Unqualified Truth and its inexpressibility by testimonies1

SUDIPTA MUNSI, Calcutta, India

Email: meetsudipta@gmail.com

As the title indicates, the aim of the present paper is to prove the inexpressibility of Truth
by the means of knowledge, with a particular focus on verbal testimony. By Truth, here is to be
understood truth as not contaminated by the influx of personal predispositions of the cogniser
and other allied factors, or what we may say, Truth-in-Itself (the allusion to Kants Thing-in-Itself is
intended). This does not at all amount to a negation of the fact that there is a core of truth that
underlies our activities. This truth is however functional truth, as distinguished from the Truth-inItself. This is to say that for the convenience of our discussion we make a twofold classification of
truth: function truth or truth and Truth-in-Itself or Truth. Such a view, instead of belittling the
value of testimonies tries to identify the boundary within which the testimonies play their proper
role.
Functional truth can be known through empirical tests and, hence, through means of
knowledge, while Truth in itself is already given and does not need validation. Further, no
validation of it through testimony (and, I suspect, the other instruments of knowledge) is even
possible, as I will show below.
Before making a formal statement about my basic contention, let us look at the following
example:
A tells B about the existence of 5 fruits on the bank of the river2. B believes in it and if, on
going there B finds that:
i.

There is no fruit at all;

ii.

There are only 2, instead of 5 fruits;

I am immensely indebted to my esteemed friend, Dr. Elisa Freschi, for raising important and highly pertinent
objections, in course of debating on an early version of the present paper. Her objections, marked as ** and
incorporated into the body of this paper, contribute, to the best of my understanding, to the strength of the thesis
presented herein.
2

This example, viz. there are five fruits on the bank of the river, being a translation of the Sanskrit line, nadtre paca
phalni santi, is borrowed from the Khaanakhaakhdya, a classical text on the dialectics of the Vednta school of
Indian philosophy, written by rhara Mira, whose date is given as 1150 A.D. by S. N. Dasgupta in A History of Indian
Philosophy, vol. 2. However, my conclusion as well as method of argument differs substantially from rhara.

then, in the first case Bs belief in As statement is wholly crushed, whereas it is partially
thwarted in the second case.
However, if A in fact saw 5 fruits on the bank of the river, and the non-existence is due to
some contingency occurring between As witnessing it, and Bs endeavour to test the validity of As
assertion, then As statement, at least ideally is not be held invalid. But for all practical purposes, it
should be and is held by B as invalid.
Had B witnessed in ditto what A had described to him, B would have indubitably held As
statement as valid, and the latter could be well treated as a valid testimony. It is interesting to
note in this connection that the reliability [or what the early Indian philosophers would call
ptatva] of A does not alter the problem, since such a notion of reliability works properly only
with reference to the functional aspect of truth, or in other words, such a notion of reliability of
the testifier is irrelevant to Truth per se.
From the aforesaid considerations, it emerges that the ideas of validity and invalidity
function only within the precincts of practical activities. In the same vein, purposefulness (or as
the early Indian philosophers call arthakriykritva, leading to savdi-pravtti3 or successful
undertaking of an action [as opposed to visavdi-pravtti or an unsuccessful undertaking])
determines such validity.
Divorced from all practical purposes, truth is neither valid nor invalid it is as it is selfrevealing and enjoying an auto-validity this is what we call the Truth-in-Itself.
Truth does not depend upon an external validation, as this event would abrogate and
annul its auto-valid character.4
What we get out of a testimonial is [provisional] truth as delimited by practical
purposefulness (what a Classical Indian thinker might have called arthakriykri or vyavahrik
satyat) but through testimonies we do not arrive at truth in its entirety, i.e. we do not get hold
of unalloyed Truth.
3

This term, along with visavdi-pravtti, is present in the Vednta corpus. Cf. Khaanakhaakhdya of rhara &
Vedntaparibh of Dharmarjdhvarndra. Earlier attestations are found also in the Buddhist Epistemological
School (Dharmakrti speaks of arthakriy) and in Nyya (Vtsyyana and Jayanta Bhaa speak of pravttismarthya).
4
This idea is rather figuratively expressed in the following verse of the Kahopaniad [I/ii/23]
nyamtm pravacanena labhyo
na medhay na bahun rutena/
yamevaia vute tena labhyastasyaia tm vivute tan svm//
Tr. This Self [the highest Truth or the Truth-in-Itself] is not to be achieved through discourses, neither through the
intellect nor even through much hearing. Whom It itself chooses, it is verily to him that the Self reveals itself.
Here discourse refers to verbal testimony, intellect to inferential testimony and hearing by extension has reference to
[sense] perception. Truth only reveals itself to someone, i.e. it can only be experienced, but never communicated.

Temporality and Truth

**

One might object that the previous examples, with the 5 fruits becoming 0 or 2, do not
take into account time. This is to say when A testifies the existence of 5 fruits on the bank of the
river he is actually referring to the fact that there were 5 fruits on the bank of a certain river at time
t. But if one or the entire set of fruits is eaten by a cow passing by the bank of the river at time t1,
then the very contention that As testimony is false since there are not 5 fruits on the bank of the
river, is itself false.
It is true that when something is known it is known in a particular instant of time.
However, witnesses themselves usually neglect this element. When A provides his testimony, he
does so believing in the enduring nature of his testimony. By contrast, if we have to differentiate
between these two evidences, on ground of their varying temporally determined character, our
very effort to bear testimony to something is carried in vacuo, since a thing existing / experienced
at time t is different from a thing existing / experienced / reproduced at time t1, with t1 being the
time of the testimonial act. Moreover, the time factor would equally affect the testifier i.e. the
person who experiences an event at time t is not the one who is providing the testimony at time t1.
Thus, taking into account time does not "rescue" the epistemological status of testimony but
rather destroys the foundation of its possibility.
Can we go without testimony?
**

One may now object that the claim that testimony is only a secondary source and it
holds true only so far as the empirical matters of practical interest are concerned, does not negate
the fact that testimony is still the only option left for such cases where we have no other source of
verifying the claim made. This objection becomes especially pertinent in such cases where one is
trying to communicate his/her own feelings as also in case of religious [mystic?] experiences.
However the above objection does not take into account the three following points:
i.

Testimony is not the only source of information about ones inner state: as for one,
who is trying to communicate his pangs to his companion, the latter becomes
aware of it through such marks as pale face, tearful eyes, etc. apart from the
statement of the narrator.

ii.

Provided that we have no other way to test the validity of what the narrator says it
becomes difficult to differentiate the real case from the fraudulent one. After all,
actors also have the ability to portray such feelings, often in a more convincing
manner.

iii.

Even a reliable (pta) testifier is hardly able to lead us to an epistemologically

better situation, since the success of an act of testimony also depends on the
reliability of the recipient. After all, the trustworthiness of a child, crying because
of hunger is of no use, if his words are misconstrued as a signal of stomach ache.
iii. Even a reliable (pta) testifier is hardly able to lead us to an epistemologically
better situation, since the success of an act of testimony also depends on the

reliability of the recipient. After all, the trustworthiness of a child, crying because
of hunger is of no use, if his words are misconstrued as a signal of stomach ache.
Connected with this, it is also to be noted that the content of a testimonial
undergoes interpretive processes both in the testifier and the listener. For
example, hearing the statement, the sun has gone down5, made by someone in
the village, a courtesan thinks, it is time for her to return to her business, while a
thief deems it as an indication for the time for his going out for theft, and a
staunch follower of the Vedas thinks it to be a signal for his becoming attentive to
his daily religious duties. Thus it is ones personal disposition that plays a crucial
role here in determining the meaning and validity of the contents of a testimonial.

The point, therefore, is: We do not deny the role of testimonies in leading us to truth, but
what we emphasise is that we only get a partial picture out of such testimonies.
Testimony in the court
Courts of law should be especially aware of the two problems mentioned above, viz.
temporality and subjectivity of functional truths, and accordingly not expect Truth but rather
truth as the best (if not the only) possible output of a testimony. This is, as already stated, because
Truth (i.e. Truth-in-itself) is independent of the trustworthiness of the witness. In this regard it
may be suggested that a recognition of this fact should enable the judiciary to introduce
significant revisions and flexibility into the prevailing penal code.
Conclusions
In the same vein, it might be said that so far as the proceedings of our work-a-day life are
concerned, testimony is the only option left. Here also the significance of such objections** as
pointing out that we ourselves are bound in time and so are our sense-perceptions, and there is no
other way than looking at things through the spectacles of time, become prominent. But our
purport in arguing against testimony is to show that:

i.

The truth we arrive at is not the TRUTH [i.e. the Truth-in-Itself];

ii.

Such truths as we arrive at with the aid of testimonies are functional truths, leading to
successful undertaking of actions. In contradistinction to this, such facts as do not
lead to an unsuccessful undertaking of desired actions are to be held as functional
untruth.

iii.

One should (principally at least) not deem his findings derived with the aid of
testimonies as final, and a space for doubt should always be made;

This example is borrowed from the chapter on Buddhist philosophy, from the Sarvadaranasagraha, a 14th century
compendium of Indian philosophical schools, authored by Mdhavcrya.

iv.

The above considerations, if applied to court cases, might be able to bring in a

significant change in the extant system of punishment.

In conclusion, it might be said that so far as our day-to-day life is concerned, we are but
compelled to accept functional truths we arrive through the medium of a varying range of
testimonies, despite knowing that these are determined by practical needs and purposefulness.