Tanada vs Tuvera,

Miciano vs. Brimo

Remember there were 2 decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in this case
of Juan Tuvera. The main decision of April 1985 and the clarificatory resolution of
December 26, 1986. In the case of Tuvera, in the main decision handed down by the
SC, you will notice that the SC tried to justify the doctrine that a law can take effect
even without publication. The SC said we have to make a distinction in answering
the question when do laws take effect the court said we have to make a distinction
between a case which is of a law of general application and a law of local
application. That was the justification that they tried to present based on an old
commonwealth act. If the law is of general application publication is indispensable
said the SC in the main decision. If the law is of local application, publication is not
necessary. However, after President Cory had reorganized the SC under her
revolutionary government. The same petitioners in this case filed a clarificatory
petition. And the first question they asked was Is there really a need to make that
distinction between a law of general application and a law of local application? SC
said in the clarificatory resolution of December 1986? NO!, there is no need to
make such distinction because Article 2 does not make such distinction. Art 2 says
plainly, laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication in the official gazette. Publication is a must. As long as it is a law it
cannot take effect unless it is published so that with that ruling It threw overboard
the views of authorities before the martial law which said that a law can take effect
even without publication provided that the law itself provides for its effectivity
because in this case of Juan Tuvera, no law can take effect without publication.
Publication is a must. Publication is part of due process. It will be the peak of
injustice to convict a person for having committed an act which he was never
informed about. The only way you can do justice there is by resorting to publication
by giving constructive notice to everybody regarding the existence of that particular
law. In the clarificatory petition, another question that was asked was what is it that
should be published? In the main decision you said that publication is a must, what
is it that should be published? Supreme Court said not an excerpt of the law, not
the number of the law, not the title of the law, not the preamble of the law, be the
entire law that must be published. If what is published it just a portion of the entire
law that does not satisfy the requirement of the law. Thats why the court said that
it must be the entire law that must be published. Then another question was asked
if we have to publish the entire law, where should it be published? Should it be
published in the official gazette as provided in Art 2 when everybody knows and
even courts can take judicial notice of the fact that the official gazette is always
late? Supreme Court gave a very simple answer. We know your problem said the
Court. Your problem is also our problem. We have the same problem. But we
cannot do anything because the SC is not mandated to amend the law. The SC has
no power to legislate. The only function of the Supreme Court is to interpret the
law.

Facts: Brimo was a citizen of Turkey but established his domicile in the
Philippines. While here in the Philippines he acquired properties and while here in
the Philippines he executed a will. In his will he declared, it is my wish that my
properties here in the Philippines be distributed to my heirs in accordance with
Philippine law. When the will was presented before probate the will was opposed
because of that particular statement he made in his will. The question is is it a
valid provision in the will?
SC: No, it is void because the law is clear. Article 16 is clear under the second
paragraph that the estate of the deceased shall be governed by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration. In other words, it is not
for that person to choose what law he may want to apply. It is the law that says
what law will apply. So the SC said that particular provision is null and void
because it violates the provision of paragraph 2 Article 16
Christensen Case
Edward Christensen was an American Citizen. He was a citizen of California. He
was among the first batch of Americans who came here with the Thomasites.
When he saw the Philippines he fell in love with the Philippines. He said beautiful
country. I will come back. And he did come back. When he returned he
established his domicile here in the Philippines. But he fell in love not only with
the country but also with a Filipino woman. But not enough to marry her. He fell
in love with her enough to sire two kids but not to marry her. So they never
married each other. He was able to sire two children both girls- Mary Lucy and
Helen. The elder one was Lucy, who was the apple of his eyes. He didnt like the
second girl. As a matter of fact he did not acknowledge her. Di naman akin yan
eh I had no contribution dyan. So much so that when Helen grew up she
brought an action against her own father. That was the first case brought by
Helen against her own father during his lifetime to compel the father to
acknowledge her as his natural child. And she won, so she became an
acknowledged natural child by judicial action not voluntarily on the part of the
father but by judicial decree. The mean time he got tired of his live in partner and
they decided to part ways. The name of the live in partner was Campo Redondo.
That woman also brought an action against Christensen under the old law
because under the old law if a man and a woman lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage whatever that has been acquired through
their joint efforts shall belong to both in equal shares. So Campo Redondo the
woman was claiming one half because he was able to amass wealth but most of
his wealth consisted of blue chip shares of stock. She was basing her claim on the
old law. The SC dismissed the action of the woman. SC said you cannot invoke
that provision because you are no read no write. How could you have contributed

to the acquisition of those properties when you are no read no write. You are
illiterate. So she got nothing. After parting ways, Edward Christensen executed a
will, leaving the bulk of his estate to Lucy his favorite and leaving to Helen only 600
pesos as legacy. Di naman siya 0, may legacy siya eh. Again Helen contested
that will, she sued the father again claiming he was preterited. She was omitted.
The court said no you were not preterited because you got something, a legacy. It
may not be enough but you got something. There is no preterition. The action of
Helen failed. When the will was presented for probate, Helen was contesting that
she was given less than what she is entitled to. Because I am an acknowledged
natural child citing the decision of the SC in the case she brought against her
father. Therefore I am entitled to my legitime as an acknowledged natural child.
But Lucy says, hindi you are not entitled because under the law the applicable law
is California law. And under California law, you are not entitled anything. Now,
Helen says ok let us go to California. When they dug up California law, they found
out a conflict of law rule. Under the California law, and that conflict of law rule
stated when a citizen of California establishes his domicile outside California and
dies in his place of domicile his succession shall be governed by the law of his
domicile. That is the conflict of law rule of California. So while Philippine law says
it should be the national law of the person who died that shall govern which is
California. By applying California, California law says no you apply Philippine law
because his domicile is Philippines. But if you follow the conflict of law rule of
California, directing the problem to the forum which is the Philippines. Philippine
law directs again to California. So it becomes a vicious circle. The SC said there is
only one way by which we can resolve this problem, by applying the renvoi
doctrine. Under the renvoi doctrine, once the problem has been tossed back to
the law of the forum there should no more be further tossing back. The problem
must be resolved by the law of the forum which is Philippine law. And under
Philippine law, since Helen was declared an acknowledged natural child of
Christensen, he was entitled to a legitime as such. So the SC said, you are entitled
to your legitime but not a centavo more. So still the bulk of the estate went to
Lucy. But she got more than what was left to her by way of legacy. When do we
apply the renvoi doctrine? You apply the renvoi doctrine only when two states do
not follow the same theory. When one state follows the nationality theory, and
another state follows the domiciliary theory. You can apply the renvoi doctrine.
But if both states follow the same theory, renvoi is not applicable. That is the case
of Christensen.
Bellis vs. Bellis
This involved another American, Amos Bellis. But he was not a citizen of
California. He was a citizen of Texas. He was married to another American, he had
children by his legitimate wife. He was also domiciled here in the Philippines for a
while and while in the Philippines he also met a woman whom he sired with a
child. The child he had with that Filipino woman, he acknowledged. He said that

boy is mine. However, Bellis executed 2 wills. In one will he disposed of all his
Texas properties in accordance to Texas laws and in the other will which he
executed, in accordance with Philippine law but he did not leave anything to the
boy. He gave nothing to the boy. When Bellis died the boy questioned the 2nd will.
The will that was executed under Philippine law. He said he was not given
anything. He was claiming preterition.
SC: You are not entitled to anything because while you are acknowledged you
were not given anything and under Texas laws they do not recognize illegitimate
children. So you are not entitled to anything. And the boy said alright why not apply
the Christensen case to my case because the Christensen case came earlier
than the Bellis case. Apply the Renvoi doctrine because he knows if the renvoi
doctrine will be applied he will be entitled to something under Philippine law. The
SC said we cannot apply the renvoi doctrine. We were only able to do that in the
Christensen case because California had a conflict of law rule but Texas does not
have a conflict of law rule so the applicable law in the case of Bellis is the Internal
law of Texas and the court cannot go beyond that law. So the boy is not entitled
to anything. That is the Bellis Case.

Judge Tamin vs. CA.

The first case that was brought to court was an action for ejectment filed or brought
by a municipality which claims ownership over a certain parcel of land. The action
for ejectment was brought against certain individuals occupying said parcel of land.
An action for ejectment is civil in nature. During the pendency of that action for
ejectment, the Bureau of Lands conducted cadastral proceedings in the same area
where the action for ejectment was brought. In other words, in the cadastral
proceedings it included in its coverage the property which was the subject of
ejectment. Cadastral proceeding is also Civil in nature. So here you have 2 cases
both civil pending before the court.
SC: The cadastral proceedings is prejudicial to the action for ejectment. You know
from your law on property that in cadastral proceedings whenever the Bureau of
Lands conduct this kinds of proceedings all persons who may have a claim over
the portion of the properties covered by the cadastral proceedings are obliged to
come out in the open and prove their claims and should they succeed whatever
they are able to prove becomes theirs. That is the object of cadastral proceedings.
SC said this is prejudicial to the action for ejectment because the property which
is the subject matter of the ejectment is covered by cadastral proceedings. If the
persons/ defendants in the ejectment case succeed in proving their claims
although the portion of the property which is the subject of the ejectment case
then the ejectment case insofar as these persons are concerned must fail. Thats
why the court said, although both cases are civil in character one is prejudicial to
the other. So the answer to the question can there be a prejudicial question when

both cases are civil, the answer is yes.

Landicho vs Relova,
Now this case of Relova involve an action for bigamy and an action for annulment
of marriage. When a person is charged with bigamy the usual defense of the
accused is nullity of 1 of the 2 marriages. In bigamy remember, it will exist when a
person contracts a subsequent marriage during the existence of a prior valid
marriage that is what constitutes bigamy under the penal code. So there must be
2 marriages contracted by one and the same person. So the usual defense of an
accused in bigamy is nullity of 1 of the marriages. Now question, in a case for
bigamy, is an action for annulment of marriage considered prejudicial? In this case
of Relova SC said, it will depend on which marriage is the subject of annulment. If
the subject of annulment is the 2nd marriage it is not prejudicial. Because before a
person may contract a 2nd marriage he should make sure that there was no prior
valid marriage but if the subject of annulment is the first marriage it can become
prejudicial provided that the cause of voidability is due to the fault of the plaintiff.
If it is the plaintiff who gave the cause then it is not prejudicial. Finally in the case
of Umali vs IAC, the court said, an action for annulment of contract is not
prejudicial which is brought by a person against a person who issues a check
without funds because the issues raised in these 2 acts are not related to each
other. We now close the book on prejudicial questions
Geluz vs CA
This is a case where the woman underwent 3 abortions. The first abortion was
had when she was still single. She did not want her parents to know that she was
pregnant. She wanted to conceal her pregnancy. She had herself aborted. The 2nd
abortion came after she became married. When she became pregnant again she
found pregnancy to be very inconvenient because she was a working spouse so
she had herself aborted again. The 2 abortions were concealed from the father of
the child. The third time she became pregnant, she had another abortion. All
performed by one and the same doctor. The husband came to know of the 3rd
abortion. So the husband brought an action against the doctor for damages and
the court awarded damages in favor of the husband but the basis for the award
for damages was Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Under 2206, the law says anyone
who causes the death of a person shall be liable for damages in an amount at
least 3000 pesos. That is the provision applied by the court in this case in
awarding damages. The doctor appealed to the SC. SC said that is wrong. Article
2206 is not applicable to this case because 2206 speaks of death of a person and a
fetus aborted is not yet a person. However, the court said while 2206 cannot be
applied to this case, it does not mean that the father is not entitled to recover
damages. The parents can recover damages for the injuries suffered by them but
not for injuries supposedly suffered by the deceased fetus because a fetus is not
person. This case was asked in the bar. The facts were reproduced exactly as it

was. But the question that was asked was what damage or damages may the
husband be entitled to claim? According to the SC, the husband may claim
damages to compensate for injuries suffered by them and not by the child but by
them which is usually in the nature of moral damages.
Navarro vs. Domagtoy.
Facts: Navarro was the mayor of a city in Surigao. Domagtoy is a city judge in that
city. So clearly while Domagtoy is an incumbent member of the judiciary he has
territorial jurisdiction. He celebrated a marriage in his house which was outside of
his territorial jurisdiction. The mayor filed his complaint but in the complaint of
the mayor which was administrative in character. What the mayor was
questioning was the propriety of the action taken by that judge. Not the validity
or nullity of the marriage. The nature of the action was administrative in character.
So the judge was being a case of acting beyond his functions. The
defense of the judge was Article 8. Under Art 8 the law provides where marriages
may be celebrated and the law says a marriage can be celebrated in any church,
chapel or temple or in open court. That is a statement of the general rule. Under
the same article 8 the law provides for exceptions however in the case of the
following 1. Marriages in articulo mortis these can be celebrated anywhere
because of the urgency of the matter 2. Marriages in remote places 3. When both
parties request in writing that the marriage be celebrated in a place designated by
them then the marriage may be celebrated in that place. That was the defense of
Domagtoy. He said I was requested by the parties to celebrate the marriage in the
place where I solemnized it. But the law provides that the request must be made
by both parties. Under the Civil code, the request must be made by the parent of
the girl but under the Family Code that was changed, the request must be made
by both the contracting parties wla nang paki ang parents. That was the defense
of Judge Domagtoy. I did it because I was requested pursuant to the provision of
Article 8. Unfortunately for him in the course of the proceedings it was found out
that the request was made only by one of the parties. SC said you must
distinguish between venue and authority when you speak of authority you refer
to art 6, when you speak venue or place where the marriage may be celebrated
you refer to article 8. Was that complied with by Judge Domagtoy? No, because
only one of the parties made the request. So the court said this does not involve
authority. What is involved here is a mere irregularity committed by Judge
Domagtoy. And under art 4 if it is simply a case of an irregularity the case remains
to be valid. The marriage remains to be valid but the persons responsible for the
irregularity shall answer for the corresponding penalty. So Domagtoy having been
found guilty he was penalized without pay for several months. Should a question
on this be given to you just cite the ruling of the court do not comment any
further just say according to the case of Navarro vs Domagtoy this is what the
court said. Reserve your comment for future use. Your objective is to pass and
once you obtain that objective if in the future a similar case would come to you.
That is the time we will on comment on this interpretation made by the SC.

Remember when we were discussing Stare Decisis we said Stare Decisis does not
apply to the SC it only applies to all court below the SC because the SC is the only
court which can reverse itself.
Loria vs. Felix
In this case, it involved a man and a woman who was living together as husband
and wife for many years without the benefit of marriage. They were just live in
partners. The woman got very sick. One of her friends advised her why dont you
get married. Why dont you call a priest and get married. She heeded the advise
so a priest was called and upon the advise of the priest that they get married they
decided to moralize their otherwise immoral relationship by getting married. But by
some stroke of faith the woman did not die. She continued to live for almost
another year. She survived although ultimately she died just the same. When she
died the heirs left by the woman was the husband, only the husband because
their union was not blessed by any child. The nephews and nieces questioned the
right of the husband to succeed his wife. They said that the marriage is not valid.
It was not a marriage in Articulo mortis because the woman did not die
immediately, she died almost after a year and because of that they should have
gotten a marriage license. Moreover, the law says in the case of a marriage in
articulo mortis the solemnizing officer is obliged to execute an affidavit attesting
to the fact that before he celebrated the marriage he ascertained that both
parties possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Those must
be stated in the affidavit and that the marriage that was celebrated is a marriage
in articulo mortis. Unfortunately, the person who solemnized the marriage failed
to execute that affidavit. And the nephews and nieces added that as an additional
ground for attacking the validity of the marriage.
SC said in a marriage in articulo mortis it is not necessary that the dying party
should die at the time of the celebration of the marriage or immediately
thereafter. That is why the Code Committee included In the definition even if the
dying party should survive it does not change the character of the marriage as
long as one or both of the contacting parties is at the point of death at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. It is immaterial if the dying party survives. With
respect to the failure of the solemnizing officer to execute the required affidavit,
the SC said the obligation to execute the affidavit is imposed by law not upon the
parties but upon the solemnizing officer. And failure of the solemnizing officer to
comply with that obligation should not be taken against the parties. So the
marriage was considered valid. That is the case of Loria vs Felix. Suppose these 2
want to get married he is dying now he tells her honey I am about to go but I
want to die being your husband call a priest so that we may get married. She
called a priest. Father Bastian goes to the place. Under the law he must first
ascertain if they possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications and
that he is really at the point of death. If he is satisfied then he can solemnize the
marriage as a marriage in articulo mortis and he must execute the required
affidavit which must be filed or recorded in the office of the local civil registrar.

He looks at him. Sama nga ng tayo. He asks questions to find out if he is not
disqualified from marrying her in the meantime she was getting worried because
he was taking time. So she tells him father naman bilisan mo at malapit na. Oo
nga uumpisahan na natin. He started but before he could finish he closed his
eyes. Sabi nya father finish it malambot pa. Mainit pa hindi pa tumitigas. So he
says malambot pa nga. I now pronounce you man and wife finish. What is the
status of the marriage? Was it valid or not? It is not because she did not marry a
person she got married to a thing. When a person dies he ceases to be a person
he becomes a thing he becomes property. So she became married to a property
and not to a person.

Ninal vs Bayadog
Facts: Ninal was married married to Billiones his wife. They had several children
by their marriage unfortunately the wife died of gunshot wound. About 18
months from the time the wife died. Ninal contracted a 2nd marriage this time
with Norma Bayadog. The marriage between Ninal and Bayadog did not last long.
Ninal died also. He was not killed by Norma. He died in a vehicular accident. Upon
his death his children by his first marriage, Billiones brought an action for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to Norma Bayadog. This case
happened in Cebu. When the children filed for an action for declaration of nullity
the judge of the court to which the case was assigned to Ferdinand Marcos (name
of judge) but no relation to the Marcoses. He dismissed the complaint. And in
dismissing the complaint the judge relied on the provision of Article 47 of the
Family Code. The judge said the action was brought by the children too late in the
day because it was filed by her children after her father had already died and
according to the judge under the provision of Article 47. The action should have
been filed during the lifetime of both spouses. That was the reason given by the
judge. Upon the dismissal of the complaint the children appealed and the SC gave
a beautiful discussion of the distinction between a void and voidable marriage
aside from interpreting for the first time the definition of Article 34 under the
Family Code. The court said the action that was brought by the children of Ninal
was for the purpose of having the marriage declared a nullity. It was a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of a void marriage. And a void marriage should not
be confused with a voidable marriage. In other words, the court was saying that
when the lower court dismissed the complaint of the children, the lower court
premised the dismissal on the wrong law because the lower court based its
decision of dismissal on the provisions of Article 47. Now, if you read the
provisions of Article 47 of the Family Code you will note Article 47 applies to
actions for annulment of marriage not declaration of nullity. In other words article
47 applies to voidable marriages and not to void marriages and the court said
there is an ocean wide of distinction between a voidable and a void marriage a
void marriage is imprescriptible, it does not prescribe, it can be brought by

anyone, the marriage can be attacked either directly or collaterally. It can even be
attacked even after the death of the parties. That is how a void marriage is. In a
voidable marriage it is valid until it is set aside. It cannot be attacked collaterally it
must be attacked directly. The action for annulment of marriage must be brought
during the lifetime of both spouses. That is what the judge contended that why he
dismissed the complaint. But the action brought by the children is not for
annulment it is for declaration of nullity. So the SC said the judge acted wrongly in
dismissing the complaint. Now, the court went into the merits of the case. The
court said under Article 34 in order that the marriage may be contracted without
a marriage license the parties must have lived together as husband and wife for a
period of at least 5 years. That period of 5 years was for the first time interpreted
by the court continuous unbroken 5 years. It cannot be interrupted 5 years as
earlier interpreted before the Family Code was enacted. SC said that the 5 year
period should be interpreted to mean continuous, unbroken, successive 5 year
period. And the absence of impediment should be interpreted to mean that there
should be no impediment to the marriage during the entire 5 year period. The
absence of impediment must not only exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage it must exist during the entire period of cohabitation of 5 years. Now
since it appeared that the 2nd marriage was contracted 18 months after the death
of the first wife. There has been no compliance to the required 5 year period
therefore the court said that this marriage did not fall within the context of Article
34 so the marriage was declared a nullity.
Enrico vs Heirs of Medinacelli
This was decided in 2007. The facts are practically the same as the facts in Ninal.
In this case, Y. Medinacelli and Trinidad Catli contracted marriage in June 1962 in
Cagayan. On May 1, 2004 Trinidad Catli died. The spouses had several children.
The marriage that was contracted in 1962 was terminated by the death of the
wife on May 1, 2004. August 26, 2004, 3 months from death of the wife Y.
Medinacelli contracted marriage with the petitioner Lolita Enrico. The marriage
did not also last long. 6 months thereafter on Feb. 2005. Y. Medinacelli died. Upon
the death of the father the children brought an action against the 2nd wife
similar to the case of Ninal. The children by the first marriage brought an action
for the declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage of their father to enrico on the
ground that the marriage did not fall under article 34 because there can be no
way they can claim that they are living as husband and wife for a period of 5 years
because their mother died in 2004 and 3 months thereafter the father contracted
a 2nd marriage. Where is now the 5 year period so they said no that the marriage
did not fall within the context of Article 34. Another ground why they say the
marriage is void was there was no marriage ceremony between the parties. When
the complaint was filed by the children, Enrico the 2nd wife moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that under AM-02-11-10 the law provides actions for
declarations of nullity of a void marriage as well as annulment of voidable

marriages can only be brought by either one of the spouses and nobody else can
bring such action not even the state can initiate the action. That was the
contention of Enrico in the dismissal of the complaint. The lower court granted
the motion to dismiss. It dismissed the complaint of the children on the basis of
that AM. The judge granted the motion to dismiss. The children filed a motion to
reconsider the order of dismissal. They cited the case of Ninal. How come the SC
approved the action in the case of Ninal when the action for the declaration of
nullity was brought by the children just like us Why are you now going to dismiss
our complaint. The judge reconsidered. The judge granted the motion for
reconsideration. And the reason given by the judge was when I granted the
motion to dismiss I did not have in mind the Ninal case. I based my order of
dismissal on that AM but realizing what the court said in the case of Ninal I
believe now that the case should not have been dismissed. I believe that what AM
provides that actions for declarations of nullity as well as action for annulment of
marriage should be filed only by either one of the spouses will apply only as long
as both spouses are alive. While it is true that during the lifetime of the parent,
the interest of the children in the estate is purely inchoate and that is the reason
why the law does not allow the children to bring the action for as long as both
parents are alive but the moment one of the parents dies that inchoate interest of
the children in the estate of the deceased children becomes now actual interest
and therefore the action should be allowed. And the judge said that I think there
is a conflict between the ruling of the court in the Ninal Case and the provisions of
the AM. Upon the reinstatement of the case, Enrico the 2nd wife appealed and
went directly to the SC without passing through the CA raising the validity of that
order. The SC said the contention of the judge that there was a conflict in the
ruling of the court in Ninal and the provision of AM is not correct. It is very clear in
this AM that on all actions for declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of
voidable marriages the action can be brought only by either one of the spouses.
Nobody else can bring such action. The children cannot bring any action for such
purpose because the children have no interest in the marriage whatever interest
they may have in the estate of the parents is purely inchoate not even the state
can bring such action. The action can be brought only by either one of the spouses
because they are the parties aggrieved if the marriage is null and void. They are
the aggrieved parties. The court said further that there is no conflict in the ruling
of the court in Ninal and the provision of the AM. It is very clear in this AM that
the AM shall apply only to marriages contacted under the Family Code. If the
marriage was contracted before the Family Code actions for annulment actions
for declarations of nullity shall be governed by the law at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The question now is did the Enrico case/doctrine
supersede the Ninal case? No, it did not. The effect that was produced by the case
of Enrico is it only clarified what law what law shall be made to apply if the
marriage was contracted under the Family Code or if the marriage was contracted
under the Civil Code. AM expressly provides these shall govern all actions for
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of voidable marriage for all marriages

contracted under Family Code. So if the marriage was contacted before the
Family Code the applicable law is not this AM. The applicable law will be the same
law that is applied in the Ninal Case. That was the ruling of the court in this case.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo.

Van Dorn was an American who became the 2nd husband of a Filipino woman.
They got married but after sometime Van Dorn sought a divorce from his Filipino
wife. During the divorce proceedings in the States Van Dorn was asked do you
have any conjugal partnership property with your Filipino wife? And he said none.
Actually there was really none. The proceedings terminated the divorce granted.
The Filipino spouse had to come home to the Philippines She returned here. Upon
her return she had to make a living. She had to because she was alone. She put up
a business. Art gallery located somewhere in Malate which became very
successful the success of her business reached Van Dorn. When he learned of the
business of his wife he came back to the Philippines. He said you are still my wife
despite the divorce because the Philippine does not recognize absolute divorce.
So insofar as the Philippines is concerned we are still husband and wife. And as
such under the Civil Code of the Philippines if the property relations of the
spouses is governed by the system of conjugal partnership of gains the law says
the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership property which
means the husband acquires the power to administer the conjugal partnership
property from the law. It is the law that gives the power to the husband. This
power is not acquired by the husband from the wife but from the law so much so
that under the Civil Code the husband cannot be deprived of that power except in
cases authorized by law. What the law gives only the law can take back. And this
was cited by Van Dorn. Since our marriage is still on according to him. I am
supposed to be the administrator to the conjugal partnership property. Of course
she did not agree. And that gave rise to this case. Van Dorn vs. Romillo. Romillo
here was the judge who decided the case in favor of the Filipino wife. The wife
was sustained by the SC the court said that since you declared in the divorce
proceedings that there was no conjugal partnership property during your
marriage you are bound by estoppel. You cannot deny the truth of that
representation later on so the wife won but she remains still married to him
under Philippine law. That is what caught the eye of Cory. Unfair. Ung husband
nakapagpalit na. But the Filipino cannot remarry. Something must be done so she
had the 2nd paragraph inserted as an amendment to Art 26. So there is now 2
questions here. You will not notice that the 2nd paragraph says whenever a citizen
of the Philippines or a Filipino citizen marries a foreigner and the marriage is valid
if the foreigner spouse should obtain a divorce from the Filipino spouse and the
foreigner spouse is allowed to remarry then the Filipino should also be allowed to
remarry. That is what the 2nd paragraph provides in substance. There are 2
bugging question here. The first question is implementing the 2nd
paragraph of Art

26 is it necessary that the marriage be a mixed marriage? Because the opening

statement of the 2nd paragraph says marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner,
must it be a mixed marriage in order that this paragraph may be applied? The
consensus at that time was yes it must be a mixed marriage because that is what
the law says. 2nd question was if the foreigner spouse should obtain a divorce
from the Filipino spouse and the foreigner spouse is allowed to remarry then the
Filipino spouse may likewise remarry. What is that law that should allow the
foreigner spouse to remarry? What is that law? Is the law referring to the law
granting the divorce or to another law?
Republic vs Orbecido.
Insofar as the first question is concerned the SC said it is not necessary that the
marriage be initially a mixed marriage in order that this paragraph may be
applicable so that even if at the start the parties to the marriage are both Filipinos
but later on during the marriage one of the spouses became a foreigner through the
process of naturalization can we apply the 2nd paragraph? Yes, the 2nd paragraph
is still applicable otherwise if you will apply these only to mixed marriages at the
beginning it will defeat the purpose of this provision and the court said what is
material here is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage what is material here is the citizenship of the parties at the time
divorce was obtained so even if initially the parties to the marriage are both
Filipinos and subsequent thereto one of them becomes a foreigner through
naturalization if the foreigner spouse now obtained a divorce from the Filipino
spouse and he is allowed to remarry the Filipino spouse is also allowed to remarry
because this provision becomes applicable. I think that has something to do with
what we are discussing now. The 2nd question now is what is that law that must
allow the foreigner spouse to remarry is it the law which granted the divorce?
Obviously it is not. That is not the law referred to here. The law that is being
referred to here is the national law of the spouse who is allowed to remarry. His
national law and not the law that granted the divorce it cannot be that law because
if that law grants a divorce automatically you can say the grantee of the divorce
decree is entitled to remarry because that is the essence of divorce. For example,
let us take 2 Filipinos husband and wife. One of them goes to Hongkong or goes to
Reno or goes to a country which grants absolute divorce for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce. He applies he succeeds, he was able to obtain the divorce that
he wanted becomes a divorced spouse now. Can he now remarry? Can the other
spouse also remarry? No, insofar as the Filipino spouse is concerned because
divorce is not recognized by our national law. Under our national law absolute
divorce is against public policy. The Filipino spouse cannot remarry because the
national law of the person does not allow to remarry. Therefore we can say it must
be the national law of the person who obtained the divorce that must allow him to
remarry. IF the Filipino spouse who became a foreigner has become a foreigner
because he has now become a citizen of Dubai, Dubai does not recognize absolute
divorce but this person was able to obtain a divorce decree elsewhere outside of

Dubai. Can that citizen of Dubai remarry such that the Filipino spouse can also
remarry? No, because divorce is not recognized by the national law of the other
spouse. So the law that must allow the foreigner spouse is not the law that grants
the divorce it should be the national of that spouse.
Arroyo vs Arroyo, Atilano Chuan Ching Beng
the court said not even an action for
mandamus will lie to compel to compel a spouse to join the other spouse under
the same roof because the nature of that obligation is different too personal it
cannot even be made the subject of mandamus. So what is her remedy? Sue him
for damages.

Lowell Santos vs CA
His wife in search for greener Pasteur left the family left the family left the country
went to the states with a promise to return but she never complied with. The
husband tried to locate her tried to contact her to convince her to return to no avail
so much so that the husband was forced to go to the States and look for her in the
entire US fortunately he was able to find her but she refused to join the family.
When the husband returned to the country immediately he filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to his wife on the ground of his wifes
psychological incapacity. SC said psychological incapacity here does not mean
personal incapacity what is meant by that is that the person who is alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is suffering from some kind of personal disorder
which must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The mere refusal
of one spouse to join the other spouse is no proof of psychological incapacity so
the petition of the husband was denied. During the first years that the Family
Code went into effect the most abused provision was Article 36 Courts were
swamped with petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage on this ground. The
court began to realize that it was becoming abuse so the courts began to be strict
as time went by so much so starting with the case of Molina which case decided
and penned by Justice Panganiban the court set standard steps to be followed to
be observed in filing a petition for this kind of action. In the different steps
provided by law one of them said the alleged psychological incapacity must be
established clearly and convincingly by expert evidence medically as well as
clinically. That particular provision in the Molina case was misunderstood mostly
by doctors because they thought that the only was to prove psychological
incapacity the psychologically incapacitated spouse to the examination to be
conducted by a physician.
Marcos vs. Marcos.

In this case of Marcos both husband and wife were members of the military both
were members of the Presidential Security guard they fell in love
they got married they both resigned from the army. They started a business of
their own the woman was very successful so much so they said that she was like a
king with a midas touch anything she touched became and turned into gold. On
the other hand the husband was the extreme opposite, what he had was satanic
touch in everything he put his fingers on he failed so much so that the failure of
the husband became the source of trouble and problem in the family. They
started to live separately and when the relationship became unbearable then the
wife filed this action for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground of
the husbands psychological incapacity following what the court said in the
Molina case the wife engaged the services of a physician to testify on the
psychological incapacity of the husband. The doctor testified the husband was
declared to be psychologically incapacitated by the lower court the husband
protested the husband said, how could that doctor declared me as psychologically
incapacitated when she never even examined me. One of the questions raised
here is to be able to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of a spouse is
the testimony of a physician indispensable because that was the interpretation
given in the Molina Case? In this case the SC speaking through Justice Panganiban
again the same ponente who wrote the decision in the Molina case this time
wrote the decision in the Marcos case and in the opening statement of his
decision he said that the law does not require the testimony of a physician which
means that if you can prove the psychological incapacity through other means
you are free to do so. The testimony of a doctor is not indispensable. That is not
the only way by which psychological incapacity can be established however the
court said while the testimony of the doctor may not be essential or necessary
because the law does not require it the presence of existence of psvchological
incapacity must be established pursuant to the totality of the evidence rule. What
is the meaning of the totality of evidence rule in actions for declaration of nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Totality of the evidence
rule covers 3 things. 1. Juridical antecedence, 2. Gravity of the defect, 3.
Incurabillty of the defect. All those 3 must be established in a n action for the
declaration of nullity and all those put together is what we call totality of the
evidence rule. What does juridical antecedence mean? It only means that the
alleged incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
not afterwards. Seriousness and gravity the cause must be established must be
serious incurable. All those 3 put together are must be established in every case
of psychological incapacity. Now question may an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity may it be brought by the
husband or the wife asking the court to declare the marriage null and void on the
ground of the petitioners psychological incapacity. In other words, If I am the
husband can I go to court and ask the court to declare my marriage to my wife as
null and void on the ground of my own psychological incapacity. Not necessary of
the psychological incapacity of my spouse but my own psychological incapacity. Is

that possible? Usually when a spouse goes to court he asks for a declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the other spouse
not his own incapacity. The court said yes that is possible. In the case of Halili that
is what happened. The case of Ting that is what happened. As a matter of fact in
one case a case for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was brought by the wife against the husband so the wife
was the petitioner and the husband was the respondent this case was decided by
case of Navarro,
here the husband wife was married for several years but the marriage was childless.
They did not have a child for 10 years so much so they decided to adopt already and
they already found a child that is being proposed for adoption at the same time the
husband was suspecting that his wife was an arsonist. He was suspecting that his
husband was playing with fire but he had no proof. It was only based on his
suspicion. He said ill wait until such time that he came across a letter that was
written by his wife to her lover and the letter said in substance dear lover I miss you
so much you are so different from my husband you are so macho my husband is
machito, you are a better bed performer than my husband etc etc, Everything about
you is big! When the husband got that letter this is what I have been waiting for.
Immediately he went to court he brought an action for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to his wife on the ground of his wifes infidelity. The wife in her
defense said in substance susumbong sumbong ka eh ganyan ka rin naman. I
knew that everytime you would come home late your usual excuse is that you
visited the child that we are proposing to adopt but the truth of the matter was It
is not the child that you were visiting but the mother of the child. In other words
the defense of the wife was based on the doctrine of pari delicto and under the
principle of pari delicto when the parties are in pari delicto neither one of them
can bring an action against the other because he who come to court must come
to court in clean hands. That was the defense of the wife. The court said pari delicto
does not apply in cases of actions for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity because nothing can prevent the court from
declaring both spouses as psychologically incapacitated that is why pari delicto
does not apply to this kind of action. But you will now notice that the court has
now become strict in granting actions for declaration of nullity marriage based on
psychological incapacity because it has realized that it has become the most
abused provision in the Family Code
Ruiz vs Atienza
Facts: This is a case involving a young man preparing for the bar just like the boys
here. He was reviewing for the bar but he had a girlfriend one day the father of
the girl caught the 2 in a very compromising situation in the house of the girl. The
father said to the boy unless you marry my daughter I will see to it that you are
never allowed to take the bar. I will see to it that youll never become a lawyer.
Since becoming a lawyer has been his boyhood dream he immediately told her

father dont worry sir I will marry your daughter. Which he did they got married
after which he took the bar and after becoming a lawyer he brought this action.
An action to have his marriage to his wife annulled on the ground that his consent
to the marriage was vitiated by intimidation that he was intimidated by the father
of his wife. The court said true there was intimidation employed against you but
not all intimidations constitutes a threat which will invalidate consent because
under the law on contracts it says a threat to commit a wrongful act is what will
vitiate consent. In other words even if there has been a threat, even if there has
been intimidation if the threat is however not to commit a wrongful act it will not
vitiate consent. In your case while indeed there had been intimidation since
threat was to commit a rightful act because it is the right of the parent to vindicate
the honor of their children it will not vitiate consent. The threat of the
father did not vitiate consent. The petition for annulment dismissed. Nothing can
be more terrible and awful than to live with a woman you did not intend to make
your wife
Republic vs. Jimenez
case
where the husband complained that his wife was impotent because the genitals
of his wife was too small to admit penetration. During the Court proceedings the
wife said that is not true. The husband says that it is true. The judge said who is
telling the truth. I think we have to inspect. So the court ordered the wife to
submit to a physical examination to find out who is telling the truth. The wife
refused saying that mine is not intended for public viewing. I refuse to be
examined. The court issued an order presuming her to be impotent because of
her refusal. The wife appealed the court said, the mere refusal of the wife to
submit to that kind of examination is not a ground for the court to presume
impotency because impotency/potency is never presumed in this jurisdiction.
Impotency if claimed or alleged must be proven as a fact it is never presumed in
this jurisdiction.
Brown vs. Yambao
n that case, an action for legal separation was brought by the
husband against the wife. But the action was brought beyond the period of
prescription however the respondent spouse filed an answer to the complaint but
did not invoke prescription. However, the court motu proprio dismissed the
action. The question is, does the court have the power? Can the court dismiss the
action on the ground of prescription if prescription has not been invoked or set up
as a defense by the respondent spouse? In this case the court said YES. The court
is empowered to dismiss the action because this kind of action is imbued with
public interest. So remember, even if the respondent spouse does not brought up

the defense of prescription, if the action has been filed beyond the period
ofprescription, the court can motu proprio dismiss the action

action, then the action must be terminated because of the nature of an action for
legal separation. It is now expressly provided for by law.

case of BugayongBugayong the husband was an OFW working

abroad and the wife was left here in the Philippines. While abroad. The husband
received information, news that his wife in the Philippines has become an arsonist
because she was playing with fire in his absence. But Bugayong ignored those
notices. He was not bothered at all by those tsismis. He considered it as gossip.
The news persisted. When he decided to come home, the news still persisted.
Still, the husband was not bothered. Maybe it was a case of true love on his part
for his wife. He did not even ask his wife about it. He did not even mention it to
his wife. Instead of verifying the truth, what he did was to have sex with her
which is but normal having been absent from each other for a long time. The
natural thing to do was make up for lost time. So he had sex with her not only
once nagrepeat performance pa. They had sex not only twice nag anchor pa. They
had sex 3 times. Not on the same day of course. Mayroon namang rest period.
May pahinga. After the third time that they had sex, it was the time that he
decided to ask his wife. Honey, totoo ban a arsonist ka? Balitang balita eh. The
wife answered totoo eh. She admitted guilt. Immediately after that the husband
went to court and filed an action for legal separation on the ground of infidelity
on the part of the wife unfortunately, the court said too late in the day because
in effect you have actually condoned the act of your wife. You have been
receiving news about your wife fooling around but instead of verifying the truth
you just ignored it. It amounted to condonation.

Remember there is one case ( JOcson vs Jocson???)

Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio

In this case an action for legal separation was
brought by the wife against the husband. During the pendency of the action, the
wife died. The father of the wife asked the court to proceed with the hearings and
continue despite the death of the wife. The court refused. The court dismissed
the action for legal separation. The reason given by the court was an action for
legal separation is a personal action which should be allowed to be brought only by
the parties thereto. And this right to bring the action is not transmissible upon
the death of 1 of the parties. Now, you will notice under the Family Code, there is
no provision that provides that should one of the parties in a case for legal
separation died, that the case should be dismissed. That, what I said was based on
the case of Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio. However, we now have an AM covering actions
for declaration of nullity of marriage as well as annulment of marriage under the
Family Code. We have a separate AM governing the proceedings of Legal
separation. Under this AM, what the court said in the case of Lapuz Sy regarding
the effects of death on one of the contracting parties in an action for legal
separation, it has been crafted into law. It is now expressly provided in the AM
that should one of the contending parties should die during the pendency of the

decided by the court. This involve husband and wife. It involves a property
supposedly owned by the husband and the wife covered by TCT. One of the
spouses died, some members of the family claim that that property should be
considered conjugal because it was registered in the name of one spouse married
to the other spouse. Another group of relatives maintain however that that
property should be considered the separate property of the husband remember if
a property is acquired during the marriage it may either be community or
conjugal partnership property but the presumption is always rebuttable it is not
conclusive. In this case those who claim that the property is conjugal maintain it is
conjugal because the property was registered in the name of the husband
married to the wife and they also claim it is conjugal because it is acquired during
the marriage. Proof that it was acquired during the marriage is the date at the
bottom of the TCT and that date was during the marriage. On the other hand the
other group says that no the property is the exclusive property of the spouse
whose name appeared first in the title. As to who is correct between the 2 was
resolved in this case. First, a property is presumed to be community or conjugal
partnership property as long as it is acquired during the marriage and depending
on what economic system the spouses have adopted. If the property relations of
the spouses is system of absolute community and the property was acquired
during the marriage the presumption of the law is that the property is community
property. If the system that governs the property relations of the spouses is that
of conjugal partnership of gains and the property was acquired during the
marriage the presumption of the law is the property is conjugal partnership
property. But in both cases the presumption is merely rebuttable. Those who
claim that the property is conjugal maintain it is so because the property was
acquired during the marriage. What proof that they have that the property was
acquired during the marriage? The date appearing on the TCT which was within
the marriage. SC said that that is not proof of acquisition. The date that appears
on the bottom of the TCT is never proof of acquisition of the property. That date
is proof as to when the property was brought within the coverage of the Torrens
system. Sc said the property may have been acquired before the marriage but
only brought under the coverage of the Torrens system during the marriage. That
is the date that appears at the bottom that is not the date of acquisition. That is
the date it was brought under the Torrens system. With respect to the contention
that the property is conjugal because it is registered in the name of the husband
as married to the wife the court said we have said in so many cases before the
phrase married to is merely descriptive of the status of the spouse whose name
appears first in the title. For example a property appears to be registered in the
following manner this property is owned by Juan de la Cruz married to Josefa

Santos. What does that connote, the presumption of the law there is that
property belongs to Juan de la Cruz. Who is this Juan de law Cruz? It is the Juan de
la Cruz married to Josefa Santos. So that phrase married to is only descriptive of
the status of the spouse who appeared first. It is different if the property is
registered as follows, This property is owned by spouses Juan e la Cruz and Josefa
Santos that clearly means it belongs to both. If it is married to the presumption of
the law is that property is the exclusive property of the spouse whose name
appears first. But that presumption is not conclusive also. It is merely rebuttable.
But unless that presumption is destroyed that presumption will remain. That is
the ruling of the court in that case
Harding vs Union Commercial Assurance. In that case the
husband gifted his wife with a car the car that was given was comprehensively
insured. While the wife was using the car, got burned, the car destroyed. Because
it was insured, the wife presented a claim against the insurance company.
Insurance Company did not want to pay because the insurance company said the
gift was not moderate. Gift of the car according to the insurance company is not a
moderate gift. The issue here is was was the gift moderate? What is the test of
moderateness? That is the first question here. The second question to be resolved
is Does the insurance company have a right to question the validity of that gift?
With respect to the first? The court said it is not the value of the gift which is the
test. The test of the moderateness of the gift is the social financial standing of the
parties that is the giver of the gist and the receiver of the gift in the community
where they reside. That is the test of moderateness. It is not the value of the gift
so that if a person is receiving a salary 200 thousand a month. He gives a gift, a car
to his wife, is that a moderate gift? Of course not. That cannot be considered
moderate taking to account the financial and social standing it the place where
they reside. But if the husband who is earning 2m or 1M pesos per month what is
a car as a gift. It is just a drop in the bucket. It is nothing. So the court said it is not
the value of the gift which is the test. The test here is the social and financial
standing of the parties, the giver and the receiver of the gift in the community
where they reside. What about the 2nd issue? Does the insurance company have a
right to question the validity of that gift? SC: You have no business questioning
that because under the law the ones allowed to question the validity of the gift
are only 2 persons 1. The heir of the donor. And when does a person become an
heir? After the death of the parent so the donor must die first before that can be
questioned by the heir. As long as that donor is alive he has no heir. The heir has
to wait before he can question. For as long as the donor is alive that cannot be
questioned by the heir. And the remedy of the heir if he questions that gift. The
remedy of the heir if he proves that the gift is inofficious and exorbitant beyond
the limit allowed by law, the remedy of the heir is reduction. But the insurance
company is not an heir so the court said you have no business in questioning the
validity of the donation. The only other party who can question the validity of that
gift is a defrauded creditor. Under the law on contracts, if a person disposes of his

properties gratuitously without leaving enough to answer for his obligations to

persons to which he is obligated that becomes questionable. That becomes an act
intended to defraud creditors. What is the remedy of the creditor? He can
question immediately. The remedy is rescission under the law on contract. But
the insurance company is not anyone there hence the court said that you cannot
question that. But a gift to be valid between husband and wife 2 conditions 1.
Moderateness, 2. Given on the occasion of a family rejoicing. Family rejoicing
means any festivity that the family would like to celebrate like anniversaries. One
day the wife wakes up with a golden watch beside her she asks the husband ano
ito bakit may bagong relo ako? The husband says that is to commemorate the first
kiss that you successfully landed on me. Is that a valid occasion of family
rejoicing? Why not, if they want to celebrate it why not. After a month another
gift is found by the wife. To celebrate the death of our mother. Is celebration of
the death of a mother in law. Can that considered as an occasion of family
rejoicing? Why not. Yes specially if the mother in law is the pan in the ass. Note
we have jurisprudence for determining moderateness but no jurisprudence for
determining occasion of family rejoicing. In the absence of jurisprudence it is best
to leave it to the family to determine what occasion they may want to celebrate,
what occasions they may want to forget.
Jocson vs. CA
The issue in this case is the true classification of the property. In other words is
that property conjugal or does that property belong to one of spouses. The case
involves a piece of land which is covered by a torrens title. In the torrens title the
property was registered to the husband married to his wife. In other words the
property is registered in this manner Belonging to Pedro Santos married to Maria
Santos The wife died. The question is how will you classify the property? If that
property is the exclusive property of the husband it is not included in the estate of
the wife. If that is conjugal thereof will be included in the estate of the wife.
Some relatives in the family that the property is conjugal and the reason given by
them is that it was acquired during the marriage. But they have to prove that it
was really acquired during the marriage for the principle to apply to the property
that it is conjugal partnership property. They have to establish time of the
acquisition of the property. The proof that they have is the date appearing on the
bottom of the TCT covering that property which date was during the marriage.
Issue: is that correct, is the date appearing on the bottom of the TCT proof of the
date of acquisition of the property covered by that Torrens title. SC said no. That
date appearing at the bottom of the TCT is not the date of acquisition of the
property. The date appearing at the bottom of the Torrens title does not represent
the date when the property covered by the title was acquired. That
date means the date the property covered by that title was brought under the
coverage of the Torrens system not date of acquisition. As a matter of fact the
property may have been acquired by either spouse or the spouse whose name
appears first in the title long before the celebration of the marriage but only

brought within the coverage of the torrens system during the marriage.
Acquisition of title is one thing and confirmation of title is another thing. This was
the first time that the court interpreted the date appearing in the TCT. What
about that phrase with respect to the person in whose name the property was
registered Pedro Santos married to maria santos What does that signify? SC said
this is nothing new we have said in the past that starting with the case of
Gonzales vs. Miller followed by the case of Stuart vs Yatco we said whenever a
property is registered in this manner that is Pedro Santos married to maria
santos the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the status of the spouse
whose name appears first in the title. In other words, it merely describes who this
Pedro Santos is. It does not create a presumption of co ownership. The
presumption there is the property still belongs to the spouse whose name
appears first. So if the property is registered in this way Pedro Santos married to
maria santos can Pedro Santos dispose, encumber, alienate the property without
the consent of Maria Santos? The answer is yes because the presumption is in
favor of the husband that the property is presumed to be his unless the contrary
is proven that the property does not belong exclusively to the husband whose
name appears first in the title. But if the property is registered in the name of
Pedro Santos and Maria Santos that is different because it now confirms without
doubt that the property belong to both spouses.
The case of Alipio vs CA
In this case the husband and wife during the lifetime of both contracted a
conjugal obligation but before that obligation could be paid the husband died.
Upon learning of the death of the husband the creditor immediately demanded
payment from the wife and when the wife did not pay the creditor sued the wife.
The question now is was the suit against the wife proper? SC said no that is wrong
because this is a conjugal debt that is involved in the problem. It does not mean
to say that upon the death of the husband immediately it can be enforced against
the surviving spouse. The proper remedy of the creditor here is not exact
collection from the surviving spouse but to press his claim against the estate of
the spouse who died because during the settlement of the estate all debts will
now be settled. That is the time for the creditor to present his claim not against
the wife alone but against the estate because the debt was contracted not as an
individual obligation of the debtor but as a conjugal obligation of both spouses.
That is the case of Alipio.
Cheeseman vs IAC.
While this is not a new case but the doctrine is followed up to now. This is a case
of a couple. A Filipino wife and a foreigner husband during the marriage they
were able to acquire real property. Under the Civil Code because this case arose
under the Civil Code and not the Family Code, the husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership property. In other words, that power of the husband to

be administrator of a conjugal partnership property was not given to the husband

by the wife. The husband did not own this power or right. It is the law which gave
the power to the husband. And the law even says the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership property which means real or personal
property the husband is the administrator and that power of the husband cannot
be removed from him except for causes authorized by law. The husband said
under the Civil Code, I am the administrator of the conjugal partnership property
which includes all properties belonging to the conjugal partnership. Does it
include real property? SC: No, there can be no conjugal real property if the
property is real because foreigner spouses are disqualified by law from acquiring
and owning real property. There can be no conjugal real property between the
husband and wife if one of the spouses is a foreigner. The conjugal partnership
property will apply only to personal properties but never to real properties. That
is the doctrine in the case of Cheeseman.
Josephine Belcudero vs CA
Under the law it is provided in both the Civil Code and the Family Code that
separation in fact between spouses does not and will not affect the community or
conjugal partnership property. Separation in fact between spouses shall not and
will not affect community or conjugal partnership property. Separation in fact
means separation between spouses without judicial approval. The separation
between bed and board is simply by agreement of the spouses but without
judicial approval. That is what we call separation in fact or separation de facto.
What do we mean when we say that it does not affect the community or conjugal
partnership property? It simply means that during the period covered by the
separation in fact between the spouses any property that may be acquired by
either one of the spouses will still belong to either community or conjugal
partnership whichever economic system governing the property relations of the
spouses. That is the doctrine laid down by the court under this case.
Roxas vs CA
This case was decided under the Civil Code. This involve husband and wife they
were separated in fact. Since this took place during the effectivity of the Civil
Code the husband was the administrator of the conjugal partnership property and
despite the separation in fact of the husband and the wife the husband continued
to be the administrator of the conjugal partnership property. In the discharge of
his powers as administrator of the conjugal partnership property the husband
lease one conjugal real property for a period of more than 1 year. When the
estranged wife learned of the contract entered into by the husband without her
consent because they were separated in fact the husband did not bother to take
her consent in the contract of lease. When the wife learned of the contract
entered into by the husband without her consent. She contested the validity of
the contract entered into by her husband without her consent. She asked for

annulment of the contract She invoked a provision of the Civil Code which says
unless the wife has been declared a non compusmentus or a spendthrift, or
under civil interdiction or is confined in the leprosarium, the husband cannot
encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of any conjugal real property without
the consent of the wife. That was the provision invoked by the wife which existed
in the Civil Code. The wife said I have not been declared any of the three
therefore before leasing the property which is a conjugal real property you should
have obtained my consent thereto. Under the Civil Code, the law did not require
written consent for this kind of provision. Under the Civil Code, what it requires is
Roxas vs CA
This case was decided under the Civil Code. This involve husband and wife they
were separated in fact. Since this took place during the effectivity of the Civil
Code the husband was the administrator of the conjugal partnership property and
despite the separation in fact of the husband and the wife the husband continued
to be the administrator of the conjugal partnership property. In the discharge of
his powers as administrator of the conjugal partnership property the husband
lease one conjugal real property for a period of more than 1 year. When the
estranged wife learned of the contract entered into by the husband without her
consent because they were separated in fact the husband did not bother to take
her consent in the contract of lease. When the wife learned of the contract
entered into by the husband without her consent. She contested the validity of
the contract entered into by her husband without her consent. She asked for
annulment of the contract She invoked a provision of the Civil Code which says
unless the wife has been declared a non compusmentus or a spendthrift, or
under civil interdiction or is confined in the leprosarium, the husband cannot
encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of any conjugal real property without
the consent of the wife. That was the provision invoked by the wife which existed
in the Civil Code. The wife said I have not been declared any of the three
therefore before leasing the property which is a conjugal real property you should
have obtained my consent thereto. Under the Civil Code, the law did not require
written consent for this kind of provision. Under the Civil Code, what it requires is
right to administer all of these shall belong to both spouses jointly. That is what
the Family Code provides under both system (ACP and CPG). The second part of
this provision provides that should one of the spouses be unable to participate in
the management or should one be incapacitated in the management of a
community or conjugal partnership property the capacitated spouse may assume
sole powers of administration, sole powers of management. But the law says this
only applies to management and administration and not to alienation or
disposition. Now the third paragraph says however in the case of encumbrance or
alienation or disposition of any conjugal community property by one spouse the
written consent by the other spouse shall be necessary. This time the law requires
written consent for any of those 3 acts to be performed by the acting spouse and
if that written consent is not available or cannot be obtained judicial
authorization shall be had otherwise the act of the acting spouse shall be

considered null and void. That is what the common provision now provides under
the Family Code. Here is now where the relevance of the ruling of the case of
Roxas comes in. As I said the Roxas decision was handed down by the SC under
the Civil Code. Can that be applied to the Family Code? Yes, in the interpretation
of the word encumbrance. What does encumbrance include? You can apply the
Roxas case that the act of leasing is an act of encumbrance and therefore under
the Family Code the act of leasing this time it will require not only the consent of
the other spouse but the written consent of the other spouse. That is the
improvement from the provision in the Civil Code. While the Civil Code requires
the consent of the wife because under the Civil Code the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership property under FC everything is joint.
Under the first paragraph the power to possess the power to enjoy and administer
shall belong to both spouses jointly and should there be a conflict
between the husband and the wife on these 3 things on this 3 acts. The wife can
question because the law says that should there be a conflict between the
decision of the husband and the wife on this 3 things the decision of the husband
shall prevail. What will be the status of the decision of the husband is it becomes
voidable because the wife is not precluded from questioning the correctness of
the decision of the husband. Here under the FC you can apply the ruling of the
court in the Roxas case on how the act of leasing should be understood. That the
act of leasing is an act of encumbrance and therefore it will now require the
written consent of the other spouse. Under the FC, the written consent of the
other spouse is needed only in the performance of 3 acts- encumbrance,
alienation and disposition. If the written consent of the wife cannot be obtained
judicial authorization must be had otherwise the status of the act performed by
the acting spouse is null and void.
The question now is how
will you adjudicate the improvement as well as the property upon which the
improvement was introduced? During the effectivity of the Civil Code here was a
decision rendered by the court in the case of Padilla vs Paterno. Likewise during
the effectivity of the civil code another decision was rendered the court in the
case of Calimlim Canullas completely changed the ruling of the court in the case
of Paterno vs. Padilla. Because in the case of Paterno-Padilla the court said the
improvement which was made to the property belonging to one of the spouses
that property of the spouse upon which the improvement was introduced shall
belong to the conjugal partnership and the value of that property shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owned that property at the time of liquidation.
Payment of the value of the property if the property is adjudicated to the conjugal
partnership reimbursement of the value of the property to the owner spouse
shall be made at the time of liquidation. That is the ruling of the court in the case
of Padilla. But in the case of Calimlim Canullas the court changed that. The court
said upon completion of the improvement, payment of the value of the land shall
immediately be made to the spouse who owned the land on which the

improvement was made and if the spouse who owned the land is not immediately
paid the value of the land upon completion of the improvement then the spouse
becomes the creditor of the conjugal partnership and the conjugal partnership
becomes the debtor of the spouse who owned the land. That was the ruling in
Canullas. That ruling is evidently wrong. So if you come across that case in your
textbooks do not follow it. Just put a note wrong decision. The correct ruling is
that rendered by the court in the case of Padilla. What is the difference of the
Padilla case to the present provision 120? In the case of Paterno under the
provisions of the Civil Code if this is the property belonging to one spouse and an
improvement is made here on this property but the improvement did not occupy
the entire property but only a portion thereof. Only that portion will go to the
conjugal partnership not the entire property. Under the Family Code that has
been changed. If after applying the formula formulated by the Family Code the
property upon which the improvement was introduced if that property is
adjudicated to the conjugal partnership it is the entire property where the
improvement was introduced that will now become conjugal partnership
property. Not only that portion occupied by the improvement but the entire
property. That is the present law now. Do not forget the formula provided in Art
120. What does the formula say? In determining how to adjudicate the property
and the improvement the law says if the cost of the improvement and the plus
value-the amount by which the value of the land upon which the improvement
has been introduced has been enhanced by the introduction of the improvement
that is what we call plus value. The formula says that if the cost of the
improvement and the plus value are greater than the value of the land the
improvement and the land shall be adjudicated to the conjugal partnership. The
improvement as well as the land shall be adjudicated to the conjugal partnership
however 120 says if the cost of the improvement and the plus value are less than
the value of the land then the improvement shall be adjudicated to the spouse
who owned the land. In other words the land and the improvement will belong now
to the spouse who owned the land. Now, if the land is adjudicated to the
conjugal partnership, if the improvement and the land is adjudicated to the
conjugal partnership the conjugal partnership is required by law to refund to the
spouse who owned the land the value of the land. That is the obligation of the
conjugal partnership if the improvement and the land are adjudicated to the
spouse who owned the land. Now when will that obligation to reimburse the
spouse who owned the land be made? The law says at the time of liquidation.
When will title to the property if it is adjudicated to the conjugal partnership pass
to the conjugal partnership? The law says it will pass upon reimbursement of the
value of the land made to the spouse who owned the land. So until that
reimbursement is made the ownership of the land remains with the spouse who
owned the land and inasmuch as reimbursement is to be made at the time of
liquidation, title of the property will pass to the conjugal partnership at the time
of liquidation. The question now is this why do they have to wait at the time of
liquidation? Why not pay upon completion as the court said in Canullas Case? The

reason is simple because it can happen that at the time of liquidation the
improvement no longer exist perhaps it was destroyed by whatever cause. So
what is it that you must remember under 120? 1. No more distinction as to kind
of improvement that has been introduced as long as it is an improvement, 2. The
improvement must have been made at the expense of the common fund, 3. The
improvement must have been made on a separate property belonging exclusively
to one of the spouses, 3. Formula in determining to whom the property and the
improvement should be adjudicated.
Caltex vs Phileas
In this case, the
conjugal dwelling is the improvement. It was constructed at the expense of the
common fund. It was built at the expense of the common fund but constructed on
the land belonging to the mother of the wife. In other words, the improvement
was not introduced on a property belonging separately to one of the spouses. The
improvement was made on a property exclusively to a stranger who happened to
be the mother of the wife. After the completion of the improvement, the mother
of the wife donated the land upon which the improvement was introduced to her
daughter who happened to be the wife. How will you classify that property now
which was acquired by the wife during the marriage? Will it now become
conjugal? Definitely not, because of the mode of acquisition. How did the wife
acquire the property? Remember the provision which says these properties shall
be considered the exclusive property of either spouse and #1 of the provision says
properties acquired during the marriage by either spouse but the mode of
acquisition is by gratuitous title becomes the exclusive property of the spouse
who acquired said property. Inasmuch as in this case of Phileas, the property was
acquired by the wife from the mother and the mode of acquisition is by gratuitous
title and the mode of acquisition is through donation that property becomes
separate and exclusive property of the wife despite the fact that she acquired the
property during the marriage. In other words in this connection I want you also to
memorize what are considered separate and exclusive properties of the spouses.
Aside from this you have properties bought or acquired at the expense of the
personal fund of the acquiring spouse. If the money used in acquiring the
property is conjugal fund that property becomes conjugal. If the money used in
acquiring such property belongs exclusively to one spouse that property becomes
the exclusive property of the acquiring spouse. Or if the properties acquired
through exchange, barter or redemption and that property is acquired in exchange
for a property belonging exclusively to one of the spouses the property
acquired in exchange is considered also exclusive property of one of the spouses.
Now in this case of Phileas, the property was acquired by the wife although during
the marriage it was acquired however by gratuitous title and there are only two
ways in which a property can be acquired by gratuitous title and these 2 ways are
1. By donation, or by 2. Succession. In this case of Phileas the mode of acquisition

was a donation so it was acquired by the wife by gratuitous title. There is no

question about the land. What about the building that was built on that land? To
whom will it belong? The conjugal dwelling built on that land at the expense of
the common fund. How will you classify that? In this case of Caltex vs. Phileas,
insofar as the building is concerned what the court applied the law of accession in
general. The land was considered the principal and the building was considered
the accessory. And under the principle of accession in general the accessory
follows the principal therefor when the land was donated to the wife she
acquired ownership not only of the land but also of the building.
Carino vs Carino where the court said outside of
remarriage a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage is not necessary
because that judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage is deemed
necessary only for purposes of remarriage. Remember that. So outside of 147 and
148 despite the fact that the marriage is void there can be community or conjugal
partnership property but only in 2 cases.
Question: Can the term family relations
include other relations outside of this 4? In the case of Gayon vs. Gayon the court
said no! The term family relations should be understood to be limited to what
Article 150 provides. Remember that. In laws are not included according to the
case of Gayon vs Gayon. The next Article says no action shall be maintained
between members of the same family unless it is shown steps towards
reconciliation have been taken, steps towards a compromise have been taken
between the parties otherwise if that is not shown in the complaint or in the
petition that was filed in court between members of the same family and that the
same has failed, the case should be dismissed. What is the nature of the provision
of 151? This provision is mandatory. Question: what will be the basis of dismissing
the action under 151? If there are no efforts towards a compromise have been
taken between the parties, the basis of the order of dismissal will be that the
complaint was prematurely filed. Why premature? Because the petition or
complaint between members of the same family was filed without resulting to
attempts towards compromise as required by Article 151. Question: Notice that
under 151 the law does not say what this relationship should be unlike in 150
where the law specifies what the relationships are but under 151 the law simply
says no action between the same member of the family. What relationship can
be considered as belonging to the same family? The court applied the case of
Gayon vs Gayon here by saying that the relationships covered by 151 are the
same relationships covered by 150. Now, is the requirement of compromise
under 151 absolute? No, it is not absolute because this must be viewed in the
light of Article 2035. Under Article 2035 which you should memorize, it
enumerates instances where the law does not allow compromises. 2035 is an
exception to 151.

Question: Can an in-law a beneficiary of the family home? In the

case of Patricio vs. Dario III, the court said yes an in-law can be considered a
beneficiary of a family home subject to two conditions 1. that the in-law mustreside
in the family home, 2. That in-law must be dependent to the head of the
family for his support. Those are the conditions impose by law. So that if the inlaw
resides in the family home but is not dependent for his support on the head
of the family. He cannot be considered a beneficiary of the family home. Or the
reverse, even if the in-law is dependent for his support to the head of the family
constituting the family home but if he does not live in the family home, he cannot
be also considered a beneficiary of the family home. What about atsays, maids,
caretakers, kasambahay-can they be considered beneficiaries of the family home?
In the case of Manacop vs CA as well as Patricio vs Dario III the court said maids
and caretakers are excluded from the term beneficiaries of the Family Home. You
remember under the law on lease, what kind of a contract is a contract of lease?
The court said the contract of lease is not a personal contract. Why? Because if
the lessee should die before the expiration of the lease period, in other words if
the lessee should die during the period of effectivity of the contract of lease the
heirs of the lessee can continue with the lease until its expiry date. That is why a
contact of lease is not considered a personal contract. However in 1 case, I can
give you the citation tomorrow, upon the death of the lessee the atsays, maids,
househelp wanted to continue the lease because at the time of the death of the
lessee the lease period has not yet expired. There is still an unexpired portion of
the period. And the atsays did not want to vacate the premises because they
wanted to continue the lease until its expiration. The court said you are atsay, you
are not heirs of the lessee so you have no business remaining in the leased
premises. Now privilege to remain in the leased premises for the rest of the
unexpired portion of the leased period is given by law only to the heirs of the
lessee but it does not mean to say gratuitous stay no! You can stay but you haveto
pay for the rentals. Those are 2 cases decided by the court. Is there a limit to
the value of the family home? Yes there is a limit. 300,000 pesos/200,000 pesos
depending on the location of the Family Home where it is situated

Question: are
costs of improvement on the Family Home included in the computation on the
limitation of value of the family home? Yes, the costs are supposed to be
included. I want you to read the case of Montequillo vs Creba (May 21, 1990), this
case is better read than discussed for you to understand the retroactive effect of
exemption from liabilities. Suppose a family home is questioned by a creditor or
the owner of the family home. The creditor maintains that the family home is
worth more than the limitation prescribed by law. Remember that the limitation
is based on the classification of the place whether it is urban or rural. 300k for
urban and 200k for rural. If the creditor or the owner of the family home
questions the valuation of the family home and he believes that the family home

exceeds the limit provided by law, can he ask for the sale of the family home?
Here you must determine first whether the creditor is a preferred creditor or not.
If he is not a preferred creditor can he question the valuation of the family home?
The answer is yes he can but before he can make an issue on that he must first
become a judgment creditor. A preferred creditor is a person who is among those
enumerated under 155. If the creditor is not included in the list mentioned in 155
he is not a preferred creditor. Can a creditor who is not a preferred creditor can
he question the valuation of the family home? Yes he can. Can he ask for the sale
of the family home? He can but before he can ask for the sale of the family home
on the ground that it violates the limitation on value he must first become a
judgement creditor. How does he become a judgment creditor? Sue the debtor
first for what he owes you. After obtaining a judgement in your favor you
nowbecome a judgement creditor and after becoming a judgement creditor in the
same court that rendered the decision in your favor you can now question the
valuation of the Family Home. Suppose it is established that the Family Home did
exceed the limits by law insofar as the valuation is concerned. Can the judgement
creditor ask for the sale of that family home? Yes, Yes, Yes. He can ask the same
court that made him a judgement creditor sell the property which is in violation of
the limitation fixed by law on the family home. If the court is really convinced that
the value of the family home is beyond the limit set by law, the court can order
the sale of that family home. How should that family home be sold? It must be
sold through a public sale not negotiated sale. Suppose the family home has been
sold, can the judgement creditor now seek payment of what is due him. Can he
now claim part of the proceeds of the sale of the family home to the extent of the
judgement that was rendered in his favor? No, he cannot because from the
proceeds of the sale of the family home you must take out first what is necessary
for the family to establish a new family home and it is on what remains after
taking out what is necessary to put up a new family home on what remains that
the judgement creditor can apply his credit. From that he can seek payment of
what is due him but not from the gross sale because from the proceeds of the
sale the law says you must separate first that amount which is necessary to put up
a new family home for the family.
f Zuzuarregui vs Zuzuarregui the court said proof of bare filiation is enough to
confer rights to an illegitimate child. That ruling was handed down by the SC under
the Civil Code before the effectivity of the Family Code but likewise during the
effectivity of the Civil Code in subsequent cases the cases of Noble vs Noble
followed by the case of Paulino vs Paulino, the court abandoned what it said in
Zuzuarregui because under these 2 cases the court said, proof of bare filiation is not
enough confer rights to a child what is necessary to confer rights to a child is
acknowledgement by the alleged parents. Recognition. In other words proof of bare
filiation without acknowledgement is nothing it does not confer rights under the
amending decisions

Banyas vs Banyas
Banyas, the child, was residing with his
mother. But someone was looking after them and this was Dr. Banyas. One day,
when the boy was out playing Dr. Banyas wrote on the letter a message for the
boy stating that Time is precious. Do not waste your time. Help your mother with
the chores. And after that he signed Your father. When Dr. Banyas died, the
boy filed a claim claiming that he was a son but the only reason for his claim is the
note. Is that enough proof of filiation? SC said that is not enough. We need more
that that because Filipinos by nature are paternalistic. They call their elders Tito
Tita. That is how the Filipino is and that is not proof of filiation. That is merely a
sign of respect. The court said we need more than this. So his petition failed.