ANGARA v.

ELECTORAL COMMISSION
L-45081, 15 July 1936
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
This is an original action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Petitioner Angara as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
Angara and Ynsua were candidates for the position of member of the National
Assembly. On 07 October 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district and on 15 November 1935, he took his oath of office. By 03
December 1935, the National Assembly assembled for the first time and passed Resolution No.
8, which confirmed the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus been filed. On 08 December 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On the next day, the
Electoral Commission adopted a resolution: par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly.
Angara, by virtue of the adopted resolution of the National Assembly, filed a Motion
to Dismiss the protest of Ynsua. However, according to Ynsua, the Electoral Commission shall
govern and take cognizance of the protest. Said Commission cannot be subject to a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the election protest
HELD:
In its attempt to address the first issue, the Court pronounced the principle of the
separation of powers of the three (3) branches of our government, to wit:
x x x The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal
of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and
the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of

treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme
Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the
judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just
where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation
of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof x x x

The Court added the following:

x x x Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department x x x in
the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function x x x Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly x x x

The Court found the purpose of the Electoral Commission from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Convention: it was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members to an
independent and impartial tribunal, as there was a long-felt need to determine legislative
contents devoid of partisan considerations. It is then constituted by a majority of members of
the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
Also, Art. VI, Sec. 4 of the Constitution repealed not only Sec. 18 of the Jones Law,
but also Section 478 of Act No. 3387. Therefore, the Court concluded:
x x x (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot
deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be
filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest x x x

The Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission.

BENGSON v. HRET
G.R. No. 142840, 07 May 2001
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Teodoro C. Cruz ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd district of Pangasinan during the 1998
general/national elections. Petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for and lost
his bid for re-election, filed a Quo Waranto Ad Cautelam with Respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He manifested that Teodoro C. Cruz is not
qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen. Section VI of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.

HRET dismissed his petition and duly declared Cruz as the duly elected Representative
of the 2nd district of Pangasinan.
Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac of Filipino parents on 1960. In 1985, he enlisted
in the US Marine Corps and by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 63, lost his Philippine
citizenship for rendering service to or accepting commission on the armed forces of a foreign
country. In 1994, he reacquired/restored his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.
ISSUE:
Whether Cruz, who loss and reacquired his original nationality, is permissible to be a
Member of the House of the Representatives
HELD:
Cruz, according to the Court, restored his former status as a natural-born citizen upon
repatriation (or recovery of original nationality) by duly complying with the following
provision of Republic Act No. 2630:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Also, according to Article III, Section IV of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

SEC. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.

Being born in the Philippines of Filipino parents, Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines before his enlistment to the U.S. Marine Corps. He then reacquired the same

through repatriation and following Petitioner Bengzons quotation of Article VI, Section VI of
the present Constitution, Cruz may be a Member of the House of the Representatives. The
Court, therefore, dismissed the petition.

MARCOS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, 15 September 1995
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House
of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency
of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, applied to Commission on
Elections to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the grounds that it did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ran for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at
the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.
In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in
Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint filed by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended
the time of residency in her application from seven months to since childhood. She claimed
that the entry of the word seven in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of
an honest misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she
had always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioners
original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC rejected the
petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not
intend to make Tacloban her domicile that she had registered as a voter in different places,
and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that
although she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose
to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the
Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes,
of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied her candidacy.
She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the
requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she
had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted
to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and changes of
residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result in a change in her
place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code
1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates
the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed
therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements
for a one-year residency for election purposes.
The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was
the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year
residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they
argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and at the same

time automatically gained her husbands domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided
there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner Romualdez-Marcos has satisfied the one-year residency
requirement to be eligible/qualified to run for the position of Representative in the First
District of Leyte
HELD:
According to the majority vote of the Court, Petitioner Romualdez-Marcos was a
resident of the First District of Leyte and, therefore, possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run for the position of Representative.
A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in
favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3)
requirements:
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one;
and one must act in accordance with that intent.
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.
A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married
late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
Petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification
as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995
elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner
filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This
time petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of
Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of
Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain
the winning number of votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the
City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995,
shall have been resolved by the Commission.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to
Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he
manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether or not the
determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc
issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept
the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the

issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and
judiciousness.
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for
the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8,
1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2,
1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner's then raises the some errors for consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
Congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution
HELD:
YES. In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
of choice.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; bona fide intentions of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
The court left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District
on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in
the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a
government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in
government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
TORAYNO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137329, 09 August 2000
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Before us is a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld
the July 14, 1998 Resolution of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled
that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be
eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial
governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the
province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to
be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter
Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis
Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25,
1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his
residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street,
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B.
Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr.,
Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a
Petition before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to
meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the
Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29,
1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto, in
which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the
proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as
the duly elected mayor of the city.
In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation,
the two cases were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent Vicente Y. Emanos residence in the City of Cagayan De Oro
qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor

Whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least
one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship
Whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of
votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city
HELD:
The Court denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the resolutions of
Respondent COMELEC.

PIMENTEL, JR. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161658, 03 November 2008
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. It made mandatory for, among others, candidates for public office to undergo a drug
test. Hence, Petitioner Pimentel, who was a senatorial candidate for the 2004 national
elections, challenged the law, specifically Section 36(g).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office is an
unconstitutional imposition to candidates for public office

HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Citing Art. VI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, an
aspiring candidate need only to meet five (5) qualifications: (i). citizenship, (ii). voter
registration, (iii). literacy, (iv). age, and (v). residency. Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
MACIAS v. COMELEC
No. L-18684, 14 September 1961
Bengzon, C.J.
FACTS:
This is an original action in the Supreme Court. Petitioner Macias and other members
of the House of Representatives are requesting Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to prevent the implementation of Republic Act No. 3040 or an act to apportion
representative districts in the country. In their petition, they allege that the law apportioned
districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of several provinces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an apportionment law which is disproportion in representation is
unconstitutional
HELD:
The Court, in its brief resolution of 23 August 1961, ruled:
x x x Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the constitutional provision in several
ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of
inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a
bigger population got there only; x x x

Quoting Justice Rugg, the Court added:

Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionmnet has been before the courts,
it has been held to be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be arbitrary
and capricious against the vital principle of equality.

Equality of representation lies at the foundation of representative government. The

Constitution directs that one hundred twenty (120) Members of the House of Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
member of their respective inhabitants.

TAN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986
Alampay, J.
FACTS:
This case was impelled by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective
Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the
plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under
Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution
HELD:
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The Supreme Court held that whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be
obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros . It appeared that
when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros
del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in
the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this
Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, There was an unexplained change
from "areas affect" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The
Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province
constitutes the area affected. Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the
plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province
of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null
and void.
MARIANO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577, 07 March 1995

Puno, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends
the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive
terms as allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area
over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be
noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality
of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers
and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall
have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by
the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case
or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are
not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be
comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

AQUINO III v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action in the Supreme Court for certiorari. Republic Act No. 9176
created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Petitioner Aquino III and other petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced
by RA 9176 runs afoul with the explicit, constitutional standard of a minimum population of
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province
HELD:
The Court denied the petition. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that
fixes a two hundred fifty-thousand minimum population that must compose a legislative
district. In other words, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution states:
x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province. There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is
entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population.
Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176970, 08 December 2008
Brion, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action to the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to prevent Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing
its Resolution No. 7837, the implementing law of the law in question. In 2006, Republic Act
No. 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This was
proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative
district from one to two. In the next election, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence.

Petitioner Bagabuyo, among other things, contended the following for the nullification
of RA 9371 on constitutional grounds: (i). Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A.
No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; (ii). a voters
sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only
allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; and (iii). a
voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the
city council for the other legislative district.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, legislative apportionment is
defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation
of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on
the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes
in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and
corporate units and territories. It is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Art. 6, Section
5(4).

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 136781, 06 October 2000
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2%
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it
proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives
come
from
the
party-list
representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD:
1. It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in
the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled
to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
2. Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient
number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
3. Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be

considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of
votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
BAGONG BAYANI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, petitioner in this case, challenges the Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
ISSUES:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
Whether or not the party-list system
underrepresented' sectors and organizations

is

exclusive

to

'marginalized

and

HELD:
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Commissioner Monsod said in the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission: "The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
Parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the partylist system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, specifically section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution.
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the

election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized

and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined
constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The court explained the 3 key words above which are "proportional representation,"
"marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
Proportional representation refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
Marginalized and underrepresented means the persons nominated by the party-list candidateorganization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties."
And "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government.
Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented.
The court further explained The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to
the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by
enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to
become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms.
This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of
the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining
the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for
the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify
for seats in the House of Representatives.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 2030766, 02 April 2013
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups against COMELEC for disqualifying them from
participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of the main reasons for the
disqualification was their failure to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
ISSUES:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners
from participating in the May 2013 elections; and
Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani v. COMELEC (ABB) and BANAT v. COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC
in the coming May 2013 elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because it merely followed the rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court
decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new parameters for the upcoming elections;
thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the
petitioners based on the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented
or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list
system have to represent a sector that is marginalized and underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never intended the
party-list system to be reserved for sectoral parties. The latter were only part of the partylist system not the entirety of it. There were two more groups composing the system
national and regional parties. This is evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districtsand those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)

National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the former
need not organize along sectoral lines and represent a particular sector. Hence, it is not
necessary for these parties to be representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. In
fact, Republic Act No. 7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections under the
Constitution, does not require these parties to fall under this criterion. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the phrase marginalized and underrepresented appeared only once in R.A.
No. 7941, particularly in the Declaration of Policy. The section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided
the simplest scheme possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require sectors, organizations, or parties to fall under the criterion as
well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 be harmonized with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The Supreme Court answered in this wise:
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and
underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack welldefined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On
the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will
give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions
in Congress riding in SUVs.

Based on the Courts ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society must comply
with the criterion of representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For national,
regional, and sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, it is
sufficient that they consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the
same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional parties, the
Supreme Court categorically stated that they may participate in the party-list elections. The
rules for their participation are found under guideline number three.
PHILCONSA v. MATHAY
No. L-25554, 04 October 1966
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines
and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to
the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the
Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who
took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while
the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on
December 30, 1965.
ISSUE:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
HELD:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the
plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular,
when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.

LIGOT v. MATHAY
L-34676, 30 April 1974
Teehankee, J.
FACTS:
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December
30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing
the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government
was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of
members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall
take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on
December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section
12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or
employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees
based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor
refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of
Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit
HELD:
To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per
annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as
far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit
is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the AuditorGeneral in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS
G.R. No. 132875-76, 03 February 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This is a motion to allow accused-appellant Jalosjos, whose conviction of statutory
rape on two (2) counts and acts of lasciviousness on six (6) counts is pending appeal, to
discharge duties as Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings. He contented further that his re-election is an expression of popular will which
cannot be rendered inutile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as a
member of House of Representatives
HELD:
In its resolution, the Court denied the motion. Election is the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. As provided in Art. VI,
Sec. 15 of the 1935 Constitution:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in
all cases except treason, felony, and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; x x x

The Court also cited Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the same, to wit:
Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same x x x but the
Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law
within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

Senators and Congressmen are privileged from arrest or detention, but it cannot be
extended beyond its ordinary meaning, i.e. the exemption is only applicable to civil arrests.
Accused-appellant Jalosjos is convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code with an
offense of more than six years imprisonment, which disallows him to claim parliamentary
immunity.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG
No. L-15905, 03 August 1966
Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Respondent Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the
Committee on National Defense. On 14 November 1958, he caused the publication of an open
letter addressed to the President of the Philippines. Said open letter alleged the following:
(i). three (3) operational plans are under serious study by some ambitious Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP) officers with the aid of some civilian political strategists; (ii). The
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense then, Jesus
Vargas, was planning a coup dtat and replace the President; and (iii). Petitioner Nicanor
Jimenez, among other officials of the government, are being used as tools to meet the plan.
Petitioner Jimenez and other respondents went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of the open
letter in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Respondent moved for
the dismissal of the complaint and argued that the open letter is a privileged communication,
which the Court of the First Instance granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication, nay, fall
within the speech or debate clause/phrase of Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the 1935 Constitution
HELD:
Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.

The publication in question is not covered by said expression, which refers to

utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while the same is
in session. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time
Respondent Cabangbang himself caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee. Hence, the letter is not
considered a privilege communication because the publication: (i). was an open letter; (ii).
the Congress was not in session; and (iii). it was not a discharge of an official function or
duty.
ADAZA v. PACANA, JR.
No. L-68159, 18 March 1985
Escolin, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging
his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vicegovernor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of
office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984.
In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana
lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then
he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of
office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the
duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors

office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was
elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the
context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local
elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Adaza, a provincial governer who was qualified and elected
as a member of the Mambabatas Pambansa, can exercise and discharge functions of both
offices simultaneously
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition and cited Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the 1973 Constitution,
to wit:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure,
except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet x x x

It thereafter enunciated, as follows:

A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit
of the people. As such, a holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions
as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restriction which public policy
may dictate on his holding of more than one office. It is therefore of no avail x x x
that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act as
an elected member of the parliament at the same time x x x as in France, Great Britain
and New Zealand [where] a local elective official can hold the position to which he had
been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN
No. L-51122, 25 March 1982
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review
the order of the Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On 14 May
1979, Petitioner Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI Corporation). Acero, one of the respondents, subbsequently
questioned the election. In his wise, the votes were not properly counted. He, therefore,
filed before the SEC quo warranto proceedings on 25 May 1979.
Fernandez, member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, sought to appear as counsel
for Acero, but Puyat objected to the same as it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to
appear as counsel before an administrative body. Consequently, Assemblyman Fernandez
bought ten (10) shares of stock in IPI Corporation to deem himself as legal owner and shall
then allow him to intervene, as indicated in his Urgent Motion for Intervention. Respondent
SEC Commissioner De Guzman granted him the leave to intervene.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez is appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,

before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision, i.e., Art. VIII,
Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution
HELD:
In its ruling, the constitutional provision would be ineffective if the Court shall find
itself to uphold the intervention. Therefore, the Court reversed and set aside Respondent
Commissioner De Guzmans Order which granted Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene
in the SEC case. It consequently made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order.