EVIDENCE

(Part VIII of IX)

Evidence (Rule 128-133)

A. General Provisions
1. Definitions
Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by
these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact. (1)
Evidence the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree
to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined
by the rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial
importance to the particular issue, apart from its relevance
Escolin: The terms relevant and material are practically the same. They are used
interchangeably by the SC. They differ in effect. Material evidence has substantial
effect.
Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of
Court
Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence
of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence
Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade,
when he is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until
contradicted and overcome by other evidence
Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does not
allow to be contradicted
Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and character as that already given
and tends to prove the same proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and character tending to prove
the same point
Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question
Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best evidence
and shows on its fact that better evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be
established; material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the
consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to be
established, hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other denies
Factum probandum
Factum Probans
Proposition to be established
Material evidencing the proposition
Conceived of as hypothetical; that which Conceived of for practical purposes as
one party affirms and the other denies
existent, and is offered as such for the
consideration of the court

Collateral facts matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a basis
merely for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue
Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or inspection as
distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is addressed directly to
the senses of the court without the intervention of a witness
Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove
facts given in evidence by the adverse party
Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence
of a fact

2. Distinguish
Admissibility of evidence
Pertains to the ability of the evidence to be
allowed and accepted subject to its
relevancy and competence
Substantive essence or characteristic
feature of evidence as would make it
worthy of consideration by the court before
its admission
Proof
Effect and result of evidence
End Result

Weight of evidence
Pertains to the effect of evidence admitted
The probative value of evidence which the
court may give to admit after complying
with the rules of relevancy and competency

Evidence
Medium of proof
Means to the end

3. Scope
a. Rule 128 2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in
all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)

b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992)

The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence, are not even suppletorily applicable to
agrarian cases. Special law allows affidavits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian
courts, even without the witness testifying nor subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits. Ordinarily, affidavits are
not admissible before the regular courts because there is no opportunity for the other
party to cross-examine. Depositions are admissible because there was an opportunity for
the adverse party to cross-examine.
Pp v. Turco 337scra714 (2000)

Subject: Failure to qualify the doctor who conducted the medical exam as an expert
witness. In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the
medical certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to
testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since
entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must
first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the
doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications.
We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the

probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent.
Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be
given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus,
while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a
special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed.,
p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on
the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile
insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen
secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the
victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical
examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No.
130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs.
Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not
disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence
on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the
instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
Famador: medical certificate can be used by the defense when:
1. the lacerations have already healed or that the lacerations are already old.
2. the admission of more fingers into the vagina would prove the sweetheart
defense
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237 (1993)

The unverified position paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the
merits of the case. Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before
the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
.1 probation board
.2 CTA
.3 SEC
.4 Immigration cases
.5 LA/NLRC
.6 CAR

B. Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
.1 relevant
.2 competent

1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 4
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in

any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact

in issue. (4a)
Relevance relation to the facts in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence
Evidence on collateral matters allowed only when it tends in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

b. Cases
Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805 (1954)

Nicolas Aasco sold 3 parcels of land to Valentin Justiniani, who in turn sold the same to
Claudio Justiniani.
Claudio executed public instrument, whereby he sold same property to Apolonio
Aparece. Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered portions III & IV and took possession
thereof, prompting Aparece to file complaint with guerilla forces.
Upon hearing this, Bautista executed public instrument recognizing Apareces ownership
of the property.
Possession was restored to Aparece.
Bautista filed complaint vs. Aparece for allegedly usurping portion of his land.
Apareces special defense: portion of land referred to in the complaint was acquired by
him from Claudio Justiniani and prayed for dismissal of the case.
TC decision: Defendant Aparece is the owner of portions III & IV.
Bautista appealed alleging that TC erred in admitting in evidence the document
relinquishing plaintiffs ownership & possession as embodied in exhibit I. Bautista
argued that the document was executed under duress, force, intimidation and that
guerilla officer has no jurisdiction over the matter.
SC: Test of admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is WON it is relevant,
material or competent.
Relevant Evidence one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter
provable in an action.
Evidence is material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the
rules of substantive law & pleadings.
Competent Evidence one that is not excluded by law in a particular case.
The mere fact that the document in question was executed before a guerilla officer does
not make the same irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent to the main issue raised in the
pleading.
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)

Both prosecution and defense presented their respective expert witnesses.

testimonies were naturally in contradiction with each other.

The

GR: Expert evidence is not conclusive upon the court. The court is not bound to accept
said evidence. The court may use it as an aid.
Exception: when the court is not knowledgeable or completely ignorant on the subject,
the court should admit the expert evidence.
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)

2. Competence
a. Rule 128 3
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence not excluded by the law or the RoC

b. Constitutional rules of exclusion

1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

2) Art. III, Sec. 12

Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
XXX

3) Art. III, Sec. 17

Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Absolutely inadmissible evidence obtained
.1 from unreasonable searches and seizures, or
.2 in violation of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence
Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only against the person whose rights are violated,
admissible for other purposes) evidence obtained
.1 in violation of the right be informed of the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
.2 from means which vitiate the free will
.3 in violation of the right against self-incrimination

c. Statutory rules of exclusion

1) NIRC, 201, as amended by RA 8424
Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. An instrument,
document or paper which is required by law to be stamped and which has been
signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not
be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the
same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or
stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add
his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp
tax unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.

Failure to stamp a document required by law to be stamped shall render the document
inadmissible in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled (201 NIRC). This is an absolute inadmissibility.

2) General Banking Act of 2000, RA 8791, 55.1 (b)

Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. 55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank shall
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose to any
unauthorized person any information relative to the funds or properties in the
custody of the bank belonging to private individuals, corporations, or any
other entity: Provided, That with respect to bank deposits, the provisions of
existing laws shall prevail;
Elements of the exclusion
.1 director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank
.2 disclosure to unauthorized person
.3 information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank belonging to
private individuals, corporations, or any other entity
.4 without a court order
de Leon: Note that this provision covers only property in the custody of the bank other
than bank deposits. For bank deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that the provision
does not state the nature of the inadmissibility. I submit that it is a rule of absolute
inadmissibility.

3) RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
GR: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office.
Exceptions
.1 written permission of the depositor
.2 impeachment, or
.3 order of a competent court in cases of
.a bribery or
.b dereliction of duty of public officials, or
.4 where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

4) RA 4200: Wire-tapping
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act
or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay
the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
Unlawful acts
.1 any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
.2 any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured in
the manner prohibited by this law; or
.3 any person to replay the same for any other person or persons
.4 any person to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or
.5 any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person:
The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit,
or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding
section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order
issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the
Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding
sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by
the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided,
That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided,
however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only
upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have
actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person
for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3)
that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
.1 any peace officer

.2 authorized by a written order of the Court

.3 in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in
case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting
to sedition, kidnapping, espionage and other offenses against national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping act is absolutely inadmissible.
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)

Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter violates the anti-wiretapping act. The
recording is inadmissible in evidence.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Salcedo Ortaez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

C. What Need NOT be Proved:

3 things that need not be proved
.1 matters of mandatory judicial notice
.2 matters of discretionary judicial notice
.3 judicial admissions

1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory (Rule 129 1)
Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Mandatory Judicial Notice
.1 existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality
.2 the law of nations
.3 the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals
.4 the political constitution and history of the Philippines
.5 the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines
.6 the laws of nature
.7 the measure of time, and
.8 the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155 (1994)

In determining prescription in a prosecution for bigamy, the reckoning point is actual

discovery of the subsequent marriage by the offended party, not from the registration of
the marriage contract. The doctrine of constructive knowledge does not apply, even if it
is more favorable to the accused.

b. Discretionary (Rule 129 2)

Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. (1a)
Discretionary Judicial Notice matters which are
.1 of public knowledge, or
.2 are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
.3 ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions

c. When hearing required (Rule 129 3)

Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court,
on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
.1 During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard thereon
.2 After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hearing is necessary when
.1 During the trial, the court
.a motu propio, on request of a party
.b announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
.2 After trial
.a before judgment or on appeal
.b motu propio, on request of a party
.c takes judicial notice of any matter, and
.d if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long as there is
a hearing. If trial is already over, the court can take judicial notice only of matters
decisive of a material issue in the case as long as there is a hearing (p. 88, Francisco).
de Leon: Why on earth would a court take judicial notice of a matter which is not decisive
of a material issue in a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19scra413 (1967) L26053
Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971) L28100
Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965) L17885
Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1 (1979) x
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988) L55960
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) 85423

As a general rule courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the
fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge. However, an exception is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter of

convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) 115908-09
BPI-Family Bank v. CA 330scra507 (2000) 122480

2. Judicial admissions
a. Rule 129 4
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
Requisites for judicial admission
.1 made by a party
.2 in the course of the proceedings
.3 in the same case
de Leon: If the admission was made in outside the proceedings or in another case, it is
also admissible under admissions of a party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
.1 it was made through palpable mistake or
.2 no such admission was made

b. Instances of Judicial admissions

Instances of Judicial admissions
.1 the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or attached to
a pleading, when the other party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rule 8 8)
.2 material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specifically deny it
(Rule 8 11)
.3 admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)
.4 act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)
.5 implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases,
except quasi-offenses and those allowed by law to be compromised (Rule 130 27)
.6 admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

c. Cases
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914) 8200
Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984) L37420
Bitong v. CA 292scra503 (1998) 123553

D.Object and Documentary Evidence

1. Rule 130 1-2
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the
senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)

Object Evidence evidence addressed to the senses of the court

Ocular inspection qualifies as object evidence.
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings
or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents. (n)
Documentary evidence any material containing modes of written expressions offered
as proof of their contents

2. Cases
People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 (1980) L29271
Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) 108280-83
Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)
State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754 (1961)

E. Best Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 3-4
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced, exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
.1 has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
.2 is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
.3 consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
.4 the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office

2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) 80505

The best evidence rule does not apply to the marked money in a buy bust operation
because the inquiry is not on the contents of the marked bill, but merely its existence.

Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966) L21438

Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948)

BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document; such an inquiry
need not be the main issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) L14257
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986)

US BER or their equivalents vs. Philippine BER other modes of written expression; is
a disputed work in an infringement case object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910) 5791
Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931) 35366 05aug31

Sec. 4. Original of document.

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
Original documents
.1 one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
.2 When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
.3 When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals

F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If
the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of

the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where
the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized public record of a private document may
be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record,
with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)

To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who possibly has a copy of the
original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

Vendor
vendee
notary public
clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
Bureau of Archives

Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds

.1 the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
.a prove execution or existence
.b prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
.c proof of contents in the following order
)1
copy
)2
recital of its contents in
)a
some authentic document, or
)b
testimony of witnesses
.2 the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party
.a adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena duces
tecum)
.b proof of the originals existence
.c adverse party fails to produce the original
.d proof of contents in the following order
)1
copy
)2
recital of its contents in
)a
some authentic document, or
)b
testimony of witnesses
.3 the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
.4 the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof
.a Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state
)1
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof
)2
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
.b Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document - may be proved by
)1
the original record, or
)2
by a copy thereof
)a
attested by the legal custodian of the record
)b
with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody

2. Cases
Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149scra32 (1987) L31189 31mar87

Facts: In action to recover land, a party failed to produce the deed of sale, but presented
only a Certificate from the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management of an
entry in a notarial register.

Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost or destroyed, the offeror
may prove its contents by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by
testimony of witnesses. The Certificate is one such authentic document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218scra602 (1993) 83377 09feb

In case of loss of the original of a document, the order of proof is as follows; 1) existence
of the original, 2) its due execution, 3) loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of
all the originals without fault of the offeror renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963)

When the existence of a document is proven or admitted by both parties, the court
should allow the lost document to be proven by parole; testimony of a witness regarding
the contents of the document need not be verbatim or perfect.
Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) L28999
24may77

Voluminous character of accounts must be established, and it must be made available to

the adverse party before parole; audit made by or testimony of private auditor is
inadmissible as proof of original record or books of accounts; auditors opinion not
admissible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales invoices not testimony of an
auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25scra845 (1968) L23893 29oct68

It is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce copy to prove that original is in actual
possession of adverse party as long as it is under his control; adverse party need not
admit that it is in his possession before a copy may be introduced.
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) 10824 24dec15

To prove a lost document, must prove due execution, delivery (if required), and the fact
of lost or destruction; it is important to have qualified witnesses.
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to offer it. - A party who
calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to
offer it as evidence. (6a)

G.Parol Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 9
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule:

When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
Exceptions:

a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading
.1 An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
.2 failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties
.3 validity of the written agreement; or
.4 The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement
If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must also be
put in issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be
admitted refers to matters other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statement of
facts), then the PER does not apply, such evidence is admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is
invoked against a litigant who is a stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to PER

.1 mutual between the parties

.2 of fact, not of law
.3 alleged and put in issue in the pleadings
.4 proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence
Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense also requires that the circumstances of selfdefense be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil Code (Statute of Frauds)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing,
or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a
price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive
part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such
things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but
when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold,
terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account
the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of
article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral
evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefit under them.
Statute of Frauds: (Art1403 NCC)

If the following agreements are not in writing and subscribed, it is unenforceable and
evidence thereof is inadmissible
.1 not to be performed within a year from the making thereof
.2 special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
.3 agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry;
.4 agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than
P500, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of
the purchase money;
.5 lease for more than 1 year, or sale of real property or of an interest therein;
.6 representation as to the credit of a 3rd person.
Exceptions (Art1405 NCC)

.1 failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence, or

.2 acceptance of benefit under the agreement

3. Parol Evidence Rule vs. Best Evidence Rule

Parol Evidence Rule
No issue as to the contents of a writing
Parol evidence is offered
Presupposes that original is in court
Effect is: cannot add, subtract, or explain the contents

Best Evidence Rule

Issue is contents of a writing
Secondary evidence is offered
Applies when the original is not available
Effect is: cannot present any evidence on the
contents other than the original
Invoked only if the controversy is between parties to the Invoked by anybody, whether a party to the
agreement
instrument or not
Applies only to agreements and wills
Applies to all kinds of writing

4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) 79962

Facts: Conrado Salonga (respondent) filed a complaint for collection and damages vs.
petitioner Lucio Cruz in Lucena RTC alleging that in the course of their business, Cruz
borrowed from him 35T as evidenced by a receipt. Cruz admitted having received the
35T not as a loan but as consideration for their fish pakyaw purchase and sublease
agreement. RTC ruled in favor of Cruz and found that the transactions were indeed
pakyaw and sublease agreements. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA ruled
that the receipts are clear in its language and its tenor must not be clouded by any parol
evidence introduced by Cruz such as self-serving testimonies.
Held: PER does not apply to receipts because it is not an agreement. It is proof only of
delivery of money. Furthermore, the parole evidence bars only evidence as to the terms,
it does not bar evidence as to statement of facts. The receipt of money is merely a
statement of fact. Lastly, failure of the adverse party to object renders parole evidence
admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740 (1993) 105419 27sep93

Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer claims that
the car was merely a security for the time deposit placements of Santos relatives. Since
Santos relatives have recovered their placements, Pioneer sued for recovery of the car.
Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While parol
evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any instrument or written document which would
prove that the deed of sale in question was only a security for the time deposit
placements of Santos' relatives in Pioneer. The 2 main witnesses for Pioneer, were not
mere employees of the bank. They were bank officers; one being a lawyer and supposed
to be steeped in legal and banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to
know the consequences of their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred

ownership over the subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in
the deed of sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a stipulation that
transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name were conditioned
on the failure of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank.
No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright and
unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.
de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of other term agreed by the parties refer to those
agreed after, not before, the execution of the agreement. Pioneer should have invoked
the exception that the agreement did not express their true intent and agreement.
Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962) L18077 29sep62

Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case, plaintiff invokes the registered mortgage

agreement. Defendant answers that the contract did not express the true agreement of
the parties because it did not include the undertaking of plaintiff to construct roads on
the land. Furthermore, defendant argues that the ordinance that requires the
construction of such roads in the subdivision before the lots could be sold is deemed
included in the contract.
Held: Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express the true intention of
the parties, it has therefore been put in issue in the pleadings. The same may therefore
be subject of parole evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840 (1918) 11346 21mar

Facts: Canuto executed a DoS with 1-year right to repurchase of a parcel of land to
Mariano. Redemption period elapsed so Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership
despite the insistent demand of Canuto that she be permitted to exercise said right in
accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period.
Canuto presented witnesses to corroborate her testimony on the oral agreement.
Mariano contends that Canuto should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the
terms of the written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence. Manila CFI ruled in
favor of Canuto.
Held: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary
contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by
parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the
time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may
have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the
contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in
any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was but merely goes to show
that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a
new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one
was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved
and enforced.
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove subsequent agreement regardless of how
soon such agreement was made.
Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915) 9935 01feb

Facts: Yu Tek & Gonzales had a written contract where Gonzales will deliver sugar to Yu
Tek. Gonzales received 3T in advance. The contract stipulated that in the event there is
no delivery of sugar, Gonzales will return the 3T and pay 1.2T in damages. Sugar was
not delivered, 3T was not returned and 1.2T was not paid. Judgment was rendered on
the 3T only. Both parties appealed. Gonzales alleges that the court erred in refusing to
permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was to be
secured from the crop which Gonzales raised in his plantation, and that he was unable to
fulfill the contract due to total failure of his crop.
Held: Parol evidence inadmissible to incorporate additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there is fraud or mistake.

Land Settlement & Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
L17820 24apr

Facts: LSDC sued Garcia Plantation for specific performance of contract and for
payment of unpaid balance of the purchase price of 2 tractors. Salud Garcia was made a
co-defendant because of 2 IOU notes executed by her. Defendants admitted the
execution of the IOU notes but contended that the same had been novated by a
subsequent agreement in a letter giving them an extension to pay the account. LSDC in
their reply and answer to the counterclaim, admitted the due execution and genuineness
of the letter but contended that the same did not express the true intent and agreement
of the parties, thereby placing the fact in issue, in the pleadings.
At the trial, LSDC presented Atty. Guinto to testify on the true agreement and intention
of the parties at the time of the letters execution. Upon Garcias objection, the lower
court ruled out said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the
parol evidence rule. LSDC intended to present Kintanar (the writer of the letter) to
testify but in view of the courts ruling, LSDC rested its case.
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect
that in view of the plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an
extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty. Kintanar gave the defendants up to May
31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided that they will make a substantial
down payment immediately, with the understanding that upon non-payment of the
substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and the LASADECO
shall feel free to seek redress in court". That there was such condition precedent is
manifested by the second paragraph of the letter.
Lower court dismissed the case stating that the action was premature due to the agreed
extension. LSDC appealed to CA. CA certified case to SC.
Held: Exception to PER may be put in issue in answer to counterclaim; when operation
of contract made to depend upon occurrence of an event, which for that reason is a
condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence, since if it is proven,
there will be no contract. PER does not apply to condition precedent because
such condition is part of the terms of the contract. It does not modify, alter, or
vary the terms or tenor of the contract.
Had the trial court permitted, as it should, LSDC to prove the condition precedent to the
extension of the payment, LSDC would have been able to show that because the
defendants had failed to pay a substantial down payment, the agreement was breached
and the contract contained in Exhibit "L", never became effective and the extension
should be considered as not having been given at all. So that, although the complaint
was filed on February 20, 1957, three months before the deadline of the extension on
May 31, 1957, there would be no premature institution of the case. The lower court,
therefore, erred in dismissing the case. The decision appealed from is reversed, and
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 8844 16dec

Facts: Maulini brought an action upon the contract of indorsement alleged to have been
made in his favor by Serrano on a IOU note executed by Padern, Moreno & Co with
Serrano as payee. The indorsement did not indicate without recourse. Maker failed to
pay the note upon presentation for payment. Maulini opted to collect from Serrano as
indorser.
Manila CFI although it received parol evidence on the subject provisionally, held that
such evidence was inadmissible to alter, vary, modify or contradict the terms of the
contract of indorsement. Thus this tended to show that, by verbal agreement between
Maulini and Serrano, Serrano, in making the indorsement, was acting as agent for the
indorsee, as a mere vehicle for the transfer of title and that his indorsement was w/o
consideration.
It seems that according to the parol evidence, Serrano was a broker doing business of
looking up and ascertaining persons who had money to loan as well as those who desired
to borrow money and acting as a middleman, negotiate a loan between the two.

Issue: WON Serrano may show by parol evidence that the indorsement was w/o
consideration and that in making it, Serrano acted as agent for Maulini as a mere vehicle
of transfer of the naked title from Padern to Maulini for which he received no
consideration.
Held: CFI erred in ruling as so. Consideration of a negotiable IOU note is, between the
immediate parties to the contract, open to attack, under proper circumstances, for the
purpose of showing an absolute lack or failure of consideration.
PER does not apply where the purpose of parol evidence is to show that no written
contract ever existed. CFI ruling is REVERSED.
FAMADOR: I agree with dissenting opinion.
PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952) L4388 13aug

Facts: Seeto went to PNB Surigao and presented a 5T check dated 10Mar pay to
cash/bearer drawn by Gan Yek Kiao against PBCom Cebu. After consultation with PNB
employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified indorsement of the check and PNB
accepted it and paid Seeto. Check was mailed to PNB Cebu 20Mar and was presented to
PBCom 09Apr but the check was dishonored for ISF. PNB demanded refund of the check
but Seeto refused claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check the drawer
had sufficient funds and that had PNB forwarded the check earlier, it would have been
paid.
PNB filed a complaint with Surigao CFI alleging that Seeto gave assurances that the
drawer of the check had sufficient funds and that upon these assurances PNB delivered
the 5T to Seeto after the latter had made a general and unqualified indorsement. Seeto
denied having made the alleged assurances. PNB presented 2 witnesses who testified
that it was not the practice of PNB to cash out of town checks and that check was cashed
because of Seetos assurances. CFI found that Seeto made an undertaking to refund the
check in the event of dishonor and that there was no unreasonable delay in the
presentation of the check.
CA held that PNB was guilty of unreasonable retaining and withholding the check and
that the delay in the presentment for payment was inexcusable, so that Seeto was
discharged from liability. It also held that parol evidence is incompetent to show that
one signing a check as indorser is merely a surety or guarantor, rejecting the evidence
adduced at the CFI about Seetos assurances and promise to refund. CA reversed CFI
ruling. PNB appealed to SC.
PNB argues that the verbal assurances given by Seeto to the employees of the bank that
he was ready to refund the amount if the check should be dishonored by PBCom is a
collateral agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, by virtue of which PNB
was induced to cash the check, and, therefore, admissible as an exception to the parol
evidence rule.
Held: Assurances made by an indorser that the drawer has funds, which assurances
induced bank to cash the check, are admissible in evidence. We find, however, that the
supposed assurances of refund in case of dishonor of the check are precisely the
ordinary obligations of an indorser, and these obligations are, under the law, considered
discharged by an unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment.
There was no express obligation assumed by the respondent herein that the drawer
would always have funds, or that he (the indorser) would refund the amount of the check
even if there was delay in its presentation, so that while the CA may have committed an
error in disregarding the evidence submitted by petitioner at the trial of the assurances
made by respondent herein at the time of the negotiation of the check, such error was
without prejudice, because the supposed assurances given were part of his obligations
as an indorser, which were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of
the check for payment. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner.
Woodhouse v. Halili, 93Phil526 (1953) L4811 31jul

Inducement by fraud may be proved by parol (drafts of the agreement as in this present
case) because it goes into the validity of the agreement.
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50Phil387 (1927) 26173 13jul

Facts: Robles was a co-heir and at the same time a lessee of Hacienda Nahalinan.
Lizarraga Hermanos wanted to buy the hacienda 2yrs before the expiry of Robles lease.
Held: Parol may be received regardless of whether the written agreement contains any
reference to the collateral agreement and whether the action is at law or in equity even
if it deals with related matters
Lechugas v. CA, 143scra335 (1986) L39972 06aug

PER not applicable where suit is between one of the parties to the document and 3rd
persons; PER does not apply and may not be invoked by either party to the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or privy to the
written agreement and does not base a claim on the instrument; both parties to the
agreement must be parties to the suit
Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 96405 26jun

PER does not specify that the agreement be a public document; need not be in any
particular form or signed by the parties; fraud must be corroborated
Facts: Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed
with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and
severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their obligation. Both obligors did not respond
to the demands made, private respondent filed a complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against
the three obligors.
Petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his
office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the
amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for
the amount of P50,000.00.
The lower court ruled in favor of the bank. The petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling
of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may overcome the contents of a promissory note.
Held: Petitioner asserts that since the promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed
by law but . . . a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses,"
parol evidence may "overcome" the contents of the promissory note. The first paragraph of the parol
evidence rule states:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that
written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting
memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing,
to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a
different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for the parol evidence rule
to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

Ortaez v. CA 266scra561 23Jan97

Contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can not be proven by parol;
merely alleging that the contract is subject to conditions does not put the exception
in issue in the pleadings
Facts: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in
Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles
to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private
respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another
person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer
with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which
were never reflected in the deeds of sale:
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private
respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been
met:

(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between .
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale.
Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was
barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed
the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo.
Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.
First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
speaks of a uniform language.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may
be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In
the former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement
containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of
sale in this case, made no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is
denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of
a valid instrument.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake
exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true
intent of the parties.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED

H.Interpretation of Documents
1. Rule 130 10-19

Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. The

language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it
bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars. such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect
to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular
provisions. In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties
is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will
control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose
language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but
evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise
peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular
instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an instrument consists partly
of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent,
the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings.
When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be

deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of

persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understand the
language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the
language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of an
agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to
it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other
understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise
equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in
whose favor the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument is
equally susceptible of two interpretations, one is favor of natural right and the
other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character. (17)
Rules of interpretation of documents

.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6

Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning in the place of execution

Instrument construed so as to give effect to more provisions
Interpretation according to intention of the parties
particular over general
Interpretation according to circumstances of the parties and the subject
Terms presumed to be used in primary and general acceptation, evidence of local,
technical, or peculiar signification use admissible
.7 Written words control printed
.8 When the characters are difficult to decipher, or the language is foreign, the evidence
of experts and interpreters is admissible
.9 When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it
.10 When different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to
be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made
.11 preference for natural right
.12 usage may be considered

2. Arts. 1370-1379 Civil Code

Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former.
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not
be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all
of them taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be
understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the
contract.

Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the
interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of
stipulations which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract
shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules
established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and
interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in
favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way
that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the
parties, the contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation

.1 If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.

.2 If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the intention
shall prevail
.3 In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
.4 terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree
.5 If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
.6 The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
.7 Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is
most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
.8 The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the
ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are
ordinarily established.
.9 The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
.10 When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the
preceding articles
.a the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of
)1

a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall

prevail

)2

an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest

reciprocity of interests

.b If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it
cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the
contract shall be null and void.
.11 The principles of interpretation stated in the Rules of Court shall likewise be
observed

3. Cases
Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914)

If from the words the meaning is plain, contract should be enforced according to the
words
Facts: Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery
business, found itself in such condition financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the
defendant, together with many others, agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock
therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the
two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after
the incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement:
Therefore, the undersigned mutually and reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise
dispose of any part of their present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., till after one year
from the date hereof.
Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos
as liquidated damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be
obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said
corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the
said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
The trial court in dismissing the case, decided favor of the defendant upon the ground that the
intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that the agreement
should be good and continue only until the corporation reached a sound financial basis.chuva chu chu.
Issue: Whether or not interpretation is needed in enforcing the contract.
Held: Contracts should be enforced as they read. The first duty of courts in enforcing contracts is to give
attention to the words thereof. If from the words the meaning is plain, the contract should be enforced
according to its words.
The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the
contract itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English.
Interpretation and construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what
the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and
interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504.)
In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is
shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was
their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that their
purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What reason can give for refusing to follow the plain
words of the men who made the contract? We see none.

Capital Insurance v. Sadang, 21 SCRA 1183 (1967)

Doubt resolved against one who prepared the document

Facts: Plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., subscribed to a bond in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in
favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc., the purpose of which was to guarantee the payment of rentals of the
fishpond and other obligations of Mateo Pinto.
To protect the interest of plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. from any liability that may arise
from the above-mentioned bond, Mateo Pinto and the defendants in this case, Esteban M. Sadang and
Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity agreement and a deed of real of real estate mortage on the property
of the defendants.
Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond to Macondray Farms, Inc.
Because of the failure of Mateo Pinto to pay the said amount to Macondray Farms, Inc., plaintiff in the
instant case as surety had to pay, as it did pay Macondray Farms, Inc., to settle the obligation of Mateo
Pinto with the said Macondray Farms, Inc.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors including herein defendants
failed to reimburse the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., the the said amount.
Because of such failure to make reimbursement, the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., filed Civil
Case against Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors including the defendants in this instant case for the
collection.
On the strength of the agreement of the parties in the Civil Case wherein it is agreed among others,
that if after the sale of all the said properties, the judment shall not have been fully satisfied, then plaintiff
may file as separate civil action against the defendants-spouses, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica,
the other indemnitors, but at the same time dismissed the case against the herein defendants without
prejudice.
Two executions were issued by the court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned decision in Civil
Case No. 30061 and after applying the proceeds of the sale of the properties in public auction there is still
a deficiency in the amount of P14,456.44 which, in view of the failure of the herein dependants to pay in
spite of plaintiff's repeated demands, had to become the subject of this instant case.

The trial court rendered judgment on April 20, 1961 (pp. 93-101, Record on Appeal) ordering
defendants to pay to plaintiff only, the amount of P300.00.
Issue: Which among the two interpretations is correct?
Held: To point on which the parties disagree is the interpretation of the following stipulation in the
mortgage contract executed by defendants-appellees:
This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of
whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety on the
bond referred to above, and or its substitution, modification, alteration, change and/or renewals. That
liability secured by the above properties is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the
bond issued in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc.
Appellant lays stress on the general statement of appellees' liability as it appears in the contract, to
wit; "to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever kind and
nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety or the bond.
Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first
P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding
company automatically releases my responsibility to them." The trial court found the said testimony to be
uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous,
the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in
accordance with the real intention of the parties as explained by defendants-appellees.

I. Rule 130 20: Qualifications of Witnesses

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground
for disqualification. (18 a)
Qualifications of witnesses
.1 can perceive
.2 perceiving
.3 can make known their perception to others
NOT ground for disqualification
.1 Religious belief
.2 political belief
.3 interest in the outcome of the case, or
.4 conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.
.a A state witness must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17 (e)]
.b A person who has been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony is disqualified from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)

1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

a. Rule 130 21
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at the time
of production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child must be mentally
mature both at the time of perception and at the time of production.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must make a distinction
between absolute disqualifications and relative disqualifications. Objections based on
absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling of the disqualified witness.

Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when it becomes apparent

that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses

1. cant perceive
2. not perceiving
3. cant make known their perception to others
4. whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, render them
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others
5. whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully
6. marital disqualification
7. parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications

1. dead mans statute

2. marital communication privilege
3. attorney-client privilege
4. an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity
5. Physician-Patient Privilege
6. Priest-Penitent Privilege
7. State Secrets

b. Cases
People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4 (1984)

Even though feeble minded, there is no showing that she could not convey her ideas by
words or signs competent; even if she had difficulty comprehending the questions.
Facts: Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28, lived with her parents. Clara Mina, however, is feebleminded. She is unable to comb her hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes. Because of her mental
condition, she just stayed in the house, doing no household chores
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who lived in the house of his sister some 15
meters away from the victim's house, knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her left alone in
the house.
While home alone, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered
the house, carried her in his arms and laid her on the floor. Objecting to what was being done to her, Clara
gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" ( or SHODI! SHODI! which translated means "I don't like! I don't like!")
Rogelio, ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well as his own trousers. He lay on top of her, inserted
his penis into her vagina and performed the sexual act. Otherwise stated, BOMBA NA SHO!
Pastora Simon, Clara Minas mother caught Rogelio doing The Nasty. Rogelio sensed the mother and
ran away shouting: ADTO NA MI NANG!
Returning from the barrio captain's house, Pastora Simon investigated Clara, who revealed to her that
she was carried away from the trunk where she was seated, then forcibly laid on the floor to have sexual
intercourse with Rogelio.
Medical examination conducted the following day revealed the following:
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock and 11 o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two fingers with difficulty.
(3) fresh perineal abrasion.
(4) smear, not done due to lack of microscope.
(5) contusion left temporal area. Lesions to heal within one week.
LOVERBOY(Rogelio) was later surrendered by his brother-in-law.
The trial court found LOVERBOY guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
Issue: Whether or not a feeble-minded person (naay teriring) may be a competent witness.
Held: That the complainant was feeble-minded and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the
questions propounded on her is an undisputed fact. However, there is no showing that she could not
convey her Ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records that complainant gave
sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the counsels.
The court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own
perceptions to others. She is a competent witness.

People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402 (1993)

Being mental retardate is not per se a disqualification; although speech was slurred,
testimony was positive, clear, plain and unambiguous.
Facts: While Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika Highway at
Casabahan, Gandara, Samar, Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for

her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the ricefield some ten meters away. There she was raped by
Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her brother Senecio, to whom she related
her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their father. That same night, the family walked the
three-kilometer distance to the police station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his
daughter by Salomon and Conge. Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr.
Susan Tanseco, who issued the following certificate:
A physical examination has been done on Miss Sylvia Soria, 20 years of age, a resident of Brgy.
Casab-ahan, Gandara, Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear, laceration on the labia minora at 6:00
o'clock position. There are isolated erythematous areas on both thighs. There is also the presence
of sandy particles on the genital area. Speculum exam, however, showed negative findings.
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a four-month search
that they were arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being detained there for one month,
they were taken back to Samar. Following a protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed
against them with the RTC.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in detail the manner of
her ravishment by Salomon with the help of his co-accused Conge. She described how she was dragged to
the ricefield by the two accused and there undressed against her will. As Conge spread and pinned her
legs, Salomon mounted and penetrated her, although with difficulty because she was still a virgin. She felt
pain in her vagina and "something slippery." She could not cry out or repel the attack because the two
were stronger than she and Conge was holding a bolo. After her rape, Salomon sucked and twisted her
nipples and demanded that he suck his penis. Her low mentality was demonstrated in her angry testimony
of her refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an icedrop."
The trial court found respondents guilty.
Issue: Whether or not a mentally retarded person is qualified to testify.
Held: A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of
other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the
quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. Thus, in People v.
Gerones, the Court accepted the testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of
a nine or ten-year old "because she was able to communicate her ordeal... clearly and consistently." In the
case of People vs. Rondina, this Court declared:
The testimony of the offended party herself was especially telling and credible despite the fact that
she was somewhat mentally deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although she was really of limited
intelligence, the complainant nevertheless did not forget the harrowing experience she suffered
during that frightful night in the bushes when the three men seared her memory with the lust they
forced upon her. The tale she narrated in court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in
anguish and remembered with pain and as plain an unembellished as the simple life she led. If she
spoke in forthright language at the trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that horrible
ravishment she could not push out of her mind.
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary
at times to ask her leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her
mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often enough in
many cases that a woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant
publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement
for her abuse.

People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, Feb. 2, 1996

Any child, regardless of age, can be a witness as long as he meets the qualifications for
competency: observation, recollection, and communication.
Facts: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her home. She
suffered extensive second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth
degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with
the crime of parricide.
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon.
In his testimony during the presentation of the evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael
declared that one evening inside their house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth and then tied her
up. However, the witness did not answer succeeding questions which sought to elicit what happened
thereafter, although he kept on looking at his father throughout this period. He later revealed that he saw
matches and kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his mother was now in heaven because
she was dead. During his rebuttal testimony, Paul Michael categorically declared that it was his father who
"burned" his mother.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael and ruled against the
accused. The appeal was likewise unfavorable to the accused.
Issue: The competence of the five-year old witness.

Held: Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the:
(a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements,
it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. As held in United States vs.
Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs. United States, and reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People vs.
Libungan:
The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness,
notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any
examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the
decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is
clear that it was erroneous.
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. We agree. A close and careful
examination of the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a
child of above average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the questions asked of
him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to such recollections.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

2. Marriage
a. Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule
.1 marriage subsists
.2 a spouse is a litigant
.3 no consent from the spouse-litigant
.4 not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse
Exceptions:
.1 in a civil case by one spouse against the other spouse, or
.2 in a criminal case for a crime committed by one spouse against
.a the other spouse or;
.b the other spouses direct descendants or ascendants
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or not communicated by
one spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriage. It can be
invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute disqualification and
can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial privilege of
ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 25). Hence, the witness has no say whether the
objection is to be raised or not. The holder of the privilege is the spouse-litigant. When
the spouse-litigant consents to the testimony, the spouse-witness must testify whether
he wants to or not.
cf Rule 130 24 (a), Marital Communications
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

Marital Disqualification

Marital Communications

Covers all matters regardless of source

Covers only those communicated by one

spouse to another

Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called to testify

Invoked when the testimony appears to

cover privileged matters

Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and marital communications
rule are the same.

b. Cases
Ordoo v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) L-39012 jan31

The wife can therefore testify against her husband in such a case for rape against her
daughter because it is considered a crime against the wife. When an offense directly
attacks, or directly impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
marital disqualification rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a spouse against the others
descendant was not yet an express exception to the marital disqualification rule.
Facts: Avelino Ordoo was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with
having raped his daughter, Leonora, on 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7,
1973 was signed by the twenty four year old victim.
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed
a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora
had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoo
threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they
reported the crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also
raped their other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in
court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoo said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoo against Leonora was
mentioned during the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoo for the rape committed
against Rosa Ordoo.
The defense counsel objected to the wifes competency. He invoked the marital
disqualification rule.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoo's motion for
the reconsideration of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and
prohibition.
Issue: Whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime
committed by him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the
marital disqualification rule.
Held: Under the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
providing that the husband or wife cannot be a witness for or against the other, ". . .
except in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." the wife is
competent to testify against her husband in a case of rape committed by the
husband against their daughter, In the law of evidence, the rape of a daughter
is a crime committed by the husband against his wife within the meaning of
the exception.
The phrase "in a tribunal case for a crime committed by one against the other," an
exception to the marital disqualification rule, should be interpreted to refer to an
offense which directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal
relations.

In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it was held that the wife was a competent witness
against the husband in a prosecution for rape committed by the husband against his
stepdaughter, who is the wife's natural daughter because the crime was "an outrage
upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as well as a crime against humanity
itself." The court adopted the interpretation the "a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the other" may refer to a crime where the wife is the
individual partially and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the husband is
being prosecuted."
In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090, it was held under the statutory
provision the husband or wife shall in no case be a witness for or against the other,
except in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, that the
wife was competent to testify against the other, that the wife was competent to testify
against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest committed against his
stepdaughter.
In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539, it was held that the wife may testify
against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest committed against
their eleven-year old daughter because incest is a "crime committed against the wife."
People v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) L-46306 feb27

The wife can testify against the husband in a case for falsification of the wifes signature
(marital consent) in public documents to sell share of wife in conjugal property because
it is a crime committed by the husband against the wife.
Facts: The above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, forged the signature of his spouse
Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house
and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano
Lacsamana, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her
marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls
under the exception to the rule.
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. A motion for
reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document committed
by a husband against his wife, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held: We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital
disqualification rule.
A criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against the husband
who allegedly forged the signature of his wife in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear
that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their
conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife, and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave
rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted
the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which
completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
In Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the other spouse is
too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not
be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the
crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a
third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly
observed by the Solicitor General," to espouse the contrary view would spawn the
dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against
his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a
license to injure and prejudice her in secret all with unabashed and
complete impunity.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) L-25643 jun27

Wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their
interests are not separate, can not be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse
party.
Facts: Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action for the annulment of a
judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant. Named as defendants were Marciano C.
Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La
Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of
the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the
Court for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain
judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons
was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance
of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the
decision of that court was void.
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the
company was placed under receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama
nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had
authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case 39827.
They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest
Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice
Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked
the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by
the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over the
objection of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be
examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her
husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130.
Held: The reason for the privilege of husband and wife not to testify against each
other is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or
husband to be the means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to
the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner.

Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the
meeting and will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry
in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse
or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her
against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are
necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to
show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc
upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility,
too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may
unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
In a suit charging fraud against the spouses, the wife cannot be compelled to testify
as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud
without violating section 20(b) of Rule 130, where as in this case, the main charge
is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of
examination of the wife is to prove that charge. Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow
one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness
when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are
separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal
party.
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) L-568 jul16

When the husband imputes crime against wife, he waives the marital disqualification
rule.
Facts: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of
robbery, was being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro.
On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go
with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the
house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room
of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few
moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's
wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still
moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one
year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his
belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the
accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a
virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by the justice
of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the latter
entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of
the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not the rebuttal testimony of the wife of the appellant violates the
rule on disqualification by reason of marriage.
Held: "The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife
shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus:

First, identity of interests;

second, the consequent danger of perjury;
third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and
which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and,
fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other." (70 C. J., 119.)

The rule that the husband and wife cannot testify for or against each other, as all other
general rules, has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the

exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which
may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a
case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The defendant, who was accused of killing his son, testifying in his own behalf, not only
limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and added what was
really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. Held: That in
giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its
natural and necessary consequences. by his said act, the husband--himself exercising
the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations
must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon
rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at
the outset.
As above modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.

3. Dead Mans Statute

a. Rule 130 23
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind. (20a)
Requisites for dead mans statute
.1 the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff
.2 Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person of
unsound mind is the defendant
.3 upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind
.4 as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
.5 [no counterclaim is filed]

b. Cases
Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) GR#74306 16mar

The dead mans statute does not apply where the case is filed by the estate. Besides,
cross-examination of the witness is a waiver of the privilege.
Facts: In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E.
Razon, Inc., et. Al. be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an
order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of
preliminary attachment vs. properties of defendants having possession of shares of stock
and for receivership of the properties of defendant corporation . . .
In their answer, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of
stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that
said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that
the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon.

Appellees also allegedthat neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid
any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its
alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to
the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object
to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan
T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the
petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was
subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the Dead mans statute is applicable in the case at bar.
Held: In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the
defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of
private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian)
and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,5000 shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian
opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of
the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly
owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with
the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination
by the private respondents' counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is
within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929)

If the witness sought to be disqualified is not the plaintiff (e.g. disinterested 3rd party),
the dead mans statute is not applicable.
Guerrero v. St. Clares Realty, 124 SCRA 553 (1983) L58164 02sep

Mere witnesses not parties to the case are not disqualified by the dead mans statute.
Furthermore, the rule requires that the defendant must be the estate. It does not apply
where the heirs are being sued in their individual capacities. Representatives are only
those who, like the executor, one sued in their representative, not personal, capacity.
Facts: During their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the
absolute owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of land. The spouses had six
children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed
Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro
Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and
adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having
been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres
Guerrero physically possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador
Ramirez. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero
entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property
cultivated and to retain the owner's share in the harvests. The arrangement between
brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land
and enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for as long as she needed the
property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of
Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow,
Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina
Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrer.
Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as
agents or buyers of the land approached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their

consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled
in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered
the following: that Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the
basis of a 'Deed of Sale of Land' purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that in 1963,
Manuel Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros,
filed an application for registration of land; that notwithstanding the opposition of the
heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that
despite oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title to the applicant; that on there was filed with the Register of Deeds of
Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the
defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the registration of
that deed; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants
Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty
Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the
defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St. Clare's
Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the
name of said realty company.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero,
had been sick for a long time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that
her mother could walk only inside their house in Paraaque; that the money spent for
the illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children,
Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that
Andres Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros
objected to the line of questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying "on
matters which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court."
The defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a
witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion
was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion
and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly
situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly
disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded.
Held: Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative
rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or
representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in
their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man's rule. "
It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to
testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance
with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word 'against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.' It should be
noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other
representative follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those
who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal,
capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words 'against the estate of
such deceased persons,' which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the
deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that
are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not
the personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid., pp. 169-171)
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in
the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose

testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres
Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to
Manuel Guerrero
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962) L16741 31jan

A cross-examination of the disqualified witness is a waiver of the dead mans privilege,

even if there was a continuing objection.
Facts: Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. and executed a
promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with
interest. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's
wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the
maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.
On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael
died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid.
In Special Proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael,
Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, filed a pleading entitled
"Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. As soon as
Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their
"Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. The
counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the
testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule
123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily crossexamined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general objection.
The trial court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim against the intestate estate
of Juan C. Ysmael
The appellate court concluded that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants
have established a just and valid claim.
Issue: Whether or not the wife of the deceased was disqualified from testifying.
Held: There was a waiver of the prohibition contained in Section 26(c), Rules
123 of the Rules of Court, when the counsel for the administratrix extensively
cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. The
reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to
what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of
two courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course
selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party to the expense,
and has consumed the time of courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course
selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such course
would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be
countenanced in any court of justice (IV Francisco, Rules of Court, 876, 877, citing the
case of Comstock's Adm'r vs. Jacobs, 89 VT. 133, 94 A. 497, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 465).
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) L2016 23aug

This in effect ruled that the Dead Mans statute can not be invoked against a plaintiffcorporation. Interest no longer disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation
may testify in a case filed against the estate of a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the defendant may testify on
facts occurring prior to the death of the decedent.
Facts: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila when the Pacific war broke out. He held
1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he
had executed promissory notes in favor of the company. In 1941 the sum of P64,500
had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of
stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company. Under
his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without
having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either

reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the amount applied
thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's
shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944 and special proceeding was subsequently
instituted for the settlement of his estate.
In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T.
Fitzsimmons. In his answer to the amended claim the administrator denied the alleged
indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant.
It is admitted that all the prewar books and records of the company were completely
destroyed or lost during the war so testimonies of witnesses were admitted.
The claimant called as witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vicepresident-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on
the status of the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons with the company; but
upon objection of the administrator the trial court refused to admit their testimony on
that point on the ground that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of
Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors
but also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company.
Issue: Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against
an executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Held: Officers and directors of corporations are not considered to be parties within the
meaning of the law. (City Savings Bank vs. Enos)
Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court disqualifies only parties
or assignors of parties, the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are
not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party
to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) 27498 20sep

Action must be brought against the estate, not by the estate, to be covered under the
dead mans statute
Escolin: The dead mans rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would be difficult to prove the
claim in the estate proceeding because of the dead mans statute. However, if there is
such an instrument, it is not barred by the dead mans statute (Neibert v. Neibert)
Facts: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894.
Marcelino died leaving Anastacia as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa
Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death
of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked
for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of
himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the
name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action when she presented a motion for a
revision of certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration
Law. Issue was joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by
ordered that in lieu of the issued decrees, new decrees and certificates of title be issued
as the exclusive properties of Anastacia Vianzon. Sometime later, a motion for a new
trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the losing party
(administratrix). This motion was denied by the trial judge.
The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery
of specified property and for damages. The court renders judgment absolving the
defendant from the complaint. The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor, the
trial judge.

From both of the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, the administratrix of the estate of
Marcelino Tongco had appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the widow should be discarded.
Held: Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this
statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction is question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected
the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and
was not designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought
"against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims
"against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to
enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds
true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense
there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.
Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to
cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters.
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the
deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made
by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to
deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard
to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."
We are of the opinion that the witness was competent.
Goi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986)

Heirs of a deceased are representatives within the ambit of the dead mans statute;
waived by defendant if he files counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse party may testify
to transactions or communications with deceased which were made with an agent of
such person if the agents is still alive and can testify as long as it is confined to the
transactions

J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
.1 marital
.2 attorney-client
.3 physician-patient
.4 priest-penitent
.5 state secrets
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification. Each of those enumerated is disqualified to
testify as to specific matters only. It does not disqualify them from testifying on matters
not privileged. Hence, it is improper to object to their testimony upon mere subpoena.
One must wait until it becomes apparent that their testimony covers matters that are
privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question that covers privileged matters; when the
purpose of their testimony as admitted by the offeror covers privileged matters) before
one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a testimonial disqualification, as
opposed to the testimonial privilege of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 25).
[careful not to be confused in the multiple meanings of the word privilege] Hence, the
witness has no say whether the objection is to be raised or not. When the holder of the
privilege (not necessarily the opposing party) consents to the testimony, the witness
must testify.

Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that (someone) may not be examined
without the consent of (another). The law does not say that one can not testify or be
examined over the objection of another. The wording of the law is to the effect that an
objection of the other party in the privileged communication is not necessary for the
privilege to hold. Consent of the other party in the privileged communication is an act
that needs to be proved for the testimony to be admitted. This is not to say that failure
of a such a party to object will never render such testimony admissible. This is to say
that where the other party to the privileged communication is not a litigant in the case,
and privileged communication is offered in evidence without the consent of such party,
the litigant against whom the testimony is offered may object to its admission on the
ground of privileged communication. Where the other party in the privileged
communication is a litigant, then his failure to object will be taken as a consent to the
testimony or a waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It can be oral or written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly communicated in the presence
of 3rd persons. In such a case, the privilege may not be invoked at all. However, if the
privileged communication was within the surreptitious observation of a 3rd person, then
the communication can be invoked if either the communicator or communicatee called
to testify. However, the privilege can not be invoked if the 3rd person is called to testify.

1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications Rule
.1 communication received
.a from the spouse
.b in confidence
.c during the marriage
.2 without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the marriage. It applies
only to matters communicated by one spouse to another in confidence. It does not
cover knowledge of matters that a spouse obtains from a source other than other
spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to the action. It is a relative
disqualification and can be invoked only when it is apparent that the testimony would
cover privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are:
.1 in a civil case by one against the other, or
.2 in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants
cf Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)

The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated by one
spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriage. It can be
invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute disqualification and
can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to testify.
Marital Disqualification (Rule 130, Sec. 22)
Covers all matters regardless of source

Marital Communications (Rule 130, Sec. 24

[a])
Covers only matters communicated by one

spouse to another, during the marriage

Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called to testify

Invoked when the testimony appears to

cover privileged matters

MEMORIZE!

b. Cases
People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) L22948 17mar

Where the privilege communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands
of a 3rd party, without collusion or voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, not
privilege; illegality of seizure must be raised by motion before trial for return of letter;
unanswered letter inadmissible
Facts: It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G.
Sityar, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and
certain other ailments. After her release therefrom she was required to go several times
to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the
operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The
defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy
some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar
outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage
shortly after leaving the clinic.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and
found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then,
without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife
and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant
pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound
upon him and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The
defendants made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos,
Bulacan, in the evening of the following.
The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and
therefore constituted murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking into
consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by his wife and seized by the
police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before the
commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant
contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the letter was a privileged communication.
Held: The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears
to have been issued.
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the
briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the
trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not
put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here;
the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent
on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in
evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to crossexamine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged.

The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third
party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness.
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation
in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has
the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his
silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.

2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent
of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has
been acquired in such capacity;
Requisites for attorney-client privilege
.1 existence of an attorney-client relationship
.2 witness is an attorney
.3 as to communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
.4 the communication was made in confidence
.5 communication was made in the course of, or with a view to professional employment
The privilege extends to the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. The difference being
consent of only the client is needed for the attorney to testify. However, the consent of
both the attorney and the client is necessary for the attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply if the attorney was sued by his client.

b. Cases
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) L-9231 06jan

Communication made by client to attorney for purpose of being communicated to others

not privileged, e.g. compromise agreement.
Facts: The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a
stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in
1897, at which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The
plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name,
"Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's
interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name.
At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the
creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings,
the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the
estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff
now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him
and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the
compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to
compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence
showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator
with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was
asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's
testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the
negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the
plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to

the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this
appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may
be withdrawn at any time before acted upon
Issue: Was the testimony in question privileged?
Held: It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express
purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be
delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter
acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply
occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
AS to whether a waiver of the client's privilege personally made in open court can be
withdrawn before acted upon, quaere. (consider whether it is correct).
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 105938 20sep

Prosecution can not use attorneys as leverage to compel them to name their clients;
clients identity is protected when there is a strong probability exists that revealing
clients name would implicate him in the very activity for which he sought advice.
Facts: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint
before the Sandiganbayan by the RP, through the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
includes shares of stocks in the named corporations.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others,
the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply,
as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of
the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment
covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of
the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal
and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
The PCGG alleged that ACCRA law firm was involved in setting up financial and corporate
framework and structures through the use of coco levy funds. In their answer, ACCRA
said that the acts were made the course of rendering professional and legal services to
clients.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client
covering their respective shareholdings.
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to
comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was
denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer may refuse in giving the identity of his client.
Held: Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to

force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is."
He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Exceptions:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is
privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in
what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general
rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information,
because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance
(without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and
parcel of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an
integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice
had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime."
The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that
it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in
question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer
cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a
principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

Boss Joel manifestation: it is premature to apply the rules on evidence for there is no
case yet, hence, there is no compulsion on the part of the lawyer to disclose the identity
of there client.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) L-21237 22mar

Letter from client to attorney obtained by adverse party, admitted authentic in court, not
privileged regardless whether legally or illegally obtained (what about constitutional rule
of exclusion on evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence?); one who overhears the communication with or without clients
knowledge is not privileged.
Facts: The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila, while
the defendant is a corporation organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its
principal office in the City of Cebu. Said company appears to be the owner by a valuable
deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located in Leyte and known
as the Lucio mine. William Anderson, as president and general manager of the defendant
company, addressed a letter to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the
products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a
scale of prices indicated in said letter.
Plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered
services to the defendant company in the way of advertising and demonstrating the
products of the defendant and expended large sums of money in visiting various parts of
the world for the purpose of carrying on said advertising and demonstrations, in shipping
to various parts of the world samples of the products of the defendant, and in otherwise
carrying on advertising work.
Anderson wrote the plaintiff, to the effect that the company was behind with
construction and was not then able to handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12,
Anderson was in Manila and the two had an interview, in the course of which the plaintiff
informed Anderson of the San Francisco order. Anderson thereupon said that, owing to
lack of capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large
orders and suggested that the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter of taking orders.
The plaintiff expressed surprise at this and told Anderson that he had not only the San
Francisco order (which he says he exhibited to Anderson) but other orders for large
quantities of bituminous limestone to be shipped to Australia and Shanghai. In another
interview on the same Anderson definitely informed the plaintiff that the contracts which
be claimed to have procured would not be filled.
Barton sued for specific performance. In the course of the trial, the defendant offered in
evidence a carbon copy of a letter written by the plaintiff to his attorney in which plaintiff
states, among other things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have
been at the rate of eigthy-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity of this city
document is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the
defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the
introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain
where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant informed the
court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. Upon
this the attorney for the plaintiff made this announcement: "We hereby give notice at
this time that unless such an explanation is made, explaining fully how this carbon copy
came into the possession of the defendant company, or any one representing it, we
propose to object to its admission on the ground that it is a confidential communication
between client and lawyer." No further information was then given by the attorney for
the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come to his hands and the trial
judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground that it was a privileged
communication between client and attorney.
Issue: Whether or not the letter should be considered as privileged communication bet.
Atty & client.
Held: We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the
letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and

client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party.
And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects the
client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the
legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to
the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. In this
connection Mr. Wigmore says:
The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption
from its processes of disclosure against himself or the attorney or their agents of
communication. This much, but not a whit more, is necessary for the maintenance
of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are
entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the
general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to
extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the
communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without
the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule
ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 34098 17sep

Introduction in evidence of a part of a paper by one party waives privilege as to other

parts of the same writing; when a party invokes BER, it is the party who produces the
original who is deemed to have introduced it in evidence; contract for attorneys fees is
not privileged; there is no partial waiver of privilege.
Facts: The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the CFI
of Manila for the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the
Orient Insurance Company, upon merchandise destroyed by a fire. In one of the clauses
of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy
would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and
action or suit should not be commenced within three months after such rejection. In the
answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in the case mentioned, it is alleged,
by way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of
such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit was not
instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months after
the rejection of the claim.
In the Course of the trial the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co.,
Inc., while being examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the
circumstances surrounding the institution of the action, said that he had reported certain
conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: he waited for about a week longer
and not having heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, he
(Bachrach) received a letter from their attorneys urging him to file these cases. The
attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, asking
that the witness be required to produce the letter referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else
his answer be stricken out. The witness replied that he had the letter with him and that
he had no objection to show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to
proceed with the cases. Upon being asked about the other part of the letter, the witness
said that the other part contained private matter, "between the attorney and ourselves.
Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, said he would like
to see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that it bore date of July 13,
1929; and upon the court inquiring whether the witness had any objection to the reading
of the letter by the attorney for the defendant, the witness replied that he wished to
consult with his attorney. Upon this the attorney for the adversary party, the Orient
Insurance Company, suggested that he would like to have the letter marked without his
reading it and it was accordingly marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view
of the production of the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the witness
as to its contents," and he added: "I now ask the permission of the court to read the
letter for my information." The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for the Teal
Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and the attorney observed that he would
have no objection to the disclosing of that part of the letter which referred exactly to the

point of the urging of the filing of the complaints, and he added: "Unfortunately, the
other part of the letter being a communication between a client and attorney, I don't
think, if your Honor please, it can be disclosed without the consent of both."
Issue: Whether or not a communication may be presented only in part, excluding other
parts for being privileged communication.
Held: The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing by one party waives
privilege as to other parts of the same writing.
When part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his adversary is
entitled to use other parts of the same writing, so far as relevant to the issues in the
case; and to this end the attorney of the latter has a right to inspect the writing and to
require its production in court.
A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter
which had been received by the plaintiff from its attorney, and when the fact was
revealed that the communication had been made by letter, the attorney for the
defendant requested that the witness be required to produce the letter in court, and if
not, that his answer should be stricken out. This in legal effect was a demand for the
production of "the best evidence," it being a well-known rule of law that a witness cannot
be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper writing which can be
produced in court. In response to this request that portion of the letter to which the
witness had supposedly referred was read into the record.
It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of
other portions of the letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged, because they
related to the terms of employment between attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid
to the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a contract for fees
could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances,
certainly be, but not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and clients are
inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and
contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege primarily
refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the
inspection of the adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was
waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283
of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing
admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to
privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any
exception.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)

Privilege does not extend to information gathered by an attorney from witnesses; WorkProduct of atty can not be secured without sufficient justification.
Facts: On February 7, 1943, the tug 'J. M. Taylor' sank while engaged in helping to tow a
car float of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The
accident was apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of
the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later the tug owners and the
underwriters employed a law firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to
defend them against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members
and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug.
A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United States Steamboat
Inspectors, at which the four survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and
made available to all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately
interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye toward the
anticipated litigation; the survivors signed these statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh
also interviewed other persons believed to have some information relating to
the accident and in some cases he made memoranda of what they told him. At
the time when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors, representatives of

two of the deceased crew members had been in communication with him. The fifth
claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit in a federal court under the Jones Act on
November 26, 1943, naming as defendants the two tug owners, individually and as
partners, and the railroad.
One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The 38th
interrogatory read: 'State whether any statements of the members of the
crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were
taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug
'John M. Taylor'.
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories except No. 38
and the supplemental ones just described. While admitting that statements of the
survivors had been taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the contents. They did
so on the ground that such requests called 'for privileged matter obtained in preparation
for litigation' and constituted 'an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files.' It
was claimed that answering these requests 'would involve practically turning over not
only the complete files, but also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts of
counsel.'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that the
requested matters were not privileged. The court then decreed that the tug owners and
Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for the tug owners forthwith 'Answer Plaintiff's 38th
interrogatory and supplemental interrogatories. Upon their refusal, the court adjudged
them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they complied.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the
District Court.
Issue: Whether or not any pre-trial device at the disposal of either counsel be used to
inquire into materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of
preparation for possible litigation.
Held: In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by
Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes that the deposition- discovery portions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover the true
facts and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be found. It is said that inquiry
may be made under these rules, epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which
is not privileged; and since the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and
liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be restricted to its narrowest bounds.
On the premise that the attorney-client privilege is the one involved in this case,
petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential communications made
by a client to his attorney. And since the materials here in issue were secured by
Fortenbaugh from third persons rather than from his clients, the tug owners,
the conclusion is reached that these materials are proper subjects for
discovery under Rule 26.
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions in issue
in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence are
not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the
content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts. For present
purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend
to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his
client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the
memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel
for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to
writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)

Privilege extends to information given by employees to corporate communications not to

facts.

Facts: Certain foreign subsidiaries of the parties, made questionable payments to

foreign govts to secure business. The main offices directed their counsel to interview
those employees and advise them on acceptable courses of conduct. The corporation
thereafter voluntarily submitted a report to the SEC disclosing the questionable
payments, which in turn transmitted a copy of that report to the IRS. The IRS was given
a list of all those interviewed, but the attys refused to produce their notes and
memorandum.
Issue: Whether atty-client privilege is available to communications between corporate
officers and employees and attys for corporation
Held: The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel are covered by the
attorney-client privilege
If an employee making the communication, of whatever rank, is in a position to control
or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation
may take upon the advice of the atty, then he is (or personifies), the corporation when
he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply. The privilege exists
to protect not only the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of information to
the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice, because the lawyer must
be fully informed in order for his client to obtain full advantage of the legal system. The
ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client
not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client, but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance (Hickman v. Taylor).
The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure
of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the atty. The protection of the
privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a
communication concerning a fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be
compelled to answer the question >What did you say or write to the atty?= but may not
refuse to disclose any relevant fact . . . merely because he incorporated a statement of
such fact into his communication to his atty.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983)

The general rule is the identity of a client is not protected; legal advice exception may be
defeated through prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in
furtherance of present or intended continuing illegality, as where the representation
itself is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link between the client and the
communication, not the link between client and possibility of potential criminal
prosecution which is protected; last link exception is abandoned; disclosure might
possibly implicate client in criminal activity not an exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)

Statement made by co-defendant to an investigator acting for defendants counsel

protected; communication by client to attorney remain privileged when attorney shares
them with co-defendant for a common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)

Protection does not extend to the communication regarding an intended crime;

communication divulged to strangers not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975)

Facts: During respondents federal criminal trial, which resulted in a conviction, defense
counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a
defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained from the witnesses by
the investigator. When the investigator was called as a witness, the District Court stated
that a copy of the investigators report would have to be submitted to the prosecution for
inspection at the completion of the investigators testimony. Defense counsel said he
did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not
testify about his interviews with the witnesses. CA, considering such ruling to be a
reversible error, held that both the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule Criminal
Procedure 16 prohibited the disclosure condition imposed.

Held: Work-Product Doctrine waived when client presents investigator as witness.

Statements made by 3rd persons gathered by investigation not covered by the privilege.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

Facts:

3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (c)
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice
or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4
Sec. 3. Report of findings. If requested by the party examined, the party causing the examination to
be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out
his findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be
made shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like report of any
examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical condition. If the party
examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and notice may make an order requiring
delivery on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court
may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial. (3a)
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by
taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that
action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who
has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical examination.
(4)

Requisites for physician-client privilege

.1 civil case
.2 witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
.3 as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity
.4 the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity
.5 the information would blacken the reputation of the patient
Escolin: The old rule used the word character (what the person actually is). The new
rules use the word reputation (what people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered by the
privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives and other people who attend to the ill can be called
to testify as to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not testify to
matters specifically referring to the patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?

1) Cases
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 91114 25sep

The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting physician to give expert

testimony regarding hypothetical facts.
Facts: Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent Juan Lim are lawfully married to each
other. Private respondent filed a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground

that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia
"before, during and after the marriage and until the present."
Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand
himself to testify on his own behalf. Private respondent's counsel announced that he
would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged
since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the
subpoena was issued.
Petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend
the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard this urgent motion. Movant
argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr.
Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended, however,
that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on
any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The
trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify.
Petitioner filed with the public respondent CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from
proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado's testimony.
CA denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature
of the testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the disqualification by reason of
privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged
communication because the information were not obtained from the patient while
attending her in her professional capacity and neither were the information necessary to
enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither
does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the
patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II
and in-charge of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of
the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.
RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended
to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.
SUBJECT TO WAIVER. Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may
be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician's testimony.
REQUISITES. In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
.1 the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
.2 the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
.3 such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
.4 the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

.5 the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.
CONDITIONS. These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain
communications, to wit:
.1 The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
.2 This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
.3 The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered;
.4 The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
SCOPE. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity
when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus,
only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that
"it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations,
are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not
stated."
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 108854 14june

Non-physician testimony on a medical psychologists report is not covered by the

physician-patient privilege. This is hearsay (because the other party could not cross
examine the doctor who prepared the report) but there was no objection.
Facts: Edgar Krohn, Jr., and
the couple developed into a
purportedly in an effort
futile. They finally separated

Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. The relationship between

stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing
to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved
in fact.

Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma.
Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes.
Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma.
Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." The decree was
confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
Later, voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was ordered by the CFI of Pasig.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma.
Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to
testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This
was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient.
The trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
in evidence.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals which denied
the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the disqualification by reason of
privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced.
Lim v. Court of Appeals (214 SCRA 273 [1992]) clearly lays down the requisites in order
that the privilege may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;

(b)the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
(d)the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband
who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.

4. Rule 130 24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege

(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making
the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given
by him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which the minister or priest belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
.1 witness is a minister or priest
.2 as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
.3 in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs

5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 24(e)
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the
court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
.1 witness is a public officer
.2 as to communications made to him in official confidence
.3 the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure

b. Cases
US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security

secrets, executive privilege can not prevail over due process.
Facts: A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's
closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon
and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in
the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming
"executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government
branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to
secure the national interest.
Issue: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive
privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?
Held: No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was
a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave
preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration
of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and
documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) 70054 08july

Confidential information is not necessarily privileged; no public interest is prejudiced by

disclosure, thus not protected; is there a need for a law to declare it confidential?
Facts: Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents" is the Order of
RTC, Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner herein, based on Section 1, Rule 27, of
the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and
records which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its
comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator's report dated and Receiver's
Report.
The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the
closure of Banco Filipino
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB
and to Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez; ..etc, etc, etc.
The RTC considered the documents not privileged because these constitute or
contain evidence material to the issues into by the Court. These materials are
said to comprise of records of the administrative proceedings conducted by respondent's
officials and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the challenged
reports and the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under
liquidation as it is the regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings
which are being assailed by the petitioner, the trial court saw no reason why said
documents should be thus concealed from it.
The grounds recited in support of their petition are the following:
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential
pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. .
Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of
gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or
injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a confidential nature
about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required in Section
13 of this Act, or about the operations of the Bank, and to the use of such information for
personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the Bank or third parties. (As
amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
Issue: Whether or not the said documents are privileged.
Held: We accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not
privileged and that these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being
inquired into by the Court.
The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There
is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof,
which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations
when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The
disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or
to third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what
it considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position
in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
This privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but
for the protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public
interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer
by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that
petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the

aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to
our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and
specious. If the respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the
performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of
disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents.
Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are
entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for
the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the
public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and
Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).

6. Newsmans Privilege
a. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws,
the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal
the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless
the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.
Requisites of newsmans privilege
.1 publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter
.2 of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
.3 cannot be compelled to reveal
.4 as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication
.5 related in confidence
Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.

b. Cases
Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978)

Constitution prevails over shield law, but entitled to hearing to prove relevance.

7. Bank Deposits (RA 1405)

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
Note that the privilege applies only to bank deposits. As to other property being held by
a bank, bank personnel may be examined upon order of a court (Sec. 55.1 [d], RA 8791,
General Banking Act of 2000).

K. Parental and Filial Privilege

1. Rule 130 25
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to
testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants. (20a)

There is no distinction between legitimate or illegitimate relations.

Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial disqualification, found in 22-24
of Rule 130 [careful not to be confused in the multiple use of the word privilege]. Here,
the witness is the holder of the privilege and has the power to invoke or waive the
privilege. The relative against whom he is testifying can not invoke nor waive the
privilege. However this must be construed in the light of Art. 215 of the Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by
one parent against the other. (315a)

Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal case where

.1 the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or
.2 the descendant-witnesss parent commits a crime against the descendant-witnesss
other parent.
Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if it is a crime by the
descendant against the ascendant-witness. The ascendant-witness may testify
voluntarily though.

2. Case
People v. Publico, 7 CAR (2s) 703 (1972)

Information given by child to 3rd person is protected

L. Admissions
Admissions that are admissible against a party
.1 Admissions against interest
.2 Compromises
.3 Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta
.a Partners/Agents admissions
.b Co-conspirators statements
.c Admission by Privies
.4 Admissions by silence

1. Admissions against interest

a. Rule 130, 26
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
The general rule is evidence as to extra-judicial acts, omissions, and declarations (AODs)
of a party is admissible. These evidences can either be favorable or unfavorable to a
party. Rule 130, 26 expressly allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer.
However, an objection may be raised as to the admissibility of AODs favorable to the
AODer on the grounds of that these are self-serving AODs. The argument is Rule 130
26 only allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer. However, 26 is only a rule
of admissibility. It allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer, but does not
prohibit evidence on AODs favorable to AODer. There being no express prohibition, any
evidence on AODs favorable to the AODer falls under the general rule that evidence not
excluded by law or the Rules is admissible (Rule 128 3). Any doubt as to such evidence
refers to its weight or probative value and not to its admissibility.
Self-serving statements = hearsay? Declaration against interest as an exception to the
hearsay rule only applies if the declarant is deceased or unable to testify. Self-defeating
statements can not be excluded by the hearsay rule because it is expressly admissible
by the rules.
Is personal knowledge on the part of the AODer required?

b. Cases
Keller & Co. v. COB L-68097 jan86

Presidents admission binds corporation.

Facts: Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Mktg, Inc. as exclusive
distributor of its household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in
the sales agreement. Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB
Group Marketing.
As security for COB Group Mktg's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one
Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB
Group Mktg the faithful performance of all the terms and conditions of the sales
agreement.
On May 20, COB Group Mktg, through Jose Bax (president & GM) executed two second
chattel mortgages over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as
security for its obligation to Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971.
However, the second mortgages did not become effective because the first mortgagee,
Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the second mortgages served the purpose
of being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a
letter dated July 24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on
November 30, 1971 and thereafter every thirtieth day of the month for three years until
COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully satisfied. They also proposed
to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation
statements wherein he showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72
(Exh. 7 and 8). He claimed overpayment although in his answer he did not allege at all
that there was an overpayment to Keller.
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group
Marketing and to justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and
Lorenzo.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Keller to pay COB the overpayment.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not there was Admission on the part of COB group.
Held: We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in
1971 by Bax as president and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving
credence to the alleged overpayment computed by Bax.
The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB
Group Marketing but they also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount
of its supposed overpayment in the sum of P100,596.72 in spite of the fact that COB
Group Marketing was declared in default and did not file any counterclaim for the
supposed overpayment.
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that
all the invoices, with delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, together
with a tabulation thereof covering the period from October 15, 1969 to January 22, 1971.
Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of account showing that
COB Group Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That amount
is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.
Bax in that discussion did not present his reconciliation statements to show
overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8 were an afterthought. He presented them long after
the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as "fabricated",
Viacrusis v. CA

L-29831 mar72

Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in this case is part of a
bigger lot of about 14.6303 hectares, covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that,
on June 8, 1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of 14.6303
hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on 1936, filed with the RD, and
recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July
7, 1941, or about 5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10, conveying the

disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to
Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais who
claimed to have made oral demands formally demanded from Viacrucis that he vacate
said portion and surrender its possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not
heeded by Viacrucis who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit 9,
confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by him, on January 12, 1954, in favor
of his brother-in-law Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in
favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision,
against them and in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Castelo and this
recognition by the now deceased Pelagio Castelo which were confirmed by the public
document Exh. G constitute a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their
interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule 130.
Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of
said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before
their (petitioners) predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture,
when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said
admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in
evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in
interest," but, also, "against third persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept
OCT No. 243 as collateral for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land
covered by said certificate of title was not his property, there is no competent evidence
on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT
No. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the latter
to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan,
unless and until OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title
issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the filing of his loan
application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title admittedly
delivered by Sanchez to Orais had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel,
to whom he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given criminal case.

2. Compromises
a. Rule 130, 27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasioffenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made
the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not admissible only as evidence of
liability. If the offer of compromise is offered as evidence on other matters (e.g. amount
of liability), then the evidence is admissible.

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause of action. In

criminal cases, the general rule is an offer of compromise is admissible. However, it is
inadmissible under the following cases:
.1 quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)
.2 cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)
.3 plea of guilty later withdrawn
.4 unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
.5 offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury
.6 [the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]
Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an injury.
It does not include offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for damages to
property is admissible in criminal cases.
Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an injury
is inadmissible in civil cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of 27 excludes in civil cases
offers to pay only for expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to pay for other expenses
fall under the general rule that an offer to compromise in civil cases is not admissible.
The exclusion in civil cases of offers to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is
merely a superfluity. Even if the exclusion was expressly applied to only criminal cases,
an offer to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is in the nature of an offer to
compromise which is undoubtedly admissible in civil cases. The bottomline is: an offer
to pay for any expense in civil cases is inadmissible.

b. Cases
Veradero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 (15sep1924) 21911

Evidence on an offer to compromise is admissible even in civil cases if it is to prove

amount of a liability and not the liability itself.
Facts: El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo,
the property of the Insular Lumber Company. The work was performed pursuant to no
express agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the price would be as low
as, or lower than, what could be secured from any other company.
The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El
Varadero de Manila was grossly exorbitant they proposed compromise. During the
course of the abortive negotiations, however, the defendant expressed a willingness to
pay the plaintiff P8,070.12. Having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court
with the result that in the CFI of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured
judgment against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of
P5,310.70. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this court and here as asked us
to increase the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise was admissible.
Held: The general rule is that an offer of compromise is inadmissible.
Where, however, the amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement
appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, it is relevant.
The rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations does not apply where there is no denial
expressed or implied of liability, and the only questions discussed relate to the amount
to be paid.
Case at bench:
Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount to
be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be more than P8,070.12.
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion
that the reasonable value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo
owned by the Insular Lumber Company, was something less than P8,000. We fix the sum
definitely at P7,700.
US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (20aug1915) L-10566

Offer of compromise in criminal cases inadmissible when accused shows that it was
made not under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason; in this case, the law allowed compromise, thus
the offer to compromise is not admitted.
Facts: Walker(secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse) testified that he had
received information that on the night of 20Jan1914, Regino Torres would go to the
house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they
stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while
afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises;
that Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of
him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he
ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run, after he had thrown one tin
over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with
lights to search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and
the other two tins, about a meter from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.
That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however,
when questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his
return from his pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw
away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense
whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a
compromise, to which he replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the
defendants who made this offer.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in evidence.
Held: An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in
evidence (Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 346). In a criminal case for theft (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27
Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that the weight both of authority and reason sustains the
rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the
accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize,
that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as
public vengeance and private interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be
entered into as regards the penal action, however it may be with respect to the civil
liability.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (06dec1995) 115908-09

Offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused is inadmissible if the
accused repudiated the actions of such person by raising the trial courts admission of
evidence of such offer as an error.
Facts:
Complainants version: According to complainant Mia Taha, 17yrs old, at around 7:00
P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School
(PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark,
she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there
was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her,
poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was
then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as
accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while
holding the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted
his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was
her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word.

She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could
not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and
she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else
she and her family would be killed.
The following morning, complainant went home to her parents' house. She likewise did
not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his
threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to
solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents
agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents
to get into trouble.
The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they
alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they
stayed for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden,
complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was
continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk
or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the
latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend
where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside
the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, they left the place because
appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing
person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem, an imam, from whom
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents
agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's
Point where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following
medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent
Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora,
hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal
at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal
opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix
closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance,
presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm.
length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection with
laceration.
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that
there was a laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual
intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches
or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found
no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
Accuseds version: They were sweethearts
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for
the settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle,
hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00.
Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case
for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office,. Helen Taha testified that she agreed
to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped

from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise offered by the accuseds wife was an implied
admission of guilt.
Held: The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed
to be an admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal
cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to
penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been
held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that
the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did
not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam
or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a
Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first
made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top
of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid
P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha,
testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and
appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer
for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not
save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the
court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs,
that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the parties.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (02dec1996) 117217

The offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused was admitted in
evidence because the accused failed to repudiate such acts by raising the trial courts
admission of evidence on such offer as an error.
Facts: Homeward bound from where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda
Ambray was waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten
minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the
guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a
stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was
summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered
her a ride, to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the
accused took a different route. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and
tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of the same
subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the
tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept.
Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced
her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the
accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away
from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if
she made noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and
slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and
commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly followed because of fear. He

removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted "Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako!," but
the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe.
He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and
pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused
then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she struggled and
fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried
to stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her
pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she
had two children. He warned her: "Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused
again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The
accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too
weak to struggle against the accused's sexual advances, the accused was able to finally
consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled out his penis and "fingered" her private
organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise,
he would kill her and all members of her family. He told her that she was his third victim
but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and
underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray,
that she was raped by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was
prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother.
Gilda Ambray was medically examined by a medico legal officer from the NBI and found
the following:
III. Conclusions:
1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of the
examination.
2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse with man on or about the
alleged date of examination.
IV. Remarks:
Laboratory Report S-92-94
spermatozoa.

shows positive result for the presence of human

"Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of
Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for
the accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents,
wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for
forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated."
Accuseds defense: Alibi, tricycle broke down.
Issue: Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accuseds family is equivalent to
an attempt to compromise and therefore an admission of guilt.
Held: Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt
was dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading
for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to
by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny
their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that
his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had
gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the
accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant's
Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the
decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and
consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and
sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to
forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of
wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon an offender.

People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (10feb1997) 117702

Whether a complaint has been filed or not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer
to compromise.
Facts: Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00
in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking
porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine
months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He
approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her
skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she
allegedly contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted
fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few
minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was
dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the
bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would
kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face,
breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but
appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and
punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost consciousness.
Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres
for one month before leaving them to return to her mother's house. Her mother found
Rosita in a state of shock. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother
for examination. The Health officer found that:
Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position];
hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental
Hospital for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk
and revealed that she was raped by appellant.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise by the appellants wife was admissible in
evidence (and should be considered as admission of guilt).
Held: Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn
refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still
Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been
filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was
already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about
it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to
compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that
after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer
to compromise and such offer is proved.
NB: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (14mar1914) L-8931

Facts: The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the
caraballa and her calf, and sentenced to imprisonment.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value in
accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by the
accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money.

Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise can be construed as admission or

confession of guilt.
Held: The weight of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of
offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers
were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that
the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course
of offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though
doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that it accepted he would
escape prosecution.
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are
opinion that in imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration
as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the
offender.
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the
accused, but if made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under
a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (US vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment
with the prosecutrix is inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an
admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman,
evidence is admissible on behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a
third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be
compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he
would pay $50 if it could be settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen
that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40
Ga., 530.)
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of
money in settlement of a civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have
been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise,
and the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs.
Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)
An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by
the state as an admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is
the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez,
45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)

3. Res Inter Alios Acta

a. Rule 130, 28
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided. (25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a party are inadmissible
against such party. However, the rules also provide for exceptions:
.1 Partners admissions;
.2 agents admissions;
.3 admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party;
.4 Co-conspirators statements;
.5 Admission by privies.

Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?

b. Cases
People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)

Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-judicial
confession of another admitting his participation in the offense.
Held: This is not a co-conspirators statement because there was no evidence of
conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the confession was
executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-accused,
the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was presented was a
merely his affidavit.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

Absent independent evidence of conspiracy, extra-judicial confession of the accused is

not admissible against others.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose
body was found strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd.,
Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some personal garments,
handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms
on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for
investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack
of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City,
Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the
victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he
admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This appears in his
extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966.
In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated
a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one
"Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the
crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery
with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None
of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts
contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the EJ
confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn
Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay
City sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was
not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower court
nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now
deceased) against appellants; in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants

when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the

crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby
ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be
used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet," there
being no independent evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the
other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the
facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of
such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would
be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime
made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo,
an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or
refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to
answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under
custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to
remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)

Extra-judicial confession of accused can not be used to implicate co-accused unless

repeated in open court.
FACTS: At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan, Jr. attended to the person
knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen and was surprised to find heavily armed men
declaring a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband dead while a
man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while
two (2) other men ran away. George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He
reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of
the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was
identified as Amado Ponce. He was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the
police station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano
Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence.
However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the
shooting incident. Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense. Valeriano Raquel
testified that on July 2, 1986, he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol
Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his
deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay
on July 3 and 4.
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son
Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to
harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his
permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at
Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two
(2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tunggol
where they arrested his son Valeriano.

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4,
1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria
Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4,
1986.
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding
all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
them accordingly.
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they
manifested that they were appealing the decision to the CA which forwarded it to the SC
in view of the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas and Valeriano
Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as
the perpetrators of the crime?
HELD: Acquitted Sabas. TC reversed.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her
husband.
The identity of the Raquels as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators
of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify
in court and he has been at large since then. The extrajudicial statements of an
accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless
these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to crossexamine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused.
A distinction should be made between
extrajudicial & judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown
wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that,
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those
exceptions do not however apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no
evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt.
Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr.
Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was negated by Dr. Anulao.
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence,
was made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was
unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato. Extrajudicial
statements made during custodial investigation w/o the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible & cant be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.
Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to
them. It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in
criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of
moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.

c. Exceptions

Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationship be proven
by evidence independent of the act or declaration sought to be admitted.

1) Partners/Agents admissions
a) Rule 130, 29
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner,
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (26a)
Requisites for admission by co-partner or agent
.1 act or declaration of a partner, agent, or person jointly interested with the party
.2 within the scope of authority
.3 made during the existence of the partnership, agency or joint interest
.4 the partnership, agency, or joint interest is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration

b) Cases
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909)

Discharge of a debt given by a managing partner, 2 years after the partnership had been
dissolved does not qualify as a partners admission and can not prejudice or bind the
other partners.
Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)

Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to recover his share in the
partnership.
Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his co-partner, are
not competent to prove the existence of a partnership, between them as against such
other partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be established by general
reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198)

The jurisdiction in which this case is decided has a law which explicitly declared that an
act of a party or his agent is not hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of his
statement as long as it is within the scope of his authority, may be used against him and
his principal

2) Co-conspirators statements
a) Rule 130, 30
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act of declaration. (27)
Requisites for co-conspirators statements
.1 act or declaration of a conspirator
.2 relating to the conspiracy
.3 made during its existence
.4 the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.

b) Cases
People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (28june1974) L-37398

Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused.
Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy, hence it was
inadmissible.

Facts: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Sgt. Tanfelix of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received an instruction to proceed immediately to Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was found at
the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds.
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. In the antemortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who
hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took
his money and jeep.
The next morning (01/18), defendant Cabrera was arrested by the police. Two days later,
she executed an extra-judicial confession. In the said extra-judicial confession she
pointed to appellant Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the
jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased were
done by appellant and his two unidentified companions.
Lt. Palomares of the Valenzuela PD who took the extra-judicial confession of defendant
Cabrera testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial confession
over the continuing objection of appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection
when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence.
The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva
was the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into
the record over the continuing objection of appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated his
objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence.
Counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's
conviction and his acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not the admission by the co-conspirator was admissible in evidence.
Held: Said admission is inadmissible against appellant who made timely objection
thereto. (Said statement could be used against Cabrera if there is corpus delicti. There
is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the
investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the
date of the incident in question. For this reason alone, that is, that said statement
was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and
appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she
was already in the hands of the authorities.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (28nov1955) L-9181

Confession regarding conspiracy may be used against confessor (multiple admissibility);

confession regarding conspiracy should be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is
proved; statements must be made during the conpiracy and in furtherance of its object
to be admissible.
Facts: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22,
1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown,
were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos. During
the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of
its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by
defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on
an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to
introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove
conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite
acts, conditions, and circumstances.
The prosecution then moved in writing for reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but
again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari.

Issues: Whether or not the admission of a co-conspirator is admissible against his coconspirator. Whether or not the admission should be completely excluded.
Held: Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession
may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the
latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such.
Sec. 30 of Rule 130 refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of
its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had
been brought to an end.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made
on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether
different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to
Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the
ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions that it could not be admitted to
prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and
completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked
that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived
and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968)

Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession;

reiterated in furtherance.
Facts: Alvarez was charged with the murder of Hector Crisostomo.
During the
investigation he made a tape-recorded statement admitting his participation in the
crime. Subsequently, he made a handwritten statement also admitting his participation
but implicated Chaw Yaw Shun as the one who ordered him to kill Crisostomo. Shun
surrendered after which he was investigated. Believing that Shun was not telling the
truth, because he would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator destroyed
the statement. In view of such denial, Shun was investigated again and made a written
confession that he ordered the killing of Crisostomo. While Shun was detained, he gave
a statement that the written confession was obtained thru force, threat and intimidation.
The TC, finding conspiracy, convicted Alvarez and Shun for murder.
Issue: WON the statements made by Alvarez and Shun are admissible to establish
conspiracy?
Held: The SC held that the confession made by Shun is inadmissible as evidence
because it was induced, extorted by means of torture, abuse or by personal violence.
Moreover, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the
confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other must
relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprise. In this case, the conflicting confession of Alvarez are not binding on Shun for
being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial.
There is, therefore no locking confession so to say, for there being no independent
evidence establishing an overt act of Shun connected to the crime.
People v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (27apr1959) L-7973

Requirement that conspiracy must be shown 1st other than confession applies only to
extra-judicial confessions not to testimony in open court.
Facts: In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio
Serrano told Piping Serrano, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and
Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the house of the first, that Pablo Navarro
had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and

testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire
and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in
the town of Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. They
tried to execute the plan for three days but failed. Finally, on the forth day they
succeeded in executing the said plan when Navarro, together with Manguera, agreed to
join them in a drinking session. Navarro and Manguera were killed that same day.
Appellants defense: Alibi & under fear of greater evil. Cadiang at the farm working with
palay; Cenzon at the market, hauled lumber, gas up; Yumul worked as laborer
removing railroad tracks.
The defendants were found guilty based on a testimony made by Anastacio Reyes.
The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by
evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the
person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of Reyes can be used against the appellants.
Held: The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to
extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at
the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always
subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be
received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible
and competent.
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of
votes to impose the death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the
proportionate costs against the appellants.

3) Admission by Privies
a) Rule 130, 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (211)
Requisites for admission by privies
.1 a party derives title to property from another
.2 act, declaration, or omission of the transferor
.3 made while holding the title
.4 in relation to the property
Tequillo: Does this not violate the Property Registration Decree, that says 3rd parties are
not bound unless the encumbrance is registered?

b) Cases
Alpuerto v. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918)

Privies denotes any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the
predecessor in interest; purchaser at execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor;
3rd parties are persons who have not intervened in the execution of the instrument
either as principals or witnesses.
Facts: The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos.
Plaintiff Eladio Alpuerto petitioned the lower court to make a declaration against the
defendant Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner of the said lands
by virtue of a contract of sale with right of repurchase executed by Llenosin his
(plaintiffs) favor. Defendant Pastor alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief
sought because the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired title was
simulated and fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose
of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Llenos.

It appears that at the time of the supposed sale to Alpuerto, there had been pending for
nearly two years in the CFI an action for collection of a considerable sum of money, in
which pastor was plaintiff and Llenos was defendant. On July 3, 1912, the contract of
sale with right of repurchase was executed (not notarized) by the parties, Llenos and
Alpuerto. This document was signed by the contracting parties and was altered by two
subscribing witnesses. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the sale took
place, judgment in the collection case was rendered in favor of Pastor. This judgment
was affirmed upon appeal to the SC on November 20, 1914. On December 3, 1914, the
contract of sale was acknowledged before a notary public. And on April 12, 1915, an
execution was issued upon the judgment in the collection case and the property in
question was levied upon as property of Llenos. Despite Alpuertos objection on the
ground that he owned the property, the sheriff proceeded with the public sale and the
property was sold to Pastor.
Issue: Who is entitled to the property in question? Was the sale from Llenos to Alpuerto
fraudulent?
Held: Article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one against
whom a condemnatory judgment has been pronounced is to be presumed fraudulent.
The cardinal question in the case therefore is: Was the transfer in question made after a
judgment had been entered against Llenos? This in turn depends upon whether the
contract of sale shall be considered effective as from the date upon which it purports to
have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from the date when it was acknowledged before a
notary public (December 3, 1914), for in the interval between these two dates final
judgment had been rendered against Llenos both in the CFI and in the SC.
According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document legally recognized shall
have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies (causahabientes), the same
force as a public instrument.
The expression legally recognized means recognized or acknowledged by the person
or persons executing the document.
Concerning the meaning of the expression privies, Manresa has this to say:
The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and
testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from
acts intervivos and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one
subrogated to it, et., will be privies; in short, he, who, by succession is placed in
the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the
private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and
obligations, is a privy.
Thus, Pastor, the purchaser at public sale must be considered a privy or successor in
interest of the execution debtor and is bound by the instrument which conveyed the
property to Alpuerto- and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a
private document.
Nevertheless, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in
fraud of creditors; the deed of sale with right of repurchase must therefore be annulled
and the property delivered to defendant.
Judgment reversed.
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)

Admission must be made while one holds title.

Facts: The City of Manila wanted to recover two lots in Calle Clavel and Barcelona. The
witnesses gave different answers as to whether or not the lots were owned by the City.
It appears that what actually happened was that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land
from Cipriano Roco and later on sold it to Jacinto del Rosario. The City of Manila wanted
to make use of two documents made by Lorenzo, one of which contained an offer to buy
the land from the City of Manila (Lorenzo mistakenly thought that the City owned the
land) and the other was a letter to the Municipal Board of Manila (the President of the
Board advised Lorenzo to write this to avoid litigation with the City).

Issue: May these two letters be used in evidence against Jacinto del Rosario (the present
owner)?
Held: No. Lorenzo signed the first document before he acquired the land from Cipriano
Roco and the second one was signed by him after he had transferred the land to Jacinto
del Rosario. This being the case, the statements contained in the documents are not
binding on Jacinto as they were made when Lorenzo no longer had title to the lands.

4. Admissions by silence
a. Rule 130 32
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence
and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing
when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
evidence against him. (23a)
Requisites for admission by silence
.1 The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or observation
of a party
.2 The party does or says nothing
.3 The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true
.4 Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.

b. Cases
People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)

Failure by a supposed rape victim to rebut sweetheart defense based on testimonial

evidence may be taken against her. Requirements for admission by silence: 1) heard and
understood, 2) at liberty to deny, 3) affects his rights, 4) within his knowledge, and 5)
material to the issue.
Facts: This case involves a review of the CAs conviction of the accused for rape and its
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused Bienvenido Paragsa was
charged and convicted for allegedly raping complainant Mirasol Magallanes, who is 12
yrs. old. Mirasol alleges that while she was alone in her hosue, Paragsa, armed with a
hunting knife, entered and managed to rape her. On the other hand, Paragsa admits
having sexual intercourse with her but denies that he used force and intimidation against
her. He claims that they were sweethearts, that Mirasol invited him to her house that
day and that it was already their 3rd intercourse. This was corroborated by 2 other
witnesses, Batosbatosan and Ducay.
Issue: WON Paragsa should be convicted for rape?
Held: No, he should be acquitted.
unsatisfactory to satisfy a conviction.

The prosecutions evidence is weak and

1. Force and intimidation was not proven. Mirasol did not make any outcry or resist the
accused. She did not immediately tell her aunt, who happened to have passed by at
the time of the alleged incident, what had happened nor did she tell her parents
about it.
2. Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the accused which was
corroborated by 2 other witnesses to the effect that she and the accused were
sweethearts. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of
what is said, it must appear:
o that he heard and understood the statement
o that he was at liberty to interpose a denial
o that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which
he was then interested and calling, naturally, for an answer
o that the facts were within his knowledge

o that the fact admitted or inference to be drawn from his silence would be material
to the issue.
3. These requisites are all present in this case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts
alleged by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of
the truth of such assertion.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

Silence of accused in custody during investigation can not be used as evidence against
him.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose
body was found strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd.,
Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some personal garments,
handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms
on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for
investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack
of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City,
Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the
victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he
admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This appears in his
extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966.
In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated
a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one
"Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the
crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery
with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None
of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts
contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the EJ
confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn
Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay
City sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was
not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower court
nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now
deceased) against appellants; in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants
when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the
crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby
ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be
used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet," there

being no independent evidence of conspiracy.

As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not
bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the
appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny
their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal
confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or
refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to
answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is
under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has
a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as
evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 853 (1965)

Court may not comment on accuseds failure to testify regarding facts within his
knowledge.
Facts: Griffin was convicted of murder in the first degree. He did not testify at the trial
on the issue of his guilt but he testified at the separate trial (California penal laws
provide separate trials if the case has two issues) on the issue of penalty. Pursuant to the
California Constitution (Art. I, sec 13 of the California Constitution provides in part: in
any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or deny
by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon
by the court and counsel, and may be considered by the court or jury.), the trial court
instructed the jury on the issue of his guilt and reminded its members that Griffin had a
constitutional right not to testify. It declared that the failure of the defendant to deny or
explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt
nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt. It commented further:
As to evidence or facts against him which defendant can reasonably be expected
to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or
explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending
to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable.
The prosecutor had this to say:
The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at
the time he left the apartment and went down the alley with herWhat kind of
man is that would want to have sex with a woman that beat up at the time he
leftHe would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood
got on the bottom of the stepsHe would know whether he beat her or mistreated
herHe would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a
cucumberbecause he was conscious of his won guiltThese things he has not
seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And in the whole world, if anybody
would know, this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she cant tell you her
side of the story. The defendant wont. (underscoring supplied)
Griffin was sentenced to death. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.
Held: The Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the federal government and its
bearing on states by provision of the Fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment by
the prosecution of the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt. The principle behind the rule that a defendant may be a competent
witness, but that his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption
against him, was designed to bar the prosecutors counsel from commenting on the

defendants refusal to testify. Thus, the state constitutional provision allowing comment
by the court or counsel directly contravenes the Constitution. The decision of the lower
court was reversed.

M.

Confessions

1. Rule 130, 33
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be
given in evidence against him. (29a)
This rule is applicable only in criminal cases.
A confession need not be in writing in order to be admissible in evidence.
If it is in writing, it is NOT required to be under oath.
Escolin: However, if it is not in writing, the prosecution may find difficulty in proving it.

2. Art. III, 12 and 17, 1987 Constitution

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

3. Rule 115 (e)

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. xxx
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

4. Cases
People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252 (1987)

A confession, to be admissible, must have been executed in the presence of counsel.

Waiver of right to counsel must be with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994)

Where the confession was made even before the accused was under custodial
investigation, it is admissible even if he was not assisted by counsel. Custodial
investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. Only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the accused is said to be under custodial investigation.
People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976)

Where the extra-judicial confessions of the accused are consistent in many material
details and manifest amazing consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of
facts which could not have been known to the police investigators if the same were not
voluntarily given by the accused, such statements are admissible against the accused on
the doctrine of interlocking confessions.

de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is when a confession is

inadmissible against one accused (e.g. obtained without counsel), but it is nevertheless
admissible against the other co-accused. The confession of one may be used against
another to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)

FACTS: On 23 October 1987, midnight, MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, which also served as the dwelling of the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay
was robbed.
The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they
detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the
robbers placed the 2 maids into the bathroom while Mary was caught, tied and gagged in
the bedroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store along
Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz.
The bedroom was ransacked and they took some P35,000 in cash and pieces of jewelry
worth P30,000.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded
into the bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor.
After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers dashed
out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing
Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth.
They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor
among the pieces of furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to 13 stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures,
told operatives of the WPD that just before the incident that evening, while with his
girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his
co-workers Compil, Mabini and Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then
confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police.
On 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased,
where able to arrest Compil in Tayabas, Quezon. Upon being arrested, Compil readily
admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from
a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the
Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila,
he was again questioned.
He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group
that robbed MJ Furnitures. He said he was only a lookout for which he received P1,000 He
did not go inside the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Compil said that his
cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all
met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator
Rogelio Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until 4:30 a.m. They all left for
Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to
the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed this narration of Compil.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, Compil after conferring with CLAO
lawyer Melencio Claroz executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the
WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other
perpetrators of the crime as Jacale, Mabini, Alvos, Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one
"Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jacale and Mabini
who were the masterminds.
Meanwhile WPD agents failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo
Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned.

After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead
of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the RTC of Mla. denied the demurrer and found the accused guilty of
robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused Compils confessions were admissible in evidence?
HELD: THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS INADMISSIBLE. Citing Gamboa v. Cruz, the
SC held that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense." The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Here, Compil was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house
of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station
where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents
again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the
commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he
was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day
even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect
for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from Compil.
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect
of his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Although the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, nevertheless, the accused had
been found by the SC to be guilty of the crime. The guilt of the accused may be
established through circumstantial evidence. The circumstances as gleaned from the
factual findings of the trial court in case at bar form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. Hence even disregarding Compils oral and written confessions, as we do, still the
prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.
Although, the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant,
Compil is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Compils
argument the TC should have convicted the arresting police officers of arbitrary
detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced, since, the law
enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.
Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of Compil that granting that he had
participated in the commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an
accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to
adduce evidence in his behalf, the SC had considered only the evidence of the
prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. Direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy which may be inferred from the acts of the
accused during and after the commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose,
concert of action and community of interest. Thus, circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to prove conspiracy. And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and
each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the others.
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)

FACTS: The eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung
(British nationals), Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon
Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun (all Malaysian
nationals) arrived in Manila from Hong Kong on board a PAL flight. All accused arrived in
Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Wing Cheung, an
employee of Select Tours acted as their tour guide.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the
tour group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in
baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5
which at the time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung
handed to Gomez the tour group's passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and
their passports.
Upon inspection, Gomez allowed two of the group to pass but after finding a number of
Alpen Cereal boxes in each of the baggages of the accused, he became suspicious and
opened one of them with a cutter. It was found to contain a white crystalline substance
which was later found to be shabu.
The tour group was ordered to proceed to the district collector's office. Inside the
collector's office, Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of
the tour group. He allegedly found a total of thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing
white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the eleven
(11) accused. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he
bundled said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to
Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of
accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking
tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also
present at this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of
Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio
Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison.
Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, he
conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed
that the substance was indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the
eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the
Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame.
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after
having identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination
by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered
from accused was "shabu." The total weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45
kilograms.
For their part, the. defense interposed by all accused was basically anchored on the
testimony of their co-accused Lim Chan Fatt, a technician and self-confessed "call boy",
who admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country
although he denied any knowledge that they contained "shabu." Lim Chan Fatt testified
that except for Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other accused were unknown or
complete strangers to him until their trip to the Philippines on 7 September 1991. With
respect to Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his
boarding house in Hongkong where the two (2) temporarily lived a few days before said
trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to their departure date, a certain Ah Hong, a coboarder and a Hongkong businessman, approached him and asked him if he could kindly
bring with him boxes of cereals to the Philippines. Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that
a certain Ah Sing will get these boxes from him at the Philippine airport and for this
trouble, Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt will have a good time in the Philippines.
Ah Hong allegedly even opened one (1) box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim
Chan Fatt acceded to Ah Hong's request as he allegedly found nothing wrong with it.
Consequently, Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals.
Since his baggage could not accommodate all thirty (30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested

Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun to accommodate some of the boxes in their
baggages. Lim Chan Fatt claimed that he entrusted five (5) boxes to Chin Kong Song and
another five (5) to Lim Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four (4) boxes inside a hand
carried plastic bag while the rest were put inside his baggage. On the basis of this
testimony, the defense endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song and
Lim Nyuk Sun were responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country and
even then they cannot be held liable for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge that these boxes contained
"shabu.
Accused Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun' and accused-appellants Au Wing Cheung
and Wong Chuen Ming. Accused-appellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals were
recovered from their baggages. They claimed that they affixed their signatures on the
boxes only because they were threatened by police authorities who were present during
the examination inside the collector's office. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung
maintained that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. and
that he had no prior knowledge that the tour group he was supposed to accompany to
the Philippines brought boxes containing "shabu." For his part, accused-appellant Wong
Chuen Ming tried to dissociate himself from the other accused by testifying that he was
not a part of their group. He claimed that he was originally booked with another travel
agency, Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day Cebu tour. This Cebu tour was allegedly
cancelled due to insufficient number of clients and accused-appellant was subsequently
transferred to and accommodated by Select Tours. The other accused who did not take
the witness stand opted to adopt as their own all testimonial and documentary evidence
presented in court for the defense.
On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused.
Only accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed their joint appeal
brief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?
HELD: Accuseds contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and due
process when their previous counsels also represented the other accused despite
"conflicting interests" was not accepted by the SC having found that said counsels tried
to present all the defenses available to each of the accused and that they did not, in any
way, put in jeopardy accused-appellants' constitutional right to counsel. It does not
appear from the records that the effectiveness of accused-appellants' previous counsels
was diminished by the fact that they also jointly represented the other accused.
The SC held that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing "shabu," are inadmissible in evidence. Accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix
their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on
the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing
their signatures, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged
for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of
accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is
not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987
Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung
from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the
"exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights
are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Among the prosecution witnesses, only Gomez testified that all the seized baggages,
including those owned by Chuen Ming and Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of
"shabu." His testimony was given credence by the TC since he was presumed to have
performed his duties in a regular manner. However, Gomez' testimony inculpating
accused-appellants was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. Customs

collector Bonifacio cannot recall if each and everyone of accused were found in
possession of any box or boxes of Alpen Cereals and the testimony of NARCOM officer
Capt. Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of "shabu"
from the baggages of accused-appellants. While Capt. Francisco was categorical in
stating that boxes of "shabu" were recovered from the baggages belonging to the other
nine (9) accused Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez actually
recovered boxes of "shabu" from accused-appellants' baggages. Hence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded to Gomez
cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to
be presumed innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other
prosecution witnesses.
There are other circumstances that militate against the conviction of accused-appellants.
First, accused-appellants are British (Hongkong) nationals while all the other accused are
Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine how accused-appellants could have conspired with
the other accused, who are total strangers, when they do not even speak the same
language. Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of testimonies of accusedappellant An Wing Cheung's superiors was presented to show that he was a bonafide
employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accusedappellant Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged by Select Tours but he
was only accommodated by the latter at the last minute when his package tour to Cebu
was cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco, both
accused-appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags containing
shabu." The SC, thus, held that accused-appellants' participation in the illegal
transportation of "shabu" into the country has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose
body was found strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd.,
Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some personal garments,
handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms
on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for
investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack
of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City,
Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the
victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he
admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This appears in his
extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966.
In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated
a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one
"Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the
crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery
with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None
of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts
contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the EJ
confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn

Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay
City sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was
not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower court
nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now
deceased) against appellants; in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants
when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the
crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby
ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be
used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet," there
being no independent evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the
other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the
facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of
such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would
be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime
made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo,
an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or
refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to
answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under
custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to
remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong
nationals, came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be
married. Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and
strangled to death in their hotel room.
On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with
Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she
had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, Yip Wai Ming was charged for murder. He was later on convicted by the
RTC of Manila. There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the
evidence about the killing is circumstantial.
Evidence presented by the prosecution alleged that on the day of the murder, Cariza
Destresa, the occupant of room 211, the room adjacent to room 210 of the couple heard
a loud argument inside the couples room and a struggle where there was supposedly a
faint cry and a loud thud (like someone banging on the floor). The front desk clerk also
testified that Yip Wai Ming, at about 10 a.m., came down later to meet with Gwen de los
Santos who was to accompany them to a tour around Manila. Ming left his fiance Lam
in their room and gave specific instructions that she shouldnt be disturbed. He was
perspiring and kind of in a hurry. During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after
appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock in the evening, he did not call his
fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition. When Ming arrived at 11 p.m. on
that day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his room. Then together with Fortunato
Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock was opened and the door
was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed covered with a

blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim 'My God, she is dead'
but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, Ming asked the room boy to go down the
hotel to inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the
police. When the police arrived, they conducted an examination of the condition of the
doors and windows of the room as well as the body of the victim and the other
surroundings. They found no signs of forcible entry and they observed that no one can
enter from the outside except the one who has the key. The police also saw the victim
wrapped in a colored blanket lying face down. When they removed the blanket and tried
to change the position of her body, the latter was already in state of rigor mortis, which
indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The police
calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11,
1993 (pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was
insured with the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with
Ming as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly
salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hongkong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking Ming to the killing is sufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Judgment reversed. Accused acquitted.
The SC found that the trial court relied only and conjectures and surmises in arriving at
its conclusion. Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to but one fair and
reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person Every hypothesis consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence. All the evidence must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. The SC found that certain key elements, without which the picture of the
crime would be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable evidence. A key element in
the web of circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to establish.
Nevertheless, the supposed insurance policy with which motive was established was not
duly proven. The prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a document
captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof of the alleged insurance. It is not a
certified copy, nor was the original first identified. The authenticity of the document has
thus not been duly established. The policy was unsigned and it was not clear whether it
was indeed taken out by Lam. Also, Law only earned $5000 a month while the premium
of the policy was for $5400. Such a discrepancy negates the assumption that there was
a policy taken and a motive for the crime.
There was also no conclusive findings as to the time of the death as testified to by Dr.
Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the WPD.
The fact that there as no forcible entry does not presupposes nor negates the possibility
that somebody may have knocked and entered the room after Lam opened the door
thinking it was hotel staff. Detective Yanquiling was so convinced that it was Ming who
did it that he did not conduct any other further investigation.
The TCs reliance on the Destreza testimony was also rebutted by the SC being unreliable
having given contradictory statements as to the time when she heard the banging
sounds or even to the date as to when her Australian boyfriend came to Manila.
Ming was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of
arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested Ming based
on series of circumstantial evidence. He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming
having committed the crime. Ming stated that five police officers at the police station
beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his
stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face.
When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged, participated in a
re-enactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed

of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in
confessing the crime.
The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. The Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against
him." Section 17,. Article III provides: "No confession, shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the
right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is
inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)

FACTS: British Horace William Barker, a WB consultant, and his Filipino wife, Teresita
Mendoza lived in Tuba, Benguet where, in the early morning of 27 August 1991, Horace
was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a
robbery in their home.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante as one of the suspect.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the prosecution initially included Richard Malig in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries filed with the RTC of
Benguet. Prior to the arraignment of Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the
information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda but, later, the Prosecutor asked
that accused Malig be dropped from the information since the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for
the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on March 1992 in Guinyangan, Quezon and was
brought to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria,
Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3 Armando
Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed
Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker
house.
On 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail where he stated that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the
least guilty among the accused in this case."
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked
him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of
the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda
that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on
trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and
obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda
toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to
Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor but found out later that they were
going to rob the Barkers. He initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it. He
admitted having hit Mrs. Barker with a lead pipe after she came down and in helping
Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the
Barkers were already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante looted the house. They
made their escape through Baguio City & then rode a Philippine Rabbit Bus heading for
Manila.
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information with only Salvamante
and Maqueda as the accused. Salvamante remained at large and trial proceeded against
Maqueda only who entered a plea of not guilty.
Maqueda interposed a defense of alibi stating that he was not in Benguet then and that
he was working as a caretaker in a polvoron factory in Sukat, Muntinlupa. This was
denied however by the owner Castrence.

In its decision promulgated on 31 August 1993, the TC found Maqueda guilty on the
ground that there was a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the supposed confession of
Maqueda to be admitted in evidence against him?
HELD: The trial court erred in admitting the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Maqueda
to SPO3 Molleno.
The TC pointed out that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is not an
extrajudicial confession, it is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction
between the two as shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti. HOWEVER, the exercise of the rights to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is
"under investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily, once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue
of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper
for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in
connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If,
nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. Here, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest
was taken in palpable violation of the said Constitutional provision. As disclosed by a
reading thereof. Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the
said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such
uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to
paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
NEVERTHELESS, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate
and to Ray Dean Salvosa are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the
Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in
the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a
state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The
provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the
rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by
government and that government has the duty to protect. or restrictions on the power of
government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the
general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental
power is not unlimited.'' They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of
arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of
the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern
the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray
Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former
under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Citing Aballe vs. People, the
declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given
in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness,
who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if
he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral
extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent
Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a
state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among

the accused in this case." In the light of these admissions, Maqueda's guilt was
established beyond moral certainty.
His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein.
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his
guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by
circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1)
He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after
the crime in question was committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large,
was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of
two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are
friends; (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both
left the place sometime in September 1991, (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon,
on 4 March 1992, and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating
that "he is the least guilty." Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1. There is more than one circumstance
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
All the requisites are present in this case. Therefore, conviction affirmed.
Bruton v. US,
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

Facts: Three co-defendants, who had been convicted or murder at a joint trial before a
jury in a Tennessee trial court, sought habeas corpus relief from a District Court claiming
that an error had been committed when the trial court admitted some of their
confessions into evidence. All three co-defendants none of whom had testified at trial,
claimed that error had occurred when their interlocking oral confessions were admitted
into evidence with cautionary instructions to the jury that each confession could be used
only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendants guilt.
The District Court granted habeas corpus relief holding that as to the admission of the
interlocking oral confessions, that the co-defendants rights had been violated under the
SCs decision in Bruton v US, in which it had been held that an accuseds right of crossexamination is violated by the admission of a co-defendants confession inculpating the
accused, notwithstanding jury instructions that the co-defendants confession must be
disregarded in determining the accuseds guilt or innocence. The CA affirmed the
decision.
Issue: WON the admission of co-defendants confessions infringed respondents rights
Held: No. The SC held that the admission of respondents confessions with proper
limiting jury instructions did not infringe respondents constitutional rights.
In this case, unlike in Bruton, the defendant had already confessed. Incriminating
extrajudicial statements will not have the same devastating consequences to a
defendant who has already confessed.
In this case, defendant corroborated his co-defendants story and has blamed himself.
Thus the natural motivation to blame others, which renders incriminating statements
suspect (as held in Bruton), does not exist in this case.

The right to confrontation does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant
extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way
implicates the defendant. An instruction directing the jury to consider a co-defendants
statement only against its source is sufficient to avoid offending the defendants
confrontation right.
When the defendants own confession is before the jury, the possible prejudice that may
result from the jurys failure to follow the courts instructions is not so devastating or
vital as to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with
limiting instructions.
Dissent: J. Stevens expressed the view that there had been a violation of right under
Bruton and that such was not harmless.
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986
People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001

N.Previous Conduct as Evidence

1. Rule 130, 34-35
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48 a)
GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
.1 intent
.2 knowledge
.3 identity
.4 plan
.5 system
.6 scheme
.7 habit
.8 custom or
.9 usage, and
.10 the like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of
money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property is, if
rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money instrument, or property. (49 a)

2. Cases
US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913)

In a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the accused had attempted to set fire
to the house on the day previous to the burning alleged in the information, for the
purpose of showing the intent of the accused in subsequently setting fire to the house.
Where a person is charged wit the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be
received of the other similar acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose
of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)

Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a
poison, causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists
went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when
analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.

Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defendant's
motive and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent
and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence
than the frequency of accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends
to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the
defendant.
Facts: Feliciano Santos, owner of some sick horses, went to the drug store of Santiago
Pineda, a registered pharmacist with a prescription from Dr. Richardson to purchase
potassium chlorate for the sick horses. When Santos administered the medicine to his
horses, the horses died. Santos, thereupon brought the remaining packages to the
Bureau of Science for examination and it was found that the packets contained not
potassium chlorate but barium chlorate (which was a poison). The two chemists, Drs.
Pea & Darjuan of the said Bureau when to Pinedas drug store and bought potassium
chlorate but where again given barium chlorate. Dr. Buencamino performed an autopsy
of the horses and found that indeed they were poisoned. In the trial, the two chemists
testified to their purchase of potassium chlorate but where instead given barium
chlorate. The admission of such testimony was objected to by the defense. The TC
convicted Pineda for violation of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law, thus, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the two
chemists?
Held: The SC affirmed the judgment. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But Pineda has confused the res inter alios
acta maxim with certain exceptions thereto. The testimony presented was not to convict
the accused of a second offense nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the
point at issue and thus to prejudice defendants case. The purpose is to ascertain
Pinedas knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If Pineda has on more
than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been
said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends
to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)

Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her
money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw
that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana
from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximianas neighbor, Juana de
la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors.
de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She
identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximinianas testimony
that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded
delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends
to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.
Facts: On the night of November 8, 1935, 7 persons with white stripes on their faces,
two carrying guns while the rest had bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto
and Maximiana Melocotones. Some of these persons went up the house while the rest
remained on guard downstairs. The men ordered Perfecto to bring out his money but
before he could do so Perfecto was attacked with bolos by the men. Perfecto slumped to
the floor dead. So, the men instead ordered his wife to get the money and jewelries to
which she complied and surrendered about P70 in case and P200 worth of jewelry.

That same night, a group of men with similar descriptions as those that robbed the
Melocotones assaulted the house of Juana de la Cruz.
After they left the house of the Melocotones, Toribio Melocotones, son of Perfecto and
Maximiana, who had seen the assailants arrive and leave their house reported the
incident to the police. Maximiana gave a description where she stated that one of her
assailants had a pockmarked face. When groups of men where presented to Maximiana
for identification she pointed to Benjamin Irang as the one who struck her with the butt
of his gun and demanded delivery of money and jewelries. He was also identified by
Juana de la Cruz as one of those who assaulted her home.
Irang later on executed an affidavit which was sworn to by him before the deputy clerk of
the CFI of Nueva Ecija stating he was merely invited to the said town and when already
there he was brought by a certain Fidel Estrella to be part of a group that would raid the
house of Perfecto Melocotones and that he merely stood guard. He also assailed the
admission of the testimony of Juana de la Cruz that the said group supposedly assaulted
her house.
The CFI of Nueva Ecija convicted said accused Irang.
Issue: Whether or not Juana de la Cruz testimony is admissible?
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz that her house is located only about 100 meters
from that of Perfecto and that they were assaulted by a group of men fitting the same
description as those who assaulted Perfectos house is admissible.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery,
it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as
the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in
the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
His affidavit is also admissible. An admission made under oath before a deputy clerk of
court cannot be considered involuntary merely because the person who made it
allegedly having done so under threat, the persons supposed to have threatened him
having denied such fact.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)

Facts: Ernesto Basa and Ernesto Balaktaw were sleeping in a pushcart along a sidewalk
when Basa was assaulted by Sofronio Palin (who held down Basa) and Geronimo Soliman
(who stabbed him many times with a balisong). Thereafter, they ran away. Balaktaw
brought Basa to the police who in turn brought him to a hospital where however Basa
died. As a defense, Soliman stated that on several occasions Basa had assaulted him,
once he was punched and in another with a lead pipe, and on that occasion he was being
extorted money. Soliman during that incident stabbed him as Basa and three of his
companions attacked him. Palin corroborated that statement of Soliman. The TC
convicted both men.
Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence convicting the two accused?
Held: Judgment affirmed.
The findings of fact particularly the character of the wounds inflicted and the admission
made by Soliman that he had inflicted the wounds support the testimony of Balaktaw as
to what happened.
The defense points out that the TC erred in not allowing them a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence particularly the criminal record of Balaktaw. The court herein hled
that the criminal record of Balaktaw cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence
because it was available to the defense much prior to the trial of the case. Also, the fact
that a person has been previously convicted for a crime does not necessarily disqualify
him as a witness for he amy still prove to be a truthful one.
The defenses claim that the trial court also erred in not allowing the defense to prove
that the deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character. While good or

bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or

improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in a crime of
murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of
such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (19sep1928) 28871

Facts: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land who sold the land to Basilio
Copreros with right of repurchase. The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio
Copreros took possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made
application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the registration of the
consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros
leased said parcels to Severino Haro. Because of this, Babiera sued Copreros for the
recovery of the possession which was dismissed by the lower court. Babiera appealed
but asked for its dismissal later then filed a complaint for recovery of property.
Fermin Bruces who was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands, while tilling
the land, was constantly harassed by Justo Babiera accompanied by his copartner on
shares, Rosendo Paycol.
On August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the town
of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente
Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro
had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several
wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.
Held: Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged
attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2
for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly
illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of
determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.
With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began the
attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be
conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no reason to
provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully.
The defense also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome
disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton,
but the trial judge would not permit it.
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he
may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible
disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of
isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the
accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not
admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the
deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to
overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked
the deceased.
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (13nov1913) L-8332

Facts: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
During the trial, the prosecution asked the witness for the defense how many times was
he convicted of assault upon other persons. To this question, the defendant Tomas
Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained
the purpose of his question by saying that he wish to demonstrate that he (witnessdefendant) has a pugnacious (aggressive) disposition.

Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the
witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being
investigated in the present cause. The objection was overruled."
The defendants were convicted of the crime charged of which decision, the defendants
appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to
the private prosecutor's question referring to the character of the witness.
Held: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he
has been called, except by showing:
1. that he has made contradictory statements: or
2. by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad.
The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the
witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness,
except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an
examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense
to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used,
and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its
ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful
acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to
the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The
question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the
defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding
the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty
of the crime. then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did
not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial
court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the
court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault
to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had
committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action.
The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could
in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
People vs Lee, 32SCRA596 (29may2002)139070

Facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez and her son,
Joseph, were in the living room of their house. The living room was brightly lit by a
circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to
General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and activity.
There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store catering
to customers. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on
television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was to her left.
Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their house and the
television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at
her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open
window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering
through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him,
Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun
hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move
as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more two hit
the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to
the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his
house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for help.
With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital
where he later died.

Held: In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is
irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accusedappellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made
in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction
and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of
the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character
he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen from is pure and
simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases
of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a
murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative
character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed
the same. The Supreme Court held:
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine
the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule
123), such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be
allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through
treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery.
Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped
through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no
opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker.

O.Hearsay Rule
1. Testimonial Knowledge
a. Rule 130, 36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30 a)

b. Cases
People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992)

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. The lack of
objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not has no probative value.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (30jan1971) L-28482

Facts: On 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the evening, the spouses Silvino Daria
and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was
making rope in the annex of their house, while the wife, four meters away, and was
applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria was using a lamp where he worked.
Outside, the night was bright because of the moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs.
She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass
southward in the direction of the house Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso
was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by
the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house.
Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for
help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim
prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after

being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot
wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana
Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers (Exibits "B" and
"C," respectively).
Held: We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the
victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This
statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the
nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his
condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness
of impending death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (14aug1965) L-20986

Facts: In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca,
Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were
charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the
trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a
prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused
Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the
commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to
commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up
this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names
of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and
Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be
hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the
objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving
the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness
was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had
raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling
was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that the abovementioned
ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further order directing
said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.
Held: The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that
hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of
a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI
Wigmore 177-8).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the
discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca
had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the
offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by
Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so
named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the
question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed
to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be
taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually
conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would
seem to be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was
committed subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by
Puesca.
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (27feb1989) 74065

Facts: At about 5pm of December 11, 1981 Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi
and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day,

appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and
dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police.
After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and
Detective Rodrigo Salamat arrested appellant. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he
killed the victim and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus Patriarca arrived.
Appellant himself led the policeman and Barangay residents to where the body was in a
toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The policeman, with the help of the
Barangay residents, dug out the body. The body of the victim was Identified by Ernesto
Guzman, his wife, and Jose Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took pictures of the
body, noted the statements of Ernesto Guzman and Jose Esguerra, and took down the
confession of appellant. Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy.
A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered
from the pit where the body of the victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were
identified by Ernesto Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with the
victim on December 11, 1981. A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of wine and glass
were likewise recovered from the same pit.
Defense version: Gaddi was asked by Guzman to buy gin. That it was Guzman who
confessed the killing to him but Guzman told the police that it was Gaddi who killed
Esguerra.
Held: Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence,
as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such conviction that:
1) there be more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty.
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently
satisfies the quantum of proof necessary to uphold a judgment of conviction. The
following circumstances proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto Esguerra.
1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was killed in the company of the
accused, drinking gin at the back of the house of Ernesto Guzman.
2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, the accused himself admitted to
Ernesto Guzman that he stabbed his drinking companion and that the latter was
'nadisgrasya niya" so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug out for a
toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto Guzman
3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo
of the Northern Police District by the barangay people who apprehended him, be
admitted the truth of the charge of the barangay residents that he killed someone and
that he dumped the body of the victim in a place being dug out as an improvised toilet .
At the time the barangay people started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant
was even instructing them as to the exact location where the body was buried
4. The fact that the place where be led the police officers and the barangay residents,
i.e. the toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried
the victim as the body of the victim was found there after the digging.
5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was wearing during the drinking
spree were later recovered from the place where the victim was buried.
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction. As a rule, the trial court's assessment

of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect
since it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of a witness while on the witness
stand and therefore can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not.
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of
the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal
had previously declared that a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately
and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his
conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as
Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is,
he was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta
Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his
stature in the community as a member of a religious movement participating in such
activities as "maanita" and procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p. 30.] In
fact, on the day the killing took place, he left his house where appellant and his
companion, Esguerra were still drinking and went to the house of Junior Isla to attend a
"maanita" and participate in the weekly activity of bringing down the crucifix and the
image of the Fatima.
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)

Facts: Leake and Hagert were engaged in a collision on Highway 3. It resulted in the
damage of Hagerts car and Leakes plow. The accident occurred at around 6:45 pm.
Hagert hit the rear of Leakes tractor which was towing his plow. Leake claimed that it
was Hagerts negligence which caused the accident while Hagert claims that because of
the absence of lights and rear reflectors, she could not see Leakes tractor and plow.
During trial, evidence was adduced and different testimonies of persons were presented.
One such testimony was that of Edward Gross, an adjuster who investigated the scene of
the accident. He stated in his testimony that while he was making his investigation, he
talked to Leakes son, who told him that the lens in the small light had been missing
from its frame for some time prior to the accident. Leakes contended that such
statement was hearsay.
Issue: WON said statement was indeed hearsay
Held: Yes. Allen Leake contends that whether or not the red lens was out at the time of
the accident is a material question of fact, determinative as to the contributory
negligence by Allen Leake.
Leakes son did not testify in the present action; he was not a party to the action; his
statement was not made under oath; his statement was not subject to crossexamination; and he was not available as a witness at the time of trial because he was in
the army and overseas.
We find that it was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the testimony
concerning what Leakes son said to Edward Gross; the sons statements were hearsay
and should have been excluded.
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)

Facts: While conducting a search of the premises of defendant Zenni, Ruby Humphrey,
pursuant to a lawful search warrant which authorized a search for evidence of
bookmaking activity, government agents answered the telephone several times. The
unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting events. The
government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the callers believed that
the premises were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief tends to
prove that they were so used. The defendants object on the ground of hearsay.
Issue: WON the utterances of the unknown callers fall within the operation of the
hearsay rule, and thus inadmissible
Held: The utterances were not within the operation of the hearsay rule.

The Federal Rules of Evidence state that:

Rule 801. (a) Statement. A statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(c) Hearsay. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trail or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
Rule 802. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress.
Assertion is not defined in the rules, but has the connotation of a forceful or positive
declaration.
The effect of the definition of statement is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay
rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key
to the definition is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.
Conclusion: The utterances of the bettors telephoning in their bets were nonassertive
verbal conduct, offered as relevant for an implied assertion to be inferred from them,
namely, that bets could be placed at the premises being telephoned. The language is
not an assertion on its face, and it is obvious these persons did not intend to make an
assertion about the fact sought to be proved or anything else.
As an implied assertion, the proferred evidence is expressly excluded from the operation
of the hearsay rule by Rule 801 of the federal Rules of Evidence, and the objection
thereto must be overruled.
Estrada vs Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (03apr2001) 146710-15

Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the Angara Diary (AD) to
establish Estradas intent to resign.
Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence?
Held:No.
The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the cases at
bar. Estrada (E) cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the AD. Nor can he feign
surprise on its use. To be sure, the said diary was frequently referred to by the parties in
their pleadings. E had all the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the hearsay rule. The rules of exclusion do not cover admissions of a party
and the AD belongs to this class. Although the AD is not the diary of E, E is bound by it,
in accordance with the doctrine of adoptive admission. Sec. Angara acted for and in
behalf of E in the crucial days before Pres. Arroyo took her oath as President. Admissions
of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (E).
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. It was also an admission against interest, which could be considered an
exception to the hearsay rule. The AD contains statements of E which reflect his state of
mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.
BOSS JOEL: this is a weird decision. Why did the SC talk about hearsay, res actos inter
alia, and other rules of evidence when there was neither trial nor hearing held? It should
be noted that the Rules on Evidence will only apply when there is a trial or a hearing.
(Sec2, Rule128) When the SC relied on the admission against interest rule they
effectively excluded any chance that the best evidence rule and the hearsay rule could
be applied. Thus, if there would be objections on the ground of best evidence and/or
hearsay, these would be overruled because the basis for the offer of the AD is admission
against interest. Besides, objections based on best evidence would not be possible
because there was no document presented.

2. Exceptions

Exceptions to the hearsay rule

.1 waiver
.2 independently relevant evidence
.3 dying declaration
.4 Declaration against interest
.5 Act or declaration about pedigree
.6 Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
.7 Common reputation
.8 Part of the res gestae
.9 Verbal acts
.10 Entries in the course of business
.11 Entries in official records
.12 Commercial lists and the like
.13 Learned treatises
.14 Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

a. Dying Declaration
1) Rule 130, 37

Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under
the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death. (31 a)
Requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration
.1 declaration of a dying person
.2 made under the consciousness of an impending death
.3 his death is the subject of inquiry
.4 as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death

2) Cases
People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)

Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim was about to
be taken to the hospital, a patrolman was able to get his statement as to the identity of
the perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the statement and he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of considerable
time between the commission of the offense and the taking of the statement. However,
the statement amounts to a dying declaration, as it is a statement coming from a
seriously wounded person even if death occurs hours or days after it was inflicted if
there be showing that it was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the
time he made his declaration until the end came. There is no need for proof that the
declarant state "that he has given up the hope of life. It is enough if. from the
circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of
mind. It is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the
conclusion that the time [of such statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the
injury from which he actually died. Its admissibility is not affected by death occurring
hours or days afterwards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (28feb1985) L-45470

Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the sand at the
bank of a river. Pablos hands were tied on his back and he was lying face down. The
barrio captain took Pablos ante-mortem statement and learned that he was Pablo
Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was not sure if he would
survive the gunshot wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon
was charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is not a dying
declaration because it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The
declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at the point of
death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this

kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as

part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and
the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the
accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the extent of
the injuries. In Laquinon, the declarant expressly said that he was not sure that we was
going to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a dying declaration, dont ask if the
declarant thinks he will die.
Facts:
People's version of the case is as follows:
On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio
captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short
while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to
the south of his house. Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man
was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the
barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man
was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat
found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, "I am Pablo
Remonde." Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face down.
Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him
who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked
"who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo
Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the
victim answered "I do not know." After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality
of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde.
Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to
which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon. Pablo Remonde was
placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital. Pablo Remonde was
admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr.
Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug
was recovered. Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November 16, 1972 because of
bullet wounds.
The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court
summarized his defense, as follows:
In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was ordered by
one Noli Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino
Nerosa to go with him, and matter of factly, they brought Remonde to the place where
said CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting at the riverbank; that before
reaching the place, Nerosa separated from him and he alone brought Remonde to
Cabardo. There Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having been commanded to buy
some provisions in Matanao, he (Remonde) never returned; to which Remonde answered
that he spent the money 'in drinking and gambling; when upon Cabardo got mad and as
Remonde attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have been fired by
Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a
Cal. 22 paltik; that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground, and then
Cabardo ordered them to go to the mountain as in fact they did; that two days later
during the day, their mountain camp was raided by the PC and Cabardo and two others
were killed while he (witness) was able to escape and went to Magpet, North Cotabato,
and engaged in farming therein with his relatives; but believing that as a KM member he
'committed something,' he surrendered to the Davao PC Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit
'2'), where up to now he is being confined.
Issue: May the Statements of Remonde be admissible as a dying declaration.
Held: The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an
ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or
not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at

the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for
admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time
to concoct a charge against the accused.
Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by the
accused for the following reasons:
First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already handtied at his back, that the place of the shooting was "covered by thick bushes and beside
the river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten men excluding the accused; under these
circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased, with all those overwhelming
handicap, would attempt to flee.
Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would be to flee
away from and not towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would turn to his right or to
his left or towards his back; if he fled to his left or right, or towards his back, he would be
exposing one side of his body, or his back, and when fired upon in that position he would
have been hit on one side of the body or at his back. The evidence as testified to by
Dr. Llanos however, shows that the deceased had only one wound a gunshot wound,
in the abdomen; this shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and
through the intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back, that is
why the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The accused's version, therefore, that the
deceased tried to flee is hard to believe for being against the physical facts.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (27jan1981) L-26193

Facts: Catalino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and wounded.
Espina asked for the police. When police officers arrived, they asked Espina who
slashed and robbed him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His declaration was taken
down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and convicted of robbery with
homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was
not made under the consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes
of recovery for his first word to his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead
which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak
unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio
is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the
wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that
his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was
made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant
expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the
victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time
to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is
at best circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
had carried away personality belonging to the offended party. There was no eyewitness
to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing objects recovered. The
consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the circumstance
that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro",
alleged to have contained cash amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and
empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can
the dying declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The
admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions
for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabios guilt of
robbery as a part of the res gestae?

Facts: The 13-year old accused was charged with Robbery with Homicide for the death
of Catalino Espina, an octogenarian, owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house,
who, in the early morning of October 5, 1965, was found on the second floor of his
dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died three days later. The
merchandise in his store was in a state of disarray and the tin can containing the cash
sales in the amount of P8.00 was found empty. The accused was positively identified by
JESUSA BIRONDO, a neighbor of the victim who saw him running from the scene of the
incident that fateful morning. CAMILO SEMILLA saw the accused ran pass him about six
meters away towards his (accuseds) house at about 5am while waiting for someone to
help him carry his banca to the shore. The victim in his ante-mortem statement taken by
the police in the presence of the victim's grandnephew also identified him. The accused
was found guilty as charged, with the attendant aggravating circumstances or disregard
of respect due to the 80-year old victim and recidivism, and without any mitigating
circumstances. He was sentenced to death but in view of his youth, the trial Court
recommended that the penalty be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the dying declaration of the victim may be used to prove the
crime of Robbery.
Held: The dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused as the one slashed
and robbed him cannot be admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of
dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide
or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
The arguments advanced are unavailing. The defense questions the admissibility of
Exhibit "A" of the prosecution as an antemortem statement arguing that there is no
evidence showing that when the declaration was uttered the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact, the victim had hopes of recovery or
his first word to Camilo Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense counsel
argues further that there are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A" was thumb-marked
because, although it was already in existence in the morning of October 5, 1965, as
alleged by Patrolman Fuentes, the accused was never confronted with the document
when he was taken in to custody by the police for the first time from the morning of
October 5 to October 6, 1965, thereby implying that the document did not yet exist at
that time.
The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain; his
inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that
"only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the
direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim
must have known that his end was inevitable. The death did not ensue till three days
after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying
declarations admissible.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police,
does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes
the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. The
mere failure of the police to confront the accused with the antemortem declaration the
first time the latter was arrested and incarcerated from, neither militates against the fact
of its execution considering that it was evidence that the police was under no
compulsion to disclose.
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)

Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came home
and found her wounded. He asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The
deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not
disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya. De Joya was charged and
convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in
itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res

gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be
a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of
such fact. The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was
expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much
of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption cuts short a
statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to
make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not
there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if
the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has
told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Since the declarant was
prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes
the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. The
words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The phrase "Si
Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" The deceased was
cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin.
The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had
intended to name her killer. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate
what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We
are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as
the doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under the
context, what else could have Si Paqui meant other than that he was responsible for
the crime?
People v. Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20, 1996

Facts: At around 8PM 30Nov1990, witness Maria Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison
approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching television in a store.
Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's
house where there was a mango tree. There, appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the
abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente,
Dignaran and Fediles suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously
attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez approached them that the
three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able
to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started
to maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of
wood and started to hit Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his
head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and
ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed Valmoria
but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house.
During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter,
Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that
time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of
witness Patricia Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his
declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness would
testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents
proceeded to the hospital. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However,
at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the
hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.

Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying declaration?

Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of
Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible
for the injuries he sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into
writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is
inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The appellant further contends that
the declaration was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of
the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the
time of its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or
Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain.
He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be
used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he
believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events,
assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the
startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity
to contrive.

b. Declaration Against Interest

1) Rule 130, 38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons. (32 a)
Requirements for hearsay testimony on declaration against interest
.1 declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
.2 against the interest of the declarant
.3 the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true
.4 as evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons
cf Rule 130 Sec. 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former. (211)

Admission by privies
One of 3 exceptions to res inter alios acta
Evidence against the successor in interest
of the admitter
Admitter need not be dead or unable to
testify
Relates to title to property
Admission need not be against the
admitters interest

2) Cases

Declaration against interest

Exception to hearsay
Evidence against even the declarant, his
successor in interest, or 3rd persons
Declarant is dead or unable to testify
Relates to any interest
Declaration must be against the interest of
the declarant

Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972)

Previous recognition of ownership in another by a party in possession of property in

dispute is admission against interest which may be received even against 3rd persons.
Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in this case is part of a
bigger lot of about 14.6303 hectares, covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that,
on June 8, 1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of 14.6303
hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on 1936, filed with the RD, and
recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July
7, 1941, or about 5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10, conveying the
disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to
Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais who
claimed to have made oral demands formally demanded from Viacrucis that he vacate
said portion and surrender its possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not
heeded by Viacrucis who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit 9,
confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by him, on January 12, 1954, in favor
of his brother-in-law Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in
favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision,
against them and in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Castelo and this
recognition by the now deceased Pelagio Castelo which were confirmed by the public
document Exh. G constitute a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their
interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule 130.
Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of
said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before
their (petitioners) predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture,
when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said
admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in
evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in
interest," but, also, "against third persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept
OCT No. 243 as collateral for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land
covered by said certificate of title was not his property, there is no competent evidence
on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT
No. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the latter
to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan,
unless and until OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title
issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the filing of his loan
application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title admittedly
delivered by Sanchez to Orais had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel,
to whom he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given criminal case.
People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928)

Declaration against interest, as an exception to the hearsay rule, covers not only
pecuniary interest, but also penal interest.
Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of
certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the
morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed,
and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno
Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded
but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was
taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal

president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one
month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable
point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal
blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina
Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and
participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the
witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was
in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only
participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to
a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado,
the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Issue: Whether or not the verified declaration of Holgado was a statement of fact
against penal interest.
Held: It is held that error was committed in not admitting the verified declaration of H as
the statement of a fact against penal interest.
One exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits
the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made
contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But by a large preponderance of
authority in the United States, the declarations of a person other than accused
confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for
accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
The general rule rejecting evidence of confessions of third parties made out of court
intended to exonerate the accused, examined in the light of its history and policy, and
found to be unjustified. It should not be received in the Philippine jurisdiction where the
principles of the common law have never been followed blindly. A study of the
authorities discloses that even if given application they are not controlling, for here the
fact is that the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath, while
they read in such a way as to ring with the truth.
Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae for it was
made by H on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of
sufficient time for reflection. The declaration fulfilled the test of the facts talking through
the party and not the party talking about the facts. The modern tendency is toward the
extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice
when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured.
People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)

Facts: At or about 1PM of 28Jan1972, the accused was at the seashore of Calarian
relaxing since he has just arrived from Jolo, Sulu that particular day.
At that time, he was already running away from the authorities because he is an escapee
from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.
Later on, the accused proceeded to his father's house which is just near the seashore,
Upon reaching the house, he saw Nori Mohamad (Majuris common law wife?) but he had
no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing him, Nori ran away, going to the
direction of the street.
Armed with the bolo which he had been carrying, he chased after Nori and he caught up
with her at the street where he started stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the
different parts of the body.
When he saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, he hurriedly left the place and
ran towards the far end of Calarian.
On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide.
Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He
admitted that he killed his wife. He declared that after he was informed by his counsel

that the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted
the killing of his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by
pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was an
escaped convict.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was not absolutely proved.
Held: Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review,
contends that the marriage of Airol to Norija was not absolutely proven. That contention
cannot be sustained. The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased
was an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper
praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec.
5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law.
That implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her
infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other
circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

Facts: At 4AM 24Jun1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio
Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan
del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter
saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair." Suddenly
petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the
ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim
succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes,
Jr., stabbed him.
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto
Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar
region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines."
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie"
who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that
he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear
would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that
since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met
"Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were
many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the
window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24Jun1989 while he was
in a store in the barangay.
The RTC of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty. CA affirmed the
judgment.
Held: One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against
interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest
cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify."
There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent
upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the

prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous
statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having
killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the
admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit.
But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even
authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who
have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant
himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.

c. Pedigree
1) Rule 130, 39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where
it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree. (33 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to pedigree
.1 act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify
.2 in respect to the pedigree of another person
.3 related to him by birth or marriage
.4 where it occurred before the controversy
.5 the relationship between the 2 persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
"Pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, the names of the relatives, and facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.

2) Cases
Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)

Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary
School on 15Aug1964 when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools
Angel Salazar, Jr., of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65.
A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of
the said elementary school.
On 31Aug1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced
retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not 26Nov1897 but 11Dec1901.
Attached to his letter was the affidavit of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes, in
which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on
11Dec1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses,
NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were
present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore, we were also invited
during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR."
On 13Apr1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental.
The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on 11Dec1901 accordingly granted
his petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was
reinstated.
The respondents appealed directly to this Court.

Held: It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war
records, for three cogent reasons.
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of
the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents
and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Indeed,
even in his application for back pay which he filed with the Department of Finance,
through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on 07Oct1948, the petitioner stated
that the date of his birth is 11Dec1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and
again in 1960 when he asked the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the
date of his birth to 11Dec1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in
a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner
was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased
relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, 11Dec1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by
evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased
relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was
born on 10Jun1898 and who retired on 10Jun1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner
then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records
indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

Facts: The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein
petitioners against herein private respondent before the RTC over a parcel of land with a
house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on 05Mar1983
without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on 03Oct1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto
himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by TCT #66886, as a
consequence of which TCT #358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On
02Jan1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo
and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on 25Oct1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance on 02Nov1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their
father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and
Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and
place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners
thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a
Comment was filed by herein private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground

that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code.
On 03Dec1992, the RTC issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and
dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.
In upholding the dismissal, respondent CA declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and
joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence,
this appeal.
Held: Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various
certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as
part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between
the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the
person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains
for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in
evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is
necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or
the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not
be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of
the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where
the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a
right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was
no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of
justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and
sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of
the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners
are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, where the
subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems
absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very
fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the
main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same
result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly

conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion
that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose
any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

d. Family Tradition
1) Rule 130, 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation
or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
(34 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree
.1 reputation or tradition existing in a family
.2 previous to the controversy
.3 in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members
.4 the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
de Leon: note that in family tradition, the declarant must be dead or unable to testify. In
family reputation or tradition, there is not even a declarant to speak of; just a witness
who was aware of an exiting family reputation or tradition.

2) Case
People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991)

Testimony of a witness and the witness grandfather as to the date of birth and age of
the witness is evidence on family tradition which is admissible as an exception to
hearsay.
Facts: On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, complainant was
playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when
appellant, a 170-pound, 53 year old market watchman at the time, held her by the hand
and took her upstairs to the second floor of the public market building which houses
some government offices and which at the time was expectedly deserted. There, he told
the complainant to hold his penis and jack it off. Thereafter, appellant ordered
complainant to lie down, and when she refused he pushed her down on the floor. When
complainant was lying flat on her back, appellant placed himself on top of her while she
was still wearing her pedal pusher shorts and panty. So, appellant forced her to take off
her pedal pushers and panty and thereupon he lay on top of her. Appellant then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated.
Complainant bled a little. Thereafter, appellant gave complainant P 2.00 and left.
Complainant stood up and went down the building but never told anybody about it
because she was afraid the appellant would kill her.
On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening complainant was sitting at the
Freedom Square when appellant approached her and told her to go with him upstairs to
the second floor of the public market. Complainant refused but appellant shoved her
towards the stairs, held her by the left arm, and brought her to the upper floor near the
civic center. There, appellant succeeded in raping the complainant.
Complainant felt some liquid oozing out from appellant's organ and into her being. And
after appellant had withdrawn his sex organ, complainant discovered that her vagina

was bleeding. Appellant then stood up and told her not to tell anybody about it. Then
appellant gave her P 2.00 and left.
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a
member of the San Carlos City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the
main entrance of the public market. Pat. Alfaro knew appellant well because he was the
public market watchman at the time. A minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant coming
down the same. Pat. Alfaro noticed that complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her
thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what happened to her. Complainant
answered that she was taken upstairs and raped by appellant. Immediately, Pat. Alfaro
brought complainant to the city hospital where she was examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon in
the presence of two medical technologists. Dr. Jagdon confirmed the report that indeed
complainant was raped. Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported the incident to the Station Guard
by phone then took complainant to the police station after the medical examination.
When they reached the station, appellant who had already been taken into custody was
readily identified by complainant as the rapist. Complainant was then investigated and
she rendered her statement to the police.
Accused-appellant's version: Alibi; roamed around checking padlocks of stores then had
a snack
The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the
alleged incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it was error on the
part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape as defined and
penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended
party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the
victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by
the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as
provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three
requisites for its admissibility, namely:
.1 that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family;
.2 that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and
.3 that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the
person must be a member of the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth
of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather
relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed
long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is
the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the
prosecution's claim that the victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at the
time of the rape incidents under consideration, we affirm the trial court's finding that the
victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of age.
It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private organ
is sufficient to consummate the crime.
Ferrer v. de Inchausti, 38 Phil 905 (1918)

Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, to be admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven
to have been made at the same time as the occurrence of the events documented.

e. Common Reputation
1) Rule 130, 41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the
controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty
years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in
evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as
evidence of common reputation. (35)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Common reputation
.1 Common reputation
.2 existing previous to the controversy
.3 respecting either
.a facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old, or
.b marriage or
.c moral character
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common
reputation.

2) Cases
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil 227 (1905)

Facts: This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots described in the
complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied
by the defendant.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the
testimony of John R. Wilson, Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del
Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not
know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city (p. 11 of the bill of
exceptions). The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and
13 of the bill of exceptions). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the
land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the
complaint. These lots abut (be adjacent to) upon the streets referred to, but do not form
a part of either. According to the complaint, they are building lots.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included
in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this
particular his testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness, who testified
that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega's testimony was merely
hearsay. It consisted of that he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that
section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the
purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing
from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held: Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred
to in the section mentioned. "Common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent
to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the
presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned
between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that
the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona,
which are precisely the street on which the property abuts.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del
Rosario to the "mayor of the city of Manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the
letter written by him on the 9th of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila.
Lorenzo del Rosario, in his testimony, admitted the authenticity of both documents which
contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel.

Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first document under the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently
informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the municipality, but
to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document because the
President of the Municipal Board, Seor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid
litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was not contradicted. We
accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not
admissible in evidence.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss.

f. Res Gestae
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. xxx
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to res gestae
.1 Statements made by a person either
.a while a startling occurrence is taking place or
.b immediately prior or
.c immediately subsequent thereto
.2 with respect to the circumstances thereof

2) Cases
People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976)

A declaration made by a person immediately after being wounded, pointing out or

naming his assailant, may be considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in
evidence. A statement was given sometime after the stabbing while the declarant was
undergoing treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood
or to fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown as
to why he would frame-up the accused would render the statement admissible as a part
of the res gestae.
Facts: Appellant admits that on 22Nov1969 while Teodulo Panimdim was attending a
dance, he (Panimdim) was stabbed in the left groin. As a result of that assault, Panimdim
died five days later at the provincial hospital. The question is: Did Putian stab Panimdim?
According to the prosecution, in the evening of that day, while Patrolman Arturo Yap was
passing Barrio Tabo-o, he noticed a commotion at the back of the dance hall in that
barrio. He was informed that someone had been stabbed. He looked for the culprit. He
found Guillermo Putian behind the municipal building with a dagger and scabbard in his
possession. Yap investigated Putian. The latter denied that he stabbed Panimdim. Yap
arrested Putian and surrendered him to Jesus Gomonit, the guard at the municipal hall.
Patrolman Yap then repaired to the clinic of Doctor Saceda where the victim, Teodulo
Panimdim, alias Doling, was brought for treatment. At the clinic, Yap wrote on a piece of
paper the victim's declaration.
When that statement was taken, Panimdim was in a sitting position. Without anybody's
help, he put on his undershirt, pants and shirt. He went to his house without anyone's
assistance.
Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named Guirmo and that he, Yap,
was the one who added the surname Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He clarified that
he wrote that surname because he knew of no other person called Guirmo in that locality
except Guirmo Putian, an alleged gambler.

Issue: Whether or not the statements given by Panimdim was part of res gestae.
Held: The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts.
The trial court admitted Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after
the commission of a felony.
Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous because it
was "made several hours after the incident". He claims that the requisite that the
declarant gave the statement before he had time to devise or contrive was not present
in this case. Appellant further contends that because the statement is in narrative form,
it is not the statement contemplated in the rule.
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part
of the res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him
the stab wound that caused his death five days later in the hospital.
"Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the
expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a
dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after,
the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling
occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res
gestae."
Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing
treatment at a medical clinic. He had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a
malicious charge against Putian. No motive has been shown as to why he would frame
up Putian.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)

Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married Domiciano Peralta. They
had a daughter Siony. On morning, Siony came to Atanacia at her house frantically told
her that Domiciano was strangling Rosita. They went to the Peralta home and found
Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They immediately reported the matter to the
police, who eventually arrested the Domiciano. At the preliminary investigation, Siony
executed a sworn statement implicating her father. Domiciano was charged with
Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as to Sionys declaration. However, Siony testified
for her father and said that though she saw someone strangling her mother, she did not
see who it was. After the defense rested, the prosecution presented the investigating
judge who testified as to the regularity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
TC convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform her of
her father's attack on her mother was part of the res gestae. Res gestae means the
"thing done." It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately
after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. Siony rushed to Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father strangling
her mother to death. Her spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the res gestae
and is assumed to preclude the probability of premeditation of fabrication. Since the
utterance was made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses
rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of selfinterest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as
expressing Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the prosecution and retracts his
testimony and subsequently testified for the defense, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. Siony testified during the preliminary examination conducted by
Judge Paano that the appellant choked her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction
was an afterthought and has no probative value at all.

Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have persuaded the daughter to
change her former declaration and testify in favor of her father. First, the accused was
her father after all, and she probably felt that she should not be responsible for his
incarceration for the rest of his life. Second, her testimony was given 7 years after the
incident and therefore could not be expected to be as accurate as the statement she
made in the preliminary investigation only hours after the killing. Third, during all this
time, her father had been under detention and she must have believed that this was
punishment enough for him. Lastly, she was, at the time she testified in court, living with
her father's sister, who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to
recant her earlier statement.

g. Verbal acts
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. xxx So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
.1 statements accompanying an equivocal act
.2 material to the issue
.3 giving it a legal significance

2) Case
Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)

Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died, Marta Torres, claiming
to be his widow, took possession of his estate and partitioned it between herself and her
children by the deceased. Plaintiffs claim to be the legal wife and children of the
deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supposed share of the estate. The
SC found numerous inconsistencies as to the testimonial and documentary evidence of
the plaintiffs as to lead to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not who they claim to be.
However, the plaintiff offered in evidence a sworn declaration of the deceased that the
plaintiffs were his children. Defendants offered letters between the deceased and his
brother showing that deceaseds sworn declaration was to deceive the customs
authorities to allow plaintiffs to enter the country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of
such letters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs authorities upon arrival
of the plaintiffs from China. The arrival and admission of these plaintiffs and the
declaration of Tan Po Pik are isolated parts of an event which is the voyage from China to
the Philippines of these supposed children of the deceased. Their preparations for the
voyage and the plans conceived by them to obtain their sure entrance into this country
are also part of the voyage. In order to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik
before the customs authorities, the other acts, declarations, and events occurring before
the said entrance into the country, which may have an essential bearing or which have
led to the realization of their entrance into the country are admissible in evidence in this
case on the ground that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of the res
gestae. A word, an expression, or an act of a person, considered apart from the
circumstances surrounding them, does not signify anything, and in many cases it
signifies the opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or act. It is
imprudent and illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs
authorities separately from the circumstances which prompted him to make such a
declaration. We must therefore inquire into circumstances which surrounded the
entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po Pik on that occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China contained an agreement
that for plaintiffs to enter the Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare before the customs
authorities that plaintiffs were his children. The names of the children whom Tan were
supposed to declare as his children were the same as the names of the plaintiffs, except
that they now bear the surname Tan. The letters even refer to one of the plaintiffs as the
deceaseds nephew. If these plaintiffs were really children of Tan Po Pik, there would

have been no necessity for the above letters. Thus, Tan Po Piks declaration before the
customs authorities is for the sole purpose of allowing the children to enter the
Philippines, and such a declaration is entirely false. All these letters formed an essential
part of the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if these letters had
not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs could not have succeeded in entering
the Philippines. Therefore, all the statements and declarations-of Tan Po Ho in these
documents relative to the prosecution of the object of the conspiracy are admissible in
evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)

Facts: Complainant Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52 years old and a widow, was
asleep inside the room at their market stall located in the public market of barangay
Oscariz, municipality of Ramon, Isabela, on the evening of 20Jan1980. With her were her
two married daughters, his son-in-law and grandchildren.
At about 10PM, the accused woke up the complainant to observe some people drinking
at a stall in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock
in the evening. So they went.
They stood a few meters away from the said stall for ten minutes to observe the drinking
session. Suddenly the accused held her hands which made the complainant shout but
was not heard due to the loud music.
The accused slapped her and brought out his gun which he pointed at her breast
threatening to kill her if she creates any noise. The accused then pulled her and she fell
on the ground hitting her head on the pavement so she lost consciousness, sustaining
injuries on the palms of her hands.
When she regained consciousness after a short while, she was dragged by the accused
towards the banana grove near the market. She managed to stand and walk while being
dragged. The accused then carried her body across the canal and dropped her on the
ground causing her to fall flat on her belly and her fingers were again injured by the
broken glasses on the ground. She could not free herself nor shout for help because of
the threat to her life.
After she fell flat on the ground, the accused held her and pressed her down and he
proceeded to remove her skirt and shorts and thereafter her blouse leaving her exposed
naked with her back to the ground. She was not wearing any panty or brassiere then.
Besides pressing her down the accused stepped on her thigh with his left foot as he went
on top of her naked body. Then he stood up warning her not to make any noise and he
removed his pants and tee-shirt after which he again went on top of her naked body
holding her hands. Pointing the gun at her breast anew, the accused repeated his threat
to kill her if she resisted. Then the accused started mashing her breast and succeeded in
having sexual congress with the complainant. She felt his penis penetrating her vagina
followed by a push and pull movement for less than an hour, until she felt semen
emitting from his penis and entering her body. When she reached home about 12:00
midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and she revealed that the accused abused
her. When Silveria pressed for details, the complainant replied that she will tell her the
following morning.
The next morning complainant told Silveria everything that happened to her and
thereafter she proceeded to Santiago town and reported the incident to Mr. Segundo
Maylem, post commander and Executive Vice Chapter Commander, VFP Southern
Isabela, from whom she sought assistance. She was advised to submit herself to an
investigation and medical examination. After due investigation by the PC, a complaint for
rape was filed signed and sworn to by complainant in the MTC against the accused.
In appealing his conviction, the accused, through counsel assailed the credibility of
complainant and interposed the defense of denial and alibi. However, by way of rebuttal
of the People's brief filed by another collaborating counsel for appellant, the failure of the
prosecution to establish involuntariness on the part of the victim was emphasized.
Held: The appeal is impressed with merit.

Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been married three times. She was
not that innocent about the world. When appellant invited her at 10PM to step out of her
house, she should have declined. Going out alone with a man late in the evening is
neither in good taste nor safe even if the one who invited her was the barrio captain.
But obviously, the appellant was quite intimate with the complainant. When he knocked
at her door and was allowed entry, he proceeded into the bedroom of complainant and
woke her up himself.
Complainant went with the appellant in her shorts. She took no precaution as any
discreet woman would do by at least putting on her panty and a brassiere instead of
stepping out with the appellant in her shorts.
If she could not be heard as her voice was drowned by the blaring stereo player, she
should have shouted louder again and again. Better still, she should have run towards
the canteen which was just two meters away or to her residence which was one market
stall away. After allegedly shouting once, she kept her peace.
She was allegedly dragged although she admits she willingly walked along. She was
allegedly carried across the canal by the appellant although she was taller and definitely
bigger than appellant.
When she fell on the ground, the appellant removed her shorts and skirt without
difficulty. She offered no resistance. Even as he stood up to remove his pants she did not
attempt to stand up to escape nor to shout for help. There was no sign of struggle or
resistance. Then the appellant put his penis into her vagina penetrating her. They had
sexual intercourse for almost one hour. She even felt the semen of appellant as it
entered her body. Not a whimper, not a sound from the complainant was heard. She
claims she was afraid due to the gun of appellant and his threats. She did not even
describe the type of gun the appellant threatened her with several times. Nor had the
prosecution shown appellant ever had a gun. All indications show that she submitted to
his advances.
As the Court sees it, what actually happened in this case, is that when the complainant
went out with the appellant that evening, she was aware of the risk of going out alone
with a man for a reason that is far from unavoidable. They were close and side by side
for sometime, allegedly watching the drinking session at Linda's canteen. They must
have succumbed to the temptation of the flesh. One thing led to the other until they had
sexual intercourse. Perhaps the complainant did not initiate or motivate the sexual
interlude. In the least, she must have abetted it if not willingly submitted to the
advances of the appellant. Indeed, they were in ecstasy for almost one hour. Such
mutual and passionate lovemaking can certainly not be characterized as involuntary. It
was free and without any compulsion.
The appellant was 48 years old when the incident happened. To think that a younger
man would rape an elderly woman of 52 years, widow, three times married, would be
quite unusual. It is more probable that it was consensual.
The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of
what happened to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important
to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a
time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. As the
Court observed, the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual
encounter. She took a walk. She spent some time thinking of what to do. Her clothes
were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down
on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had
enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation
cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING the appellant of the offense charged, with
costs de oficio.
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)

Facts: At around 7pm of 07Nov1983, Adelaida Lingad left her niece, Grace Paule and her
three (3) children namely: Geraldine (Irene), Glenly and Enrique, all minors, at home to
attend the wake of her uncle in a house 200 meters away from her place. The children
were the only ones left at home. Her husband was then working abroad. At that time,
Adelaida had P4,000.00 in cash which was wrapped in newspaper and kept hidden under
her bed. Before leaving the house, Adelaida instructed the kids to go to bed.
At around 1pm or 2pm of 08Nov1983, accused Tala, Tolentino, Matawaran and an
unknown person whose face was covered entered the house of Adelaida Lingad by
forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded to know from the
children where their mother hid her money. Grace Paule knew Manolito Tolentino alias
Bong because he is both an uncle and a barriomate. She also knew Carlito Tala alias Boy
who is a relative of her mother and Rodolfo Matawaran who is a "barkada" of Carlito. She
recognized all the accused for the lights were on. When the man whose face was
covered threatened to stab the kids, Geraldine got so frighten that she revealed to the
accused where her mother hid the money.
After Tolentino took the P4,000.00, he stabbed Grace Paule and the children. During the
stabbing incident, Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain it back after
about five (5) minutes and shouted for help. Her mother and grandmother, who lived
nearby, heard her and immediately proceeded to said house but the four (4) accused
had already left.
When accused Tolentino's brother informed Adelaida about the stabbing incident that
took place in her house, Adelaida immediately rushed to her house and saw all the
children with stab wounds. Glenly was lying on the bed already dead while her bloodied
niece Grace was sitting down near the door looking pale and holding her heart. Upon
reaching Geraldine, who was lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of the
person responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering "Bong-Bong" and also
mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran. However, when she asked her son
Enrique the latter was not able to answer but merely made a sign with his three (3)
fingers. Thereafter, Adelaida lost consciousness and was brought to the house of her
mother.
Grace Paule was the only surviving victim.
Defense: Alibi, delivered water melons.
Held: We find Grace's testimony credible. There is no evidence on record to show why
said witness would falsely implicate the accused-appellant Tala who is a relative of her
mother unless it is the truth. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by prosecution
witness Adelaida Lingad when the latter testified that her deceased daughter Geraldine
mentioned the names of the accused-appellant Tala and accused Matawaran as the
persons who stabbed her before she died. As to accused-appellant's contention that the
statement of Geraldine, naming her assailant soon after she was stabbed is inadmissible
as part of res gestae, We find said contention fallacious.
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements
made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named accusedappellant as one of the perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after
the occurrence of the stabbing incident.

h. Entries in the Course of Business

1) Rule 130, 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty. (37 a)

Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in the course of

business
.1 Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer
.2 by a person deceased, or unable to testify
.3 who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
.4 if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Note that in business records, the person making the entry must be deceased or unable
to testify. In official records, the person making the entry need not be deceased or
unable to testify (Rule 130, Sec. 44). Both official and business records are only prima
facie evidence.
If the person making the entry is still alive, use the record to refresh his memory. (Rule
132, Sec. 16)

2) Cases
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)

Facts: This case arose out of a grade crossing accident which occurred in
Massachusetts.
The accident occurred on the night of 25Dec1940. On 27Dec1940, the engineer of the
train, who died before the trial, made a statement at a freight office of petitioners where
he was interviewed by an assistant superintendent of the road and by a representative
of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. This statement was offered in evidence
by petitioners under the Act of 20Jun1936. They offered to prove (in the language of the
Act) that the statement was signed in the regular course of business, it being the regular
course of such business to make such a statement. Respondent's objection to its
introduction was sustained.
Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the engineer was admissible as entries in
the course of business.
Held: We agree with the majority view below that it was properly excluded.
We do not think that it was made 'in the regular course' of business within the meaning
of the Act. The business of the petitioners is the railroad business. That business like
other enterprises entails the keeping of numerous books and records essential to its
conduct or useful in its efficient operation. Though such books and records were
considered reliable and trustworthy for major decisions in the industrial and business
world, their use in litigation was greatly circumscribed or hedged about by the hearsay
rule-restrictions which greatly increased the time and cost of making the proof where
those who made the records were numerous.
An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it affords information on
which the management may act. It is not, however, typical of entries made
systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect
transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The conduct of a business
commonly entails the payment of tort claims incurred by the negligence of its
employees. But the fact that a company makes a business out of recording its
employees' versions of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of
records made 'in the regular course' of the business within the meaning of the Act.
In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are not for the systematic conduct
of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts
payable, bills of lading and the like these reports are calculated for use essentially in the
court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.
Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp., (CA) 72 O.G. 3941

Facts: Philam entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Capital Assurance and the
Galang spouses. The Galangs were agents of Philam.

Under the agreement, Capital and the Galangs, jointly and severally, agreed to pay
Philam a certain sum with interest in consideration of Philams issuance of a clearance in
favor of the Galangs. The sum was paid in full by Capital Life.
However, there appears to be a stipulation in the Agreement to the effect that Capital
and the Galangs would pay to Philam any and all obligations of the Galangs arising from
the unremitted premium collections and such other agency accounts.
Pursuant to this, Philam wrote a letter to Capital informing it that the Galangs had
collected premium payments from policy holders and failed to remit the same to it.
Philam demanded payment therefore. The Galangs did not admit that such amount was
due and so Capital refused to pay. Philam sued for collection of the additional amounts
against Capital, the lone defendant.
During the trial, Philam had but one witness, Narciso Bacani, the chief of its Accounts
Control Office. He testified on a statement of account showing that the Galangs are
indebted to Philam. He however, DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW
THE ACCOUNT HAD RISEN AS HIS OFFICE MERELY COMPUTED THE CHARGES BASED ON
DEBIT MEMOS RECEIVED FROM OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF PHILAM.
CFI ruled against Capital. Capital contends that Philam has not proven the alledged
unremitted premium payments. It contests the admissibility of the said statement of
account (SOA).
Issue: WON the SOA is admissible.
Held: No. The witness could have had knowledge of the entries made as it was his office
which made such entries in the SOA, but certainly he did not have personal knowledge of
the facts stated in the entries i.e., that the Galangs had collected premiums and failed to
remit them since by his own admission, he merely computed the charges.
Moreover, he is not a person deceased, outside of the Phils, or unable to testify so that
the entries made could be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Consequently, the testimony of the witness here is worthless as evidence and the SOA to
which he testified is likewise bereft of probative value.
The entries in question being so far removed from the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
cannot and should not substitute for a witness personal knowledge of the transactions
sought to be established. Complaint dismissed.
Dissenting (justice de Castro): Testifying on the SOA, the witness stated without
controversion that he prepared the same pursuant to his duties as a section chief of the
account control office. As a matter of course, his section compiles and computes
unremitted premium collections based on data received from the other departments. It
is hard to see how the statement should be less trustworthy when the person who
prepared it is available and did precisely testify on it.
As for his knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, practical necessity makes it
sufficient that he received the information in the regular course of business, when the
person giving such information gave it in compliance with a duty.
It is not essential that the entrant should have personal knowledge of the fact entered by
him if he made the entry in the regular course of business, recording a report made to
him by one or more other ersons in the regular course of business lying in the personal
knowledge of the latter, there is no objection of receiving the entry provided that
practical inconveniences of producing on the stand the numerous persons thus
concerned would in the particular case outweigh the probable utility of doing so.
The entrant may be said to have received the information on the regular course of
business, when the person giving such information gave it in compliance with his duty.

i. Official Records
1) Rule 130, 44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in

the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. (38)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in official records
.1 made in the performance of his duty
.2 by either
.a a public officer of the Philippines, or
.b by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
Note that in official records, the person making the entry need not be deceased or
unable to testify, but he must be a public officer or a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law. In business records, the person making the entry must be
deceased or unable to testify. Both official and business records are only prima facie
evidence.

2) Cases
Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330 (1968)

Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one child,
Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her mother. Crisanta was married to Fermin
Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate. The property
therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never caused the OCT to be
cancelled and to have another issued in his name. Ciriacas estate was therefore not yet
closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless. Upon
Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of extra-judicial summary settlement of
Ciriacas estate and had it registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to be an illegitimate child
of Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for summary settlement of
Ciriacas estate. Julia opposed, along with the Fortuses, who claim to be Victorinos halfbrother and sisters. They claim to be the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba
Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleged parents,
but sought to present secondary evidence. The SC found the testimonial evidence the
Fortuses presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondary evidence were
inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an original marriage contract
was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses presented baptismal certificates of some of
them to prove the marriage of their parents. Note that they must prove marriage
because otherwise, they would be illegitimate relatives of Victorino which would
disqualify them from inheriting from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the sacrament on
the date stated therein, but not the truth of the statements therein made as to the
parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal certificates public documents
or public writings, because the parochial records of baptisms are not public or official
records, as they are not kept by public officers, and are not proof of relationship or
filiation of the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their parents
had deported themselves in public as husband and wife and had been living under the
same roof, the legal presumption is that they had entered into a lawful marriage. This
presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no clear and concrete evidence
showing otherwise. In this case, however, there is a certificate from the Division of
Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the marriage record of spouses Fermin Fortus and
Jacoba Aguil supposed to have been solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the
Municipality of Rosario, Batangas had been received by said office for file', and this
certification is further strengthened by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in
the office of the municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of
such marriage supposedly contracted between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the
baptismal certificates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus had
overcome by satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil

were never married and hence all of their children are not legitimate brothers or half
brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino Fortus.
Escolin: Before, baptismal certificates were competent evidence to establish the
parentage of the child. After Act 3753, baptismal certificates were no longer competent.
Johnson v. Lutz, ()
Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (31mar1966) L-12986

Facts: It appears that in the afternoon of 18Mar1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex
service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread
to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects
inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.),
Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its
agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as
the cause of the fire.
1. Police Department Report:"Investigation disclosed that at about 4PM 18Mar1948, while Leandro Flores was
transferring gasoline from a tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into underground tank of the
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this
City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the
main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly
blazed. Quick action of Leandio Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the
truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames
scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and
the following accessories, and residences."
2. The Fire Department Report:In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the
installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand,) the complainants furnished this Office a
copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. It appears in
this picture that there is in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to
information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed
between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks."
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence
and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are
admissible in evidence as entries in official records.
Held:
As to report of Detective Capacillo:
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the
material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were
not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to

some facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station where the fire occurred; to
Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the
time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who
could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To
qualify their statements as "official information acquired by the officers who prepared
the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule: the facts
stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information,
not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
appellees.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendants failure to
explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has
evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may
be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees
and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
As to report by Captain Leoncio Mariano:
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his
duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly
be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. Those facts, descriptive of the
location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in
question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro Flores
before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who,
alone and without assistance, was transfering the contents thereof into the underground
storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank there
were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to
drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to
the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the
tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he
heard someone shout "fire."
Decision reversed.
People v. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (30sep1982) L-48727

Facts: Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs.
Pepito Leona at San Fernando, La Union where she resided.
On 22Apr1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that day,
the members of the Leones family, including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and
his sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby beach resort for a picnic.
At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the
appellant and Elizabeth entered the room where complainant was lying down and forced
her to take three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were aspirin. The
complainant refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when the appellant held
her mouth while his sister pushed the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth left
the room and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.

Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took off her panty. Then the
appellant went on top of her. The complainant tried to push him but as she was weak
and dizzy, the appellant succeeded in abusing her.
At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant,
found the complainant unconscious near her room without any panty on. She was then
taken to the La Union Provincial Hospital by the driver of the Leona family.
When admitted to the hospital at about 6PM of the same date, the complainant was
semiconscious, incoherent and hysterical. She refused to talk and to be examined by
the doctors. She was irritated when approached by a male figure. The complainant was
first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she had vaginal bleeding.
The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that
she might have been a victim of rape. In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr.
Cayao examined her on 26Apr1973 after which she issued a medical certificate with the
following findings:
.1 Presence of erythema (redness of the skin) of the vestibular portion of external
genitalia;
.2 Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2:00 o'clock and 10 o'clock;
.3 Easily admit one finger with pain;
.4 Unclotted blood at the vagina cavity;
.5 Smear exam for sperm cell-negative; D'plococci-negative Florence test-reagent not
available.'
Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any
examination to determine whether drug was given to the complainant.
Defense: Alibi, at the beach.
Held: The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her
admission in the hospital on 22Apr1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the
diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records
by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by
law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of
Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but
unfortunately, he was not presented as a witness for the government.
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which
was then already healing on 22Apr1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration
occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a weeklong vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27, 1975) and there is
evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La
Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San Fernando, La Union,
she had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.
From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim,
Irene Dulay, was having her menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the
Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself admitted in her testimony
that on 22Apr1973, she was having her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior
that a man would have sexual intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual
period, as was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was allegedly abused
by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence, taboo and distaste to have
sexual contact with a menstruating female and this is so however passionate and lustful
the man may be unless he is depraved or demented, We cannot believe that the
accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of civil engineering studying in
Baguio City, would break or violate such a taboo by drugging the complainant girl with
the help of his sister and afterwards have sex relations with her in her menstrual
condition.
There are also proof that complainant was obsessed with the accused and that the
complainant was praning.

Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (16aug1956) L-8171

Facts: On 09Aug1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant appellant Company

and driven by Edgardo Hernandez its driver, collided with a passenger truck at
Paraaque, Rizal. In the course of and as a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over
Armando Manalo, an eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which resulted in his
death several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through
reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to one
year prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P3,000, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs.
Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity. Two writs of
execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs
were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal,
in Hernandez' name could be found.
On 17Feb1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother
respectively of Armando, filed the present action against the Company to enforce its
subsidiary liability.
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay
to plaintiffs damages.
The company appealed. To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiff
presented evidences, among them, the sheriffs return of the writs of execution.
Defendant company objected to CFI admitting the sheriffs return. CFI ruled against
defendant company.
In their appeal, defendant contends that admitting the sheriffs return without presenting
the sheriff in court deprived them of the opportunity to cross-examine the said sheriff.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary that the sheriff testify in court on his return of the
writs.
Held: A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and
is prima, facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The sheriff making the return need
not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents, an
exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed
before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. The courts
and the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The
litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in
which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness
are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in
which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception to official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting, the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work
of Administration of government and the interest of the public having business with
officials would alike suffer in consequence.
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to
be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case
may appear to require.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (27jan1993) 103292

Facts: While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were walking home through an
uninhabited place at about 11PM on 14Oct1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang
suddenly appeared from the surrounding rice fields. Cabuang grabbed Maria Victoria and
covered her mouth, Evelyn ran away because she became terribly frightened and
Matabang followed in pursuit. Matabang lost sight of Evelyn along the road.

From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the road, Evelyn saw Maria
Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the accused Cabuang, Matabang and two (2) other men
and heard Maria Victoria crying and pleading for help. Evelyn clearly recognized
Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two (2).
Early the next morning, on 15Oct1988, the body of Maria Victoria was found in the
barangay traversed by the road on which Maria Victoria were walking the night before.
Issue: Whether or not the Police Blotter was conclusive.
Held: Appellants principally urge that the trial court had erred in finding that prosecution
witness Evelyn de Vera had positively identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang
as the assailants of Maria Victoria. Appellants point to the entry in the Bayambang police
blotter (Exhibit "I") which stated that the assailants were "still unidentified" although the
entry was made after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera was questioned by the police.
We consider this contention bereft or merit. Upon receiving the report that a dead body
was found, members of the Bayambang Police Station immediately proceeded to the
reported crime scene on the morning of 15Oct1988. The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio
Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning, noticed that she was in a
state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of
the same day when Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn
statement to the police. Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the
police blotter at around 11AM, stating that the assailants were still unidentified; there
was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement made and completed in the
afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identities of the men she had seen
the night before and who she believed were responsible for the rape and death of her
cousin Maria Victoria. The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the
doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the first time she was
questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case
law that the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may
know about a crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief.
Entries in a police blotter though regularly done in the course of performance of official
duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, In People v. Santito, Jr., this
Court held that entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be
incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly
much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the
trial court cannot base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily
consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and
presented in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that Prosecution witness Evelyn de
Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among
those who had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana.
People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1, 1996

Facts: The evidence shows that at around 7pm of 26Nov1989, within the vicinity of Pier
14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog
on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with "Ramon Doe" on the
other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists.
Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with
bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and
simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants
ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to
Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog even
attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking but when he
chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon;
Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards
the highway; when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter who however
fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return
with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded;

instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly; when "Mando" saw what
happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon
and "Mando" then fled towards the highway.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out the
latter's companions to bring him to the hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda
Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the hospital;
that Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to testify;
that his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money earned him
the ire of the latter and that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.
Held: The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet prepared by Pat.
Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the
principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter,
are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The
entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of
his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is
understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed
than the matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance Information
Sheet was never formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court
below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court
cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only
after interviewing Camba an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have
compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort
to present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must
concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule,
hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was
acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information
because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only
must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such
statements for the record. In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give
such statements.

j. Commercial Lists
1) Rule 130, 45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters
of interest, to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Commercial lists
a. statements of matters of interest
b. to persons engaged in an occupation

c. contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation

d. as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated
e. the compilation is
i. published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
ii. generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the prices of shares

2) Cases
State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)

Facts: Lungsford was arrested upon being found in possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road
Runner which was stolen from James Wilton. He was charged with the crime of
knowingly possessing a motor vehicle with an altered serial number. The State unable to
produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or to testify that it was stolen. Lungsford
testified at trial that he bought the car from James Law. Although he had title and
registration he couldnt corroborate the hearsay nature of certain evidence admitted.
The errors focus on the way the police attempted to prove that the car in question was
stolen.
Cars have distinguishing numbers which are placed in the cars at the point of
production. The vehicle identification number (VIN) indicates the year, type and make of
the car. In the case at bar, the VIN was riveted into the drivers side of the dashboard.
There was also a factory order number stamped under the hood of stamped to the
radiator brace on the drivers side. There was also a packing slip number in the coils of
the back seat. A car can be traced through any of these numbers.
Since it appeared that the VIN wasnt factory installed, the National Automobile Theft
Bureau was requested to trace the car through the factory order no. A factory trace
provides the time of manufacture and reveals the zone office where the car was sold,
permitting the identification of the first owner. The VIN for the vehicle may also be
determined. The trace of the factory order number stamped on the radiator brace
produced an allegedly corresponding VIN.
Lungsford claimed that the windshield was smashed and the VIN tag was broken loose
on one side, that he bought new seats from a junkyard, replaced the engine and put in a
new radiator and brace. No receipts were presented. He re-registered the car due to a
lost license plate.
The State relied on the NATB factory trace information to establish that the car was the
same one Wilton reported stolen. The judge didnt allow the State to prove what NATB
told the detective, but the entire tracing process was crucial in the States attempt to
link the car in Lungsfords possession to the stolen Wilton vehicle which it had allowed.
The judge convicted Lungsford.
The NATB is a non-profit corporation, national in scope, financed by about 500
automobile insurance companies representing 95% of the industry. Its purpose is to
prevent and reduce theft and losses of automobiles. It gathers and disseminates
information on stolen automobiles and assists law enforcers in their identification and
recovery. It is the repository for all vehicle information and identification numbers on all
American and Foreign made cars, thus an informational warehouse & registry of the
industry.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal investigation report of NATB be admissible in
evidence?
Held: Conviction reversed.
Although Walsh was not permitted to tell the jury the contents of the information he
received from NATB, his whole process of tracing the identity of the said car was
dependent thereon. This crucial link was evidential against Lungsford. The record is
devoid of any proof on the reliability of the NATB procedures and of any evidential basis
for admission of data derived therefrom. There must be compliance with Evid. R. 63 (30)
whereby the judge must be convinced that the compilation, list, register, periodical is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally considered
useful or reliable. If such is met, then statements from the compilation, etc. are

admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated. The rationale of this rule is
that the use of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult to call the witness to
the stand all those who have participated in the preparation or compilation of such. The
trustworthiness requirement is satisfied by the requirement that a finding be made by
the judge that the material is regularly published for use by persons who rely on it.
There is no reason to falsify such compilation etc. since it needs to be accurate.
The trial judge erred in holding that this hearsay of Wilton was admissible under business
records exception. While police records may qualify as business records for certain
purposes and in certain respects, they are not vehicles by which substantive evidential
status may be conferred upon the otherwise hearsay declarations of a victim or witness
to the crime, accident or other occurrence. If the declarant is unavailable to testify and
if the statement is not admissible under res gestae or dying declarations, it cannot be
admitted predicated upon the circumstance that the statement was made to a police
officer who paraphrased its content in his report. The rationale is that records made in
the usual course of business normally possess a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness. The business record exception is predicated on the fact that the
record itself is kept in the usual course of business and that the recorded information is
obtained from a declarant having a business duty to communicate truthfully. Both have
to be met. In this case, the 2nd criteria was not met. A police record is admissible to
prove that a report of a crime was made by a member of the public and when it was
made and received. But it is not admissible to prove the truth of the contents of that
report since members of the public, whether targets of investigation, witnesses or
victims, are not under a duty to make an honest and truthful report. Citizen declarations
are held to constitute hearsay in respect of otherwise admissible police reports.
PNOC Shipping vs. CA (299 SCRA 402)

Facts: In the morning of 21Sep1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by the Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corp., collided with Luzon Stevedorings (LSC) vessel, Petroparcel near
Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas. After an investigation was conducted, the
Philippine Coast Guard found Petroparcel at fault. After an unsuccessful demand by
Maria Efigenia, they sued LSC and Capt Duruelo (captain of the boat) for damages.
Since, LSC had sold all of its boats, barges and ships to PNOC Shipping, PNOC assuming
the obligations of LSC on the boats replaced LSC as party defendant. The Lower Court
ruled in favor of Maria Efigenia awarding P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the
fishing boat with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
In arriving at the above disposition, the LC cited the evidence presented by Maria
Efigenia consisting the testimony of its sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario, their general
manager. He testified that Maria Efigenia XV was wooden boat owned by the said
corporation and, at the time it sank, it was then carrying 1,060 baneras of assorted fish
the value of which was never recovered. Also, lost were two Cummins engines (250 hp),
radar, pathometer and compass. Because of the loss of the ship, they had to hire a
lawyer to litigate their claim in the Baord of Marine Inquiry and here in the lower court.
The lower court considered the following documentary evidence: (1.) Marine Protest
executed by Delfin Villarosa; (2.) a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler
by Magalong Engineering costing P2,250,000; (3.) a pro forma invoice for the Cummins
model engine costing P1,160,000 each; (4.) a quotation for a compact daylight radar
costing P145,000; (5.) quotation of prices for nylon ropes, compass, floats; (6.) retainer
agreement between del Rosario and F. Sumulong Law for attorneys fees and (7.) a
quotation for nets and baneras (tubs). On the other hand, PNOC presented Lorenzo
Lazaro, its Senior Estimator at its shipyard, as an expert witness stating that the award
was excessive but he could not give a breakdown of the prices for the replacement of
the boat. MR was denied. On appeal to the CA, the award was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the documents presented by Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corp. as in the nature of documents in a commercial lists, in the nature
of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, exempt
from the hearsay rule?
Held: Decision modified. Award of Actual Damages deleted and an award of P2,000,000
in Nominal Damages is given.

To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to

prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof on the basis of available evidence. Damages cannot be presumed and
courts must point to specific facts as basis for the measure of the award. In this case,
actual damages was proven only by the sole testimony of the fishing corps. general
manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. PNOC had objected to the
admission of such evidence on the ground that these were not duly authenticated and
that Del Rosario had no personal knowledge on the contents of the writing and neither
was an expert on the subject. This objection was ignored by the lower court.
The court herein held that the price quotations that became the basis of the award are
ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been
proferred along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.
Such a testimony was hearsay. Also, any testimony he makes shall be considered selfserving interests.
The court also holds that the documents do not fall under any of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The CA had considered said documents as part of one of the exception
under the Commercial Lists and the Like Rule. In order, to fall under such an exception,
a document must be:
1. it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
2. such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published
compilation;
3. said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation;
and
4. it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Therefore, applying ejusdem generis, the exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations
issued personally to Del Rosario. These are not published in any list, register, periodical
or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports,
as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation. These are merely
letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Nevertheless, since the fishing corp. had been injured, nominal damages are awarded
not as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of a technical injury.
Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139

Facts: Maximino Noble conveyed a parcel of land he owned in Camarines Sur to

Proculo, his son, on 22Jun1945 by means of a public deed.
The public deed stipulated that the sum of P2,600 in Japanese currency (P180 of which
was paid to Francisco Espiritu by Proculo as repurchase price in July 1944) and P500
Philippine currency, the total of P3,100 was paid by Proculo to Maximino in 1944 & in
June 1945. That this sale is being made subject to the condition that Maximino
preserves unto himself, his heirs and assigns, the right to repurchase or redeem the
parcel of land for P2,600 and P500 and within a 5-year period from the date of the
instrument, provided that if Maximino, his heirs and assigns fail to exercise the right of
redemption within the time aforesaid, this sale shall be irrevocable and unconditional
without the necessity of executing any other instrument.
On 28Feb1948, by means of another public deed, conveyed the same parcel by way of
absolute sale to Gregoria Estrada for P3,000 Philippine currency. Only P2,300 was paid,
the P700 to be invested in the redemption of the property from Proculo. Gregoria
offered to redeem, tendering P700 to Proculo, which he refused. Hence, this action for
conventional redemption to compel Proculo to reconvey the property to her. The trial
court ruled in favor of Gregoria. Proculo contends that the said court should not have
applied the Ballantine Scale of Values and should have fixed the redemption price at
P3,100 which was the amount he paid therefore, under the case of Rogers vs. Smith.

Issue: Whether or not the courts can simply take judicial notice of the Ballantine Scale of
Values?
Held: Yes. Ballantine submitted a conversion table which recommended the adoption of
measures which were greatly needed to solve the problem created by transactions made
during the Japanese occupation and to hasten the economic recovery of the country.
The SC, CA and the different CFIs in the country have repeatedly applied its provisions in
numerous cases. It is therefore an official document whose publication constituted a
leading event of general interest and whose provisions are widely known and have
played an important part in the contemporary political history of the country of which
courts of justice could take judicial cognizance.
There can be no doubt of the propriety of the trial courts action in applying the table to
the transaction at bar. No evidence of the rate of exchange between Japanese
occupation currency and Philippine currency at the time the transaction took place
having been presented, the case is one which calls for the application of said conversion
table.
The doctrine laid down in Roger vs. Smith, Bell is inapplicable to the case at bar. The
transaction in that case was a debt which created the relation of debtor-creditor between
the parties, and the instrument in which it is recorded did not provide for the payment of
the debt in any specific currency. Hence, the debt had to be paid in legal tender at the
time payment of the obligation was demanded, under the provision of the Act of the U.S.
Cognress.
However, in the case at bar, the transaction is distinct. It is a sale with the right of
repurchase and it was executed on 22Jun1945. It did not create a relation of debtor and
creditor between the parties. It simply conferred upon the vendor a legal right which he
may or may not exercise.

k. Learned Treatises
1) Rule 130, 46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on
a subject of history, law, science or art is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness
expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in
the subject. (40 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Learned treatises (used
to prove unwritten foreign law)
a. published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
b. on a subject of history, law, science or art
c. Either
i. the court takes judicial notice, or
ii. a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject

2) Cases

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)

Philippine courts can not take judicial notice of foreign law. Failure to prove foreign law
whether unwritten under Rule 130, Sec. 46 or written under Rule 132, Sec. 24, raises the
presumption that the law is the same as ours.
Escolin: This provision is useful to prove an unwritten law. E.g. learned treatises on
unwritten law which the court has taken judicial notice: Manresa, Sanchez-Roman. E.g. of
writers of treatises acknowledged as experts: Corpus juris, Corpus juris secundum, LRA
If it is a written law that is sought to be proven, cf Rule 132, Sec. 19
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx

E.g. of written official acts: Judicial decisions, executive orders. Our courts take judicial
notice of local laws. However, there are certain instances when an official copy of the
written official act is required to be presented. cf Rule 132, Sec. 24
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)

Ways to prove written foreign official acts

a. official publication, or
b. copy
i. attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and
ii. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1. accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a. a secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
c. by any Philippine officer in the foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept
2. and, authenticated by the seal of his office.

l. Prior Testimony
1) Rule 130, 47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and interrogatories (Rule 24,
RoC)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to prior testimony
a. testimony or deposition
b. of a witness deceased or unable to testify
c. given in a former case or proceeding
d. involving the same parties and subject matter
e. as evidence against the adverse party
f. adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him

2) Cases
Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967)

Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify,
their prior testimony is inadmissible. Mere refusal to testify is does not amount to
inability to testify. The party could have urged to court to have these witnesses
summoned, arrested, and punished for contempt in case of refusal to obey the
summons.
Facts: Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo thru their mother, Celestina Daldo, as guardian
ad litem, filed a case for recognition as illegitimate children and support against
Francisco Tan. Oral evidence was presented by them & as the plaintiff were about to
rest, Celestina moved for dismissal because the parties have reached an amicable
settlement. Celestina she said in an affidavit submitted to the court, Francisco is not

the father of my children . . . So, the court dismissed the case. One year & eight
months later, a similar case was instituted with the grandmother as guardian. At first,
the court held that the case is barred by res judicata because of the previous civil case
but on motion for reconsideration, support and recognition were granted. The CA
reversed, saying the evidence wasnt enough to establish paternity. In the second case,
the witnesses of the kids who testified in the first case refused to testify, & the court did
not admit the testimonies of these witnesses from the former trial. Thus, this petition on
certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal to testify fall under the unable to testify provision of
Sec. 47, Rule 130?
Held: The SC affirmed the CA. The witnesses werent dead. Neither were they outside
the RP. They simply didnt want to testify. This doesnt amount to an inability to testify.
Therefore, the prior testimony rule cannot be applied in this case. Also, the plaintiff in
this case could have asked the court to compel these witnesses to come, but they didnt
do so. All in all, the evidence wasnt enough to show paternity for the children in order
to be recognized by Tan.
People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)

Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the
preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the
prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the condition that the
witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. At the trial, the
witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were recalled
and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte
affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during the
preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected
the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony
was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses
whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses
were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the
appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the
accused to meet the witnesses face to face.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

Facts: Defendant Herschel Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of
Bernard Isaacs and with possession of stolen credit cads belonging to the latter and his
wife, Amy. At a preliminary hearing, defendants appointed counsel called the victims
daughter, Anita, as the defenses only witness. Anita testified that she had permitted
defendant to use her apartment for several days while she was away. However, she
refused to admit that she had given defendant checks and the credit cards without
informing him that she did not have permission to use them. At the defendants
subsequent credit cards with the understanding that he could use them. The daughter
did not appear at trial even though several subpoenas had been issued to her at her
parents residence. The State offered the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony
in rebuttal. The defendant objected to this on the ground that it was violative of the
Confrontation Clause. The mother testified that Amys whereabouts were unknown to
them. The TC admitted the transcript into evidence while the CA reversed. The SC of
Ohio ruled that the transcript was inadmissible because the mere opportunity to crossexamine at the preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for
purposes of trial.
Issue: Whether or not the transcript of testimony is admissible?
Held: Yes, the introduction in evidence at defendants trial of the daughters preliminary
hearing testimony was constitutionally permissible.
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation
Clause requires a showing of his unavailability. Even then his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. The daughters prior testimony bore

sufficient indicia of reliability afforded the trier of facts a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement. Even though defense counsels questioning of the
witness occurred on direct examination defense counsel tested the testimony with the
equivalent of significant cross-examination. His questioning which was replete with
leading questions and comporting with the principal purpose of cross-examination which
is to challenge the veracity of the daughters testimony, clearly partook of crossexamination as a matter of form. This was so even though the witness was not
personally available for questioning at the trial and that the defendant had a different
lawyer at trial from the one at the preliminary hearing.
It afforded substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the Confrontation Clause. The record disclosed
that the witness was constitutionally unavailable for purposes of the defendants trial.
Case was reversed and remanded.

P. Opinion Rule
1. Rule 130, 48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as
indicated in the following sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence. (43 a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which
proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
a. a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown
to possess, may be received in evidence.
b. the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
c. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
d. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
e. his impressions of the
i. emotion
ii. behavior
iii. condition or
iv. appearance of a person

2. Cases
Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)

Facts: Plaintiff was the owner of a truck which was entrusted to Pabo Dilag. On the
night of December 31, 1944, during the Japanese occupation, the truck was stolen. After
the liberation, Dilag saw the truck parked in front of the City Lunch in San Pablo City.
Recognizing that it was the same car owned by their company he had seized the car with
the aid of policemen. The plaintiff company filed a case for recovery against Merced its
present possessor and also against Lim Ben, Sy Pua and Sixto Zandueta, former alleged
owners. In the course of the trial in the lower court, Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public
Works testified as to the tell tale marks of alterations on the motor number of the truck.
This testimony was impugned by the defendants on the ground that Aguilar was not
qualified as an expert on motor numbers.
Issue: Whether or not Aguilar qualified as an expert?

Held: Yes. It appears that Aguilar has been with the Bureau since 1930, having
occupied the position of inspector in charge of weighing and measuring trucks and
verifying their motor numbers, chief of registration division for 8 years and from 1938 to
date of the trial, chief investigator of motor vehicles, charged with the duty of
investigating conflicting claims on motor vehicles. With such a background experience,
a person who has occupied those positions should be deemed amply qualified for the
simple task of determining whether the number appearing on the motor of a particular
vehicle is genuine or not.
Although a witness, in order to be competent as an expert, must show himself to be
skilled or experienced in the business or profession to which the subject relates, there is
no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been
acquired. Scientific training and study are not always essential to the competency of the
witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his
knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than
scientific study or research. Generally, speaking, any person who by study or experience
has acquired practical knowledge or experience may be allowed to give in evidence his
opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill relating to such business or
employment. Even where the problem presented is one which ordinarily requires some
scientific knowledge or training, one long experienced may testify as an expert, although
he has pursued no special study of the matter. Knowledge acquired by doing is no less
valuable than that acquired by study.
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)

Facts: Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevara and Felipe Bautista were suspected of
committing theft of a revolver. They were arrested and taken by Valentin Trono, a subinspector of the municipal police and other policemen, to Sapang-Angelo and beaten and
ill-treated. Perez died the next morning.
Trono et al were charged with murder and convicted by the trial court. They are now
contending on appeal that Perez was not ill-treated but that the cause of death was
hypertropic cirrhosis (whatever that means!) as certified by the examining physician,
Icasiana. The testimony of the physician was not given credence by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the court is bound by the testimony of a physician acting as an
expert witness?
Held: No.
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting
consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of a professional character. The
courts, however, are not bound to submit to such testimony. They are free to weigh
them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with other elements of conviction which may have been
adduced during the trial.
In the present case, the court did not give credit to the testimony of the physician
because:
it appears that the physician was an intimate friend of one of the accused Angeles;
the physician stated in the certificate that Perez died from cholera (not hypertropic
cirrhosis) but the mom of the deceased testified that her son was of a robust
constitution and suffered no ailments whatever;
the physicians certificate stated that Perezs body showed only two small bruises but
other witnesses testified that they saw more bruises in different parts of his body;
the physician himself when he was testifying during the trial withdrew his statements
made in the physicians certificate.
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)

United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)

People v. Adoviso GR# 116196-97 23jun1999

Facts: In this case, on the night of February 18, 1990, Emeterio and Rufino Vasquez
were shot by five assailants inside their house in Bula, Camarines Sur. During the
incident, Bonifacio, son of Emetrio, saw Pablo Adoviso and five other hooded persons
shooting his father and his nephew being shot. He hid himself in the dark and only
rushed to the injured victims aide when the assailants left, accompanied by his son
Elmer. Elmer gave first aid to his grandfather and cousin by binding their wounds with
diapers while Bonifacio went to the municipal building to fetch the police. The police
came and brought the two victims to the hospital. Both, however, died the next
morning. Adoviso was charged for the murder of the two victims. In his defense, he
alleged alibi and that he offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Lucena, a
polygraph exminer of the NBI in Manila. In a Polygraph report, Lucena opined that his
polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to
pertinent questions relevenat to the investigations of the crimes. Nevertheless, the TC
convicted him for murder.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not considering the polygraph as having
exculpated the accused from the crime charged?
Held: Judgment affirmed. The witnesses were able to see and identify him clearly and
thus his defense of alibi couldnt stick.
As to the polygraph test defense, a polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that
simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body
that are believed to be involuntarily cause by an examinees conscious attempt to
deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or a lie detector test is that a
person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in
breathing, which will be recorded in the graph. However, American courts almost
uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose
of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or
the prosecution seeks its introduction for the reason that the polygraph has not as yet
attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception. The rule is no different here. In People vs. Daniel, the court stated that much
faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive.
Appellant had not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
People v. Baid GR#129667 31jul2000

Facts: Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having
suffered from schizophrenia since 1988. In December 1996, she was confined at the
Holy Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her mental condition. On
the other hand, accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the patients'
room. He woke the complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the same time
touching her foot. Complainant took the cigarette. As she smoked it, accused-appellant
caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she afterward removed her pants.
It turned out she was not wearing any underwear. Accused-appellant also removed his
pants and the two had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they transferred under the bed
and continued their sexual intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused-appellant had
an orgasm. A female patient who had been awakened tried to separate the two, and, as
she failed to do so, she went out to call the two nurses on duty. The nurses responded
but, when they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant had already put on
her pants.
Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medicolegal examination. She told him what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the
incident into writing and then gave her a physical examination.
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior of the complainant's
genitalia, could have been recently caused by a hard blunt object, such as an erect penis

during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr. Reyes found that
complainant was suffering from mental illness and that she had lapses in the course of
her interview.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the complainant who was pra-pra is admissible
in evidence.
Held: Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to
be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions
to others. Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly
relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them.
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim
("inappropriate affect") during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering
questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from
schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness
and memory, it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of
consciousness and gross deficits of memory. It has long been settled that a person
should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies between complainant's sworn statement and
her testimony as to the number of times she and accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse and where they did the same, an examination of the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly complainant's sworn statement and her interview with the
examining medico-legal officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse
with her in different positions at various places in the same room. When complainant
testified, she stated that, aside from the fact that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her on her bed, he made her transfer later under the bed. Be that as it
may, complainant has consistently established in all of her statements that he had
sexual intercourse with her on her bed. Whether or not he had sex with her near the
window and while facing him is of no moment and does not negate the finding of rape.
Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and
inconsequential. They show that complainant's testimony was unrehearsed, and rather
than diminish the probative value of her testimony, they reinforce it.
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients were
sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the
commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and
place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the malefactor and the
victim are not alone.
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses
presented during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly
and credibly established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence would only
be a mere surplusage.
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding
of rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof. What consummates the felony is
the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of his victim
without her consent. Neither is it required that lacerations be found in the victim's
hymen. We have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a rape charge to
prosper as long as the victim categorically and consistently declares that she has been
defiled. In this case, aside from complainant's positive testimony, the medical
examination of the complainant showed an abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that
she had recent sexual intercourse. That the deep healed lacerations found on the
complainant's genitalia may have been caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is
immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an
expert witness. However, he cannot do this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr.
Salangad's qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross-examined her
on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, 36, objections not
timely raised are deemed waived.

The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert
testimony as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her
testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the
case.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem
of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.

Q.Rule 130, 51: Character Evidence

Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it can not present
evidence on the bad moral character of the accused on its evidence in chief.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if
it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only
when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
This covers either party to the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14. (46 a, 47 a)
cf Rule 132, Sec. 14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)

GR: Character evidence not generally admissible

Exceptions
a. In Criminal Cases:
i. accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
ii. In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the accused
which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
iii. moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in
any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
b. In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
c. good character of an impeached witness

R. Rule 131, 1: Burden of Proof

Sec. 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law

1. Civil Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 1
Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable mortgage, the evidence
presented must be clear and convincing, not merely a preponderance of evidence.

b. Cases
Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986

Facts: The plaintiffs Pornellosa Spouses are claiming a parcel of land by virtue of a deed
of sale by its former occupant, Vicenta San Jose, who sold to them also the house located
in the said property. However, the lot in question happens to form part of the Santa
Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner. This
Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government by virtue of Commonwealth Act no.
539, Sec. 1. There is no evidence showing that Vicenta San Jose owned the land. She
merely owned the house on it. This action by the spouse is to compel the Land Tenure
Administration to sell the lot in question to them in the amount of P1,505.00. All the
spouses presented in support of their claim were documents of the sale of the house to
them by San Jose.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses Pornellosa have proven their claim to own the lot in
question?
Held: A partys claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by
competent evidence. A plaintiff is duty-bound to prove his allegations in the complaint.
He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his
opponent.
The plaintiffs who want to compel the Director of Lands to sell them the lot of an
expropriated landed estate should prove their allegation that they acquired the rights of
a bona fide occupant to said lot. A sale of a house is not sufficient to convey title or any
right to the lot on which the house stands.
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
document.
IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)

Facts: Tobias bought an installment one Dodge truck from Leelin Motors. Tobias
executed a promissory note in favor of Leelin Motors, which note was secured by a
chattel mortgage on the truck in favor of Leelin Motors. The latter indorsed the note and
assigned the mortgage to IFC. As a consequence, Tobias paid six installments to IFC. On
May 14, 1970, IFCs counsel wrote to Tobias demanding him to pay or to surrender the
truck otherwise court action would be pursued. At the time the letter was written, Tobias
was in arrear in the payment of more than 2 installments. Tobias wrote back saying that
he was surrendering the truck because the truck was with Leelin Motors when it met an
accident & because of the delay in its repairs. Upon learning of the accident, IFC decided
not to get the truck and sued for payment. The LC and CA dismissed the IFCs complaint
on the ground that inasmuch as Tobias surrendered the truck, he complied with the IFCs
demands. Now, IFC claims that it is an unpaid vendor who under Art. 1484 of the NCC
may choose exacting fulfillment of the obligation, canceling the sale or foreclosing the
mortgage if any; and that it now chose the first option. Tobias claims that IFC is now
estopped to claim payment when it demanded the surrender to which demand Tobias
acceded.
Held: The SC reversed the LCs and CAs rulings. Art. 1484 is clear in that an unpaid (in
the payment of 2 or more installments) vendor has the 3 options (alternative, not
cumulative). IFC has not availed of cancellation nor of foreclosure (which presupposes
more than a mere demand to surrender possession). Thus, IFC is still free to avail of the

remedy of exacting fulfillment. As regards estoppel, to hold IFC in estoppel, it must be

shown that the latter knew of the accident when it gave Tobias its options to pay or to
surrender. IFC claims it had no such knowledge. Nobody in his right mind would give
the options Tobias had, if the accident was known. The more plausible thing to do is to
ask for payment had IFC known. Besides, the allegation of IFC that it had no knowledge
is a negative allegation which needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential
part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. The burden of
proof, therefore, is on Tobias to disprove IFCs lack of knowledge. Tobias failed.

2. Criminal Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 2
Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt.
For self-defense, the accused must show clear and convincing evidence.

b. Cases
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)

The prosecution has the burden of proving even the negative elements of a crime (e.g.
lack of license to possess a firearm).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer, who is in charge of
issuing the licenses, that the accused was not issued a license.
Facts: The LC found Pajenado guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He
appealed to the SC and argued that there is no prima facie case in which to hold him
guilty of illegal possession of firearm because the prosecution failed to prove his lack of a
license to carry a firearm.
Issue: Whether or not Pajenado should be found guilty of illegal possession of firearms?
Held: No. Under the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, in criminal
cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a
negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if it is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged. The burden of proof was with the prosecution and in this case
they must prove that the firearm used by Pajenado in committing the offense charged
was not properly licensed. It cannot be denied that the lack of or the absence of a
license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm. The
information filed against Pajenado specifically alleged that he had no license or permit to
possess the said gun. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecutions duty not to
merely allege that negative fact but to prove it as well.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977)

The elements of self-defense must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing

evidence.
Facts: On the night of September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by
Ricardo Verzola in the presence of Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan,
Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two to the
ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Verzola then went to his house, changed his
clothes and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the
piece of wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went
to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in
an accident.
The police authorities went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body
of the deceased sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. When questioned, Josefina
revealed that Verzola was the assailant of her husband.
She later gave a written statement narrating the incident, stating that Verzola went to
their house, entered her room where she was sleeping with her husband, woke her up
and had carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo woke up and attempted to rise

Verzola clubbed Bernardo. This statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge
Valera.
At about 4:00 a.m., Verzola was picked up by the police and, in the municipal bldg., he
executed a written statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. He
stated therein that, he went to Bernardos house and went under their house pricking
with a bamboo twig Josephina who was laying down. She came down to my place, where
they did everything. But before that in the night, Josephina told him 'THAT HER
HUSBAND WAS PLANNING TO KILL HIM and just after they were through, Josephina went
upstairs inside (the) house, and because he cannot withstand anymore the plan of her
husband to kill him, he went upstairs and in the room he saw Bernardo lying down. He
clubbed him three times at the nape, and when he did not move anymore that was the
time when we both with Josephine Molina throw him downstairs of their house. After that
he went home. He further admitted that Josephina was his paramour. The said
statement was sworn to in front of Judge Valera. Verzola then guided the authorities to
his house where, in their presence, he retrieved from the toilet his bloodstained clothes
as well as the piece of wood which he used in clubbing the deceased.
Dr. Luis P. Bringas Municipal Health Officer, who conducted the autopsy, testified that
the deceased died instantaneously as a result of cardio-respiratory failure caused by
"cerebral compressions and hemorrhages". The deceased sustained different lacerations
on the head and back of the ear.
Versola, later, impugned his statement and claimed he did so in self-defense. Thus, he
testified that while he was feeding his two cows in front of his house, he heard cries for
help coming from Bernardos house. Recognizing it to be Josefinas voice, he proceeded
to the house. He armed himself with a pan of a plow upon entering the yard because he
feared an intruder had entered the Molina's residence. At the door of the room, he heard
the man say: 'Vulva of your mother, I will kill you." As he entered the room, he saw his
Josefina in a corner, being maltreated by Bernardo. After he noticed his presence, he
said: "Vulva of your mother, I will kill all of you." At that juncture, Bernardo stooped to
pick up a bolo from the floor. As Bernardo was still bending towards the bolo, he struck
him twice with the piece of wood, hitting the head of the victim, causing him to fall. After
he had fallen, he tried to revive the victim by shaking the head of the latter on his lap
while saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy". He explained that this was the reason why there were
bloodstains on his clothes.
Josefina corroborated said new statement of Verzola. Both appellants contended that
they were not aware of the contents of their E-J confessions as they were made to sign
them by the police w/o being able to read their contents.
The trial court convicted Verzola as principal while Josefina as an accessory to murder.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Held: SC affirms Verzola conviction but acquits Josefina.
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human
being, the burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may
justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his
exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution for even if that were weak,
it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. It is
evident that no such proof was adduced by Verzola. Verzolas conduct was incompatible
with the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although he claims
that he brought the victim down the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet when
he was able to get a jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in going
to town. Moreover, he kept quiet about the incident. It was only from Josefina Molina that
the police learned for the first time that Verzola was the assailant of the deceased.
Verzola attempted to conceal his participation by hiding his bloodstained clothes and the
weapon he used.
The physical facts of the case, such as nature, character and location of the wounds
sustained by the deceased and the presence of the bloodstains on the beddings of the

victim are undisputed. These facts and circumstances belie the claim of the appellant
that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the contrary, they sufficiently indicate
that the fatal injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying
defenseless on the floor, as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.
Although Josefina admitted in her extra-judicial statement that she was the paramour of
Verzola for over a year, there is no proof that she had knowledge of the criminal design
of her co-appellant. Neither has she cooperated with him by previous or simultaneous
acts, much less is there any showing that she supplied the principal with material or
moral aid. Her only participation was in assisting her co-appellant in bringing the body of
the deceased to the ground. The question, therefore, is whether or not by said overt act
she could be held criminally responsible as an accessory.
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but, with knows of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime;
(b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its
discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the
crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The main difference separating
accessories after the fact the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the
consummation of the crime and subordinate to that of the principal.
There was no proof also that the act of Josephina in bringing down the body was to
destroy the body of the crime or to make it appear that death of the victim was
accidental. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co- appellant bring
the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)

3. Administrative Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 5
Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

b. Cases

S. Presumptions
1. Conclusive presumptions
a. Rule 131, 2
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time
of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3
a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
a. a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
b. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

b. Arts. 1431-1439 NCC: Estoppel

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are
not in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the
Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their
successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation of another sells or alienates a thing,
the former cannot subsequently set up his own title as against the buyer or
grantee.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing
leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable
property, one of them is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or
real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal
title or interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of
facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the
facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded
misrepresentation.

must

have

acted

in

accordance

with

the

Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of
personal property for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he
received the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title
to defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who
received the same in good faith and for value.
Statutory instances of estoppel
a. non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the transferee by
operation of law (Art. 1434 NCC)
b. agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)
c. a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as
against the lessor or bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)
d. in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of them is
misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate,

the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all
these requisites are present:
i. fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the party
estopped;
ii. party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as
misrepresented;
iii. party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
iv. party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation. (Art.
1437 NCC)
e. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal property for
the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a
pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge of the property,
made by the other to a pledgee who received the same in good faith and for value.
(Art. 1438 NCC)

c. Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)

Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some guerilla
soldiers would arrest her for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba complained to
them against her for having illegally encroached on her property. Afraid to be taken to
the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for her to do. He suggested
that she execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor for the portion in question which
was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order that he could defend her rights in his
name against the claim of Conchita Cuba. Manjon accepted the suggestion and asked
Molina to have the corresponding deed of sale prepared which Manjon signed. However,
Manjon made the Molina sign a statement in, which he expressly admitted that the
transaction was only a simulated sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted
that the statement was a forgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land
because it was part of the public domain, sales patent having been issued to plaintiff by
the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person who is not the owner of a
thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later the seller or grantor acquires title
thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. Case remanded to
determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994)

The juridical relation between petitioners and private respondents is that of lessee and
lessor. Considering this jural relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased
the questioned lot from somebody else. A tenant cannot, in an action involving the
possession of the leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can a tenant
set up any inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his
landlord, without first delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the
agreement between themselves.

2. Disputable presumptions
a. Rule 131, 4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the
later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of
the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the
thing accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected
to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an
issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient
consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the
instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course
of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities,
and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and whose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of

disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances

hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before
marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Family Code and in the rules for a declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of
copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions
and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another
marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former
marriage, these rides shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the
former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with
things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published
by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of
cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published,
contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property
to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption
is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the
same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who
died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from
the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;

2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to
have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male
is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages,
the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called
to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof,
they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5 a)

b. Cases
People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976)

Mere non-presentation of a written statement of a witness to the police which she

allegedly did not sign, does not give rise to the presumption that it "contained
declarations disastrous to the prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed
evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both
the defense and the prosecution through use of compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena
duces tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992)

The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does
not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative. Neither does it
apply in cases where the witness, as in this case, is available to the accused because
then, the evidence would have the same weight against one party as against the other.
Mere failure to present the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of
evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)

Facts: This is an action to recover possession of a tract of land, for payment of rent due
(from 1899 to 1902) damages and costs brought by Miguel Pascual against Macario
Angeles. The land in question formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual (sister of Miguel)
who leased such to the defendant Angeles. Upon the death of Ciriaca, it was inherited
by the Miguel and Angeles recognized Miguel as heir and successor to his sister, and that
he had paid the rents due to the lessor (Ciriaca) to the Miguel since Ciriacas death in
1894, when in 1901 eventually decided to keep the land for himself and stopped paying
rent. Angeles specifically denied the genuineness and due execution of the lease
agreement, and argues that he has been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public and
continuous possession of the same lot for 30 years. The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging that it was not
necessary to show that the land in question had been allotted to the plaintiff in the
partition of the estate of his sister since it satisfactorily appeared that the defendant had
been paying rent or the plaintiff under the questioned lease, thus recognizing him as the
lawful owner and successor to his sister. Also that he had sufficiently proved the identity
of the land in question. The motion for a new trial was denied thus he appealed to the
SC.
Issue: Whether or not Angeles or a tenant can deny the title of his landlord in a contract
of lease?
Held: The SC held that since the action arose from a contract of lease which presuppose
in the lessor a right to the ownership or possession of the property, the lessor cannot be
compelled to prove his title thereto. The tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Since Miguel was the testamentary successor of his sister, and that the lessee
recognized him as possessor and heir to the deceased by paying rent to him. Angeles is
now barred from questioning the right of Ciriaca and her successor Miguel to the land.

Also the defendant cannot question the genuineness and due execution of the lease
which he himself recognized as it was admitted into evidence. He also cannot question
the identity of the land in question since in his answer, he stated that he had been in
possession of the lot in question and so both parties were in agreement as to the lot in
question.
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)

Facts: Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco and Luis Vizmanos were engaged in business and
that in the course thereof Santiago Trillana (Defendant) purchased from them
merchandise to the value of P4,000. In June or July 1901, the partnership was dissolved
and the business was divided up between the partners. All accoutnes and debts of the
defendant were allotted to the plaintiff. On Jan. 15, 1904, the Plaintiff filed a complaint
against defendant to recover said amount. The indebtedness was proven by the
documents (vales) signed by the Defendant in favor of Plaintiff or of Vizmanos or Lawa
(their agent).
In his answer, the defendant alleged that the had already settled his accounts and
obligations contracted in the business to which the complaint refers, by means of
periodical payments in tuba. In evidence of this, while testifying under oath, he
introduced a document dated 19 November 1903, signed by the agent Lawa declaring
that the defendant had no outstanding debt with the partnership. The trial judge ruled in
favor of the Plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay the said amount?
Held: Yes. When the agent Lawa executed the document, the business had already
closed and he had ceased to act in it administration and management. Therefore, he
was not authorized to sign the document made out by the debtor, extinguishing the
latters liability. Since the vales existed, and were in possession of the creditor, it was
because the amounts they called for had not yet been paid, inasmuch as an obligation
can only be presumed to have been fulfilled when the proofs of its existence have been
returned to the debtor.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

[Note: Sec. 3, Disputable presumptions (c.) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act.]
Facts: In this case, 18 yr. Old David Sandstorm confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen.
Based upon the confession and corroborating evidence, David Sandstorm was charged
with deliberate homicide in that he purposely or knowingly caused the death of Annie
Jensen. At trial, the jury was informed that although Sandstorm admitted killing the
victim, he did not do so purposely or knowingly, and therefore was not guilty of
deliberate homicide but of a lesser crime. They contended that 2 court-appointed
health experts described the mental state of Sandstorm as compounded by a personality
disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption. The prosecution requested the trial judge
to instruct the jury that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequence of his voluntary acts. Sandstorms counsel objected arguing that the
instruction has the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or
knowledge to the defense and that is impermissible under the Federal Constitution and
due process of law. The objection was overruled and the jury found petitioner guilty,
sentencing him to 100 yrs. in prison. Sandstorm appealed to the Montana SC affirming
in toto. Thus, this petition on certiorari to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not such instructions given by the Trial judge shifted the of proof on
criminal prosecution to the defense?
Held: The SC reversed the Montana SC.

The Respondents contention was that the instruction was merely a permissive inference
that is, it allows but did not require the jury to draw conclusions about defendants
intent from his actions and that such inferences are constitutional. Nevertheless, the
SC found that the jury was not told that they had a choice of inferring intent but rather it
can be seen that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as
mandatory.
Respondent argues further that even if viewed as a mandatory presumption rather than
as a permissive inference, the presumption did not conclusively establish intent but
rather could be rebutted. The court pointed out that, a reasonable jury could interpret
the presumption as conclusive and not technically as a presumption which could be an
irrebutable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the
presumption (which is the voluntariness of the killing done by Sandstorm) thus
effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. Montanas own
Rules of Evidence expressly state that the presumption at issue here may be overcome
only by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption.
Such a
requirement shifts not only the burden of production but also the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of intent.
A State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and may
not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by means of such a presumption. Because
Sandstorms jury may have interpreted the instruction as either a burden shifting
presumption or a conclusive presumption, either interpretation would have deprived
defendant his right to due process and thus render such instruction unconstitutional.

3. Rule 131, 4: Legitimacy or Illegitimacy

Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no
presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred
days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the
spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must
prove his allegation. (6)

T. Examination of Witnesses
1. Rule 132 1-18
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1 a)
Examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
a. done in open court
b. under oath or affirmation
c. answers of the witness shall be given orally, unless
i. the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
ii. the question calls for a different mode of answer
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or
hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers
thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or
witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand
or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official
stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be
deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2 a)
The rules now require even the statements of the judge be recorded.
Requisites for transcript to be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the
proceedings
a. made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
b. certified as correct by him

Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer

questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him.
However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and
from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an
offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless
it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be
presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense. (3 a, l9 a)
Obligation of a witness answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a
claim against him
Rights of a witness
a. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
b. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
c. Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
d. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense,
unless otherwise provided by law; or
e. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the
fact
i. at issue or
ii. from which the fact in issue would be presumed
iii. of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in
which an individual witness may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief
of a witness by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (3
a)
Direct examination the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him
on the facts relevant to the issue.
Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of
the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
a. as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith
b. with sufficient fullness and freedom
i. to test his
1. accuracy and
2. truthfulness and
3. freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse
ii. to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue

Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the crossexamination of the witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the
party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given during the crossexamination. On re-direct examination, questions on matters not dealt with
during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
(12)
Re-direct examination
a. to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination
b. with leave of court, on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct
examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters
stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as may be
allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)
Re-cross-examination
a. on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
b. with leave of court, other matters
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides
has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court.
The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of
justice may require. (14)
A witness can be recalled only with leave of the court.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to
the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading
question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On Preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified
to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not
allowed. (5 a, 6 a, and 8 a)
Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
a. cross examination;
b. Preliminary matters;
c. difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
i. ignorant, or
ii. a child of tender years, or
iii. feeble mind, or
iv. a deaf-mute;
d. unwilling or hostile witness (cf Rule 132, Sec. 12); or

Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. xxx
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

e. witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or

private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.

Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness,
or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Impeachment of adverse party's witness
a. contradictory evidence
b. evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad
c. evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony
d. evidence of conviction of an offense
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to
witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by
the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief. (6 a, 7 a)
GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad
character)
a. an unwilling or hostile witness; or
b. a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.
Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile
a. adverse interest
b. unjustified reluctance to testify, or
c. misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness
a. may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character
b. may also be impeached by the opponent
c. may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his direct
examination
d. proponent may ask leading questions
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements,
and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. (16)
Requisites for impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent statements

a. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question
is put to him concerning them.
b. the statements must be
i. related to him
ii. with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present
c. he must be asked whether he made such statements
d. if so, allowed to explain them
Escolin: if the witness refuses to acknowledge the prior inconsistent statement, present
someone who can testify that the recording of the prior statement was accurate (e.g.
stenographer, in which case, the statement is prima facie evidence of the fact stated
therein).
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good
character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached. (17)
cf Rule 130, Sec. 51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
xxx
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec(ion 14. (46 a, 47 a)

Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has
been impeached.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the
judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The
judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another until all shall have been examined. (18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or
recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the
adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and
may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or
record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made;
but such evidence must be received with caution. (10 a)
Requisites for a witness to refer to a memorandum
a. the memorandum must have been written or recorded by himself or under his
direction
b. either
i. at the time when the fact occurred, or
ii. immediately thereafter, or
iii. at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
c. he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded
d. the memorandum must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence.
e. if the witness retains no recollection of the particular facts, he must swear that the
writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may
be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence. (11 a)

When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by

one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other.
When a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence,
any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding
may also be given in evidence.
cf Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919) under Rule 130 Sec. 42
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness. Whenever a writing is
shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party. (9 a)

2. Cases
a. Examination in Open Court
People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 (1976)

Facts: In Crim. Case no. 289, People vs. Ojoy, of CFI of Iloilo, after the accused had
testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was
filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters
stated therein.
Private prosecutors objected to the proposed procedure but
notwithstanding the Judge issued an order sustaining the proposed procedure.
Contending that the said order violates Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 of Rule 132 and Sec. 1 of Rule
133, the petitioners herein file this petition on certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not said order is violative of the Rules of Court, requiring that the
testimonies of witnesses should be given orally in open court?
Held: The SC annuls said order.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a
trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The
opponent" demands confrontation for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be
had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate
answers.
Personal appearance of the witness before the judge, enables the judge as the trier of
facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only
when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance,
manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.
The physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation
and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
The great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is
based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took
advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
Thus, if a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial,
with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious
that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the
evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear
and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of
litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules,
only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of
evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be
propounded to the witness. A witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of
his own knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed,
except or, preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and intelligible
answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a
deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of
the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to
adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically
authorized by the Rules of Court.

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)

Facts: Aug. 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was assassinated as he was
about to disembark at the tarmac of the Manila International Airport. Lying prostrate on
the ground also was the dead body of Rolando Galman, the supposed assassin.
PD 1886 was promulgated by then President Marcos creating an ad hoc Fact Finding
Body which became known as the Agrava Board (chaired by Justice Corazon Agrava).
Pursuant to said decree various witnesses testified and appeared before the said board
and/or produced documentary and other evidence. Among the witnesses where Gen.
Fabian Ver, Gen. Prospero Olivas, and orther soldiers comprising Aquinos security detail.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to Pres. Marcos and
which was referred to the Tanodbayan. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 informations for murder (one for Aquino,
the other for Galman) against Ver et al either as accessories, accomplices and several
principles.
Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded guilty.
In the course of trial, the prosecution offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of Ver et al before the Agrava Board.
Ver filed a formal motion to exclude his testimony in said board contending that it is
violative of his right against self-incrimination and the immunity granted by PD 1886.
Olivas and the other respondents followed Vers motion with their own similar motion.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motion contending that the immunity could not be
granted because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the
Agrava Board.
On June 13, 1985, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution admitting all the evidence
except the testimonies produced by Ver et al in view of the immunity granted by PD
1886. MR was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by Ver et al can be admitted in evidence,
being violative of their right to self-incrimination?
Held: 9-5, Petition Dismissed.
LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND APPLICATION OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As to the argument that the fact-finding initiative of the Agrava Board did not constitute
a custodial investigation - The court herein held that the Agrava Board was created by
PD 1886 not merely to determine the facts surrounding Aquinos death but also to
identify the culprits for their consequent prosecution. As pointed out PD 1886, sec. 12
provides that the Agrava Board if its findings warrant the prosecution of any person the
Board may file the initiatory complaint with the proper government agency. By its very
nature, the investigation and questioning made by the Agrava Board was in the nature of
a custodial investigation requiring that the accused be given counsel and that he be
appraised of his rights under the Miranda doctrine.
The court found in review of the pleadings and annexes of the proceedings of the Agrava
Board was constitutionally infirm for not conforming with the specified constitutional
standards thus they should be excluded.
EFFECT OF IMMUNITY STATUTES
Use Immunity vs. Transactional Immunity - The Court further pointed out that PD 1886
denied to Ver et al the right to remain silent because under Sec. 5, PD 1886 that they
should answer all questions raised if not they would be cited for contempt of court. Also,
they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves. Nevertheless, PD
1886s denial of such rights was based on the fact that the law provided immunity to the
persons who may testify in front of said board. Thereinafter, the court differentiated,
use immunity from transactional immunity as applied here and granted by law.
Use immunity prohibits use of witness compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution. Transaction Immunity grants

immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.
PD 1886 grants use immunity only. It makes only the witness immune from use of
any statement given but not immune from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof.
Merely testifying do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding
his invocation of his right of self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against
him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. Due process demands
that the Agrava board should have been informed of their Miranda rights.
Invocation of right to remain silent before giving testimony and to prevent its use is
wrong. The literal interpretation of PD 1886 in such a way is repugnant to Article IV,
Sec. 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility.
Dissents:
Teehankee The right against self-incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is
considered an option of refusal to answer, not a prohibition of inquiry. The privilege
must be invoked at the proper time and that time is when the question is propounded.
This has to be so because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling
whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. A
person who has been summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline
to be sworn as a witness and no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling
for incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.
Melencio-Herrera - There should be no automatic immunity bath of the entire
testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the evidence as is
not privileged.
Relova Under PD 1886, testimony adduced before the Agrava Board may not be used
against the witness only after he has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination.
Therefore, respondents cannot invoke the immunity clause of PD 1886 since they did not
claim the privilege to remain silent when being asked questions at the Agrava Board
hearing.

b. Cross-Examination
de la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, 154 S 65 (1987)

Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given
on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
Implied waiver of the right of cross-examine may take various forms, as long as the party
was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed
to take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself alone. Repeated absences, and/or
unjustified motions for postponement of the hearing in which the witness is scheduled to
be cross-examined until the witness passed away is a waiver of the right to crossexamine.
Facts: On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners with
the RTC of Rizal for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of
land in the name of Ponciano de la Paz with damages
Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to
her and her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz
and approved by the court. The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1399 was Ponciano's
testate estate.
In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties
adjudicated to Loreto and her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not
accounted for in the probate proceedings but is actually community property of the
parties.
The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of
Ponciano de la Paz who died in 1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano

while: 1) Emilio de la Paz, Jr., is the son of Emilio, a recognized natural child of Ponciano;
2) Manuela de la Paz is the recognized natural child of Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is
the daughter of Emilio, recognized natural child of Ponciano; 4) Margarita de la Paz is the
daughter of Wenceslao, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida de la Paz,
is the daughter of Augusto, another recognized natural child of Ponciano. As regards
petitioner Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim that he is one of the heirs of
Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano,
he being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the decedent.
The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the
merits followed.
Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984.
On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The
cross-examination was, however, not completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open
court for the continuance of the cross-examination on the ground that he still had to
conduct a lengthy cross-examination.
On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to
some errors in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of
Loreto. The motion was granted.
This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he
would not be able to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. The
trial was rescheduled three times.
During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their
counsel appeared despite due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she
be allowed to present evidence ex parte before a commissioner. The motion was granted
and Loreto presented additional evidence ex parte in the afternoon of the same day. On
this same date, she finished the presentation of her evidence and submitted her case for
decision.
Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to crossexamine Loreto.
On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the petitioners' counsel failed to
appear, and the cross-examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time.
Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly
postponed cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short
and rescheduled again on motion of the petitioners' counsel.
Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for
the purpose of substituting the respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of
Loreto.
At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved verbally to
strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The petitioners filed a petition with the IAC to annul the lower court's orders dated
January 24, 1985 and February 11, 1985 and to prohibit the court from further
proceeding.
This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the proceedings. Thus, on March
29, 1985, the lower court promulgated a decision declaring the private respondents, the
children and heirs of Loreto, as the true owners of the subject parcel of land.
The IAC denied the petition and the MR.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Loreto should be stricken off the records.
Held: A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an interlocutory order. Wellsettled is the rule that interlocutory orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari
unless issued in patent abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of
the respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for crossexamination from the time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to
November 7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the case before her death on December
1, 1984. The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times
failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on May 23,
1984 to a later date duet o the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony
may be justified, but the same cannot be said for the subsequent posponements
requested by the petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7, 1984, did not
push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at the
scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners nor their counsel
appeared leading to the presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during the
scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners were allowed to crossexamine Loreto despite the fact that the case was already deemed submitted for
decision, the petitioners again failed to appear.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to crossexamine Loreto. Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto.
Her testimony stands.
Fulgado v. CA, 182 S 81 (1990)

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal, civil, or administrative, is a fundamental right which is part of
due process. The right is not to an actual, but a mere opportunity to cross-examine.
Failure of the adverse party to move to schedule the hearing for the cross-examination
of a witness before he died or migrated abroad (the imminence of which the adverse
party was aware) is a waiver of such right. The burden is on the party wishing to exercise
the right to cross-examination, not necessarily the plaintiff, to schedule the hearing.
Facts: On September 9,1967, Ruperto Fulgado, a man approaching the twilight of his
life, undertook the arduous task of filing an action in the CFI against herein respondents
for the annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. The
defendants (herein private respondents) filed their answer to the complaint with special
and affirmative defenses and a counterclaim.
After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was finally set for February 1, 1968 at
8:30 in the morning. Private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time at
the pre-trial and were subsequently declared as in default. Plaintiff Fulgado was then
allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court.
Meanwhile, upon learning of their predicament, private respondents immediately filed a
motion to lift the order of default on the same day that the order was issued. The trial
court denied said motion in its order of February 16, 1972. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Persistently, respondents filed a petition for relief from
the default order. Once more, this was denied.
On April 24, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Ruperto
Fulgado. On appeal, however, the CA found that private respondents had been deprived
of their day in court by the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default.
The Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on June 27,1974 and the
records of the case were remanded to the trial court.
The case was set for hearing but was rescheduled because the judge went on leave. In
the meantime, Fulgado died and was substituted by his heirs. Fulgado's witness, Jose
Fulgado, referred to in the dispositive part of the Appellate Court's judgment, had earlier
migrated to the United States.
The respondents prayed for the sticking off from the records the testimonies of the
petitioners witnesses which the court allowed. As a consequence, the case was
dismissed.
The CA affirmed the TCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witnesses should be excluded.

Held: The appeal is well-taken.

The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has
always been understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-examination, but
merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. Thus the
resolution of the present case would hinge on whether or not this was an opportunity for
cross-examination.
From the records presented, it is manifest that private respondents had enough
opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before
his migration. When the Court of Appeals set aside the default judgment and remanded
the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits, "granting to the defendants the
opportunity to present their evidence." This was a positive signal for them to proceed
with the cross-examination of the two Fulgados. But despite knowledge of Ruperto's
failing health (he was then 89 years of age) and Jose's imminent travel to the United
States, private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. They tarried for more
than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision on June 27, 1974 to ask
the trial court on July 3, 1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any
date of August and September ... ."
Razon v. CA, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)
Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental, 52 O.G. 4672 (1956)
U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
U.S. v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

c. Recalling Witnesses
People v. Rivera, 200 S 786 (1991)

The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's

mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of
justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as
here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the
earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground
for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but
ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional
questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant
or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial
ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for
instance, that particularly identified material points were not covered in the crossexamination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the
witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so
inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, there
would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
Furthermore, failure of the recalled witness to be appear is not ground to strike out his
testimony. There should have been a showing of the indispensability of his further
examination, what it was that would have been elicited, and that such additional
testimony would cause the evidence to become inadmissible. Lastly, striking out of
testimony must be upon motion. It can not be ordered motu propio.
Facts: Wilfredo Sembrao was charged with Arson for allegedly willfully causing the fire
which destroyed the 2nd and 3rd floors of the I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath
Owned by Juanito Tan and frequented by Stanley Fabito. On December 8, 1987,
prosecution witness Benjamin Lee testified on Sembranos act of running from the VIP
room where the fire started and his refusal to stop. On April 26, 1987, cross, re-direct
and re-cross examinations were conducted after which Lee was asked to step down.

After the prosecution completed its presentation of evidence but before it could rest its
case, defendants original counsel withdrew and was substituted by defendants original
counsel withdrew and was substituted by atty. Rodriguez, who then filed a motion to
recall Lee for further examination on the ground that there seems to be many points
and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded by the other
defense counsel who conducted the cross-examination. The court granted the motion
over objections of the prosecution. Lee failed to come since he left his work and
transferred somewhere else to dispense with the recall of Lee but the RTC denied this
and even ordered the testimony of Lee to be stricken of the record due to a lack of
complete cross-examination. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTCs grant of leave to recall Lee was proper?
Held: No. Certiorari granted.
Although the Rules of Court gives the court discretion in granting leave for the recall of
witnesses, such cannot be exercised on the basis of applicants mere general statement
that there is need to recall a witness in the interest of justice or in order to afford a
party full opportunity to present his case or the reason invoked in the present case. To
regard these generalities as sufficient ground to recall a witness would make it
ministerial rather than discretionary. Thus, there must be a satisfactory showing of
some concrete, substantial ground for the recall (e.g. that particularly identified material
points were not covered in the cross, that particularly described vital documents were
not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, that the cross-examination was
conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof). Here, the
questions that were supposedly not asked were not specified in the motion.
Moreover, the RTC acted whimsically when it ordered the striking out of Lees testimony.
The court acted unilaterally without any motion to this effect and without giving the
prosecution opportunity to contest it. The striking out was ordered without any showing
that further cross was really indispensable. Here, Lee was already subjected to both
cross and re-cross so that the absence of cross can neither be invoked as a ground to
strike out Lee testimony.
People v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716 (1968)

Facts: Estrada was one of several accused in kidnapping Elvira Principe. The CFI found
Estrada guilty and was sentenced to death. The case of the people was established thru
the testimonies of 12 witnesses. Ceribo, one of the witnesses who testified for the
prosecution, testified that he was a surrendered Huk and he already knew about the
kidnapping because there was a conference in Barrio Biga where it was agreed to kidnap
Elvira because she was the one pointed to by Estrada. Estradas defense was that the
charge against him was a pure concoction. Estrada sought to recall Ceribo because it
was claimed that he was to retract his previous testimony from the prosecution and then
testify for the defense. However, the court denied the defense the right to call back
Ceribo.
Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in denying the defense the right to
call back witness Ceribo?
Held: The SC held that under Sec. 14, Rule 132 Rules of Court explicitly provides that
the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require. It was the better part of discretion and caution on the
part of the court to have denied it. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to
show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for
the prosecution.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207 (1977)

d. Leading Questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994)

A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in
the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and

credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make
them known to the court. In the case before us, the trial court noted that although
Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions,
"her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition
did not vitiate her credibility.
State v. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)

e. Impeaching One's Own Witness

Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706 (1960)

f. Impeachment By Bias
U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
U.S. v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)

g. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement

Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986)

A party may impeach a witness by introducing into evidence their previous testimony in
his disbarment proceedings which are inconsistent with their current testimony. An
attorney may waive the confidential nature of his own disbarment proceedings.
Facts: On May 16, 1979, a case for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of
Possession and Damages" was filed by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de
Ebuiza, mother of the other private respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner
Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons for the recovery of a parcel of land located at
Urbiztondo, San Juan. La Union.
The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case previously filed on July
22, 1975 with this Court by private respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner
Villalon with falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and his sons'
favor, but which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his contingent fee for the
professional services he had rendered to EBUIZA's parents. The Disbarment Case was
referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation where testimonial evidence was received. The case still pends thereat.
In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence the
testimonies of some of the private respondents, namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina
Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.), in the Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching
their testimonies in the Civil Case.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters
relating to the proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on
September 20, 1985, the TC issued its questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike.
Their MR was denied so they filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
with the IAC which denied their petition.
Held: By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to
impeach the credibility of their adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former
occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the statements made during the
trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case.
The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification
of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil
Case wherein the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.
The offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to
petitioners, while procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes
of impeachment. The broader interests of justice would then require that petitioners be

given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial
appreciation.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927)

To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statements, he must be given ample

opportunity to explain the discrepancies by a reading to him of such prior statement.
Mere presentation of the statement, without said declaration having been read to the
witness while he testified, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to cross-examine the witness
during the preliminary investigation. He can only give questions to the investigating
officer to be propounded to the witness.
Facts: The evidence shows, as an indisputable fact, that in the early morning of April 25,
1926, one Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of
Maasin, Leyte, form the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in
the left lung, as appears from the death certificate.
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having
been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and,
because, moreover, of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation
and during the trial.
The TC convicted the accused of murder.
Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court erred in not ignoring Glicerio Orit's
testimony, and in not acquitting the accused Alejo Resabal on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Held: We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the
information to be used as a witness for the Government, does not prevent this witness
from telling the truth in this case, especially in the absence of proof showing the interest
he might possibly have in testifying against the accused. Neither is the apparent
contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of
the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for
the simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him
of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the
discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1,
without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court
of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)

h. Impeachment By Other Means

U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
Coles v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)

i. Exclusion of Witnesses

People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)

Facts: Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama and Pampang were charged and convicted for the
murder of Eleno Lamorena in the CFI of Lanao.
On appeal, said persons assigned as error the trial courts refusal to admit a certain
witness presented by the defense on the ground that said witness had been present
during a hearing despite the courts order that all witnesses leave the court.
Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the witness was proper?
Held: Yes. Conviction affirmed.
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the discretion of the court to admit or
reject the testimony of the witness. Although the SC is of opinion that the lower court
should have admitted the testimony of the witness, especially when he said that he did
not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to show that this error
has affected appellants defense especially since there is no indication whatsoever as to
what the witness would have stated in his testimony.
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)

Facts: Joe Berry Bishop was convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. When
the case was called for trial, defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The
prosecutor stated that most of his witnesses were police officers. Counsel for the
defendant argued that his client would be prejudiced by allowing the officers to remain
and moved for their exclusion. This motion was denied because the trial court wanted
the police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the trail as an educational
experience, and wanted them to be able to see the fruits of their labor. Hence, this
appeal to the CA of Oregon.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in not excluding the witnesses and was the
defendant prejudiced by this failure to exclude the witnesses?
Held: Yes, the trial court erred. A review of Oregon SC cases reveals that a motion to
exclude witnesses is normally granted. The practice of excluding witnesses from the
courtroom except while each is testifying is to be strongly recommended, particularly
here the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure cumulative or corroborative.
However, these authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude witnesses and
the other party voices no objection, the motion should always be granted. When the
motion is opposed, the trial courts discretion comes into play. The trail court must
weigh the good cause shown for not excluding witnesses against policy favoring
exclusion. Thus, if the record contains some showing of good cause for not excluding
the witnesses and if the trial court made a reasonable choice between the good cause
shown and the policy favoring exclusion, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. But
if the record contains no reason for not excluding witnesses, or an insufficient reason,
then the trial court has abused its discretion. In this case, the CA found that the reasons
advanced by the trial court were not relevant to the purpose of the trail, namely, the
determination of whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Balanced
against the danger that the witnesses memories might be confused by other testimony,
and the other reasons for the rule of sequestration (exclusion), the reasons advanced by
the court were insufficient.
Yes, he was prejudiced. The State has the burden to prove the lack of prejudice from
denial of defendants motion to exclude witnesses, and when a trail court has abused its
discretion by not excluding witnesses, prejudice will be assumed unless the record
affirmatively reflects the contrary.

j. Refreshing Recollection
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)

U.Authentication and Proof of Documents

1. Rule 132 19-33

Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents
a. written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
b. notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and
c. public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
Public documents
Genuineness and authenticity presumed

Private documents
Must prove genuineness and
execution

Binding against the parties and 3rd persons

Binds only parties to the document

due

Certain transactions are required to be in a public

document (e.g. donation of real property)

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. (cf with Rule 132, Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (23 a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary.
Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by
any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
authenticity need be given. (22 a)
Requisites for admissibility of private document
a. offered as authentic due execution and authenticity must be proved
i. either by
1. anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

2. evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

a. any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
1. upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
2. has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person
b. a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge
ii. Unless it is an ancient document; requisites
1. more than 30 years old
2. produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and
3. unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
b. not offered as authentic identified as that which it is claimed to be
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
a. entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
b. all other public documents evidence, even against a 3rd person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19 (official acts), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
The record of public documents of official acts may be evidenced by
a. an official publication thereof or
b. a copy
i. attested by
1. the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
2. his deputy, and
ii. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1. accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a. secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general
c. consul
d. vice consul, or
e. consular agent or
f. any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept
2. authenticated by the seal of his office.
Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts
a. get a copy from the legal custodian
b. have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
c. have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodian of a
copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation

must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
a. state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be
b. be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy
of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in
which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the
record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the
just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record
of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy
thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
a. the original record, or
b. a copy thereof
i. attested by the legal custodian of the record
ii. with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
a. A written statement
i. signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
ii. that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office,
b. accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed to have custody
If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss from
a. notary public
b. bureau of archives
c. clerk of court who commissioned the notary public
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be
impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial
officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the
record, in respect to the proceedings. (30 a)
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of
a. want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer
b. collusion between the parties, or
c. fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged
or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31 a)

Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by

law
a. may be presented in evidence without further proof
b. the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. The party producing a
document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been
altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties
affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute
a. must account for the alteration, either as
i. made by another, without his concurrence, or
ii. made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
iii. otherwise properly or innocently made, or
iv. the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument
b. If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence
Sec. 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed
private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33
a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents
written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial. (34 a)
Documents written in an unofficial language
a. shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino
b. parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial.

2. Cases
a. Proof of private documents
Buag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988)

The authenticity and due execution of a private document is not proven by testimony
that the party thumbmarked it. The circumstances of the presence of the witness during
the execution must be related. There must be proof that the party understood it,
considering he was illiterate (implied from the thumbmarking). There must be showing
that the document was duly read, explained and translated to the illiterate party.
Facts: These is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Pampanga
between Bunag and Bautista. Bunag claims that the property in question was originally
owned by his father Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for
1941 and 320 for 1960 (Exhs. B & E). They had transferred their residence to Tarlac
from Pampanga and Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, was allowed by his father
to erect a house on said lot and lived therein on the condition that he would pay for the
land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. He admitted, however, that he only
learned about this agreement from his father. On September 15,1962, and September
24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his lawyer, to vacate
the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). On the other hand, Bautista
testified that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of
January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered

it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no money, he referred the
matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the
P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his
father and Bunag; that he came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he
stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed his
sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos, trees,
calamansi, eggplants, thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5
to 5-M); that the property is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and he denies that her sister
Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay on the property as her sister had
a house of her own then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said
property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when Bunag affixed Ms
thumbmark on the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other
documents supporting the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the
parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and the letter of the assessor to
Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment. (Rollo, pp. 15-18). The
trial court decided in favor of petitioner. The CA, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to
have been validly executed and rueld in favor of Bruno. MR was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was authentic and validly executed?
Held: Note here that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a notary
public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of
attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly
typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint. The deed of sale is not
notarized and is, therefore, a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must
be proved before it can be received in evidence.
Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section
21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale,
the CA relied on the testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents.
However, the TC had ruled otherwise since it received the testimony of Brigida with
caution, coming as it does from a sister of the defendants. The circumstances other
alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related. Neither
does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It
should be noted that the deed was written in English. Since it appears that said
document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio
Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the circumstances, the minimum proof
necessary to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the
document (Exhibit "1") was duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag.
Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented.
The SC also considered the lack of instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief
that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked.
without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of
the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence that a private writing must
be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the testimony
of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of
Exhibit "l," coming as it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not,
be overlook falling short the minimum requirements of credibility. The testimony of an
eye-witness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must state
that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed
thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the
writing. More so if the document was merely thumb-marked.

The Court adopts the TC's findings and its conclusion that the due execution and
authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not proved and thus such private
document should be excluded.

b. Ancient documents
Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990)

Where the offerors witness testified that the document had a missing 4th page, the
document can not qualify as an ancient document because it is blemished by alteration
or circmstance of suspicion. An incomplete document is akin to an altered document,
more so if the missing page contains the signature of the parties to the document. Proof
of the documents authenticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)

Lack of signatures on the first pages of a document alone is not a blemish that would
disqualify a document from being an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had
been substituted should be proven in order to disqualify the document from being an
ancient document, more so if the documents were shown to be exact copies of the
original on file with the Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity
is no longer required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had been
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to determine
whether the document was in fact an ancient document because it was in the first place
a public document whose authenticity and due execution need not be proven. The
problem with this case is it is now authority to say that private documents whose first
pages are not signed by the parties can qualify as ancient documents. Keep in mind that
crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact that the document presented matches the one
on file in the Registry of Deeds. Had there been no matching copy in the Registry of
Deeds, I submit that the document can not qualify as an ancient document.
Facts: An action for recovery of possession was field by Songco and Doe alleging that
Lacsa owed the disputed piece of and by showing an OCT and that the respondent
occupied the land by fraud. Respondents denied the allegation and said that the OCT
relied upon by the petitioners was superseded by a TCT by virtue of a document (Exh. 3)
and later by superseded by another document (Exh. 7). Petitioners submit that the
documents are not ancient documents for it must not only be 30 yrs. old but also found
in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion. They allege that the document cannot be considered as such because the
first 2 pages did not bear the signatures of the parties to the document.
Issue: Whether or not the documents are ancient documents?
Held: Yes, under the rule, the documents must be atleast 30 yrs. old and this was shown
by the fact that exh. 3 was executed on April 7, 1923 and Exh. 7 on January 20, 1924.
The next requisite that it be found or produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found was shown when the document was found under the care of the Register of
Deeds as they certified that both documents are copies of the original. The petitioners
contention that the lack of signature on the first two apges cast doubt on the
authenticity of the document was answered by the SC saying that we cannot uphold
this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As the petitioner failed to show proof of the
irregularity, the SC ruled that the document is valid. As a contract appearing honest and
lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness must
present conclusive evidence of fabrication.

c. Proof of foreign judgments

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)

To be enforceable, the foreign judgment must be proven as a public document of a

written official act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
The offeror must submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having legal
custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the original,

which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer having

jurisdiction in that country.
Facts: Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation
(Pascor) as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the GulfEast Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred
from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with
officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the
services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement
of others to insubordination.
Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts unbecoming a marine
officer and for character assassination. Rances denied the charges set out in the
complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a
court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign
principal. The POEA found Rances liable for inciting another officer or seaman to
insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6)
months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension. The
POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of Rances.
Later, Rances filed a complaint against Pascor where he sought to carry out and enforce
the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal
which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in the first POEA Case. Rances claimed that be
had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by
the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with
the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the
wife of the claimant Rances doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] and that since
his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her, he was entitled to recover the
additional US$ 1,500.00." As evidence of this foreign award, Rances submitted what
purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic
script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator
and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin
Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." In its answer filed on 11 December 1985,
petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: (1.) that the copy of the Dubai decision
relied upon by Rances could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly
authenticated; (2.) that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; (3.) that
the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and
(4.) that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having
been there dismissed as a counterclaim.
In its decision, the POEA held Pascor liable to pay Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00
"at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." The POEA denied Pascor's
appeal for having been filed out of time. On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private
respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC. On 14
August 1986, NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as filed out of time.
Issue: (Related to evidence) Whether or not the Dubai decision was admissible in
evidence as proven?
Held: The appeal should have been allowed by the NLRC because there was a real effort
and legal cause for the said appeal. In the end, the decision of the POEA was set aside.
Ruling on the merits,
An examination of the complaint filed by Rances in the POEA shows that the cause of
action pleaded by Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by the Dubai Court
which purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$
1,500.00 under certain circumstances. Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had
no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1,
Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has
jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen." Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's

foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court
which had apparently already been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances
of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for
enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular
courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia,
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of
evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in
proceedings before the POEA.
Even assuming in arguendo that the POEA has jurisdiction, still Rances cannot rely upon
the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The
Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner
of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a writing is attend
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the
proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai
Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original
decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular
Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984,
signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the
requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged
by Section 25.
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai
decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an
English translation of that decision., but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official
language like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a
translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. In the instant case, there is no showing of
who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances
submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by
an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government.
Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English
languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not
sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that
translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai
decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of the English translation
submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to have been rendered
against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent
Rances simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign
principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation that was
resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be enforced
against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to

be rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly
denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of
Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court.
Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure
governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign principal Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd. it still would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound by
the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach
to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with
persons like respondent Rances. Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for
judgments secured against Gulf East Ship Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf
East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may involve a
contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993)

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a witness is not
sufficient to prove foreign law.
Facts: Zalamea purchased two tickets from the Manila agent of TWA. Cesar and
Suthiras tickets were purchased as a 75% discount, while Lianas was a full fare ticket.
They all had confirmed reservations. In NY, on the appointed date, they checked in an
hour earlier but they were placed in the wait-list. Eventually, only Cesar was able to
board while the 2 others had to book with American Airlines. Upon their arrival in Manila,
they filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage. The LC
ruled in their favor, while the CA modified it as regards moral damages, on the ground
that there was no fraud or bad faith, since . . . overbooking of flights is specifically
allowed by the Code of Federal Regulations by the CAB.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith
because it has a right to overbook flights?
Held: The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must alleged and prove. Written law may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of it
customer service agent that the Code of the CAB allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact.

d. Documents in unofficial language

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)

A document written in an unofficial language should be translated into either English or

Filipino. The translator should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or
as a competent translator of both languages. The translation should be either sworn to
as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976)

Affidavits written in an unofficial language and not accompanied with a translation are
inadmissible in evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which dont have the required
documentary stamp tax will not be admitted in evidence.
Facts: One night, Monleon arrived at his house drunk. He inquired from Concordia, his
wife, whether their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano. She
assured him that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where the carabao
was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that the carabao had
not been adequately fed. He became furious.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued
between them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed
her head against a post, and kicked her in the abdomen. He shouted: "What do I care if
there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let your brothers and
sisters stand up and I will also include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children,
pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that
morning of June 2. Death was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition
within the belly, requiring surgical intervention
Sixteen days after Concordia death, Monleon thumbmarked a confession, written in the
Cebuano dialect and sworn to before the town mayor (Exh. C). He admitted in that
confession that he assaulted his wife and that he had repented for the wrong which he
had done to her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the Cebu City
police department and a relative of Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife
because he was drunk and she was a nagger.
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) exhumed her body. He found bluish-black
discolorations on the sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical
vertebra below the skull or at the base of the neck, and on the first ribs. The
discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage "caused by trauma or external violence."
The doctor ventured the opinion that the "acute abdomen" could have been caused "by
external violence"
Monleon denied that he used violence against his wife. He testified that he and his wife
had merely a verbal quarrel and that Clemencia, the sister of Concordia and the wife of
his elder brother, testified against him because Clemencia and Monleon had a boundary
dispute regarding the lands inherited by Clemencia and Concordia from their father,
Victor Bongo. Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo" that he
would take care of his children. He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if
he did not affix his thumbmark to his confession.
The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio
alleged that the trial court erred in giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit
of his son, Marciano, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the NBI
medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in treating the alleged declarations of
Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in rejecting the
testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and Felicisima.
Held: TCs judgment affirmed but lowered to reclusion perpetua. The court herein held
that:
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo
was the victim was established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon
and Epifania Bongo. Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was corroborated
by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133 and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not destroy the
probative value of the confession nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he
assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the confession by reason of the
improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or
untrustworthiness.

The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his
thumbmark to the confession. There is no evidence that he was tortured or maltreated.
Monleon could have complained to the fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he
was forced to execute his confession. He did not do so.
Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's
affidavit which was written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh. E) and which was not
accompanied with the corresponding translation. That confession is well-taken. The trial
court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because
section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English, Spanish or the national language "To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial"
The trial court, also, erred in ruling that the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to
the husband of Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent acts inflicted upon her
(Concordia) by appellant Monleon, are part of the res gestae. That ruling was made in
connection with Clemencia's testimony (not on direct examination but in answer to the
questions of the trial judge) that at eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or about
an hour after Concordia was assaulted by Monleon, she (Concordia) left her house and
went to Clemencia's house three hundred meters away and recounted to Clemencia's
husband (appellant Monleon's brother) how she was beaten by Monleon. Appellants
counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely maltreated
by Monleon (according to the prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go
to Clemencia's house which was located on a hill. Clemencia's testimony reveals that she
must have been confused in making that assertion, assuming that it was accurately
translated and reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire testimony reveals that what she
really meant was that Concordia on the following day, June 2, recounted to her, as
Concordia recounted also to Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all
probability what happened was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around eight
o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her husband that she witnessed the assault
made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia.
People v. Salison, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)

Facts: At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria
Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was
then watching television in a store. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder
and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There,
appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente,
Dignaran and Fediles suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously
attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez approached them that the
three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able
to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started
to maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of
wood and started to hit Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his
head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and
ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed Valmoria
but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house.
During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter,
Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that
time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of
witness Patricia Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his
declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness would
testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence.

After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents
proceeded to the hospital. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However,
at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the
hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of
Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible
for the injuries he sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into
writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is
inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The appellant further contends that
the declaration was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of
the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the
time of its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or
Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain.
He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be
used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he
believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events,
assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as
part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under
the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)

Facts: The accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. To
prove that the accused was not a registered owner of a gun, the Prosecution introduced
as evidence a certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra,
Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame. The certification
stated that accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or
caliber.
The defense objected saying that it was hearsay because the person certifying was not
presented in court. The TC however admitted the same.
The accused was found guilty by the TC.
Issue: Whether or not the certificate is admissible and if it is, was it sufficient.
Held: On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on
hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44, Entries in official
records.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of
the said document.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNPFirearm and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in
the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is
not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the
certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a
specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of
its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be.
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999

V. Offer and Objection

1. Rule 132 34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the
offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of
a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed
by the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
a. testimony the time the witness is called to testify
b. documentary and object after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Offer of evidence

Identification of evidence

Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made

immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of
a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days
after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
a. orally immediately after the offer is made.
b. in writing within 3 days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is
allowed by the court.
c. a question propounded in the course of the oral examination as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
The grounds for the objections should always be specified.
Grounds for objection
a. Hearsay
b. argumentative
c. leading
d. misleading
e. incompetent
f. irrelevant
g. best evidence rule
h. parole evidence rule
i. question has no basis
j.

Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes

reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the
questions being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection
has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall
not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
a. in the course of the examination of a witness
b. objection has been made
c. reasonably apparent that the questions being propounded are of the same class as
those to which objection has been made
d. adverse party records his continuing objection to such class of questions
Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after
the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to
inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made
an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining
the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds
relied upon. (38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
a. must be given immediately after the objection is made
b. unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question
presented; but the ruling shall always be made
i. during the trial and
ii. at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to
meet the situation presented by the ruling.
GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the
objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even if the rules does not
require the judge to so state.
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question before
the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same,
and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the
objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers
which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
a. witness answers the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection
b. objection is found to be meritorious
c. court order that the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to
or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)

If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the

offeror may
a. have the same attached to or made part of the record, if the evidence is object or
documentary
b. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
i. the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
ii. the substance of the proposed testimony.

2. Cases
a. When evidence considered offered
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997)

The court shall consider no evidence, even an extra-judicial confession, which has not
been formally offered. Mere fact that evidence has been identified and marked in the
course of the examination of a witness, without the contents being recited in his
testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered as evidence. Identification of
documentary evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the
marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is
done only when the party rests its case.
PB Com v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991)

Where the genuineness and due execution of documents of an instrument attached to a

complaint are deemed admitted by failure to specifically deny it under oath, such
instruments are considered as evidence although they were not formally offered.
Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
(8a)

Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991)

Mere fact that a document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has been offered as
evidence. Marking at the pre-trial was only for the purpose of identifying them at that
time. However, if an exhibit has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and has
itself been incorporated into the records (i.e. recital of the contents of the exhibit).

b. When objection make

People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993)

Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal offer of the testimony should be
done when the witness was called to testify.
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994)

Failure to object upon the time a witness is called to testify on the ground that there was
no formal offer of the testimony is a waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground
after the witness has testified is too late.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)

Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e.
when the party rests its case) as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time
(e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere identification and marking is not
equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide to not offer evidence
already identified and marked.
de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection because
continuing objections are applicable when there is a single objection to a class of
evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new rules on evidence is now
clear that continuing objections are applicable only to testimonial evidence.

de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible evidence is
being identified and marked, and then object when it is formally offered? Interpacific
Transit was explicit when it said What really matters is the objection to the document at
the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents recited,
the offeror decides not to formally offer it into evidence. Is the court authorized to
consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena? I would say yes
because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of the testimony of the
witness which has been formally offered.
People v. Cario, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
Vda. de Oate v. CA, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

W.

Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

1. Rule 133
Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider
a. all the facts and circumstances of the case
b. the witnesses' manner of testifying
c. their intelligence
d. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
e. the nature of the facts to which they testify
f. the probability or improbability of their testimony
g. their interest or want of interest
h. their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
i. number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.
An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.

Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. (2 a)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
a. does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty.
b. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
a. There is more than one circumstance
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence
upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
a. the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties

b. but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.

2. Cases
People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)

Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there were no eyewitnesses.
However, there was evidence as to the presence of the accused at the scene of the
crime before and at the time the fire started, that he moved out hurriedly and running
away from the burning premises, that he had previously manifested resentment against
the owner of the premises and even hinted that he would burn the owners house, that
he abandoned his job, left Davao City without leaving a word to anyone, and went into
hiding in Manila, that he concealed his identity by disguising himself with long hair, long
moustache, and colored eyeglasses, that he exhibited indifference and unperturbed
attitude towards the fate suffered by the victims, that he did not even condole with the
bereaved family and relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake or the
funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and strained relationship with the
owner of the burned premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)

Facts: Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio clasa were
charged with the crime of murder (of Pedro Sopriengo, a Chinaman). The 2 principal
witnesses for the prosecution, Moldes and Resardo, positively identified the 4 defendants
as the assailants. 3 other witnesses for the prosecution testified that they saw Agapito
Lasada carrying a stick or a club and dressed in caamo and accompanied by 3 men
walking around the town. On the other hand, the defense sought to establish an alibi,
and for this purpose presented witnesses testifying that Agapito Lasada was sick with
beri-beri and could hardly walk, and that at the time of the incident he was at the house
of Vicente Tuazon, the municipal president of the town of Abuyog.
Issue: Whether or not defendants are guilty? Whether or not the testimony of the
defenses witness should be accepted?
Held: To determine whose testimony is to be accepted as true, an analysis of the proofs
is necessary. There are several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is by crossexamination to involve the witness in contradiction and discrepancies as to material
facts stated by him. But if the conflicts cannot be reconciled, the court must adopt that
testimony which it believes to be true, and in reaching this conclusion it can take into
consideration the general character of the witness, his manner and demeanor on the
stand, the consistency of his statements, their probability and improbability, his ability
and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence, his motive to speak the truth or
swear a falsehood.
The SC believed the prosecution witnesses. (Although the dissent believed the defense
witnesses.) Vicente Tuazon the principal witness for the defense was deeply interested
in the case because he had been directed to confine the defendant in accordance with
the decision of the court. Doctor Stallmens testimony provided that Agapito could
hardly walk but defendant could and in fact did walk around town and never was in a
condition that he could not travel. The testimony of Barbasan and Mundala wherein they
stated that they, together with Moldes and Resarda were invited to the house of Julia
Sopriego and that Julia offered them P200 each on condition that they would testify that
the defendant and his brothers killed he father is so unreasonable that it can not be
believed.
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)

Facts: Abendan was convicted in the CFI of Pangasinan for the murder of Doria. It was
alleged that, during his term as Chief of Police, the accused arrested Doria, took him to a
cemetery, tried to bury him alive and then finished him off. The prosecution presented
three witnesses, Samson, Delfin and Arzadon who were allegedly ith the accused when
the incident happened.

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the three witnesses is sufficient to convict the
accused of murder?
Held: No. Acquitted.
The truthfulness of the witnesses is doubtful since they had every reason to be hostile to
the accused appellant.
It is shown that the appellant had caused the arrest of Samson and Delfin because of
certain criminal charges. While Aazon had been investigated by the appellant for the
theft of cement. It also appears that on one occasion the appellant slapped and kicked
Delfin because of the latters admission of illegal acts.
It is improbable that the appellant would have utilized the three witnesses in
perpetrating a heinous crime without a showing that they were of his confidence.
Dissent, J. Tuazon The evidence is conclusive and airtight. The witnesses were all
simple folks who gave simple, flawless narration of the murder. None of them have been
shown to have sufficient reason to lie.
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

Facts: SPO3 Jose Nio narrated that at about 9:00 p.m., July 9, 1992, with CAFGU
members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Bgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons there. From there, they proceeded to Bgy. Onion where they met Nilo
Solayao and four others. Nio became suspicious when they observed that the latter
were drunk and that Solayo was wearing a camouflage uniform. Solayaos companions,
upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Nio introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which
the Solayao was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm
locally know as "latong."
When he asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm, Solayao
answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Solayao, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that
this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was
still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a
shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves
as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the
others had been used up. Solayaos claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that
he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves.
On August 25, 1994, the TC found Solayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under
Sec. 1 of PD 1866. It found that Solayao did not contest the fact that Nio confiscated
the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly
found credible Solayaos submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by
accident.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm?
Held: In People v. Lualhati, it was ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,:
the existence of the subject firearm and
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
As to the argument that the subject firearm was the product of an unlawful warrantless
search - In this case, Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of Nio's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage
uniform and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be

noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons were roaming around the bgys of Caibiran. This case is similar to
Posadas v. CA being a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a
search even before an arrest could be made.
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the
absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, the SC pointed out that the
prosecution failed to prove that Solayao lacked the necessary permit or license to
possess the subject firearm. It is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and
every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution was
only able to prove by testimonial evidence that Solayao admitted before Nio that he did
not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm. In other words, the
prosecution relied on Solayaos admission to prove the second element.
The SC stated that this admission is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm. An admission by the accused, in
this case Solayao, can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing
beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and
which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged. By its very nature, an
"admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt
may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt. It is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues
pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but
which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."
Said admission is extra-judicial in nature thus not covered by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof. Not being a
judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not
stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
The SC agrees with the argument of the Sol. Gen. that "while the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession
of appellant, w/o the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the
same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry
such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing
evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned."
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)

Facts: Agapito and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Cagayan and
among their neighbors are Bgy Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert
Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse responded to a report that a there was
a stabbing incident in said Bgy 12.
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores,
a policewoman of his own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained
bolo and a fan knife and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was and in front of the Bgy. Capt.s store, Eclipse
saw Agapito on the ground w/ blood all over his body.
Eclipse called for Bgy Capt. Liban to come out of his house. In the presence and within
the hearing of said barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering
because I killed my husband".
Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless body of Agapito to a
funeral parlor while he and Dolores went to the PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse turned

over Dolores together with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer. Eclipse then orally
made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the Police Blotter.
The defense contended that it was not Dolores but a Robert Santos who killed Agapito. In
the p.m. of July 30, 1990, Agapito and his neighbor Robert were in the former's house
passing the time over a bottle of beer grande. When Dolores arrived home from work,
Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos, met her with the following intemperate
questions: Your mother's cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?
Dolores just kept quiet, and then went to the market. To buy something to cook for
supper. Upon returning home, while cooking in the kitchen, she heard an argument
between them pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade w/c the latter gave Santos.
Dolores tried to pacify them but Santos was running out of the house with a bolo and
being chased by Agapito who was holding a knife and whose clothes were bloodied. A
struggle ensued between Agapito and Robert and, while wrestling, Agapito dropped the
knife which Dolores picked up and tried to stab Robert but she was so overwhelmed by
nervousness, falling unconscious. When she regained consciousness, found herself
beside her dying husband, Dolores picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise
time when Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident. Dolores gave the knife and bolo
to Eclipse. Eclipse invited her to go with him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station and when
they arrived there, Eclipse, in the presence of Dolores, reported that she killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she did not
say anything.
The TC convicted Dolores giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It found nothing on record which showed that their impartiality had been
vitiated or compromised or that they had any motive to falsely impute upon the
appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the appellant
surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she
killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was needed
to prove her culpability. The trial court held that the confession was admissible for it was
not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in connection with
the killing of her husband.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense.
First, she testified that she did not confess to Eclipse in the presence of Barangay
Captain Liban. If her denial is true, why did she not correct or even protest what Eclipse
did or reported?
Second, she blamed Robert Santos who did her husband in. If this is true, why did she
not tell it to Eclipse and Bgy. Capt. Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she withhold
such a very vital information when she was brought to the Tuguegarao PNP Station
shortly after the incident?
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the PI, since, it afforded the
accused the best opportunity to explain her innocence and to identify the "real killer" of
her husband.
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. How can a man injured be able to chase
another man and wrestle him to the ground?
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are at variance at a very
vital point particularly the wrestling of the bolo. Racheta said that when the two men
caught up with one another Robert could no longer run anywhere else, he turned around,
faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him many times. Such inconsistency in the
version of the two defense witnesses cannot but heighten one's conviction that the
defense theory is a conjured one.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Bgy.
Capt. Liban and SPO1 Eclipse?
Held: SC held that the Ruling of the TC affirmed.

The TC held that prosecution witness Eclipse told the truth when he declared under oath
that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him
that she killed her husband.
If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of
esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public
duty as a peace officer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as to an
improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good
faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused.
Liban's testimony does not have to corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the confession of
the Dolores. What must be corroborated is the EJ confession & not the testimony of the
person to whom the confession is made, & the corroborative evidence required is not the
testimony of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible and
positive & if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient to convict. In determining the value & credibility of evidence, witnesses are
to be weighed, not numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not
question its presence because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in
this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not
mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be
some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were
necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify
conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need
not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt.
However, the TCs characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed her
husband as an extrajudicial confession is wrong, it is only an admission. In a confession.
there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: A confession
is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which
constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the
appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and
circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by
strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not
guilty of killing her husband.
The circumstances described in the TC decision constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person. The requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are
present.
In appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.