G.R. No.

167798

April 19, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONSKILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA
P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR.
and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 167930

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENTOWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have
created unnecessary and costly redundancies and higher costs to
government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding several
identification cards;

April 19, 2006

BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.

CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL
V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,
Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR.
CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. REYES, JR. of BAYAN,
MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT,
FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM,
WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN of
GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R. DUREMDES of the NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L.
FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS
SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO
NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC
and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the Administrator of the
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of
Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005,
reads:

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes

and issuance of identification cards in government to reduce costs and to
provide greater convenience for those transacting business with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses,
enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued identification cards
in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names
and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system
for government.1avvphil.net All government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt
a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following
objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both
the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple
ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with
the government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the
unified ID card as provided under this executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID

cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective
government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents
shall be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be
collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be limited to the
following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency

and a common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and,
together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the
right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall
appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, to Harmonize All Government Identification
Systems. The Director-General, National Economic Development
Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government
ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority. In addition to his
organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive
order a unified government ID system containing only such data and
features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the
identity of the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their
respective leagues of governors or mayors, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities
of the government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide
adoption of and support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in
government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create sub
committees or technical working groups, to provide such assistance
as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its
functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in
pursuance of the objectives of this executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies shall adopt such
safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the right to
privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service
delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for
purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to
those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
violation of a persons right to privacy shall be allowed or tolerated
under this order;

branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on

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the citizens right to privacy.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the
following grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates
the decision of this Honorable Court inOple v. Torres et al., G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as
the Social Security Act of 1997.

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification

system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization
of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as

she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation
of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by

advanced security features and cryptographic technology; and

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be

required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such
conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card
shall prescribe.

(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the

owners consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or
penalties for any violation of its provisions.

Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the

Department of Budget and Management shall be provided to carry out the
objectives of this executive order.

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the

necessity of EO 420.

Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or

portions thereof, which are inconsistent with this executive order, are hereby
revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420,

the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.

Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of

laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and penalizes
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those without ID.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive

Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420
is a usurpation of legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners
claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of
the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the
Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount
public concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions

also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because

all government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to
implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional.
Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. All government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO 420
applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been
issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government
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entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayors Office, LTO, PRC, and
similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part
of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the
purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both
the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple
ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with
the government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the
unified ID card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID
cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective
government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and
provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of
Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12)
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing
features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal
identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one
who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14
specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from
applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to
be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities.
Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes,
other than the 14 specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for
their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions
of these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some
government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows.
At present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are
disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.
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In the case of the Supreme Court, the IDs that the Court issues to all its
employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1)
Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6)
Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11)
Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number;
(14) Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and
(15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also
show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only
"the first five items listed" in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number
and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at
present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed
uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data
contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive,
specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and
making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits.
These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and
supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of
a single ID format for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the
collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of
EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can
individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an
act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the
government entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue
IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can
enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct
all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws,
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The
Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not
need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch
of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or
to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
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voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national

ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that

is compulsory for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public
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services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing
the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO
420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also
compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In
issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but
merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as
well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing
laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of
legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for
imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. Private employers
routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also
routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and
associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID
cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an
employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed
as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is
not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID
card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a
special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such
purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well
as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not.
Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of
personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation
because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO
420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on
all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420
requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data
while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected
and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded
under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not
compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government
entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID
cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that
presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own
name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data
specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number,
and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to
ensure integrity and reliability of identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive
department should undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations,
insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly
service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are
day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even
the Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all
first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system
with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts
within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the
Executive department. If government entities under the Executive
department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card
issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and
convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power.
Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative
power.

no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and

recording of personal identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored
for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific
data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data
collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less
data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to
EO 420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems.
Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14
specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government
entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of
personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section
5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for
purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to
those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under
this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification
system shall be instituted;

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization
of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of
these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by

advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be
required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such

conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card

shall prescribe.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even
narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared
to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides
strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast
to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national
ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany,
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not
have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for
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health, social or other public services. Even with EO 420, the Philippines
will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID
systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and
other specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth,
and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions
under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from
false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will
suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.
The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy,
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namely, Griswold v. Connecticut, U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters
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15
Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Whalen v. Roe. The last two
decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable
to the present case.
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law
that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives because
enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of
married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Because the facts and the
issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case,
Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect
and store information on individuals from public records nationwide but

whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The
premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect
and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public
records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of
Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification
records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to
exchange such information with "officials of States, cities and other
institutions." The Department of Justice treated such information as
confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee
demanded the criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom
of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would
"constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and the information
demanded falls under that category of exempt information.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal
data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly
confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly
confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution grants the "right of the people to information on matters of public
concern." Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated
as "strictly confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and not matters
of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press.
Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but
actually supports the validity EO 420.
Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection
for control over information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government
reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a
potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized
database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the
identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the
database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to
keep their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the privacy claim, and declared:
Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel,
to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential
part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect
unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the
community does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of
privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New
York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the
Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less
personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data
for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical
records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries
persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative
of the right to privacy.
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In
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Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions
to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of
such records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
"recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to
the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patients
confidentiality and privacy are permissible."
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Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the

U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required doctors performing an
abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors name,
the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the
woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the
fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded
institutions, the law made such information publicly available. In Casey, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated: "The collection of information with respect to
actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be
said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion
more difficult."
Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S.
Supreme Court have upheld in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative
of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far
benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO
420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes,
data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO
420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
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exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is
not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of
safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is

decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems
and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws.
EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive
issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a "National Computerized
19
Identification Reference System," a national ID system that did not exist
prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card
system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection
and card issuance system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly
to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is
declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF
THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F.
Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
1
right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We
grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the

various basic services and social security providing agencies
and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve
such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized
Identification Reference System. A decentralized
Identification Reference System among the key basic
services and social security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An InterAgency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the
implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of
the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12,
1996 and reads as follows:

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

Administrator, Social Security System,

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

Administrator, National Statistics Office

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and

foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to
properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

Managing Director, National Computer Center.

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is
hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such
shall provide administrative and technical support to the
IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference
Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the
common reference number to establish a linkage among

concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate

with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology
and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.

ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign.

The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the
National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead
agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and
use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification
Reference.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE

PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO.
308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the

implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and
SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the
President through the IACC, on the status of implementation
of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect
immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the
year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner
filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members
of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE

C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308

INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
2
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE
AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE
EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S
3
INTEREST IN PRIVACY.
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues
relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the
case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet
to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a

distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
4
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
5
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification
6
(ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced
that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
7
guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we
need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule
on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
9
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
10
broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
11
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
12
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
13
all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
14
15
executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is
16
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
17
observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive.
He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
18
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
19
bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
20
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a
mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their
right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of
power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by
this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
8
to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and

21
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
22
the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
23
promulgated in administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the

24

legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308

implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
25
governance." and "embodies changes in administrative structure
and procedures designed to serve the
26
people." The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals
with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the
Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III
on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch,
Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure.
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the
organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government
budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative
agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code
covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal
organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline,
and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials
27
on private individuals or parties outside government.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and
creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business
with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and

enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of
Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining
the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". .
. Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policymaking that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make
28
laws."
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still
it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to
29
30
be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United
States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it
ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right
of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third,
31
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras
formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give
them life and substance . . . various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."

32

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold

ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr.
Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which
made the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the
right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider
implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has
come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as
such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has
always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
33
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order

of the court, or when public safety or order requires

otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions
34
of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes
as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
35
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
36
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private

37

communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of

38
39
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
40
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
41
42
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the
43
Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
44
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden
of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of
A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right
to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods
45
to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." The term
"biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
46
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. A
physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such
as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral
characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice
47
print, signature and keystroke. Most biometric idenfication systems use a
card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The
biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card
48
or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN.
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where
technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an
individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in
49
computer data banks and becomes a means of identifying an individual
using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every
50
time service or access is provided. Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary

pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print
51
similar to a finger print. Another biometric method is known as the "artificial
nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of
52
substances excreted from the skin of people. The latest on the list of
biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by
taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution
pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all
53
contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature."
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some
science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited
to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses
various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an
individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state
what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O.
No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that
it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information
alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
54
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the
generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O.
No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government
the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308
cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative
order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a
government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions
with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in
the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file
may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the
chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic
55
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
56
too great for some of our authorities to resist.

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to
the name, address and other basic personal infomation about the
57
individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308
from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does
not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances
and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy
58
and guaranty the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer
linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is
broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the
data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the
59
system.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed
60
for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions"
by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
61
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
62
less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very
63
abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradleto-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is
64
one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer
is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
65
information given at different times and for varied purposes. It can continue
adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of
stored date is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its
way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
66
subject. Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any
person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting
opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and
hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The
Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty
if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but
would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a

reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of
biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
67
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The
factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
68
expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
69
diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology
in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
70
privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
71
decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
72
accepted. The security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of
technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect.
Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its
face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the
metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure
by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with
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imprisonment and fine. Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure
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of SSS employment records and reports. These laws, however, apply to
records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may
be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the
National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is
another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of
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the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. He stressed that
the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development
planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right
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to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.
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We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the

constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a
valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public

officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his
sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to
privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
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maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019
is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is
sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and
penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar,
A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that
when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It
will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that
their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated,
even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily
show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or
regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded
by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human
rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do
is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected
by the Constitutions.
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The case of Whalen v. Roe cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In
Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record
of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled
Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining
prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized
medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses
of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State
Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed
that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear
that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public
disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug
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addicts. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to
privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs.

The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and

rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially
appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter.
Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous
safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the
informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation.
In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy
was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above,
A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court
is not per se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process,
retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work
wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private
industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of
the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law
enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of
credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and
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streamlining of financial activities. Used wisely, data stored in the computer
could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive
information for those who have to frame policy and make key
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decisions. The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
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technology. It developed the internet, introduced the concept of
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cyberspace and the information superhighway where the individual, armed
only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of
information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
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the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and
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a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must
be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades
individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason
for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state.
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a

private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly

distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a
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democratic and a totalitarian society.
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governments,
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journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In th case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It
is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing
result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of
his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record89
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." Oblivious
to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that
the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.