California Fire Journal
America's Fire Dangerous Buildings and
The Non Sprinklered High Rise
By Richard M. Patton
The owners of highrise buildings like to quote fire statis-
tics that "prove" a person is safer from fire in an office
building than a baby is in his mother's arms. The overall
statistics are very good. But that's only part of the story.
There's much more to tell.
Old High Rises are Getting More Fire Dangerous
The older nonsprinklered high rises are getting more dan-
gerous. For one thing, communication cables now exten-
sively snake through all floors. Despite lab certifications
these cables do burn. I've surveyed many high rise build-
ings as a fire protection engineer, and found that fire rated
floor slabs were often penetrated (opened up) in nonstan-
dard ways. Push up a lay-in ceiling panel near the vertical
shaft. Often you find that large "non-sealed" holes in the
shaft above the ceiling are "normal operating procedure."
Thus, the shaft plus the cables became a clear path for fire
spread from basement to roof.
Buildings are loaded with more combustibles today, more
plush interiors, more plastics, more "highly toxic gas" pro-
ducing materials, more electronic gadgetry, more fire haz-
ards than ever before.
Exits are Voided
Years ago, during a many decade period when the Fire
Safety Establishment shunned the concept of a life safety
oriented fire sprinkler system, and early fire control, and
instead relied solely on building construction controls; the
exit was the heart of the "fire solution." The mentality at
that time was, in a nutshell, flee the fire--get out of the
building when a fire occurs.
Most high rises are essentially exitless buildings today. A
10-20-or 30-story stairway, at the very best, is a tortuous
exit path. At worst, it is an impossible one.
Has there ever been a major high rise fire (say most or all
of one floor completely involved) where the interior stair-
ways were not blocked by smoke? A high rise traps smoke
about as effectively as a sieve holds water. The "stack ef-
fect" sucks the smoke into the stairways like a thirsty kid
sucks soda up through a straw. Smoke doesn't just flow
up the stairs either, it flows up through the entire building
endangering those above the fire floor.
The elevator industry got hit with legal actions after some
high rise fire deaths in New York City. The occupants
were trapped in the cars on the fire floors (improper con-
trols were the cause). The industry then took the easy way
out. Instead of making the elevators safe exits during a fire
(technically not difficult) they maneuvered through a
"national" elevator code which solved their liability prob-
lems. The code mandates that when a fire alarm operates,
the elevators automatically go to the ground floor-express.
Then the cars sit there until the fire enginesarrive. The ele-
vator itself is now the safest thing in the high rise; but the
people are quite another matter.
When the engines arrive, those on the upper floors may
already be trapped, and already tasting the smoke. Safe
use of the elevators above the fire floor may be impossible
at this time, because the changes needed to make elevators
safe never occurred. Thus, the firemen must attempt to
gain control from below as the fire works its way upward
toward those trapped above.
Flashover
From the turn of the century up until the late 1960's only a
limited number of "fire experts" were aware of the flash-
over phenomenon. Until I began writing about this pheno-
menon, explaining how it "defeated" the building code
plan, it was an "in house" secret of the fire protection com-
munity for decades.
Flashover is the mechanism by which seemingly solid com-
bustibles such as office furnishing, can bum within a build-
ing in a manner similar to the way a flammable liquid flash-
es. (See the Patton authored article, "Pouring Gasoline on
the Ceiling," available on request.) Today flashover is
finally "out of the closet" and increasingly the fire services
are recognizing it as the primary cause of flash fires and
fire deaths in buildings.
It's the Contents Fire (Not the Building Type)
That Counts
During the time period prior to the 1970's, fire specialists
considered a building's fire potential to be a function of its
basic construction. The concrete and steel "fireproof ' build-
ing was considered an "inherently safe" building. The fire
specialists ignored the fire potential of the combustible con-
tents of the building. Having made the building "fireproof'
they believed there was no need to protect against the "con-
tents fire." Thus, there was no need for an automatic fire
control system.
What these "experts" closed their eyes to was the potential
for the furnishings to bum, just as fuel burns within a fur-
nace; and they especially ignored the potential for the interi-
or fire to flash so rapidly as to overwhelm the "building
code fire safety features" built into the building.
The history of fire in America during this century has been
primarily a history of rapidly spreading (post flashover)
contents fires defeating the "fireproof' box.
 California Fire Journal
The high rise is merely 10 or 20 fireproof boxes, piled one
on top of the other, each filled with things that can bum
and flash. The penchant of the owners to believe that their
own particular fireproof boxes are special, and not subject
to flash fires, is more wishful thinking than reality.
Fire Fighting Considerations
There is one major reason why the highrise office building
has so far had a good fire record--and it is not that the high
rise owners have been superlative building managers, fire
safety wise. In fact, many owners just flat out believe they
do not have a fire problem to begin with (so why do any-
thing unless you're forced to?).
The reason why disastrous high rise fires have been infre-
quent is because most such buildings have been located in
downtown areas of major cities where fire department man-
power and equipment was enormous, and just minutes
away. Today, the high rise has moved into the suburb, the
windows have been sealed shut, the interior combustibility
has increased, and the fire department even in the city is
losing ground to urban economics.
Manual control of a fire that may occur 5, 10, or 20 floors
above the street is always a gamble because the firemen
must approach from below the fire, and the people who
are subject to dying are above the fire. Smoke still rises in
a fire, and it goes up through a high rise like water through
a sieve.
And, when the high rise moved out of the big city core
area into the suburbs, the gamble went up another notch.
Somehow, it just makes sense, to control that fire
automatically, before the manual control facilities are tested
to the utmost.
The Potential
The high rise building owners are correct when they point
out that about 80 percent of all fire deaths occur in the
home or other residential type buildings; not the high rise
office building.
But, if the small but frequent fire is a legitimate concern,
so also is the INFREQUENT HOLOCAUST! Do we ig-
nore safety controls for the airline industry because most
transportation deaths are caused by the automobile?
There are two very frightening matters relative to the high
rise office building fire potential.
Number 1 is that there are 1000 to 2000 --possibly 5000--
lives or more at risk to a single fire.
Number 2 is that the predominant code system in the U.S.
still does not adequately acknowledge the danger.
The National Fire Protection Association Building Code
(Life Safety Code NFPA No. 101) will allow nearly all
buildings, even a new high rise to be built with no auto-
matic control of the contents fire. This defies logic. If the
building itself warrants FIREPROOFING--including from
two to four hours worth of fire sheathing on the steel
columns--to withstand the expected internal fire; then it
would seem the people inside are worth a fire control sys-
tem because the people can not be fireproofed.
So, the high rise is a serious problem. Thousands of lives
are at risk to a single fire and in general conditions are
slowly getting worse relative to existing nonsprinldered
buildings; but as of yet the fire code system has not prop-
erly identified the problem or defined practical solutions.
Nor has the public been given proper and adequate
information to deal with the problem.
The Responsibility of the Fire Official
The fire official's number 1 responsibility is to protect hu-
man life from fire. Where a serious potential for major loss
of life exists, the official has two obligations, or so it
would seem.
The first is to inform his superiors, and especially the pub-
lic of the problems. Without help from above, and support
from the people, it is not possible to create the solutions
needed.
Without an informed citizenry, even the top men of govern-
ment cannot get the job done. Government needs the sup-
port of the people to be successful. So, the identifying the
problem and informing the public are the first things the
official should do to safeguard the public.
The second responsibility of the public official is to devise
practical ways of solving the problem. Providing infor-
mation as to the danger is not enough, there must be pro-
grams set in motion to eventually eliminate the danger.
So, the offical should take two actions relative to the fire
danger of existing high rise buildings, one is to "level"
with the public, the other is to plan the corrections.
Both of these actions may require the fire official to move
in ways not yet sanctioned by the code system. The honest
analysis of the fire problem will, of necessity, deal with
the ways the NFPA code system has failed to solve the
problem and even today hinders the solutions. Even
though such revelations may be painful to the fire official,
because of past relationships, failure to adequately inform
the public would be a new negative on top of old nega-
tives, and this could be a "prime cause" in the event of a
major holocaust involving hundreds of lives.
The second thing that may require the fire official to move
in ways different than that currently prescribed by the
codes, is the need for practical solutions to the high rise
problem.
All of the following are truths:
1. Nearly all existing high rises are NOT protected against
the internal fire.
2. Virtually ALL such buildings have sufficient loading of
combustibles so as to make the building subject to a
FLASHOVER fire. The flashover fire can, and often has,
43
 California Fire Journal
defeated the "building code plan" of fire safety (the com-
partments, fireproofing and exits).
3. A post flashover fire can and will generate enormous
quantities of deadly gases that will rise rapidly upward
within the fireproof building even as the exit ways are
being blocked. In short, a post flashover fire has an
ENORMOUS potential to kill.
The solving of the high rise problem can NOT be achieved
within the framework of the existing NFPA code system.
For starters, the SOLUTION will require a much more
practical fire sprinkler system--a fire sprinkler system not
currently allowed by the codes.
And the SOLUTION requires a major redirecting of the
overall fire safety plan for buildings. This includes a de-
emphasis of the regulating of the structure itself, and a
greater emphasis on a control of the interior fire. These
essentials to a viable plan for correcting the problem are
contrary to the motives of the current code system.
So, the bottom line is this:
1. Our cities are excessively fire dangerous today. The
existing nonsprinklered high rise is a primary problem.
2. Fire officials and other public officials have an
obligation to initiate corrective action, including dissemin-
ating full and frank information to the public.
3. The long term solution will require a "breaking away"
from the traditional code concepts which created the prob-
lems to begin with.
In short, the public official cannot do his duty to the public
and conceal the negatives of the code system at the same
time. The corrective action requires a departure from the
failed policies of the past.
The Basics of the Solution
All of the following will be found to be necessary to the
correcting of the fire dangerous buildings of our cities,
especially the high rise fire dangerous buildings.
1.The creation of new sprinkler system design parameters
to make retrofit fire sprinkler systems practical.
2. Tax incentives for retrofitting, plus a tax base that sets a
higher tax rate on a more dangerous building; just as a
higher insurance rate is applied to the fire prone building.
3. The requiring of mandatory liability insurance cover-
ages at adequate levels to properly compensate all those
who may die or be maimed in a building fire due to the
disregard of the potential of the "contents"fire. There is a
potential to kill 1,000 people or more in buildings which
by today's knowledge of fire behavior are "obviously" fire
dangerous.
4. The creation of state or municipal insurance entities that
will promote fire sprinkler protection in the event the fire
insurance industry continues to orient their regulations
only toward property protection, without adequate human
life safety considerations. This would also create a source
of funding for fire service operations.
5. Establish "ground rules" (including antitrust laws) for
"voluntary code making" organizations that will create re-
forms and especially prohibit a "vested interest" organi-
zation from being assigned seats on the code making com-
mittees.
6. Transfer essential municipal engineering evaluation ser-
vices from the Insurance Rating Bureaus to governmental,
or nonbiased third party organizations. Here we are refer-
ring to "grading" and classifying water supply systems,
fire department operations, etc. Today, the insurance sys-
tem of "grading" the adequacy of a city's fire protection
program does not properly consider human life safety
needs.
7. Create nonbiased (third party) fire investigation organi-
zations and practices. The intent here is to ensure that prop-
er investigations will be made of fires such as the MGM
Hotel and Dupont Plaza Hotel fires. Note that any organi-
zation that creates, sells or promotes the very codes the
buildings were constructed to, will (when investigating a
fire), tend to exonerate the code system itself from blame
for the conditions that contributed to the fire spread.
8. Create independent investigatory organizations to evalu-
ate the functions and adequacies of the private labeling or
certifying laboratories, especially in relation to fires caus-
ing loss of life. Here we are especially speaking of the
Underwriters Laboratory and the Factory Mutual Labora-
tory. Note that in event of a failure, under fire conditions,
of a U.L. or R.M. listed device (which is also required by
an NFPA standard) it may be advantageous to all con-
cerned (the NFPA, U.L., F.M. and the manufacturer) to
conceal this "failure" from the public. In a great many situa-
tions the public has not been properly informed relative to
the failures of what is termed "standard approved systems
or devices" during fires.
All of the preceding are fundamental to the broad solutions
needed to rectify the fire dangerous buildings that are so
common today, and to make our cities fire safe.
The "starting point" for all of the preceding is for the fire
official to begin the process of providing the public full
and complete information on these matters, including the
existence of flaws within the code system that led to the
problems to begin with.
This report has been oriented primarily toward the existing
high rise problem because the human loss potential is
particularly great for this building type. However, no fire
official should take this as a reason NOT to be concerned
with the problems discussed because his own town does
not have structures higher than four to six stories. The
Coconut Grove (fireproof construction) and the Beverly
Hills Supper Club (combustible construction) show that
neither construction type or building height is a guarantee
that prevents loss.
Every fire official and every public official owes the public
one thing above all else--and that is the TRUTH about
why fires continue to occur routinely and deadly in our
"code design" buildings. A