PERSONS AND FAMILY

RELATIONS CASE DIGEST

(2nd Exam)
BRAZA VS. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 181174
Collateral and Direct Attack
Facts:
Petitoner Ma. Cristina Brazas husband, Pablo Braza, died in
a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following
the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular came and introduced Patrick
Titular Braza as her and Pablos son. Ma Cristina thereupon
made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patricks birth
certificate, Pablo acknowledged him as his son and
legitimated by virtue of the marriage of the parents.
Ma Cristina likewise obtained a copy of the marriage
contract of Pablo and Lucille, drawing her and her children
to file a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Registrar.
The petitioners contend that Patrick could not have been
legitimated by the marriage between Lucille and Pablo
because the said marriage was bigamous on account of the
valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo. Petitioners prayed for:
1)
Correction of the entries in Patricks birth
record with respect to his legitimation, name
of father and his acknowledgement, and use of
Braza as last name;
2)
Submit Patrick to DNA testing; and
3)
Declaration of nullity of legitimation and
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Lucile
and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patricks motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, TC
dismissed the petition stating that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family
court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of
Patrick, hence, the controversy should be in an ordinary
adversarial action.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the
validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy and
correction of entries in the civil registrar under Rule 108
(Cancellation or correction of Entries in the Original
Registry). They also insist that the main cause of action is the
correction of Patricks birth records and that the rest of the
prayers are merely incidental.
Issue: WON the court may pass upon the validity or
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar.
Held:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entries under
Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. The
proceedings in rule 108 can only be used for clerical errors in
the civil registry. Such alterations may be allowed in
adversarial proceedings in which all parties are impleaded
and due process is properly observed.
The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy which is governed
by A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC of the Family Code (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages). The validity of marriages
as well as legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct
action filed by proper party and not through collateral attack

(indirect action) such as the petition filed before the court a

quo.

JULIANO-LLAVE vs REPUBLIC
FACTS:
11 months before Sen. Mamintal Tamanos death, he
married Estrellita Juliano-Llave twice under the Islamic
laws tradition on May 27, 1993 and subsequently, under a
civil ceremony an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on
June 2, 1993. Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as
divorced in their marriage contracts. From then on,
Estrellita has been indicating herself as Sen. Tamanos wife,
and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib) filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita
and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged,
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when
he married Estrellita in 1993.

Zorayda argues that the Civil Code

governs her marriage with the deceased
The subsequent marriage entered into by
deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave
is void ab initio -- he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting;
His status being declared as "divorced"
has no factual or legal basis, because the
deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed
under the New Civil Code;
The deceased did not and could not have
divorced Complainant Zorayda by
invoking the provision of P.D. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, for the simple reason that
the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083,
since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda) did not register their mutual
desire to be thus covered by this law.

Upon being summoned by the RTC on Dec 19, 1994,

Estrellita asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to
file her answer and another 15 days, both of which the court
granted.
Estrellita, instead of submitting her answer, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on Feb 20, 1995 where she declared that under the
Muslim Code, the jurisdiction on Muslim marriages fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts. The
trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity Estrellita
filed a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss which was referred to the
CA.
During the pendency of the certiorari petition, the RTC
continued to try the case. Eventually, however, the CA

resolved the petition opposing to Estrellita. Estrellita then

raised the appellate courts judgment to this Court.
After multiple delays in appearing in the court with her
evidence, on the ground that she has not yet filed her
answer as she still expects the outcome of the petition
raised in the SC, RTC rendered the judgement declaring
Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
Estrellita argues that her marriage with Sen. Tamano is valid
because he was already divorced under the Muslim Code
when he married her. She asserts that the law (P.D. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws) is
automatically applied to the marriage of Zorayda and the
late senator without the need to register their consent to be
covered by it, as both parties are muslims whose marriage
was solemnized under Muslim law. She also argues that
complainant has no legal standing to file suit because only
the husband/wife can file for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under SC.

pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure,

she called her husband and promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.
Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate
or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of
no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure
of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for
more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years
constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:

ISSUE:

No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate

with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not
constitute psychological incapacity.

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.

Tamano was bigamous.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY

HELD:
Yes. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and nonMuslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given
time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity. PD 1083 never invalidated their marriage. Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
Regardless if they undertook a divorce under the Muslim
Code, they are still married pursuant to the Civil Code as it
was the existing law for marriage between Muslims and nonMuslims when the union took place.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines." But we already ruled "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Code, which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112019 (January 4, 1995)

FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met
Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a
municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents and Julia gave
birth to a Leouel Jr. in 1987. Occasionally, the couple will
quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference
of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.
PETITION IS DENIED.

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi husband, petitioner
*wife is unnamed
This case was commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband. After the celebration of their marriage,
they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
Contrary to the wifes expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to have sexual intercourse, the petitioner
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She
claims that she did not even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations. The results of their physical examinations
were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that
of her husbands examination was kept confidential. While
no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed

medications for her husband which was also kept

confidential.
The wife claims that her husband is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed her husband using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. According to
her, he just married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The petitioner admitted that since their marriage until their
separation, there was no sexual contact between them. But
the reason for this, according to him, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts,
she always removed his hands. He claims that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
The wife filed for the annulment of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the husband. The
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the annulment, stating
that:
(1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and,
(3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or science.
The trial court decided in favor of the wife, ruling that such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON the failure of the husband to consummate his
marriage with his wife can be considered as psychological
incapacity on his part, and thus be a ground for annulment.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order." Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA

Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo, married and had a son.
After a year, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
incapacity alleged by Roridel is manifested through the
immaturity of Reynaldo, financially unstable and a habitual
quarrelsome. He prefers to spend more time with friends
and incapable of complying essential marital obligations.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Roridel.
Issue:
WoN the marriage should be declared null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity
Ruling:
Court reversed Lower court decision deciding
that marriage is valid. Psychological incapacity is not mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It must exist at the time of marriage, must
demonstrate an inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage, and characterized by gravity, judicial
antecedence and incurability. In the case at bar,
psychological defect cannot be clearly shown as incapacity
but more of a difficulty in performance of marital
obligations.
Grounds of Psychological Incapacity

HELD:
Yes.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity."
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
An examination of the evidence shows that the husband's
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him
does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent,
but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire
time that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out
of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for
not having asserted his rights as a husband.

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the

plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be
medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the
time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable
the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 6871 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate
Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and
the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.

MARCOS VERSUS MARCOS

Gr. No. 136490 - October 19, 2000
Facts: Brenda Marcos and Wilson Marcos first met when
both of them were assigned at the Malacanang Palace
during the Marcos time. They got acquainted with each
other, later they became sweethearts and got married.
After the downfall of President Marcos, both of them left
the service. Wilson engaged in different business but it
didn't went well. Brenda as a wife, urges Wilson to look for a
job to support the family and for the children will see him as
a head of the family not her earning for the family. Because
of this situation, they would often quarrel, as a consequence
he would hit and beat her. Wilson would even force her to
have sex with him and inflict harm to their children for a
slight mistake, until such time they lived separately. One
time they had a bitter quarrel that ended up Wilson hitting
her including her mother to come for her aid. Brenda left the
dwelling along with her children.Brenda filed a petition for a
declaration of nullity of marriage for the grounds of
psychological incapacity against the respondent. Brenda
subject herself to a medical and psychological examination
but the respondent did not undergo such test.
The RTC ruled that Wilson Marcos is psychologically
incapacitated and does not perform his marital obligations.
The Court of Appeals ruled that psychological incapacity
has not been established by the totality of evidence
presented by the petitioner. Hence this petition.
Issues: Whether or not the marriage of Brenda and Wilson is
void for the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: No, the marriage of Brenda and Wilson is not void
for the ground of psychological incapacity.
Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation
of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity.
Under the law, Article 36 of the family code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological not physical although
its manifestations and symptoms maybe physical. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c)
sufficiently proven by experts; (d) clearly explained in the
decision. The presence of evidence that can adequately
establish a party's psychological condition.
The petitioner however, did not sufficiently lead to
the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
In fact the respondent now is taxi driver.

The appellant was not subjected to any psychological

or psychiatric evaluation. There is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which was psychological or mental.

The evidence presented by the petitioner refers only

to the grounds of legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void. Therefore, the court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity. Juridical antecedence and incurability.

place of her in-laws. A week after the marriage Avelino

would disappear for months and then reappear and
disappear again. During the time when he was with his
family, he joined drinking sprees with his friends and when
he got home he forced Erlinda to sexual activity and inflict
injury if she refused. Avelino left their home again and never
came back. One day Erlinda found out that her husband was
imprisoned and escape from jail. She filed in RTC of
Olongapo for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The petition was granted. However, the
investigating prosecutor filed for a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and OSG filed for motion for reconsideration, all
were denied. CA also reaffirmed trial courts decision.
ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA are correct when it declared
the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino null and void under
Article 36 of FC on the ground of psychological incapacity as
he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual
alcoholic and a fugitive from justice.
RULING: No, the RTC and CA were not correct when it
declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino null and void
under Article 36 of FC. The Supreme Court in Republic v. CA
and Molina used the guidelines in application and
interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code;
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of marriage and against is
dissolution and nullity.
(2)
The root cause of psychological incapacity
must be; (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint (c) sufficiently
proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the
decision
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code
(7)
Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.
It is evident that Erlinda failed to comply the
evidentiary elements of said above-mentioned
guidelines specifically number 2, which needs of an
expert to prove the psychological incapacity of Avelina.
Further, the allege conviction and escape of her
husband from jail was not sufficiently proven. Hence,
the petition was granted and the marriage continues to
exist being valid.

Petition is denied and CA decision affirmed except

that personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua
non to a finding of psychological incapacity.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA VS ZOSIMO PESCA
FACTS:
REPUBLIC V. DAGDAG
FACTS: Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Dagdag, 20 years old. Begot 2 children and lived near the

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A.

Pesca first met in 1975 while on board a vessel bound for
Bacolod City. They got married on 03 March 1975. Initially,

the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still

the term has been so defined in Santos. Indeed, there is no

a student in college and respondent is a seaman. Six months

merit in the petition. The term psychological incapacity, as

later, the young couple established their residence in

a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under

Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in

Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the

Caloocan City where they finally resided. The union begot

Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina.

four children. It started in 1988 when she noticed that

respondent showed signs of psychological incapacity to

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in declaring the marriage

perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an

between petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting.

emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became

apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual

WON the doctrine enunciated in Santos and Molina

case apply to the case at bar

drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the

afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned

HELD: NO.

to stop or to minimize his drinking, respondent would beat,

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed

slap and kick her. At one time, he chased her with a loaded

independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,

shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the

existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,

children. The children themselves were not spared from

`psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

physical violence. Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner

mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be

and her children left the conjugal abode as they could no

truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that

longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner

concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the

decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home. But,

parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68

to her dismay, matters became worse. On the morning of 22

of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live

March 1994, about eight oclock, he assaulted her for about

together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help

half an hour in the presence of the children. She submitted

and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment

herself to medical examination which diagnosed her injuries

of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological

as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint

incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders

with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to

respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by

give meaning and significance to the marriage. This

the MTC of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of

psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is

imprisonment. This time, petitioner and her children left the

celebrated."

conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister.

Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the RTC for the

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the

Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or

declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking

interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of

psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the

the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim

custody of her minor children and prayed for support

legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the

pendente lite. On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly

interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent

filed. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his

court has the force of law. The interpretation or

marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He

construction placed by the courts establishes the

denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically

contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as

incapacitated.

so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of

On 15 November 1995, the RTC rendered its

that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when

decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and

a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a

respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of

different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to

psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and

be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied

ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in

Respondent appealed contending that the trial court erred,

accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex

particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare

prospicit, non respicit. It is in Santos when, for the first

the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to

time, the Court has given life to the term psychological

reopen the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision

incapacity. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided

of the trial court and declared the marriage between

procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in

petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting because signs

trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on

of mental incapacity has not been thoroughly established to

psychological incapacity.

cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital

covenant. As provided in Art68 of the FC.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an

inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family.

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, argues that the

While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her

application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant

unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally

only a remand of the case to the trial court for further

terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily

proceedings and not its dismissal. Be that as it may,

be the fitting denouement to it.

respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its

assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has
been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as

DEDEL V CA
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel exchanged marital vows before the City Court of
Pasay in September 28, 1996. The civil marriage was ratified
in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced
four children.

was not valid. He alleged he simply signed the marriage

contract so that Villareyes can claim the allotment from his
salary as a seaman. Moreover, he stated that, through the
help of his brother, he had verified that said marriage to
Villareyes was not in the records of the Civil Register of
Manila.
The RTC, despite Tenebro's arguments, found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out

to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She
had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.

He appealed, but the CA affirmed the lower

court's decision.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for

treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Despite the treatment, Sharon continued her relationship
with the Jordanian National named Mustafa Ibrahim and
had two Children. When Mustafa left the country, Sharon
went back to petitioner bringing along her two Children.
Petitioner accepted her and treated the children as his own
but Sharon soon abandoned him to join Ibrahim at Jordan.

On his petition to the Supereme Court, Tenebro

added to his contention that with the declaration of his
marriage to Ancajas as void ab initio, he, hence, cannot be
charged for the crime of bigamy.

Petitioner then filed for declaration for nullity of marriage on

the ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: whether or not the totality of the evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated
RULING:
No.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
The sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibilty of the wife does not constitute psychological
incapacity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by
petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article
55of the Family Code. Article 36 is not to be equated with
legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In
short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.

TENEBRO V. CA
FACTS:
In 1990, Veronico Tenebro, petitioner, married
private complainant Leticia Ancajas. They lived together until
the later part of 1991, when Tenebro told Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes, in
1996. He showed her a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes, thenafter left their dwelling,
reasoning that he will leave her to co-habit with his
first/legal wife Villareyes.
Later Ancajas learned that Tenebro yet again
contracted a marriage, this time with Nilda Villegas. After
ascertaining with Villareyes the truth about her (villareyes)
marriage with Tenebro, Ancajas filed a bigamy case against
petitioner.
Tenebro's' contention was that since there was
no actual marriage ceremony, his marriage with Villareyes

In the meantime, Tenebro's marriage to Ancajas

had been declared null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro can still be liable for
contracting a bigamous marriage, even when such marriage
had already been declared void ab intio on the ground of
psychological incapacity
HELD:
Yes, Tenebro can still be held liable for
committing bigamy.
All the elements of the crime of Bigamy are
present in the instant case.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, states the following as
the elements of the crime of Bigamy:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
It was clearly established by the prosecution that
Tenebro's marriage to Villareyes was valid. As such valid
marriage was subsisting when he contracted marriage with
the private respondent-- the second marriage being valid if
not for the previous marriage, Tenebro had committed
bigamy. That the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was subsequently declared as void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity is beside the point,
since such declaration would not retroact to the date when
the marriage was contracted. The court ruled that
petitioner cannot use this to free himself from criminal
liability.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings. The straight-forward text of the law
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

JARILLO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were
married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal. On
May 4, 1975, they again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony in Pangasinan. And she had begotten a
daughter.

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent

marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy on November 26,
1979. And on April 16, 1995, they exchanged marital vows.
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case
No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was
charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City

in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect

service of summons by publication. The motion was granted
and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving
Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond
after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed
a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation.

Accused-appellant filed against Alocillo on October 5, 2000

for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to

perform his marital obligation.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and
1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2)
her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for
lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had
prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as
far back as 1978.

HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped
Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshios illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.
Ruling:
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became
final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of
nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004,
the CA denied reconsideration and ruled that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said
marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
Petitioners conviction for the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a
valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, bigamy as
already consummated because at the time of celebration of
the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners
marriage to Uy make any difference. Art 349 would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed
there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November
16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor,
Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months
and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she
learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but
did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus
summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently,