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Maquiling vs. Comelec

April 16, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:
Luisa (kinda used Michels locgov digest! thank you!)
SUMMARY:
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Fil citizen who lost
his Fil citizenship when he became a naturalized US citizen.
He applied for repatriation and met the twin requirements of
taking the oath of allegiance and renouncing his US
citizenship. However, he still continued to use his US
passport in his travel abroad. Subsequently, he filed his
COC.
A petition to disqualify/ cancel COC was filed against
him on the ground of citizenship. He was not able to file an
answer until after elections (he won) and his proclamation.
The second placer, Maquiling, intervened, claiming
that since the winning candidate (Arnado) was disqualified
from the beginning, he is the qualified mayor.
SC held that Arnado was disqualified from the
beginning and that Maquiling was the qualified mayor.
DOCTRINE:
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining
the winner of an election.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules

that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of
those who are allowed to participate as players. When there
are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America,
he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Stating, among others : I am a natural born Filipino citizen /
naturalized Filipino citizen. I am not a permanent resident of,
or immigrant to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the office
I seek to be elected to.
On 28 April 2010, Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal

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mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the

10 May 2010 local and national elections. Balua contended
that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto the ff:
-

A certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration

dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American
A computer-generated travel record dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines
A certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the passenger manifest

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an

Order requiring Arnado to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken
by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer.
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. They granted the petition for
disqualification.

They held that Balua failed to present any evidence to

support his contention that Arnado was a US citizen but
COMELEC disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino
citizen. Arnados act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnados
continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that
Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to
enable him to run for office.
Hence, Arnados proclamation should be annulled. The order
of succession under Section 44 LGC should take effect.
Arnado filed an MR before the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification
of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC EN BANC

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Under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission

"shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, Maquiling can intervene but
he would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it
agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the
First Division allowing the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the
First Division and granted Arnados Motion for
Reconsideration, reasoning that when Arnado renounced his
US Citizenship, he became a Filipino as though he never
became a citizen of another country. The use of a US
passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying
such.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety
of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite
his continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there was valid intervention yes
2. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office. yes
3. Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code (Vice Mayor sits) is applicable to
this case. NO

Whether or not there was valid intervention yes

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before
the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646: Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the
case.
whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office. yes
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to
run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship, as required by law. Hence
a legal presumption exists that he is one.

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However, this legal presumption does not operate

permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing
the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. Such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for
an elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code (Vice Mayor sits) is applicable to
this case. - NO
Topacio vs. Paredes is a misconstrued case

Topacio v. Paredes is the jurisprudential spring of the

principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest.
In that case, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo
Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in
that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
This phrase however is a mere obiter dictum of the case.
The Court was comparing the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. This was
the distinction that the court made:
(1) Candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections
- The court, after an examination of the ballots may
find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of
votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus
to the board of canvassers to correct the returns
accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding

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the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud

or illegality that it cannot be determined who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
- We have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful
candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that
another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter.
- The question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots;
(2) Declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.
- No question as to the correctness of the returns or
the manner of casting and counting the ballots is
before the deciding power, and generally the only
result can be that the election fails entirely.
- There is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots.
- The question is confined to the personal character
and circumstances of a single individual.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes
a candidate. The ballot cannot override the constitutional
and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates.
Hence, when a person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the

will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot

cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
Maquiling is not a second-placer
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of
the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the

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realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still

cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the firstplacer among the qualified candidates.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,

his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
Dispositive: petition granted
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed

and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be
suspended under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June
2010, long after the elections and after he was already
proclaimed as the winner.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who
fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.

I dissent from the ponencias conclusions that:

(1) respondent Rommel C. Arnados (Arnado) use of
his US passport in traveling twice to the US violated
his Oath of Renunciation so that he reverted back to
the status of a dual citizen a distinct ground for
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) that barred him from
assuming the office of Mayor of Kuswagan, Lanao del
Norte; and
(2) the petitioner, Casan Macode Mquiling
(Maquiling), the "second placer" in the 2010
elections, should be rightfully seated as Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
I base this Dissent on the following grounds:

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1) Arnado has performed all acts required by Section

5(2) of Republic Act No. 92251 (RA 9225) to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to qualify and run
for public office;
2) The evidence on record shows that Arnados use of
his US passport in two trips to the US after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225
and renouncing his US citizenship, were mere
isolated acts that were sufficiently justified under the
given circumstances that Arnado fully explained;
3) Arnados use of his US passport did not amount to
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA
63);
4) Under the circumstances of this case, Arnado did
not do anything to negate the oath of renunciation
he took;
5) At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of Arnados eligibility after this was confirmed by the
mandate of the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte by his election as Mayor; and
6) The assailed findings of facts and consequent
conclusions of law are based on evidence on record
and are correct applications of law; hence, no basis
exists for this Court to rule that the Comelec en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the
case.

GMA Network v. COMELEC

September 2, 2014
Peralta
Alycat
Note: I dont know what the doctrine is because I think every
issue in this case is important. Apologies.

FACTS/ SUMMARY:
Assailed in five petitions are certain COMELEC
regulations relative to the conduct of the 2013 elections
dealing with political advertisements. The petitions put in
issue Sec. 9(a) of Resolution 9615, which limits the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates to an
aggregate total of 120 minutes, and of political parties to an
aggregate total of 180 minutes. Petitioners contend that this
restrictive regulation violates freedom of the press, impairs
the peoples right to suffrage, as well as their right to
information relative to their right to choose who to elect.
(The Supreme Court found for petitioners and declared Sec.
9(a) unconstitutional.)
ISSUE: WON Sec. 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 is
constitutional NO
RATIO:
a. Past elections and airtime limits
o COMELECs authority to impose airtime limits
flows from the Fair Election Act (RA 9006).
- Sec. 32 allows national candidates and
political parties 120 minutes of television
advertisement and 180 minutes of radio
advertisement.
o In the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, these
limits were implemented on a per station

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basis. (So kunware, 120 mins of TV ads on

ABS, 120 on GMA, and so on)
For the 2013 elections, COMELEC Resolution
9615, as amended by Resolution 9631, chose
to aggregate the total broadcast time among
the different broadcast media. (So kunware,
40 mins of TV ads on ABS, 40 on GMA, 40 na
lang pwede sa TV5 kasi 120 na yun.)
Sen.
Alan
Peter
Cayetano
(PetitionerIntervenor): COMELEC arbitrarily changed the
rule. He cited what happened at the hearing
on the new rule.
- Chairman Brillantes: If in 2010, COMELEC
felt that per station is the rule, then that is
the prerogative of COMELEC. If the current
COMELEC feels that 120 is enough for the
particular medium like TV and 180 for
radio, that is our prerogative.
COMELEC did not have any basis for the
aggregate basis, except for its own idea as to
what should be the maximum number of
minutes.

b. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable

basis
for
changing
the
interpretation
and
implementation of the airtime limits
o COMELEC is the office authorized to enforce
election laws, but it cannot exercise its
powers without limitations or reasonable
basis.
o COMELEC is not free to simply change the
rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular
manner in the past.
o Here, COMELEC did not fully explain or justify
the change, except to make reference to the
need to level the playing field.

If the per station basis was deemed enough

to comply with that objective in the past, why
should it now be suddenly inadequate?
- COMELECs answer was simply that The
right to amplify (regulation) is with the
COMELEC.
- There is something basically wrong with
this answer.
1. It does not really provide a good
basis for change.
2. Those affected must be given a
better explanation why the previous
rules are no longer good enough.
x Globe v. NTC: It is essential
if an administrative agency
decides inconsistently with
previous action, that it explain
thoroughly
why
the
previous standards should no
longer apply.

c. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it

by the law in adopting aggregate basis in the
determination of allowable airtime.
o The law, on its face, does not justify a
conclusion that the maximum allowable
airtime should be based on the totality of
broadcasts in all stations.
o RA 9006 repealed Sec. 11(b), RA 6646, which
prohibited political advertisements. RA 9006
relieved the candidate from that restriction.
o In repealing RA 6646 and enacting RA 9006,
Congress intended to provide a more
expansive and liberal means by which
candidates could explain and expound on
their candidacies and platforms, and for the
electorate to know better the personalities
behind the candidates.

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COMELEC: The phrase per day per station

was dropped from the House and Senate bills
shows that Congress intended to impose
aggregate total airtime limits.
- The Supreme Court cannot bring itself to
read the changes in the bill as disclosing
an intent COMELEC wants the Court to put
on the law.
- If anything, it means that the computation
must not be based on a per day basis
for each TV or radio station.
COMELEC went beyond its legal mandate
when it provided for rules beyond what was
contemplated by the law.
- Lokin v. COMELEC: COMELEC has neither
the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks
to implement thereby.
- Chief Justice Hughes: Departmental zeal
may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute.

o
d. Sec. 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 9165 on airtime
limits also goes against the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression, of speech, and of the
press.
o The guarantee of freedom to speak is useless
without the ability to communicate and
disseminate what is said.
o Where there is a need to reach a large
audience, the need to access the media
becomes critical.
o Buckley v. Valeo: The electorates increasing
dependence on TV, radio, and other mass
media for news and information has made
these modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.

GMA came up with an analysis of the practical

effects of such a regulation.
- 120 minutes/ 88 day campaign period =
81.81 seconds on TV per day
- 81.81 seconds per day/ 3 major networks
= 27.27 seconds of airtime per network
per day
- Commercial advertisements in TV are
viewed by only 39.2% of the viewing
audience in Metro Manila.
- Thus, a national candidate will be forced
to use all of his airtime on TV only in urban
areas such as Metro Manila, to achieve
maximum exposure.
The adverted reason for imposing the
aggregate-based airtime limits is to level the
playing field. This does not constitute a
compelling state interest. What COMELEC
has done is analogous to letting a bird fly
after one that has clipped its wings. (Ano
raw??)
It might also be necessary that a national
candidate convey his message through
dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself.
COMELEC itself recognizes that even a slight
increase in TV exposure can significantly
boost a candidates popularity, name recall,
and electability. If so, curtailing the ability of a
candidate to effectively reach out to the
electorate would curtail his freedom to speak
as a means of connecting with the people.
Justice Black: The Founding Fathers gave the
free press the protection it must have to fulfill
its essential role in our democracy.

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e. Sec. 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 is violative of

the peoples right to suffrage
o Moya v. Del Fierro: The enfranchised voter
has a voice in his Government, and whenever
possible, it is the solemn duty of the judiciary,
when called upon to act in justifiable cases, to
give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it.
o Williams v. Rhodes: Competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral
processes and of the First
Amendment freedoms.
- Candidates and political parties need the
means to disseminate their ideas.

o
f.

Resolution 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption

o COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 on
January 15, 2013 and then held a public
hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain.
o The new Resolution introduced a radical
change. In this regard, it is not enough that
the new rules be published or explained after
they had been adopted.
o CIR v. CA: When the administrative rule goes
beyond interpretation, but substantially adds
to or increases the burden of those governed,
it behooves the agency to accord to those
directly affected at least a chance to be heard
before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.
- This case applies to COMELEC mutatis
mutandis, even if COMELEC is an
independent office. Rules that apply to
administrative agencies must be deemed
to apply to COMELEC as a dictate of due
process.
g. Resolution 9615 does not impose an unreasonable
burden on the broadcast industry

o
o

Sec. 7 of the Resolution makes it unlawful for

any radio, television, cable television station,
or other mass media to sell or give free of
charge air time to any candidate in excess of
the limit
GMA contends that this requirement imposes
upon the broadcast industry the unreasonable
duty to monitor the political advertisements it
airs
- According to GMAs study, for the entire
election season, this would entail an
additional 27,494,720 hours for which it
would have to engage and train 39,055
personnel
But the legal duty of monitoring actually lies
with COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely
required to submit documents to aid
COMELEC in monitoring.
Further, Resolution 9631 has amended
Resolution 9615 to the effect that the
requirement is now prior notice
The monitoring requirement does not
constitute prior restraint. Such a requirement
is a reasonable means to ensure that parties
and
candidates
are
afforded
equal
opportunities to promote their respective
candidacies
- It cannot be prior restraint, since there is
no
restriction
on
dissemination
of
information before broadcast
- This is a content neutral regulation, which
is allowed

DISPOSITIVE: Sec. 9(a) is declared unconstitutional. The

rest of the Resolution remains in full force and effect.

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Lokin v. Commission on
Elections

2.

June 22, 2010

Bersamin, J.
Oswald P. Imbat
SUMMARY: Just before the May 14, 2007 elections, CIBAC,
through its President Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment, withdrawing
from its list of nominees already submitted to the
COMELEC the name of, among others, Lokin. The COMELEC
approved, based on Section 13, Resolution 7804, which
allowed substitution in case of withdrawal of nomination by
the
party-list
organization.
Lokin
assailed
the
constitutionality of Section 13, Resolution 7804. The
Supreme Court declared the provision invalid, since it
expanded the ground provided in Section 8, RA 7941.
DOCTRINE: The Legislature, through Section 8, RA 7941,
deprived the party-list organization of the right to change
its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list
is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the
nominee dies, (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination, or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
FACTS:
1. Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), registered
under the party-list system, manifested its intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections.
a. Through its president, Emmanuel Joel Villanueva, it
submitted a list of 5 nominees to the COMELEC.
b. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared
in the certificate of nomination, were: (1) Villanueva,

3.

4.

5.

(2) Luis Lokin, Jr., (3) Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales, (4)

Sherwin Tugna, and (5) Emil Galang. Their certificates
of acceptance were attached to the certificate of
nomination.
c. The list of nominees was later published in The
Philippine Star News and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Before the elections (May 7, 2007), CIBAC, through
Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment.
a. It withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang, and substituted Armi Jane Borje as one of the
nominees.
b. The amended list thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2)
Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
After the elections (June 20, 2007), Villanueva sent a
letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,
attaching the signed petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC
members.
a. The petitions confirmed the substitution previously
made.
b. It was stated therein that Lokin and Tugna were not
among the nominees presented and proclaimed by
CIBAC in its proclamation rally, and that Galang had
signified his desire to focus on his family life.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel,
filed with the COMELEC en banc, as the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC), a motion seeking the proclamation of
Lokin as its second nominee.
a. The motion was purportedly based on Party-List
Canvass Report No. 26, which showed that CIBAC
garnered 744,674 votes. Thus, based on relevant
formulas, it was entitled to a second seat.
b. Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales opposed the motion.
Since the COMELEC failed to act on the certificate of
substitution, Villanueva filed a petition to confirm the
same on June 28, 2007.
a. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC resolved to set the
matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal and
substitution for proper disposition and hearing as E.M.
No. 07-054.

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6. In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, as the NBC,

issued NBC Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 to
partially proclaim the winning parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System,
including CIBAC.
a. The COMELEC en banc also issued NBC Resolution No.
07-72 dated July 18, 2007, proclaiming, among others,
that CIBAC was entitled to one additional seat. It also
held in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees
with pending disputes.
b. Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general
of CIBAC, informed Roberto Nazareno, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, of the
promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72. He
requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker
Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
c. Nazareno replied that the request could not be granted
in view of E.M. No. 07-054.
7. On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved
E.M. No. 07-054, approving the withdrawal and
substitution.
a. It explained that the actions of Villanueva in his
capacity as the president of CIBAC were presumed to
be within the scope of his authority as such.
b. Under Section 1, Article IV, CIBAC By-Laws, Villanueva,
as president, was charged to oversee and direct
corporate activities, which included submission of its
certificate of nominees.
c. The act of withdrawal, although done without any
written Board approval, was accomplished with the
Board's acquiescence or at least understanding.
d. Thus, Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as the official
second nominee and took her oath on September 17,
2007.
8. Lokin now:
a. Seeks to compel COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee, via mandamus; and
b. Assails, through certiorari, (i) Section 13, Resolution
7804 (Rules and Regulations Governing the Filing of
Manifestation of Intent to Participate, and Submission

of Names of Nominees), which provides a right to

change nominees, and (ii) the resolution of the
COMELEC in E.M. No. 07-054. He argues that
Resolution 7804 expanded Section 8, RA 7941, the law
which it implements.
9. The COMELEC and CIBAC argues that:
a. Certiorari is inappropriate in view of the proclamation
of Gonzales. The proper recourse is an election protest
or quo warranto before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, pursuant to Section 17, Article VI,
Constitution.
b. Lokin is guilty of forum shopping, since the petition for
mandamus and certiorari both seek to proclaim him as
the second nominee.
ISSUES/RULINGS:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction? Yes.
2. Is Lokin guilty of forum shopping? No.
3. Is Section 13, Resolution 7804 valid? No.
4. Was the approval of the withdrawal of nominees valid?
No.
RATIO:
1. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto. It concerns a very
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as the second nominee of CIBAC.
a. Lokin does not propose to oust a nominee of another
party to determine which between the defeated and
winning party-list organizations actually obtained the
majority vote. He seeks to unseat another nominee of
the same party-list organization. As such, this is not an
election protest.
b. This is also not a quo warranto proceeding since ut
does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of CruzGonzales
to
the
Republic,
or
some
other
disqualification.
c. Certiorari is the correct remedy to review the
resolution in E.M. No. 07-054, pursuant to Section 7,
Article IX-A, Constitution, now implemented by Rule

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64, Rules of Court, which provides for the review of the

judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC
and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 states that the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, within 30 days.
2. The mere filing of several cases based on the same
incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping.
a. The test is whether the actions involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances. The actions must raise identical causes
of action, subject matter, and issues, i.e., forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.
b. Lokin filed the petition for mandamus arguing that
COMELEC had, upon a finding that CIBAC was entitled
to a second seat, a ministerial duty to proclaim him as
COMELECs second nominee.
c. He filed the petition for certiorari to assail the
resolution the COMELEC of E.M. No. 07-054 and to
challenge the validity of Section 13, Resolution No.
7804.
d. Thus, the petitions were based on different causes of
action and seeks different reliefs.
3. Section 13, Resolution No. 7804 is invalid because it adds
a new ground for substitution not found in RA 7941.
a. To be valid, the administrative IRRs must comply with
the following requisites:
i. Its promulgation must be authorized by the
Legislature;
ii. It must be within the scope of the authority given by
the Legislature;
iii. It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure; and
iv. It must be reasonable.
b. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to
its powers under the Constitution, BP Blg. 881, and RA
7941 (Party-List System Act). Hence, the COMELEC met
the first requisite.

c. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no

question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
resolution itself.
d. The COMELEC, however, failed comply with the second
and fourth requisites.
e. Based on the text of law, Section 8, RA No. 7941,1 the
Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC,
except in three instances:
i. The nominee dies;
ii. The nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or
iii. The nominee becomes incapacitated.
f. The use of the word No is indicative that the
legislative intent it to make the statute mandatory and
may only be obeyed by completely refraining from
doing the forbidden act, subject to the exceptions
which the law itself provides.
g. Based on the deliberations of the Congress, the
general rule is that, once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, no more changes should be made in the
names or in the order of the nominees.
h. Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list
organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the rught to change or alter the
order after submission.
i. The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious, because
the COMELEC can rightly presume that the list reflects
the will of the party-list organization.
j. The publication of the list allows the voters to know
who the nominees are. Allowing changes after
submission may circumvent this demand for
transparency.
1

No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be

allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except
in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list.

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k. The exceptions under Section 8, RA 7941 are

exclusive. When the case does not fall within the
exception, the general rule applies.
l. Section 13, Resolution No. 7804 expanded the
exceptions by providing that a nominee may be
substituted when his nomination is withdrawn by the
party. This expansion is effectively an amendment of
an act of Congress, which an administrative IRR cannot
do.
m.This is not a mere rewording or rephrasing of the law
for a new ground is thereby established.
n. Further, the new ground conflicts with the intent of the
Legislature to avoid the arbitrariness of party-list
organizations and ensure transparency in the system.
4. In view of the nullity of Section 13, Resolution 7804, the
approval of the withdrawal and substitution is without any
legal basis.
DISPOSITIVE:
Section 13, Resolution 7804 nullified. Approval of withdrawal
and substitution set aside. Proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales
annulled. Proclamation of Lokin ordered.

BANAT vs. COMELEC

April 21, 2009
Carpio, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
SUMMARY: Comelec acting as National Board of Canvassers
issued a Resolution declaring guaranteed seats for 13
political parties who articipated in the last 2007 election. In
the same resolution, it was declared that the Veterans ruling
will be used in the distribution of additional seats. This
means additional seats will be given to those who will get at
least 2% votes in relation to the garnered votes of the first
party who got the highest votes. Pursuant to the issuance of
said Resolution, the filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by BANAT was declared moot and

academic. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

(The issues raised can be gleaned from the SC ruling as
provided in the doctrine part)
DOCTRINE:
(1)

The 20% allocation for party-list representatives

in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is a ceiling
and it is not mandatory to fill it up
(2) The three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional is prescribed by the constitution itself and
is tool for the prevention of any domination of any
political party
(3) The 2% threshold is valid as to the allocation of first seat
but for allocation of additional seats there should not be
a 2% threshold because it will make it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats (20%) when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50
(4) Allocation of additional seats: (after ranking the parties
from highest to lowest)

First, the percentage of votes garnered is multiplied

by the remaining available seats (no. of seats
available guaranteed seats)
Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the
parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.

Finally, apply the three-seat cap to determine the

number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled.
(5) The Constitution did not prohibit major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections but by 8-7
voting, the Court decided that major political parties
must not be allowed to participate in party-list election.
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the
party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted

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15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List

System.

(2) those guaranteed with one seat are entitled to

additional seats

On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution. BANAT filed its petition
because the national papers contains news that the
COMELEC will be implementing the Veterans ruling and
apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.

for the first party

x = proportion of votes received by the first

party relative to total votes for party system

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, issued a

resolution:

(1)

proclaiming 13 parties as winners in the party-list

elections, namely: BUHAY, CIBAC, GABRIELA, APEC,
AKBAYAN, COOP-NATCCO, ARC, BUTIL, ABONO, BAYAN
MUNA, A TEACHER, ALAGAD, ANAK PAWIS.

(2)

declaring the projected maximum party-list votes to be

16,723,121 and the presumptive 2% threshold to be
pegged at 334,462 votes.
All the 13 parties proclaimed and BATAS (not
proclaimed due to a pending Petition for cancellation of
Registration) garnered at least the presumptive 2%
threshold

(3)

The proportion of votes received by the first

party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
additional seats:

At least 6%

(1) parties who obtained at least 2 % are guaranteed 1

seat

4% but <6% 1

The total number of seats of each winning party,

organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC formula
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

Subsequently the Comelec issued another Resolution

declaring the additional seats allocated to the appropriate
parties based on the Veterans ruling:

Additional
seats

<4%

for other qualified parties:

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Comelec, acting as NBC, declared the Petition filed by Banat

as moot and academic. In that same petition, BANAT
recommended, among others, that initially, all party-list
groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats
shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941,
that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by
each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats
under the 2% threshold rule.

(2) Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional? It is prescribed by the constitution
itself for the prevention of any domination of any
political party
(3) Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional? Yes for the allocation of first seat
but for allocation of additional seats there should
not be a 2% threshold because it will make it
mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats
(20%) when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50
(4) How shall the party-list representative seats be
allocated?
(5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties
be barred from participating in the party-list
elections? The Constitution did not prohibit but
by 8-7 voting, the Court decided that major
political parties must not be allowed to
participate in party-list election.

Hence, BANAT filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus

assailing the NBC Resolutions.

Intevenors: Arts, Business and Science Professionals (ABS),

Aangat Tayo (AT), Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Phils. (Senior Citizens).

RATIO:
Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:

ISSUES and RULING

(1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? It is a
ceiling and it is not mandatory to fill it up

(1) the twenty percent allocation the combined

number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;

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(2) the two percent threshold only those parties

garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
(3) the three-seat limit each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
(4) proportional
representation the
additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.
1. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the
filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution,
in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x
x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled.

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution (Section

5(1), Article 6 of the Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941) : (No. of seats available to legislative
districts/0.80) x 0.20 = No. of seats available to
party-list representatives

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the

number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Using the
formula, since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220
district representatives, there are 55 seats available to
party-list representatives.

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list

representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom
of the legislature.
--------------------------

2. The three-seat cap is mandated by the Constitution. The

three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
--------------------------

3. Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of

the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees
a seat to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number

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of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total

number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. This is
where petitioners and intervenors problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause
in proportion to their total number of votes to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party . This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of
R.A. No. 7941.
In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment
of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
The Court therefore strike down the two percent threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.
--------------------------

4. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list

candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. Those who garnered at least 2% gets a
guaranteed 1 seat.
Allocation of additional seats: (after ranking the parties from
highest to lowest)

First, the percentage of votes garnered is multiplied

by the remaining available seats (no. of seats
available guaranteed seats)

Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the

parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.

Finally, apply the three-seat cap to determine the

number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled.
-------------------------5. Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List
Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party
system that allowed all political parties to participate
in the party-list elections. Congress, in enacting R.A.
No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.

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Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission state that major political parties
are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the
party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the
nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens,
he or she must be a senior citizen.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue
the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous
in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, the Court declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. Major political parties are disallowed from
participating in party-list elections.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

2 April 2013
Justice Carpio

SUMMARY: Fifty two party-list groups and organizations filed

separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court in an effort
to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The
COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November
and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and

underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a

marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector
they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the
poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of
the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the
existing accreditation of the rest. They also assailedthe poll bodys
denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.

DOCTRINE: The SC ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and

remanded these petitions to the COMELEC. The party-list groups
and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained
mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a
chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court
ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions,
were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of
determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the
new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013 elections.

The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be
faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT) of the SC regarding the party-list system. These
earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in
the party-list system.

The SC pointed out that there was an inherent inconsistency in

the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the
major political parties should represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified
these major parties from the party-list system.

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As for BANAT, the SC said that the guidelines in this ruling merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if
through their allied sectoral organizations.
ATONG PAGLAUM PARAMETERS:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided

they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized

and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that

lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,

the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not

be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

FACTS:
Fifty two party-list groups and organizations assailed the
Resolutions issued by COMELEC disqualifying them from
participating in the May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Reasons given by COMELEC:
1. Failure to satisfy the two criteria (a) that all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (b) all nominees

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must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector
they represent.
2. As political or regional parties, they are not organized
along sectoral lines and do not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
3. Petitioners nominees who do not belong to the sectors
they represent were disqualified, although they may have a track
record of advocacy for their sectors.
4. Nominees of non-sectoral parties were disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector.
5. A party was disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee.
ISSUE:
1. Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the May 2013 elections? NO (No
GAD in following the prevailing decisions of the SC in disqualifying
petitioners. BUT the SC remanded to the COMELEC all petitions for
the COMELEC to determine who are qualified under the NEW
PARAMETERS set by the present case.)
2. [RELEVANT] Should the Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT criteria
for participating in the party-list system be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming May 2013 party-list elections? NO.

C. Common denominator between sectoral and nonsectoral parties: They cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in national elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections.
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION. The intent to include
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Sec.
5(1)2, Art. VI of the Constitution.
A. The commas after the words "national," and "regional,"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and
regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have
stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not,
precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list
system exclusively sectoral.
B. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three
different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are
different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

RATIO:
I. FRAMERS INTENT. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
the party-list system, to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties.
A. Commissioner Villacorta: Political parties can participate
in the party-list system for as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that the Constitution
shall designate.
B. The framers of the Constitution voted down, 19-22, a
proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the HoR,
or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first 3 consecutive terms.

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more

that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

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CASE DIGESTS
C. Moreover, Section 5(2)3, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two reasons.
First, the other of the seats would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, negating the idea that the
party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties.
Second, the reservation of of the seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the
ratification of the Constitution, clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
III. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF RA 7941 4 (Party-List System Act). The
law that implements the party-list system sanctions the
participation of non-sectoral parties in the party-list system.
3

Section 5 (2). The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per

centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose

A. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as

"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government."
On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.
B. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. To participate in the party-list system, it is sufficient that
the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
C. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."The sectors mentioned in
Section
5
are
not
all
necessarily
"marginalized
and
underrepresented."
However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their

sector.

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CASE DIGESTS
D. Section 65 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another reason for
holding that the law does not require national or regional parties,
as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6
provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the
registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration
refers
to
non-representation
of
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented."

E. The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented"

appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 6 on Declaration of
Policy.
While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations
or
parties
must
be
"marginalized
and
underrepresented."
*crucial* How do we harmonize Section 2 of RA 7941 with
its specific implementing provisions, taking into account the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the party-list system?

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC

may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented"

should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their
nature,
economically
"marginalized
and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these
sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to
the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented.
Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or
6

Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.

PUBOFF | B2015
CASE DIGESTS
infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well
as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow
small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "welldefined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House
of Representatives.
On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant,
fisherfolk,
urban poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give
the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where
those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic
and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their
own members to the House of Representatives.
F. Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second
guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list
system, that "while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of
Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
disqualified major political parties from participating in the partylist system.
In effect, COMELEC refused to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited
major political parties from participating in the party-list system,
even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the

"first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list
elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.
However, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings.
The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives. The
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies."
The sectoral wing of a major political party must have its
own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government,
officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the
sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941,
which provides that "component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system."
G. Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications
of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the
case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.

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ATONG PAGLAUM PARAMETERS
The SC suspended its rule that a party may appeal to the SC from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed GAD.
The SC remanded all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"

must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral

parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
RULING: WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.
The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders
but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system
under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not
participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions,
which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may
conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This
Decision is immediately executory.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by CJ Sereno

The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was
that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in
the political arena.
Dissenting opinion (as regards the 2nd and 4thparameters
enunciated by J. Carpio; also as to the alleged violation of
Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution)
Second parameter: National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral

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CASE DIGESTS
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
CJ Sereno:
1. First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social
justice, the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented"
under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to divorce
national and regional parties or organizations from the primary
objective of attaining social justice, which objective surrounds,
permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
2. Second, Section2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become
members of the House of Representatives" On its face, it is
apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies
"sectors", "organizations" and "parties".
3. Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of
statutory construction, the import of "social justice" that has
developed in various decisions is that when the law can be
interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that favors
the underprivileged must be favored.
4. Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that
the party-list system is a countervailing means for the weaker
segments of our society (Commissioner Ople) to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and wellestablished political parties.
5. The ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and
RA 7941, and the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
evince an indisputable intent to allow national, regional, and
sectoral parties and organizations to participate in the party-list
system.
CJ Sereno: The error here is to conclude that if the law treats
national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations the same
by requiring that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," they become the same. By analogy, people can
be treated similarly but that does not make them identical.

6. The ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, only 50% of the seats are allocated
during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution to representatives from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows that the
other 50% would be allocated to representatives from sectors
which are non-marginalized and underrepresented.
CJ Sereno: The error here is to conclude that the latter statement
necessarily follows if the former is true. This is not so since the
latter 50% can very well include representatives from other nonenumerated sectors, or even national or regional parties and
organizations, all of which can be "marginalized and
underrepresented."
7. The ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, from participating in the party-list system.
CJ Sereno: The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based
or cause-oriented parties are necessarily non marginalized or
underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how
"marginalization and underrepresentation" is defined. The
ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived notion
that "marginalized and underrepresented" refers only to those
"economically" marginalized. However, there is no need for this
Court to define the phrase "marginalized and underrepresented,"
primarily because it already constitutes sufficient legislative
standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the
exercise of its discretion to determine the qualification of a partylist group.
8. Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional
parties to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is not
a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel registration under
Section 6 of RA 7941.
CJ Sereno: The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC
may refuse or cancel if the party "violates or fails to comply with
laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it must be first
established that "marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a
requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue here.

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CASE DIGESTS
9. The ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement
of "marginalization and underrepresentation" appears only once in
RA 7941.
CJ Sereno: The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to
appear more than once to carry sufficient legal significance.
"Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of a
legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative powers.
Fourth parameter: Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
1. Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a "well-defined
political
constituency"
as
a
requirement
along
with
"marginalization and underrepresentation." They are cumulative
requirements, not alternative. Thus, underrepresentation." They
are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral parties
and organizations intending to run in the party-list elections must
meet both.
2. The ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived
notions of what it means to be "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political
constituency." The exact content of these legislative standards
should be left to the COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts,
created to address social disparities, to be able to give life to the
"social justice" policy of the Constitution.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list
groups whose registration was cancelled on the basis of applying
the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the
qualification of nominees wherein the "new parameters" apply. If
other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those with "new
parameters,"say, for example, failure to prove track record, a
remand would be uncalled for because the doctrine pertaining to
the other grounds remain unchanged.

COMELEC did not violate Sec. 37, Art. IX-C of the Constitution
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasijudicial powers which can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same
article. However, since the conduct of automatic review and
summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of COMELECs
administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for
reconsideration in Section 3 is not required.
Concurring opinion (as regards 6th parameter)
Sixth Parameter: National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
1. The disqualification of a party-list group due to the
disqualification of its nominee is only reasonable if based on
material
misrepresentations
regarding
the
nominees
qualifications.
Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should
not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it
meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani
(alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the
ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or
sectoral party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3)
nominees remains qualified, for reasons explained below.
The law considers a violation of election laws as a
disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be
considered a violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of
gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard
cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on
the disqualification of its nominee must be based on a material
misrepresentation regarding that nominees qualifications. This
also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers
7

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre- proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

PUBOFF | B2015
CASE DIGESTS
declaring "untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for
disqualification.
2. As regards the second qualification (one of the three nominees
remains qualified), party-list groups should have at least one
qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be
allowed to participate in the elections. This is because if all of its
top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not
cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the elections, and
should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it
would still have no one to represent it, because the law does not
allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee through
substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections
13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Leonen

(Concurred as to allowance of nonsectoral parties to
participate in the party-list system; Dissented as to the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC and as to the jurisdiction of COMELEC to
disqualify registered party-list groups)
Concurring opinion
1. The Constitutional provisions have always created space for
"national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations" to join
the party list system. It is textually clear that national political
parties or regional organizations do not need to be organized on
sectoral lines.
2. There is no constitutional requirement that all those who
participate in the party list system "must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups" as mentioned in
Republic Act No. 7941. This law is unconstitutional in so far as it
makes a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the
Constitution.

In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by

constitutionally entrenching the ability of political parties and
organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the benefit
of those who have been marginalized and underrepresented in the
past. It makes it possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis of
their loyalty to principle and platform rather than their family
affiliation. It encourages more collective action by the membership
of the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the party be
controlled only by a select few.
5. Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who
are marginalized and underrepresented, but they do not
necessarily come mainly from that economic class. Just a glance at
the history of strong political parties in different jurisdictions will
show that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who
will provide their rationale and continually guide their membership
in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform their movement
forward.
Dissenting Opinion (COMELEC committed GAD)
1. Marginalized and underrepresented is ambiguous. There can
be no consistent judicially discernible standard for the COMELEC to
apply. It thus invites invidious intervention from COMELEC to
undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to vie for
representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of
the electorate. COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the
electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and beyond its jurisdiction.
2. In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a
definition of what it is to be socially marginalized. No empirical
studies have informed COMELECs determination as to which
groups are "underrepresented" in government. In fact, there is no
indication as to what the characteristics of an individual's or
groups identity would lead the COMELEC en banc to consider that
they were a "sector".

3. There was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi

relevant to our present cases in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani et
al. v. COMELEC and BANAT v. COMELEC.

3. With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction

to disqualify is clearly reposed on the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution in article VI, section 17
clearly provides:

4. It is no accident that the party list system is only confined to the

House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to mature
genuine political parties and give them the experience and the
ability to build constituencies for other elective public offices.

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all

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contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members..."
A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to
disqualifying registered political party list groups should prevail
over the more general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the "sole judge"
clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the
rest.
J. Leonens Alternative Parameters:
First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented". However, they will have to
clearly show how their plans will impact on the "marginalized and
underrepresented". Should the party list group prefer to represent
a sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT will
apply to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list
system must not also be a participant in the election of
representatives for the legislative districts. In other words, political
parties that field candidates for legislative districts cannot also
participate in the party list system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms
guided by a vision of society, an understanding of history, a
statement of their philosophies and how this translates into
realistic political platforms;
Fifth, the parties or organizations--not only the nominees--must
have concrete and verifiable track record of political participation
showing their translation of their political platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must
be organized solely for the purpose of participating in electoral
exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as
three (3) years, prior to their registration. Within that period they
should be able to show concrete activities that are in line with their
political platforms;

Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active

membership roster so as to be able to mount a credible campaign
for purpose of enticing their audience (national, regional or
sectoral) for their election;
Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have
participated in the political activities of the organization;
Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is
not only democratically elected but also one which is not
dominated by the nominees themselves;
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected
through a transparent and democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the
party or organization must be clear and should not point to a few
dominant contributors specifically of individuals with families that
are or have participated in the elections for representatives of
legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be
able to win within the two elections subsequent to their
registration;
Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and
Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization.