Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.

PBM
51 SCRA 189 June 5, 1973

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed
out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which
may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their
jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.

Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are
absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being
sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of
the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which
made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court
a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that
the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the
NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit.
Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals sent a check payable to Catolico as
a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug
Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary,
and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that
there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GSIS

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
6
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business
of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of
Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role
as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion
call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued
that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the
national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution,
and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification
of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the
WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same
time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

*T+he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control

of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic
trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in
the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative
guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion
of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no
patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise
of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between
the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy
makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @

"JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.
FACTS: Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old
girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely
lacerated on the right side, though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant
guilty as charged and was sentenced to death.
Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza
testified that appellant confessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which
was submitted as evidence for the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the waiver
was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. On the other hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an
interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant
accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were about 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer
assisted appellant during the interview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI,
who testified that it was possible that the lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt other
than the male organ.
ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which appellant claimed to have been
obtained from him were admissible.
HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only in writing and with assistance of
counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this
prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters.
For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17,
1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore,
already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12 (1) of the Constitution applied to him. . . .
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the
alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in
evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso
Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during
interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers
without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between
a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.

PEOPLE v MENDOZA
G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found her husband,
Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the spouses
only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with parricide and
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio
Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No.
41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first securing the necessary license or permit
therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced, following
which, a judgment of conviction was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the funeral, wake, burial and incidental
expenses that said Alipio Eusebio spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.
And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;
2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.

Plus costs of the proceedings.

Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine
Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and penalized
under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.
The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby forfeited in favor of
the government together with all the ammunitions.
With costs against the accused.
Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered committed to the Bureau
of Corrections.
The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable
documents, in grave violation of accuseds constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the minor
daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof to
the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the police investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite the
police investigators undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the decisively
clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of parricide
was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.)

the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating
circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old daughter attended the
birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza. While the party was going on,
accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer. When it was time
for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave,
proceeding directly to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias (p. 4,
Appellees Brief.).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 oclock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet there. After a
while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilias parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some perfume for Cecilias
brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 oclock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of the
subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilias god-daughter, and they hitched a ride
home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were
on but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accused-appellant did not respond. A moment
later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the masters
bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to
douse him. She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She change her clothes and readied
herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine
having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her
room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw
accused-appellant hiding a gun under the bed in her parents room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked Charmaine to call
her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not believe Charmaine and talked to
accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had been shot
and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he would be
arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia into accusedappellants car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital to
investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. Thereafter , the policemen
invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III,
Pamplona, Las Pias. While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked inside Gabacs

waist. He promptly told Gabac Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril. Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38
caliber revolver with Serial No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the
gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime scene to respond to the call of accusedappellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughters death, and that valuables were being taken out of
his daughters house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including
accused-appellants personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated
November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander,
580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt
Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There was also a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine
Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for
Personnel which described the firearm as One Colt Revolver SN 41001 (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night of
November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and
that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still supporting her parents as well
as her brothers and sisters.
Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death threats
over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and perfumes
business. She also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her by workers from Saudi Arabia to be
sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 oclock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his wife,
Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they proceeded to
the masters bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him goodnight. He and his wife were then left alone in their
room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money and uttered Dad, okey na. She also brought out the .38
caliber revolver from her bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn, November
16, 1992, pp. 21-28).
Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their
room. When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the
backdoor of their house which banged. Consequently, he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from the
backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his concern over his wifes
condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a while, he
called up his brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and the two of them
then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant about the incident,
but he refused to comment. He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the advice of his
relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the police about the incident.

Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on February 28,
1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied possession of a .38 caliber
revolver, he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968 and 1969 (tsn, November
16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to have
sired children by another woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defenses theory that the victim was engaged in illegal activities
which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the opportunity and the
propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all elements
which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that no proof had
been established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that
the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission
of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt (People vs. Damao,
253 SCRA 146 [1996]).
During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes,
Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter Charmaine, and his
now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot to death, no one was there except these three
persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his innocence by denying that he killed his wife,
insinuating that another person is the killer. This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of accused-appellant that some
convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought,
a devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accused-appellant even refused to give any statement or comment to
the police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by
somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but natural for him, as a husband to
cooperate with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the
alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and instead, he took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about
the incident when the police conducted the investigation, which is rather odd if he really were innocent. Verily it was
only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came out with the story about the handy intruder. He
kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his fatherin-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to observe the
witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest
respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).
As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family went to the
birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact was shown when
accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without informing them where he would be. The victims

father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had been
quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends
that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents
him on account of his having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The Court
finds improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose
but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to believe
that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory that when
Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a naturally spontaneous narration, but
rather evidently a coached one. According to to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced
accused-appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this, being in
accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her, at a very
tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects as shown by the act of embracing
him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the trial court correctly disregarded the
same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after her mothers
death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the custody of accused-appellant who was
allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant,
hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act. Such contradictory statements
should not discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of the case (People
vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this
can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change
discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony for
the prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither are
we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon her
father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellants denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin test conducted
on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal weapon,
and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute between
him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went, and not about the fact
that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal
weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother

was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio
Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to
him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accused-appellant is
further established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing
him to carry the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally procured
in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against
unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule
that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person
from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law
Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol, the
certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive
Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accused-appellant,
the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with
the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that he is not. And when
circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it
cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546
[1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates
man is all too plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No.
1866 was committed, fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997
amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22,
1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot
be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital
penalty was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old
hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his
competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be
sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a
postal delivery van.

Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel,
Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At
1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio
C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero.

Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should favour
him as an accused.

Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect and petitioners
extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence

Held:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who is not a
habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

SERRANO VS NLRC
G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting
measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given
separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security
section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employers good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the
services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and
efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be
reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned
should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering
dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that
article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is
dismissed renders the termination without legal effect.

Domino vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]
Facts:
Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of
Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter
of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for
reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner.

2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May
1998 election
Ruling:
1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code over a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine
whether false representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy including the residence
requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means
the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but
acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot located
therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in
Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original
domicile.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner
and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he
is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from
which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations

specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to
be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not
to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified
compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the
only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and
write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

Yrasuegui v. PAL, 569 SCRA 467 (2008)

Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL,herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed.
Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.