Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6691

April 27, 2007

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment1 dated August 12, 2004 filed by Atty.
George S. Briones charging Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez with violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91
on forum-shopping and Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
the April 3, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in SP Proc. No. 99-92870,
entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of Luz J. Henson", to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
1. Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to
immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate
of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.
2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
3. Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs in proportion to their
shares. From the share of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall be deducted the advances made
to her.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Complainant Atty. Briones is the Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson. Respondent Atty.
Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the late Luz J. Henson (Heirs).
On April 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from the Order dated April 3,
2002, questioning the payment of commission to Atty. Briones.2

Ads By softonicOn April 29, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing
the Order dated March 12, 2002, appointing the firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at

the expense of the late Luz J. Henson, as well as the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it
denied their motion for recommendation.3
On July 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition forMandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
71844,4 alleging that the respondent Judge therein unlawfully refused to comply with his ministerial
duty to approve their appeal which was perfected on time. 5
Atty. Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, represented
by Atty. Jimenez, are guilty of forum shopping for which reason, the petition should be dismissed.

On February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping issue, granted the petition
and ordered the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from
the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to Atty. Briones.7
Atty. Briones then filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 159130, praying for the dismissal of the appeal from the Order dated
April 3, 2002, insofar as it ordered the payment of commission to him, as the Special Administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luz J. Henson.8
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
Atty. Briones (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed his "Memorandum with Administrative
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents", 9 for violation of
Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 2891 on forum shopping.
Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as respondent) and the Heirs
engaged again in forum shopping when respondent, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a criminal
complaint and executed an affidavit against complainant for resisting and seriously disobeying the
RTC Order dated April 3, 2002 which directed complainant to deliver the residue of the estate to the
Heirs in proportion to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like;
or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Ads By softonicby filing the unfounded criminal complaint against him to obtain an improper advantage in
Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 before the RTC, Branch 46, and coerce complainant to deliver to

the Heirs the residue of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson without any writ of execution or any
pronouncement from the RTC as to the finality of the Order dated April 3, 2002; 10 and in executing
an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.
The Court in its Resolution dated January 24, 2005, in G.R. No. 159130, resolved to docket the
complaint against Atty. Jimenez as a regular administrative complaint; referred said Complaint to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC); and required Atty. Jimenez to comment. 11
Respondent filed his Comment on April 6, 2005. He contends that when he assisted the Heirs in
filing a criminal case against complainant, he was merely fulfilling his legal duty to take the
necessary steps to protect the interests of his clients; that it cannot serve as basis for filing an
administrative case against him.12 Respondent further cites Santiago v. Rafanan13 where the Court
absolved the respondent lawyer from administrative liability in submitting an affidavit in a preliminary
investigation in defense of his clients.
On January 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation recommending that the
administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez be dismissed for lack of merit. 14
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show that
respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of
Alba, Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488
assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to complainant.
It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought.
Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.15 The Court likewise finds no fault on the part of
respondent in executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint as held in the Santiagocase.
However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent violated Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that before respondent assisted the
Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter
to comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs of the late
Luz J. Henson. Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted
to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3, 2002 which directs
complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As aptly pointed out by
complainant, respondent should have first filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of the
third part of said Order instead of immediately resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against
him. A mere perusal of the rest of the Order dated April 3, 2002 readily discloses that the approval of
the report of complainant as Special Administrator was suspended prior to the audit of the
administration of complainant. Consequently, the RTC would still have to determine and define the
residue referred to in the subject Order. The filing of the criminal complaint was evidently premature.
Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01 because he
assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant after the latter ignored
the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence
and capability. The Court is not convinced. Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the
proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his
clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
As held in Suzuki v. Tiamson:16

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with
zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client
must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15,
Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the
principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the
supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense
of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 17
Although respondent failed to live up to this expectation, there is no evidence that he acted with
malice or bad faith. Consequently, it is but fit to reprimand respondent for his act of unfair dealing
with complainant. It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine
would accomplish the end desired.18
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED for violation of Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 2-33.

Id. at 41.
3
Id.
4
Entitled, "Lilia J. Henson-Cruz; Ruby J. Henson and Antonio J. Henson, petitioners, versus, Hon. Artemio S. Tipon, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and George C. Briones, Respondents."
5
Rollo, p. 43.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 45.
8
Id. at 2 and 33. (G.R. No. 159130 is still pending with the Court).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 32.
11
Id.
2

12

Id. at 184.
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91, 103-104.
14
Rollo, p. 212.
15
Argel v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 867, 876 (1999).
16
A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 129.
17
Id. at 139-140.
18
Id. at 140.
13

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7298

June 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which
threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of
documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005,
complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a
notice from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation
pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless.
Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return
to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his
client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of
cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 1

Ads By softonicBelieving that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards,
complainant filed an administrative complaint2with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion
to Dismiss and Counterclaims)3 claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal
counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges
against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the Arbiter. By way of
counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent
also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public
Functions4 and for violation of the Notarial Law.5
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear. 6 Both
parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that
complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94
requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.8 On 10 July 2006,
the IBP Commission on Discipline transmitted to the Court the notice of saidResolution and
the records of the case.9 Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for
Reconsideration (for Modification of Decision) 10 reiterating his claim of damages against complainant
in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing
the "false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive,
evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit." 11
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline)12 alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper,
after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was
deprived of his right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his
position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006 Resolution13 of
the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for
proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his position paper on 21
December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of
said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt
attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the
same date. 14
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his failure
to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.

Ads By softonicThe requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by
Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court
or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded
the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of
court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. 16
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his
failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently
dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition.
However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the
reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant's subsequent
compliance with the requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be
attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other
proceedings or "action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the
Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,19 which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion
of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.20 Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping
seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their
cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue

inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent
the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or
decisions upon the same issue.21
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum
shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the
filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment
complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person."22 Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum
shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 23
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect
in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification
against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's
Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the grant of the present
petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even
spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and
his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 24 In particular,
Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this
Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield
or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.25
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter,
he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement,
he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such
as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to
blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or
opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from
making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice."
In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion,
the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the
exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the
credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of
the victim.26

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very
serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent's disbarment from the
practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution." 28 While the respondent in Boyboy was
exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he
admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely
an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting
that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses
punishable by the State."29 He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice
and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent's threat to
file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to
give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations
of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep
silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is
usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his
client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand
requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just
a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant
which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed
to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are
definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which
a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The
privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and
extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too
severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his
overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is
reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is
hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 10-11.

Id. at 1-5.
3
Id. at 21-27.
4
Respondent claims that Atty. Jocson signed the administrative complaint against him without indicating his Roll of
Attorney Number.
5
Respondent claims that Atty. Jocson notarized the complaint despite the expiration of his notarial commission.
6
Rollo, p. 49.
7
Id. at 103-105.
8
Id. at 102. See Resolution No. XVII-2006-291.
9
Id. at 101-105.
10
Id. at 170-177.
11
Id. at 175.
12
Id. at 106-115.
13
Id. at 102.
14
Id. at 76-88.
15
Said provision states:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and d eliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
16
Land Car, Inc. v. Dev't Bachelor Express, Inc., 462 Phil. 796, 801 (2003), citing Administrative Circular No. 04-94, April
1, 1994; Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 614;Prubankers Association v. Prudential
Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74.
17
No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
18
Id. at 600-601.
19
Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 96, 108-109, citing Zebra Security Agency v. NLRC, Phil.
200, 209.
20
Id. at 109, citing Nacuray v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 749, 756.
21
Id., citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 605, 616.
22
Rules of Court, Rule 139-B, Sec. 1.
23
Supra note 19, at 110, citing Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, 30 August 2000, 339 SCRA 306, 309
citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192, 198.
24
See E.L. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1995 Ed.), p. 210, citing Maglasang v. People, 190 SCRA 306.
25
Id. at 213.
26
See Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 5, citing Hess v. Sparks, 24 P. 979, 980, 44 Kan. 465, 21 Am.St.Rep. 300.
27
449 Phil. 664 (2003).
28
Id. at 674-675.
29
Rollo, p. 132.
2

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1558. March 10, 2003]

HONORIO
MANALANG
and
FLORENCIO
CIRILLO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO
F.
[1]
ANGELES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
[2]

In this administrative complaint filed on November 11, 1975, against Atty. Francisco F. Angeles
for grave misconduct as a lawyer, respondent stands charged with infidelity in the discharge of fiduciary
obligations to his clients, herein complainants Honorio Manalang and Florencio Cirillo.
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and
separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the National
Labor Relations Commission Region IV Office, docketed as NLRC-RO 4 No. 4-2417-74. Respondent was
their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the decision became
final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his clients, respondent compromised the
award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount
collected minus the agreed upon attorneys fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and
offered to give them only the sum of P2,650.
Complainants then instituted the instant case, with the assistance of the then Citizens Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO)[3] of the Department of Justice.
Ads By softonicIn his answer, filed on December 15, 1975, respondent stated that he offered to give
complainants their money, but they insisted that he deduct from this attorneys fees the amount
of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant,
together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative expenses.[4] Respondent claimed that to accept
complainants proposition meant that he would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling the
case.[5]
In our resolution[6] of January 9, 1976, we referred the case to the Office of Solicitor General (OSG)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The OSG conducted several hearings from March-August 1976.[7] The complainants testimonies
were received. Respondent appeared only at three (3) hearings, those of June 21, 1976,[8] July 1,
1976[9] and August 6, 1976.[10] On August 24, 1976, theGeneral ordered respondents testimony stricken
from the record and the case deemed submitted for resolution[11] for his failure to appear despite due
notice.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Hearings were scheduled on September 20 and November 21, 1991, but neither party
appeared despite prior due notice. The IBP then subpoenaed respondent for him to appear at the
hearings on February 12-13, 1992, but the notices were returned unserved with the indication that
respondent had changed address. On July 8, 1992, the IBP issued an order stating that respondent had
been given ample opportunities to present his evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution
on the basis of the existing evidence.
On January 23, 1997, the IBP Committee on Discipline issued a resolution recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. [12] This was adopted and approved
[13]
by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution of July 26, 1997.
On September 23, 1997, respondent moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, dated July 26, 1997.

On October 8, 1997, we resolved to refer this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
[14]
recommendation within twenty (20) days from notice.
On June 19, 2002, the Bar Confidant
recommended that the IBP Resolution, recommending suspension of the respondent from the practice of
law for two (2) years be affirmed.[15]
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended
from the practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients funds.
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant solely
to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good moral
character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice
thereof.[16] For the bar must not only maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, it must likewise be
exacting in its standards for honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainants were awarded P6,500.00 in NLRC-RO 4
No. 4-2417-74 for unpaid overtime and separation pay. Of this amount, thirty percent (30%) or P1,950
was agreed to be paid to respondent as his attorneys fees. In other words, complainants were to receive
from respondent the net sum of P4,550 or P2,275 each. Alleging difficulties in collecting the full amount
awarded, respondent compromised the award on execution and collected only P5,500 from the losing
party in NLRC-RO 4 No. 4-2417-74. This compromise was allegedly without authority from his clients.
The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and must be supported by evidence. [17] In the
instant case, respondent failed to show such authority.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected
by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned.[18] A client has every right to expect from his
counsel that nothing will be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By
compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the
stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well
as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[19]
Ads By softonicWorse, as found by the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent only offered to
remit to complainants the amount ofP2,650 or P1,325 each, an amount substantially less than the P2,275
that each complainant was entitled to receive under the judgment. On this score, respondent failed to
establish any credible defense. Moreover, he consistently failed to appear at the hearings scheduled by
the CBD. Hence, his excuse for failing to give the money due his clients merit scant consideration.
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.[20] In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondents receipt of and
failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of
Rule 16.03,[21] Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, his excuse in his answer,
that he should be allowed to deduct sheriffs fees and other administrative expenses before delivering the
money due his clients, is unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of Court in
the enforcement of an attorneys liens.[22] The records of this case are barren of any statement of
respondents claims for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did respondent present any
showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money judgment to be served upon his clients
and to the losing party in NLRC-RO 4 No. 4-2417-74.
His act of holding on to his clients money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of
integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no
[23]
right. He appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[24]
We note that in 1976 at the hearings before the OSG, complainant Manalang declared he was
[25]
[26]
already 58 years old, while complainant Cirillo stated that he was 64 years of age. A quarter of
century has since passed. It is true that a disciplinary action involves no private interest and affords no
redress for private grievance, since it is undertaken solely for the public welfare, and the attorney-at-law is
called to task mainly to answer to this Court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[27] Nevertheless, we

must stress that disciplinary action against a member of the bar involves the public interest, and it should
[28]
be resolved with dispatch.
Moreover, we note that respondents clients in the instant case were poor
working men. They were made to wait long for their money, by their very own counsel, contrary to the
Attorneys Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is contrary to all ethical principles that
members of the bar are supposed to uphold. Thus, we find no hesitance in imposing on respondent the
penalty of suspension. However, this is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken
into account by way of mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months
suspension appears to us in order.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Francisco F. Angeles from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is also
ordered to pay the sum of two thousand two hundred seventy five pesos (P2,275.00) each to
complainants Honorio Manalang and Florencio Cirillo, with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
the time of filing this complaint until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and
entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and theAdministrator be furnished
also a copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20264 January 30, 1971

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA, respondents.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Jose M. Luison for petitioners.
Tolentino and Garcia and D.R. Cruz for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

Ads By softonicThis petition for certiorari to review a decision of respondentCourt of Appeals was given
due course because it was therein vigorously asserted that legal questions of gravity and of moment,
there being allegations of an unwarranted departure from and a patent misreading of applicable and
controlling decisions, called for determination by this Tribunal. The brief for petitioners-spouses,
however, failed to substantiate such imputed failings of respondent Court. The performance did
not live up to the promise. On the basis of the facts as duly found by respondent Court, which we

are not at liberty to disregard, and the governing legal provisions, there is no basis for reversal. We
affirm.
The nature of the case presented before the lower court by private respondent Angelina D. Guevara,
assisted by her spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals thus: "Plaintiff seeks recovery of `one (1) lady's diamond ring 18 cts.
white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total weight'
which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc." 1 Then came a summary of now
respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that around October 11, 1953
plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea restaurant recognized her ring in
the finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant answered from
hercomadre. Plaintiff explained that that ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Defendant
handed the ring to plaintiff and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of plaintiff,
plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and her attorney
proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida a
examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded
that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to defendant who
despite a written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when the
sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant refused to deliver the ring which had been
examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost."2
How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present petitioner before us, along with her
husband Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff's claim was narrated thus: "On the other hand, defendant
denied having made any admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence
tends to show that the ring (Exhibit 1) was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it
from Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Petring, who was boarding in her house; that the
ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida
which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond on Exhibit 1 was before the
trial never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts." 3
Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals with the
judgment of the lower court being reversed. It is this decision now under review.
These are the facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals: "That the ring brought by the parties
for examination by Rebullida on December 14, 1953 was the same ring purchased by plaintiff from
R. Rebullida, Inc. on October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1952 has been abundantly
established by plaintiff's evidence. Before plaintiff lost the ring, she had been wearing it for six years
and became familiar with it. Thus, when she saw the missing ring in the finger of defendant, she
readily and definitely identified it. Her identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose
candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry
business and being a disinterested witness since both parties are his customers. Indeed, defendant
made no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card told
plaintiff that that was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand, ... asserting ownership.
Further confirmation may be found in the extra-judicial admissions, contained in defendant's original
and first amended answers ..."4

Ads By softonicThese further facts likewise appeal therein: "The foregoing proof is not counter-balanced
by the denial on the part of defendant or the presentation of the ring, Exhibit I, which has a diamondsolitaire 2.57 cts., or much heavier than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only. It is noteworthy
that defendant gave a rather dubious source of her ring. Aling Petring from whom the ring
supposedly came turned out to be a mysterious and ephemeral figure. Miss Hinahon did not even

know her true and full name, nor her forwarding address. She appeared from nowhere, boarded
three months in the house of Hinahon long enough to sell her diamond ring, disappearing from the
scene a week thereafter. Indeed, the case was terminated without any hearing on the third-party and
fourth-party complaints, which would have shown up the falsity of defendant's theory. Moreover, Mrs.
Baldomera Miranda, third-party defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant on the latter's alleged
attempt to exchange the ring defendant bought through her, is [belied] by her judicial admission in
her Answer that appellee `suggested that she would make alterations to the mounting and
structural design of the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the original one' (Cunanan
vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. 3796). Finally, defendant is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions ...
although made by defendant's counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is
permitted to act such, has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make
admission for the purpose of the litigation... Her proffered explanation that her counsel
misunderstood her is puerile because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the
exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote."5
It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding that the discrepancy as to the weight
between the diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and the lost diamond was due to defendant having
"substituted a diamond-solitaire of plaintiff with a heavier stone" that the decision was rendered,
respondent Court reversing the lower court and ordering defendant, now petitioner Consuelo S.
de Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring or fact value of P1,000.00 and costs, as well as to pay plaintiff
P1,000.00 as attorney's fee and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence this appeal.
To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent Court. It correctly applied the law to the
facts as found.
1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was
found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in
good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price. As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, 6 the right of the owner cannot be
defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor. There is a
reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco.7Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of
the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being
dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons
must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."8
2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned
error that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's
claim. As the above cases demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner can recover the same
once she can show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court of Appeals was so convinced from the
evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation is such respondent. That is a factual
determination to which we must pay heed. Instead of proving any alleged departure from legal
norms by respondent Court, petitioner would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code, which provides: 'A
possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a

just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." She would accord to it a greater legal
significance than that to which under the controlling doctrines it is entitled. The brief for respondents
did clearly point out why petitioner's assertion is lacking in support not only from the cases but even
from commentators. Thus: "Actually, even under the first clause, possession in good faith does not
really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a period of acquisitive
prescription for movables through `uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of
the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of three years), so that many Spanish writers,
including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of
the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor is not that of ownership,
but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Phil. p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol, 6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the
very reason that the title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title
sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately following
provides that `one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of
this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in fact assumes that
possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire
indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or
illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to
recover it under any condition.' "9
lwp h1. t

The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to prove the identity of the diamond
ring. Clearly the question raised is one of the fact. What the Court of Appeals found is conclusive.
Again, petitioner could not demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the Court of Appeals
acted in an arbitrary manner. As made mention of in the brief for respondents two disinterested
witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cementina of the Pasay City Police
Department, both of whom could not be accused of being biased in favor of respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.
The third assigned error of petitioners would find fault with respondent Court relying "on the
weakness of the title or evidence" of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia. It is true, in the decision
under review, mention was made of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment when in
her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring the stock card, told respondent Angelina L.
Guevara that that was her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of the latter asserting ownership. It
was likewise stated in such decision that there were extra-judicial admissions in the original and first
amended answers of petitioner. In the appraisal of her testimony, respondent Court likewise spoke
of her giving a rather dubious source of her ring, the person from whom she allegedly bought it
turning out "to be a mysterious and ephemeral figure." As a matter of fact, as set forth a few pages
back, respondent Court did enumerate the flaws in the version given by petitioner. From the
weakness of the testimony offered which, as thus made clear, petitioner, did not even seek to refute,
she would raise the legal question that respondent Court relied on the "weakness of [her] title or
evidence" rather than on the proof justifying respondent Angelina D. Guevara's claim of ownership.
Petitioner here would ignore the finding of fact of respondent Court that such ownership on her part
"has been abundantly established" by her evidence. Again here, in essence, the question raised is
one of fact, and there is no justification for us to reverse respondent Court.
The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of error is that the matter of the substitution of the
diamond on the ring was a question raised for the first time on appeal as it was never put in issue by
the pleadings nor the subject of reception of evidence by both parties and not touched upon in the
decision of the lower court. Why no such question could be raised in the pleadings of respondent
Angelina D. Guevara was clarified by the fact that the substitution came after it was brought for
examination to Mr. Rebullida. After the knowledge of such substitution was gained, however, the
issue was raised at the trial according to the said respondent resulting in that portion of the decision

where the lower court reached a negative conclusion. As a result, in the motion for reconsideration,
one of the points raised as to such decision being contrary to the evidence is the finding that there
was no substitution. It is not necessary to state that respondent Court, exercising its appellate power
reversed the lower court. What was held by it is controlling. What is clear is that there is no factual
basis for the legal arguments on which the fourth assigned error is predicated.
What is said takes care of the fifth assigned error that respondent Court was mistaken in its finding
that there was such a substitution. Again petitioner would have us pass on a question of credibility
which is left to respondent Court of Appeals. The sixth assigned error would complain against the
reversal of the lower court judgment as well as petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia being made to pay
respondent Angelina D. Guevara exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. The reversal is
called for in the light of the appraisal of the evidence of record as meticulously weighed by
respondent Court. As to the attorney's fees and exemplary damages, this is what respondent Court
said in the decision under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees
in the sum of P1,000, it being just and equitable under the circumstances, and another P1,000 as
exemplary damages for the public good to discourage litigants from resorting to fraudulent devices to
frustrate the ends of justice, as defendant herein tried to substitute the ring, Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's
ring." 10 Considering the circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth assigned error on the matter
by petitioner fails to demonstrate that respondent Court's actuation is blemished by legal defects.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby affirmed.
With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result, Art. 85 of the Code of Commerce not being applicable.

Footnotes
1 Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioners, pp. I to II.
2 Ibid., p. II.
3 Ibid., pp. II-III.
4 Ibid., pp. IV-V.
5 Ibid., pp. V-VI.
6 98 Phil. 788 (1956).
7 L-18536, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 486.
8 Ibid., p. 493.
9 Refutation of the First Assignment of Error, Brief for
Respondents-Appellees, pp. 8-10.
10 Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the petititoners, p. VII.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-20241 November 22, 1974

IN THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF ONE PARCEL
OF LAND SITUATED AT PANAKAGAN, PATIIS, SAN MATEO,
RIZAL. LUIS R. SANTIAGO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
PACITA V. DE LOS SANTOS and BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, oppositors-appellees.
Luna & Manalo for applicant-appellant.
Fortunato de Leon for private oppositor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:p

Ads By softonicIt is an occurrence, not too often repeated, that counsel, either through a display of
candor, which is commendable or a failure to appreciate the untoward consequences, which is
something else again, submits a pleading, which on its face demonstrates the lack of merit of the
action he has filed. It did happen here. Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of
land. In a motion to set the case for hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being
public in character, thus lending support to the opposition of the Director of Forestry,
theDirector of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos. The then Judge Cecilia Muoz
Palma, now an Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Its reversal is sought in this appeal. It is to
be admitted that the brief submitted by new counsel, the firm of Luna and Manalo, is both thorough
and comprehensive. It does not, however, avail. The infirmity of the case for appellant is incurable.
We affirm.
The facts of the case and why it should be dismissed are set forth with clarity in the appealed order
of the then Palma. Thus: "This is an application filed by Luis R. Santiago for registration of his title
over a parcel of land containing an area of 1,288,337 sq. meters located in San Mateo, Rizal. The
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita V. de
losSantos. On September 15, 1961, after examination of the records, this Court ordered the
applicant to show cause why his application should not be dismissed outright on the ground that the
property applied for is part of the public domain. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the application
were filed by the oppositor Pacita V. de losSantos and the Director of Forestry which motions
are principally based on the allegation that the property applied for is a portion of the public domain
which was leased to Mrs. Pacita de los Santos under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305. After
due consideration of the allegations of said oppositors and taking into account certain documents
existing in the records of this case, we find the Motion to Dismiss to be justified and meritorious.
The Court makes reference to the documents attached to applicant's motion dated August 24, 1961
all of which show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain
which was leased under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305 to the oppositor Pacita V. de
los Santos and which was excluded from said lease agreement only in the month of August this
year." 1

Even the most cursory reading of the order of dismissal can lead to no other conclusion except that it
should be affirmed. It would be an affront to reason if on the undisputed facts, there would be any
other outcome. It does follow therefore that notwithstanding the vigor with which the appeal is
prosecuted by new counsel, it does not and cannot suffice for a reversal.
1. The pleading that left no choice to the then Palma except to dismiss the case reads thus:
"[Comes now] theApplicant by the undersigned counsel to this Court respectfully request that
the above-entitled Land Registration Case be calendared for hearing in view of the fact that a portion
of the said parcel of land subject of this registration which was claimed as part of the public forest
has already been released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Resources for agricultural
purposes as evidenced by its order dated August 10, 1961, ... ." 2Attached to such pleading were the
documents, which, in the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the land object of this registration
proceeding is part of the public domain ... ." Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his
client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to
the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the
concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded any better. What
was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although
thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is
conclusive and binding. Our decisions from Irlanda v. Pitargue, 3 announced in a 1912 decision, toDe
Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 4 promulgated in 1972, speak to that effect. "It is a familiar doctrine," according to
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Joe's Radio & Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 5 "that an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as
to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not ... ." 6 Even if there had been a full hearing on the case,
therefore, the result would not have been any different. There was no choice then for the lower court
except to dismiss the complaint.

Ads By softonic2. Laboring under such a handicap, how did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firm
of Luna and Manalo, seek to extricate him from a predicament of his own making? It would rely on
certain procedural doctrines; more specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss of oppositor
Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default
except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her, and that she had
no interest to oppose the application of the registration of her land, although admittedly there was a
claim on her part under a pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of
dismissal being set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may
pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it would clearly
appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to be forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of
oppositor de los Santos, it was stated: "That the son of applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S.
Santiago, was one time the Lessee of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by him
under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled
by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the improvements
and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease Contract; ... ." 7 There was no denial
of such allegation. It is quite obvious then that the facts, no less than the law, call for precisely the
conclusion reached by the then Judge Muoz Palma.
There is here once more an apt illustration of the Moreland dictum in Alonso v.
Villamor: 8 "Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." 9 So, too, is this excerpt from an
opinion of Chief Justice Moran in Co Tiamco v. Diaz: 10 "Rules of pleading are intended to secure a
method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear
before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance.
What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off

on procedural points." 11To show how committed is this Court to such a doctrine, reference may be made
to the opinion in Economic Insurance Company, Inc. v. Uy Realty
Company: 12 "It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every
conceivable legal defense the law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability
to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are
intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a
greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown with success an
unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to
accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor, we have stressed that we are not to lend
the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory
substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation." 13 Well could Justice Cardozo observe: "A system of
procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the
warrant of clear
necessity." 14

3. The appealed order of dismissal is thus impressed with merit. It has likewise in its favor the
soundest policy considerations, based no less on one of the prime objectives of the fundamental
law. Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization
of the natural resources is ordained. 15There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary
does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be
grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity
that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. 16 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it
retains its rights over the same as dominus. Its disposition is justified only when shown that its utilization
promotes the public welfare. Especially so in case of doubt, considering that our forest resources have
been unduly depleted, courts should not lightly accept claims that a parcel of land no longer can be
classified as forestal. That is certainly one mode of assuring the realization of the national patrimony
being held in trust for future generations. There is thus fealty to the ideal of conservation.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 17, 1961 of the then Judge Muoz Palma is
affirmed. Costs against appellant Luis R. Santiago.
Makalintal, C.J., Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, Order of Dismissal, 136-138.
2 Ibid, 28.
3 22 Phil. 383.
4 L-28040, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 577. Cf. Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148 (1914); Ramirez v. Orientalist
Co., 38 Phil. 634 (1918); Manalo v. Gueco 42 Phil. 925 (1920); McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248 (1922);
Bastida v. Menzi and Co., 58 Phil. 188 (1933); Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 (1946); Aquino v. Blanco, 79
Phil. 647 (1947); Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948); Joe's Radio and Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics,
104 Phil. 333 (1958); Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, August 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; Libudan v. Gil L-21163,
May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17.
5 104 Phil. 333 (1958).
6 Ibid, 340.
7 Record on Appeal, Motion to Dismiss of Oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos, par. 8.
8 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
9 Ibid, 322.
10 75 Phil. 672 (1946).
11 Ibid, 681. Cf. De Jesus v. Manglapus, 81 Phil. 114 (1948); Municipality of Hinabangan v. Wright, 107 Phil.
394 (1960); Jalandoni v. National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, 108 Phil. 486 (1960).
12 L-28056, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 744.

13 Ibid, 749.
14 Reed v. Allen, 286 US 191, 209 (1932).
15 The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution reads: "The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution."
The present Constitution has substantially a similar Preamble: "We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the
aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a Government that shall embody our ideals, promote the general
welfare, conserve and develop the patrimony of our Nation, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty, and equality, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution."
16 Cf. Lee Hong Hock v. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372.