USA

Logistics is the process of planning and executing force sustainment in support of military operations. A forceprojection Army depends on the right logistical decisions prior to the onset of operations. There is normally
little time for last-minute logistics fixes when the decision to employ combat forces has been made.

LOGISTICS CHARACTERISTICS
Scarce resources require logistics operations to be efficient, not wasteful. Logistics operations must be
effective to provide the intended or expected support; therefore, successful logistics support must be
balanced between effectiveness and efficiency. Logistics operations are characterized by being able to
anticipate requirements, integrate joint and multinational logistics support and improvise solutions and by
being responsive and continuous. These characteristics facilitate effective, efficient logistics support and
enable operational success. They apply in both war and OOTW. These imperatives act as a guide for
planners and operators to synchronize logistics on the battlefield. The corps engineer unit commander and
his staff understand and use these imperatives while planning engineer operations. The following paragraphs
describe these characteristics along with corps engineer considerations for each:
ANTICIPATION
INTEGRATION
CONTINUITY
RESPONSIVENESS
IMPROVISATION

Commander's intent.

Commander's concept of the operation.

Host-nation assets.
Joint-service capabilities.
Multinational/coalition-nation capabilities.
Systems interoperability.
Availability of sealift and airlift into the theater.
Suitability of air, ground, and sea LOC.

Corps engineer logistics priorities can shift between units or may be focused on a particular area. Shifting
priorities between units or areas requires close scrutiny and coordination by the logistics planner to ensure
that there are no lapses in support. The shifting of priorities from one location to another on the battlefield is
an extremely complicated process with a high potential for failure. Some examples of potential reasons for
shifting priorities are-

Reconstituting the force.

Exploiting enemy weaknesses on the battlefield.
Preparing for future operations such as counterattacks.
Continuing with success of a current operation.

Motto and Creed

I am an American Soldier and a logistician.
I am the heir of Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation Soldiers who have served our Nation in war
and peace since 1775.
I provide the Nations warfighters of all services what they need, when they need it, where they need it.
I anticipate the warfighters need for sustainment in all situations, at all times, under all conditions.
I integrate logistics into the commanders plans and decisions.
I ensure continuity of support to sustain the momentum of the force.
I respond rapidly to the ever-changing needs of the warfighter.
I improvise to sustain the force with innovation and ingenuity.
I live by the Army values and the Soldiers Creed.
I lead by example.
I am true to the motto of the Logistics Corps, "Sustinendum Victoriam" "Sustaining Victory!"[1]

The United States Military logistics support is grouped into 10 classes of supply:[17]
Class
Class I

Description
Subsistence (food), gratuitous (free) health and comfort items.

Consumer
Class
Troops

Clothing, individual equipment, tent-age, organizational tool sets and kits, hand
Class II

tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies and

Troops

equipment.
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) (package and bulk): Petroleum, fuels,
Class III

lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk
chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and

Equipment

additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal.

Class IV

Class V

Construction materials, including installed equipment and all fortification and

barrier materials.
Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators,
pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated items.

Troops

Equipment

Personal demand items (such as health and hygiene products, soaps and
Class VI

toothpaste, writing material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, alcohol, Troops
and camerasnonmilitary sales items) and paperclips.

Class VII

Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.

Equipment

Medical material (equipment and consumables) including repair parts peculiar to

Class VIII

medical equipment. (Class VIIIa Medical consumable supplies not including

blood & blood products; Class VIIIb Blood & blood components (whole blood,

Troops

platelets, plasma, packed red cells, etc.).

Class IX

Class X

Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies, and sub-assemblies

(repairable or non-repairable) required for maintenance support of all equipment.
Material to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic
development (not included in Classes I through IX).

Miscellaneous Water, salvage, and captured material.

RUSSIA
>The Russians did not have anything like the supply requirements of Allied
>units, their units 'bombed up' for an Op, and off they went, without any
>logistic support at all.
As stated, that's a canard. Logistics is not magic. Materials usage
is directly related to actions. Sure, if you sit on your duff, you don't need
much stuff. But in order to fire 1000 50-kg shells, you have to move 50,000
kgs, plus accessories, overhead, and the supplies and overhead of the part of
the logistics train you use. The Russians didn't have a magical way to
conduct military operations without supplying them.
Now, it is a fact that a lot of the total transport capability of the
WWII Russian military was organic to units. There wasn't enough left over to
maintain the kind of classical logistics structure the Western Allies had.
But that was not by Russian preference--they just didn't have the
requisite equipment, management and engineering skills and transportation
infrastructure. Their struggles to build those capabilities throughout the
war are sufficient evidence that they recognized they were operationally and
organizationally inferior.
You are arguing, I think, that their units were wonderfully effective
indefinitely while needing much less tonnage than the Western Allies, so that
they didn't need the logistics capability they didn't have. That's factually
wrong--the dominant portion of any modern unit's logistical tonnage during a
fast attack is POL, weapons/vehicle replacement and ammunition. American

Equipment

Civilians
Troops

units had organic supply lift capability, just like the Russians, but
while American units could generally count on the logistics guys to get
materials to them just when their organic supplies were exhausted, Russian
units could not. When Russian units with only the supplies they could carry
organically had used up those supplies, and found themselves not receiving
replacements from the rear, they were effectively de-militarized.
Units stop shooting and driving when they run out of shells and gas.
The original argument here was that the Russians would have been able
to advance westward against the Western Allies without hindrance by Allied
fighter-bomber interdiction of logistics activity. That is absurd. The
interdicting units might have had to look harder for trains and trucks, but
each individual destroyed target would be a much larger percentage of the
overall resources the Russians had available. And, with our superior photo
intelligence capability and knowledge of the ground we were retreating over,
the fighter-bomber pilots would know exactly where to hit the bridges,
railyards and other pinchpoints in the road and rail net--the real key to
disabling a logistics system.
In a lot of ways, war is won and lost by logistics. The Russian Army
at the end of WWII was not a wonderful example of how to run a logistics
system. They got the logistics job done only because the folks they were
fighting had an inadequate capability to interdict that system. Our
capability would have been immensely greater.
John Schaefer