM)
2. (FOUO) Heatth: Detaineeis in good health. He hasno significantmedicalhistory, but upon

in-processing,he was notedto be G6PD-deficient. He hasno known drug allergies.
3. (S) DetaineeSummary:
a. (S) Backgroundand CaptureData. Unlessotherwisenoted,the following background
notesare basedsolely on the detainee'sstatements:
o Prior History: The detaineewas born in SaudiArabia, but he claims Yemeni
citizenship. The detaineeleft SaudiArabia for Yemen in 1990. Analyst Note: Detaineewas not
afforded Squdi Arabian citizenship becausehisfamily was of Yemenidecent.
o Recruitmentand Travel: The detaineelived in Hudaydah,YM. Detainee'sfriend,
Gelan Uthman, was a former mujahid and fought in the 1980sagainstthe Russians.Uthman
introducedthe detaineeto Abd Al-Razzaqin Sana'a,YM. Razzaqexplained to the detaineehow
to get to Afghanistan(AF). Approximately 1998,the detaineetraveledfrom Sana'a,YM,
through Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan(PK), where he stayedin a guesthouse.He then went on to
Kandahar,AF, staying there two days, and then traveled to Kabul, AF, where he stayedat Abu
Khalid's guesthousefor one week.
BY: MultipleSources
CLASSIFIED
1.5(C)
12958
Section
REASON:E.O.
DECLASSIFYON: 20290903
S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20290903
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: (S) Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued
Detention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9SA-000572DP
o Training and Activities: The detaineewas trained to use the RPG and small arms at
the Sadeeqterrorist camp located outside of Khowst, AF. Detaineereturnedto Hudaydah,YM,
in approximately 1998 and spent 12 to 15 months making arrangementsfor anothertrip back to
Afghanistanwith his family. Detaineeand his family traveledin approximately1999to
Kandahar,AF via Karachi, PK. In Kandahar,the detaineeand his family stayedin an apartment
provided by the Taliban. The following week, they continuedto Kabul, AF, where they stayed
for about 2 Yzyears. In Kabul, AF, they stayedwith Abu Zubayr, collecting charitable donations
and selling honey to support the household. After one year, in approximately 2000, detaineeand
his family moved into their own house.
o CaptureInformation: When Kabul fell, in November 2001, Zubayr took the
detainee'sfamily to Kandahar and the detaineewent by himself to Logar. The detaineebought a
Kalashnikov rifle and traveled with five unidentified Arabs to Gardez,AF, continuing into the
mountains by foot. He later met a Pakistani man named Muhammed Masoud and traveled with
him to Karachi, PK, where he rented an apartment. Two days later on 7 February 2002,the
"Riyadh the Facilitator,"who
Pakistanipolice knockedon his door and arrestedhim, along with
is discussedin detail below. They were both transferredto the American prison in Kandahar,AF.
b. (S) Transfer to JTF GTMO: Detaineewas subsequentlytransportedto GuantanamoBay
Naval Base,Cuba,on 8 June 2002,
c. (S) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF GTMO: To provide informationon madafas
(guesthouses).
d. (S/A{F) Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention:
o (S/AIF) Detaineehas admitted that he receivedtraining on light weaponsand the
RPG at Camp Sadeeq. He was instructedby camp leaderAbu Atta, confirming his enemy
combatantstatus.Abu Khalid, whom the detaineemet at a guesthousein Kabul, AF, arrangedfor
the detaineeto attend Camp Sadeeq. (Analyst Notes: The detqineeprobably received basic
training elsewhereand advancedAl-Qaida sponsoredtraining at Camp Sadeeq,becauseCamp
Sadeeqwas usedfor advancedtraining by Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida selected its mostpromising
studentsfor more specializedor advancedtraining. Camp Sadeeqalso contained laboratories.
Someof the laboratories are reported to have been usedfor explosives,poisons, and gasses.
Chemicol testswere performed on live rabbits at one lab. The rabbits died during testing. While
the detaineeclaimed Abu Khalid arrangedfor his trqining, further reporting statesthat,
normally, advancedtraining at Camp Sadeeqwas given on the recommendationof the trainers,
indicating that Abu Khalid may have beena basic skills trainer for the detaineeor a highJevel
Al-Qaida member.)
o (S/AIF) Detaineewas capturedat an Al-Qaida safe housein Karachi, PK, with known
Al-Qaida facilitator SharkaouryAbdo Ali Al-Hajj, aka Riyadh the Facilitator. (AnalystNote:
Sharkaoury, variant Charkawi, is a well-known Al-Qaidafacilitator who traveled to Bosnia in
2
S E C R E T // NOFORN/ I 20290903
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: (S) Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued
1995to participate in jihad and attemptedto participate in jihad in Somalia. He was later
implicated in theplanned attack on the US Embassyin Sana'a, YM. He facilitated the travel of
many mujahideeninto Afghanistan, and also out of Pakistan,following the US led attacl<s
against the Taliban and Al-Qaida associatedforcesin Afghanistan.)
o (S/AIF) Detaineeand his family lived with an Abu Zubayr. Reporting indicatesthat
an Al-Qaida senior lieutenantwas in chargeof a guesthousewhere the detaineelived. (Analyst
note; This senior lieutenant is most likely Zuboyr, who has been identified as monaging several
guesthousesin Afghanistan. It is believedthat this Zubayr is also the Abu Zuboyr who was
involved in attemptsto destroy US and British ships in the Straits of Gibraltar and is now
incarceratedin Morocco.)
. (S) Detaineeidentified Yemeni Abu Al-Maqdad as one of the camp trainers. (S)
Detaineeclaims to have stayedat an unidentified hotel in the SadarBazaar areaof Karachi, PK.
(Analyst note: The Sadar (Saddar) Bazaar is an area knownfor Al-Qaida transient berthing.
Several hotels, including the Dubai Hotel and the Mustafa Hotel, were used by numerous
detaineesduring their ingress to Afghanistan. One hotel was also used by at least one of the
highjackers approximatelyfour months before the I I September2001 attaclcs.)
. (S) A Taliban guesthousefinanced'allof the detainee'stravel expenses,to include
room and board,during his returnto Yemen following his first trip to Afghanistan. (Analyst
were
note; This is unusualin that, while room and board were oftenprovided, the guesthouses
provided
normally
were
Travel
expenses
the
recruits.
not lcnownto provide additional funding to
by their recruiter or paid by the individual recruit. If the Talibanfinanced his travels back to
Yemen,it could indicatethat the detaineeis a signfficantmemberof the Al-Qaida/Taliban
forces.)
. (S) Detaineewas afraid when the Taliban fell (probably a referenceto the fall of
Kabul, AF); so he traveledtwo to threehoursto Logar, AF. Detaineeclaims he went to a large
unidentified school, where many Arabs were staying, and remainedthere for less than a week.
o Analyst note: In November2001, the Al WofaNGO transfened its operations
Kabul
to Logar, commandeeringa vacant school. Detainees US9KU-000568DPand
from
US7KU-00057IDP, both associatedwith Al Wafa,were cqptured during the sameraid on
Riyadh the Facilitator's houseduring which the detaineewas captured. It is likely that the
school referencedby the detaineeis the school occupied by Al Wafa. Al Wafq is classified as a
Tier 2 NGO (non-governmentalorganization). Tier 2 NGOs are defined as those that have
demonstratedthe intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US
personsor interests.
e. (S) IntelligenceFocus:JTF GTMO has determinedthat this detaineeis of medium
intelligencevalue due to his associationwith and knowledgeof:
o
Key Facilitators and trainers:

'Ali Al-Hajj, AKA Riyadh the Facilitator
o SharkaouryAbdo
o Abu Khalid, Al-Qaida facilitator
J
S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20290903
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JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: (S) Recommendationto Transferto the Control of Another Country for Continued
o
o
o
o AbuZubayr, seniorAl-Qaida operative

o Trainers and Curriculum at Camp Sadeeq
Function and usesof the Camp Sadeeqlaboratory
o Al-Qaida CBRNE program
Taliban support to international travels
Al Wafa NGO operationsin Logar, AF
suchas
4. (S) Detainee'sConduct: Detainee'sonly disciplinaryincidentsare non-aggressive,
leading prayer,having a physicaltraining session,or engagingin unauthorizedcommunications.
This detainee'soverall behaviorhasbeencompliantand completelynon-aggressive.
on 24February 2004, and
5. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswas reassessed
he remains an enemy combatant.
F. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment:
that this detaineeis a memberof Al-Qaida and/orits global
a. (S) Summary: It is assessed
a commitment to jihad, has links to key facilitators
has
demonstrated
Detainee
network.
terrorist
in Al-Qaida's intemationalterroristnetwork,has participatedin terroristtraining, likely
participatedin direct hostilitiesagainstthe US and coalition forces,and maintainsthe capability
to continueto do so if released.Detainee'sprobability of receivingadvancedterroristtraining,
makesit imperativedetaineebe
knowledgeof key Al-Qaida facilitators,trainers,and safehouses
of
retainedin the custodyof the US Govemmentor the Kingdom SaudiArabia Govemment. His
continueddetentionwill allow for further exploitationof his past affiliation with variousterrorist
groups and prevent him from engagingin further terrorist activity. It has been determinedthat
the detaineeposesa medium to high risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interests
and allies.
b. (S) Recommendation:JTF GTMO recommendsthis detaineebe transferredfor
continueddetentionto his country of origin (Kingdom of SaudiArabia) if a satisfactory
agreementcan be reachedthat allows accessto detaineeand/oraccessto exploitedintelligence.
If a satisfactoryagreementcannot be reachedfor his continued detention in the Kingdom of
SaudiArabia, he shouldbe retainedunder DoD control
AY W. HOOD
igadier General,US Army
Commanding
CF: CITF-GTMO
A
S E C R ET//NOFORN//20290903
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330429
APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
29 April 2008
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000686DP (S)

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul Hakim
Current/True Name and Aliases: Abdel Ghalib Ahmad
Hakim, Abd al-Hakim Ghalib Ahmad al-Haj, Abdel Hakim
Sanani, Abdul Hameed, Huthayfah
Place of Birth: Taiz, Yemen (YM)
Date of Birth: 14 February 1978
Citizenship: Yemen
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000686DP
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 18 July 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida, who
reportedly accompanied Usama Bin Laden (UBL) throughout Afghanistan (AF). Detainee is
further assessed to be a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior alQaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ010016DP (GZ-10016), and al-Qaida military operations commander Nashwan Abd alRazzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), with the
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purpose of returning to Afghanistan to conduct remote controlled improvised explosive
devices (IED) attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee adheres to a known alQaida cover story and is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan via an al-Qaida facilitation
network to train at the al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee has acknowledged associations
with the Jamaat Tablighi (JT) and was facilitated through a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) network
after fleeing hostilities in Afghanistan. 1 [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS
DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this
detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value
Added alias Huthayfah 2
Updated detainees date of birth 3
Updated information and analysis of the activities at the Abu Zubaydah and Issa safe
houses
Revised detainees Account of Events
Updated detainees Property Held
Added information about detainees passport
Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT)
target. Priority 1 targets include issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of
interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist
groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a
clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Variants of Jamaat Tablighi included Talique Jammat and Markez al-Tablighi. The JT is NIPF Priority
3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial
support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to
Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. The LT is an NIPF Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 1 targets include
issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice
President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor
terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to
US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction.
2
000686 SIR 17-Apr-2006
3
PAK1-2002-805326
2
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a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended secondary school in Taiz until 1998.
Afterwards, detainee worked on his fathers farm growing wheat and khat, but did not serve
in the Yemeni military. 4
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee was exposed to the JT through the al-Nur
Mosque in Taiz. While he did not want to become an official member of JT, detainee
requested to travel with JT to Pakistan (PK) to achieve his goal of memorizing the Koran. JT
leader, Ahmad Marish, assisted detainee in obtaining his passport and visa, while a local
benefactor, Muhammad Hassan, paid for detainees airline ticket. Prior to departure from
Sanaa, YM, detainee met several traveling companions, one of whom was named al-Amire.
Detainee and al-Amire stayed at a hotel in Karachi, PK for three days waiting for a sum of
money that al-Amire was expecting to be wired from Saudi Arabia. Upon receipt of the
money, detainee and al-Amire traveled to the Makki Mosque in Karachi. The two men then
traveled to Lahore, PK so detainee could study at the Raiwind Center. Al-Amire paid for
detainees train ticket to show his appreciation for detainee staying with him in Karachi. 5
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee did not become acquainted with anyone at
the center because he only spoke Arabic. He attended lectures, some of which were
translated into Arabic. The centers director, Abd al-Wahab, told detainee about the
Salafiyah University in Faisalabad, PK, where many Arabs studied. Detainee traveled to
Faisalabad with a group of 15 to 17 Pakistani men. After two days in Faisalabad, a member
of detainees traveling group, Iqbal, took detainee to the Salafiyah University to meet Shaykh
Garri Sab. The shaykh would not allow detainee to reside at the university because detainee
only wanted to memorize the Koran and would not attend classes. Shaykh Sab introduced
detainee to students that lived at a house with Arabs who were interested in only memorizing
the Koran. The students took detainee to the house and asked the house owner, Issa, if
detainee could stay. Detainee kept to himself during his stay at Issas house. His typical day
consisted of praying, reading the Koran, and doing chores. 6
4
000686 302 20-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Khat (also kat or qat) is an evergreen shrub (Catha edulis) native to
the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is a narcotic leaf.
5
000686 FM40 11-DEC-2003, 000686 302 04-OCT-2002, 000686 SIR 22-DEC-2003, 000686 FM40 21-AUG2004
6
IIR 6 034 0194 03, 000686 302 19-OCT-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Iqbal is Ekbal. Issa managed the
Faisalabad safe house located near the Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad. Issas Safe House was also called the
3
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a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two Faisalabad safe houses on 28 March
2002, arresting suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016, and killing
one. At the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested at least 15
suspected al-Qaida members including detainee. At the other safe house, Pakistani officials
arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members along with manuals,
tools, and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators. 7 These safe
houses were operated by the LT and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives
enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF to help al-Qaidas Arab fighters escape
Afghanistan. 8 Detainee and other suspects were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison
in Lahore, PK and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. All suspects were transferred to US
custody sometime in May 2002. 9
Casio Model A159W watch
Money:
274,000 Afghanis (AFG) 10
15,000 Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 11
One 7.62 mm bullet
Miscellaneous items, including a mirror, scissors, comb, and flashlight
Although not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reportedly in detainees
possession at time of capture:
Passport 12
Plane ticket 13
Yemeni House and the Crescent Textile Mill House. Variants for Jamia Salafia include Jamiyah Salfiyah, Jamea
Salafeyah, Salafyah University, and Salafi University.
7
IIR 6 034 0286 05, 000694 KB 22-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Suspected al-Qaida members captured at Issas safe
house include (YM-679); (YM-680); (YM-681); (YM-683); (WE-684); (AG-685); (LY-688); (YM-689); (YM690); (YM-691); (YM-692); (YM-693, deceased); (LY-695); (RS-702) and (YM-728). See IIR 6 034 0979 03,
000684 SIR 14-OCT-2004.
8
TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002,
010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b
9
IIR 6 034 0144 03, IIR 4 201 4063 05, IIR 6 034 0470 03, IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872
02, TD-314/20711-02
10
Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $58 US.
11
12
Analyst Note: For information about detainees passport, see the SCI Supplement.
13
000686 INITIAL SCREENING 23-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0194 03
4
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c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002

following:
Guesthouse for Arabs in Faisalabad to include activities and individuals associated
with the guesthouse or occupants
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainees account is only partially truthful.
Detainee has yet to admit that he went to Afghanistan, although first-hand accounts place him in
Kandahar. Detainee consistently relies on a standard al-Qaida cover story, which includes
facilitation through the JT. Detainee consistently talks of how he traveled only to study the
Koran, yet detainee is unable to answer simple questions about the Koran. As true recitation of
the Koran is only in Arabic, it is unlikely detainee would travel to Pakistan to memorize it.
Detainee is withholding information and is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training
and combat before escaping to Pakistan with the group lead by GZ-10016.
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of alQaida. Detainee was reported to be a respected associate who traveled with UBL in
Afghanistan, and is assessed to have received training at the al-Faruq Training camp after
traveling to Afghanistan with the support of the al-Qaida network. Detainee is assessed to be
a member of GZ-10016s Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks
against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have fled hostilities in Afghanistan
and escaped to Pakistan with the members of this cell. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe
House, and is assessed to have served in supporting roles for individuals undergoing remote
controlled detonator training at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House.
(S//NF) Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida. Detainee was reported in
Afghanistan, possibly directly associated with UBL, and was facilitated through the alQaida network.
(C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN
US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), photo-identified detainee as Abdel Hakim Sanani
from Yemen. YM-252 saw detainee in Kandahar and stated detainee traveled to
Afghanistan to fight. YM-252 stated detainee was well respected by the al-Qaida
5
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fighters and a relatively important individual. Detainee traveled with UBL to various
places in Afghanistan where UBL went to receive bayat (oath of allegiance) from
fighters, and had been given a Toyota Corolla by the Taliban or al-Qaida. 14 (Analyst
Note: YM-252 was located in Kandahar during the spring and summer of 2001, and
attended the al-Qaida affiliated Islamic Institute there, giving him plausible access to
knowledge about Islamic scholars traveling with UBL.)
(S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operational planner, Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash,
aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014D (YM-10014), identified detainee
from the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp in Kandahar during the summer of 2001 at
the time Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Egyptian group, Jamaat al-Jihad, joined alQaida. Detainee frequently prayed next to YM-10014 during prayer time at alFaruq. 15 (Analyst Note: YM-10014s account indicates he saw detainee numerous
times during the week YM-10014 was at al-Faruq, and also indicates detainee
received training as it is unlikely he would be allowed to simply visit al-Faruq for any
length of time.)
(S//NF) It is assessed the al-Qaida network facilitated detainees travel. Detainee
adheres to a known al-Qaida cover story of traveling to Pakistan for education
(normally Islamic education) and claimed he never traveled to Afghanistan.
(S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee and many of the other detainees captured
during the 28 March 2002 raids adopted a false cover story citing education as
their purpose for travel to Pakistan. They additionally denied any links to alQaida or even travel to Afghanistan. These claims have been assessed to be false
with reporting from other detainees confirming their travel to Afghanistan,
training in al-Qaida camps, and participation in hostilities against US and
Coalition forces. 16 Several detainees also had false student identification cards
created to support their cover story. 17
(S//NF) Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story
and al-Qaida is known to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international
travels of its members. 18 Detainee stated a JT member obtained the Pakistani visa
for detainee. After traveling to Karachi, detainee claimed a member of the JT
14
IIR 6 034 1255 04, 000252 SIR 23-May-2005, 000252 FM40 05-Jan-2005 (part one of two)
TD-314/39255-03
16
Analyst Note: As an example, YM-680 claimed he was a student at the University and was identified as such
along with detainee. See 000695 FM40 24-Sep-3004. However, YM-680 has also been identified as a facilitator
and Usama Bin Laden adherent who swore bayat. See RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0117-07 ISN 493.
17
Counterfeit PAK1-2002-805339, PAK1-2002-805338
18
IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, JITF-CT Special Analysis US Jamaat
Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10MAR-2004.
15
6
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took him to the Makki Mosque and after an unspecified period, detainee traveled
to the JT world headquarters in Raiwind, PK. 19
(S//NF) Analyst Note: While detainee claimed he received assistance
from the JT, this assistance was either provided based on his expression to the
JT that he intended to perform dawa (missionary work) for the JT, or more
likely as part of an established al-Qaida facilitation network between Yemen
and Pakistan. It is unlikely that dedicated JT members would obtain
detainees travel visa for him in Yemen except in the furtherance of dawa
activities. It is equally unlikely that the JT would allow him to stay at the
Makki Mosque in Karachi. The Makki Mosque is the central/main JT
Mosque in Karachi and numerous detainees have used the Makki Mosque as
part of a JT cover story for travel to Pakistan. Detainee has failed to validate
his claims that he traveled for education. 20
Detainee obtained his passport and visa with the help of Ahmed
(S//NF)
Marish. 21 Muhammad Muhammad Hassen, ISN US9YM-000681 (YM-681),
who was captured with detainee, also received travel assistance from Yemen to
Pakistan from Ahmad Marish. 22 Fayad Yahya Ahmad, US9YM-000683DP (YM683); and YM-681 stated Ahmed Marish was the JT leader in Taiz, Yemen. 23
(S//NF) Detainees travel to Pakistan is assessed to have been facilitated
by the same individual who facilitated YM-681; Shawki Awad Balzuhair, ISN
US9YM-000838DP (YM-838); and Ali Abdullah Ahmed, ISN US9YM000693DP (YM-693, deceased). YM-681 and YM-838s passports held
consecutively numbered visas obtained 5 May 2001. The purpose for
Pakistan travel noted on YM-681s visa was medical treatment. The purpose
for YM-838s travel was to accompany a patient. The purpose for YM-693s
visa, obtained two days after YM-681 and YM-838, was also to accompany a
patient. Detainees visa, obtained the same day as YM-693s, had a serial
number separated numerically by only one number from YM-693s, although
19
000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 302 07-SEP-2002, 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.

Analyst Note: For additional information on the JT and its links to al-Qaida, see IIR 6 034 0278 04, IIR 6 034
0286 04 28, and Abu Bakr University Analysis (JDIMS, References). Other detainees associated with the Makki
Mosque include YM-028DP, BA-052DP (transferred), SA-0114DP (transferred), YM-0152DP, MO-294DP
(transferred), SA-333DP (transferred), SA-507DP (transferred), JO-651DP (transferred), YM-683DP, YM-686DP,
and YM-691DP the last three were captured with detainee.
21
000686 SIR 22-DEC-2003
22
000681 MFR 25-JUN-2002
23
000683 MFR 07-JUL-2002, 000681 MFR 25-JUN-2002
20
7
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his purpose was listed as business. Detainee, YM-681, and YM-693 were all
from Taiz, YM. 24
(S//NF) Detainee stated he stayed at the Raiwand Center for several months
before he traveled to the Issa Safe House. The Raiwand Center is a well known
JT center of operations. 25 Others detained in the Faisalabad raids told a similar
story of traveling to Pakistan to teach and study Islam under the auspices of JT,
and have similarly denied traveling to Afghanistan. Despite their claims to the
contrary, detainee, YM-681, Muhammad Ali Salem al-Zarnuki, ISN US9YM000691DP (YM-691), and Muhammad Ahmad Salam, ISN US9YM-000689DP
(YM-689), have all been identified at al-Qaida associated locations in
Afghanistan. 26
(S//NF) Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN
US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), an admitted explosives trainer who was captured
with detainee, reported detainee did not attend the Faisalabad Salafist
University. 27
(S//NF) Detainee is an assessed member of GZ-10016s Martyrs Brigade, a
Faisalabad cell that intended to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces.
Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training.
(S//NF) Analyst Note: When escaping from US and Coalition forces in
Afghanistan in late 2001, GZ-10016 and IZ-10026 devised a plan to train individuals
in explosives and detonators. These individuals would then return to Afghanistan
where they would create the devices and teach others to use and create them as well.
GZ-10016 fled to Lahore and then Faisalabad with a group of al-Qaida associated
fighters, which is assessed to include detainee and the others captured on 28 March
2002. Remote detonator training was conducted at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House,
while the Issa Safe House occupants (including detainee) are assessed to have
provided support functions for the detonator trainees. Occupants at the Issa Safe
House included individuals with explosives expertise who GZ-10016 may have
intended to produce the explosives for use with the detonators and provide other
services such as security and surveillance of targets. 28 GZ-10016 also intended for
the trainees to create explosives, which Arab suicide operatives would detonate at
000681 Passport PAKP-2002-900012, 000838 PASSPORT 04-JUL-01, 000693 PASSPORT 29-MAR-2000,

000686 PAK1-2002-805326
25
000686 FM40 11-DEC-2003, IIR 6 034 0292 04
26
IIR 6 034 1255 04, TD-314/39255-03, 000689 302 20-JUN-2002, 000691 302 18-JUN-2002, 000681 18-JUN2002
27
IIR 6 034 0196 05, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, 000691 FM40 16-SEP-2003
28
TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/39716-03, NCTC
Terrorist Threat Assessment 4-May-2006
24
8
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
checkpoints in Afghanistan. 29 It is possible some individuals at the Issa Safe House
were designated for this task, although detainee is not assessed to have been inclined
to commit suicide. The following describes the plan, specific participants, and their
movement to Faisalabad. Due to detainees willingness to withhold information of
intelligence value, reports from other JTF-GTMO detainees regarding detainees true
activities in Afghanistan, as well as his association with the Martyrs Brigade, detainee
is assessed to be a willing cell participant who intended to conduct further attacks
against US and Coalition forces.
(S//NF) As previously noted, Pakistani authorities captured detainee and about
30 other suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 during raids on
LT operated Faisalabad safe houses identified as the Issa Safe House and GZ-10016
Safe House. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House. GZ-10016 stated he
created the Martyrs Brigade, a unit conceived to conduct attacks against US-based
targets, employing remotely detonated explosives activated by Pakistan based
triggermen using cell phones. 30
(S//NF) According to open source and other reporting, the residents of the
Issa Safe House were part of a network poised to launch attacks against American
installations and embassies in various countries. The plan had been finalized but
was broken up by the Faisalabad safe house raids that led to the arrest of
numerous suspects including its chief, GZ-10016. 31
(S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISN US9SU-000707DP (SU-707), stated
GZ-10016 was the director of the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad. 32
(S//NF) GZ-10016s original plan was to flee Afghanistan and travel via
Pakistan to Iran, where he would set up a base of operations for the Brigade. GZ10016 claimed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had agreed to send 15 of his best men to
join with members of GZ-10016s Khaldan group to form the Brigade. GZ10016s long-term intent was to train and place suicide bombers or remotely
controlled IEDs in an effort to attack US and Coalition targets in Afghanistan.
(Analyst Note: Al-Qaida operative Jose Padilla, the American convicted of
providing material support to terrorism, briefly stayed with GZ-10016 at the
Faisalabad safe house where GZ-10016 was captured.)33
29
30
TD-314/18008-04
TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02

SAP20020404000045 04-APR-2002, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02
32
000707 302 11-SEP-2002
33
TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD314/16969-02, TD-314/17373-02, TD-314/59808-05, Analyst Note: For SU-707s reporting on Padilla, see 000707
MFR 17-JAN-2003, IIR 6 034 0657 02, IIR 6 034 0755 02,and IIR 6 034 0827 04.
31
9
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(S//NF) Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA-000696DP (SA-696)
reported IZ-10026 was responsible for identifying recruits for al-Qaida related
terrorist activities and putting them in contact with GZ-10016. 34
(S//NF) Talha al-Kini, aka (Binyam Ahmad Muhammad), ISN US9ET0001458DP (ET-1458), reported GZ-10016 and IZ-10026 talked with him (ET1458), SA-696, and Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-Sharbi, ISN US9SA-000682DP
(SA-682), in Zormat about electronics training. ET-1458, who temporarily
occupied the Abu Zubaydah safe house prior to the raid, stated everyone
understood they were to receive electronics training in remotely controlled IEDs
and then return to IZ-10026 in Afghanistan to train Afghans to build and/or use
the devices. 35 If they did not train the Afghans, then they were to build the
devices and provide them for the Afghans to use. 36
(S//NF) Detainee was captured with a Casio A159W watch. 37 (Analyst Note:
While there is no other evidence to indicate detainee received explosives training,
his possession of the watch, his withholding of information and willingness to
provide false information, and connections to explosives trained personnel
captured with him, indicates the possibility he did receive such training and
requires further investigation.)
(U//FOUO) The possession of a Casio F-91W model watch (or the silvercolor version of this model, the A159W), is an indicator of al-Qaida training
in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A JTF-GTMO
detainee identified the Casio watch as the sign of al-Qaida, [which] uses the
watch to make bombs. The Casio was known to be given to the students at
al-Qaida bomb-making training courses in Afghanistan, at which the students
received instruction in the preparation of timing devices using the watch.
Approximately one-third of the JTF-GTMO detainees that were captured with
these models of watches have known connections to explosives, either having
attended explosives training, having association with a facility where IEDs
were made or where explosives training was given, or having association with
a person identified as an explosives expert. 38
(S//NF) GZ-10016 described his escape from Afghanistan with a group of other
al-Qaida operatives under his command via Birmal and Zormat, AF and Bannu and
Lahore, PK to Faisalabad with the assistance of the LT network of facilitators.
34
35
IIR 6 034 1126 03
001458 FM40 28-JUL-2004, For additional information on these individuals and their associations, see TD-
314/17440-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03

IIR 6 034 0282 05, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-2004, 001458 FM40 28-JUL-2004
37
Property Held
38
For additional details see 000174 SIR 29-Dec-2006, 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch Electronic
Analysis Report 19-Aug-2004, Casio Watches and Relationship to Detainees 20-Apr-2006.
36
10
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According to GZ-10016, the safe houses, as well as transportation and security for
these moves, was provided by LT operatives. 39 (Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed
to be a member of the group of al-Qaida operatives who fled Afghanistan with GZ10016.)
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have followed the same route of escape from
Afghanistan to the safe house in Faisalabad as used by GZ-10016, ET-1458, and
other detainees. 40 SA-682 wrote a poem venerating several detainees, assessed to
include detainee, who were captured at the Issa Safe House and the Abu
Zubaydah Safe House. The poem noted GZ-10016 was pushing us to glory. 41
(S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu
Yasir al-Jazairi), reported Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi, ISN US9YM000688 (YM-688), was with a large group of Yemenis in Faisalabad, all of whom
fled Afghanistan for Pakistan and were seeking to return to Yemen. 42 YM-688
was captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House. 43
(S//NF) GZ-10016 corroborated Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghitis
statements stating the Yemenis were moved out of Afghanistan and put into a
safe house in Faisalabad to wait for new documents. 44
(S//NF) YM-688 admitted he fought in Afghanistan and fled to the Issa Safe
House. 45 (Analyst Note: The group was not transported to the safe house en
mass. Some detainees arrived from the Lahore safe houses days or weeks after
others.)
(S//NF) Ravil Mingazov, ISN US9RS-000702DP (RS-702), received bomb
training at the al-Faruq Training Camp from mid-August through mid-September
2001. 46 (Analyst Note: This would place detainee and RS-702 at the al-Faruq
Training Camp around the same time, although detainee probably graduated from
al-Faruq no later than August.)
(S//NF) GZ-10016 stated Abd Muhaymin sent two engineers (YM-696 and SA682) to GZ-10016 for remote controlled explosives training. GZ-10016 said he began
instructing the individuals but they had not completed their training prior to the 28
TD-314/16265-02, TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, Multiple ISNs
FBIS SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b, 000114
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan-2001
40
TD-314/20711-02, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-2004
41
000682 POCKET LITTER 00-XXX-2004, 000684 SIR 03-FEB-2006, Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to be
the individual identified as Hakim from Yemen in the poem.
42
TD-314/44476-03
43
000679 FM40 11-SEP-2003
44
TD-314/41623-02
45
000688 SIR 14-MAY-2005
46
IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0196 05, IIR 6 034 1483 03
39
11
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March 2002 raid on the Abu Zubaydah Safe House in Faisalabad. 47 (Analyst Note:
Abd Muhaymin is a variant of IZ-10026s alias Abd al-Muhaymin. Sufyian
Barhoumi, aka (Abu Ubaydah al-Jazairi), ISN US9AG-000694DP (AG-694), who
provided explosives and electronic detonator training, was also captured at the Abu
Zubaydah Safe House. 48)
(S//NF) SA-696 confirmed the IED plan, stating he intended to make circuit
boards at the safe house to be used with explosives for operations against US
forces in Afghanistan. SA-696 purchased enough components to produce 30
detonators and had produced two test units by the time of the raids. 49 Electronic
schematics, electrical components, and a voltmeter were recovered in the raids. 50
(S//NF) Detainee has a brother who is a Commander in the Ministry of Defense in
Yemen. 51
c. (U//FOUO) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MEDIUM threat from a
detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the
guard force and staff. He currently has 24 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS
with the most recent occurring on 16 January 2008, when he refused to come out of
recreation when instructed to by a guard. He has two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for
assault with the most recent occurring on 6 August 2004, when he threw a water cup on the
guards. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating
in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, assaults, provoking
words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he
had a total of 12 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in 2008.
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainees
most recent interrogation session occurred on 16 July 2007.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee may have had direct access to al-Qaida senior
leadership personalities as a scholar traveling with UBL. Detainee was caught in one of two
Faisalabad safe houses that were tied to GZ-10016, used to conduct preparations to conduct
47
TD-314/30299-03, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/1744002

48
000696 SIR 17-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: AG-694 is listed with his MP Number 198, and the alias Shafeeq in
the report. YM-696 reported on other individuals involved in the training in this report as well.
49
TD-314/35879-02
50
TD-314/63481-03, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b)[1]
51
GUAN-2003-I00890, Analyst Note: Detainee addresses his brother as Qaid Ahmed, meaning Commander
Ahmad in letters home. See GUAN 2003-T03364.
12
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IED attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Detainee reportedly attended
the al-Faruq Training Camp.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee can possibly provide information pertaining
to UBLs indoctrination speeches, senior al-Qaida members, and the Islamic Institute in
Kandahar. Detainee can further possibly report on travel routes to and from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Detainee may have information about advanced explosives training conducted at
the Faisalabad safe houses and operational plans to conduct IED attacks against US and
Coalition forces. Detainee should be able to provide information about other detainees
captured with him at the Faisalabad safe houses, including their roles and responsibilities
concerning operational planning and intended targets.
Detainees activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Indoctrination of potential al-Qaida operatives
Al-Faruq Training Camp in Kandahar
Islamic Institute in Kandahar
GZ-10016 and IZ-10026
Issa Safe House and Abu Zubaydah Safe House personnel and activities
Planned attacks against US and Coalition forces
Potential suicide operatives
LT facilitation
Recruitment and facilitation techniques in Yemen
Yemeni officials sympathetic to extremists
Terrorist biographical and psychological information
Radicalization Factors
Terrorist recruitment of juveniles
13
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330429
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SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for
GuantanamoDetainee,ISN US9YM-000686DP(S)
on 5 November 2004,
and he remains an enemy combatant.
r.
vq
7/*24ry
'
MARK H. BUZBY
RearAdmiral,US Navy
Commandins
<-/
Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologt.
t4
S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20330429
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APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
28 April 2008
Miami, FL 33172

1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Salem Hussein Mohammed

Current/True Name and Aliases: Husayn Salim Muhammad
al-Matari Yafai, Husayn al-Adani
Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM)
Date of Birth: 19 June 1977
Citizenship: Yemen
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-001015DP

Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 9
January 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee was an al-Qaida facilitator located in Iran (IR)
providing travel and false travel documents to Arab extremists attempting to enter
Afghanistan (AF). Senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu
Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016) and other al-Qaida members reported
detainee operated out of al-Qaida supported guest and safe houses in Iran and Afghanistan.
JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

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A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A HIGH threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value

Added reasons for continued detention

Added detail to detainees prior history
Added detail to detainees recruitment and travel
Added detail to detainees training and activities

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee finished his high school education at a literary school
in Aden in 1997. 1 He later worked at a Hyundai plant in Yemen where he earned
approximately 30,000 Yemeni Riyals per month. 2 Detainee lived at home with his parents,
and was able to save most of his salary. 3 Detainee previously worked in construction, as a
clothing salesman, and as a khat merchant. 4 Detainee speaks English fairly well. 5
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee is from southern Yemen and once hoped to
find more opportunities in Europe than would be available to him as a southern Yemeni (he
believed that politics in Yemen were controlled by the northern part of the country.) 6
Detainee flew from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) in the beginning of September 2001.
After four days in Karachi, detainee traveled by train to the Tabligh Center in Lahore, PK. 7
1
Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26-MAR-2008, No. 1015, 001015 KB 03-APR-2003

Analyst Note: In 2003, 30,000 Yemeni Riyals was equivalent to $168.53 US. It is unclear at which Hyundai
plant detainee worked. Hyundai is heavily involved in the Yemeni liquid natural gas industry, and has an
automobile distributor in-country.
3
001015 FM40 05-OCT-2005
4
001015 KB 3-APR-2003, Analyst Note: Khat (also ghat, qat, or chat) is an evergreen shrub (Catha edulis) native
to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is widely used in the region for its mild euphoric and
stimulating effects.
5
001015 FM40 08-MAR-2005, 001015 FM40 14-JAN-2004
6
001015 FM40 04-OCT-2005
7
001015 FM40 19-DEC-2003, 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, 001015 MFR 12-MAY-2003, Analyst Note:
The Tabligh Center refers to the Jamaat Tablighi (JT) which has been identified as a Priority 3 Terrorist Support
2
2
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Detainee traveled with approximately $2000 US and hoped to travel via the Tablighi Islamic
Missionary Organization in Europe. 8 Detainee did not plan to go to any specific country, but
hoped to be granted political asylum in whichever European country he entered. 9
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: While at the Tabligh Center, detainee met an
individual named Mohammad Ali al-Pakistani, after he overheard detainee speaking Arabic
to a security guard at the center. 10 Ali al-Pakistani then took detainee to a guesthouse. 11
Detainee explained to Ali al-Pakistani that he wanted to travel to Europe and was not
interested in the Tabligh. Detainee stated Ali al-Pakistani had smuggled people in the past. 12
After two and a half months in Lahore (about mid November 2001), Ali al-Pakistani
informed detainee it would not be possible for detainee to travel to Europe because of the
terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. Ali al-Pakistani also
indicated it would not be a good idea for detainee to travel because he was an Arab. Ali alPakistani then told detainee he should go back to Yemen or, if he wanted, Ali al-Pakistani
would smuggle detainee into Europe. Detainee agreed to pay Ali al-Pakistani 8,800
Pakistani rupees (approximately $145 US) for the service and to bring an extra $1000 US for
bribes and travel expenses. Within a month, Ali al-Pakistani and detainee traveled by rail
and bus to a village near the Pakistan and Iranian border. Detainee and Ali al-Pakistani were
ferried across the border by a Farsi speaking driver. Ali al-Pakistani may have bribed border
guards to allow passage. Ali al-Pakistani appeared familiar with both the driver and the
process of bribing border guards. 13 After two and a half hours, they arrived at the drivers
house where they spent one day before traveling on by bus to Mashhad, IR via Tehran, IR. 14
After detainee and Ali al-Pakistani arrived in Mashhad, they took a taxi from the bus terminal
to a home in Mashhad where detainee and Ali al-Pakistani stayed for a month. Ali alPakistani told detainee they were going back to Tehran, and then venture to Turkey and
Greece. They took a bus back to Tehran, and then a taxi to a hotel in a primarily Iraqi and
Kurdish area of the city. 15 During one of their stays at a guesthouse in Iran, Iranian
Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist
organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2
terrorist groups.
8
Analyst Note: In 001015 SIR 21-OCT-2004, detainee stated he took $1500 USD and 15,000 Pakistani Rupees
($268.87 USD) when he left Yemen for Pakistan.
9
001015 FM40 05-OCT-2005
10
001015 FM40 27-MAY-2005
11
001015 MFR 12-MAY-2003
12
001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003
13
IIR 6 034 0994 03
14
Analyst Note: The circuitous route/travel to and from Tehran and Meshhad, IR and amount of time in country
by detainee and his facilitator suggest activities other than simply transiting a neighboring country for follow on
travel to Europe, as detainee indicated.
15
001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003
3
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intelligence operatives took photos of al-Qaida and Taliban members who were present at the
house. Within four or five days, the Iranian agents returned with false passports for those
fighters. 16
a. (S//NF) Detainee states he was captured by non-uniformed Iranian policemen as he
walked with Ali al-Pakistani in Tehran. Detainee was tried and convicted for being in Iran
illegally, and was held in jail in Tehran and Mashhad for at least two months before his
transfer to Afghanistan in April 2002. Detainee also stated he was tortured while in the
custody of the Iranians. 17 Detainee was held at the Afghan prison in Kabul for
approximately two and a half months before being transferred to US custody (approximately
July 2002). 18
ID Cards
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) registration Card
Emergency card
Various personal items including clothing and toiletries
Though JTF-GTMO holds no money of detainee, he claims he had $2000 US at the
time of his arrest. 19
following:
Iranian prison system and law enforcement methods

Iranian intelligence activities and operations
Al-Qaida personnel in Pakistan
Jihad recruitment procedures used in Pakistan
Drug trade in Yemen
Recruiter and travel facilitator, Mohammed Ali al-Pakistani
16
IIR 6 034 088 07, Analyst Note: Detainees admitted presence in Iran, and knowledge of al-Qaida members,
including Usama Bin Ladens (UBL) family members, their activities, and interaction with Iranian authorities
reflects detainees close association with al-Qaida.
17
001015 SIR 29-MAR-2005 , IIR 6 034 5139 03
18
001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, FM40 21-JUL-2004
19
001015 FM40 31-JUL-2004
4
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Terrorism targets, activities and related facilities

Terrorism biographical/psychological information
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainee continues to hide information

regarding his timeline and activities in Afghanistan and Iran. Detainee has yet to provide details
of his activities as a facilitator and those of other al-Qaida members during his tenure in al-Qaida
safe houses in Iran. Detainee continues to deny being in Afghanistan, despite past reporting to
the contrary.
to the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who
served as a travel facilitator, providing false travel documents for Arab extremists transiting
Iran for entry into Afghanistan. Detainee is reported to have operated out of al-Qaida safe
houses in Iran and in guesthouses in Afghanistan.
(S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida.

(S//NF) Upon detainees transfer to Afghan control, Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officials identified detainee as a member of alQaida who had fled Afghanistan. 20 (Analyst Note: Detainee denies being in
Afghanistan.) 21
(S//NF) According to Abd al-Rahman Ahmad Khdar, ISN US9CA-000990DP,
(CA-990, transferred), he saw Marfadai (variant of detainees alias) at al-Qaida
guesthouses in Afghanistan. Khdar described detainee as an old junior al-Qaida
member, by which he meant detainee had been around for some time but was not a
senior or an al-Qaida leader. 22
(S//NF) Detainee is an al-Qaida facilitator who provided false travel documents for
other Arab extremists transiting Iran for entry into Afghanistan.
(S//NF) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, US9SA-000230DP, (SA-230)
identified Husayn al-Adeni, (assessed to be detainee), as an al-Qaida facilitator in
Tehran who assisted the transit of extremists to Konar, AF. 23 (Analyst Note: Konar
20
IIR 6 044 5140 03, IIR 6 044 5139 03, Analyst Note: Detainees timeline and travel in Iran is similar to the
movement of mujahideen, including other detainees, who escaped Afghanistan into Iran after the US bombing
campaign began after 11 September 2001.
21
1015 SIR 30-JUL-2005
22
CIR-3316-14554-04, Analyst Note: Variant of detainee alias Marfadi is Marfadai.
23
IIR 6 034 0395 05, 000230 SIR 28-JUL-2005, 000230 SIR 18-JUL-2005, Analyst Note: A variant of Husayn alAdani is Hussein al-Adeni. The name Husayn al-Adani is associated to detainee through 001463 Techdoc 05-Jun-
5
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is probably Konar Province, AF.) SA-230 noted Husayn al-Adani (variant of
detainee alias, assessed to be detainee) was at the guesthouse with Tawfiq Nasir
Awadh al-Bayhani ISN US9SA-000893DP (SA-893) from late 2000 to early 2001.)
(S//NF) SA-230 stated detainee informed him that he (detainee) stayed at a
guesthouse for lower ranking al-Qaida members in Tehran, IR, operated by Hamza alQaiti. Al-Qaiti received money from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) for the maintenance
of the house. 24 Detainee also informed SA-230 that Iranian intelligence agents
visited the safehouse and photographed the al-Qaida and Taliban members to prepare
falsified passports for them. 25 (Analyst Note: The term fighters is assessed to be a
reference to the al-Qaida associated Islamic extremists who transited to and from
Afghanistan to participate in violent militant activity in country.)
(S//NF) According to SA-230, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, Hamza al-Qaiti, and
Abu Hassan traveled to Iran together and founded two small guesthouses in
Tehran. They had two people at the guesthouses that are now at JTF-GTMO (SA893 and Hussain al-Adani (detainee alias)).26
(S//NF) According to an Egyptian government service, an individual named
Hussein al-Yafi, (a variant of detainees alias), provided Muhammad Midhat Mursi
al-Sayyid Umar with a false passport. 27 (Analyst Note: According to the Egyptian
Ministry of Interiors State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), Midhat is the son of
al-Qaida leader Abu Khabab aka (Abu Khabab al-Masri), a senior al-Qaida
explosives trainer).
(S//NF) Midhat was placed under surveillance and subsequently arrested in
August 2000 following his return to Egypt. The Egyptian General Intelligence
Service (EGIS) reported Midhat entered Egypt with a flawless Yemeni passport
in the name of Muhammad Abdallah Said al-Hamidy, issued in Aden in 1999. 28
2005 1941-2041 (S//NF//OC) and through the assimilation of detainees name Husayn with his city of origin, Aden,
YM. The timeframe of late 2000 to early 2001, reported by SA-230 and GZ-10016, place detainee in Afghanistan
considerably earlier than detainees claimed arrival in Pakistan in September 2001.
24
IIR 6 034 0088 07, Analyst Note: According to Tolfiq Nassar Ahmed (al-Bihani) aka Tawfiq Nasir Awadh alBayhani, US9SA-000893DP (SA-893), SA-893 and detainee lived in the second safe house for lower ranking
fighters.
25
IIR 6 034 0088 07, 000230 SIR 22-SEP-2006, Analyst Note: SA-230 stated he received this information from
both detainee and Tawfiq Nassar Ahmad al-Bayhani, ISN US9SA-000893DP (SA-893).
26
000230 SIR 03-AUG-2005, 000230 SIR 22-SEP-2006,
27
TD-314/42804-01, Analyst Note: Detainee is reported to have provided Muhammad Midhat Musri al-Sayyid
Umar a passport in 2000, a year earlier than his admitted travel to Pakistan. Biographic information associated with
a postcard from detainee lists his name as Muhammad Hussain Salem al-Yafai. See GUAN-2005-T04415 05-SEP2005.
28
TD-314/42804-01
6
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
(S//NF) Midhats father, Abu Khabab, was a well-known Derunta Camp
commander and trainer, as well as a poison and explosives expert. 29 Abu Khabab
was rumored to have been killed in a January 2006 air strike in Damadola, PK.
(S//NF) GZ-10016 identified detainee as someone he met at the Zubayr al-Haili
Guesthouse in Kandahar, AF, where detainee worked. 30
(S//NF) Zubayr al-Haili aka (Badr Abd al-Karim al-Sudayri), was an al-Qaida
facilitator who provided money, false passports, and clothing to the al-Qaida
members at the guesthouse in Kandahar. 31 According to GZ-10016, this
individual (detainee) was sent to him seeking money to get married in early 2001.
GZ-10016 gave him approximately $2000 US and never saw him again. 32
(Analyst Note: It is highly improbable that GZ-10016 would provide detainee
with $2000 US unless detainee was a mujahid.)
(S//NF) Detainee stated $2,000 US was taken from him when he was
captured in Iran. 33 (Analyst Note: This is possibly the $2000 US that GZ10016 reported he gave detainee.)
(S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling in Iran before arriving in Mashhad where he
stayed for over a month. 34 (Analyst Note: It is assessed detainee stayed at al-Qaida
safe houses in Iran after his departure from Afghanistan.)
c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and sometimes hostile to the
guard force and staff. He currently has 54 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS
with the most recent occurring on 1 April 2008, when he failed to stop talking during
restraint procedures. He has four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for major assault with
the most recent occurring on 18 February 2008, when he became combative while being
moved to recreation. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and
participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules,
unauthorized communications, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words
and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 25 March 2007
29
TD-314/30539-01, TD-314/06941-00, TD-314/32706-01

TD 314/37232-05, IIR 2 340 6066 02, 000516 SIR 29-JUN-2006, IIR 6 034 0284 06, IIR 6 034 0059 05, 001457
SIR 20-OCT-2004, Analyst Note: The al-Haili Guesthouse was used as a stopover for Arabs before and after
training at al-Qaidas al-Faruq Militant Training Camp. Detainee would have received militant training before he
would be given a position of trust and responsibility at a guesthouse. The guesthouse was also known as the Hajji
Habash guesthouse, the al-Ansar Guesthouse, the Abu Khulud Guesthouse, the Zubair Guesthouse, and the Suhaib
guesthouse.
31
IIR 6 034 0337 06, 001457 FM40 17-JUN-2004, Analyst Note: On 10 June 2002, Moroccan Internal Intelligence
Service (DGST) officers arrested Zubair al-Haili in Casablanca.
32
TD-314/37232-05
33
001015 FM40 31-JUL-2004
34
001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0088 07
30
7
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
detainee was in possession of a comb hidden inside a knee brace. In 2007, he had a total of
18 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and seven so far in 2008
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainees
most recent interrogation session occurred on 3 April 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainees admitted presence at a JT Center in
Pakistan probably provided him with information on JT recruitment, facilitation, security
procedures, and other extremists. Detainees reported presence at al-Qaida guesthouses in
Afghanistan and al-Qaida safe houses in Iran probably provided him with information on alQaida logistics, facilitators, and personnel. Detainees assessed activities as a travel
facilitator probably provided him with information on the illegal passport market, transiting
extremists, and other facilitators.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida member who has
information on al-Qaida associated guesthouses and safe houses in Afghanistan and Iran.
Detainee was a travel facilitator who has information on illegal passport market, facilitation
methods, transiting extremists, and al-Qaida members who sought refuge in Iran following
the US and Coalition bombing campaign in Afghanistan.
Iranian intelligence personnel support to al-Qaida and other extremist elements

Al-Qaida facilitation of extremists
Falsification of passports and other documents
Association between JT and al-Qaida
Routes of ingress and egress from Afghanistan and Iran
Al-Qaida associated guesthouses
Terrorism targets, activities and related facilities
Iranian activities and operations
Terrorist biographical/psychological information
Terrorism radicalization factors
8
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo
Detainee,ISN US9YM-001015DP(S)
on 15 December2004,
and he remains an enemy combatant.
I
"jlk{;W
TIIfr,
RearAdmiral, US Navy
Commandins
Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology.
o
S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 20330428
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APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
14 January 2009
Miami, FL 33172.
SUBJECT: Response to the Designated Civilian Official (DCO) Decision to Transfer
Guantanamo Detainee, Husayn Salim Muhammad al-Matari Yafai, ISN US9YM-001015DP (S)
(S//NF) New information has been discovered since his most recent assessment indicating
detainee continues to support extremism. JTF-GTMO reaffirms the 28 April 2008
recommendation for the continued detention of YM-1015 based on the following key data points.
JTF-GTMO continues to determine this detainee to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a
threat to the US, its interests, and allies. Detainee is a probable recidivist candidate. JTF-GTMO
disagrees with the 22 August 2008 ARB findings and its subsequent recommendation for
transfer, and submits the following for additional consideration.
(S//NF) Background: Detainee was an al-Qaida facilitator located in Iran who provided travel
and false travel documents to Arab extremists attempting to enter Afghanistan. Senior al-Qaida
facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP
(GZ-10016) and other al-Qaida members reported detainee operated out of al-Qaida supported
guesthouses and safe houses in Iran and Afghanistan.
1. (S//NF) The ARB noted its recommendation was based on detainees captured
circumstances which were due to his illegal presence in Iran and not due to any affiliation
with al-Qaida. The ARB also noted there is no information that detainee participated in
combat action or that he carried a weapon. JTF-GTMO argues there is sufficient information
to identify detainee as a member of al-Qaida. Additionally, while no specific information is
available to clarify his participation in hostilities, detainees service as an al-Qaida facilitator
enabled hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.
2. (S//NF) Detainee was detained for being in Iran illegally. However, SA-230
(transferred) reported detainee informed him that he (detainee) stayed at a guesthouse for
lower ranking al-Qaida members in Tehran, IR, operated by Hamza al-Qaiti. Al-Qaiti

S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20340114
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SUBJECT: Response to the Designated Civilian Official (DCO) for the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) Decision to Transfer Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-001015DP (S)
received money from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) for the maintenance of the house. 1
Additionally, SA-230 separately identified the name Husayn al-Adeni, (assessed to be
detainee), as an al-Qaida facilitator in Tehran who assisted the transit of extremists to
Afghanistan. 2 (Analyst Note: As detainee reportedly identified the guesthouse for al-Qaida
members, he provided an admission of his al-Qaida membership. Detainee has provided
conflicting stories about the purpose and manner of his travel to Iran.)
3. (S//NF) Upon detainees transfer to Afghan control, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS) officials identified detainee as a member of al-Qaida. 3
4. (S//NF) Detainees alias was identified as an al-Qaida member through a personal
connection at al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan. 4
5. (S//NF) According to an Egyptian government service, an individual named Husayn alYafai, (detainee), provided Muhammad Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar with a false passport. 5
6. (S//NF) GZ-10016 met detainee at the Zubayr al-Haili Guesthouse in Kandahar, AF,
where detainee worked. 6 (Analyst Note: The al-Haili Guesthouse was used as a stopover for
Arabs en route to and from training at al-Qaidas al-Faruq Training Camp, the front lines,
and Pakistan. The guesthouse was also known as the Hajji Habash Guesthouse. Detainees
work at the al-Qaida guesthouse supports the assessment that he was a member of al-Qaida
and is an additional indicator for facilitation and support activities.)
7. (S//NF) Detainee is currently uncooperative indicating continuing support to extremism.
Additionally, detainee uses counter-interrogation techniques, expressed he posed a threat to
his debriefer, 7 and threatened to kill US personnel at JTF-GTMO. 8 Detainee prayed, God
help us overcome those infidels, God help the ones [hunger] striking, God may curse those
oppressors. 9
1
IIR 6 034 0088 07, Analyst Note: According to Tolfiq Nassar Ahmed (al-Bihani) aka Tawfiq Nasir Awadh alBayhani, US9SA-000893DP (SA-893), SA-893 and detainee lived in the second safe house for lower ranking
fighters.
2
IIR 6 034 0395 05, 000230 SIR 28-JUL-2005, 000230 SIR 18-JUL-2005, Analyst Note: A variant of Husayn alAdani is Hussein al-Adeni. The name Husayn al-Adani is associated to detainee through 001463 Techdoc 05-Jun2005 1941-2041 (S//NF//OC) and through the assimilation of detainees name Husayn with his city of origin, Aden,
YM. The timeframe of late 2000 to early 2001, reported by SA-230 and GZ-10016, place detainee in Afghanistan
considerably earlier than detainees claimed arrival in Pakistan in September 2001.
3
IIR 6 044 5140 03, IIR 6 044 5139 03, Analyst Note: Detainees timeline and travel in Iran is similar to the
movement of mujahideen, including other detainees, who escaped Afghanistan into Iran after the US bombing
campaign began after 11 September 2001.
4
CIR-3316-14554-04, Analyst Note: Variant of detainee alias Marfadi is Marfadai.
5
TD-314/42804-01
6
TD 314/37232-05, IIR 2 340 6066 02, 000516 SIR 29-JUN-2006, IIR 6 034 0284 06, IIR 6 034 0059 05, 001457
SIR 20-OCT-2004,
7
001015 SIR 07-Nov-2008
8
JDG Incident 06-Aug-2005
9
JDG Incident 25-Dec-08
2
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S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O34OII4
JTF GTMO-CG
SIIBJECT: Responseto the DesignatedCivilian Official (DCO) for the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) Decision to TransferGuantanamoDetainee,ISN US9YM-001015DP (S)
(S//NF) If releasedwithout rehabilitation,close supervision,and meansto successfully

reintegrateinto his societyas a law-abiding citizen, it is assesseddetaineewould seekout prior
associatesand reengagein hostilities and extremistsupportactivities at home and abroad.
Rear Admiral, US Navy

Commanding
S E C R E T //NOFORN / / 2O34OII4
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APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
1 October 2008
Miami, FL 33172
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9TS-000174DP (S)

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ahmad Muhammad Jumr
al-Masaudi
Current/True Name and Aliases: Hasham Bin Ali Bin Amor
Sliti, Hamza, Ahmad Bin Muhammad Bin Omar, Hassan
Sofi, Imed Hadj Said Ben, Abu Fadil, Abu Esma, Aziz
Burdarbala, Abu Konah
Place of Birth: Hammam Lif, Tunisia (TS)
Date of Birth: 12 February 1966
Citizenship: Tunisia
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TS-000174DP
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 22 May 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and
means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed
detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist activities.
Since arriving in JTF-GTMO, although detainee has appeared cooperative during recent
debriefings, he has not provided anything of intelligence value. It appears detainee employs
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
counter-interrogation techniques during custodial interviews, indicating his continuing
support for extremism. Additionally, detainee holds anti-US sentiment and on more than one
occasion has threatened to kill members of the guard force. Detainee was a member of the
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), an Islamic terrorist organization with active cells in
Europe, a former active presence in Afghanistan (AF), and close ties to the Global Jihad
Support Network (GJSN), 1 the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the al-Qaida
network. In 2004, detainee was convicted in absentia on terrorism-related charges for his
role in TCG suicide attacks, including a foiled attack against US military personnel at the
Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium and assassination of the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad
Shah Massoud. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces
in Afghanistan, and accepted a fatwa (religious decree) to engage in combat alongside
Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region. Detainee is assessed to have received training on
weapons, and possibly explosives. The DIA assesses detainee to be among the top 52 enemy
combatants at JTF-GTMO who pose the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of
terrorism if released. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS
AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
A HIGH threat from a detention perspective
Of MEDIUM intelligence value
Added reporting indicating detainee is employing counter-interrogation techniques
Added reporting that confirms detainees anti-US stance
Added reporting on death threats made by detainee to the guard force
Updated capture information
Included listing of foreign criminal judgments against detainee
Included statement of detainees motive for going to Afghanistan
The GJSN is designated as a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1
target. These targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of
interest of the President, Vice President, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and NSC/HSC Principals and
Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations
involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests and those preparing to
employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
2
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a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee speaks Arabic, French, and Italian. Detainee received
formal education from 1972 to 1982, and then worked as a mechanic for the Tunisian
National Guard, maintaining and repairing military vehicles from 1982 to 1984 in lieu of
active military service. He later completed three years of college, obtaining a degree in
mechanics and a certificate in car repair. 2 In 1995, detainee traveled to Italy (IT), where he
lived with friends who allegedly introduced detainee to drugs. In 1997, Italian authorities
arrested detainee for narcotics possession and sentenced him to three years and eight months
in jail. He served only eleven months, and after two additional months in a drug
rehabilitation center, detainee escaped and returned to drug use and thievery. In September
1998, detainees cousin, Amor Sliti, aka (Abu Nadhir), met detainee in Genoa, IT and drove
him to Belgium. There, detainee lived and worked out of Slitis residence as a mechanic.
Because of detainees continued involvement with drugs, detainee moved from Slitis home
to the residence of another cousin. Detainee was eventually arrested at the French-Belgian
border as he attempted to return to Italy and was imprisoned for 62 days in Belgium. 3
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: After detainees release from prison, Sliti suggested
detainee travel to Afghanistan to distance himself from drugs and find the right path to
Allah. 4 Sliti introduced detainee to a Moroccan named Tawfiq, aka (Kamal), aka (Khattab),
who acquired a forged Belgian passport and visa for detainees travel. 5 In May 2000,
detainee left Belgium for the UK where he came into contact with Abu Ahmad and Abu
Khalid, aka (Kamel Ben Moussa), who assisted detainee by purchasing an airline ticket to
Pakistan (PK) and securing a 12-day tourist visa. On 20 May 2000, detainee traveled from
London, UK to Islamabad, PK. An Afghan named Julaybib met detainee at the airport and
accompanied him to Peshawar, PK. Detainee then traveled to Jalalabad, AF. Detainee was
housed at the Tunisian Guesthouse headed by Abu Ayadh for between five and seven
months. 6
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed in Jalalabad for a total of 18 months
studying the Koran, polishing his Arabic, and performing household chores. 7 Detainee
2
IIR 2 340 6712 02, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, 000174 KB 20-MAY-2002

IIR 2 340 6712 02, TD-314/02157-03, Analyst Note: Variants of Amor include Omar and Omer. Variants of
Nadhir include Nadir and Nadher.
4
TD-314/02157-03, 000174 302 08-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee has presented conflicting accounts. In
another account, detainee has stated it was Abu Khalid, aka (Kamel Ben Moussa), the TCG contact in London, who
prompted detainee to travel to Afghanistan (see 000174 302 17-MAY-2002).
5
IIR 2 340 6712 02
6
IIR 2 340 6712 02, TD-314/36335-03, 000174 302 08-JUN-2002, IIR 2 340 6785 02
7
000174 302 08-JUN-2002, IIR 2 340 6712 02
3
3
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
suspected other Arabs in the neighborhood were attending the nearby Derunta Training
Camp, but did not attend training himself. 8 In approximately October or November 2000,
detainee decided to leave Afghanistan and return to Europe because he felt the guesthouse
was too structured. Other guesthouse residents scorned and marginalized him for being too
European, and tasked him with menial janitorial duties. Pakistani authorities detained him at
the airport as he attempted to leave the country with a false passport and identity papers. As
Belgian consulate officials examined his papers, detainee escaped and returned to Jalalabad
with the help of Julaybib. 9 Detainee returned to the Tunisian Guesthouse, staying until either
October 2000 or January 2001. Detainee then contacted Abu Qaqa and requested to stay at
the Abdallah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad. There, detainee also clashed with others who
attended the mosque. They called him a spy, immoral, and a threat to neighborhood children
because they did not approve of him living in the mosque. 10 US and Coalition forces
captured Jalalabad in December 2001, at which time detainee fled to Pakistan.11
a. (S//NF) After fleeing to Pakistan, detainee was captured by the Pakistani Army in
December 2001. Detainee provided the pseudonym Ahmad Muhammad Umr al-Masaudi to
the Pakistanis presenting himself possibly as a Palestinian which he was listed as when
handed over to US authorities. 12 Detainee was transferred from Kohat, PK into US custody
at Kandahar, AF on 30 December 2001. 13
Money
$100 US
10,250 Pakistani rupees (PKR) 14
IIR 6 034 0534 04, 000174 MFR 14-JUL-2002

IIR 2 340 6712 02, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, TD-314/02157-03, 00174 302 08-JUN-2002.
10
000174 302 30-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0577 02
11
000174 302 17-MAY-2002, TD-314/36335-03, TD-314/02157-03
12
TD-314/02157-03, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, 000174 INITIAL SCREENING 31-DEC-2001, Analyst Note:
The initial screening report states detainee was captured on 5 Ramadan (approximately 21 November 2001),
however, during subsequent custodial interviews detainee stated he was captured on the same month he fled
Jalalabad in December 2001.
13
TD-314/00845-02
14
9
4
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following:
Drug trafficking; the criminal and drug culture of North African immigrants in Italy
Recruitment and indoctrination of North Africans into Muslim extremist groups in
Europe
Smuggling of North Africans through Europe and into Afghanistan; including the use,
manufacture and procurement of forged documents, routes used and methods of bypass
for checkpoints and security personnel
A safe house in the vicinity of Sehat Aama Hospital in Jalalabad
Individuals and activities associated with the Abdallah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad
Islamic extremist groups from Tunisia; to include: The TCG, the Tunisian Islamic
Front (FIT), the GIA, and elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) 15
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainees account omits key facts, contacts,
and events, and important periods in detainees past remain unexplained. When first interrogated
detainee presented a fabricated cover story and disavowed knowledge of his associates in Europe
and Afghanistanan account he later retracted. Moreover, detainee reportedly instructed other
Kandahar detainees to corroborate his cover story. The lack of detail regarding detainees
activities during the 18 months he spent in Jalalabad living among known terrorists clearly
indicates deception, particularly in light of reports that detainee accepted a fatwa to fight with
Kashmiri militants during that time frame and his conviction in absentia in the Trabelsi plot.
Detainee was obviously shaken when confronted with the coded address book that was
confiscated by Belgian authorities after his October 2000 arrest in Islamabad, an item omitted in
detainees account of that arrest. Detainees consistent denials of personal involvement in
jihadist activities are not credible in light of his involvement in key TCG activities and his close
association with so many known and admitted terrorist operatives.
to the US, its interests, and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: If released without rehabilitation, close
supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it
is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist
activities. Since arriving in JTF-GTMO, although detainee has appeared cooperative during
15
The GSPC, now known as al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is designated as a NIPF CT
Priority 1 target.
5
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
recent debriefings, he has not provided anything of intelligence value. It appears detainee
employs counter-interrogation techniques during custodial interviews, indicating his
continuing support for extremism. Additionally, detainee holds anti-US sentiment and on
more than one occasion has threatened to kill members of the guard force. Detainee was a
member of the TCG, an Islamic terrorist organization with active cells in Europe, a former
active presence in Afghanistan, and close ties to the GJSN, GIA, and the al-Qaida network.
In 2004, detainee was convicted in absentia on terrorism-related charges for his role in TCG
suicide attacks, including a foiled attack against US military personnel at the Kleine Brogel
Air Base and assassination of the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detainee
probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, and
accepted a fatwa to engage in combat alongside Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region.
Detainee is assessed to have received training on weapons, and possibly explosives. The
DIA assesses detainee to be among the top 52 enemy combatants at JTF-GTMO who pose
the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of terrorism if released.
(S//NF) Detainee was a member of the TCG, an Islamic terrorist organization with
active cells in Europe, a former presence in Afghanistan, and close ties to the GJSN,
GIA, and the al-Qaida network.
(S//NF) Detainee was recruited into the TCG by his cousin, TCG co-founder
Amor Sliti.
(S//NF) Detainee stated that his move to Belgium in late 1998 and his later
travel to Afghanistan in 2000 were at the insistence of Sliti. Detainee resided in
Slitis house while in Belgium, and when Sliti moved with his family to
Afghanistan, detainee followed shortly thereafter.16
(C//NF) In September 2004, the Belgium government found Sliti guilty of
providing support to the assassins of Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah
Massoud. 17
(S//NF) Detainee was present in a founding meeting for the TCG in Jalalabads
Tunisian Guesthouse, held in June 2000 by the former emir (leader) of the TCG, Abu
Ayadh, aka (Sayfullah Omar Bin Hussayn). Others present included Amor Sliti;
Abdallah Bin Ali al-Lutfi, aka (Julaybib), ISN US9TS-000894DP (TS-894); Adil Bin
Ahmad Ibrahim Hakimi, aka (Abu Bilal), ISN US9TS-000168DP (TS-168); Adel Bin
Muhammad Abbess Ouerghi, aka (Abu Musab), ISN US9TS-000502DP (TS-502);
Khlifa Ben Hassan; and possibly Hedi Ben Hedili Hammami, aka (Zubayr), ISN
US9TS-000717DP (TS-717). 18
16
TD-314/23097-02, IIR 6 807 0090 04, IIR 6 807 0067 05, IIR 6 807 0074 03, TD-314/35898-03, TD-314/3633503
17
IIR 6 807 0067 05
18
TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/20628-03, Analyst Note: No further information is available about Khlifa Ben
Hassan. See CIR 316-19550-06.
6
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JTF-GTMO-CDR
(S//NF) Detainee resided in the TCG associated Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad
between early to mid-2000 through November 2001. 19
(S//NF) Detained senior al-Qaida facilitator, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad
Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), stated he
meet detainee in the Tunisian Guesthouse in Jalalabad. In approximately October
2000, detainee requested a French passport from GZ-10016 so he could travel to
France. However, GZ-10016 was unable to obtain a passport of quality for
detainee. 20
(S//NF) Detainee was associated with a GIA cell in Bologna, IT in 1997 that
included the other TCG members from the Tunisian Guesthouse. In December 2002,
Italian national military police, Ros Carabinieri, indicated detainee had an outstanding
Italian arrest warrant for his ties to the Bologna GIA cell. At least seven other
Tunisian detainees (Ridah Bin Saleh al-Yazidi, US9TS-000038DP (TS-38), Riyadh
Bin Muhammad Tahir Bin Lakhdir Nasri ISN US9TS-000510DP (TS-510), TS-502,
TS-168, TS-717, TS-894, and Lutfi Lagha, ISN US9TS-000660DP (TS-660,
transferred)) also had outstanding warrants or were otherwise identified as suspects in
the 1997 investigation. 21 (Analyst Note: This suggests detainees involvement in the
Tunisian terrorist network began during or prior to his residency in Italy, years before
his travel to Afghanistan.)
(S//NF) Detainee was convicted in absentia in Belgium in 2004 on terrorism
related charges for his role in TCG suicide attacks, including a foiled 2001 attack
against US military personnel at the Kleine Brogel Air Base and the assassination of
Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detainee was sentenced to four
years imprisonment. Seventeen other TCG members, including Tariq Maaroufi,
Nisar Trabelsi, Amor Sliti, and TS-168, also received sentences ranging from several
months to ten years. Paris TCG cell leader Djamel Beghal, was tried in Paris on
related charges. 22
(C) The Tunisian government has issued the following criminal judgments
against detainee: the first judgment #16851 dated January 26, 2005 sentences
detainee in absentia to eight years imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist
organization operating abroad, the second judgment #26585 dated March 24, 2006
sentences detainee in absentia to eight years imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist
19
IIR 2 340 6606 02, IIR 6 034 0577 02, IIR 2 340 6785 02, TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/39191-05, 000174 SIR
EXT 30-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: According to detainee, the other occupants of the guesthouse included Abu
Ayadh, Amor Sliti, TS-894, Lutfi Lagha, ISN US9TS-000660DP (TS-660), Dujana (possibly TS-510), Bilal
(possibly TS-168), Musab (possibly TS-502), Zubayr (possibly TS-717), Abu Hamza (possibly, (aka Djemal
Beghal)), Abu Qaqa (possibly Nisar Trabelsi), Khudeyfa, Khalil, and Abu Ubayda.
20
TD-314/39191-05
21
IIR 5 398 6003 03, TD-314/38907-01
22
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 30-SEP-03
7
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
JTF-GTMO-CDR
organization operating abroad at a time of peace intending to incite hatred and
religious fanaticism. 23
(S//NF) Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces
in Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) During a custodial interview on 11 March 2005, detainee
acknowledged he was going to Afghanistan to help support them against the
American invasion of their country. 24
(C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee admitted that mistakes were made by him in
Afghanistan. According to detainee, religious people would ask a person to go to
Afghanistan to learn about religion but when the person got there, they learned about
military operations as well. Afterwards, the person would be asked to engage in
combat. 25
(S//NF) TS-502 stated that all of the Tunisians detained at JTF-GTMO had sided
with UBL against US and Coalition forces.26
(S//NF) Detainees TCG associates engaged in combat operations against US and
Coalition forces after the US invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Ayadh and TS-717
organized the Jalalabad group and volunteered to defend UBL and the embattled alQaida fighters at Tora Bora, AF. 27 TS-168 also reportedly fought US and Coalition
forces in Tora Bora. 28
(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received weapons training that included small
arms and possibly explosives. This training was probably conducted at al-Qaidas
Derunta Camp.
(S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving visual weapons training from Cheboutti
al-Jazeeri. 29 Detainee admitted Cheboutti briefly lived in the Abdallah Azzam
Mosque with detainee. Cheboutti worked in a Jalalabad shop repairing weapons and
was likely receiving training at Derunta Camp. 30
(S//NF) Amor Slitis second wife, Christine Volcke, testified in the Belgian trial
of Sliti, Trabelsi, detainee, and others that she had heard talk of training camps and
saw an exercise book belonging to detainee that contained drawings of electrical
circuits, possibly related to explosives, while in Jalalabad. 31
(S//NF) Detainee demonstrated knowledge of Derunta Training Camp cover
stories and code words (Going swimming and buying fish), layout (very
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 221510Z JUN07
000174 FM40 11-MAR-2005
25
IIR 6 034 0409 08
23
24
26
IIR 6 034 0893 04

TD-314/12008-03
28
TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/24907-02, TD-314/55272-05
29
000174 SIR EXT 25-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Cheboutti is Shabuti.
30
000174 302 10-JUL-2002
31
FBIS EUP20040229000162
27
8
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
JTF-GTMO-CDR
military--lots of checkpoints), and key personnel such as explosives trainer Midhat
Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab). Detainee described Abu Khababs
reputation as very knowledgeable about chemistry, physics, and fabrication of
explosives. 32 (Analyst Note: Derunta was one of UBLs most important training
camps in Afghanistan, known to provide small arms, explosives, and possibly
biological and chemical weapons training.)
(S//NF) Many other TCG members who stayed at the Tunisian Guesthouse are
known or suspected to have attended Derunta Training Camp. 33
(S//NF) Detainee accepted a fatwa to conduct combat alongside Pakistani militants in
the Kashmir region.
(S//NF) GZ-10016 recalled that he heard detainee had accepted a fatwa to fight
alongside Pakistani militants in Kashmir. 34 (Analyst Note: Additional information is
available in an SCI supplement.)
(S//NF) DIA assess detainee to be among the top 52 enemy combatants at JTFGTMO who pose the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of terrorism if
released. 35
(S//NF) Detainee has been repeatedly uncooperative during custodial interviews, has
acknowledged providing false information to debriefers, and often employs counterinterrogation techniques indicating his continuing support for extremism. 36
(S//NF) Detainee has threatened guard staff at JTF-GTMO and in Iraq upon release
and holds anti-US sentiment. 37
c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention
perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and
staff. Detainee currently has 388 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the
most recent occurring on 2 July 2008, when he refused to remove a towel from cell window.
He has 153 reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 28
February 2008, when he threw food at the guard force. Other incidents for which he has
been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow
guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized
communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, provoking words and
gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 5 July 2007, detainee
was found in possession of string with razor attached to the end (shank). In 2007, detainee
had a total of 32 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 33 so far in 2008.
32
000174 302 10-JUL-2002, IIR 6 034 0534 04

IIR 6 034 0629 03, IIR 2 340 6606 02, TD-314/05602-03
34
TD-314/39191-05
35
Defense Analysis Report 11-JUL-2008
36
000174 FM40 27-JUL-2006, GUAN-2005-T02809,000174 FM40 24-JUN-2005, 000174 SIR 17-MAY-2007,
TD-314/02157-03,000174 302 17-May-2002,000174 INITIAL SCREENING 31-DEC-2001
37
JIG INCIDENT 04-NOV-2006 19:51:00, JIG INCIDENT 20-APR-2006 19:16:00
33
9
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331001
JTF-GTMO-CDR

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainees
most recent interrogation session occurred on 18 July 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee resided or associated with key Tunisian
extremists in Europe, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for at least three or four years prior to his
capture. During that time, he had direct access to the core contingent of Tunisian extremists
in Italy and later in Jalalabad, including involvement in key organizational meetings of the
TCG. Detainee had close access to senior TCG and al-Qaida figures including Abu Ayadh,
GZ-10016, and Djamel Beghal. Detainee is in a position to provide information about
militant operations in Kashmir.
c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee likely possesses intelligence of value not
yet exploited. Detainee has provided extensive and specific information on extremist
operatives and facilities in both Afghanistan and Europe, to include derogatory accounts of
his own cousins money couriering in support of the TCG. 38 Many of detainees associates
are now in custody of the US, Belgium, France, and Tunisia. 39 However, a number of TCG
members are still unaccounted for. 40 Detainee has yet to divulge the full details of his
participation in the TCG and his association with al-Qaida networks. Specifically, he should
have information concerning recruitment, facilitation and activities of key members within
the North African extremist network in Europe and Afghanistan. Detainee still has additional
incriminating information against Amor Sliti, Abu Ayadh, TS-510, TS-168, and other
detainees.
Extremist organizations and operations in Europe including operations against US
personnel or interests
TCG organization and operations, including leadership; cells in Belgium, Italy, UK,
and Jalalabad; operations; training; facilitation and logistic support, including use of and
role in GJSN; and relationship with al-Qaida.
Hostile acts committed by TCG, GJSN, GIA, and al-Qaida members now in custody
at JTF-GTMO
GIA cells and operations in Italy and the relationship between GIA and the TCG.
Recruitment and facilitation of extremist in Europe
38
IIR 2 340 6785 02, 000174 SIR 24-MAY-2004

IIR 6 807 0067 05
40
TD-314/42171-05
39
10
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S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O33IOOI
JTF.GTMO-CDR
for ContinuedDetentionUnderDoD Control(CD) for
SUBJECT:Recommendation
(S)
ISN
US9TS-000174DP
Detainee,
Guantanamo
o Europeannarcoticstrade
o Assassinationof Ahmad ShahMassoud,the perpetrators,and supportfor the
operationby extremistelements
o Militant operationsin Kashmir
on 6 December2004,
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatuswas reassessed
and he remainsan enemy combatant.
D. M. THOMAS,JR
RearAdmiral,US Navy
Commanding
'
Definitions for intelligenceterms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military IntelligenceCollege
October 2001 guide Intelligence llarning Terminologt.
11
S E C R E T /i NOFORN / / 2O33IOOI

2014-Nov-20 GTMO Detainee Releases

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JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

000553 GUAN 2007-T04630 18-Oct-2007

IIR 2 340 6543 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Hajji is Hagi.

MARK H. BUZBY- {=_)

Definitionsfor intelligencetermsusedin the assessment

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthemCommand,3511NW 9lst Avenue,

2. (FOUO) Heatth: Detaineeis in good health. He hasno significantmedicalhistory, but upon

Key Facilitators and trainers:

o AbuZubayr, seniorAl-Qaida operative

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

5. (U) Capture Information:

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002

000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 302 07-SEP-2002, 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.

000681 Passport PAKP-2002-900012, 000838 PASSPORT 04-JUL-01, 000693 PASSPORT 29-MAR-2000,

TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02

IIR 6 034 1126 03

314/17440-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03

TD-314/30299-03, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/1744002

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Salem Hussein Mohammed

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainees

Added reasons for continued detention

4. (U) Detainees Account of Events:

Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26-MAR-2008, No. 1015, 001015 KB 03-APR-2003

Iranian prison system and law enforcement methods

Terrorism targets, activities and related facilities

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainee continues to hide information

(S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida.

TD-314/30539-01, TD-314/06941-00, TD-314/32706-01

Iranian intelligence personnel support to al-Qaida and other extremist elements

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

(S//NF) If releasedwithout rehabilitation,close supervision,and meansto successfully

Rear Admiral, US Navy

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

IIR 2 340 6712 02, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, 000174 KB 20-MAY-2002

IIR 6 034 0534 04, 000174 MFR 14-JUL-2002

IIR 6 034 0893 04

000174 302 10-JUL-2002, IIR 6 034 0534 04

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

IIR 2 340 6785 02, 000174 SIR 24-MAY-2004

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