U.S.

Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

Office of the Clerk
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 20530

OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - BAL

31 Hopkins Plaza, Room 1600
Baltimore, MD 21201

Name: JANDRES - AGUILUZ, EDWIN A...

A 073-674-189

Date of this notice: 11/13/2014

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,

DCWUL ct1AAJ
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Panel Members:
Mullane, Hugh G.
Greer, Anne J.
Pauley, Roger

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished

Cite as: Edwin Alexander Jandres-Aguiluz, A073 674 189 (BIA Nov. 13, 2014)

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Kellie MacDonald
CAIR Coalition
1612 K St., NW, Ste. 204
Washington, DC 20006

..
Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review
Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: A073 674 189 - Baltimore, MD

Date:

NOV 132014

In re: EDWIN ALEXANDER JANDRES-AGUILUZ a.k.a. Edwin Handres

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

Kellie MacDonald, Law Student

Heidi Altman, Supervising Attorney

CHARGE:
Notice: Sec.

237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony (as defined under section 101(a)(43)(G))
237(a)(2)(A)(ii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] Convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude
237(a)(2)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)] Convicted of crime involving moral turpitude

APPLICATION: Termination

The respondent appeals the March 14, 2014, and March 26, 2014, decisions of the
Immigration Judge finding him removable and denying his motion to terminate. The Department
of Homeland Security has not responded. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent
moved the Board to accept a supplemental brief. The respondent's motion will be granted. The
record will be remanded.
We review findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and
all other issues in appeals, de novo. 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i), (ii).
The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was granted lawful permanent resident
status in September 1996. On April 13, 1998, the respondent was convicted, pursuant to a guilty
plea, of a violation of MARYLAND CODE ARTICLE (MCA) 27 145(c)(l),1 credit card theft, for
which he was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, suspended; fines; and restitution
(see conviction records for respondent, filed Sept. 11, 2013). On March 26, 2013, the respondent
was convicted, 2 pursuant to a guilty plea, of two counts of violating MARYLAND CODE,
CRIMINAL LAW 6-202, burglary in the first degree, for which he was sentenced to 364 days'
I

This section is now codified at MARYLAND CODE, CRIMINAL LA w 8-204(a)(l ).

There is no dispute that the respondent's 2013 conviction does not constitute an aggravated
felony, but is a CIMT (I.J. at 8).

Cite as: Edwin Alexander Jandres-Aguiluz, A073 674 189 (BIA Nov. 13, 2014)

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APPEAL AND MOTION

A073 674 189

conduct that falls outside the generic theft offense or that does not involve moral turpitude.
See United States v. Henriquez, 757 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2014); Matter of Silva-Trevino,
24 I&N Dec. 687, 690 (A.G. 2008). "This realistic probability can be established by showing
that, in at least one other case, the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special
(nongeneric) manner[.] " Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1 124, 1 129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Assuming, arguendo, that the respondent's argument is correct, where a State statute on its
face covers conduct that is not punishable under the generic definition of the crime, there must
be a realistic probability that the State would prosecute conduct under the statute that falls
outside the generic definition of the removable offense to defeat a charge of removability under
the categorical approach. See Matter of Ferreira, 26 I&N Dec. 4 15 (BIA 20 14). For
proceedings to be terminated based on the respondent's reading of the statute, Maryland must
actually prosecute violations of MCA 27 145(c)(l) in cases in which an individual ''takes
a credit card from another . . . without the consent of the cardholder" without an intent to deprive
the cardholder of the use of the credit card, e.g., where a person mistakenly takes another's card.
See Moncrieffe v. Holder, supra; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)
(holding that a motion to terminate should be granted if the respondent can "at least point to his
own case or other case in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special
(nongeneric) manner for which he argues").
The Immigration Judge did not apply the "realistic probability" test as part of his categorical
inquiry. Because such application requires fact-fmding, we will remand the record to the
Immigration Judge for application of the realistic probability test, as described in Moncrieffe and
Duenas-Alvarez. See Matter of Ferreira, supra, at 42 1. On remand, the parties may submit
additional evidence and argument, which may include evidence of Maryland prosecutions (or the
lack thereof) for theft of a credit card with or without the intent to deprive the cardholder.
ORDER:
The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for
consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

further proceedings

3
Cite as: Edwin Alexander Jandres-Aguiluz, A073 674 189 (BIA Nov. 13, 2014)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

On appeal, the respondent argues that MCA 27 145(c)(l) is divisible and the modified
categorical analysis is appropriate under Descamps v. United States, _U.S. _,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2293 (20 13). The respondent argues that the phrase in MCA 27 145(c)(l)
"with intent to use it or sell it or to transfer it" modifies only the immediately preceding clause.
Thus, he argues, under Moncrieffe v. Holder, _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013), the
"least of th [e] acts criminalized" does not include "the intent to deprive" language required for
an aggravated felony theft offense or a CIMT. See Matter of Garcia-Madruga, supra; Matter of
Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to
involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended.). In other words, the
respondent argues that MCA 27 145(c)(l) does not "necessarily" reach conduct that includes
the intent to deprive.

"=''

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE OFFICE

31

FOR

IMMIGRATION

REVIEW

IMMIGRATION COURT
HOPKINS

ROOM 440

PLAZA,

BALTIMORE,

21201

16,

2014

UMd Immigration Clinic

Sweeney,

500 W.

Maureen

Baltimore St,

Baltimore,

MD

Ste.

360

21201
Date:

Mar

File A073-674-189
In the Matter of:
JANDRES

AGUILUZ,

EDWIN ALEXAN DER

Attached is a copy of the written decision of the Immigration Judge.

This decision is final unless an appeal is taken to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
Notice of Appeal,

Representative,

The enclosed copies of

and FORM EOIR 27,

properly executed,

Notice

FORM EOIR 26,

of

Entry

as Attorney or

must be filed with the Board of

Immigration Appeals on or before

The appeal must be accompanied by proof of paid fee
Enclosed is a copy of the oral
Enclosed is a transcript

decision.

of the testimony of record.

to

You are granted until

to

this

submit a brief

office in support of your appeal.

ing counsel is granted until

($110.00).

to submit a

brief in opposition to the appeal.

-- 1 is
Enclosed

copy of the order / decision of

the Immigration Judge.

All papers filed with the Court shall be accompanied by proof

of service upon opposing counsel.
fl

cc:

DHS,

31

ICE,

OFFICE OF THE

HOPKINS PLAZA 16TH

BALTIMORE,

MD

UL

FLOOR

212010000

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

MD

r
\,,_

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

A# 073-674-189

Edwin Alexander JANDRES-AGUILUZ

RESPONDENT

CHARGES:

Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act ("Act" or "INA"), as amended, in that, at
any time after admission, you have been convicted of an
aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of
the Act, a law relating to a theft offense (including receipt
of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term
of imprisonment at least 1 year was imposed;
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, as amended, in that, at
any time after admission, you have been convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single
scheme of criminal misconduct;
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, as amended, in that you
have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years after admission for which a
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.

APPLICATION:

Respondent's Motion to Terminate Proceedings

APPEARANCES

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE DHS:

Alyse L. Prawde and Lauren Gold, Student Attorneys

University of Maryland School of Law
Clinic Law Office, Suite 360
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

Jennifer Piateski, Esq.

Assistant Chief Counsel
31 Hopkins Plaza, Suite 1600
Baltimore, MD 21201

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF:

c
INTERIM MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Statement of the Case

I.

The respondent is a male native and citizen of El Salvador. The Department of

Homeland Security ("DHS") placed him into removal proceedings through the issuance of a

not a citizen or national of the United States; (2) is a native and citizen of El Salvador; (3) was
admitted to the United States at or near Houston, Texas, on or about August 14, 1 993 as a B-1
non-immigrant visitor; (4) adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident on
September 24, 1996 under section 245 of the Act; (5) was, on April 13, 1998, convicted in the
District Court at Montgomery County, Maryland for the offense of credit card theft, in violation
1
ofMo. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l) (District Court Case Number 4D00056585; (7) for that
offense, was sentenced to 18 months incarceration; (8) was, on March 26, 2013, convicted in the
Circuit Court at Montgomery County, Maryland for the offense of first degree burglary, in
violation of MD. CODE ANN ., CRIM. LAW 6-202 (Circuit Court Case Number 122074C); and (9)
these crimes did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.
On September 11, 201 3, the respondent admitted the factual allegations listed above, and
the Court, based upon the conviction records submitted by the DHS, sustained the charges of
removability pursuant to INA

237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). After several continuances to allow the

respondent the opportunity to secure counsel, the respondent, through counsel, contested the
Court's finding with respect to his removability and sought to terminate proceedings contending
that he was not removable as charged. The Court instructed the parties to submit briefs on the
issue of removability, which each party thereafter submitted. Having reviewed the arguments of
both parties, the evidence of record, and the applicable law, the Court's decision and order now
follow.
II.

Evidence Presented

A. Documentary Evidence

The following documents were received, but not yet admitted into evidence:

DHS Conviction Records for Respondent, received September 1 1, 201 3

DHS withdrew factual allegation 6 at a hearing on September 11, 2013.

2

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Notice to Appear (''NTA"), dated August 26, 2013. The NTA alleges that the respondent: (1) is

Respondent's Motion to Enter Appearance as Student Attorneys and Representational

Statement, dated January 8, 2014

Respondent's Written Pleading, dated January 22, 20 14

Letter to the Court filed by Counsel for the Respondent, received February 21, 2014

DHS Response to Respondent's Motion to Terminate Proceedings, received March 5,

2014
Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Terminating Removal
Proceedings, received March 5, 2014
Respondent's Reply to DHS's Response to Respondent's Motion to Terminate
Proceedings, received March 13, 2014

Position of the Parties

Respondent
The respondent contends that he is not removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated

felony theft offense for his Maryland credit card theft conviction in 1998. 2 The respondent
argues that the statute of conviction is divisible as the first clause does not include an explicit
intent element, whereas the second clause is specifically modified by intent to use, sell, or
transfer. For this reason, the respondent posits, the Court must apply a modified categorical
approach analysis and, given the DHS's failure to submit any records beyond the fact of
conviction for this offense, the Court must assume the minimum conduct required for a
conviction under the statute--here, an unauthorized taking with no intent element. Further, the
respondent contends that this offense is consistent with the respondent's description of the facts
underlying the offense.

ResQondent received less than a one year sentence of incarnation for his first degree burglary
conviction; therefore, it is uncontested that this offense does not constitute an aggravated felony
burglary offense. See INA 101(a)(43)(G).
3

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Respondent's Motion, and Memorandum in Support thereof, to Withdraw Plea and

Enter New Plea and to Terminate Proceedings or, in the alternative, to Set Briefing
Schedule and Hearing on Removability, received January 22, 2014

III.

Letter from Respondent to the Court, received October 8, 2013

'
,,

In addition, the respondent argues that his 1998 credit card theft conviction is not a crime

involving moral turpitude ("CIMT") because the statute of conviction does not require any intent
with respect to the first clause; much less does it require intent to permanently deprive the owner
of the use and benefit of the credit card. Given that the Board of lmmigration Appeals ("BIA")
has held that a theft conviction is a CIMT "only when a permanent taking is intended," M atter of

conviction is overbroad, encompassing both CIMT and non-CIMT offenses, and therefore is not
categorically a CIMT. Accordingly, the respondent avers that his 1998 credit card theft
conviction constitutes neither

an

aggravated felony nor a CIMT, and he is therefore not

removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).3
DHS

The DHS contends that the respondent's 1998 credit card theft conviction is an
aggravated felony theft offense as defined by INA 101(a)(43)(G). Specifically, the DHS
argues that the elements of credit card theft contained in the Maryland statute are functionally
equivalent to those of generic theft, as set forth in Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436
(BIA 2008), and therefore

an

offense under the statute is categorically an aggravated felony and

a CIMT. Further, with respect to intent, the DHS submits that intent to deprive may be inferred
from the other express terms of the statute. Accordingly, the DHS submits that the respondent is
removable as charged.
IV.

Analysis and Findings

The Court has considered the arguments of both parties and the entire record carefully.
The Court has reviewed all evidence, even if not specifically discussed further in this decision.
Based on the following, the Court finds that the respondent is removable pursuant to all
three charges of removability under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii);

as

an alien convicted of an

aggravated felony theft offense under INA 10 1(a)(43)(G), two CIMTs not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct, and a CIMT committed within five years after admission
3 In his briefs, the respondent also argued that the Court should consider his Motion to Terminate
unopposed and should grant the Motion because the DHS failed to file a timely response. See 8
C.F.R. I 003.23(a). However, given the complexity of the legal issues raised by the
respondent's convictions and in the interest of arriving at a full and complete resolution of the
matter, the Court accepted the DHS's untimely response.

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Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973), the respondent contends that the statute of

c
for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court shall deny the respondent's Motion to Terminate proceedings and find that he is removable
as charged.

The Court must examine whether the respondent's credit card theft conviction is an
aggravated felony under the categorical approach. This approach allows the Court to look only
to the elements of the criminal statute at issue and compare them to the elements of the relevant
ground of removability. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 4 95 U.S. 575 (1990). Generally,
under this approach, the Court may not inquire into the facts of the offense, but will examine the
elements required to sustain the conviction. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,

2283 (2013). If the statute is divisible such that it includes conduct that is not considered an
aggravated felony, the Court must then use the modified categorical approach. See e.g., United

States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012). Per this approach, the Court may look to the
record of conviction and other relevant documents to determine if the offense is an aggravated

fel ony See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
.

Here, the respondent was convicted under M D. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l),4 which is
technically divisible between offenses involving an unauthorized taking of a credit card and
offenses involving the receipt of a stolen credit card. However, both offenses involve conduct
that constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense as defined by INA 101(a)(43)(G). See

Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. at 436 (setting forth the elements of a theft offense
under INA 101(a)(43)(G)); Matter ofBahta, 22 l&N Dec. 1381, 1390 (BIA 2000) (setting forth
the generic definition of "receipt of stolen property'' within INA 101(a)(43)(G)). Accordingly,
the Court must analyze the respondent's conviction under the categorical approach. See Gomez,

690 F.3d at 201.

MD. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l) provides that a person commits credit card theft when he
takes a credit card from a person, or from the possession, custody or control of
another without the cardholder's consent or who, with know ledge that it has been
so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer it to
a person other than the issuer or the cardholder.
4

MD. CODE Art.

27, 145(c)(l) is now codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 8-204(a)(l).
5

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

The respondent's 1998 credit card theft conviction is an aggravated felony theft offense as
defined bv INA 10J(a)(43)(G) rendering him removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)fiii)

A theft offense within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G) consists of''the taking of, or exercise
of control over, property without consent and with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of the
rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent."

Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 l&N Dec. at 436; see also Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276,

without consent, or knowingly receiving a credit card that has been taken without the
cardholder's consent, with the intent to use, sell, or transfer it to another thereby depriving the
true cardholder his rights and benefits of ownership of the card. Thus, credit card theft in
Maryland includes all of the elements of generic theft for purposes of INA 101(a)(43)(G).
However, the respondent contends that the first clause-"takes a credit card from a
person, or from the possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder's
consent"-lacks a mens rea component. MD. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)( l ) (emphasis added). In
other words, the respondent argues that the phrase ''with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer
it" modifies only the immediately preceding clause, ''who, with knowledge that it has been so
taken, receives the credit card." MD. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l) (emphasis added). The Court
disagrees with the respondent's interpretation.
In Soliman v. Gonzales, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Virginia credit card theft
statute, the elements of which are not materially different from MD. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l).

See 419 F.3d at 284; compare Va. Code Ann. 18.2-192(1)(a), with MD. CODE Art. 27,
145(c)(l). The Virginia statute is nearly identical to the Maryland statute and provides that a
person is guilty of credit card theft when he
takes, obtains or withholds a credit card or credit card number from the person,
possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder's consent or who,
with knowledge that it has been so taken, obtained or withheld, receives the credit
card or credit card number with intent to use it or sell it, or to transfer it to a
person other than the issuer or the cardholder.
Va. Code Ann. 18.2-192(1)(a). Notably, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the intent element in the
Virginia statute, which follows a similar clause as that of the Maryland statute, as applying to the
whole subsection. See Soliman, 419 F.3d at 284.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a strong preference for
finding a mens rea requirement or

an

element of intent within a criminal statute, even where one

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

283 (4th Cir. 2005). The Maryland statute expressly proscribes taking the credit card of another

c
is not expressly included. See Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 46-48 (Md. 1999) (discussing cases
indicating the Supreme Court's policy of favoring inclusion of a mens rea requirement when
interpreting a criminal statute); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52
(1952); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-20 (1994). It is particularly appropriate to
construe a criminal statute

as

requiring some kind of mens rea element in order to prevent

For example, if there was no requirement of mental culpability attached to the crime of credit
card theft in Maryland, then a person who accidently picked up the credit card of another while
dining at a restaurant or paying for something at a store, mistaking it for his or her own, would
be guilty of credit card theft under the statute. Interpreting the statute in such a manner would
therefore lead to an absurd result. Further, the Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he
requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of criminal
jurisprudence." Garnett

v.

State, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (Md. 1993). Thus, while the Court

interprets MD. CODE Art. 27, 145(c)(l)

as

inclusive of an intent element that is applicable to

the entirety of the subsection, even if the intent element were applicable only to the immediately
preceding clause, the Court finds it appropriate to read an intent element into each clause of the
subsection. See Soliman, 419 F.3d at 283 (statutory provisions are to be read as a whole).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the respondent's conviction for credit card theft is

an

aggravated felony theft offense within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G), and therefore he is
removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
The respondent's 1998 credit card theft conviction is a CIMT rendering him removable
pursuant to INA . 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii)

The respondent's credit card theft conviction is also categorically a CIMT. The BIA has
held that a CIMT "refers generally to conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in
general." Matter ofJurado, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33 (BIA 2006); see also Matter of Tran, 21 I&N
Dec. 291, 292-93 (BIA 1996). "It is well settled that theft or larceny offenses involve moral
turpitude." Matter of Jurado, 24 l&N Dec. at 33. However, the respondent contends that his
conviction for credit card theft is not a CIMT because the statute does not require intent to

permanently deprive the cardholder of his credit card. The Court disagrees.

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criminalizing innocent conduct. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985).

The BIA in Matter of Jurado held that the nature of retail theft in Pennsylvania "is such
that it is reasonable to assume that the taking is with the intention of retaining the merchandise
permanently." 24 I&N Dec. at 34; see also Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 1338, 1350 (BIA
2000) (noting that specific intent to permanently deprive may be presumed where a person

such that it is reasonable to assume the taking is with intent to permanently deprive, so is the
nature of credit card theft as it is reasonable to assume that when one takes or receives the credit
card of another without consent, the intent is to do so permanently until the card is cancelled by
the cardholder who discovers it is missing or until it is simply no longer able to be used. See id.
While the respondent contends that the facts underlying his crime were the result of a
misunderstanding with his step-father, the Court, upon conducting a categorical analysis of the
offense, does not look beyond the statute of conviction. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. Even
under a modified categorical approach analysis, the Court would not consider extrinsic evidence,
such as the respondent's recitation of the facts concerning his conduct underlying his conviction.

See Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2013).
It is well established, and the parties do not dispute, that burglary with intent to commit
theft is a CIMT. See Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. at 294; Matter ofFrentescu, 18 I&N Dec.
244, 245 (BIA 1982). The first degree burglary statute in Maryland is divisible between offenses
involving burglary with intent to commit theft and burglary with intent to commit a crime of
violence. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LA w 6-202(a). Here, the indictment-an admissible,

Shephard approved document under the modified categorical approach-establishes that the
-

Respondent was convicted of an offense involving burglary with intent to commit theft. See
DHS Conviction Records at 15; see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. Therefore, the respondent's
burglary conviction also constitutes a CIMT. Accordingly, the respondent's conviction for credit
card theft is a CIMT rendering him removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii).
V.

Conclusion

Having reviewed all of the available evidence, this Court finds that the respondent's 1998
Maryland credit card theft conviction is an aggravated felony theft conviction as defined by INA
10l(a)(43)(G) rendering him removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). Moreover, the
Court finds that the respondent's 1998 Maryland credit card theft conviction is one of two CIMT
convictions on his record, which was committed within five years of admission rendering him
8

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unlawfully takes, or attempts to take, the property of another). Just as the nature of retail theft is

removable pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Accordingly, the respondent is

removable as charged, and the Motion to Terminate is denied.

ORDER

I.

the respondent's Motion to Terminate is DENIED; and

II.

the respondent is removable to El Salvador as charged.

di:R:ro

Date

o
sland
United States Immigration Judge
Baltimore, Maryland

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center | www.irac.net

It is hereby ordered that: