Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 7890

September 29, 1914

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al., plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.

S. E. Imperial for appellants.

Tomas Lorayes for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for
probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it
had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the
will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition
on the 17th day of September, 1910.

On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:

1.
That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa
Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is
and the second was a grandchild of the latter.

2.
That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather,
the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due
respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.

3.
That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in
periodical attacks.

By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is unfounded, the
undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the testator's died without succession,
but is represented now by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their
grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable.

After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on the 22d day of
September, 1911, rendered the following decision:

This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the decease Florencio Pecson,
who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.

From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa Manjares,
likewise deceased, which children are those named Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino,
Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented himself
from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard of him for
the past twenty years. The said Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried
when he emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed that he died and
it is held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided among the other heirs.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso Mediavillo, by whom she had two
children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her husband,

Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator,
Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo, is also living. The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she
went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that
she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should
not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and sets it aside as being of no
force or value whatever. The court further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson,
is the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the said Teresa, and that her father,
as the heir of his son Joaquin, also Teresa's son, is the heris of the other one-half of the said share
pertaining to Teresa that is, of the one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover,
the court decrees that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion,
Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are also heirs of the estate
of Florencio Pecson.

From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:

FIRST ERROR

The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario Mediavillo is contrary
to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value whatever.

SECOND ERROR

The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir
by representation of the one-half of the one seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.

With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it appears that during
the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight
children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa Pecson;

that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The will made
no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in the will for the said Teresa.
All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa had been married with
one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in question she died, leaving
her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears
from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa
Pecson, her husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo
died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the will in question was made.

Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named
Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo,
because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall
have no share in my property.

The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is copied above,
alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a consideration of that question, the lower court
found that she had been disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That
order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first assignment of
error.

By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio Pecson disinherited the
said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said
Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."

The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario Mediavillo at the
time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower
court reached the following conclusion:

The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to
study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her

grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his
will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and
who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather.

The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits
his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not
ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take
place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848)
we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the
cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code
provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the
legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and
for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire
whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of
the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or
not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof
of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator,
should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny
the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof.
The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also
sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:

Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.

It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance was
without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however,
to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show
that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It appears from the
record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from
a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson,
took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man; that it was upon
that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and
that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said
event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief

periods, up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact
that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was
probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894
or 1895.

After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court that he did
not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error.

With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the
mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her
husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave
one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that would
have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his
father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was committed. The
appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower
court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:

The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole or half blood.

The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the Civil
Code. Article 935 provides that:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from
him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

Article 936 provides that:

The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of them only survive, he or she
shall succeed to the son's entire estate.

It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment
of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there
were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or
mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a
descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower
court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the
estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the
foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the
will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the
estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby
ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and that such further proceedings be had as the interested parties may deem
necessary, for the purpose of disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson would have
belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and
October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for
probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and
SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay
ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana
ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya
ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim
siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya
at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng
babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center
of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat
at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3

(signed)

Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)

Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)

ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were
consolidated.4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the
court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of
the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private

respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes
a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because
Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other
heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy
Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100
(1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10
AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE
RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION,
WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE
TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause
the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the
sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case;
and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not
raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect,
Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken
as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the

matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his
or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator
to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules
of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated
in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory.17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate
and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid
testate proceedings.
No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48627

February 19, 1943

TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO VDA. DE SINGSON,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor-appellee,

EMILIA FLORENTINO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees,

EVARISTO SINGSON, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

M.H. de Joya and Evaristo Singson for appellants.

Teofilo Mendoza and Vicente Paz for appellees.

OZAETA, J.:

Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15, 1938, without any descendant
or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow Doa Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and
four nieces, the children of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which
reads as follows:

Octavo. Orderno y mando que todos mis bienes no dispuestos de otro modo en este testamento, se
distribuiran en partes iguales a todos los que tienen derecho a ello.

The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of in
the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the deceased "in the proportion
provided in paragraph 8 of the will." The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition
insofar as it includes the nieces of the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in
relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. The nieces also objected to
the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified properties had been omitted therefrom,
which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which under clause 8 of the will "should be
distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." The trial court sustained the contention of the
nieces (appellees herein) and ordered the administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to
include therein the said properties and that all of those not disposed of in the will be adjudicated in
equal parts to the brothers and nieces of the deceased."

The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will above quoted. Said
clause provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be
distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article
751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree."

The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word "relatives" in the clause
in question. We do not need to decide here whether, had the testator used the word "relatives," the
nieces would be excluded. The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that
under said article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and
sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others. Manresa among them, hold that said article
excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We think the testator, by referring to
"all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the
uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be
distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he dies intestate.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.