MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. HON. FELIX L.

MOYA

FACTS:
From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created
respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over
eight (8) barrios of petitioner. For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of
boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private
respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it
appears that no action was taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a
complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public
respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of
the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 475

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

RULING:
No.Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15
SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there
is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of
action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of
Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have
dismissed the case.
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes
is administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies
of the government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on
appropriate occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only entities authorized
by law may be patties in a civil action. Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the
President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal
personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge
should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

FACTS:

September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move
it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No
publication or copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is
readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul
the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by
Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:

No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the

Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to
the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January
1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper
columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said
resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before
and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against
the plebiscite issues.
ISSUE:
Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under
Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
RULING:
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a
leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates

involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no

statutory basis.

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.

FACTS:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four
(4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8,
1995 elections.
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand
Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against
Danilo Manalastas 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalans 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest challenging the
results of the elections in the municipalitys forty-seven (47) precincts.In due time,
Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in
twenty-one (21) precincts of the 47 protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest questioning the
results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. Meneses, on his
part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts of the
157 protested by Punzalan.
Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
ordered a revision of the ballots. The result of said physical count coincided with the
figures reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses - 10,301 votes; Manalastas 9,317 votes; and Punzalan - 8,612 votes. Because of these irregularities, the trial court
was constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing
thereon and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid
the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at
the back thereof.
RULING
No. While Section 24of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as An Act Providing
For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, requires the
BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so

does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to
said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained
therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or
any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not
penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that
a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines provides that in the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good
reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to
affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear
reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.
well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that
the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people
is imperative.

ELECTION
CASE DIGESTS
De Guzman, Erika Bianca S.