J Indian Philos (2012) 40:593614

DOI 10.1007/s10781-012-9168-x

Svabhvavda and the Crvka/Lokyata: A Historical

Overview
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

Published online: 15 November 2012

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract svabhva (own being) and yadchh (chance, accident) are named as
two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatkraa) in the vUp.
But in later works, such as Asvaghosas poems, svabhva is synonymous with

yadchh and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhva is said to be
inhering in the Lokayata materialist system, although in which sensecosmic order
or accidentis not always clearly mentioned. Svabhva is also a part of the
Samkhya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed that

the idea of svabhva as cosmic order became a part of Lokayata between the sixth
and the eighth century CE and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so
that in the fourteenth century Sayana-Madhava aka Vidyaranya could categorically

declare that the Carvaka/Lokayata upheld causality, not chance. But the other
meaning of svabhva, identical with yadchh, continued to circulate along with
kla, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and
similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of
svabhva continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another
domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-a`-vis puruakra (manliness or human endeavour).
Keywords Carvaka/Lokayata first cause kla Medical compilations
Samkhya svabhva yadchh

Introductory Remarks
We first read of svabhva (lit. own being) as one of the several rival claimants for
the title of being the first cause (jagatkraa) in the vUp (c. sixth century BCE),

R. Bhattacharya (&)
Pavlov Institute, 98 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700 007, India
e-mail: carvaka_rkb@yahoo.com; ramakrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com

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1.2. Thereafter more and more of such claimants are made to appear on the scene.
Asvaghosa (first century CE) in his Sau, 16.17 writes:

And the cause of this suffering from active being in the world is to be found in
the category of the vices such as desire (t) and the rest, not in Creator
(vara) or Principal Matter (prakti), or Time or the Nature of Things
(svabhva) or Fate (vidhi) or Chance (yadcch) [Sau, 90 (text), 114
(translation)].
No fewer than 28 such claimants appeared in course of time (Bhattacharya,
December 2001, 1923. See also the Appendix below). Apparently the six
mentioned in the Sau were some (if not all) of the first causes that were current in
the first century CE. It is interesting to observe that although the lists found in
different sources are far from being identical, two of the claimants, svabhva and
kla, are often present in such lists. Yet neither Dasgupta (1922) nor Frauwallner
(1956) in their respective histories of Indian philosophy deals with svabhva.
Dasgupta (1922) merely mentions it once (I: 78), quoting vUp, 1.2, and, although
Frauwallner writes about the doctrine of time, kla, at some length ( English trans.
II: 7578), he does not mention the other claimants for the title of jagatkraa at all.
It is necessary to study the significance of svabhva for a particular reason. Quite
a number of writers on Indian philosophy have accepted this doctrine as a part of the
Carvaka/Lokayata, not always making clear what svabhva stands for in the context
of this philosophical system: causality or accident. Both the meanings of svabhva
are encountered in ancient as well as modern philosophical works.
Different Views on Svabhavavada vis--vis the Crvka/Lokyata
Let us take a few instances. Louis de La Vallee Poussin believes that the materialists
in India (philosophers without philosophy he calls them), by denying induction
were forced to deny causality (8:494). He then relates svabhva-as-accident to
materialism:
The name Svabhavikas is given to the scholars who believe that things, the
colour of the lotus and the sharpness of thorn, are born from the svabhvo,
own nature. Much could be said on the exact value of the word: it probably
means; Things are not produced by causes; they are because they are. (8:494)
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, it is evident from the sources he refers to, relies heavily
on Buddhist works in his exposition of the meaning of svabhva.
On the other hand, speaking of the Carvaka/Lokayata ontology, Eli Franco and
Karin Preisendanz write:
The world in all its diversity is only the result of various combinations of the
material elements. There is no determinative principle, such as God or karma,
which is responsible for the properties of things. They are due to their own
nature; no agent makes fire hot or water cool. Lokayata causality operates with
material causes only, and efficient causes are not recognized (179).

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The Carvaka/Lokayata then admits causality in the svavvavdin way, rejecting

other rival jagatkraas. Apparently in this respect Franco and Preisendanz have
S-Ms SDS, chap. 1 and other sources in mind.
Similarly, speaking of the Carvaka/Lokayata ethics, Franco and Preisendanz
revert, though not explicitly, to the doctrine of svabhva:
That we could have an unequal share of pleasure and pain is not due to any
unseen force like karma, but to the different capacities of things caused by
different combinations of the elements, just as bubbles on the ocean display a
diversity of size, hue and duration (180).1
Thus we have two diametrically opposite views on svabhva vis-a`-vis the
Carvaka/Lokayata. But this is not all. At least one modern scholar, Kavel Werner,
has identied the Carvaka and svabhvavda: While there are other materialistic
and realistic schools in Indian philosophy, the Carvaka is the only naturalist
(svabhava vadin) (Werner 1997, p. 274).2 Werner in all probability was following
Vidyaranyas VPS, 210 (or some secondary source) in identifying svabhvavda

with the Carvaka/Lokayata.

Let it be noted that the authors of these three views have one or the other ancient
authority in their support.

Other Modern Views on Svabhava

It is neither possible nor necessary to review all the interpretations that have been
offered by modern scholars. We propose to discuss some of the more representative
and well-known works that deal with svabhva in relation to the Carvaka/Lokayata.
Speaking of the Carvakas, Seal (1915) writes:
Among the Charvakas there were two classes, the cruder school of materialists
who accepted perception (pratyaka) as a valid source of knowledge, as well
as the reality of natural law (svabhva), and the finer school of sceptics, who
impugned all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, and all
evidence, Perception as well as Inference. (p. 252)
Seal quotes Jayantabhatta (NM, chap. 1) as the authority who speaks of the

suikitacrvk (the well educated Carvakas) and crvkadhrta (cunning

Carvaka). Such a division of the Carvakas, now we know, is baseless, for
Cakradhara in his GrBh commentary on the NM has explained that by both the terms
Jayanta was referring to Udbhatabhatta and his followers (GrBh I: 52, 100). Before

1
The reference to bubbles is obviously derived from a Carvaka aphorism: jalabudbudavajjv, Souls
are like water bubbles (Bhattacharya, I. 9. 2009, pp. 79, 87). Franco relates this aphorism to the doctrine
of epiphenomenalism and cites S. Hodgsons description of the mind-body relationship as the foam
thrown up and floating on a wave (Franco 1997, p. 99).
2
Cf. also his comment: Buddhism steers between the extreme asceticism of Upnisadic teaching and the
extreme indulgence of the senses taught by the naturalists (svabhva vdins) of whom Carvaka is an
example (p. 275).

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the discovery of this commentary (1972), scholars like Dasgupta (1922, 1, pp. 78
179, 362) and Shastri (1959, pp. 104105) too were deceived by Jayantas irony.
This, however, is not the point. Seal, it should be noted, takes svabhva to mean
natural law, that is, causality. He further writes that while the Buddhists assumed
the principle of causality to be the ground of induction, the Carvakas did not (pp.
252253). Apparently, according to Seal, one group of Carvakas admitted natural
law, and the other, like the Buddhists, took their stands on the principle of the
Uniformity of Nature (prativandha, svabhvaprativandha, as the Nyyavindu says).
The problem is that ahetu cannot be the basis of the Carvaka/Lokayata. No
aphorism or verse has yet been found that could associate the Carvaka/Lokayata with
ahetuvda. So if svabhva = ahetuvda, Carvaka/Lokayata cannot be = svabhva, a
view that Vidyaranya in his refutation of the Carvaka holds: sarva krya

svabhvd ebotpadyate iti brhaspatyo manyate, the brhaspatya (the follower of

Brhaspati) thinks that all effects originate from svabhva (VPS, p. 210. See also Sinha

III, pp. 221222).

Similarly, Kaviraj (1923) divides svabhvavda into two varieties: extremist and
moderate (pp. 4647; reprinted in C/L 442443), labels reminiscent of Indian
National Congress leadership of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This division too is not in conformity with available evidence. Kaviraj assumes that
the earliest representatives of the extreme form of svabhavavada seem to have been
a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called lokyatikas, but
subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of Crvkas (pp. 47
48; C/L 443). He refers to the evidence found in Pali literature, to the Jabali episode
in the Rmyaa (Ayodhyakanda, 100. 3839 in vulgate ed. = 94. 3233 in crit.

ed.) and the Jain Bhagavatstra, 2. 248.

In the whole of Pali literature, the word lokyata means vitaasattham, the
science of disputation, not materialism (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 187192;
Franco 2011, p. 630). The same meaning holds true for the passage in the Rmyaa
as also for the Bhagavatstra. Jabali does speak like a materialist but he represents
some pre-Carvaka school of dehtmavda, not the Carvaka, which appears much
later (the name to designate this school is seldom encountered before the eighth
century CE. The name along with Lokayata as its namesake occurs in Haribhadras
DSam, verse 85d, and Kamalaslas TSP, gloss on TS, verse 1885.
There is no mention of Lokayata along with svabhva before the sixth century
CE. It first occurs in the oldest known commentary on the SK (Suvarasaptatistra,
cited by Bedekar 1961a, p. 10).3 Speaking of the rival claimants for being the first
cause (as found in SK verse 27), Paramartha quotes a verse: What produces the
white colour of the hamsas [swans], the green colour of the parrots and the

variegated colour of the peacocks, it is from that I too am created. Paramartha

quotes the verse again in his commentary on SK verse 61 and adds: Thus
spontaneity (svabhva) is the cause of the entire world; Deliverance is effectuated
then spontaneously and not by Nature (prakti). Earlier still, in Mbh, 12. 224. 50,
3

This text not being available to me, I have used Sastris rendering (p. 36). Instead of writing the
earliest known commentator of the SK whose work was translated into Chinese by Paramartha every
time, I shall henceforth use the shorthand Paramartha.

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svabhva is associated with the bhtacintak, those who think in terms of the
elements. However, in another verse in the same book (12.230.4) bhtacintak is
replaced by apare jan, other people, not identified with any school of thinkers.
The reading then is doubtful and the implication of the term bhtacintak is
uncertain (see Bhattacharya 2002a, 2007b, pp. 275277).
Following Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Johnston (1928) declares that he would
identify the svabhavavada with the adhiccasamuppanna [adhtyasamutpanna in
Sanskrit] school of the Brahmajalasutta of the Dghanikya (Sau 60n). In a later
article (1931), Johnston explains adhiccasamuppanna as akraasamuppanna,
originating without any cause, as opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of paiccasamuppanna [prattyasamutpanna in Sanskrit], interdependent origination, which is
one of the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy that provides the first inkling of the
modern formulation of the law of causation, of the law of universal causation, as
T. W. Rhys Davids puts it (pp. 42, 47).4 Johnston takes svabhva to mean
accidentalism but does not consider why it is mentioned as a separate item, not
identical to yadcch, chance, both in the vUp and the Sau. As we shall see, many
of the handbooks and sundry popular works on Indian philosophy follow his view.
At the same time, however, there was a divergent view which explained svabhva as
causality, quite distinct from svabhva as accident. Curiously enough, both the
views have been attributed to the Carvaka/Lokayata: some believe that the Carvakas
were materialists and accidentalists at the same time; some others speak of them as
materialists believing in causality, in the material cause (updnakraa), not,
however, in the efficient cause (nimittakraa). The earliest list of jagatkraas
(SvUp 1.2) mentions three such efficient causes, namely, time, destiny and purua
(primeval man or the spirit or God) and one material cause, elements (bhtni),
while yadcch denies causality altogether.
It is also too much to claim, as Hiriyanna (1949) does, that the Carvaka/Lokayata
is a lineal descendent of that doctrine (sc. svabhvavda) (1949/1974, p. 57).
What is worse, in spite of making a clear distinction between svabhva and
yadcch, Hiriyanna tends to associate the Carvaka with both (1932, pp. 103104;
1974, p. 181)!
Hiriyanna (in an article written before 1952) again observed that there were two
non-Vedic currents of thought in the Early Post-Vedic period: One known as
Svabhavavada or naturalism which repudiated belief in the spontaneous and the
supernatural; and the other, dualistic or pluralistic in its character which gave rise to
doctrines like Jainism in the course of this period (1952, p. 110). This, I am afraid,
accords too much credit to svabhvavda as a parallel source of the Vedic currents
of thought such as Saivism and Vaisnavism. Similarly it is difficult to accept

Hiriyannas view expressed elsewhere (1932) that the Carvaka doctrine ascribes
the events of life to mere accident and that is how svabhvavda is to be
understood as the main source of later sensualist doctrine of Carvaka (1932,
4

Chattopadhyaya was very much impressed by Rhys Davidss Introduction to the Mah-nidnasuttanta, as is evident from his preference for using the phrase laws of nature (or natural law) in
relation to svabhva (see below). He reprinted this Introduction in Chattopadhyaya (ed.) 1982, pp. 64
72, renaming it Causality as Weltanschauung: Early Buddhism. Chattopadhyaya also quotes extensively
from this Introduction in 1990, pp. 128131).

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p. 104). When S-M associates the Carvaka/Lokayata with svabhvavda, he rejects

the concept of chance, yadchh at the same time (SDS Joshi (ed.), 11). Writing
under the name of Vidyaranya, S-M again identifies svabhvavda with the

Carvaka: svabhvavda eba pramrthika iti manyomnasya, (The Laukayatika)

considers svabhvavda to be the supreme reality. (VPS, 211). Svabhva thus is
treated as causality. If we accept S-Ms view in this regard, Hiriyanna cannot be
right.
jvikas (1951) writes, Some heretics exalted
Basham in his study of the A
jvika system (p. 226). Following
svabhva to the status of Niyati in the regular A
the Jain representation of svabhva, he brands the svabhvavdins as akriyvdins,
who agreed with the niyativdins on the futility of human efforts (p. 226). In
which way then did the former differ from the latter? Basham says: while the latter
viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself, for the former he
was rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature (p. 226). So far,
so good. Basham then goes on to observe that [t]hese ideas have much in
jvikism
common, and suggests that svabhvavda was a small sub-sect of A
(p. 226).
jvikas led him to include every heretical
Bashams total involvement with the A

view as a part of Ajvikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the

doctrine of svabhva was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the
evidence of the vUp and the Sau is to be believed, svabhva, along with but distinct
from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers
whom the author/s of the vUp did not approve of. Svabhva is mentioned there
only in connection with the origin of the universe, the first cause, so to say. In
later works svabhva is endowed with another dimension: whether or not free will
and hence human endeavour have any role to play in shaping the course of human
life. The basic point here is to deny the existence of any power or force beyond
nature and man. Implicitly svabhva involves the rejection of God or any
supernatural agency such as time, destiny, accident, the four (or five) basic
elements, and purua. Now all these words have some special technical sense.
Purua, for example, means the primordial person in the gveda (10.90.11), the
spirit in the Upanisads, and the human body in the medical texts. When we come to

Samkhya it carries a sense far away from all this (for the various significations of

purua, see Chattopadhyaya 1985, pp. 286287). Svabhva too is explained in no

fewer than eight different and quite unrelated senses in Haricarana Vandyopadhyayas Bangla-Bangla lexicon, Vagya abdakoa. Such a variety of
meanings are also found in case of the English word nature (see Oxford English
Dictionary, s.v.). Lovejoy (1952, pp. 7273) shows that Nature as the cosmic order
as a whole could mean both regularity and irregularity. Randle once noted the
possibility that names which later applied to a specific school were used in an early
period in a different or in a much more general sense (p. 3). We learn of all these
rival claimants from the works of those who are mostly intent on refuting the
atheistic doctrine. Yet all of the opponents certainly did not understand svabhva,
kla, etc. in the same sense. Occurrence of the same set of words should not deceive
us.

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The crux lies in the fact that some of the opponents take svabhva to mean not
only ahetuvda, accidentalism, but also its logical corollary, akriyvda, inactivism,
while some other opponents understand svabhva as rigid causality, svabhva
(instead of God or time or destiny or any other agency) being the cause of every
change in the world as also in human life. The logical corollary should then be
kriyvda, activism, or faith in human endeavour or resoluteness (puruaakra),
although this is not always explicitly mentioned in relation to svabhva-as-causality.
Riepe (1961) seems to have accepted Bashams views in toto and ventures on
some speculations:
The Ajivikas believed that all beings are developed by niyati, by destiny,
according to chance (sagati), and nature (bhva). The ripening of the world,
unlike the evolution of prakriti (sic) in Samkhya philosophy, is completely
predetermined. Evidently the niyativdins like the svabhvavdins (whose
view is that all things happened according to nature) together made up a group
called akriyavdins (those who did not believe in the effectiveness of
puruaakra) who believed works cannot effect any change. Niyati is not one
of a number of causes but is the only cause. (44).
Here we have a melange, a strange amalgam of several contradictory doctrines,
jvikas.
not in the least supported by any positive evidence in the literature of the A
Some Indian philosophers, more particularly the Jains, did have a penchant for
reconciling the irreconcilables, but, to the best of my knowledge, nobody would
care to associate svabhva with both destiny and chance, except perhaps some Jain
philosophers and may be a few others (Bhattacharya 2001b, pp. 4652).
Bedekar (1961a, b) has dealt with the doctrine of svabhva at a considerable
length. He notes several significant facts but what concerns us here is that he, too,
associates the doctrines of svabhva and kla with what he calls crass materialism
(1961a, p. 5), presumably because according to these doctrines everything in the
world including human life is the product of the Material Elements (Earth, Water,
Fire, Air and Space) which come together and go off at the behest of Svabhava,
Kala etc. (Bedekar 1961a, pp. 56). Materialism does begin and end with material
elements, which is why it is also called bhtavda. But the elements do not come
together and go off at the behest of anything or anybody, that is, any efficient
cause, as has already been noted above. So, when Bedekar speaks of svabhva
conceived as a mythopoeic personification invested with a will of its own,
governing in its supreme sway, the whole course of the world and the human life
(1961a, p. 6), svabhva tends to become a mystic force like time and destiny, a view
quite alien to materialism. Materialism does not admit such mythopoeic personifications. Moreover, in the Mbh, 12.172.11 and elsewhere svabhva invariably
suggests accident or absence of any cause; no efficient cause is allowed
(animittata) (for further details see Bhattacharya 1999, pp. 99101).
In spite of its excellent documentation, especially of Jain sources, Kulkarnis
study of svabhvavda (1968) suffers from the same mix-up. He rejects the view
that Svabhavavada was a small sub-sect of jivikism (Basham, p. 226). However,
the alternative he proposes is equally unacceptable. In his opinion svabhvavda
was more intimately connected with Materialism or Crvkadaranain as much

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as both deny a transmigrating soul. (p. 18). This is all the more astonishing
because the few verses which represent the doctrine of svabhva (for a collection
see Bhattacharya 2002b, pp. 7680) are absolutely silent about the soul. The
epigrams neither affirm nor deny its existence.
Kulkarni further suggests that it would be more proper to regard Svabhvavda
as part and parcel of Materialism as has been done by tradition (p. 18). Herein lies
the chief crux: tradition associates svabhvavda with materialism but no ground for
doing so is ever stated clearly, except perhaps for the reason that both are atheistic.
The Vedantins consider causality as part and parcel of materialism. S-M has been
the most influential in giving currency to this tradition and modern scholars like
Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 5568, etc.), Malvania (1982, p. 125) and others have
followed suit. We are thus left to account for the other implication of svabhva as
mere accident.
Warder (1971) follows the Buddhist tradition and accepts the view of svabhva
(own nature, in his rendering) as a rejection of the concept of causality. He does
not care to notice the implication of the separate mention of svabhva and yadcch
in the vUp I.2 and other sources (although in addition to the vUp he refers to the
BC, the Mbh, and some later works). He says:
In the earliest Buddhist sources, such as the Dgha Nikya, the theory of
phenomena originated without causes is generally known as adhiccasamuppanna, originated spontaneously, originated independently, and later this is
explained as yadicch (Sanskrit yadcch), chance, spontaneity, at will
(35).
This is a mere rehash of Johnstons view mentioned above.5
Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 5568; 1977, pp. 175186, etc.) all along insists on
the concept of svabhva-as-causality. Svabhva to him means not just inherent
nature but the Laws of Nature. In one of his last works (1991) he writes:
We have seen that it (sc. svabhva) formed an important feature of the new
intellectual climate ushered in the Second Urbanization and further, notwithstanding differences among the modern and medieval scholars of looking back
at it, the concept itself at least foreshadowed what came to be known in later
times as the Laws of Nature (II:6970. Emphasis added).
From the twenty three verses pertaining to svabhvavda (Bhattacharya 2002b,
pp. 7590) it is evident that since the composition of the Moksadharma section

(Santiparvan) of the Mbh (see Bhattacharya 1999) and the Sau (that is, the first
century CE onwards) the concept of svabhva had become quite indistinguishable
from ahetu, denoting both akriyvda and atheism. This is also the view of all
Buddhist philosophers. For instance, in course of commenting on PV, verses162cd
163ab, Manorathanandin identifies the vague word kecit as svabhvavdina (p. 64).
Although Dharmakrti does not mention the word svabhva, the doctrine itself
5

Warder does not specifically mention the Carvaka/Lokayata in connection with svabhva, although he
jivaka and Ajnana Philosophy. The section on svabhva
discusses it in a chapter entitled Lokayata, A
jivaka. Hence it can be assumed that he too believes
occurs in the first part of this chapter, before the A
that Lokayata and the doctrine of svabhva are one and the same.

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denying causality and providing the stock example of the sharpness of the thorn to
boot (taikydnm yath nsti kraam kaakdiu tathkraametat syd)
cannot but be reminiscent of svabhva-as-accident. On the other hand, in the
Upanisadic tradition and some later Naiyaikas and Vedantins works (for

references see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 3740), it is equally evident that there was
another view which claimed svabhva to be the cause of all things. Both approaches
are recorded in TS, 4.110:
sarvahetunirasa bhvn janma varyate |
svabhvavdibhiste hi nhu svamapi karanam ||6

The proponents of the doctrine of svabhva describe the origination of things

as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to
be its own cause. (Emphasis added)
Apparently there was a group of svabhvavdins who no longer accepted
svabhva itself to be the cause of everything (the earlier position) but reverted to the
position of ahetuvda. Kamalasla in his comment on this verse clearly mentions the
existence of two schools of svabhvavdins. The passage runs as follows:
nanu ye svata eva bhv bhavantiiti varayanti, tebhya e ko bheda?
ityha te htyadi. te = svabhvavdina. svamiti svarpam. apiabdt
pararpamapi. purbakastu svabhavam karanamicchanti, ete tamapi nec

chantti bhedah.

Question: What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe
the origination of things to themselves?
Answer: They do not, etc. They, i.e. the upholders of svabhva; the thing itself,
i.e. its own nature (prior to origination); eventhis implies that they do not
accept the form of any other thing to be the cause; the difference thus is that
while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its cause, these
other people do not accept even that as the cause (Emphasis added).
On the basis of this passage Bedekar rightly concluded: Thus Kamalasla seems
to suggest that there were two schools of Svabhavavadins: One school maintain at
least Svabhavathe nature of the things itselfas the cause to denial of other
things as causes, the other school denying even Svabhava as the cause (1961a,
11n46). However, in the very next sentence he dismisses this highly significant
point rather summarily by saying, The distinction tends to be metaphysical and
abstract. We shall see later that instead of being metaphysical and abstract it is
the key to the crux.
That there were two groups of svabhvavdins can also be inferred from the
variant readings of the classic, oft-quoted verse expounding the basis position of
svabhvavda. Asvaghosas version of a couplet rules out any role of human

endeavour and represents the later position:

6

The TS verse (along with the two following) is also quoted in Prajnakaramatis commentary on the
Bodhi, 9.117 and in Maladhari Ratnaprabha Vijayas commentary on GV, 2.25 (1643). Kulkarni, using a
different edition, gives the verse number in the GV as 1963 (13. n. 10). He thinks: it is not unlikely that
they (sc. TS, 4.110-112) are derived from a common source (p. 20).

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R. Bhattacharya

ka kaakasya prakaroti taikya vicitrabhva mga-paki v

svabhvata sarvamida pravtta na kmakrasti kuta prayatna
Who fashions the sharpness of the thorn or the varied nature of beast and bird?
All this takes place by natural development. There is no such thing in
this respect as action of our own will, a fortiori no possibility of effort (BC,
9.62, quoted in several other works. For details see Bhattacharya 2002b, 77,
verse 6).
Three other variants of the same couplet completely omit the conclusion urging
akriyvda and stops at asserting the role of svabhva, not of any other agency or
creator as the cause of all varieties. The first one reads:
ka kaakn prakaroti taikya vicitrabhva mga-paki ca
mdhurya iko kaut ca nimbe svabhvata sarvamida pravttam
Who fashions the sharpness of the thorns and the varied nature of beasts and
birds? Who fashions the sugarcane sweet and the margosa bitter? All this takes
place by natural development (SVi on BS, 1.7. Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 77,
verse 6a).
Other variants (Bhattacharya 2002b, vv.714, 22) similarly propose svabhva as
the cause of everything, either in the form of a series of rhetorical questions or as
denial of any creator god by implication. Here are a few examples:
badary kaakastka jurekaca kucita
phala ca vartula tasy vada kena vinirmitam
Of the many thorns of a jujube tree, one is sharp, another is straight, yet
another is crooked. But its fruit is round. Say, who has made all this?
(Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 7).
agniruo jala ta samasparastathnila
keneda citrita tasmt svabhvt tadvyavasthiti
The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the breeze of morn; By
whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born (Bhattacharya
2002b, p. 78, verse 8).
A variant of this verse is also found in the SSS (chap. 2, verse 2):
agnair auyam ap atya kokile madhurasvara
itydyekaprakra syt svabhvo npara kvacit
The heat of fire, the cold of water, the sweet sound of the cuckoos, and such
other things happen to be (due to) the invariable nature (of those things), and
(they) are not anything else. (Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 8, v.l.).
Denial of causality and free will then is the mark of one group of svabhvavdins
(see Bhattacharya 2002b, verses 17, 19) while acceptance of svbhva as the cause
of everything is the mark of the other (see Bhattacharya 2001a, b).
That the word svabhva stands also for causality or universal order is also borne
out by some observations of Joseph Needham. Referring to one of Chattopadhyayas works (1977) Needham (1980) writes:

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603

A key word in the ancient Indian literature is svabhva, which could be

translated inherent nature, innate thus-ness, or the essential nature of
things. It must have had close relations with ta and even dharma in some
senses, meaning the Order of Nature or the way in which Nature worksall
recalling Tao in Chinese. The physicians were seeking the pattern-principles
in Nature, the ultimate reasons (ultimately of course inscrutable) why things
are as they are and behave as they do (1980, 25).
Needham in this context makes another significant point in relation to the rendering
of svabhva in Chinese:
It is interesting to see how these Sanskrit words came out when the
Buddhist philosophers needed to translate them into Chinese. Svabhva was
rendered as hsing, and defined as embodied cause, the unchanging,
independent, self-dependent, fundamental nature behind the manifestation
or expression of anything. Sometimes this was amplified as tzu hsing, the
primary germ [verb. sap.] out of which all material appearances are
evolved, the first source of the material world of phenomena. Other more
curious locutions were ssu-pho-pho and tzu-thi-thi, own state, essential or
inherent property, innate or peculiar disposition, natural state or constitution
(1980, 25).
That svabhva in the Chinese tradition meant hetu alone, not ahetu is clear from
this instance.
Thus hetu and ahetu, kriy and akriy continued to be associated with
svabhvavda for centuries together. Most probably the group of svabhvavdins
who believed svabhva to be the cause of everything and hence believed in activism
merged with the Carvakas at some point of time, although we cannot say exactly
when. It may be presumed that such a merger took place before Paramartha, i.e., in
or before the sixth century CE.
When Svabhvavda and Lokyata Came to Coalesce
Yet it is also evident from the works of both Santaraksita and Haribhadra that

svabhva and the Carvaka/Lokayata were not considered identical even in the
eighth century CE. These two most well-versed savants never associate the two
doctrines. Santaraksita criticizes them in two different and widely separated

chapters (TS, chs. 4 and 22), presumably knowing well that the twain were
unrelated, at least not identical; one was not a namesake for the other. It is also
worthy of note that at the very outset of his work he dispenses with six of earlier
doctrines (similar but not the same as enumerated in the vUp) and then proceeds to
examine other and later philosophical systems. In Haribhadras two compendious
works, the LTN and the VS, too, all the doctrines are treated as distinct ones. The
only difference in the approaches of these two scholars is that while Santaraksita

does not mention yadcch at all (presumably because he calls the same doctrine

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R. Bhattacharya

svabhva), Haribhadra in both the LTN (chs.1 and 2), and the VS 2.169-72), take
note of svabhva and yadcch as two different concepts, opposed to each other.7
It was then sometime after the eighth century CE that svabhva became an
integral part of the Carvaka/Lokayata. Paramartha had shown earlier that the
Laukayatikas quoted a verse presumably composed by a svabhvavdin (on SK,
v.27), but the assimilation is first clearly noticed in Utpalas SVi (tenth century CE)
on BS, 1.5. Utpala does not explain what he understands by svabhva.
Nevertheless, we have at least one piece of evidence before the SDS that it was
svabhva-as-causality, not as chance or accident, which had got assimilated in the
Carvaka/Lokayata.
There are also at least two aphorisms attributed to the Carvakas which almost
definitely have their origin in svbhvvda. The stras are as follows: janmavaicitrya bhedjjagadapi vicitram and mayracandrakovat, The world is varied due
to the variation of origin and As the eye in the peacocks tail (II.1 and II.2 in
Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 79, 87). Jnanasrbhadra (late eleventh century) mentions
both aphorisms in his LV, marking them as iti lokyatastre (qutd. in Namai 1976,
p. 38 n11 on A2A8). The second simile is found employed in several verses
pertaining to svabhvavda: cf. What has fashioned the variegated plumage of
peacocks? TS, 4. 111c; It is due to svabhva like the variety of the peacock
(i.e., its plumage), NVV, 2: 10.8 Perhaps this is why some Vedantins could speak of
the Carvaka and svabhva-as-causality at the same breath. The other group of
svabhvavdins, on the contrary, clung to the later, altered view of svabhva-asaccident. It is this group that is mentioned and refuted in the Nyaya texts and
commentaries as proponents of kasmikat, without any reference to the Crvka/
Lokyata (see NS 4.1.221.24). Svabhva and yadcch had become synonymous to
some, as is evident from Dalhanas view. He goes to the extent of explaining

yadcch as causality (on SS, Sarrasthana, 1.11, 340)! Perhaps he argued to himself:
If svabhva could mean yadcch, why could yadcch not mean svabhva as well?
The words were semantically interchangeable to him.
Such a conclusion may appear to be partly conjectural, based as it is on the words
of Santaraksita, Kamalasla, and Haribhadra, and the absence of any reference to

ahetuvda and akriyvda in some verses expounding svabhvavda. But without

such a conjecture we cannot account for the reason why Somadevasuri could take
the Carvakas to be proponents of activism (YTC, I: 382).

Two Significations of Kla and Svabhva

How could the same name, svabhva, be attributed to so diverse and contradictory
views in two different domains, cosmology and ethics? We have to understand that
7
Pseudo-Sakara distinguishes between svabhva and yadcch as follows: By svabhva is meant the
power invariably belonging to the material objects, as for instance [the radiation of] heat by fireBy
yadcch is meant purely fortuitous origin (on vUp 1.2). Sankarananda, Amalananda and S-M too make
the distinction between the two along the same line. See Bhattacharya 2006, 3940.
8
Several verses attributed to the svabhvavdins contain this and similar examples. See Bhattacharya
2002b, pp. 7779.

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605

such changes in and additions to original meanings always happen to certain words,
not all at once but over the ages. Such radical changes in signification and
implication did not happen in case of svabhva alone. It happens in a number of
other instances too. Think of the knotty question: What is meant by stika and
nstika? To the Vedists, three non-Vedic systems, namely, the Buddhist, the Jain
and the Carvaka, all are nstikas; to the Buddhists and the Jains, the Carvakas alone
are so. More relevant to this study is another question: What is yoga? The word,
even in the context of philosophy alone, signifies a wide spectrum of systems (see
Randle 3n1). I propose that the same happened in case of svabhva and kla too.
Let us look at the doctrine of kla. Erich Frauwallner has made a distinction
between the idea of time in the Iranian neighbourhood and India. Gopinath Kaviraj too
has pointed out that the original klavda was a fatalistic creed but in the work of
Srpati the astronomer (as quoted by Dallana or Dalhana) time became synonymous

with the lord-vara (Kaviraj 60). Yet there are reasons to believe that some sort of
klavda was adopted by the astronomers as their own creed (Agnicit Purusottama on

S, 1.528). Here too we face a crux: did the concept of time in the works of astronomers
originate from the philosophical concept of kla as mentioned in the vUp? It is
equally probable that astronomers quite independently developed their concept of time
themselves. In other words, the klavda of the AV and vUp and that of the
astronomers are virtually unrelated; only the word kla is common to both.
Klavda has also been said to be the view of the paurikas, mythographers, by
Utpala (gloss on BS, 1.7). Was the commentator right in this? It is plausible but by
no means certain.9
Apart from the astronomers, Vatsyayana in his KS, 1.2.39 too portrays the
klakraikas as believing that time alone is the determinant of human happiness
and misery. The arthacintakas alone uphold purusakra (human effort/manliness)
and, as the commentator says, denounce daivamtravda, fatalism (Jayamagal on
KS 1.2.39, 23).
Frauwallner has discussed klavda first by referring to some verses related to
time in a hymn (AV, 19.53) and then mentioned some Buddhist and Jain sources. He
concludes by saying:
But in general this doctrine remains in the background. Apart from an
occasional mention, the leading philosophical systems take no knowledge of
it. On the contrary, they discuss the question of Time in quite a different way.
9

Kern in his edition of the BS has questioned the statement of Varahamihira that Kanabhuk (Kanada)
1.4) to be
the
claimed dravyni, substance, etc. (that is, the six categories mentioned in the Vaieikastra,
first cause: Althoughthey are the foundation of Kanadas System, they are nowhere said, at least to

my knowledge, to be the cause of the Universe. It appears

the statement of our author is not accurate
(172 n1).
Commentators on poems and narratives sometimes have to explain the philosophical views
occasionally found in the texts. Since they do not have any uninterrupted tradition to follow, they
have to recourse to their own understanding and knowledge. Especially when the views are archaic and no
longer current, commentators and scholiasts are of little or no help. Sometimes they are totally unreliable.
Two commentators are not always unanimous on the actual signification of technical terms. Nlakantha is

the worst offender in his glosses on the philosophical passages in the Mbh (see n11 below). We cannot
altogether dispense with the commentaries but blind faith in the glosses offered by them only leads to
further confusion.

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R. Bhattacharya

First of all we can say that the idea of Time vanishes where the proper
philosophical thought comes in; it emerges only comparatively later. The
nature-philosophy of the Vaisesika in their atomistic-mechanistic world
picture had sufficiently proved the origin of all things so that there was no
room for Time as the World-cause (Frauwallner I: 76).
If this interpretation of kla is accepted, the same might apply to the origin of the
several mutually exclusive meanings of svabhva in medical and philosophical
works. It is interesting to note that an astronomer like Bhaskaracarya (Si,
Goladhyaya 5) and Srpati (Se 15.21) and even a grammarian like Durgacarya
[1.4.3 (on Nirukta 1.19), pp. 110111] resorted to the concept of svabhva in order
to explain how the planets continued to roam in the void and how words acquire
some special significations.
Hence it may be presumed that svabhva, like kla, was rather a concept
available for use by all and sundry without their ever being or even becoming
klavdins or svabhvavdins. There was no fixed connotations attached to these
words; anyone could take them in whatever sense one liked. Kla could mean an
abstraction or a namesake of lord-vara (as in Gt 11.32: klo asmi lokakayakt
prvddho lokn samhartumiha pravtta, Time I am, in fulness, the consumer of
creatures, here at work for the destruction of creatures. As the translator explains:
Time here stands for the divine power of causing change (Gt 174). Similarly
svabhva could mean both causality and accident. Both klavda and svabhvavda
were lost philosophies, as Randle said (16n3). But the words, kla and svabhva,
remained in currency in classical Sanskrit and could be invoked as and when
necessary. Malvania (GV, 125) and Chattopadhyaya (2001, p. 56) apparently
presumed that svabhva had always stood for causality and had not, at a certain
stage of development, between the sixth century BCE and the first century CE,
become synonymous with yadcch. Like kla, svabhva too first appeared as a
jagatkraa (the first cause), a view of cosmology distinct from both the idea of a
creator as well as of an uncaused entity. Then the word in the sense of chance or
accident, haha, appeared in a different domain relating to the philosophy of life, as
a member of a triad or tetrad: daiva, puruakra, haha/svabhva, and kla (for a
detailed discussion see Bhattacharya 2007 b, 277281). This other domain, human
conduct, is not altogether unrelated to the first, for if the world is viewed as created
and moved by chance or accident, any human effort to achieve some end in life is
bound to be futile. Thus even cosmological speculations may and do influence
peoples philosophy of life. If, on the other hand, the world is conceived as an
ordered entity, every effect having a cause of its own, the philosophy of life that
would follow would uphold human endeavour and resoluteness. In the Indian
tradition, daiva, haha/yadcch, and niyati follow from the first world-view,
namely, ahetuvda, while the second world-view, upholding karman, would endorse
an activist philosophy of life. Karman, it is to be noted, admits rebirth, for actions of
previous lives will have concomitant effects on succeeding lives: reward and
punishment will be commensurate with past actions, good and evil. Svabhva-ascausality, on the contrary, dispenses with such unseen and unverifiable concepts as
it admits nothing supernatural beyond this world. Here causality is not something

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607

imposed from above or existing outside natural phenomena, yet every action would
have its natural effect. In short, svabhva-as-causality as a doctrine has every right
to be called proto-materialistic. Although it first appeared as an independent view, it
was latterly assimilated in the Carvaka/Lokayata materialist school.

Materialist Views in India: One or Many?

The relation of svabhva-as-causality to the Carvaka/Lokayata is well attested. Yet,
it is also known that the Carvaka/Lokayata was not the only materialist philosophy
in India. Besides Samkhya there was at least another materialist school which

thought in terms of ve elements as opposed to the Carvaka/Lokayata which spoke

of four (earth, air, fire, and water), thereby excluding ka or vyoma, space or ether,
presumably because it was not amenable to sense perception. Several Buddhist and
Jain sources as well as some verses in the Mbh confirm the existence of the school
which was not only bhtapacakavdin but also akriyvdin in its philosophy of life
(for details see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 3343). It is possible that the doctrine of
yadcch was at some point of time renamed svabhva and had got assimilated in
the thoughts of this or some other pre-Carvaka philosophical school that is called
bhtavda in Manimekalai, 27.26527.275, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem
(written between the third century and the seventh century CE). Mbh 12.267.4 also
speaks of time as the creator of all beings out of the pacamahbhtni, five great
elements. Another verse in the Mbh (13.50.11) says that all gods, human beings,
Gandharvas, Pisacas, demons and monsters are created out of svabhva, having
neither any effect nor any cause. There was thus several approaches to the problem
of jagatkraa, combining kla, bhtas and svabhva-as-accident.
Thus svabhva-as-accident is as much a part of one or probably more than one
pre-Carvaka materialist view of svabhva-as-causality. Those who speak of
svabhvavda as related to the Barhaspatya or Carvaka are definitely not right in
their identification but not altogether wrong either. The latter being the only living
system of materialist philosophy known to them, they could not think of any older
or lost pre-Carvaka materialist school to which akriyvda and ahetuvda were
actually related. Barhaspatya or Carvaka or Lokayata was a sort of brand name
representing materialism in India after the eighth century CE. Hence the confusion
around the issue: whether the Carvaka/Lokayata upholds ahetu and akriy or hetu
and kriy.
The original doctrine of svabhva, it appears, was lost or merged in another
system of philosophy such as the Carvaka/Lokayata, whether in its first incarnation
as causality or in its second incarnation as accident, and thus persisted as a concept
found both in Samkhya and the Carvaka/Lokayata. Johnston has noticed that that

svabhva was still held worth shot and shell in the eighth century (Johnston 1928,
10
159n). We may add: and even long after, as found in VPS (fourteenth century CE),
10
Apparently he had in mind the lines from Alfred Tennysons poem, The Charge of the Light
Brigade: Stormd at with shot and shell, / Boldly they rode and well, / Into the valley of Death, / Into
the mouth of Hell (Stanza 3), p. 167.

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if not for anything else but merely for forms sake, or perhaps because it was
customary to establish theism and/or human endeavour/resoluteness (puruakra)
by denouncing all atheistic and/or fatalistic views. The doctrines of svabhva and
kla were two such targets, conventionally chosen by some later writers.
It is also to be noted that all those who identify svabhvavda with the Lokayata
such as Utpala are not at all explicit about what they mean by svabhva: causality or
its negation. Therefore, casual remarks concerning svabhva and the Carvaka/
Lokayata quoted out of context by any author are not to be taken at face value. It is
obvious that commentators like Nlakantha were at a loss to explain some of the

technical terms of philosophy employed in the Mbh and were therefore forced to
11
provide wild and often wrong glosses. By the ninth century, the relation between
svabhvavda as a doctrine involving causality and/or as a component part of the
Carvaka/Lokayata (if not a synonym for it) was widely accepted as an established
fact, at least by most of the Vedantins.12 Thus we have a continuity of this view
identifying svabhvavda with the Carvaka/Lokayata, right from pseudo-Sankara
nandagiri (fourteenth century)
(ninth century), Amalananda (thirteenth century), A
in their respective commentaries on the vUp 1.2, down to S-M (fourteenth century)
srama (sixteenth century) and Agnicit Purusottama
in SDS, chap. 1, Nrsimha A

(seventeenth century) in their respective commentaries on the S, 1.528, in whatever

sense they might have taken the word svabhva. We have also seen that in the
Chinese tradition svabhva was taken in the sense of causality alone (Needham
1980, p. 25 qutd. above). And it is this firm belief in causality that marks the
Carvaka/Lokayata.
What is not to be overlooked is that the view of svabhva-as-accident or haha,
chance, too continued to exist side by side with the medical view of svabhva as
embodied cause or unchanging nature (see Chattopadhyaya 1977, pp. 178184).
Even though the Indian medical texts are characterized by such a faith, there is
nothing to show that they had been influenced by the Carvaka/Lokayata. On the
other hand, as has been shown above, the Carvaka/Lokayata was not the only school
of materialism in India. The original Samkhya was also materialistic in its approach

and the relation of the CS to Samkhya is an established fact (Dasgupta II, pp. 273,

304, 312, 314, etc.). Yet it should not delude us into believing that the CS, in the
form it has come down to us, is wholly or even primarily influenced by Samkhya. It

is true that the authors and successive reconstructors (pratisaskarts) and

redactors of the Indian medical texts, unlike their Greek counterparts, were not
hostile to philosophy (see Bhattacharya 2003). Yet the philosophical speculations in
11

diparvan, Mbh (crit. ed.), 68, notes: Nlakantha has

Sukthankar in his Prolegomena to the A

misunderstood the text and gives doubtful, far-fetched or fanciful interpretations, such as offering
a
Vedantic twist to 1.23.15 and suggesting an esoteric meaning of 1.232.1-7,19. Belvalkar in his Editorial
Note on the Santiparvan (crit. ed.), VIII, too complains that orthodox commentators like Nlakantha

gloss over the differences in the representation of the very large number of philosophical passages,
particularly Samkhya passages and interpret them all in consonance with Advaita Vedanta. The
commentators by no means agree in their interpretations. See also Bhattacharya (2001a, pp. 182183),
cataloguing Nlakanthas shifting positions regarding svabhva.

12
The only exception known to me is Madhusudana Sarasvat on S, 1.528. He does not identify the
svabhvavdins with the Carvakas but thinks that the svabhvavdins are accidentalists, who think that
the effect happens without any cause, kraa vinaiva krya bhavati. (p. 678).

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609

the CS and the SS are so hopelessly mixed up with Brahminical beliefs and so oddly
interpreted by the commentators (see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 4142) that it is
virtually impossible to separate the right reading from the spurious, unless some
earlier and more authentic mss are discovered.13 Apart from the materialist trait
found in the medical texts, there were several proto-materialist views current in
India from the Buddhas time, of which Ajita Kesakambala (Kesakambalin in
Sanskrit) is a very well-known representative (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 4554).
Some of such materialists may have been akriyvdins and ahetuvadins as well, a
fact attested by clear references to them in the Mbh and other sources (see
Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 3343 and 2007b).

Summing Up
The upshot of the whole discussion is then as follows: svabhva was one of the oldest
concepts formulated somewhat vaguely before or during the sixth century BCE
which finds mention in vUp 1.2. It continued to be invoked, along with other
concepts such as time, destiny, chance, karman, etc., as one of the many claimants for
the role of the first cause. In course of time, definitely before the first century CE,
svabhva, instead of, or rather in addition to, signifying causality, became
synonymous with chance or accident and was derided as an inactivist approach to
life in the Moksadharma section of the Mbh. The Buddhists (and the Naiyayikas too)

adopted this changed connotation of svabhva as a namesake for yadcch, while

some followers of Samkhya and almost all Vedantins, right from the ninth century,

continued to hold the original view that svabhva stood for causality while yadcch,
for accident. Till the eighth century svabhvavda (whether as a doctrine advocating
causality or chance) and the Carvaka/Lokayata were considered by some (Santaraksita and Haribhadra, for instance) to be unrelated to each other. At a certain point

of time (we do not know exactly when, but definitely before Utpala and
Jnanasrbhadra, i.e., between the eighth century and the tenth century CE)
svabhva-as-causality had already got associated with the Lokayata, perhaps
because of their common atheistic and anti-supernatural character. Svabhvavda
thereafter ceased to be a separate view and somehow got assimilated in the Carvaka /
Lokayata materialism. Other materialist views such as bhtavda in the mean time
seem to have withered away.

13

Chattopadhyayas plea for a new critical edition of the CS (1979, p. 235; 1986, pp. 569578) is
perfectly justified. In fact, such an edition of the Vimanasthana of the CS is under preparation, supervised
by Karin Preisendanz, Institut fur Sudasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Universitat Wien (see the
respective papers by Maas and by Pecchia). But if the proposed edition is prepared on the basis of
available mss along the line envisaged by Chattopadhyaya, the amount of emendation, not supported by
ms evidence, will be so large that text-critics would quite legitimately condemn the reconstituted text as
motivated by purely subjective considerations to suit the philosophical bias of the new editor(s). The rst
critical edition of the CS and the SS can never give us what Chattopadhayaya wished for. Maybe after the
second or even the third critical edition (as Sukthankar said about editing the Mbh in his Prolegomena to
diparvan, crit. ed., 104), emendatio and higher criticism may achieve it. See also Bhattacharya
the A
(2002a).

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R. Bhattacharya

In spite of all this, svabhva has its own place in the Samkhya tradition. In the

medical literature too svabhva occupies an important place. In the medical texts as
well as in the Brahminical and Jain philosophical literature, a syncretic doctrine,
which has been named kldismagrvda, involving time, svabhva, niyati and
karman (Dixit, ippan 45; VS, 2.191193. See also Bhattacharya 2007) is also
proposed by some Jain writers, although by no means all. For all practical purposes
svabhva turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by
anyone and everyone; it was no longer attached to any particular school of thought.
In the fields of astronomy and grammar too svabhva is sometimes invoked when no
plausible explanation of an odd phenomenon is available to the authors (Bhattacharya 2006, p. 45). More importantly, both the meanings of svabhva, namely,
causality and accident, continued to circulate simultaneously and anyone could
choose either of the two meanings. The same situation evolved in course of time in
relation to klavda as well.
Another aspect of svabhva to be noted is that in the dispute between two forces,
daiva and puruakra, svabhva-as-accident is akin to the former, while svabhvaas-causality, to the latter. Sometimes, however, two more forces, namely, chance
and time, are also added (see Bhattacharya 2007b). The confusion of significations
around the word svabhva in philosophical literature can be resolved if we
remember that besides Samkhya and the Carvaka/Lokayata, other materialist views

were current in India long before the redaction of the first stra-work of the
Carvaka/Lokayata, which most probably took place before the eighth century CE;
between the sixth and the eighth, to be more specific.
Acknowledgment Thanks are due to Amitava Bhattacharya for reading the draft and offering valuable
suggestions for improvement. The usual disclaimers apply.

Appendix
Besides the mention of one or the other of the first cause, (see Bhattacharya 2001c)
several lists of the competing causalities [in Wilhelm Halbfasss (p. 291) words]
are available. In addition to the first of such lists provided in vUp, 1.2, we have JM,
23.1720 (svabhva, vara, prvakta karma, ucchedavda), VS, chap. 2 (kla,
svabhva, niyati, karman), Siddhasena Divakara, qutd. by Kulkarni, 16 n22 (kla,
svabhva, niyati, prvakarma, puruakra), TS, chs. 16 (prakti,, vara, both the
two, svabhva, abdabrahman, tman), SV on S, 1.1.3 (kla, niyati, svabhva,
vara, tman), Mathara and Gaudapada on SK, 61 (vara, purua, svabhva, kla),

GS, verses 679683 (kla, vara, tman, niyati, svabhva), SS,1.1.11 (svabhva,
vara, kla, yadcch, niyati), SK, 548 (vara, niyati, karman, svabhva, kla),
Kumbhaka, as quoted by al-Brun, I:321 (mahbhta, kla, svabhva, karman),
Kriykalpataru, as quoted in YTC, Book 5, 458 (vidhi, vidht, niyati, svabhva,
kla, droha, daiva, karman), and TRD, 1115 (kla, vara, tman, niyati, svabhva,
yadchh).
Thus from the fourth century CE to the fifteenth century, we have some such lists
that however, intentionally or not, confuse the two domains, cosmological and

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611

ethical, in which svabhva and kla are generally common (I have omitted such
texts as the HV, Bhavisyaparvan, 20.22 (vulgate ed.), which too mentions kla and

svabhva). We also have references to svabhva in various parvans of the Mbh

(Bhattacharya 2007b, pp. 275277) and stray references to the bhtacintakas,
klakraikas, hahavdakas, and syncretic views in various sources (see
Bhattacharya 2001a, b, and 2007b passim).
In order to understand what svabhva means in a particular base text and
commentary we have to determine at first which domain is being referred to,
cosmological or ethical, and then decide what svabhva there stands for, causality or
accident. All the syncretic views may be safely ignored, for they are expressions of
mere wishful thinking: excepting a few Jains none used to think in such syncretic
terms. Even all the Jain philosophers did not hold the same view in relation to
svabhva in either domain, cosmological and ethical, and some viewed svabhva as
causality, others as accident (Bhattacharya 2005, 2006). As to the relation between
svabhvavda and the Carvaka/Lokayata, too, the Jains were not unanimous in their
opinion.

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