Some Remarks on the Yogastra

Author(s): Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Jul., 2009), pp. 249-262
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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SOME REMARKS ON THE YOGA S TRA

Marcus SacriniA. Ferraz

of So Paulo
PhilosophyDepartment,University

Introduction
The recentlyreleasedcriticaleditionofthefirst
chapterofthe Ptanjalayogahas confirmedthatthereis no manuscriptevidence in favorof the autonomousexistenceof
a Yogastra(YS)S Manuscriptspresenta whole text,the Yogasstra,laterdivided into
to Vysa). The extracattributed
two parts,VSand Yogabhsya(thelattertraditionally
tion of a YS fromthe Yogasstrais evidentlypossible, but it is not obvious whether
the resultis a coherentworkthatconveysa clear message. In the presentarticle,we
discuss some topics includedin the YS in orderto evaluate the logical consistencyof
the yoga system.2
Our leadingthreadin thistask is providedin an articleby T. S. Rukmani,3who
defendsthe claim thatthereare so many logical problemsin the yoga school that
yoga should be taken more "as a disciplineto be followed ratherthanto be underWe presentand analyze fourproblemsraised by Rukmani:
stood intellectually/'4
the firstrefersto a tensionbetween the firstdegree of samdhi and the continuity
of YS 11.27;the thirddeals with
of mentalactivities;the second is an interpretation
the role of dharmameghain the yoga system;and the fourthexplores the living
liberation.
Beforediscussingthe YS, some major translationoptions mustbe pointedout.
Several Sanskrittechnicaltermscan be renderedintoEnglishin different
forms,and
commentatorshave not reached a consensus on the issue. Our optionsare the following:we translatesamdhifollowingEliade's suggestion,as "enstasy,"a wordthat
as a perfect"standinginside oneself,"freefromall
expressesyogic self-realization
is translatedas "mind," the aggregateof mental
Citta
limitations.5
phenomenal
is translatedas "cessation" and vrttias "mental
Nirodha
contents.
and
capacities
modification,"which includes both mental processes as inferenceor perception
and theircontents.Otherchoices are specifiedwhen required.
The Goal of Yoga

BeforeconsideringRukmani'schallenges to the theoreticalbasis of yoga, we must

outlinethe goal of yoga as statedby the YS. In doing so, a general backgroundis
providedto the discussionof the supposed problemsidentifiedin the yoga system.
Let us considerthe safrasin 1.2-4. YS 1.2 definesyoga as the cessation of the modificationsof the mind.6 YS 1.3 describesthe resultof yoga: the permanenceof the
"knower" in its very nature.7Finally,YS 1.4 assertsthe effectof the absence of
between mindand itsmodifications.8
yoga: the identification

PhilosophyEast & West Volume 59, Number3 July2009 249-262

of Hawai'i Press
2009 by University

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249

These sutraspresentyoga as a specifictechnique forreachinga special state,

where all mentalmodificationscease. The factthatthisstatemustbe reached suggeststwo things.
between mindand itsmodifications.Indeed,
(1) There is a factualidentification
thisidentification
can be called "metaphysicalignorance"(avidya)and is the source
mindascribes
ofall humanafflictions
(klesas) (see II.4).9 In thisstateof identification,
to
the
to
the
to
the
and
painful,and suftransitory,
purity
perpetuity
impure,
pleasure
fersthe bad consequences of these mistakes(see II.5).10
(2) There is an essential distinctionbetween the knowerand the mentalprocesses wherebyhuman beings are ordinarilyinsertedintothe phenomenal world.
In the yoga system,mind is not conscious by itself.Stra IV.19 assertsthat mind
"has not lightin itself,since it belongs to the seeable."11 In otherwords,thereis a
pure principleor being (purusa)thatmustnotbe confusedwithany mentalprocess.
The statewhere the practitioner
is completelyfreefromthisconfusionand unveils
hertruenatureis enstasy.
The pathfromthe practitioner's
identification
withmentalprocessesto herliberation is providedby yoga. All practicespresentedby the YS aim to stop the flowof
is freefromher
ordinaryexperience,so as to disclose a statewhere the practitioner
mind
and
exists
as
an
unconditioned
being (purusa).The YS clasonly
phenomenal
can
sifiesthe mentalmodifications
thatmustbe transcendedso thatthe practitioner
attainthe fullliberationof herpurusa (YS I.6):12 knowledge(praman),error(viparyaya),creativethought(vikalpa),deep sleep (nidra),and memory(smrti)P All normal psychiclife(includingall sound knowledgeacquired by perception[pratyaksa],
inference[anumna],or verbalcognition[agama] [see I.7]14)mustbe suppressedso
thatthe purusa can be released fromall phenomenallimitations.
The accomplishmentof thisfinalgoal, the samdhi, is not immediate.Enstasy
supposes skillfulnessin the eight techniques,designatedas astngayoga,that are
expounded in the second chapterof the VS. In additionto this,thereare at least
two degreesof enstasyaccordingto the firstchapterof the VS. In stra1.17, the first
degreeof samdhi is presentedas enstasy"withall intuitive
knowledge"(samprajnfaj.15This intuitiveknowledgeor insight(prajn)is notdescribedby stra1.7,which
presentsthe cognitiveskillsof common people. Indeed, prajn impliesa directaccess to the natureof anythingchosen as the object of contemplation,thatis, a perfectfusion(sampatti)of the practitioner's
mindwithherobject or support.Prajnis
nota cognitiveresourcecommonlyavailable; thisintuitiveknowledgearisesfroma
special techniqueof yoga, samyama(control),which is composed of the finalthree
memberso astngayoga:dhrana(mentalconcentrationon an object [III.1]16),dhyna (thecontinuity
of thisconcentration[III.2]17),and samdhi (thecomplete integrationwiththe object [III.3]18).Thus, intuitiveknowledge(prajn)presupposesthatat
leastone level ofenstasyhas been achieved, preciselytheone called samprajnta.
Stra1.17 affirms
thatsamprajnta-samdhiis accompanied by foursupportive
factors:reasoning(vitarka),"refined"reflection(vicra),sublimehappiness(nanda),
and sense of "egoity" (asmit)}9 These fourfactorsdo not play the same role.
Accordingto saras I.42-44, the firsttwo (vitarkaand vicra) designate cognitive

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processesthatprovidefoursubleveisof enstasy.The lasttwo, as we will tryto show,

describethe objects wherebythese processes operate.20
two formsof samprajnta-samdhi.
Let us considerthe foursubleveisof the first
First,the YS describesa samdhi with reasoning,a kindof enstasybased on inference (see I.42).21 Here, prajn does not arise froma special mentalcapacity but
fromthe special use of a cognitiveresourceavailable to normalpeople (reasoning),
which mustbe employed as vehicle fora perfectfusionwithan objective support.
Second, YS presentsthe next sublevei of enstasy,samdhi withoutreasoning(see
I.43). One may hereask what mentalcapacity is the vehicle forthissecond enstasy.
Indeed,thereis none. This second sublevei of enstasyis intendedto reach the same
butwithoutthe mentalresourceused forit.Indeed, reasoningis
outcome as thefirst,
forthe firsttime.When thisstateis reached in a sound
samdhi
to
achieve
required
the resultingenstasywithoutthe cognitiveskillthat
attain
can
the
practitioner
way,
was used as a leadingthreadbefore.The YS pointsout thatthecognitiveconstituents
of reasoning(includingmemory)mustbe purifiedso thatenstasywithoutreasoning
means thatthe practitioner
can take place.22 This purification
gains autonomywith
theirhelp.
without
achieves
and
constituents
these
to
prajn
cognitive
regard
ofthe
the
structure
The thirdand fourthsubleveisof samprajnta-samdhi
repeat
first
two,althoughthe mentalcapacityat stakein these last levels is no merereasonrefinedreflection.Accordingly,the YS describes two more enstasies from
but
ing
whence prajn arises: with refinedreflectionand withoutrefinedreflection(see
I.4423). Here, refinedreflection(vicra)designatesa moresubtlecognitiveskillthan
withitsobject is intended,
reasoning.In the thirdsublevei,a fusionof thisreflection
and in the fourththe same outcome is to be achieved withoutthismentalskill.
The two lastsupportivefactorsof samprajnta-samdhi(annda and asmit)are
notmentalcapacities buttwo kindsof object on which at least vicraoperates.This
idea can be inferredfromstra 1.41, which describes what the supportsused in
samprajnta-samdhiare. One of these supportsis grhya,that is, an object that
can be grasped by the normalprocesses of human cognition,as reasoning.In this
sense, grhyacan designatethe object upon which samdhi withand withoutreaof humancognisoningis attained.Moreover,stra1.41tellsus thatthe instruments
are also supportsof enstasy.24These
tion (grahana)and the veryknower (grahltr)
supportsare subtlerthanobjects of reasoningand requirea subtlercognitiveprocess
in orderto be grasped.We suggestthatthiscognitiveprocess is vicra and thatthe
objects on which the enstasieswithand withoutrefinedreflectionare attainedare
of cognition
Ifone accepts thatnanda is an instrument
exactlygrahanaand grahltr.
two last
the
that
clarifies
then
one
the
of
and thatasmit is a subtle part
knower,
to
are not cognitiveprocesses but the objects which
formsof samprajnta-samdhi
mentalconcentrationis applied.25
can
The main differences
among the supportivefactorsof samprajnta-samdhi
first
two
the
to
this
1.
in
be summarizedin the diagram figure According
diagram,
formsof samprajnta-samdhi(vitarkaand vicra) are mental processes, divided
intofoursubleveisthatare organized in an orderof increasingsubtleness(froma to
d). The last two of these subleveis use as supportthe othertwo formsof samdhi.

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251

Process

Enstasy

(a) withreasoning (vitarka)

Object

grhya

/ (b) without
reasoning
samprajnta-samdhi

N.

(c) withrefinedreflection(viara)

granaria(a'nanda)

(d) withoutrefinedreflection

(asmit)
grahftf

Fig. 1.

The designationof bothmentalskillsand objectivesupportsas samdhi seems probto

lematicat first,
since one maythinkthatthe same concept is applied concurrently
some capacities of humansubjectivity
and to the objects on which these capacities
operate. However,one mustacknowledge thatthe "objects'' designatedas supportive factorsof samprajnta-samdhiare subjective capacities and not any external
contentgrasped by them. In thisway, the YS suggestsa kindof gradual ascent toward the innerconstituentsof mind. The firsttwo subleveis of enstasy(withand
withoutreasoning)implythe mind's absorption(the accomplishmentof samyama,
as revealed above) in an objective content.Afterthat,both the enstasieswithand
withoutrefinedreflectionimplythe mind's absorptionin itself,in itsveryconstituents. This ascent is not arbitrary,
but a preliminary
task with regardto the second
and ultimatedegree of samdhi (asamprajnta),which aims at the absorptionof
the practitioner'smind in purusa, the conscious principlethatgives rise to mental
activities.
The Problemof Samprajnta-samdhi
The expositionof the firstdegree of samdhi in the lastsectionprovidesus withthe
Rukmani'scriticismoftheyoga system.
indispensablebackgroundforunderstanding
Rukmanihas pointedout an internaltensionin the definitionof samdhi.26On the
one hand, samdhi is definedby the V5 as the accomplishmentof yoga, thatis, as
the cessation of mentalmodifications.However,on the otherhand, the firstdegree
of enstasy(samprajnta-samdhi)
cannot be understoodas the fullcessationof mental modifications,
since mentalprocessesare stillat workin it.A dilemmaarisesfrom
these claims: eithersamprajnta-samdhiis not a trueaccomplishmentof yogabut,in thiscase, one cannot understandwhy itis designatedas samdhi- or the accomplishmentof yoga does not reallyimplythe cessation of all mental modificaof yoga as statedin YS I.2.
tions,and, hence, one cannot accept the definition
This problem does not arise fromthe fact that the subleveis of samprajntasamdhi are based on cognitiveskills (reasoningand refinedreflection).Indeed,
one could answer to this supposed problem by remarkingthat the second and
fourthsubleveis of samprajnta(withoutreasoningand withoutrefinedreflection)

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occur withoutany cognitive skill, and that the firstand the thirdsubleveis are
simplypreliminary
practicesoftheenstasiespurifiedofall cognitivecapacity.Intruth,
Rukmanirefersto the factthat,according to the YS, all subleveis of samprajntasamdhi produce latentimpressions(samskras),which are effectsarisingfromany
typeof mentalactivity(even those enstasieswithoutreasoningor refinedreflection).
Generally speaking, these latent impressionscrystallizehabit patterns(vsans),
which are potentialcauses of new mental modifications.That is why these latent
impressionsare also called bija (seeds): theygive riseto thefuturepatternsof mental
reactionsbased on past experiences.
are special since theydestroythe
The latentimpressionsof samprajnta-samdhi
banal latent impressions(see III.927) and, consequently,the old mental patterns
derived fromtheircrystallization.Moreover,these special samskrasproduce the
mentaltendencyforseekingthe accomplishmentof yoga. However, like all other
latentimpressions,the samskrasarisingfromthe firstdegree of enstasyare mental
impressions,so thatRukmaniis correctin pointingout a tensionbetween thisfirst
degree of samdhi and the achievementof the yoga process.
We have said above that a dilemma arises fromthis tension. Ian Whicher,
choosing the second hornof thisdilemma,defendsthe claim thatnirodha(the intended cessation or dissolutionof vrttis)does not implya true suppressionof all
mentalflux.Accordingto Whicher, "in Yoga philosophy,dissolutionmeans that
the karmicallybindingeffects(and affects)of the vrttis
dissolves, not the existence
the
classical
in
He
takes
total/'28
vrttis
of
all
of vrtti,
i.e.,
theoryof gunas (which,in
fact,exceeds the scope of the YS) as his pointof departure.The gunas are said to be
There are three
the elementsthatcompose all phenomena, includingmental vrttis.
and subbeneficial
is
said
to
this
last
sattva.
and
produce
Only
gunas: rajas, tamas,
effects
of
the
harmful
dissolve
both
ForWhicher,yoga practices
lime vrttis.
rajasicor
based on sattva,the
tamasic mentalmodificationsand produce the beneficialvrttis,
luminouselementof mind.Accordingly,yoga would aim to dissolveonlythe rajasic
As Whicherstates,in the
withwhich the mindis usuallyidentified.
or tamasic vrttis,
or cognitiveerror
state
of
consciousness
a
"it
is
specific
accomplishmentof yoga,
evidenced in the mindand notthe mind itselfwhich is at issue/'29
in the YS gives at leastpartialsupportto
The descriptionof samprajnta-samdhi
Whicher's position.As we have seen above, in thisdegree of enstasy,mentalprocesses stilloccur, so that mind does not reallycease in samprajnta.30However,
suppose thatWhicher'spositionis correct.When we presentedthe dilemmaarising
we statedthata troublesomeconsequence would ensue
fromsamprajnta-samdhi,
fromthe alternativedefendedby Whicher: ifthe accomplishmentof yoga does not
thenthe definitiongiven by YS 1.2
implythe cessation of all mentalmodifications,
(yoga is the cessationof mentalmodifications)is incorrect.This consequence would
a complex argumentto deny
revealthe YS as an incoherenttext.Whicherformulates
if
intendedto defineyoga as
the
YS
tollens:
modus
with
a
thisproblem,beginning
the cessationof mentalmodificationsin general,thenstra1.2would use the plural
formof vrtti,which would clearly comprehend the totalityof mental processes.
However,thispluralformis not used, and, thus,yoga cannot be definedas the ces-

MarcusSacriniA. Ferraz

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253

sationof all mentalmodifications.Next,Whichertakesthisconclusion as a premise

and adds to it two otherclaims: yoga is definedby the cessation of what cittavrtti
means, and cittavrtti
designatesonly a certainkind of mentalmodification,which
resultsfromrajas and tamas.3^Fromthese premises,he reaches the followingconclusion: yoga is the cessationof rajasic and tamasic mentalmodifications,
but notof
the sattivicones.
In our view, Whicher'sargumentis valid, butat leasttwo of his premisesare not
true.The first
one is theconditionalstatementofthe modus tollens.Itis notclear that
in orderto referto all mental modificationsV5 should have used "wff/s"and not
In fact,"vrttis"can referto several kindsof modificationsand not only
"cittavrttis."
to the mentalones. The YS providesus withat leasttwo examples of thewide scope
of vrtti:in 11.50vrtti
describesthe modifications
of the prn, and in 111.42the same
word designatesa kind of phenomenal modificationthatcan be controlledby the
yoga practices. Accordingly,if stra 1.2 had used the plural formof "vrtti,"as
Whichersuggests,the strawould have referred
notjustto all mentalmodifications
but to any modificationat all, be it bodilyor even worldly.To restrict
the scope of
"vrtti"to the modifications
at stake in the definitionof yoga, the YS uses "cittavrtti."
delimitsthe kindof modifications
aimed at yoga, which are exactly
Thus, "cittavrtti"
the ones relatedto the mind.As a consequence, neitheris "cittavrtti"
insufficient
to
referto all mentalmodificationsnor is "vrttis"(plural)capable of makingsuch reference withexactitude.
The second troublesomepremisein Whicher'sargumentis the one thatdefines
cittavrtti
as referring
The onlyclasonlyto rajasic and tamasic mentalmodifications.
sificationof mental modificationsinto theirgeneral components is stated in 1.5,
where vrttis
are divided into"afflicted"and "non-afflicted."32
Probably,one would
are the afflicted
think,followingWhicher,thatthe rajasic and tamasic modifications
ones. However,thiswould not exhaustthe rangeof what "cittavrtti"
refersto since
the textclearlyincludesthe non-afflicted
modifications
as contentsof cittavrtti.
As a
consequence, the YS includes all kindsof mentalmodifications(be theycaused by
rajas, tamas,or sattva)in the sphereof what mustcease so thatyoga can be accom-

plished.
Ifour criticismsof Whicher's premisesare correct,then his argumentdoes not
providesupportforthe intendedconclusion thatyoga does not implythe cessation
of all mental modifications.Consequently,Whicher's positionin regardto the dilemmathathas arisenfromsamprajnta-samdhi
promptshimto an incoherentoutcome: according to him,samprajnta-samdhiis to be considered an accomplishmentof yoga, althoughthis degree of enstasystillproduces mentalmodifications.
This thesisneeds to be consistentwiththe generaldefinitionof yoga providedin YS
1.2,which statesthatyoga impliesthe cessation of all mentalmodifications.However, as we have seen, Whicherfailsto providea sound argumentin favorof such
consistency.
The hornof the dilemma chosen by Whicherpromptsus to considerdaunting
philosophicalproblems,which seem to confirmRukmani'sgeneral impressionthat
yoga mustbe a practicaldisciplineratherthan a theoreticalone. However,we can

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escape fromthese problemsifwe accept theotherhornofthe dilemma,thatis, ifwe

defendthe claim thatsamprajnta-samdhiis not a trueand complete accomplishmentof yoga. In fact,thisclaim seems the simplestand mostreasonable interpretation of the sufrasconcerningsamprajnta-samdhi.Afterall, samprajnta-samdhi
produces latentimpressions,which clearlyimplythatat thisdegree of samdhi not
all mentalmodificationshave ceased. Samprajnta-samdhiis an enstasybased on
supportivefactorsthat gives rise to samskras.Accordingly,how should we deal
withthe consequence of the dilemma at issue? As we have statedabove, ifwe accept the firstdilemma,then we mustexplain why samprajnta-samdhiis called
samdhi,thatis, the finalaccomplishmentof yoga, where no mentalmodification
is supposed to exist.We defendthe claim thatsamprajnta-samdhiis included in
samdhi because the finalgoal of yoga is a complex state,composed of several
degrees. Indeed, samprajnta-samdhidescribes an importantlevel of enstasy,
where most,althoughnot all, mentalmodificationshave alreadyceased. This level
should
is an indispensablestage in the fullattainmentof yoga since practitioners
learn how to reach enstasywith supportivefactorsin orderto repeat the process
withoutany support,as we will see in the nextsection.Thus,one is correctin assertingthatthefinalgoal ofyoga (samdhi)requiresthe cessation (nirodha)of all mental
modifications.
However,thisfullcessation is notan instantaneousachievement,and
even in the sphereof samdhi thereare levels of enstasywhere thisfinalgoal is not
fullyattained.
The Final Degree of Enstasy

In the previoussection,we triedto solve a problem raised by Rukmaniconcerning samprajnta-samdhi.Consequently,we intended to show that the role of
samprajnta-samdhiin the yoga systemis understandableand thatthistopic does
not confirmRukmani'sappraisal of yoga as more of a practicaldiscipline than a
coherenttheory.In thissection,we deal withtwo problemsraised by Rukmaniconcerningthe lastdegree of samdhi.
thatis,enstasy"beThe YS designatesthislastenstasyas asamprajnta-samdhi,
for a persearches
the
this
At
intuitive
all
level,
practitioner
knowledge."
yond
in
reached
have
to
is
as
she
of
kind
fectfusion,not with any
supposed
support,
be
isolated
must
butwiththe pureconscious principle,which
samprajnta-samdhi,
fromall itsphenomenalapplicationsby the usual mentalprocesses.33Accordingly,
the yoga process is achieved; that is, the unconditionedbeing of mind (purusa) is
released fromall phenomenalaspects, even fromthose subtlecomponentsof mind
as nanda and asmit,which serve as supportsforthe firstdegree of enstasy,as we
have seen above. When the finalenstasyis reached,the samskrasof samprajntasamdhi(whichis consideredexteriorto thislastdegree- see III.834)are suppressed.
Consequently,thereis no vittior latentimpressionat all; the enstasyis perfect,withreveals herselfas a pure conscious power.
out seeds, and the practitioner
One problemraised by Rukmaniconcerningthis last enstasyarises fromstra
thataccomplishes
11.27,which assertsthatthe intuitiveknowledgeofthe practitioner

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255

between purusa (the pure

asamprajnta-samdhiand surpasses the identification
conscious principle)and prakrti(the phenomenal or materialprinciple)has seven
levels.35This enigmaticstraseems to indicatethatthe passage fromsamprajntasamdhi (which is alreadycomposed of different
subleveis,as we have seen above)
to asamprajnta-samdhiis gradual. However, the YS does not explain what the
seven levels are. Rukmaniconsiders the textof the so-called Yogabhsyaon this
issue.36 Let us remember,as we stated in our firstparagraph,that,in the manuscripts,the YS and Yogabhsyaare not divided,so thatit is quite reasonable to use
ofsome topics.Accordingto
thewhole textto formulatean acceptable interpretation
Rukmani,the Yogabhsyacreates more problemsthan it solves. The thirdlevel of
asamprajnta,forexample, is presentedby thistextas the end of the identification
is expected to be
between purusa and prakrti,but the end of this misidentification
the lastlevel of enstasy.Moreover,Rukmaniconsidersthe Yogabhsyafs
explanation
ofthefifth,
sixth,and seventhlevelsofasamprajntato be buta presentationin differentways ofthe stateof kaivalya(liberation),definedin thefourthchapterofthe YS.37
Rukmani'sexpositionof the incoherenciesof the Yogasstra(the YS plus the
Yogabhsya)in straII.27 are convincing.However, we would like to hypothesize
thatmaybe these incoherenciesfollowfromthe incapacityof researchersto understand clearlythe doctrineof the VS. J. Bronkhorst
suggeststhatthe Yogasstrawas
the
author
of
the
so-called
composed by
Yogabhsya.This personcompiled the sothis person committed
called YS and added his own comments. For Bronkhorst,
some mistakesin the organizationof the safras.38Moreover,Y. Grinshpondefends
the claim thatin several passages the Yogabhsyaprovidesexcessivelyconservative
of the sufras.39Analogously,the incoherenciesfoundby Rukmaniin
interpretations
sufraII.27 could be derivedeitherfromincorrectcommentsfromthe authorof the
Yogabhsyaor even froma bad compilationofthe stras.More researchon thispossibilityis requiredbeforeconcluding thatsufraII.27 is incoherentwith otherpassages of the YS.
The last problemraised by Rukmanithatwe will deal withhere is the place in
the yoga systemofthe enstasycalled dharmamegha(cloud of virtue),which is introduced only in the fourthchapterof the VS.40Accordingto YS IV.29, dharmamegha
arises fromthe full revelationof viveka,a special capacity fordiscriminating
that
enables the practitioner
to distinguishbetween hertruenatureand the phenomenal
world. SafrasIV.30 and 32 statethe consequences of dharmamegha:accordingto
and all actionsor deeds (karIV.30, thisenstasyimpliesthe cessationofall afflictions
have
ma).4^ In IV.32, itis statedthatin dharmameghathe phenomenalmodifications
also ceased.42 To the extentthatmental vrttisare phenomenal modifications,
one
can inferthattheyalso cease when dharmameghais achieved. Consequently,this
stage of enstasyis beyond the subleveis of samprajnta,which stillproduces samskra (which is clearlya mental modification).We defendthe claim thatdharmamegha is only a different
descriptionof asamprajnta-samdhi.Althoughthe phrase
"asamprajnta-samdhi"is not mentionedin the fourthchapterof the YS, the consequences of this last level of enstasyare expounded when dharmameghais presented. The word "dharmamegha"simply emphasizes that the practitionerwho

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attainsthe last degree of enstasyis freefromall debts due to past actions and can
reap the benefitsof truevirtue.43
The Problemof LivingLiberation
Untilnow, we have discussed some passages in the VSthat,accordingto Rukmani,
may contain serious problemsconcerningthe theoreticalbasis of the yoga system.
We intendto show thatthistheoreticalbasis cannot, based on these passages, be
labeled as incoherentor even illogical. However, we do not defendthe claim that
such a basis is perfect,either.There is at least one problem in the Y5, concisely
pointedout by Rukmani,44withwhich we agree. We referto livingliberation,that
can bothcompletelyliberatepurusa and continue
is, the claim thatthe practitioner
to live. In thisfinalsection,we will presentand discuss thisproblem.
We have seen above thatin asamprajnta-samdhino mentalchange occurs. To
reach thisstate,theeffectsof past mentalmodifications
mustbe extinguished.When
these effectsare fullynullified,the pure conscious power is liberatedfromany pheand to the extentthatin asamprajnta-samdhino new vrttiis
nomenal constraint,
of such enstasyimpliesthatthe practitioner
to
be
produced,the attainment
expected
Thisis nota tentativestateofmind,as samprajntahas no morementalmodifications.
samdhi is described,forinstance,in straIV.27, which assertsthatsamprajntais
Indeed, in thislowerdegreeofenstasy,one stillreturns
incompleteand temporary.45
mentalprocessestake place.46 Nevertheto ordinaryconsciousness,where different
no longerhas eithermentalvrtti
less,when asamprajntais attained,the practitioner
or karma(as describedin YS IV.30).
To understandwhat is at stake in asamprajnta,we mustmake explicitwhat is
encompassed by the range of karma. All deeds, be they physical or mental,are
these deeds have
karma.Accordingto the classical doctrineof karmaand rebirth,
a crucial role in the fateof human beings duringtheirnumerouslives. Bronkhorst
addresses thispoint by sayingthat"deeds constitutethe decisive factorthatcause
rebirthto take place and thatdeterminewhat the new lifewill be like/'47In other
words, all mental and corporal modificationsproduce effectsthat hold human
different
meditation
beings in a cycle of infiniterebirths.Accordingto Bronkhorst,
schools developed in ancient India to discoverways to escape thistragicfate.One
of these schools supportsthe claim thatdeeds are performedby a phenomenalself,
which is notthetrueinvariableself.When thisunconditionedselfis revealed,one is
liberatedfromthe karmiceffectsof deeds.48 A second school claims thatone must
perfectlyimmobilizemind and body, so thatno deed is created and the effectsof
past deeds are purgedby the timeof death,when complete liberationis achieved.49
In our view, yoga containselementsof these two traditionalschools of meditation.On the one hand, yoga assertsthatthe phenomenalmind (citta)is notthe true
selfand thatone can disclose the trueselfand attainfullliberationin life.On the
otherhand,yoga practicesare intendedto cause all bodilyand mentalmodifications
to cease so thatthe trueself(purusa)is liberated;moreover,no deed is supposed to
be performedafterthe fullattainmentof asamprajnta-samdhi.Thus, yoga at the

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257

same timedefendsthe claim thatlivingliberationis possible and thatwhen thisliberationoccurs no further

physicalor mentaldeed is performed.
This last claim is difficultto accept since our ordinarynotion of life is so
Whicherexpressesthe increentangledwiththatof deeds and mentalmodifications.
thus:"ifall the great
from
the
of
dulityarising
consequences asamprajnta-samdhi
so
Yoga mastersof the past had obliteratedor thoroughlysuppressedtheirmindsin
orderto attainspiritualliberation,how did they speak, teach, reason, remember,
empathize,or even use theword T"?50 To avoid such problems,Whicherproposes,
are suppressedand notthewhole
as we have seen above, thatonlytheafflictedvrttis
we
phenomenal mind. Againstthis interpretation, have triedto show in the last
section that the YS asserts that the practitionerwho has attained asamprajntasamdhi has no mental modificationsand produces no karma. However, to the
extentthat life implies karmaand phenomenal modifications(at least fromphysican be alive withcal metabolism),how is it possible thata liberatedpractitioner
out producingany karmai
The fourthchapterofthe YS triesto conciliate livingliberationand deeds. Saras
can create auxiliarymindsbased
4, 5, and 6 describe how the liberatedpractitioner
on her masteryover the sense of "egoity" (asmit).Stras111.16-54assertthatthe
establishescontrol(samyama)over any supportused to attainsamdhi.
practitioner
We have seen above thatin samprajntasamdhione of the supportsused to reach
establishescontrolover asmit,a
enstasyis asmit. Consequently,the practitioner
controlthatincludeseven the abilityto reproduceitby creatingone or severaldouto perbles ofoneself.These doubles are said to be used bythe liberatedpractitioner
formany deed, such as teachingdisciples. As the duplicated mindsdo not produce
latentimpressions(see IV.6),51theydo not imprisonthe liberatedpurusa in the phenomenalworld.
Thisdoctrineofthe creationof auxiliarymindsis intendedto reconcilethe living
liberationand the immutability
ofthe released self:all deeds would be performed
by
createdbeingsand notbypurusa itself.However,severalproblemsarisefromsuch a
doctrine:even ifwe accept thatthecreationofsuch doubles is possible and thatthey
produce no karma,how should we understandthe act thatcreates the duplicated
minds?Is thisnota mentalmodification?
Does notsuch an act cause karmiceffects?
we
doctrine
understand
the
of
created minds as an attemptto explain
Moreover,
how a liberatedpractitioner
could performvolitionalacts. Nevertheless,thiskindof
act does notexhaustthe rangeof karmiceffectssince involuntary
acts, such as those
at the very
to
the
alive
and
excretion,
necessary keep
body
(breathing,digestion,
still
taken
as
karma.
Should
to
the
classical
be
least),
should, according
doctrine,
not thisorganicor involuntary
karmahinderthe liberationof purusai Ifthe answer
is "no, itshould not,"thenone impliesthatthe processofyoga is limitedto the mental dimensionof humanbeing,which is to be distinctfromthe physicalsphere.This
answeris problematic,since the YS defendsno substantialdualismconcerningbody
and mind.The ontologicaldistinctionpresentedby the yoga systemis thatbetween
phenomenalor materialentities(includingthe physicalworldand citta,theordinary
human mind) and a nonmanifestedconscious principle (purusa).52Thus, when

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asamprajnta-samdhiis achieved, the cessation both of karma(as described in V5

IV.30) and of phenomenalmodifications(as described in YS IV.32) are supposed to
mindbutalso in herwhole phenomenalbeing,
be valid notonly in the practitioner's
which includes herbody.
Ifthe answer to our question above is "yes, it should," then we foresee two
options:(a) thereis no perfectliberationof purusa so long as the body of the practitionerlives,which contradictsthe expositionof asamprajnta-samdhi;and (b) the
organic karmaof the body is also suppressedas well as the mental modifications
when asamprajnta-samdhiis achieved. This claim (b) seems the coherentconsequence oftheexpositionof asamprajnta-samdhi.However,we hardlyunderstand,
can be alive, ifall the involuntary
then,how the liberatedpractitioner
processes of
her body, insofaras theyare karma,should be extinguishedas well as all mental
modifications.Moreover,the YS does not clarifyhow farthe body itselfshould be
suppressed.This lastproblemarises because the techniquesof yoga are intendedto
surpass the phenomenal constraintson purusa both by absorbingthe manifested
effectsof phenomenalprocesses in theirsubtlecauses (see 11.1
053) and by suppress11.1
about
could
causes
that
effect
654).
(see
Consequently,we
bring
potential
ingany
is
not
of
a
set
as
can ask ifthe body itself,
supposed to be
phenomenal processes,
reabsorbedin itscauses. The expected answer,be itpositiveor negative,would simply repeatthe problemsarisingfromour formerquestion (about the role of organic
karmain regardto the liberationof purusa).
The topic of livingliberationin the yoga systemrequiresanotherjournal article.
We have sketchedthe problemhere to show thatthe YS is farfrombeing an indisputable expositionof an unambiguousdoctrine.However,we also rejectthe claim
thatthe YS is nota logicallyconsistenttext,as Rukmanisuggests.In thefirst
sections,
that
in
the
VSso
ofcertainspecificpassages
we intendedto providean interpretation
threeseriousproblemsraised by Rukmanicould at least be minimized.Our general
on the YS before
conclusion is thatmuch moreexegeticalworkshould be performed
can
be
asserted.
its
on
verdict
logical consistency
any definitive
Notes
1 - See P. Maas, Samdhipda: Das erste Kapitel des Patanjalayogasastra zum
ersten Mal kritischediert (Aachen: Shaker, 2006).

of the YS and rarelyreferto

ourselvesto the textualinterpretation
2 - We restrict
otherschools of ancient India. Accordingly,we will notdeal withthe Buddhist
influenceon the YS, an important
approach thatcould clarifysome aspects of
theyogic system.The close analysisof some conceptsofthe YS will be enough
forour purposeshere.
3 - See T. S. Rukmani,"Tension between Vyuthnaand Nirodha in the Yogastras,"Journalof Indian Philosophy25 (6) (1997): 613-628.
4 - Ibid.,p. 623.

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259

5 - See Mircea Eliade, Yoga, Immortality

and Freedom(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1969).
6 - YS I.2: yogascittavrttinirodhah.
We use the followingedition: Bangai Baba,
Yogastra of Patajali with the commentary of Vysa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas,

1976).

7 - V5 1.3: tada drastuh svarupe 'vasthanam.

8 - YS 1.4: vrttisarupyamitaratra.
9 - YS II.4: avidy ksetramuttaresmprasuptatanuvicchinnodarnam.
10 - YS 11.5: anityasuciduhkaanatmasu nityasucisukhatmakhytiravidya.
11 - VS IV. 1 9: na tatsvbhasam drsyatvat.
12 - VSI.6: pramanaviparyayavikalpanidrasmrtayah.

13 -The concept of vikalpa is not restrictedto the active productionof mental

images,since italso includes linguisticcreationsto which no real object corresponds (e.g., such logical absurditiesas a roundsquare).
14 - YS 1.7: pratyaksanumananagamah pramanani.
15 - VSI.17: vitarkavicaranandasmitarupanugamatsamprajatah.
1 6 - YS 111.1: desabandhascittasya dharana.
1 7 - YS 111.2: tatrapratyayaikatanata dhyanan.
18 - YS III.3: tadevrthamatranirbhsamsvarupasunyamiva samadhih.

19 - The YS also definesasmita as a klesa (affliction)

that mustbe suppressed in
orderto reach the goal of yoga, which is samdhi (see YS II.3). This apparent
paradox is explained in note 23 below.
20 - We followthe interpretation
of Baba; see Baba, Yogastraof Patajaliwiththe
commentary of Vysa, pp. 24-25 n. 3.

21 - YS 1.42: tatrasabdarthajanavikalpaih sakirna savitarka sampattih.

22 - YS I.43: smrtiparisuddhau svarpasunyevarthamatranirbhasa nirvitarka.
23 - YS I.44: etayaiva savicar nirvicara ca suksmavisaya vykhyata.
24 - YS 1.41: ksinavrtterabhijatasyevamanergrahitrgrahanagrhiesu.

25 - Asmitais a componentof the knowerand, because ofthis,a supporton which

the samdhi with and withoutrefinedreflectionshould be reached. Thus,
asmit gives rise to enstasyand can be called a formof samdhi. However,
asmit is a phenomenal aspect of cittaand makes use of the pure conscious
principlein orderto exist(see VS.II.6).That is why asmit is also a klesa, that
thatmustbe surpassedso thatyoga can be fullyattained.
is, a limitation

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26 - See Rukmani,"Tension between Vyuthanaand Nirodha in the Yoga-stras,"

pp. 614-615.
nirodhaksana27 - V5 111.9: vyutthananirodhasamskarayorabhibhavaprdurbhavau
cittnvayonirodhaparinmah.
ofthe Mind,"Jour28 - Ian Whicher,"Nirodha,Yoga Praxisand theTransformation
6.
25
nal of Indian Philosophy (1) (1997):
29 -Ibid., p. 11.
30 - It is notclear ifthese processes are only sattivic,as Whicher'spositionholds.
as our confusedand mistakenidentityof au31 - As he asserts,"it is the cittavrtti
thenticselfhood (purusa), not our ymis, thoughtsand experiences in total
which mustcome to a stateof definitivecessation" (Whicher,"Nirodha,Yoga
of the Mind," p. 20).
Praxisand the Transformation
32 - YS 1.5: vrttayah
pacatayyahklistklistah.
thatyoga is notan activitythatjoins
33 - We agree withMax Mller,who affirmed
physicaland psychicaspects of existence,as is usuallyunderstood,buta technique to put underthe yoke of the pure conscious power all the phenomenal
aspects of the experience. See Mller, The Six Systemsof Indian Philosophy
(London: Longmans,Green and Co., 1912), p. 309.
34 - YS 111.8: tadapi bahiragamprvebhyah.
35 - YS II.27: tasyasaptadh prntabhumih
praja.
36 - See Rukmani,"Tension between Vyuthanaand Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras/f
p. 618.
37 -See Ibid.,pp. 618-619.
38 - See J. Bronkhorst,
"Patajali and the Yoga Stras" Studienzur Indologie und
10 (1984): 209.
Iranistik
39 - See Y. Grinshpon,"Yogic Revolutionand Tokens of Conservatismin Vyasayoga," Journalof Indian Philosophy25 (2) (1997): 129-138.
40 - See Rukmani,"Tension between Vyuthanaand Nirodha in the Yoga-stras,"
pp. 619-621.

sarvathvivekakhyterdharmameghah
41 - YS IV.29: prasamkhyne'pyakusTdasya
samdhih.
42 - YS IV.32: tatahkrtrthnam
parinamakramasamptirgunnm.
43 - The word "dharmamegha"expressesthisstatein a metaphoricalway, as ifthe
would enterinto a different
liberatedpractitioner
atmosphereor would even
feel a blissful"rain" fromthe special "cloud" of virtue.

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44 - Rukmani,"Tension between Vyuthnaand Nirodha in the Yoga-stras,"pp.

621-622.
45 - V5IV.27: tacchidresupratyayntarni
samskrebhyah.
46 Many of these processes use the latent impressionsof the experience of
enstasy,impressionsthatbesides destroyingthe normalsamskrasalso stimulate the practitioner
to repeatthe enstasyin a more enduringway, since there
are supposed to be fewerand fewerlatentimpressionsthathinderthe liberation
of purusa.
47 - Bronkhorst,
"Self and Meditationin Indian Buddhism"(Paper presentedat the
InternationalConferenceon Korean Son Buddhism,Seoul, 1998; electronic
version, retrievedJanuary3, 2007, from http://kr.buddhism.org/zen/koan/
y_bronkhorst.htm).
48 - See ibid.
49 - See ibid.
50 - Whicher,"Nirodha,Yoga Praxisand the Transformation
of the Mind," p. 10.
51 - YS IV.6: iatradhynajamansayam.
52 - In his article "Mind/ConsciousnessDualism in Snkya-Yoga Philosophy,"
Philosophyand Phenomenological Research 53 (4) (1993): 845-859, Paul
Schweizerextractsconsequences fromthisontologyforcontemporary
philosophy.
53 YS 11.10:te pratiprasavaheyh
sksmh.
54 - YS 11.1
6: heyamduhkhamangatam.

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