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People vs Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 400)

FACTS
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by
Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.
>An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety
Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and
the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
HELD:
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated
in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in
their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.
Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse
of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.

PICOP v. Asuncion Case Digest


PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of
Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP

compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the
PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC
issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its
second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by
the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the
search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no
personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3)the place to be searched
was not described with particularity.

People vs Estrada (296 SCRA 383)


PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
FACTS:
A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private
respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
pertinent facts of the present case are as follows:
> Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended
with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at
New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the
same applicant)
>Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition
stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound
containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot
41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse
at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products.
> On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the
search warrant is illegal and null and void.
Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958.
Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present
documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the
applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases
where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance,
the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant
can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities.
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he
went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such
certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a
license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually
located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to
be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is
owned by a different person.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be
noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people,
workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the
residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or
structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is
516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does
not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of
private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which
is violative of the constitutional requirement.

Microsoft Corp v. Maxicorp


ntellectual Property Law on Copyright Probable Cause in Issuing Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against
Maxicorp Inc. He observed that Microsoft Software (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged
within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were
issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a
search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought
as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who
showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC
judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed
by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued
was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are
sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the issuance of
the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule
for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it
was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

People v. Aruta
Search and Seizure Informers Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie
that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the
same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a
Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers;
NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the
contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana
leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta
cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime.
Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed
to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accusedappellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was
there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being
no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a
poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Burgos v. Chief of staff


On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pa o, Executive Judge of the Court of irst Instance of Quezon City, issued two
(2) search warrants where the premises at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We orum newspapers, respectively. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of
the WE ORUM newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the
WE ORUM newspaper.
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizationknown as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the WE ORUM and other subversive materials and propaganda,
more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking Bagong Silang.
Pursuant to the said search warrants, the business premises of the Metropolitan Mail and We orum newspapers
were searched. Accordingly, office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles
used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature allegedly possessed by Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the We orum newspaper,
were seized. Thereafter, the premises of both printing offices were padlocked and sealed thereby preventing the
publication of the aforementioned newspapers.

A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed
after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants,
subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case No. Q022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.
Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners came immediately before the
Supreme Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before Judge Cruz- Pa o.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not the immediate recourse to the Supreme Court was proper to question the validity of the two (2) search
warrants.
Whether or not the two (2) search warrants were validly issued.
ANSWERS:
No. However the Court took cognizance of the petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the We orum offices, which was televised
in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. REMEDY AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH
The correct remedy for petitioners was to file a motion to quash the search warrants Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court
that issued them (Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]). But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the
public interest generated by the search of the We orum offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely
publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its
inherent power to suspend its rules. It is always in the power of the Supreme Court to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purpos es of jus tice require it.
2. ON VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANTS
Use of evidence seized in an illegal search does not prevent a party from questioning its validity Respondents also
submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents
in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not
follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever
he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way
affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
A mere typographical error in a search warrant does not render the same invalid The search warrant used to search the
premises of the We orum newspaper at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City indicated that
the articles sought to be seized were allegedly kept at No. 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City as contained in the warrant.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for

respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the
places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued the
said search warrant.
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it
has been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued,
and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched.
The seizure of articles belonging to other persons not named in the warrant does not invalidate the search warrant or
the search conducted Section 2 of Rule 126 (now Section 3 of Rule 126) of the Rules of Court provides that a search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of (a) property subject of the offense; (b) property stolen or embezzled
and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. It does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under Section 2(b), one of the properties that may be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession
it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.
Mere unsubstantiated allegations or baseless conclusions of law do not constitute probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in
Col. Abadillas application that petitioner is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requi rements of probable cause.
Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant must be based on personal knowledge of the applicant or his witness
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the
premises above-mentioned and the articles and things above- described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for ree Philippines, and April 6 Movement.
In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires
no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of irst Instance (64 Phil. 33), this Court ruled that the oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose

thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
General warrants are unconstitutional Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
In Stanford v. State of Texas the search warrant which authorized the search for books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in
Texas, was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to seize any
evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise have been held too general, and that portion of
a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy] was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
Stonehill v. Diokno
search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a
search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
(2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short,
the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no
cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects
the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued
from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular

acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and
the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

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