Book 4: Obligations & Contracts

Title XVII. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 2 > QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or
insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed. (n)
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage. (1905)
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was
in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed
by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount
of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official. (n)
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be
liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or
injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages
caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
1.

Proof of Negligence in Quasi Delict cases

2.

Who has the burden of proof

Negligence cases are highly common and usually deal with injury related to accidents in stores,
restaurants, public places, motor vehicle accidents, etc.. These cases require clear indisputable
evidence that highlights the misconduct of the responsible party, as proof that a negligent act lead to
such accident or injury.
Burden of Proof & Presumptions
The burden of proof a plaintiff faces in a case relates to four elements of proof that must exist in order
for them to be able to prove that a negligent act not only existed, but that the act by a defendant led to
the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
These four elements relate to the following: that the defendant was under responsibility of a legal duty
(to protect), that there was a failure in proper conduct by that party, to show that this failure led
directly to the injury caused to the plaintiff, and finally that an injury actually occurred and is evident.
All these details must be presented to a court in the form of evidence, which can be direct or
circumstantial. Provided that this proof is given clearly to the court, and the proof confirms the
negligent act, the defendant would be held liable for his or her actions and the damages endured by
the plaintiff.
Circumstantial Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur
Circumstantial evidence pertains to a type of evidence that exists to indirectly prove a case, and is not
as evident or clear as direct evidence. Since direct evidence for a case would be a witness account, or
perhaps a video containing the act, it can incriminate the defendant to the negligent act. Such
evidence can be the physical remnants of an accident or injury, and can be proven through a series of
scientific tests and theories.
Forensic science is one of the key components used to provide circumstantial evidence in a case, and
has been successful in doing so. There is an type of circumstantial evidence, which is also referred to as
a doctrine in the field, that serves to prove negligence known as res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur
requires that four elements be provided in order for the evidence to be valid and existent. The term
itself is derived from the Latin phrase the thing speaks for itself, referring to the accident.
Res Ipsa Loquitur-Procedural Effect
A case that provides a res ipsa loquitur evidence must meet four demanding factors of such a type of
circumstantial evidence. These four elements are: that the accident existed solely due to the
misconduct of the defendant, and could not have happened otherwise, that the accident happened
under the responsibility and/or attention of the defendant, that the plaintiff did not take part in any
actions that would contribute to the accidents occurrence, and finally that the detailed evidence and
description of the accident be made highly available to the defendant. The elements provided give a
clear account as to the failure in responsibility by the defendant as well as its direct correlation to the
injury sustained by the plaintiff, and make such evidence accessible to the defendant. - See more at:
http://tort.laws.com/negligence-proof/negligence-proof#sthash.ICXpdIbG.dpuf

3.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR, when doctrine is applicable; when not applicable;

In the common law, res ipsa loquitur (Latin for "the thing itself speaks") is a doctrine that states that
the elements of duty of careand breach can sometimes be inferred from the very nature of an accident
or other outcome, even without direct evidence of how any defendant behaved. Although modern
formulations differ by jurisdiction, the common law originally stated that the accident must satisfy the
necessary conditions of negligence.

Latin phrase
The term comes from Latin and is literally translated "the thing itself speaks", but the sense is well
conveyed in the more common translation, "the thing speaks for itself." [1] The earliest known use of the
phrase was by Cicero in his defence speech Pro Milone.[2][3]The circumstances around the genesis of the
phrase and application by Cicero in Roman legal trials has led to questions whether it reflects on the
quality of res ipsa loquitur as a legal doctrine subsequent 52 BC, some 1,915 years before Byrne v
Boadle, as well as the question whether Chief Baron Pollock might have taken direct inspiration from
Cicero's application of the maxim in writing his judgment in that case. [4]

Leading case
The legal doctrine was first formulated by Baron Pollock in the 1863 English case Byrne v Boadle.[5]

The exclusive control requirement

The common law traditionally required that "the instrumentality or agent which caused the accident
was under the exclusive control of the defendant." See e.g., Eaton v. Eaton, 575 A2d 858 (NJ 1990).
However, the Second and Third versions of the Restatement of Torts eliminated this strict requirement,
because it can be difficult to prove "exclusive control." Accordingly, this element has largely given way
in modern cases to a less rigid formulation: that the evidence eliminates, to a sufficient degree, other
responsible causes (including the conduct of the plaintiff and third parties). For example, in New York
State, the defendant's exclusivity of control must be such that the likelihood of injury was, more likely
than not, the result of the defendant's negligence. The likelihood of other possibilities do not need to be
eliminated altogether but they must be so reduced that the greater probability lies with the defendant.
For a fictitious example of the exclusive control rule:

John Doe is injured when an elevator he has entered plunges several floors and stops abruptly.

Jane's Corporation built, and is responsible for maintaining, the elevator.

Doe sues Jane, and during the proceedings, Jane claims that Doe's complaint should be
dismissed because he has never proved, or for that matter even offered, a theory as to why the
elevator functioned incorrectly. Therefore, argues Jane, there is no evidence that they were at fault.

The court holds that Doe does not have to prove anything beyond the fall itself.

The elevator evidently malfunctioned (it was not intended to fall nor is that a proper
function of a correctly functioning elevator).

Jane was responsible for the elevator in every respect

So Jane's Corporation is responsible for the fall.

The thing speaks for itself: no further explanation is needed to establish the prima facie case.
In some cases a closed group of people may be held in breach of a duty of care under the rule of res
ipsa loquitur. In Ybarra v. Spangard,[6] a patient undergoing surgery experienced back complications as
a result of the surgery, but it could not be determined exactly which member of the surgical team had
breached his or her duty, and so it was held that they had all breached, because it was certain that at
least one of them was the only person who was in exclusive control of the instrumentality of harm.
In jurisdictions that employ this less rigid formulation of exclusive control, this element subsumes the
element that the plaintiff did not contribute to his injury. In modern case law,contributory negligence is
compared to the injury caused by the other. For example, if the negligence of the other is 95% of the
cause of the plaintiff's injury, and the plaintiff is 5% responsible, then the plaintiff's slight fault cannot
negate the negligence of the other. This new type of split liability is commonly called comparative
negligence.

Typical in medical malpractice

Res ipsa loquitur often arises in the "scalpel left behind" variety of case. For example, a person goes to
a doctor with abdominal pains after having his appendix removed. X-rays show the patient has a metal
object the size and shape of a scalpel in his abdomen. It requires no further explanation to show the
surgeon who removed the appendix was negligent, as there is no legitimate reason for a doctor to
leave a scalpel in a body at the end of an appendectomy.

Contrast to prima facie

Res ipsa loquitur is often confused with prima facie ("at first sight"), the common law doctrine that a
party must show some minimum amount of evidence before a trial is worthwhile.
The difference between the two is that prima facie is a term meaning there is enough evidence for
there to be a case to answer. Res ipsa loquitur means that because the facts are so obvious, a party
need not explain any more. For example:

"There is a prima facie case that the defendant is liable. They controlled the pump. The pump
was left on and flooded the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff was away and had left the house in the
control of the defendant. Res ipsa loquitur."

Res Ipsa Loquitur

[Latin, The thing speaks for itself.] A rebuttable presumption or inference that the defendant was neglig
ent, which arises upon proof that theinstrumentality or condition causing the injury was in the defenda
nt's exclusive control and that the accident was one that ordinarily does notoccur in the absence of Neg
ligence.
Res ipsa loquitur, or res ipsa, as it is commonly called, is really a rule of evidence, not a rule of Substan
tive Law.
Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others agai
nst an unreasonable risk of
harm. Inorder to prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish by a Preponderance of
Evidence that the defendant's conduct wasunreasonable in light of the particular situation and that suc
h conduct caused the plaintiff's injury. The mere fact that an accident or an injuryhas occurred, with not
hing more, is not evidence of negligence. There must be evidence that negligence caused the event. Su
ch evidence canconsist of direct testimony by eyewitnesses who observed the defendant's unreasonabl
e conduct and its injurious result.
Negligence can also be established by Circumstantial
Evidence when no direct evidence exists. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of onerecognized fact or
set of facts from which the fact to be determined can be reasonably inferred because it is the logical co
nclusion that can bedrawn from all the known facts. For example, skid marks at the scene of an acciden
t are circumstantial evidence that a car was driven at anexcessive speed. The reasoning process must
be based upon the facts offered as evidence, together with a sufficient background of humanexperienc
e, to justify the conclusion. Evidence that merely suggests the possibility of negligence is insufficient, si
nce negligence must appearmore likely than not to have occurred. This inference must cover all the nec
essary elements of negligence: that the defendant owed the plaintiffa duty, which the defendant violat
ed by failing to act according to the required standard of conduct, and that such negligent conduct injur
ed theplaintiff.
Res ipsa loquitur is one form of circumstantial evidence that permits a reasonable person to surmise th
at the most Probable
Cause of anaccident was the defendant's negligence. This concept was first advanced in 1863 in a case
in which a barrel of flour rolled out of a warehousewindow and fell upon a passing pedestrian. Res ipsa l
oquitur was the reasonable conclusion because, under the circumstances, the defendantwas probably c
ulpable since no other explanation was likely. The concept was rapidly applied to cases involving injurie
s to passengers causedby carriers, such as railroads, which were required to prove they had not been n
egligent. Res ipsa loquitur, as it is in the early 2000s appliedby nearly all of the 50 states, deals with th
e sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and, as in some states, affects the Burden of Proof in
negligence cases.
Elements
Three basic requirements must be satisfied before a court can submit the question of negligence to the
jury under res ipsa loquitur.
Inference of Negligence The plaintiff's injury must be of a type that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone has been negligent. Thisrequirement, which is the inference of negligence, allows res ipsa to
be applied to a wide variety of situations, such as the falling of elevators,the presence of a dead mouse
in a bottle of soda, or a streetcar careening through a restaurant. Although many of the cases involve fr
eakishand improbable situations, ordinary events, such as where a passenger is injured when a vehicle
stops abruptly, will also warrant theapplication of res ipsa. Commercial air travel became so safe in the
late twentieth century that planes engaged in regularly scheduledcommercial flights generally do not cr
ash unless someone has been negligent. Vehicular accidents caused by a sudden loss of control, suchas
a car suddenly swerving off the road or a truck skidding on a slippery road and crossing into the wrong l
ane of traffic, justify the conclusionthat such an event would not normally occur except for someone's n
egligence.
This inference of negligence does not mean that all other possible causes of the injurious event must b
e eliminated. A plaintiff using res ipsa toenable her case to go to the jury must prove that the defendan
t's negligence is the most probable cause of her injuries. The particular nature ofthe defendant's neglig
ence need not be pinpointed. For instance, where a bottle of soda explodes in a supermarket immediat
ely after itsdelivery by the bottler, the injured person does not have to prove that the bottler failed to n
otice a defect in the bottle or that the soda was over-carbonated. It is sufficient to establish that the ex
plosion would not have occurred unless the bottler had been negligent.
Where the inference of negligence depends upon facts beyond the common knowledge of jurors, Expert
Testimony is necessary to furnish thisinformation. Such testimony is usually presented in cases of profe
ssional negligence, such as Medical

Malpractice. An expert witness cantestify directly in regard to the inferred fact itself, such as when the
expert testifies that the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred if thedoctor had not been negligent.
Exclusive Control by the Defendant The plaintiff's injury or damage must have been caused by an i
nstrumentality or condition that waswithin the exclusive control of the defendant. Some courts interpret
this requirement to mean that exclusive control or management must haveexisted at the time of the inj
ury. This interpretation has led to harsh results. In one case, a customer sat down in a chair in a store w
hilewaiting for a salesperson. The chair collapsed and the customer was injured. The court denied recov
ery to the customer in her negligenceaction against the store because it found that the chair was not wi
thin the exclusive control of the store but rather was under the exclusivecontrol of the customer at the t
ime of injury.
This application of the rule has been regarded as inflexible by many courts, since it severely restricts th
e type of case to which res ipsa canbe applied. In response, many states prescribe that the negligence
must occur while the defendant has control over the instrumentality. In theexample of the exploding so
da bottle, the negligence of the bottler occurred somewhere in the bottling process. The fact that the b
ottle wassitting on a supermarket shelf and was no longer in the immediate possession of the bottler do
es not prevent the reasonable conclusion thatthe injury resulted from the negligence of the bottler. The
injured plaintiff must first show that the bottle was not cracked by mishandling after itleft the plant of t
he bottler. This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must account for every minute of the existen
ce of the bottle from thetime it left the plant. If the plaintiff can substantiate the fact of careful handling
in general and the absence of unusual incidents, such as thedeliberate tampering of the bottled goods
by an unknown person, such facts would permit reasonable persons to conclude that the injury wasmor
e likely than not to have been caused by the defendant's negligence while he had exclusive control of t
he bottle.
Since there must be exclusive control by the defendant, res ipsa cannot be used against multiple defen
dants in a negligence case where theplaintiff claims he has been injured by the negligence of another. F
or example, a pedestrian is injured when he is struck by a car that had justcollided with another vehicle
. The pedestrian institutes a negligence action against one driver and seeks to have res ipsa applied to
his case.An inference of negligence does not arise from the mere fact of the collision, since neither driv
er is in exclusive control of the situation. If,however, one driver is cleared of fault by some specific evid
ence, the jury is justified in inferring that the injury was the result of the otherdriver's negligence.
The requirement of exclusive control by the defendant is not applied in cases involving Vicarious
Liability or shared responsibility for the sameinstrumentality or condition. In one case, a person was inj
ured when an elevator in which she was riding fell very rapidly. She brought anegligence action against
both the owner of the building and the company that manufactured the elevator and had the maintena
nce servicecontract for the building. The plaintiff relied completely on res ipsa. The jury found for the pl
aintiff since a falling elevator is not the type ofaccident that usually occurs without negligence, so that t
he negligence of those in control can be inferred. The service contract between theelevator company a
nd the building owner established the fact that they exerted joint control over the elevator. The require
ment of exclusivecontrol by a defendant of the instrumentality causing injury does not mean that only a
single entity has control. Where two or more defendantsare acting jointly, the doctrine of res ipsa can b
e applied to establish their negligence.
Some state courts have departed from the requirement of exclusive control and applied res ipsa loquitu
r against multiple defendants. In onecase, while an anesthetized patient was undergoing an operation f
or appendicitis, he suffered a traumatic injury to his shoulder. Res ipsa wasapplied against all of the doc
tors and hospital employees connected with the operation, although not all of them were negligent. The
courtbased its decision on the special responsibility for the plaintiff's safety undertaken by everyone co
ncerned.
Freedom from Contributory Negligence The event in question must not have been attributable to a
ny cause for which the plaintiff isresponsible. The plaintiff must not have done anything that significantl
y contributed to the accident that caused the injury. In one case, a waterskier was injured when the pro
peller of the boat that had been towing him struck his arm as the boat was attempting to pick him up.
He suedthe driver and the owner of the boat for negligence, which could be found if res ipsa was applie
d. The plaintiff attempted to dive underwaterwhen he saw the boat approaching him, but he was unsuc
cessful in escaping injury. The defendants claimed that the attempted dive causedthe accident and, the
refore, res ipsa was inapplicable.
The trial court accepted this argument, which was later rejected by the appellate court. The appellate c
ourt decided that the question ofwhether the attempted dive caused the accident should have been pre
sented to the jury under res ipsa. It stated that a plaintiff may rely uponres ipsa loquitur even though h
e has participated in the events leading to the accident if the evidence excludes his conduct as the resp
onsiblecause. In light of the skier's testimony that he was about to be struck by the boat, as well as the
testimony of other eyewitnesses, the jurycould logically conclude that the attempted dive was not a ca
use of the accident.
Accessibility of Evidence
In addition to the three basic requirements, a few states apply res ipsa in negligence cases where the e
vidence of the facts of the event ismore accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. In one state, f
or example, a plaintiff was injured when the bleacher section in which shewas sitting collapsed during a

basketball game under the management and supervision of the defendant high school athletic associati
on. Shesued the association for negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa. The appellate court, reviewin
g a verdict for the plaintiff, affirmed it because"the underlying reason for the res ipsa rule is that the chi
ef evidence of the true cause of the injury is practically accessible to the defendantbut inaccessible to t
he injured person."
The Effect of Res Ipsa
Res ipsa loquitur is usually used when there is no direct evidence of the defendant's negligence. The fa
cts presented to the court must meetthe three basic requirements. Once the court decides that the fact
s of a particular case warrant the application of res ipsa, it instructs the juryon the basic principles, but i
t is the function of the jury to decide the credibility and weight of the inference to be drawn from the kn
own facts.The jury can conclude that the defendant was negligent, but the jury is not compelled to do s
o. Everything depends upon the particular facts ofeach case. An inference of negligence might be so cle
ar that no reasonable person could fail to accept it. If the defendant offers noexplanation, the court can
direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the inference is so strong that reasonable jurors could not reach any ot
herconclusion. Where the jury considers the question of negligence, it can decide that the facts do not l
ogically lead to an inference of thedefendant's negligence, even if the defendant did not offer any evide
nce in her defense. If the defendant presents evidence that makes itunlikely that she has acted neglige
ntly, the plaintiff will lose his case unless he can rebut the evidence, since such evidence destroys thein
ference of negligence created by res ipsa.
A minority of courts hold that res ipsa creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Unless the defen
dant offers sufficient evidence tocontradict it, the court must direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Some stat
es have gone as far as to shift the burden of proof to the defendant,requiring her to introduce evidence
of greater weight than that of the plaintiff.
Cross-references
Evidence; Malpractice; Negligence; Probable Cause.
res ipsa loquitur (rayz ip-sah loh-quither) n. Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," a doctrine of law that one is presumed to be negligent ifhe/
she/it had exclusive control of whatever caused the injury even though there is no specific evidence of
an act of negligence, and withoutnegligence the accident would not have happened. Examples: a load
of bricks on the roof of a building being constructed by HighriseConstruction Co. falls and injures Paul P
edestrian below, and Highrise is liable for Pedestrian's injury even though no one saw the load fall.Whil
e under anesthetic, Isabel Patient's nerve in her arm is damaged although it was not part of the surgical
procedure, and she is unaware ofwhich of a dozen medical people in the room caused the damage. Und
er res ipsa loquitur all those connected with the operation are liable fornegligence. Lawyers often short
en the doctrine to "res ips," and find it a handy shorthand for a complex doctrine. (See: negligence)
Copyright 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.
res ipsa loquitur noun automatic lack of due diligence, automatic
negligence, automatic responsibility, breach of duty, dereliction,
definite, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, imprudence, irresponsibility, lack of
attention, liability imposed for obvious responsibillty,liability for sole and exclusive control, obvious and
cerrain negligence, the thing speaks for itself
Associated concepts: negligence
Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
4.

Cases:
a. Ma-ao Central Co., Inc. vs. CA, et.al. GR No. 83491, August 27, 1990
b. Ludo and Luym Corp. Vs. CA, GR No. 125483, February 1, 2011, 351 SCRA 35
c. Africa vs. Caltex, Inc. CR No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
d. FF Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. CA, et.al., GR No. L-52732, August 29, 1988
e. Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., GR No. L-21749, September
29, 1967
f.
Espiritu vs. Phil. Power & Devt. Co., GR No. L-3240-R, Sept. 20, 1949