CAMBALIZA V CRISTAL-TENORIO (2004)

CANON 9/RULE 9.01

FACTS:
[C]omplainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee
of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law
office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office. Case on deceit and grossly immoral conduct did
not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
complainant alleged that the respondent cooperated in
the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and two other allegations.
The respondent averred that this disbarment complaint
was filed by the complainant just to get even with
her. The complainant later filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint as she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and
the case was pursued. The IBP found the respondent
guilty of assisting in unauthorized practice of law.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the CPR
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist
in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character.
SERANA V SANDIGANBAYAN (2008)

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior

student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting
January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation
of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the
President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed
to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance
of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for
estafa and filed the case to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash theinformation. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with
finality.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an estafa case?
(2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with
Salary Grade 27?
DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606
which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
(2) While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court.

RATIONALE: (1) The rule is well-established in this

jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.

deed of sale and for partition of the disputed property

among the surviving heirs of Pablo. The deed of sale
was executed by Candida, grandmother of the Zarates,
in favor of the Sevillos, which included Pablos siblings.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must

be expounded by reference to each other in order
toarrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.

The deed of sale was declared null and void and the lot
was ordered to be partitioned amongst the Sevillos. The
lot was surveyed and subdivided into 6 lots.

Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No.

1606, theSandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.

Petitioner Carlet filed an action for reconvayance of

property against the Zarates. Defendants moved to
dismiss the case, claiming that the complaint had
already been pleaded and passed upon in the lower
court, CA and Supreme Court. It was determined that
the plaintiff tried to obtain the same relief by way of
different action with the decision affirmed by the CA.

(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, even if she does not have a salary grade
27, as she is placed thereby express provision of law.

HELD: No, petition denied

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the

Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of
a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

CARLET V CA (1997)
CANON 10/RULE 10.01
FACTS:
A lot in Laguna was purchased by Jose Sevillo in 1910 on
installment. One of his children, Paolo, and his wife
Antonia Palisoc (represented by Carlet as special
administrator of their estate) declared the lot for
taxation purposes even if it was still under Joses name.
Pablo remarried to Candida Baylo, who had a child
named Cirila Carolasan. Pablo and Candida did not bear
their own child. They filed for reconstitution of title
which was issued in their names.
After they died, the heirs of Cirila, all surnamed Zarate
and are private respondents, filed for annulment of

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition

When material facts or questions which were in issue in

a former action and were admitted or judicially
determined there are conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions
become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a
subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies regardless of the form of the latter.
Here are four requisites to successfully invoke res
judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. A judgment on the merits rendered in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
subsequent action when the three identities are
present.
The first three elements are not disputed by petitioner.
The last element was correctly determined by the lower
courts and affirmed by the SC.
What counsel did to refile the action to relitigate the
title to and partition the lot violates Canon 10 and Rule
10.01 of the CPR. There is no forum shopping as this
only applies when two or more cases are still pending.

MONTEREY V ARAYATA (1935)

FACTS:

Atty. Eustaqio Arayata prepared a deed of sale in his

favor of a parcel of land for P4,000. He stated that the
person who sold the land to him was his father even
though he knew that the vendor had already died and
had a fictitious document notarized by the other
respondent, Tereso Montoya. Said document also
stated that the vendor appeared before the notary
personally.
He also filed an application to marry one Engracia
Ortega and stating in his application that he was single
while he still had a subsisting marriage.
ISSUE: WON respondents are guilty of malpractice
HELD: Montoya No, Arayata yes; 1 month
suspension
Respondent notary acted in good faith when he ratified
the contents of the falsified document. Arayata was an
accompanied by an old man, whom he assured
Montoya was his father.
Arataya was indeed the true and only heir but he is still
guilty of malpractice and unprofessional conduct for his
actions and statement to the notary. It is however
mitigated being that he is the actual heir and the
complainant has neither real nor direct interest in the
transaction complained of.
No action was taken on the second complaint as a
complaint for bigamy filed by the wife is already
pending in another court.

IN RE SAMANIEGO (1951)
FACTS:
Bernardo Samaniego was the cousin of respondent
Arturo. He filed a war damage claim with the USPhilippine War Commission. While he was married, he
cohabited with Alejandra Cruz.
A check for P841.50 was issued by the Commission to
Bernardo who had already died. Respondent and
Alejandra Cruz were able to cash the check with the
former signing as Bernardo.
Respondent claims that he honestly believed Alejandra
was the lawful wife of his cousin and in good faith was
motivated solely by a desire to help her. He also denies
representing himself as Bernardo.
ISSUE: WON respondent committed malpractice

HELD: Yes, 1 year suspension

While respondents excuse may mitigate his liability, the
lawyer has still committed malpractice. He knew he was
not Bernardo and signed with his name knowing full
well Bernardo was dead. Further, while respondent
acted without malice and did not profit, he misled the
bank and committed an act of moral laxity.

BAUTISTA V GONZALES (1990)

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista,
respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of
lawyers oath. Required by this Court to answer the
charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill
of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to
amend his complaint by making his charges more
definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondents
motion and required complainant to file an amended
complaint. Complainant submitted an amended
complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients,
namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to
pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent
fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in
litigation.
xxx
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to
enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for
the development into a residential subdivision of the
land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT
No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorneys fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction on June
30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
xxx
Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above,
reads:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee,
provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all
expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious
misconduct involving a champertous contract.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law
for six (6) months.
RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or
bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04,
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer
may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados,
however, does not provide for reimbursement to
respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses
of proceedings to enforce the clients rights is
champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements are
against public policy especially where, as in this case,
the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his
own expense in consideration of some bargain to have
part of the thing in dispute [citation omitted]. The
execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client, for
which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION V INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO (1971)
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as
the Unions), while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with
the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe
Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the
secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president,
in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried

to dissuade the members of the Unions from

disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired
Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate
secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department.
Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the
Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies;
negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals,
but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of
union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on
January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for deadlock on
collective bargaining. The issue was dropped
subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties
negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of
salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as
supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going on in the
Department of Labor after the notice to strike was
served on the Companies. These employees resigned
from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting
manager and president, sent to each of the strikers a
letter(exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to
conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work
voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security
guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end
of the day or to sleep nights at the office where
comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess
of eight hours.

6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your

families.
7. The decision to make is yours whether you
still believe in the motives of the strike or in the
fairness of the Management.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the

exception of a few unionists who were convinced to
desist by the aforesaid letter
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958,
until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions picket
lines xxx succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in
front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to
the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the
resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with
the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies
then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the
City Fiscals Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the
individual strikers:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has
made us even more convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but
we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or
without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of
the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal
charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2
June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by
this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced
to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges
filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were
dismissed by the fiscals office and by the courts. These
three cases involved slight physical injuries against
one striker and light coercion against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of

preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2,
1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the
striking employees decided to call off their strike and to
report back to work on June 2, 1958.
* However, before readmitting the strikers, the
Companies required them not only to secure clearances
from the City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be
screened by a management committee among the
members of which were Enage and Garcia. The
screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with
pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by
the Companies without being required to secure
clearances from the fiscals office. Subsequently, when
practically all the strikers had secured clearances from
the fiscals office, the Companies readmitted only some
but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and
members of the Unions who were most active in the
strike, on the ground that they committed acts inimical
to the interest of the respondents, without however
stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24
of the above number were ultimately notified months
later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of
June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed
under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to
now have not been readmitted although there have
been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending
out individual letters to them urging them to abandon
their strike and return to work, with a promise of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if
they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958,
they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against
the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of
ULP
HELD: YES
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees
individually during a strike following unproductive

efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be

operated the next day and that their jobs were open for
them should they want to come in has been held to be
an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with
the right of collective bargaining through dealing with
the employees individually instead of through their
collective bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still
under obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees bargaining representative.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their
homes, with the employer or his representative urging
the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,
constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed
activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an
activity to which they are entitled free from the
employers molestation.
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement
and attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable
cots, free coffee and occasional movies, overtime
pay for work performed in excess of eight hours, and
arrangements for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty
of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and,
consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to
an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when
they are represented by a union, since the employees
thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine
what the consequences of returning to work would be.
ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and
Garcia with attractive compensations; respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without
increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect
compelling these employees to resign from their
unions; respondents, thru their president and manager,
respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of
non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three
buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only
one gate less than two meters wide and in the process,
crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in
injuries on the part of the picketers and the strikebreakers; respondents brought against the picketers
criminal charges, only three of which were not
dismissed, and these three only for slight
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the
respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the

court of first instance restraining the strikers from

stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and
peaceful use of the Companies gates, entrance and
driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies
buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before
and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B,
yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of
the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy
unionism within them.
II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against
all the strikers in general. They separated the active
from the less active unionists on the basis of their
militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists
belonging to the first category were refused
readmission even after they were able to secure
clearances from the competent authorities with respect
to the criminal charges filed against them.
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort
to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination
in the readmission of strikers returning to work the
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a
committee.
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record
shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed
charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the
striking employees reported back for work on June 2,
1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless
they first secured the necessary clearances; but when
all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently
present the required clearances, the respondents still
refused to take them back.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and
members of the striking unions do not indicate
sufficient basis for dismissal.

ALLIED BANK V CA (2003)

Facts:
Private respondent is an employee of
petitioner, hired as an accountant-bookkeeper and
eventually promoted as an assistant manager which
included his transfer to several branches nine times. His
appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel
Action which provides as one of the conditions of

employment the provision on petitioners right to

transfer employees on as a regular appointment as the
need arises in the interest of maintaining smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public.
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers
assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed
respondent as second in the order of priority of
assistant managers to be assigned outside of
Cebu City. However, private respondent refused to be
transferred to Bacolod City in a letter by reason of
parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that
would result if he is away from his family. He thereafter
filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent
that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch,
however, private respondent again refused. As a result,
petitioner warned and required him to follow the said
orders; otherwise, he shall be penalized under the
companys discipline policy. Furthermore, private
respondent was required to explain and defend himself.
The latter replied stating that whether he be suspended
or dismissed, it would all the more establish and fortify
his complaint pending before the NLRC and further
charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in
ordering his transfer. He further alleges that the
managements discriminatory act of transferring only
the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its
exercise of management prerogative when in truth and
in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some
new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection
with management.
As a result, petitioner, through a Memo, informed
private respondent that Allied Bank is terminating him.
The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) continued
refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to
report for work despite the denial of his application for
additional vacation leave.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had
abused its management prerogative in ordering private
respondents transfer and the refusal by the latter did
not amount to insubordination. The NLRC likewise ruled
that: (1) petitioner terminated the private respondent
without just cause considering family considerations; (2)
the transfer is a demotion since the Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem
branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted
him, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant
accountant in the Tagbilaran branch; (3) the

termination was illegal for lack of due process as no

hearing appears to have been conducted and that
petitioner failed to send a termination notice and
instead issued a Memo merely stating a notice of
termination would be issued, but petitioner did not
issue any notice; and (4) petitioner dismissed private
respondent in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor
practice as the dismissal undermined the latters right
to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws.
The ruling of NLRC was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Issues:
1. WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN
PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS REFUSAL
TO TRANSFER CONSTITUTES VIOLATIONS OF
COMPANY RULES WARRANTING THE PENALTY
OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER PETITIONER DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN DIRECTING
HIS TRANSFER.
4. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TRANSFER
CONSTITUTES A DEMOTION.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER IS COMMITTED ULP.
6. WHETHER ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS.

Held:
1.

Yes. The rule is that the transfer of an

employee ordinarily lies within the ambit
of the employers prerogatives. The
employer exercises the prerogative to
transfer an employee for valid reasons and
according to the requirement of its
business, provided the transfer does not
result in demotion in rank or diminution of
the employees salary, benefits and other
privileges. In illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of showing that
the transfer is not unnecessary,
inconvenient and prejudicial to the
displaced employee.

2.

Yes. Private respondent was well aware of

petitioners policy of periodically
transferring personnel to different
branches. The assignment to the different
branches of Allied Bank was a condition of
his employment and he consented to this
condition when he signed the Notice of
Personnel Action.

The Court cannot accept the proposition that when an

employee opposes his employers decision to transfer
him to another work place, there being no bad faith or
underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is
the employees wishes that should be made to prevail.
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes
willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer.
Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress
against employers for rules or orders that they regard
as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these
rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey
them at their peril. Therefore, private
respondents continued refusal to obey Allied Banks
transfer orders warrants just cause in his dismissal in
accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code and
thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
3.

No. Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994

showed that at least 14 accounting officers
and personnel from various branches,
including private respondent, were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank
did not single him out. The same letter
explained that he was second in line for
assignment outside Cebu because he had
been in Cebu for seven years already. It
must be noted that none of the other
transferees joined private respondents in
his complaint or corroborated his
allegations of widespread discrimination
and favoritism.

4.

No. No evidence was presented showing

that the transfer would diminish his salary,
benefits, or privileges. On the contrary,
petitioners letter of 13 June 1994 assured
private respondent that he would not
suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and
that the transfer would involve the same
rank, duties and obligations.

5.

No. Unfair labor practices relate only to

violations of the constitutional right of

workers and employees to selforganization and are limited to the acts

enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor
Code, none of which applies to the present
case. There is no evidence that private
respondent took part in forming a union, or
even that a union existed in Allied Bank.
6.

Yes. To be effective, a dismissal must

comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code which provides:

For termination of employment based on just causes as

defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i)

A written notice served on the

employee specifying the
ground or grounds of
termination, and giving said
employee reasonable
opportunity within which to
explain his side.

(ii)

A hearing or conference
during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if he so desires is
given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the
evidence presented against
him.

(iii)

A written notice of
termination served on the
employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his
termination.

The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks

letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required private
respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him for his refusal to comply with the
transfer orders. On the requirement of a hearing, the
Court has held that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard. An actual hearing is not
necessary. The exchange of several letters gave him an
opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and
Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a notice
of termination. The Court has held that the nature of

an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it

but by its body and contents. Moreover, private
respondent himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination. The Memo shows that it unequivocally
informed private respondent of Allied Banks decision to
dismiss him and discussed the findings of the
Investigation Committee that served as grounds for the
dismissal. In addition, the Memo also refuted the
charges of discrimination and demotion.
However, the Memo suffered from certain
errors. Although the Memo stated that termination
was to be effective as of 1 September 1994, the Memo
bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly,
private respondent only received a copy of the Memo
on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the
supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a
written notice of termination must be served on the
employee. Allied Bank could not terminate him on 1
September 1994 because he had not received as of that
date the notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss
him. The dismissal could only take effect on 5 October
1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason,
private respondent is entitled to backwages for the
period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
Fallo:
CA and NLRC affirmed. Case is remanded to the Labor
Arbiter for the computationof the backwages, inclusive
of allowances and other benefits, due to private
respondent from 1 September 1994 until 4 October
1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto
M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in
citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future
(Dosch v. NLRC).

LIM V MONTANO (2006)

FACTS:
In the case at bar, complainant John Siy Lim charged
respondent Atty. Montano with gross misconduct
relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928.
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the
complaint in the said civil case out of malice, indicating
that it involves the same parties, the same causes of
action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C14542.

In respondents comment, he denied the allegations

against him. While he admitted filing the civil case
stated herein as a counsel for plaintiff therein, he
asserted that it was not filed with malicious intent.
Moreover, while the new case involved the same party,
it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as
such, the principle of res judicata did not apply.
He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No.
C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of
instrument,while Civil Case No. 19928 was for
annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his
professional appreciation that his client had a good
case."
In his reply, the complainant stressed that the
respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No.
C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint;
and "the lame excuse of the respondent that the
present case is an action in rem while the other case is
an action in personam" did not merit consideration.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Canon 12 of Code of
Professional Responsibility and is liable for forum
shopping.
HELD: In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of
forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware
that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and
executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No.
C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original
counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the
subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to
protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were
not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation
and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration.
As a responsible member of the bar, he should have
explained the effect of such final and executory decision
file another case involving the same property and
asserting the same rights. The filing of another action
concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficientadministration of
justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule
12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a
malice."27While we rule that the respondent should be
sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power
to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that

seriously affects the standing and character of the

lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where
any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.
Thus, respondent lawyer is suspended from practice of
law for six months.

AGUILAR V MANILA BANKING CORP (2006)

FACTS:
Petitioners obtained a P600,000.00 loan from the
Manila Banking Corporation (respondent), secured by a
real estate. When petitioners failed to pay their
obligation, the mortgaged property was extra-judicially
foreclosed. Respondent was the winning bidder at
public auction sale. Thereafter, instead of redeeming
the property, petitioners filed a complaint for
annulment of the foreclosure sale of the property
before the Regional Trial Court.
While the case was pending, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement. Under the Compromise
Agreement dated January 23, 1987, the petitioners
admitted the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure
and agreed to purchase the property from respondent
for P2,548,000.00. Parties agreed that the amount of
P100,000.00 shall be payable upon execution of the
agreement and the balance of P2,448,000.00, which
shall earn twenty-six per cent (26%) interest per annum,
shall be payable in eighteen installments. Petitioners
failed to pay the balance of P2,448,000.00 within the
eighteen-installment period from February 23, 1987 to
July 27, 1988.
A year and three months later, or on October 20, 1989,
respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30,
1987. petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for
deferment of the enforcement of the writ of execution
until July 31, 1990 because petitioners have a pending
proposal for the settlement of their judgment debt. And
to evade the implementation of the writ, petitioners
filed on December 20, 1991 an Ex-Parte Motion to
Recall the Court's Order dated December 5, 1991
claiming that their obligation was novated by the Letter
dated June 7, 1991 from respondent's Statutory
Receiver.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution
manifesting that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 did not
novate the Decision dated January 30, 1987 but was a

mere accommodation of the petitioners' request for a

liberal mode of payment of their account and
petitioners still failed to comply with such approved
mode of payment. RTC Branch 165 issued its Order
which resolved the pending motions with the Court.
With respect to petitioner's ex-parte motion to recall,
the Court said that for failure to comply with Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and
considering the nature of petitioners' motion, it treated
petitioner's motion as a mere scrap of paper.
Petitioners appealed before the CA but it was
denied.hence, petition for review.
Issue: whether respondent's receivership is a
supervening event that rendered execution of the
Decision dated January 30, 1987 impossible, if not
unjust; that since a bank under receivership is relieved
of its obligation to pay interest on the deposits of its
depositors, they (petitioners) are also not obliged to pay
interest on a loan due it and interest shall commence
again only after respondent's resumption of banking
operations.
Held: On the arguments relating to the effect of
respondent's receivership, petitioners brought this
matter for the first time in RTC Branch 165 in their
Omnibus Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years
after respondent was placed under receivership and
was ordered to close operation in 1987. The belated
invocation of such circumstance speaks strongly of the
staleness of their claim.
Besides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners'
position that they are not obliged to pay interest on
their obligation when respondent was placed under
receivership. When a bank is placed under receivership,
it would only not be able to do new business, that is, to
grant new loans or to accept new deposits. However,
the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect
debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the
assets of the bank.
Thus, petitioners' obligation to pay interest subsists
even when respondent was placed under receivership.
The respondent's receivership is an extraneous
circumstance and has no effect on petitioners'
obligation.