REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 166676

September 12, 2008

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and
seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name
Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that
her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Dr. Sionzon issued
a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change
of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender
change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court
very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically
proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is
hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a)
By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b)
By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with
the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF
SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT
MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents
petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is abona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under
Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna
was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person
and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender
is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City
of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed
and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a)
That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing;
(b)
The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c)
The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date
and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in
the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection
with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations;
(h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section
3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil

registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance
with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1)
swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male
or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order
to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male
nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit
the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent
is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot
but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change
of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, isAFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127263

April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmedthe decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at
the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,
respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at
San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately,
and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later
amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without
just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of
gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon
of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but
operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina
away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her
husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was
dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows
inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She
said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only
of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more
than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4,
1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a
decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her

part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital
act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband
existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied
the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the
alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision 17 of
the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's
purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of
the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And
prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'
MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO,
THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE
PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH
IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS
APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack
of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at
the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and
rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial
justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be

subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the
marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the
parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before
the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage
itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of
issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's
birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents
she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on
record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under
Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked
as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted
by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having
been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is

hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground
therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default.
Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to
live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It
reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who
were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification
from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no
such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject

marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate
court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his
duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the
New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by
a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render
the marriage voidab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry
to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its nonissuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody
of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a
ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. Itewill be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The
r subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage"
a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of
the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite
receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties
is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing
officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2]dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September
25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the
declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in
the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of
a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.

Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and
Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason
is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given
the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 [14] of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.[16] However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent
observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH
AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree
of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal
intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the

crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract
a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing
that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may remarry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed
to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied
on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid
down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage
entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration
of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But
in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two
were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking
this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtainedafter the second marriage
was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,
but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is
done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167684

July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May
1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went
to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed
Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a
marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National
Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her
for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated
in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license,
(Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the
Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael
D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church
rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills,
Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage
license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and
reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and
defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in
March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain
for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It
was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made
inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony
was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9,
1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of
San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11,
1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever

issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of
the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on
May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her
family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her
to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided
to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's
home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of
everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her,
he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 528-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the
civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the
church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just
came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated
that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when
they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior
by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff
preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex
between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98,
pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff
took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and
then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff
away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often
moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her motherin-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher.
Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that
plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister
with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite
of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff

identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the
following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a
license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E",
and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the
more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita
N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as
their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil
Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor
General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that
they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the
reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore
just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in
the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage
license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it
"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an
entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of
plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage
contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior
to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of
officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the
marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly
issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage
arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties
was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan.
As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the
present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to
enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not
exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification
shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It
reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to
Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed
and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR.
JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry
Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it
may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No.
2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material
contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the
register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you
those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about
no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you
could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which
now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted
on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be
overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty
has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence
as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It
can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of
nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30364

July 28, 1969
ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-30603
July 28, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, RAMON
ESPIRITU, FEDERICO R. MACLANG, FEDERICO BAUTISTA, ONOFRE MANGILA and CESARIO
TORRES, petitioners.
Jovito R. Salonga and Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez.
Juan T. David for petitioners Jose Lava, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Solicitors Eduardo C. Abaya and Vicente A. Torres for
respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are two identical petitions for habeas corpus filed by petitioners: (1) Angel C. Baking
and Simeon G. Rodriguez in L-30364; and (2) Jose Lava, Ramon Espiritu, Federico R. Maclang, Federico
Bautista, Onofre Mangila, and Cesario Torres in L-30603.
Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of
respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et
al., G.R. Nos. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to
ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has since become final.
Previously, on March 31, 1969, petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez registered their
petition for habeas corpus in G.R. No. L-30364, one of the cases at bar. They claimed that they had been
denied the right to a speedy trial. On May 24, 1969, after this Court rendered its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime of rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for early
decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate release, based primarily upon an
averment similar to the other petition for habeas corpus before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969.
The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners should now be released because they have already
served the ten (10) year sentences meted out to them. They give as reasons:
First. Petitioners have been detained in prison pending the decision of their cases for more than eighteen
(18) years and seven (7) months. By Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, 1 one-half of their preventive
imprisonment is to be deducted from their sentence. In other words, they are already credited with more
than nine (9) years and three (3) months, representing one-half of eighteen (18) years and seven (7)
months. This is not disputed.2
Second. Petitioners would go farther and claim for themselves benefits accorded by Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code granting time allowance for good conduct. Petitioners would apply said Article 97
through all the time of their detention period of over eighteen years.
We directed respondent Director of Prisons to produce before us the bodies of the petitioners. He did. In his
return, thru the Solicitor General, he balks vehemently at the application of Article 97 to petitioners' case.
After hearing and submission of memoranda, the present cases are now up for decision.
1. The key problem that now confronts us in the two petitions at bar is whether or not Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable to detention prisoners. Said provision of law in its English version reads:
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal
institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for
each month of good behavior; .
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of eight days for each month of good behavior; .
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.
Petitioners who have been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this Court's judgment of May 16, 1969,
lay heavy stress on the phrase "any prisoner" in the English text of Article 97. In asking that the provision be

made to apply to them when they were still detention prisoners, they say that the law does not distinguish
between a prisoner who is serving sentence and decision prisoner.
The Spanish text of Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
1wph1.t
ART. 97. Abono de tiempo por buena conducto. La buena conducta, observada por el penado
en cualquier establiciemento penal le hara acreedor a las siguientes reducciones del tiempo de
su condena.
1.a Cinco dias cada mes de buena conducta durante los dos primeros aos de privacion de
libertad;
2.a Ocho dias por mes durante los aos tercero al quinto inclusive;
3.a Diez dias por mes, durante los demas aos hasta el decimo inclusive; y
4.a Quince dias por mes desde el undecimo en adelante.
It must be stated that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in
Spanish, the Spanish text governs. 3 The term "any prisoner" in the Spanish text is "el penado." Who is a
convict or a person already sentenced by final judgment. For, "el penado" means a "delincuente condenado
a una pea." 4 There is thus no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its reach.
Because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado not one under "prision preventiva."
The allowance for good conduct "for each month of good behavior" then unquestionably refers to good
behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and not otherwise.
Indeed, under Article 24 (1), Revised Penal Code, the arrest and temporary detention of accused persons
are not considered as penalties. By necessary implication from the statutory scheme of the Revised Penal
Code, especially Article 28 thereof, 5 the service of a sentence of one in prison begins only on the day the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
More to this. While Article 97 talks of "any prisoner" in the English text, it speaks, however, of that prisoner
as being entitled to deductions for good conduct allowances "from the period of his sentence" ("del tiempo
de su condena"). An accurate reading, therefore, of the provision yields the plain implication that the
prisoner concerned is one who already has a sentence clamped upon him, i.e., a definite sentence by final
judgment. The term "any prisoner" should thus be limited to those convicted by final judgment. This is the
import of the law as written.
2. And then, there is the familiar precept that a codal provision is not to be interpreted in isolation. It is
axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that a code, such as the Revised Penal Code, should be construed as a
whole. Courts are duty-bound to harmonize the various provisions thereof. The rule we should go by is that
"a code enacted as a single comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such, and not as a series of
disconnnected articles or statutes." 6
The reason why we now take stock of the foregoing rule is that we find in the same Revised Penal Code,
Article 94, which provides as follows:
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1wph1.t
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.7
As originally written in Spanish, this article reads:
ART. 94. Como se extingue parcialmente la responsabilidad penal. La responsabilidad penal
se extinguira parcialmente: .
1.o Por indulto condicional;
2.o Por conmutacion de la sentencia; y
3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.
By the above provision, good conduct allowances are given only to the culprit who earns the same "while he
is serving his sentence" ("el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia"). 8 What is crystal clear in Article 94
then is that good conduct allowances are awarded only to those who are serving their sentences.
Petitioners, as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be serving sentence
during the period of their preventive imprisonment. And this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code which reduces petitioners' respective sentences by one-half of their preventive imprisonment.
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Article 29 merely credits said time [of one-half of the preventive

imprisonment] to convicts by final judgment. Said article does not in any way imply that detention prisoners,
thereafter convicted by final judgment, have been serving sentence during their detention period.
So it is, that Article 97 is to be read in conjunction with Article 94 which, under the circumstances, should
likewise be deemed to give meaning to the term "any prisoner" in Article 97. Article 94 above-quoted, we
must say, is embraced in the same chapter of the Revised Penal Code as Article 97 relied upon by
petitioners. Both of them are in Book One, Title Four, Chapter Two, entitled "PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF
CRIMINAL LIABILITY", the very same heading of Article 94. And Article 94 appears to be the lead article of
Chapter Two, because it talks in general terms of everything contained in said Chapter Two. To elaborate,
Article 95 speaks of conditional pardon, provided in Article 94(1); Article 96 deals with commutation of
sentence, mentioned in Article 94(2); and Articles 97, 98 and 99 (the rest of the Chapter) refer to good
conduct allowances treated by Article 94(3). Obvious from all these is that it is from Article 94(3) that Articles
97 (the provision under interpretation), 98 and 99 should take their bearings. And it says we repeat
that: "La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: ... 3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que
obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.
Our view on the meaning of Article 97 gets a tremendous lift from Article 98 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under
the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within
48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity
or catastrophe referred to in said article.9
While Article 98 also contains the phrase "any prisoner" (translated from the Spanish text which uses the
words "los penados"), it is clear that this phrase is confined to convicts who have "evaded the service of
[their] sentence" ("que quebrantaren su sentencia").
The position we here take is not without jurisprudential support. In People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122, the
accused was convicted of abduction and sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
After having served 8 years, 1 month and 17 days, he was pardoned "on condition that he should not again
be found guilty of any crime." He left unserved 6 years, 6 months and 14 days. Subsequently, he was
prosecuted, tried, found guilty of another crime attempted robbery in band with physical injuries and
sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment.
He was thereafter charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon. After trial, he was adjudged guilty
and sentenced "to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon namely, six years, six months and
fourteen days." In upholding that judgment of conviction on appeal, this Court, amongst others, said: "The
appellant's contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time
provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the
good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no
reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence." 10
We accordingly hold that, by a consideration of the terms of Article 97 alone, and also in conjunction with
other parts of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase "any prisoner" in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as
referring only to a prisoner serving sentence.
3. A formidable argument against the tenability of petitioners' plea is Section 5 of Act 1533 of the Philippine
Commission (enacted on August 30, 1906), the old law "providing for the diminution of sentences ... in
consideration of good conduct and diligence." Section 5 of said Act 1533 reads:
SEC. 5. Detention prisoners who voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be
assigned to them shall be entitled to a credit in accordance with the provisions of this Act, which
shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their
conviction.11
This provision of law, it must be said, still subsists. The repealing clause of the Revised Penal Code, Article
367 thereof, expressly abrogated Sections 1, 2 and 6 only of Act 1533. Section 5 thereof must therefore be
deemed to form part of the present law on good conduct allowances.
By Section 5 just transcribed, detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances it they "voluntarily
offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them." In which case, the credit they receive
"shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction." This
is the soleexception to the rule that only those serving sentence shall be entitled to good conduct

allowances. If detention prisoners do not follow the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533, they cannot
earn credit for good conduct.
In the cases before us, there is not as much as an intimation that petitioners have voluntarily offered in
writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told us that they
worked during the period of their preventive imprisonment. The burden to show that the condition imposed
by Section 5, Act 1533 has been met, is certainly upon petitioners. They have not discharged this burden. It
is thus our firm conclusion that they cannot avail of the benefits granted to detention prisoners under
Section 5 of Act 1533.
Upon the law we read it, petitioners' remedy is not with this Court. The law is the law. We cannot change the
law under the guise of interpretation. Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden
grounds; we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress. 12
For the reasons given, the petitions herein to set petitioners at liberty are hereby denied. No costs allowed.
So ordered.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to
do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are
thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in
nature.