Professional Documents
Culture Documents
#1 (19), 2010
Defense Industry
Russia Joins the Fifth-Gen Game
PUBLISHER
Centre for
Analysis of
Strategies and
Technologies
CAST Director & Publisher
Ruslan Pukhov
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Mikhail Barabanov
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Dmitry Vasiliev
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Energy Security
Russias Efforts to Secure EU Gas Market
Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry
3
6
Arms Trade
Russian Arms Trade in 2009: Figures, Trends and Projections
Naval Build-up and New Submarines in Asia-Pacific:
Growing Security Risks
9
17
Armed Forces
Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy,
Commander of the Russian Navy
21
Our Authors
32
Defense Industry
Energy Security
Energy Security
be simply called off though the project can of course be
reshaped yet again.
Energy Security
managers of Gazprom were not too distraught by the launch
of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline (annual capacity 40
bcm). China is not prepared to pay too much for its gas anyway,
so the new pipeline helps Russia by removing a potential
competitor from the European market and diverting new
gas production to the developing Asian markets. Meanwhile,
continuing economic growth in China and India gives Russia
hope that in time, it will find a buyer there for its more costly
gas from the Siberian and Yamal fields.
The Iranian gas fields lie just below the surface, and
most of the gas they hold is recoverable. Russia, meanwhile,
ranks first in terms of its total gas reserves, but only about 20
per cent of this gas is economical to produce at the current
prices. This is why Russia is trying to orchestrate careful
coordination of energy flows to the export markets with
Iran and other members of the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum (GECF). It hopes to prevent a price war with Iran on
the European markets. These considerations are also part
of the reason why Moscow supports sanctions against Iran
in the IAEA framework. It seems that political backing for
international sanctions never comes without some energy
or military project in mind.
Energy Security
Background
Work on the project was launched by German specialists
in August 1975. The original plan was to build two 1,240 MW
energy reactors based on the Convoy design. The first was to
be finished by 1980, the second was to follow in 1981. But the
project was suspended due to lack of funding in 1979, when
Iran was facing a large budget deficit, and then completely
shelved after the Islamic revolution.
The first time Russian specialists visited the Bushehr
site was in 1994. Their job was to assess the damage done to
what the Germans had built by the passage of time and air
raids during the eight-year war with Iraq.
Energy Security
The Iranians had only minimal involvement in the project
when the Germans were in charge. But under the January
1995 agreement between the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom) and the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI), Iranian subcontractors secured a share of
construction and installation jobs.
It took these subcontractors three years (from 1995 to
1997) to do the work that should have been done in 12 months.
In order to keep the project on track, a Minatom delegation
sent to Tehran in 1998 pushed through the decision that the
Russian general contractor would finish the first reactor on
its own. An agreement to that effect was signed on August 29,
1998 as an addendum to the main contract.
Climate
The climate in the Bushehr area is very harsh. It is
extremely hot and humid, and there is lots of brine in the
air due to the proximity of the ocean. That puts additional
requirements on the equipment, because in a climate like
that, even stainless steel goes to rust. A special painting
technology had to be developed to protect the stations
structural elements.
The high temperatures pose further problems. The
summer highs at the Bushehr site can reach +50C . When
Russian specialists arrived in the late 1990s, air conditioning
was not working yet, so temperatures within the containment
area would sometimes hit 60C . The Germans who worked at the
site in the 1970s had a special clause in their contract allowing
them to put all work on hold during the summer heat waves.
Financial hurdles
During the negotiations on the Bushehr contract,
Tehran agreed to pay in several installments upon completion
of individual project milestones (as opposed to financing
the project by means of a Russian loan). What is more, the
Iranians agreed to pay 80 per cent in cash, and only 20 per cent
in kind . That was one of the major incentives for Minatom
to undertake the whole complicated project of finishing a
nuclear power plant started by the Germans . The total value
of the contract, as agreed in the 1998 protocol, was set at just
over 1bn dollars.
Ever since the signing of the addendum to the contract
in 1998, this figure has not been adjusted for inflation. A
serious strengthening of the euro against the dollar posed
a further problem, since some of equipment and material
suppliers come from the Euro area.
In February 2007, work at the Bushehr site started to
grind to a halt due to funding shortages. By the summer of
that year, the Russian contractor had reduced the number
of staff there from 3,000 to just 800 people . After some hard
bargaining, during which the Russian general contractor
even contemplated pulling out of the project, an agreement
was reached with the Iranians that the growing cost of
equipment and engineering works would be compensated
once the reactor goes live. The size of that compensation will
also be finalized once Bushehr becomes operational. This
resolution of the financial problems enabled Russia to make
first deliveries of nuclear fuel to Bushehr in December 2007,
thus ruling out the possibility that the project would once
again be abandoned.
Another difficulty the Russian contractor had to contend
with was that it was impossible to obtain a state loan in Russia
itself for getting the project rolling and for signing contracts
with equipment manufacturers.
US pressure
In the period from mid-1990s to mid-2000s, Russias
cooperation with Iran, especially on nuclear energy, was
# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief
Iran Breakthrough for Russian Nuclear Industry
Energy Security
the biggest thorn in the relations between Washington and
Moscow. After 1995, the Iranian issue informed Americas
stance on almost every single aspect of its dealings with
Russia, and especially cooperation in high-tech areas, such
as the International Space Station, peaceful use of nuclear
energy, launches of American satellites by Russian carriers,
etc . For nearly a decade the successive US administrations
viewed Russian-Iranian cooperation on Bushehr as evidence
of Moscows indirect support for the Iranian nuclear arms
program.
Washington spared no diplomatic effort to persuade
Russia to walk away from the Bushehr project, and to
get several other countries to ban their companies from
taking part. As already mentioned, Germany refused to
cooperate with Russia for political motives and under US
pressure. Ukraine and the Czech Republic soon followed
suit. Ukraines Turboatom was due to supply the turbine for
the nuclear plant. But those plans were cancelled during US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albrights visit to Kiev on March
6, 1998. Kiev pulled out of the Iranian project in return for
Washingtons pledge to support Ukrainian membership
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
a (broken) promise of greater support for the countrys
energy sector, especially in Kharkiv Region (as part of the
so called Kharkiv Initiative). The Czech Republics ZVVZ
Milevsko was due to supply ventilation and air conditioning
equipment. But in March 2000, shortly before Madeleine
Albrights visit to Prague, the Czech government passed a
law through parliament which effectively vetoed the deal.
Russias Atomstroyexport therefore suddenly faced the
problem of looking for alternative suppliers.
It also has to be said that apart from American (and
also Israeli) criticism, Minatom had to fend off domestic
opponents (although they represented a minority point of
view). They argued that the Bushehr project would further
sour the already tense relations with the West, and help Iran
develop military uses for nuclear energy.
Not before 2005 did George W Bush recognize that
the Bushehr nuclear plant poses no threat to the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.And in December 2007 he welcomed
the Russian decision to supply nuclear fuel to Bushehr,
arguing that this would remove the need for Iran to build its
own uranium enrichment facility or develop an independent
nuclear fuel cycle capability. Part of the reason for US support
was the deal signed by Moscow and Tehran on February 28,
2005, under which spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr plant
would be shipped back to Russia.
Conclusion
1. The Bushehr project signed 15 years ago is no longer
a life raft for the Russian nuclear industry, which struggled
through the 1990s after state funding had suddenly dried
up. But it was the 1bn dollar Iranian contract signed in 19951998 that had largely enabled the entire sector to preserve
the expertise and retain specialists needed to build a nuclear
power plant, at least until Russia managed to secure more
custom from the Chinese (the new reactor in Tianwan) and
the Indians (the Kudankulam project).
2. The project has largely lost its economic importance
to Russia, and become more of a political cause. The chances
of turning a profit on the whole venture are remote: the costs
of this 1bn dollar contract have now spiraled to 3bn euros
or more. Therefore the key benefits of Bushehr are political,
inasmuch as it represents a practical implementation of Irans
right to develop a peaceful nuclear program, and therefore
alleviates the concerns in Tehran and other capitals of the
developing world over alleged restrictions on their access to
nuclear energy.
3. For many nations mulling a nuclear energy program
of their own, the project has become an indicator or Russias
credibility as a partner in big international high-tech projects.
The countrys reputation is now at stake at Bushehr. So it really
matters that despite sustained US pressure over many years, and
the withdrawal of several third-country subcontractors from the
project under pressure from Washington, the launch of power
generation at Bushehr is now a matter of several months.
4. The Bushehr NPP is a good example of integration of
Russian technology into Western designs. Russian hardware
has been successfully merged with the German-designed
structural framework. That could help Rosatom, the Russian
nuclear industry giant, in its ambitions to partner with
foreign companies in building nuclear power plants in Russia
itself and abroad.
5. The experience of Russian-Iranian cooperation at
Bushehr can be used to build more nuclear energy reactors
on Iranian territory. One obvious possibility would be a
second reactor at Bushehr itself. But any practical steps on
that proposal would have to wait until Iran answers the key
remaining questions on its past undeclared nuclear activities,
and until the most sensitive issues of the Iranian nuclear
dossier are resolved. Meanwhile, the very first step towards
a second Bushehr reactor would be the beginning of power
generation at the first reactor, which can be expected before
the years end.
Arms Trade
* Rosoboroneksport figures plus USD 500m, the estimated worth of contracts signed by independent suppliers of components,
instruments and accessories. Figures for 2006 provided by the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation.
Source: FSMTC, ROE; CAST Estimates.
# 1, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief
Russian Arms Trade in 2009:
Figures, Trends and Projections
Arms Trade
2. Venezuela, which received a USD 2.2bn loan from
Moscow in 2009 to be spent on Russian weapons, probably,
was the second-largest customer. But it is not clear what exactly
the Venezuelans have bought. The only known contract is for
the delivery of 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks. The
rest is pure speculation, though on the whole it is safe to assume
that the new Venezuelan deal includes a large number of air
defense missile systems and artillery equipment (S-300V and
Pechora-2M SAM systems, Smerch MLR systems, Msta-S and
Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, etc.). Unofficial reports
claim that the deal is actually much bigger than the size of the
Russian loan would suggest, estimating it at up to USD 4bn.
3. According to open sources, not a single large contract
was signed with India in 2009. The only new sale reported in
the media is the purchase of five Ka-31 Helix E airborne early
warning helicopters worth USD 100m.
4. For the first time in several years, fighter jets made by
RSK MiG have become a significant export item. Deliveries
have begun in earnest on an earlier contract for MiG-29K
fighters to be based on Indias Vikramaditya aircraft carrier.
Russia has also signed a EUR 400m contract with Burma for
20 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets.
5. The Russian Defense Ministry has made clear its
intention to begin buying arms and military equipment
abroad - and not just a few samples to gain access to foreign
technology, but as part of the Russian armys routine weapons
procurement program. The announcement of the plan to buy
a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France was the
first signal of this new policy.
Identified deliveries
The combined worth of Russian arms deliveries to
foreign customers reported in the open sources is USD 5.64bn
(See Table 1), accounting for roughly 65 per cent of the official
arms exports figure of USD 8.5bn. If exports of spare parts,
instruments and accessories (worth about USD 1bn) are
included in the tally, the so-called transparency index will
increase to 0.8 (80 per cent)5.
Aerospace equipment is still the largest category of
Russias military exports (61 per cent of identified deliveries,
see Figure 2). Arms and equipment for the ground forces
ranked second (21 per cent of the total), followed by naval
equipment and air defense systems (9 per cent and 8 per cent,
respectively). Meanwhile, the share of aerospace equipment
in the official ROE exports figures is 50 per cent (of the
USD7.44bn total), followed by arms and equipment for the
ground forces (19 per cent), naval equipment (14 per cent)
and air defense systems (13 per cent). The disparity between
the official figures and our calculations is mainly due to the
underreporting of naval and air defense exports in the open
sources.
In our estimates of the destinations for Russian arms
deliveries in 2009,Algeria ranks first with 29 per cent, followed
by India (25 per cent) and China (12 per cent). ROE has not
provided any regional breakdown of its exports figures.
Breakdown by type of equipment
Aerospace equipment. Our estimate of aerospace
equipment deliveries in 2009 is USD 3.45bn. The bulk of that
figure (USD 2.07bn) was generated by 41 fighter jets of the
Su30 Flanker family shipped to several countries, including:
20 Su30MKI aircraft to India (including 2 fully completed
jets and 18 assembly kits), 14 Su-30MKI(A) to Algeria, six
Su30MKM to Malaysia and one Su-30MK2 to Indonesia.
Deliveries began in earnest in 2009 on the contract
to supply MiG-29K fighters for the future Indian aircraft
carrier Vikramaditya (former heavy aircraft carrying cruiser
Figure 2. Breakdown of identified 2009 deliveries of Russian weapons by type and by country*
* based on total deliveries estimate of USD 5.64bn. These calculations do not include the deliveries of spare parts, instruments and
accessories (estimated at USD 1bn) because of the scarcity of details on those exports. The regional breakdown does not include the sales of
Igla man-portable SAM systems, estimated at about USD50m annually.
10
Arms Trade
Admiral Gorshkov). Russias RSK MiG corporation handed
over to the Indians another four jets worth an estimated USD
180m. That means that six aircraft out of the total 16 have
now been delivered.
Afghanistan and Azerbaijan seem to have been the two
main destinations for Russian helicopter deliveries in 2009.
Kabul received 13 Mi-17V-5 Hip assault landing helicopters,
with the United States acting as an intermediary. Baku
appears to have taken delivery of six Mi-17-1V transports. At
least another 15 machines of the Mi-17 family were shipped
to Iran, Bolivia, Iraq, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan
and Egypt. China received three Ka-28 Helix anti-submarine
helicopters. This list is almost certainly incomplete, as the
2009 production target of Vertolety Rossii, the umbrella
corporation for Russian helicopter makers, was 180 units, of
which 70 percent were destined for exports.
As in the previous two years, China was the main
destination for aircraft turbofan engines under separate
contracts. The 2009 deliveries include 122 AL-31FN engines
(for Chinas J-10 fighter jets), 15 RD-93 engines (for FC-1
fighters) and 11 D-30KP2 engines for H-6K bombers, worth
an estimated total of USD 600m.
Arms and equipment for ground troops. Identified
transfers of arms and equipment for ground troops in 2009
add up to USD 1.18bn. For the third year running, the T-90S
main battle tank accounted for the bulk of exports in this
category. Its largest recipient last year was India, which took
delivery of 100 completed T-90S tanks and possibly several
dozen assembly kits, worth an estimated USD 600m in total.
Naval equipment. Identified deliveries of naval
equipment in 2009 stood at USD 537m. But judging from
ROEs official breakdown of deliveries by type of equipment,
the actual figure is probably twice as high.
Algeria was the largest importer - it has taken delivery of
one new Project 636M conventional submarine (USD 300m)
and one refitted and upgraded Project 877EKM conventional
submarine (USD 50m).
Also in 2009 Russia and India agreed on the final cost
of refit and upgrade of the Admiral Gorshkov heavy aircraft
carrying cruiser, which will be renamed into Vikramaditya
once it becomes part of the Indian Navy. The new figure is
USD 2.3bn, and the delivery date has been pushed back to
2012. The initial sum under the 2004 contract was USD 850m,
with the completion date some time in 2008.
Air defense systems. Identified deliveries of air defense
systems fell to just USD 460m in 2009 - a third of the previous
years figure. But judging from ROE official reports, actual
exports were closer to USD 1bn.
Open-source reports have allowed us to identify only
the delivery of the new Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) gun-missile antiaircraft system to Syria and the UAE. Media coverage of that
contract has been fairly detailed. It is also known that Russia
exports about USD 50m worth of the Igla man-portable
SAM systems every year. All the other transfers of air defense
equipment could not be identified.
The beginning of shipments to Iran of the S-300PMU1
(SA-20) SAM systems (an upgraded version of the S-300PS
units from the Russian Defense Ministrys existing stock)
was initially scheduled for the spring of 2009, but was later
postponed until the fall of that year, and then suspended
indefinitely for political reasons. Iran has already voiced its
frustration on that account6.
Spare par ts, instruments and accessories.
Deliveries in this category reached USD 1bn in 2009. Half
of that figure was generated by independent exporters.
In 2006, those exporters sold about USD 400m worth of
their wares. Sukhoi, a combat aircraft maker, remains an
undisputed leader in this area - its sales of spare parts
and components remained unchanged from the previous
year at USD 200m.
Regional breakdown
Algeria, which received a large number of Su-30 fighter
jets in 2009, was the top destination for Russian arms
deliveries (29 per cent of the total). It was followed by India
(25 per cent), which took delivery of Su-30MKI and MiG-29
fighter jets, as well as T-90S tanks. China, which received
large batches of aircraft engines, and probably SAM systems,
was third (12 per cent). Syria ranked fourth with 8 per cent
after importing 20 Pansir-S1 anti-aircraft systems. Malaysia
and Venezuela share the fifth place with 5 per cent each.
Vietnam and Afghanistan accounted for 3 per cent each. On
the whole, Russian arms exports are fairly diverse in terms
of the geography of their destinations.
11
Arms Trade
second with 10 per cent, followed by Burma with 8 per
cent. ROE has not released its own regional breakdown
figures for 2009.
By type of equipment
Naval. This category came out on top last year thanks
solely to the signing of the large Vietnam contract for six
Project 636M conventional submarines, worth an estimated
USD 2.1bn. The contract also includes the creation of onshore infrastructure, which will have to be built from scratch
because Vietnam has never had any submarines. The total
value of the contract is therefore much higher that the price of
the subs themselves USD4bn is a conservative estimate.
The Vietnam deal was the largest not only in the
naval equipment category, but across all categories. It was
undoubtedly the contract of the year for Russias defense
industry.
Aerospace equipment. Our estimate for new sales in
this category is USD 2.24bn. The largest deal (worth about
EUR 400m) was signed with Burma for 20 MiG-29 fighter
jets (which had already been partially built when the contract
was signed).
A big contract, estimated at USD 320m, was signed for
eight Su-30MK2 fighter jets with Vietnam. The deal does not
include airborne weapons, which Vietnam intends to buy
later. Another big contract (worth an estimated USD 720m)
was signed with China for Al-31FN and D-30KP2 turbofan
engines to be fitted on Chinese aircraft of indigenous
design.
Russias largest helicopter contract last year (22 Mi171
helicopters, worth USD 345m) was signed with the Iraqi
Figure 3. Breakdown of identified arms exports contracts by type of equipment and region, 2009*
* based on estimated total of USD 6.89bn. The figure does not include contracts for spare parts, instruments and accessories (USD 1bn)
because no details on them are available.
Source: CAST estimate based on media reports.
12
Arms Trade
Prospects for 2010
Imports
ASIA
China
India
Weapon
designation
No.
ordered
AL-31FN jet
122
engines
Su-30MKI fighter 140
kit
Su-30MKI
fighters
40
Year of
contract
Year(s) of
deliveries
Delivered in 2009
2009
2009**
500
122**
Completed
2000
20042012
(2014)
430
18**
69
2007
20082010
80
2**
mln USD
units
Delivered by
2010, units
Notes
13
Arms Trade
Recipient
India
No.
ordered
Year of
contract
Year(s) of
deliveries
12 / 4
2004
20082010
180
2/2
3/3
IL-38 aircraft
5
upgrade program
2001
20052009
80
2*
Completed
T-90S MBTs /
T-90 MBT kit
Smerch MLR
systems
Bastion coast
based anti-ship
missile system
2007
20082011
20072009
2009
600
124 / n/a
80***
100 /
n/a
4-10**
Completed
150
Completed
MiG-29K/KUB
carrier based
fighters
Delivered in 2009
mln USD
units
Delivered by
2010, units
Notes
124 /
223
38
2005
1 batt.
2006
Su-30MKM
fighters
18
2003
20072009
300
Completed
Afghanistan Mi-17-V5
helicopters
61
n/a
20092016
100
MIDDLE EAST
Algeria
Su-30MKI(A)
fighters
28
2006
20072009
1200
14
Completed
2006
20092010
300
36
2006
330
20**
30**
1000
2006
100
200
600
50
2000
20082010
20072010
20092012
80***
4-6**
4-6
Vietnam
Malaysia
Syria
UAE
14
Weapon
designation
Kilo class
(Project 636M)
submarines
Pantzir-S1 air
defense systems
T-72 MBTs
upgrade program
Pantzir-S1 air
defense systems
Arms Trade
Recipient
Weapon
designation
No.
ordered
Year of
contract
LATIN AMERICA
Venezuela Construction of 2007
a MRO center
for Russian
helicopters
Construction of a 2006
plant for license
production of
AK-103 assault
rifles and 7.62
cartridges
* delivery value more than USD 80 mln.
** CAST estimate.
*** estimate based on a mid-value.
Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates.
Year(s) of
deliveries
Delivered in 2009
mln USD
Delivered by
2010, units
units
Notes
20072010**
100
n/a
n/a
20082010
160
n/a
n/a
Table 2. Major* Identified Contracts for Delivery of Russian Arms Signed in 2009
Recipient
Weapon designation
No. ordered
Year(s) of deliveries
Contract value,
m USD
Notes
122
55
5
2009**
2009-2011
n/a
500
220**
100
2010-2011
320
2011-2016**
4000
Myanmar
MiG-29 fighters
20
2010
560**
Turkmenistan
MIDDLE EAST
Iraq
Kamaz trucks
1052
n/a
100
Mi-171 helicopters
22
2009-2011
345
BTR-80A APCs
120-mm 2B1 towed
mortar
Kamaz trucks
100
50
n/a
n/a
100
400
2009
ASIA
China
India
Vietnam
Yemen
LATIN AMERICA
Venezuela
T-72M1M MBTs
92
* - contract value more than USD 80m.
** - CAST estimate.
Sources: Russian and foreign press; CAST estimates.
n/a
400
Upgraded ex-Russian
15
Arms Trade
1
2
3
4
5
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/CurrentInflation.asp.
Rosoboroneksport would have been quite happy simply to repeat the financial results of 2008, let alone surpass them.
Average exchange rate for the respective years.
That year ROE, which had not yet been designated Russias sole arms exporter, signed USD 9bn worth of contracts.
In our roundup of 2008 results (see Moscow Defense Brief, No 1, 2009) we managed to identify 80 per cent of the transfers, but the
figure did not include exports of components and spare parts. Had those been taken into account, the ratio would have been 0.9 (90
per cent).
6 However, it cannot be ruled out that up to three battalions of Buk-M1 (SA-11) SAM systems from the Russian army stock were secretly
delivered to Iran in 2009. The transfer of these systems to Iran (customer 102), along with the S-300PS systems, was mentioned
in the table of transfers of equipment assigned to Russias air defense units (under the Russian Air Force and Air Defense) as part of
their reform. The table, which was based on directives of Russias Defense Ministry, has been circulating on the Web since early 2009.
It is available at: www.ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php/topic,382.0.html.
16
Arms Trade
NuclearPowered
Submarines
Conventional
Submarines
Aircraft
Carriers
Destroyers and
Frigates
Corvettes
Large
Amphibious
Ships
Total warships
USA
Europe
Russia
China
India
Japan
Rest Asia
Rest World
Total World
Incl. Total
Asia
11
11
25
10
12
68
44
28
25
23
13
18
15
130
61
2
6
8
11
2
-
12
3
2
10
9
3
1
28
43
13
25
44
58
63
13
23
47
29
284
146
17
Arms Trade
the two largest regional arms markets, along with the Middle
East. As Asian economies continue their breakneck growth,
that market will become even more important.
Given the lengthy coastlines of many Asian countries,
and the importance of waterways for their global trade, it is
unsurprising that the regions navies are at the forefront of
military modernization. Asia has become a hotspot of naval
build-up. Most of the new warships launched in the world
over the past decade were built for the Asian navies.
This has led to a radical shift in the balance of naval
strength not just in Asia but on the global scale. While the
Asian countries are rapidly beefing up their navies, the
traditional powers such as the United States, Europe and
the former Soviet Union have been reducing their numerical
strength at sea for 20 years now, ever since the end of the
Cold War. America, Britain and most NATO countries are
now left with roughly half the numbers of ships they had
20 years ago. The former Soviet Navy, inherited mostly by
Russia, has undergone even deeper cuts by some 80 per
cent and a severe degradation of its combat capability. In
Europe and Russia, the trend towards further reductions
in the naval strength continues. The latest announcement
to that effect has recently come from Britain London is
apparently considering a further downsizing of the Royal
Navy, which could affect plans to build a second CVF aircraft
carrier. Asian nations, meanwhile, are building and buying
ever more ships, and the level of their technology is beginning
to approach Western standards.
The focus of naval activity and the overall center of
naval power is now shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region.
This has several distinct consequences:
China and, to a lesser extent, India are becoming great
naval powers, capable of projecting that power beyond
their own coastlines, and in future, on the global scale.
Table/Figure 2. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (major surface warships)
Major surface warships
Aircraft Carriers
Cruisers, Destroyers and
Frigates
Corvettes
Large Amphibious Ships
Total major surface
warships
18
1990
2009
Total World
Total World
31
942
1
236
21
641
2
239
360
273
1606
55
110
402
232
198
1092
97
99
437
Arms Trade
Table/Figure 3. Share of the Asian Navies in the Global Naval Balance (submarines)
Submarines
Nuclear-Powered
Submarines
Conventional
Submarines
Total submarines
1990
2009
Total World
Total World
367
153
479
120
275
140
846
127
428
149
Conventional Submarines
Total Submarines
19
Arms Trade
Table/Figure 4. Combined number of submarines in the navies of AsPac nations (projection)
Submarines
20
2009
2020
9
140
25
192
Armed Forces
result. And then we need to start thinking about the day after
tomorrow. We need to start thinking now - in fact, we should
have already started. We have already laid some foundations.
But if we start redesigning the whole system, we will not see
any serious results in missile building over the next few years.
So, to answer you previous question, the missile is not flying
YET, but it will fly. It will have to fly. It just needs to be built
properly. But that is something our manufacturers need to
sort out.
Q: What was the cause of the failure during the latest
tests?
A: The cause of the failure? What does it matter, whether
it was the ejection cartridge or not? Yesterday it was the
ejection cartridge, before that is was the poor engineering
and manufacturing of the steering mechanism of the first
stage, next time it could be something else. It makes no
difference. The real question is whether or not our defense
contractors can manufacture such a missile. Are they up to
the task? I think we have what it takes to build such missiles.
Our defense industry has that capability, we just have some
problems that need to be resolved.
Q: What about the Sineva liquid-fuel missile, which is
already operational? Can it become a replacement for the
Bulava?
A: Replacing the Bulava with the Sineva is just empty
talk. Even those who have never served in the Navy understand
this. These are two completely different weapons systems,
with very different launch requirements. The Sineva may be
a good missile, but it cannot serve as our main missile up
until 2050, because it was designed back in the late 1990s.
And what we are trying to do now is lay the foundations for
the Navy that will last up until 2050. As for redesigning the
Borei-class subs to carry the Sineva missiles, we are not going
to do that either - such a redesign is simply impossible.
Q: Any chance of the Bark program being resurrected?
A: We should not be going back, we should be moving
forward. Resurrecting the Bark missile complex, which was
21
Armed Forces
designed 20 years ago, would be an admission of defeat. We
need new technology. Why resurrect something that can be
nothing more than a stopgap? Our strategy is to overcome
these problems we are facing now and move on to a new
generation of technology. Let me remind you that the Bark
missile weighs about 100 metric tons. It is yesterdays
generation of technology.
Q: How many submarines, including strategic subs, does
the Russian Navy require to ensure our countrys security and
deal with any threats from the sea?
A: We have a clear understanding of what we should
get rid of, and what we should keep. Of course, we should
have a nuclear fleet, and it should have a very high degree
of standardization in terms of the components that we have
now. But we are not talking about numbers. I am not going to
talk about the numbers at all. What is really important is the
quality, the capability that we can achieve. Once we achieve
the quality that we need in some areas, then we can talk about
the numbers. We already have the strategy of how the Navy
should be used, it has already been approved. But the strategy
of building this Navy has been under discussion for many
years, and it has yet to be approved.
The Navy should be made up of diversified forces, not
just ships and submarines. No Navy has fought on its own in
the second half of the 20th century. Naval strength has always
been deployed as part of a diversified group of forces. The
essence of this approach is to have a diverse structure in the
Armed Forces to fight on the ground, on the seas and in the
air. The Navy, with is missile carriers and auxiliary ships, will
be an element of that. There is nothing new in this approach,
but that is the right approach.
Q: What will be the role of aircraft carriers in the whole
strategy of building the Russian Navy?
A: An aircraft carrying fleet is not just aircraft carriers.
It is a powerful combined-services group of forces. It has a
general purpose, but it is also an element of strategic offensive
forces, which serves a wide range of purposes. The most
important for us is the issue of missile defense, air defense
and space defense, where we have a serious gap. The aircraft
carrying fleet should be an integral component of our single
missile defense, air defense and space defense system.
Q: At what stage is the development of the new aircraft
carrier?
A: Development is already under way. Under the existing
schedule we should have the basic designs with the key tactical
and technical specifications by the end of next year.After that,
work will commence on more detailed designs.
Q: When can we expect the launch of the new ship?
A: It is difficult to give a specific time frame. We need a
separate federal program to finance this work - funding this
project from the general military procurement budget would
hardly be feasible. With a bit of luck I think the ship can be
launched by 2020.
22
Q: What will be the role of the Mistral-class helicoptercarrying ships, which the Navy is planning to buy from
abroad?
A: For us the technology of building such ships is more
important than the actual ships. We need to learn how to
build such ships here in Russia, using the latest technologies.
This experience will help us in building the future aircraft
carriers, so this has relevance to your previous question.
Q: How many Mistral-class ships are you planning to
buy from France?
A: We have determined that we need to buy one such
ship, and build at least three more at the Russian shipyards,
using technical assistance from the French.
Q: And what if the French refuse to provide such
technical assistance in building the ships in Russia?
A: In that case we will work with other countries, which
also have very modern and advanced technologies in building
such ships - including the Netherlands, Spain, and others.
Q: There have recently been some reports in the media
that the naval Su-33 aircraft will soon be replaced with the
new MiG-29K.
A: It is true that the service life of the Su-33s expires
in 2015. We are preparing for their replacement, and in the
very near future we are planning to buy a batch of at least
24 aircraft to be based on our aircraft carrier, the Admiral
Kuznetsov. The first tests of these fighter jets have been
successful. Over the period of September 28 - October 2,
several MiG-29Ks performed successful landings and takeoffs from the aircraft carrier.
Q: Does the Russian Navy command have any plans to
modernize the logistics base in the Syrian port of Tartus?
A: The Russian Navy command has plans to create a
naval station for combat ships in Tartus, including the ships
of the Black Sea fleet. Right now this Navy logistics base
there is the only Russian military base in the far-abroad
[foreign countries that were not part of the former Soviet
Union]. If an agreement is reached with the Syrians, the
opportunities are very good there. The plan now is to create
a proper naval station there, where ships of the Russian
Navy will be able to replenish their water and food supplies
or undergo repairs, and where the crew can spend some
time ashore. By the way, in mid-July two Black Sea Fleet
tug boats brought a new mooring float to Tartus. Of course,
it is a bit too early to speak now about creating a fullyfledged military naval base there, but we have such plans
for the distant future. We have a lot of respect for our Syrian
colleagues. They are our allies who did not turn away from
the Russian Navy even during the most difficult times,
which I am glad to say are now in the past. At the same
time, the Russian Navys financial capabilities are not what
they were even as recently as 2008. We have to take into
account that our finances have taken a hit in 2009 and 2010
compared to 2008 due to the economic crisis.
Armed Forces
Q: Have there been any negotiations with other countries
about setting up Russian naval bases there, for example, to
counter piracy?
A: There have been, let us say, discussions rather than
negotiations. There is an understanding of the need for this.
When the right time comes, we can talk about it. It is a very
delicate issue.
Q: Will Russia use Abkhazia as a base for the Russian
Black Sea Fleet?
A: There will be a naval station in Ochamchira for
several ships. Before this happens we need to complete the
discussions with the Abkhaz side - that will happen in the
very near future. But there will not be any large naval bases
there, there will just be a good naval station. We will just keep
a limited number of small ships there, ships of the second or
third rank - no more than what we strictly need there.
Q: What awaits the Black Sea Fleet after 2017? Some
politicians in Ukraine say that the Russian fleet needs to start
preparing right now for future withdrawal from Sevastopol,
so that no Russian ships are left there by 2017.
A: That is a matter of international relations and
politics. Withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol
is not a pleasant topic for discussion for either Ukraine or
Russia. But I have never heard Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko talk about it. On the contrary, he has always said
that all of Ukraines commitments in terms of stationing
the Black Sea Fleet will be fulfilled. Geographically, there
is no better location on the entire Black Sea coast than the
Akhtiarskaya Bay in Sevastopol to serve as a naval base. But
apart from geography, there is also history. Have our relations
with Ukraine really become so bad that we need to withdraw
from Sevastopol after 2017? Does the majority of Ukrainian
citizens demand the Russian fleets withdrawal after 2017?
There is a great many people in Ukraine whose opinion on
this issue is very sound. The presence of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a firm guarantee of stability along
the entire Black Sea coast of the CIS nations. This needs
to be considered very seriously. There are also proposals
about [using the Black Sea Fleet] as an instrument to jointly
address shared problems, taking into account Russian and
Ukrainian national interests. The Black Sea Fleet is a very
powerful instrument. So the situation is not hopeless. We
should not harbor any delusions, but we should not despair
either.
Q: Could the military naval base in Novorossiysk be
used as an alternative to Sevastopol?
A: There have never been any plans to turn the
Novorossiysk military naval base into the main base of the
Black Sea Fleet. What we are talking about is having the
capability for some of the Black Sea Fleet ships to be based
on the northern coastline of the Russian Caucasus. So let
us not confuse this with actually moving the main base of
the fleet there. What we are now doing in Novorossiysk is
23
Armed Forces
mean we are going to work under their command. We can
participate in joint operations with NATO, as well as with
others - such as the European Union, first of all, but also with
the naval forces of Egypt, China, Turkey and other countries.
There is no doubt that we need a coordination of joint efforts
but without our forces being subordinated to anyone else.
Q: Will only the Pacific Fleet ships be taking part?
A: The Russian Navy ships will be taking part,
predominantly the ships of the Pacific Fleet, because the
Indian Ocean is its area of responsibility. It is easier, simpler
and cheaper to use the Pacific Fleet for this. The time it would
take to deploy a Black Sea Fleet ship in that area is about
Admiral Visotskiy was interviewed by RIA Novosti correspondent Sergey Safronov for Moscow Defense Brief
24
Date
Aircraft
March 14,
2000
Su-24
April 6,
2000
MiG-31
May 11,
2000
Su-27K
(Su-33)
June 9,
2000
Su-25
June 21,
2000
Il-76MD
June 26,
2000
Side
number
Location
Unit
Casualties
Cause
Details
Crew
Klimshchina
village (Smolensk
Region)
Crew error
11
Kotlas
(Arkhangelsk
Region)
Pilot error
71 red
Severomorsk
(Murmansk
Region)
279th independent
naval fighter air
regiment
Technical
problem
Bashanta
(Stavropol
Territory)
Unknown
RA-76723
Privolzhskiy
airfield (Astrakhan
Region)
117th military
transport air
regiment
Technical
problem
Su-24M
12 white
Baltimor
(Voronezh)
Pilot error
July 21,
2000
Mi-8T
34
Levashovo
(Leningrad
Region)
138th independent
combined air
regiment
19
Pilot error
October 25,
2000
Il-18
RA-74295
Batumi (Georgia)
84
Navigation
error
February
26, 2001
MiG-31
22 red
Zakhar
Sorokin
Monchegorsk
(Murmansk
Region)
Technical
problem
* the table lists air accidents and crashes which have led to a loss of aircraft from January 1, 2000 to date. The list includes only
piloted planes and helicopters belonging to the Russian military. It does not include planes and helicopters lost for various reasons
in 20002010 in Chechnya and Ingushetia, nor the aircraft lost in August 2008 in Georgia.
25
Date
Aircraft
Side
number
Location
Unit
Casualties
Cause
Details
Crew
10
March 11,
2001
Su-24M
Mozdok (North
Ossetia)
Pilot error
11
March 22,
2001
MiG-29UB
35 km northeast
of Akhtubinsk
(Astrakhan
Region)
Technical
problem
Col S.Seregin,
Maj A.Voropaev
12
April 19,
2001
L-39C
627th guard
training air
regiment
Technical
problem
13
May 17,
2001
Su-27
64 red
Staraya Vasilyevka
village (Tambov
Region)
Technical
problem
14
May 22,
2001
An-12MGA
RA-12135
Myakotino village
(Tver Region)
226th independent
combined air
regiment
Unknown
15
July 11,
2001
L-39C
Gavrilovka village
(Tambov Region)
Pilot error
16
July 17,
2001
Su-27K
(Su-33)
Ostrov (Pskov
Region)
279th independent
naval fighter air
regiment
Pilot error
17
July 20,
2001
Mi-8
Lake
Petropavlovskoye
(Khabarov
Territory)
Pilot error
18
November
5, 2001
Mi-8MT
Krasnyy Bor
(Leningrad
Region)
Pilot error
19
February
19, 2001
Su-24
Myshka village
(Pskov Region)
Pilot error
20
February
21, 2001
An-26
Lakhta
(Arkhangelsk
Region)
403rd independent
combined air
regiment
17
Pilot error
21
March 26,
2002
Su-27
Solovey Klyuch
settlement
(Maritime
Territory)
Technical
problem
22
May 7,
2002
Mi-8MT
Kosh-Agas (Altay
Republic)
337th independent
combat helicopter
regiment of Army
Aviation
11
Pilot error
23
June 14,
2002
L-39C
Tikhoretsk
(Krasnodar
Territory)
627th guard
training air
regiment
Technical
problem
26
70
07 red
15521
Date
Aircraft
Side
number
Location
Unit
Casualties
Cause
Details
Crew
24
June 20,
2002
L-39C
Borisoglebsk
(Voronezh Region)
Pilot error
25
August 12,
2002
L-39C
Yuzhnaya
Sosnovka (Tambov
Region)
Technical
problem
26
September
19, 2002
Mi-24P
Verkhnyaya Vyrka
village (Kaluga
Region)
45th independent
helicopter combat
and command
regiment of Army
Aviation
Unknown
27
March 26,
2003
Ka-27PS
Ussurian Gulf
289th independent
combined antisubmarine air
regiment
Pilot error
Lt Col Aleksandr
Topyrychev, Capt Andrey
Korovin, Capt Andrey
Krasnoshekov, warrant
officer Renat KhaMitov
28
June 19,
2003
MiG-29UB
Armavir
(Krasnodar
Territory)
Crew error
29
July 2, 2003
MiG-25RB
Verkhniy Nyud
(Murmansk
Region)
98th guard
reconnaissance air
regiment
Crew error
30
July 14,
2003
L-39C
Kushchevskaya
(Krasnodar
Territory)
Pilot error
31
July 24,
2003
Mi-8T
Pesochnoye village
(Samara Region)
109th training
helicopter regiment
Technical
problem
Lt Yu.Neverov, warrant
officer I.Ivanov, cadet
S.Kiryushin
32
August 7,
2003
Su-24MR
Bada
(Chita Region)
313th
reconnaissance air
regiment
Navigation
error
33
August 7,
2003
Mi-8T
Sokol
(Saratov Region)
131st training
helicopter regiment
Pilot error
34
August 23,
2003
2 Mi-24V
Chernigovka
(Maritime
Territory)
319th independent
helicopter combat
and command
regiment
Pilot error
35
September
18, 2003
Tu-160
Stepnoye
(Saratov Region)
121st guard
heavy bomber air
regiment
Technical
problem
36
October 14,
2003
MiG-31
Borovaya
settlement (Tver
Region)
3958th guard
airbase
Technical
problem
37
November
12, 2003
MiG-29
Mt. Urasar
(Armenia)
3624th airbase
Unknown
01 red
Mikhail
Gromov
27
Date
Aircraft
Side
number
Unit
Casualties
Cause
Details
Crew
Lake Kalygir
(Kamchatka
Region)
317th independent
combined air
regiment of the
Pacific Fleet
Pilot error
Khurba
(Khabarovsk
Territory)
Technical
problem
Shatalovo
(Smolensk Region)
47th independent
guard
reconnaissance air
regiment
Technical
problem
Asbest (Sverdlovsk
Region)
933rd airbase
Unknown
Pilot error
38
January 22,
2004
Mi-8T
39
February
12, 2004
Su-24M
40
March 4,
2004
Su-24MR
41
April 2,
2004
Mi-8
42
April 15,
2004
Mi-24P
43
July 6,
2004
Mi-8SMV
Zavorovo
(Tula Region)
226th independent
combined air
regiment
Unknown
44
July 8,
2004
Tu-22M3
Soltsy (Novgorod
Region)
Technical
problem
45
September
7, 2004
Mi-8MT
Ust-Maimlya
(Kamchatka
Region)
329th independent
combined air
squadron of
strategic missile
troops
Technical
problem
46
April 1,
2005
Mi-24P
Yurga training
ground
337th independent
combat helicopter
regiment
Pilot error
47
May 12,
2005
MiG-29
31 blue
Andreapol (Tver
Region)
Pilot error
48
May 21,
2005
Su-25
32
Yavan (Tajikistan)
Technical
problem
49
June 1, 2005
MiG-31DZ
Khotilovo
(Tver Region)
Technical
problem
50
August 18,
2005
Mi-8MTV2
41
Khabarovsk
(Central)
825th independent
helicopter regiment
Technical
problem
51
September
15, 2005
Su-27K
(Su-33)
82 red
North Atlantic
279th independent
naval fighter air
regiment
Technical
problem
52
September
15, 2005
Su-27P
12 red
Iotishkes village
(Lithuania)
Navigation
error
53
September
20, 2005
L-39C
Khanskaya airfield
(Maykop, Adygeya)
Technical
problem
28
94
Location
08 white
Date
Aircraft
54
January 16,
2006
Su-24MR
55
March 15,
2006
Su-24M
56
June 28,
2006
Su-25
57
June 28,
2006
Su-24M
58
July 10,
2006
Tu-134VKP
59
July 14,
2006
Mi-8
60
July 27,
2006
MiG-29UB
61
July 30,
2006
62
Side
number
Location
Unit
Casualties
Cause
Details
Crew
Vozzhayevka
(Amur Region)
Technical
problem
Kuleshovka
settlement
(Voronezh Region)
Technical
problem
Sokolya Sloboda
village (Bryansk
Region)
Unknown
66 white
Ostrov (Pskov
Region)
240th independent
combined air
regiment
Technical
problem
05 red
Gvardeyskoye
airfield (Crimea,
Ukraine)
318th independent
combined air
regiment of the
Black Sea Fleet
Bird strike
Pushkin
(Leningrad
Region)
Unknown
Bolshoye Savino
(Perm Territory)
Strizhy aerobatics
group of the 237th
guard aerospace
equipment
demonstration
center
Bird strike
Su-24M
Medovoye village
(Kaliningrad
Region)
4th guard
independent naval
assault air regiment
of the Baltic Fleet
Pilot error
September
11, 2006
Mi-8MT
Yuzhnyy
settlement (North
Ossetia)
11
Pilot error
63
September
14, 2006
L-39C
Novokubansk
(Krasnodar
Territory)
Unknown
64
March 21,
2007
2 MiG-29
Millerovo (Rostov
Region)
Pilot error
65
August 9,
2007
L-39C
Khanskaya airfield
(Maykop, Adygeya)
Technical
problem
66
August 23,
2007
Su-24M
115 km north of
Khurba airfielf
(Khabarovsk
Territory)
Technical
problem
67
January 28,
2008
L-39C
Kotelnikovo
(Volgograd
Region)
Pilot error
68
February 1,
2008
L-39C
Armavir
(Krasnodar
Territory)
Technical
problem
69
March 20,
2008
Su-25
Novoselskoye
(Maritime
Territory)
Pilot error
07 white
01 blue
63 white
29
Date
Aircraft
Side
number
Location
Unit
Cause
Details
Unknown
Crew
70
June 24,
2008
Mi-24
71
July 29,
2008
Su-27UB
44 blue
Vozdvizhenka
(Maritime
Territory)
Technical
problem
72
October 17,
2008
MiG-29
11 white
Khadakta village
(Chita Region)
Technical
problem
73
December
5, 2008
MiG-29
55 white
Ingoda village
(Chita Region)
Technical
problem
74
December
19, 2008
Su-24M
02
Mosalskoye village
(Voronezh Region)
Technical
problem
75
February 3,
2009
Mi-24
Nadezhdinka
(Saratov Region)
626th training
helicopter regiment
Technical
problem
76
March 17,
2009
L-39C
Alekseyevskoye
village (Krasnodar
Territory)
Unknown
Lt Aleksandr Zaytsev
77
May 4, 2009
Ka-27PL
Baltic Sea
396th independent
naval antisubmarine
helicopter squadron
of the Baltic Fleet
Pilot error
78
June 17,
2009
Su-24MR
Monchegorsk
(Murmansk
Region)
98th guard
reconnaissance air
regiment
Pilot error
79
June 19,
2007
Su-24M
KostinoBystryanskiy
village (Rostov
Region)
Technical
problem
80
June 19,
2009
Mi-28N
43 yellow
(Nizhniy Novgorod
Region)
Unknown
81
August 16,
2009
Su-27UB
and Su-27
18 blue and
14 blue
Zhukovskiy
(Moscow Region)
Russkiye Vityazi
aerobatics group
of the 237th
guard aerospace
equipment
demonstration
center
Pilot error
82
November
6, 2009
Tu-142M3
55 red
Tatar Strait
568th independent
combined air
regiment of the
Pacific Fleet
11
Unknown
83
January 14,
2010
Su-27SM
86 red
Galichnyy
(Khabarovsk
Territory)
6987th airbase
Unknown
30
Kochubeyevskiy
District (Stavropol
Territory)
Casualties
45 yellow
Number of accidents
Including crashes
Fatalities
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
8
10
8
11
8
8
10
3
8
8
1
4
4
5
7
2
1
4
0
4
4
1
105
16
34
22
8
1
15
0
4
17
1
Total
83
36
223
Su-24
L-39
Mi-8
Su-27
MiG-29
Mi-24
Su-25
MiG-31
Ka-27
Tu-134
Il-18
An-26
Tu-142
An-12
Tu-160
Tu-22
Il-76
Mi-28
MiG-25
Causes
Number lost
Fatalities
15
13
12
10
9
7
4
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
54
8
5
3
12
3
1
4
84
17
11
7
4
4
0
0
0
0
Causes
technical problems
pilot error
unknown
navigation error
crew error
bird strike
Number of
accidents
Fatalities
33
28
14
3
3
2
16
90
31
86
0
0
31
Our Authors
Mikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government.
Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.
Andrey Frolov. Graduated with an honours degree from the Faculty of Foreign Affairs of Saint Petersburg State University and
in 2003 from the French-Russian Masters School of Political Science and International Relations. In 20032004 researcher
at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center), executive editor of Yaderny Kontrol magazine (in Russian). In 2004
project manager of Export control system transformation in Russia.
Natalia Grib is a journalism graduate of the Belarus National University. She took Reuters training courses in London
and Radio Free Europe courses in Prague. Joined Kommersant, a leading Russian broadsheet, in 2002 as a special energy
correspondent. Author of more than 2,000 articles on fuel and energy policy and of the book The Gas Emperor.
Anton Khlopkov is Director of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and Editor-in-Chief of
the Nuclear Club journal. He is a graduate of Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). From 2000 to 2009 he has worked
for the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), including as Deputy Director (20032007) and Executive Director
(20072009). He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Encyclopedia (2009). Co-author of the monographs:
At the Nuclear Threshold: The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (2007); Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Guidebook (2006); Nuclear Nonproliferation in RussianAmerican Relations: History, Opportunities and Outlook (2000); author of the monograph Irans Nuclear Program in RussianAmerican Relations (2001). He is an expert on nuclear proliferation and atomic energy issues.
Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum
news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 19941997
worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information
center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House
since2003.
Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations
in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a
project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 19961997. Since September of
1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russias military-technical cooperation
with other countries.
Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russias leading
broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspapers editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek
in 20052008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of
Kommersant from October 2008 to date.
Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University Higher School of Economics with a Masters Degree in Strategic
Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 ,
editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.
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