LYDIA O. CHUA VS.

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. NO. 88979, February 7, 1992

Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as

much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

FACTS: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988) was enacted to
provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those
affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered
service minimum of two years.
Sec. 2.Coverage
. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over 15years as a
coterminous
employee
of
4
successive NIA
projects.
Petitioner
Lydia
Chua,
believing
that
she
is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with the NIA but was denied and
later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead offered a separation benefits of monthly basic pay for
each year of service.
a)co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners status is co-terminous employee is excluded from the benefits of R.A. No. 6683.

RULING: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because
of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was
done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by
the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law
because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen
(15) years. In four (4) governmental projects.
The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of
necessary implication, which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. The so-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One
of the rules of statutory construction used to fill the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater include the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit,
sunperinest et minus.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.

Prepared by:
NEL KRISTINE M. PEDREGOSA

JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 217,
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, and WILSON CHAM, respondents.
G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002.
The burden of proving the invalidity of law rests on those who challenge it.
FACTS: It appears that the petitioners were charged with the offense of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by P.D. No. 818 for having issued to private respondent Wilson Cham two (2) post-dated checks, to wit:
Metro Bank Check No. 464728 dated 15 January 1992 for the amount of P365,750.00, and Metro Bank Check No. 464743 dated
January 12, 1992 for the amount of P429,000.00.Check No. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF) while the second check (No. 464743) was not presented for payment upon request of
petitioner Jovencio P. Lim. Thereafter, or in June 2000, Wilson Cham filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to which petitioner spouses filed their counter-affidavit with motion to dismiss.
On 28 June 2001, the Presiding Judge of the public respondent Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217 to which said
criminal case was assigned, issued a Warrant for the Arrest of the petitioner with no bail recommended.
On 18 July 2001, petitioners filed with respondent court an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest with
application for a TRO/Injunction .However, the respondent court denied the same in an order dated 24 July 2001.
Petitioners' motion for bail filed on 24 July 2001 was summarily denied by respondent court on the same day and petitioner
Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent court and is now detained at the Quezon
City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remains at large.
ISSUE: The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties for Estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being
violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
enshrined under the Constitution.
RULING: Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely,
to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a
necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to
avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose
for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.
PD 818 Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
x
x
x
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.
Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The
burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that
PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is
incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity of laws,
presidential decrees and executive orders.] PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Prepared by:
NEL KRISTINE M. PEDREGOSA

FRANCISCO LAO LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

AND BENITO VILLACENCIO DY
G.R. NO. 87047, October 31, 1990

Where the instrument is susceptible of two interpretations, one which will make it invalid and illegal and another which
will make it valid and legal, the latter interpretation should be adopted.

FACTS: The records show that private complainant entered into contract of lease with the petitioner for a period of 3 years,
that is, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired, private respondent refused to vacate the premises, hence,
petitioner filed an ejectment suit against the former in the City Court of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 051063-CV.
The case was terminated by a judicially approved compromise agreement of the parties providing in part:
3. That the term of the lease shall be renewed every 3years retroacting from October 1979 to October 1982; after
which the above named rental shall be raised automatically by 20% every three years for as long as defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay the said increases, the defendant to give notice of his intent to renew sixty (60) days before the
expiration of the term;
By reason of said compromise agreement the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. On April
17, 1985, petitioner advised Villavicencio that he would no longer renew the contract effective October, 1985.
However, on August 5, 1985, Villavicencio informed petitioner in writing of his intention to renew the contract of
lease for another term, commencing November, 1985 to October, 1988. In reply to said letter, petitioner advised Villavicencio
that he did not agree to a renewal of the lease contract upon its expiration in October, 1985.On January 15, 1986, because of
Villavicencio's refusal to vacate the premises, petitioner filed another ejectment suit, this time with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. In its decision of September 24, 1987, said court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that:
(1) The lease contract has not expired, being a continuous one the period whereof depended upon the lessee's need
for the premises and his ability to pay the rents; and
(2) The compromise agreement entered into in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 051063-CV constitutes res judicata to
the case before it. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila which, in its decision of January 28, 1988, affirmed
the decision of the lower court.CA affirmed RTC and held that:
(a) The stipulation in the compromise agreement which, in its formulation, allows the lessee to stay on the premises
as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition and, therefore, beyond the ambit of Article 1308
of the Civil Code; and
(b) That a compromise has the effect of res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the present contract of lease, the lessee has sole power to determine its continuance or not.

RULING: NO. Contrary to the ruling of respondent court, the disputed stipulation "for as long as the defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay said increases" is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment
of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee. It is likewise a suspensive condition because the renewal of the
lease, which gives rise to a new lease, depends upon said condition. It should be noted that a renewal constitutes a new
contract of lease although with the same terms and conditions as those in the expired lease.
PETITION GRANTED.

Prepared by:
NEL KRISTINE M. PEDREGOSA