VALENZUELA vs CA, Richard Li and ALEXANER COMMERCIAL, INC.

FACTS:
Accg to Plaintiff:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a
blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires;
she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was
flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear
to open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will
help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant,
which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's
car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh
Accdg to defendant:
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at
55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic
was light. He was suddenly confronted with a car coming from the opposite direction,
travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved
to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which
he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted.
TC held defendant was liable and also its employer corporation to whom the car was
registered. CA affirmed, with modification in not holding corporation liable.
ISSUE:
1. WON plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence
2. WON car-owner corporation is jointly and solidarily liable
HELD;
NO
YES, Art 2180
RATIO:
Re CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection.

In the case at bar, Li alleges that Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection
was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. COURT DISAGREES
An actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from
persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.
EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.
Examples of Emergency rule:
Victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two
children suddenly darting into the street the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the
best means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children
In the case at bar,
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not
be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to
the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her
car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that
she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others." 23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
ISSUE 2: relationship of Li and Corporation car owner:
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which
holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the
liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28
Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident
the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art
2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is
introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in
selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is overcome. The question of
diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.

Re COMPANY CARS an Employers liability. WHEN:

When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in
effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the
privilege reasonably and responsively.
provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent.
As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to
it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of
a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li
as well as the corporation to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li
and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company
car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it
gave full and unlimited use of a company car. 31 Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company
Del San Transport Lines vs. C&A Construction, Inc.
GR 156034 October 1, 2003
Facts:
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by
the National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas
Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was completed in 1994 but it was
not formally turned over to NHA.
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of
installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of
October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report
from his radio head operator in Japan5 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about
eight (8) hours.7 At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep
tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was
already congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of
Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were
already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to
counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To
avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.9 He succeeded in avoiding
the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full
astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.10 The damage caused by the
incident amounted to P456,198.24.
Issues:

WON Capt. Jusep is guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North
Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994?
WON Del San Transport Lines is solidary liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for
the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Held:
YES, YES.
Ratio:
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was
negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator
in Japan19 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours.21 This, notwithstanding, he
did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at
the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot
be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if
the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that
determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate
and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the
typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours
thinking that the typhoon might change direction.22 He cannot claim that he waited for the sun
to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because
of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he
did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy23 and
there was no weather disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation.25 Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater
chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they
docked was very near North Harbor.26 Even if the latter was already congested, he would still
have time to seek refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly,
the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep
found himself was caused by his own negligence.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also
the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty.
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt.
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen
be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence
in supervising its employees.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated

rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly
implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner
should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents failure to allege in its
complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,31 it was held that it is not
necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees,
inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence against
the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make
out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Martinez vs. Buskirk
GR L-5691 December 27, 1910
Facts:
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was
riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the lefthand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to
which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to
that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at
great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and
stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that
instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata
occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said
plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself
and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the
cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon
had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied
the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went
back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that
while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle
drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which
frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was
unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came
into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was
riding. The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Issue:
Old Civil Code ata pero dito kasi based yung issue .

Art. 1902.
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903.
The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible. The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
WON an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and
capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed
upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
Held:
Note: Persons case under customs.
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage
were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven
one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit,
during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the
accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no
accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise
in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered
merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant
on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case.
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the
injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like
circumstances. It cannot be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the
disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some person all
the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury from
the facts of each case

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable
or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which
have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason
why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf
Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are
not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate
against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and that
only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was
performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and
Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554)
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of
merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury,
in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the
custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public
now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the
practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces,
the custom of a people? We think not.
Tison vs Pomasin
GR 173180 August 24, 2011
Facts:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni)
was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer,
driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga
City.

The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the
passengers side. He testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going
downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching
on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further
causing death and injuries to its passengers.
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he
noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it
began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To
avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a
tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-

trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise
damaged.[4]
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His
daughter, Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham
Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and
granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His wife,
Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce,
Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol
sustained injuries.[5] On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the
tractor-trailer were injured.
Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to
respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each immediately after the accident and
P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorios daughters. Cynthia, in
turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners.
Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the
accident at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00 for hospitalization, medical and burial
expenses; P350,000.00 for continuous hospitalization and medical expenses of Spouses
Pomasin; P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P30,000.00 for loss of income of Cynthia; P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P1,000.00
per court appearance; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses; and cost of suit.
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately
caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses
Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.
Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents filed the instant
complaint to harass them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners
counterclaimed for damages.

Issue:
WON the testimony of Claudio Jabon or Laarni Pomasin was to be given more credence
by the court? Who was negligent?
WON the the lack of authority of Jabon to drive a tractor in his license is the proximate
cause of the accident?
Held:
The testimony of Claudio Jabon is to be given more weight, Laarni Pomasin was
negligent.
The problem in the license of Jabon is not the proximate cause of the accident.
Ratio:
First Issue:
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding
greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the
tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.

One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his
concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger. The trial court
expounded, thus:
In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration is their
opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they
testify to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which
oftentimes happen merely momentarily or in the split of a second. In the case of a running or
travelling vehicle, especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in
ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving continuously from moment to
moment even in long trips. While in the case of a mere passenger, he does not have to direct
his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he may converse with
other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle,
as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to, rendering his opportunity for observation on
the precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately preceding thereto not as much as
that of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. So that as between
the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru
their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case,
the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a
mere passenger of Plaintiffs vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as
much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver, consequently the capacity for
observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point of
inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the
passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the drivers
seat especially in nighttime, thus rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the
antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver. This being so, this Court is
more inclined to believe the story of defendants driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven by
Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag
manner and in the process the two vehicles approaching each other from opposite directions
at highway speed came in contact with each other, the zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender
of the truck all the way to the fuel tank, the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the
jitney, being thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck.
The appellate court labelled the trial courts rationalization as a sweeping conjecture*19+ and
countered that Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a
clear view of the incident despite the fact that he was not driving.
While it is logical that a drivers attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere
passenger, it should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly
circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow that between
the opposing testimonies of a driver and a passenger, the former is more credible. The factual
setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered.
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent.
The recollection of Gregorio veered from curving and downward to uphill. On this point,
Jabon and his testimony is more credible.

The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial
courts conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the
original testimony of Gregorio that the road was curving and downward. It is this conclusion,
prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorios testimony, that gives credence to the further
testimony of Jabon that the herein respondents jitney, loaded with passengers with top-load
was running in a zigzag manner.
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the
road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag
manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of
evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of
the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was
running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon
should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the
tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case,
leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a
tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Second Issue:
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person
was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation
was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is
without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.[28] Likewise
controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals[29] where we reiterated that
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in
itself in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did
not attempt to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the
injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these
violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist.
Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the
accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the
cyclists own liability. We took the occasion to state that:

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a
legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact
there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer drivers
restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to
sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including
restriction code 8 in his license.
Malayan Insurance Co. vs. Alberto
GR 194320 February 1, 2012
Facts:
At around 5 oclock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the
corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a
Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker
with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number PDL 297; and (4) a
Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732.

Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer
1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi
Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All
three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo
Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the
rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were
shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear
right portion of the Isuzu Tanker. Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994,
Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the aforementioned
Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own damage and theft, among others.
Having insured the vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its
Complaint dated October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured
amounting to PhP 700,000.

Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by
operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several
demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes
(Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck,
requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents
refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint
for damages for gross negligence against respondents.

In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular
accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver.
They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the service road of EDSA, maneuvered
its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes right of way. When the
Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action
could not cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence,
the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the
rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand, sideswiped the
Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the latter in the amount of PhP 20,000.
Respondents also controverted the results of the Police Report, asserting that it was
based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus driver.

After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued. Malayan Insurance
presented the testimony of its lone witness, a motor car claim adjuster, who attested
that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the documents
submitted to him. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in Civil Case No. 99-95885, ruled in
favor of Malayan Insurance and declared respondents liable for damages. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff against defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint;
2. Attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and;
3. Cost of suit.
Issue:
WON the police report is admissible evidence to support the claim of Malayan
insurance?
WON there was a valid subrogation to Malayan of the claim of damages of the insured owner of
the Mitsubishi gallant?
Held:
Yes it is admissible.
Yes there is a valid subrogation.
Ratio:
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially
since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in evidence.[16]
Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating
police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness
knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned
from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.

As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are
entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in
evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been
acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the
above requisites could be adequately proved.
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report,
and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1
Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third
requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports presentation in evidence;
thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so.[ As a result, the police report is still
admissible in evidence
We agree with Malayan Insurance. Even if We consider the inadmissibility of the police
report in evidence, still, respondents cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. The D.M. Consunji, Inc. case is quite elucidating:
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa
loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was
negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality

speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or
some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care.
In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties
disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in
turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the reckless
driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which allegation is totally
unsupported by any evidence on record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is
astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or
driver of the Nissan Bus.
What is at once evident from the instant case, however, is the presence of all the requisites
for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. As explained in
D.M. Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening
of the accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the
following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.[29]
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi
Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the
Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no
contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently,
all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby
creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the
presumption of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the contrary. It
is unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any evidence before the trial
court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing

the complaint for Malayan Insurances adverted failure to prove negligence on the part of
respondents.
Validity of Subrogation
Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced
by the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt[31] presented by
it before the trial court. Respondents, however, claim that the documents presented by
Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important details that would show proper
subrogation.
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all the opportunity, but failed to object to the
presentation of its evidence. Thus, and as We have mentioned earlier, respondents are deemed
to have waived their right to make an objection. As this Court held in Asian Construction and
Development Corporation v. COMFAC Corporation:
The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court
cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. We note that ASIAKONSTRUCTs counsel of
record before the trial court, Atty. Bernard Dy, who actively participated in the initial stages of
the case stopped attending the hearings when COMFAC was about to end its presentation.
Thus, ASIAKONSTRUCT could not object to COMFACs offer of evidence nor present evidence
in its defense; ASIAKONSTRUCT was deemed by the trial court to have waived its chance to do
so.
Note also that when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so state in
the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first
time on appeal. Because of a partys failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the
evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising
from the offer of evidence properly presented.
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt
presented by Malayan Insurance are already part of the evidence on record, and since it is not
disputed that the insurance company, indeed, paid PhP 700,000 to the assured, then there is a
valid subrogation in the case at bar. As explained in Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation:
Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful claim or
right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or
claim, including its remedies or securities. The principle covers a situation wherein an insurer
has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to
the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy. It contemplates
full substitution such that it places the party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may
use all means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment.
We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as an equitable assignment
to the insurer of all the remedies that the insured may have against the third party whose
negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor

does it grow out of, any privity of contract. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance
company of the insurance claim. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in equity. It is
designed to promote and to accomplish justice; and is the mode that equity adopts to compel
the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to
pay.
Considering the above ruling, it is only but proper that Malayan Insurance be subrogated to the
rights of the assured.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA
GR 137873 April 20, 2001
*Hindi ko masyado ma gets to, paki try basahin in the original pero try ko explain din sa Monday.
Facts:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a
report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:

[The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he
was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as
carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2
meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners
and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole
[p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core,
Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save
his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to
the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

Issue:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building
to the basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting
to his death.
The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has
a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees.
On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site
with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No
contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband*;] thus[,] the last
requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it
"proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the
elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for
the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from
arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances
for the application of the doctrine has been established.1wphi1.nt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed
before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn statement,
the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover,
the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in
arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners
employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the
lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said
statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the
cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut
the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or
to establish any defense relating to the incident.

DR. EMMANUEL JARCIA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

-Res ipsa loquitur Roy Jr. (son of Mrs. Santiago complainant in this case) was hit by a taxicab.
He was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment where he was
attended by intern doctor, Dr. Jarcia and resident doctor, Dr. Bastan.
An X-ray of the victims ankle was ordered and its result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia.
Dr. Bastan also examined Roy and informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that
was hit, there was no need to examine the upper leg.
However, eleven (11) days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and
misalignment of the right foot so Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital and the X-ray
revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone.
Hence, Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a complaint with the (NBI) against the petitioners
for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy Jr., to suffer serious
physical injuries.
NBI indorsed the complaint to the Prosecutors office and a case was filed before the RTC.
RTC ruling: The Court finds the accused guilty for simple imprudence resulting to physical
injuries.
ELEMENTS of imprudence:
The elements of imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing
or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
CA ruling: Affirmed lower courts decision , sustained the judgment of conviction against the
accused for the crime of simple imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, applying the res
ipsa loquitor doctrine.
ISSUE:
WoN the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case NO
WoNor not the petitioners are liable for criminal negligence. NO

HELD/RULING:
[1] NO. The court ruled that theres only CIVIL NEGLIGENCE here and that res ipso loquitur doctrine is
inapplicable due that the petitioners are merely resident doctors of the hospital and the injuries
suffered by Roy were not under the exclusive control of the petitioners.

res ipsa loquitur : "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or
a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case,
is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the
plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
REQS for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the
person injured.
In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.s injury and the series of tests that were
supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the
exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the
Manila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency room. While it may
be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not through the scholarly
assumptions of a layman like the patients mother, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert

witness/es. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating
patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion.

[2] NO as to CRIMINIAL NEGLIGENCE. ACQUITTED.

RE CIVIL NEGLIGENCE: In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to

determine the extent of Roy Jr.s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their duties as members
of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that they did not have the capacity to make
such thorough evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another doctor with
sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right.
Basis: Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in
the Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously. He
should secure for them all possible benefits that may depend upon his professional skill
and care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the physicians failure to fulfill his obligation to
his patients is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is
discreditable and inexcusable.
RE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE:
As residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were expected to know the medical
protocol in treating leg fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents. However, no precise evidence
and scientific explanation pointing to the fact that the delay in the application of the cast to the patients
fractured leg because of failure to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the patient, prolonged the
pain of the child or aggravated his condition or even caused further complications. Any person may opine
that had patient Roy Jr. been treated properly and given the extensive X-ray examination, the extent and
severity of the injury, spiral fracture of the mid-tibial part or the bigger bone of the leg, could have been
detected early on and the prolonged pain and suffering of Roy Jr. could have been prevented. But still, that
opinion, even how logical it may seem would not, and could not, be enough basis to hold one
criminally liable; thus, a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt.