Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CAP 693
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CONTENTS
Page
1
Introduction
Scope
Purpose
Background
Means of Compliance
Compliance by Method A
Compliance by Method B
Appendices
A
11
References
17
iii
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Aviation Authority has issued AAD 001-05-99, which became effective on
7 June 1999. The AAD makes the installation and use of health monitoring systems
(HMS) mandatory for United Kingdom registered helicopters issued with a Certificate
of Airworthiness in the Transport Category (Passenger), which have a maximum
approved seating configuration of more than 9 passengers. However this Directive is
not applicable to helicopters certificated to BCAR 29 or JAR-29.
This CAP provides operators with the basis for an acceptable means of compliance
with the Directive.
Figure 1 shows the operator options and timescales for compliance with this AAD.
Applicability
Certificate of Airworthiness in the
Transport Category (Passenger)
with seating Configuration of more
than nine
YES
Comply by Agreed
Procedure/Practices
1 year
Is an approved system
currently fitted?
NO
Comply by fitting an
approved system
YES
NO
Comply with
procedures and
practices
2 years
2 years
FIGURE 1
SCOPE
AAD 001-05-99 when referring to HMS or HUMS means a system utilising on
board equipment for monitoring the health of helicopter rotor and rotor drive system
components. Helicopters affected by this AAD will need to demonstrate an effective
vibration health monitoring capability. Consequently much of this CAP relates
specifically to vibration monitoring systems. However, it is accepted that many
methods of health monitoring, such as transmission magnetic plugs, chip detectors, oil
analysis, will already be adequately controlled by the helicopter constructors
maintenance instructions. The monitoring techniques to be considered are;
Vibration Monitoring System (VMS) which should monitor :
Pressure
Temperature
Torque
Physical Displacement (Rotor blade and tracking is a practical
example)
Debris generation via real time analysis in fluid streams (Oil and
exhaust gases)
Magnetic Plugs
Spectrographic Oil Analysis
PURPOSE
The purpose of this CAP is to provide guidance to industry on what the CAA consider
to be an acceptable means of compliance with the subject AAD.
The AAD has been raised in response to numerous AAIB rotorcraft accident/incident
reports which have highlighted the positive role that vibration monitoring systems
could play in reducing the accident rate in the helicopter community.
The benefits of vibration monitoring in the UK have so far been limited to North Sea
operations of Transport Category (Passenger) helicopters, where the operators have
fitted these systems in recognition of the benefits together with their desire to satisfy
their customers safety objectives.
The CAA has been proactive in promoting the positive aspects of health monitoring
and has adopted requirements for the certification of large helicopters which include a
rotor and transmission design assessment, in which health monitoring is an acceptable
compensating provision. The decision to mandate the installation and use of health
monitoring systems has been taken in response to the recent AAIB recommendations
relating to incidents and accidents.
BACKGROUND
In the early 1980s in response to a growing unease with the safety record of large civil
transport helicopters, the Chairman of the CAA requested that the Airworthiness
Requirements Board (ARB) establish a panel to review existing helicopter
airworthiness requirements. This panel, the Helicopter Airworthiness Review Panel
(HARP), reported in 1984 and confirmed that the fatal airworthiness accident rate for
large twin engine helicopters was significantly higher than for comparable aeroplanes.
From their review of failures, HARP recognised that the helicopter is different. So
much of its critical mechanism, the rotors and rotor drive system, involved single load
paths without duplication or redundancy. They identified a fundamental difference
between the helicopter and fixed wing aircraft, the inability to guard against a failure
by duplication.
However, experience showed that although this machinery employed safe life rather
than fail safe design, often defect propagation would occur for a period of time before
failure occurred. This, coupled with the recognition that there had been important
developments in health monitoring system (HMS) technology, encouraged the
members of HARP to recommend the philosophy that where full redundancy has not
been possible by design then warning of likely failure in a suitable time scale could
provide an acceptable level of safety.
The types in todays UK fleet are likely to remain in service for the foreseeable future.
Therefore, all the really significant improvements to the airworthiness codes that the
CAA/JAA has introduced over the past few years are effective for new helicopters,
but are currently of no benefit to the existing fleet. Therefore, there is a need to
improve the airworthiness of the current fleet.
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Operational trials of health monitoring systems were carried out between 1987 and
1991 over the North Sea. These trials demonstrated the technical feasibility of first
generation HMS, including vibration monitoring, in what must be considered as a
very testing environment. Today all large UK registered helicopters employed in
North Sea operations have HMS fitted, as a customer requirement, rather than a
mandatory requirement, except for the S61, where a CAA mandatory AAD
necessitates HMS for a specific component.
The CAA has recognised that helicopter rotor and transmission systems are
susceptible to potentially hazardous and catastrophic failure effects, due to the very
nature of their design (single load path) and has for many years realised the benefit of
the installation of HMS as a compensating provision, for new certifications.
The CAA has sponsored, along with the UK government, a comprehensive safety
research programme which culminated in successful operational trials of HMS
equipment on four North Sea oil/gas support helicopters. The Authority has also
managed extensive research programmes exploring the technical feasibility of HMS,
including in-service trials and seeded fault tests.
It is considered that the first generation HMS, which added comprehensive vibration
monitoring to existing health monitoring techniques, has already demonstrated the
ability to identify potentially hazardous and catastrophic failure modes, and has
already reduced fatal accident statistics.
First generation HMS (including vibration monitoring) has been shown to be both
technically feasible and economically justifiable for existing operational helicopters.
The CAA believes that it is technically feasible to extend the benefits from HMS to
helicopters currently in service (helicopters issued with a Certificate of Airworthiness
in the Transport Category (Passenger), which have a maximum approved seating
configuration of more than 9 passengers).
Several HMS systems are available for most types of medium and large helicopter.
The systems employed by operators have generally been designed for retrofit into
existing helicopters. The recent UK CAA requirement for CVFDR systems to be
installed on helicopters above 2730 kg has allowed system designers to incorporate
Health Monitoring Functions along with the mandatory CVFDR functions. This
combining of systems has reduced the overall design, implementation and weight
burden of two separate systems. It follows that many UK operators complying with
CVFDR requirement now operate their helicopters with health monitoring including
vibration monitoring.
MEANS OFCOMPLIANCE
5.1
Demonstration of Compliance
The following two methods are acceptable for showing compliance with this AAD.
These are;
Method A :
Method B :
5.2
Continuation of Compliance
Once compliance has been demonstrated the CAA will monitor compliance with this
AAD by continued surveillance visits and direct input where the means of compliance
has been predicated upon CAA involvement. It is anticipated that the degree of direct
(day to day) CAA involvement will be minimal and will take the form of an audit
function based upon satisfactory demonstration of capability. The CAA will therefore
seek a management structure with appropriate safeguards and controls that will ensure
that all changes and decisions are made by appropriately trained and authorised
personnel of the operator. This will include, where applicable, sub-contractors
involved in maintenance of the helicopter as part of the overall quality function.
Compliance with this Directive will affect maintenance activity and therefore will be
audited under JAR-145 procedures.
COMPLIANCE BY METHOD A
As detailed in section 1 of this CAP, the CAA AAD applies to helicopters issued with
a Certificate of Airworthiness in the Transport Category (Passenger), which have a
maximum approved seating configuration of more than 9 passengers.
Compliance with Method A utilises HMS which are currently approved by the CAA.
This can be applied to helicopters already fitted with such systems (North Sea
operation) and also helicopters of the same types which are not yet fitted with HMS.
Existing operators with approved systems will need to address all the aspects of this
section, however this is unlikely to require additional testing or design assessment. It
is considered that such systems / operator combinations have a proven capability with
respect to an acceptable standard of transmission fault detection such that a degree of
credit can be granted for their compliance with this AAD. As such the period for
compliance has been set at 1 year from the effective date of the AAD.
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Operators of helicopters not already fitted with a HMS, who elect to comply by
installing an existing CAA approved system will need to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Authority that their fitment and use of the system offers an
equivalent level of safety to that currently afforded by existing operators of the
system. Operators may also elect to incorporate, as much as possible, the controls and
procedures available from the vendor in order to facilitate demonstration of
compliance. As such the period for compliance has been set at 2 years from the
effective date of the AAD.
In assessing compliance with this AAD the CAA are seeking procedures and practices
associated with a well managed health monitoring system.
It is anticipated that the procedures and practices highlighted in this section may well
mirror that of some existing operators and therefore the degree of adjustment may be
minimal. In showing compliance the CAA expects existing operators of approved
systems to utilise, as much as possible, their existing procedures and working
practices.
6.1
Organisational chart
This should show the position of the personnel detailed in 6.1.1 above, within the
organisation.
6.1.3
Maintenance of HMS, interface with HMS supplier, interface with CAA, review and
control of excessive false alarm rates, data storage etc.
It may also be necessary to define particular helicopter operating conditions that need to
be established prior to acquiring data.
6.1.4
HMS facilities
This section should identify the ground based HMS equipment and its location on site
with respect to flight crew and maintenance personnel accessibility.
6.1.5
Helicopters affected
This should list all the helicopters affected by the AAD detailing the helicopter type,
registration and HUM system configuration. Also the standard of accelerometer
supports, position and type should be controlled.
6.1.8
Where the constructor is prepared to offer advice, regarding the setting of thresholds, this
information should be adopted.
6.1.9
The Master Minimum Equipment List for each affected type will be amended
accordingly.
6.1.10 Training
Training must cover all personnel involved in HMS activity to ensure that the
competencies necessary to ensure effective use of the systems can be achieved and
maintained. CAA will periodically review training records, initially in order to accept
compliance with the AAD and later during routine operation and maintenance
approval audits.
6.1.11 Event Reporting
Any cases of successful VHM alerts, or defective components found where VHM failed
to alert, should be notified to CAA. This will continue until system reliability has been
confirmed and will not replace the need to submit an MOR where this is applicable.
6.1.12 Quality System
More detailed guidance on some of the above subjects can be found in Appendix A.
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COMPLIANCE BY METHOD B
In demonstrating compliance using this method the applicant will also need to address
the requirements of method A, (i.e. paragraphs 6.1.1 to 6.1.12 above and the guidance
material of Appendix A). It is considered that normal means of compliance with this
CAA AAD will be method A as it presents less of a cost burden to the operator. This
section does not therefore repeat the method A requirement details.
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10
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TRAINING APPROACH
The operator will have to arrange maintenance training classes for his personnel in the use
and intended applications . The training will prepare the operators personnel to perform 1st
(field), and 2nd (routine) level maintenance to the level of scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance based on HMS advisory messages.
Training classes will have to cover the use of health and vibration monitoring data to schedule
inspection, cleaning, replacement/repair, and for performing adjustments, operational checks,
and troubleshooting of the system and monitored components.
Two different philosophies have been reported regarding the approach to training. One is to
instigate a formal classroom based course lasting several days, while the other is to carry out a
series of less formal one day teach-ins, on a one-to-one basis.
The classroom based training offers the potential of training to a deeper level of knowledge
but can be lacking in practical content unless very carefully structured. This approach may not
suit an operator who chooses to introduce system functions gradually, as training may well be
forgotten before the opportunity to apply it is available. One day teach-ins have the advantage
that training content will always be up to date and can be readily re-structured. If presented
one-on-one, this training will also be able to focus on an individuals particular needs. This
could, however, become a burden as it may not make the most efficient use of an instructors
time.
External courses run by equipment suppliers have been used by most system operators.
Where the operator is not the equipment supplier, this has so far been the approach to training
in data interpretation by the operator. Equipment suppliers courses have been reported, in
general, as being too deep and too expensive for large numbers of line personnel. The
approach has generally been to send monitoring specialists and supervisors on such courses
and use them to train line personnel in house.
Instrumentation System (EFIS) can be. Successful trouble shooting may require a knowledge
of the architecture of the system and software processes in use.
Suggested topics for a users course are:
(i)
(ii)
Personnel attending such courses will require background experience and knowledge of
helicopter maintenance. There is some overlap of trade boundaries in the course requirements
which will have to be considered and addressed by the course provider with respect to
licensing and approval regulations applicable to individuals.
Continuation Training
HMS although not new is still a dynamic technology and as a consequence is changing
rapidly. Continuation training is necessary as changes are implemented. Operators and
equipment suppliers should hold regular reviews on the subject of such changes and revise
training programmes to incorporate the effects of significant changes.
Threshold Changes
The refinement of the HMS limits will be an ongoing process accompanying the validation
effort. Refining the limits requires an understanding of the relationship between the values of
the various parameters or algorithms and the increase in the severity of the fault detected. In
some cases some improvement in limits can be fairly easily made. Several instances of
removal of a component for an indicated fault, followed by inspection of the component
which shows that no fault or a level of damage which is insufficient to warrant removal of the
component from service, would serve to indicate that some increase in the corresponding
limit can be made. In general, however, one needs to have a history for the particular
component to develop the relationship between the severity of the fault and the health and
vibration monitoring indication or indications. In the cases of the existing approved systems
this was developed for gearboxes by several research programmes sponsored by the CAA.
The procedures and controls for these limits and any proposed changes will need to be agreed
with the CAA and should be based upon past experience coupled with sound engineering
practices.
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There are two aspects to this, firstly, which departments should have access to the system and,
secondly, what level of expertise do they have in using the system?
The question of who should have access to the system is very important, especially if the
outputs of the system are important to the analysis processes. Systems whose output is
important have to be sufficiently protected to prevent data corruption or loss. This implies
that the only people who should have access to it are those who are going to be doing or
analysing the processing related to that system. Even if the possibility of malicious sabotage
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is discounted, if other departments such as sales or even other engineering departments, are
allowed to have access to the system (even indirectly via a network) there is the possibility
that system data could be accidentally lost or corrupted. There are other aspects to protecting
health and vibration monitoring analysis systems from accidental or deliberate damage and
these are discussed later in this CAP.
The level of expertise of the intended users is just as important as the restricted use of the
system. Health and vibration monitoring analysis is detailed and complex and if the analysis
team is presented with a tool they are unfamiliar with their job can only become harder.
If a completely new system is being selected the associated training needs of the staff must be
considered and provided before the tool is put in to use, particularly if there is any level of
importance associated with its output.
Equally, if a modification is being made to the system, the effect on how the system is used
must be carefully considered. Human factors research indicates that, when a system is
modified in such a way that it appears to be largely unchanged, errors start to occur because
system operators incorrectly assume that it will perform in exactly the same way as the
previous version. This misjudgement can, and does, lead to serious errors. If the system in
question is calculating or analysing something that has an airworthiness impact on the
helicopter, this should be carefully considered.
2)
Several steps can be taken to protect data from corruption or loss and some of these, such as
careful scrutiny of the gathering, storage and transfer systems have already been discussed but
there are other steps that can be taken.
Firstly, once the required function of a system has been determined, all software other than
that needed for the required functionality should be removed from the machine it is running
on. This will ensure that there is no way any other software programs can accidentally corrupt
it. The system should also be isolated wherever possible. i.e. not connected to networks,
adjacent systems or the internet as this will help to protect it from misuse and viruses. It will
also help to protect it from the accidental corruption that can occur when interlinked networks
fail.
A set of procedures related to the access and use of the system and its related data should also
be created to prevent accidental misuse. These procedures should also cover any applicable
security aspects of data protection such as the application of disk drive and store room locks
and a list of who has keys to them. The procedures should be reviewed on a regular basis to
ensure their continued applicability.
Finally a set of verification and validation procedures should be put in place to ensure that
any accidental or deliberate corruption of data can be spotted in time to compensate for it.
These procedures should also deal with the issue of what to do if corrupted data is found and
how and if it can be of continued use. Some systems that monitor component usage deal with
corrupted data by taking a deliberately pessimistic view of the analysed flight and assigning
figures that represent severe use and wear for that flight, this is one possible way to deal with
corrupted or missing data.
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APPENDIX B
References:
JAR-29 Issue 1. Large Rotorcraft.
JAA/INT/POL/27 and 29/1, Issue 2. Protection From The Effects of HIRF.
EUROCAE ED-12B, RTCA DO-178B Software Considerations on Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification.
EUROCAE ED-14C, RTCA DO-160C Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for
Airborne Equipment.
Airworthiness Notice 45A Software Management and Certification Guidelines.
CAAIP Leaflet 11-16 Computer Control - Records and Programmes.
AMC / IEM 20-115B
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