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Chua v.

Civil Service Commission


Case No. 60G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote
No.146
Facts:In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683
(2 December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary
separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those
affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary
and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.
Sec. 2.Coverage
. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of
all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of
the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority
(NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects.
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that
sheis qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January
30, 1989 with the NIA but was denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise
denied. She was instead offered a separation benefits of monthly basic pay for
each year of service.
a)co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject
to the availability of funds for the same;
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a
coterminous employee.
Held: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like
casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same
benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this
case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes thatthe denial of
petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is
unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the
benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2)
years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In
four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]

15AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in
Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of
service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission
yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1
of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special
civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act
No. 6683.

HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,


like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why
the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are
not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the
PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable
maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC
of petitioners application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after
all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.

[G.R. No. 149276.February 26, 2002]


LIM AND LIM vs. PEOPLE, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 26
2002.
G.R. No. 149276(Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. People of the Philippines, et al.)
In their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedures,
petitioner spouses assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree 818 which
amended Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly imposing
excessive or no bail on accused; imposes excessive fines and inflicts cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment; violates the due process clause under the constitution; and
was not published in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
It appears that the petitioners were charged with the offense of Estafa under Art.
315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 818 for having
issued to private respondent Wilson Cham two (2) post-dated checks, to wit:Metro
Bank Check No. 464728 dated 15 January 1992 for the amount of P365,750.00, and
Metro Bank Check No. 464743 dated January 12, 1992 for the amount of
P429,000.00.Check No. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF) while the second check (No. 464743) was not
presented for payment upon request of petitioner Jovencio P. Lim.Thereafter, or in
June 2000, Wilson Cham filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to which petitioner spouses filed their counter-affidavit
with motion to dismiss.
On 16 February 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause
against the petitioners and recommending the filing of an information against them
for estafa defined in Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D.
No. 818 with no bail recommended.On the same day, an Information was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, charging petitioners with estafa under Art.
315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-01-101574.
On 28 June 2001, the Presiding Judge of the public respondent Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 217 to which said criminal case was assigned, issued a
Warrant for the Arrest of the petitioner with no bail recommended.
On 18 July 2001, petitioners filed with respondent court an Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and Warrant of Arrest with application for a TRO/Injunction.However,
the respondent court denied the same in an order dated 24 July 2001.

Petitioners' motion for bail filed on 24 July 2001 was summarily denied by
respondent court on the same day and petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue
of the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent court and is now detained at the
Quezon City Jail.However, petitioner Teresita Lim remains at large.
Hence, this petition.
In our resolution dated 28 August 2001, the respondents were required to Comment
on the petition.Private respondent, through counsel, filed his comment on 15 October
2001.On the other hand, the OSG has requested for four (4) extensions to file its
Comment prompting the petitioner to file two (2) Urgent Motions to resolve prayer to
allow petitioner Jovencio Lim to post bail bond, to which an opposition was filed by
private respondent.
Undaunted, petitioners' counsel filed on 29 January 2001, a Manifestation and Motion
bringing to Our attention Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated 6 November
2001 amending the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving Estafa under Art. 315, 2(d) as
amended by P.D. 818 and Qualified Theft, which now allows bail in such cases, thus:
"x x x
"(3)Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail
shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2(a)
of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00 plus an
additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00;
Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed
P60,000.00"
In view of the aforecited Circular No. 74 of the Department of Justice, the
intendment and provision of which would benefit the accused, the Court hereby
resolves to grant the prayer of petitioner Jovencio Lim to post bail pending resolution
on the merits of his petition for Certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, branch 217 is directed, within 10 days from notice, to allow petitioners
to post bail in accordance with the provisions of Department of Justice Circular No.
74 dated November 6, 2001.
This case is now closed and terminated.(Puno, J., no part)
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002]

JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of
bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative
of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and
documentary proofs, follow.
In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two
postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in
the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in
the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not
presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the
dishonored check.
When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no.
464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa
under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.
On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable
cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for
estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of
estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter,
the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners, thus:
It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the
complaining witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime
charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the
arrest of the accused be issued.
No Bail Recommended.
SO ORDERED.[1]

On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and
Warrant of Arrest which was denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners motion
for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same
day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued
by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner
Teresita Lim remained at large.
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions
on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of
Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated
November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as
follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable


penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based
on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail
Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the
total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.
In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no
longer be discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates
Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
x

Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. x x x.
We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in
contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this regard, the
impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200
pesos.
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is
P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of
imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and
disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate
of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment.
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel,
degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution.[2] Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the
statute involved is cruel and degrading.
In People vs. Tongko,[3] this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as
cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or
in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the
like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman.
Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for
estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not
increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original
amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained the same
notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificant compared to the
present value of the peso.
This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically
and categorically stated in the following:
WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases
committed by means of bouncing checks;
WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples
confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial
transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and
the undermining of the banking system of the country;

WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa
cases by increasing the existing penalties provided therefor.
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was
motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that
undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a
necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD
818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves
that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert
was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing
checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we
conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.
Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in
favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.[4] The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge
it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III
of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim
is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due
process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive
orders.[5] PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.[6]
With the foregoing considerations
constitutionality of PD 818.

in

mind,

this

Court

upholds

the

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.


SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part due to relation to counsel.
Mendoza, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 87047 October 31, 1990FRANCISCO LAO LIMvs.COURT OF APPEALS


and BENITO VILLAVICENCIO DY, respondents.
FACTS:
First Ejectment Case:
Private respondent entered into a contract of lease with petitioner for a period
of three (3) years,that is, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired,
private respondent refused to vacate the premises, hence, petitioner filed an
ejectment suit against the Lao Lim. The case was terminated by a judicially approved
compromise agreement of the parties providing in part:

That the term of the lease shall be renewed every three years retroacting from
October 1979 to October 1982;after which the above-named rental shall be raised
automatically by 20% every three years for as long as defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay the said increases, the defendant to give notice of
his intent to renew sixty (60) days before the expiration of the term;
By reason of said compromise agreement the lease continued from 1979 to 1982,
then from 1982to 1985. On April 17, 1985, Dy advised Lao Lim that he would no
longer renew the contract effective October, 1985.
3
However, on August 5, 1985, private Lao Lim informed petitioner inwriting of his
intention to renew the contract of lease for another term, commencing
November,1985 to October, 1988. In reply to said letter, Dy advised private
respondent that he did not agreeto a renewal of the lease contract upon its
expiration in October, 1985.
5
Second Ejectment Case:
On January 15, 1986, because of private Lao Lims refusal to vacate the premises,
Dy filed another
ejectment suit, this time with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
114659-CV. Inits decision of September 24, 1987, said court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that (1) thelease contract has not expired, being a
continuous one the period whereof depended upon thelessee's need for the premises
and his ability to pay the rents; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into in
the aforesaid Civil Case No. 051063-CV constitutes
res judicata
to the case before it.Dy appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila which, in its
decision of January 28, 1988 in CivilCase No. 87-42719, affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
ISSUE:
Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on
the premises aslong as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
HELD:
No, since the stipulation for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can
meet and pay saidincreases
is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of
leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee

1
Laidziii: Case Digest in Oblicon

A
Different Kinds of Obligations: Pure and Conditional Obligations #2
G.R. No. 87047 October 31, 1990FRANCISCO LAO LIM
vs.
CA and BENITOVILLAVICENCIO DY
THE CASE:
CA having affirmed
in toto
on June 30, 1988 in CA-G.R.SP No. 13925, the decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch XLVI in
Civil Case No. 87-42719, entitled "Francisco Lao Lim vs. Benito Villavicencio Dy, "petitioner
seeks the reversal of such affirmance in the instant petition.
FACTS:
The records show that Villavicencio entered into a contract of lease with petitioner for a
period of three(3) years, that is, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired,
Villavicencio refused to vacate the premises, hence, petitioner filed an ejectment suit
against the former in the City Court of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 051063CV.The case was terminated by a judicially approved compromise agreement of the parties
providing in part:

3. That the term of the lease shall be renewed every3years retroacting from October 1979
to October1982; after which the above named rental shall be raised automatically by 20%
every three years for as long as defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay the
said increases, the defendant to give notice of his intent to renew sixty (60) days before
the expiration of the term;

By reason of said compromise agreement the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then from
1982 to1985. On April 17, 1985, petitioner advised Villavicencio that he would no longer
renew the contract effective October, 1985.
However, on August 5, 1985, Villavicencio informed petitioner in writing of his intention to
renew the contract of lease for another term, commencing November, 1985 to October,
1988. In reply to said letter, petitioner advised Villavicencio that he did not agree to a
renewal of the lease contract upon its expiration in October, 1985.On January 15, 1986,
because of Villavicencio's refusal to vacate the premises, petitioner filed another
ejectment suit, this time with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In its decision of
September 24,1987, said court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that:(1)
the lease contract has not expired, being a continuous one the period whereof depended
upon the lessee's need for the premises and his ability to pay the rents; and(2)
the compromise agreement entered into in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 051063-CV
constitutes
res judicata

to the case before it. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila which, in its decision of
January 28, 1988, affirmed the decision of the lower court.CA affirmed RTC and held that:
(1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which, in its formulation, allows the lessee
tostay on the premises as long as he needs it andcan pay rents is valid, being a
resolutorycondition and, therefore, beyond the ambit of Article 1308 of the Civil Code; and
(2) that a compromise has the effect of
res judicata
.
ISSUE:
Was the stipulation in the compromise agreementwhich allows the lessee to stay on the
premises aslong as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
RULING:
No. The decision of respondent CA is REVERSED andSET ASIDE.
HELD:
The disputed stipulation "for as long as the defendantneeded the premises and can meet
and pay saidincreases" is a
purely potestative condition
becauseit leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leaseholdrights to the sole and exclusive
will of the lessee.It is likewise a
suspensive condition
because therenewal of the lease, which gives rise to a new lease,depends upon said
condition. It should be noted thata renewal constitutes a new contract of leasealthough
with the same terms and conditions as thosein the expired lease.

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