FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004.]

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, respondent.
Office of the Legal Aid for complainant.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant Federico Ramos filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility against his counsel, Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo, for demanding the delivery of 1,000
square meters of the litigated parcel of land as a payment for his appearance fees. In his answer, respondent argued,
among others, that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the
1,000 square meters of land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case had been
terminated. After investigation, the IBP Board of Governors found respondent to be guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. AScHCD
The Court ruled that there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a
written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall
within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in
Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002. However, the respondent was still found
guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was reprimanded.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; SALES; LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING THE PROPERTY OR
RIGHTS OF HIS CLIENT WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION DURING THE PENDENCY OF
THE CASE. Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or
assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of
their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also
public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised
by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage
of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. However, the said
prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client's property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. CDAHIT
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSUMMATED WITH THE ACTUAL TRANSFER OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual
transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v.
Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when
he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property. In the consolidated administrative cases
of Valencia v. Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the
practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE DEMAND FOR DELIVERY OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY NOT A
PROHIBITED TRANSACTION. In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation
since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere
demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is
unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29,
2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
4.
LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS; THE POWER TO DISBAR OR
SUSPEND MUST BE EXERCISED WITH GREAT CAUTION. We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner,
as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of

the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been
violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense
committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and
reasonable. DSITEH
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the
delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees. AcSHCD
The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:
Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo's Makati office to engage his
services as counsel in a case 1 involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the
case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation
and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land
as appearance fees. 2
On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent's office to inquire about the status of the case. Respondent
informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge.
Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount
of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made. 3
Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the
summons and copy of the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of
appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period. aIcDCT
On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq.
m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondent's appearance fee. In the same letter,
respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter
within 30 days.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to
his Makati office to engage his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated in San
Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainant's family lost 7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one
Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog haltingly, was assisted by
his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to
handle the case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not engage their
services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least onehalf of the land involved as his attorney's fee, plus cash expenses, while the other asked for 1/4 of the land in addition
to a large sum of money. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance
fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his siblings on the matter.
Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to respondent's office to discuss
the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee of
P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after their
treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00 per
appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property,
if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and other incidental
expenses. Respondent accepted the complainant's offer.
Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and
thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny
Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier
promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a written commitment and
gave respondent's secretary P2,000.00 of the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellant's brief. aTADCE
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land

to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Since then
complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29,
2003.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel, respondent Atty.
Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of
land which was the subject of litigation.
In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. 4
On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads: 5
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. 6
Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of
the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been
terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the
complainant.
Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on the basis
of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable because a
Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per
court appearance. IcHTAa
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the
property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.
7 The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or
judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these
persons. 8 It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. 9 However, the said
prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client's property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual
transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v.
Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when
he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property. 10 In the consolidated administrative
cases of Valencia v. Cabanting, 11 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months
from the practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari
proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a
written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall
within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in
Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002. acEHSI
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.

XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6
months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty. 12 All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a
member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. EaTCSA
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169079. August 28, 2007.]
FRANCISCO RAYOS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2007 filed by respondent Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez,
seeking a modification of the Decision dated 12 February 2007.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that: AHCTEa
1.
Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney's oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely;
2.
Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT (35%) of the
total amount awarded 1 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951; and
3.
Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred Nine Pesos and
Twenty-One Centavos (P290,109.21), 2 which he retained in excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable
attorney's fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the Bar and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
DTESIA
Respondent received a copy of the Decision on 5 March 2007. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was filed
within the reglementary period provided under the Rules.
Respondent begs the compassionate understanding and magnanimity of the Honorable Court for some leniency
regarding his unintentional transgression and prays that the penalty of suspension of six months imposed upon him be
reduced to a fine, invoking his almost 15 years of patient, devoted, complete and successful professional services
rendered to petitioner; for the bad faith of the latter in dismissing him as counsel without justifiable cause; and his
good faith in retaining the money "contingently" with the view of winning petitioner's cause.
In light of respondent's sincere plea for compassion from the Court, we take a second look at the penalty imposed.
DCTSEA
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of
mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her
infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's
advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the Court's determination of the imposable
penalty. 3
Applying the rationale in the aforesaid catena of cases, it is appropriate for this Court, in the case at bar, to consider
the following circumstances, to wit:
a)
respondent had spent 15 years in defending petitioner's cause from the trial court to the Supreme Court;
b)
his efforts at defending their cause were palpably real, complete, and total, with utmost devotion and
zealousness;
c)
respondent's advanced age;
d)
this is the first time that respondent has been found administratively liable per available record; and
AECDHS
e)
respondent's good faith in retaining what he sincerely believed to be his contingent fee. As can be gleaned
from the facts, petitioner and respondent entered into a contingent fee arrangement whereby the latter, as counsel, will
be paid for the legal services only if he secures a judgment favorable for his client. When respondent retained the

amount of P557,961.21 and P159,120.00 out of the P1,219,920.00, he did so believing in good faith that it was a
reasonable payment for the contingent fees which he was entitled to retain. It cannot be ignored that respondent indeed
successfully defended petitioner's case in Civil Case No. SM-951.
We are persuaded to exhibit a degree of leniency towards the respondent. We, thus, maintain a more compassionate
approach.
WHEREFORE, the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 February
2007 is MODIFIED in that the suspension of six months is DELETED, and in lieu thereof a fine of P20,000.00 is
IMPOSED, effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. The said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005.]
MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
Jose G. Paler and Teodosio Dino for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1.
LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS CONSTITUTES GROSS
MISCONDUCT. Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals." Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel,
we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of
law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.
2.
ID.; ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE; DISBARMENT IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR
CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE; CASE AT BAR.
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It involves
"an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent
act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, "[t]he review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No
elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the
bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice." cEITCA
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts.
ECcTaS
The complaint, 1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of action.
The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in
favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in
consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that
sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the
assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta
borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both
promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks

in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However, when
Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked "Account Closed." She
referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he
allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of
his attorney's fees, and gave her an additional P323 in cash. aATCDI
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her
favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon
her request, only so she could show the bank where she was working that she "had money coming to her." Araneta
further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be
encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two
"borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which
she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell
seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded
that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to turn the tables on her." 3
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant and her
counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the
respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine o'clock in the
morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely
Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear, so the case was called again
the following day, 24 January 1973. HCSEIT
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant,
Moreno, taking the stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a
postponement to prepare his defense. 7 No further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is
shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement
with the conform of Moreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainant's
basic grievance."
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission
notified 8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the
complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no
longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts were unknown. An inquiry 9 made at his IBP chapter
yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two o'clock in the afternoon. 10
Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced, the case was
submitted for resolution on such date. 11
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in part:
cEaDTA
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering.
The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There
was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the
alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury warrant was done but
neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal
portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to be that of the
respondent beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an ocular
examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and "H" do not show definitely
that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent
did sign the treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same
treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no evidence to prove
that she saw him sign it.

There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop payment" or even any
written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury warrant having been "stopped"
he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action. ITDHSE
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00
to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to
have been aware when he issued said checks that his account with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn
was already closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act of the respondent
in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to
show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was
an act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless commercial documents to
deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is
abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent,
belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as
a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by
him of the decision of suspension. AICTcE
The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension from
three months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July 2003,
the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made
mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final
judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The Resolution, which was attached to the report,
states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S.
Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was
denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is
final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require
the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20
November 1992. DcHaET
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973,
when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and
Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty
sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his
own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn
against a closed account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly
found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the
Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality."
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18 as the
effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the

public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus,
paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals." 19
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment,
is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 20
In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the
obligation. 23
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final
judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has
been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 25
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral
turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 27 "[t]he
review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice." 28
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country. CacHES
SO ORDERED.

Cecilia Agno all of whom shall be members of the Board of Trustees together with two others;
3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation, Mr. KHALIFA undertakes as his
contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the following:
(a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) initially on or before
AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be used to have the license of ISRC reinstated;

EN BANC

(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P250,000.00) to start the business operations of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other
obligations, if any;

A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008

Cecilia Agno vs Atty. Marciano Cagatan
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and his group while the legal and
government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each other in the
course of the business operations shall be maintained in order to avoid problem with the government, the workers and
the employers;

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation 5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the assistance of a qualified accountant and
each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy thereof; the share of the parties may be released to each of them as
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
often as the parties agree, however, advances against the share of each may be agreed upon by the parties;
The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a
corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRCs 6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of this agreement shall be the sole
recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his 50% ownership shall be free from such claims.
provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from participating in overseas Manila, August 9, 1992.
recruitment.1
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLEs cancellation of ISRCs license with the Office of the
CECILIA AGNO
President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondents favor in the Resolution dated March 30, 1993 2
which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE and the Philippine Overseas Employment WITNESSES:
Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject to the payment of a guarantee bond which was
_______________ _________________
double the amount required by law.
Since ISRCs recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a
Complaint-Affidavit6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against the respondent claiming that
application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA. 3
the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President, particularly on August amount of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from
9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 4 with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, her inquiries with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply
Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,5 the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement
could not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the
quoted in toto hereunder:
complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer was
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of
ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRCs recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino
citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of Agreement this 9th day of August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that she and her husband
concerning the joint ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of money, respondent issued a bank check
dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being
CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:
drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and accordingly, immediate steps shall be or redeem his dishonored check, prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
taken to submit the necessary documents to the Securities and Exchange Commission to legalize the arrangement and against the respondent. An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the
to cause the issuance of the corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his group;
respondent with the said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter failed several
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after deducting all the pertinent expenses times to attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a bouncing
that the officers of the corporation shall be: Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice
President and General Manager, Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated representative, Treasurer, Ms. to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of
P500,000.00.

In his Comment,8 respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while ISRCs recruitment license was
cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of the President on March 30, 1993, on
appeal. During the pendency of the said appeal, he and complainants husband Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement because the latter offered to buy shares of stock of ISRC in order to finance the then pending appeal for
the reinstatement of the ISRC license and for Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full management and
operation of the corporation. The respondent further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on
various dates the total amount of P500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of
money to pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there were still legal
procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and complainant were in a
hurry to start the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold and assigned his own shareholdings in
ISRC for P500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment 9 dated April 26, 1993. The respondent, in
turn, issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00, which was not intended to be encashed but only to guarantee the
reimbursement of the money to Khalifa and the complainant in case the appeal would be decided adversely against
ISRC. Conversely, the check would be returned to respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The
respondent denied employing fraud or misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy
his shares after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a good case. The respondent averred that
complainant was motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating criminal charges against him instead of
seeking rescission of the Deed of Assignment and refund of the consideration for the sale of the shares of stock. The
respondent surmised that they decided not to proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when complainant had
secured her own license after she had received the Deed of Assignment and assumed the position of acting treasurer of
the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-submission of copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of
Assignment and complainants appointment as Acting Treasurer with the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRCs
license to recruit and the pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of
Assignment in favor of the complainant and her husband Khalifa regarding the five hundred shares of stock,
respondent also presented in support of his allegations copies of 1) his Letter 10 dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA
requesting the renewal of ISRCs license, and 2) a Letter 11 dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation
Office of the POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable commercial banking
corporation in the amount of P400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of recruited workers; cash bond
deposit of P200,000.00; and surety bond of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear ISRCs pending cases with said agency
before respondents request for reinstatement of ISRCs license as a land based agency.

there is no showing that the respondent used the amount he received from the complainant in compliance with the
respondents undertakings in the Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement employed by respondent is
supported by the fact that complainant was made to appear that she will be appointed as treasurer of the corporation,
however there was no action on the part of the respondent to change the composition of the Board of Directors and the
treasurer in the records of the corporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent did
not fully reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the reinstatement of the corporations license to operate.
Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of the complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account shows the
respondent had no desire to return the money entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the corporation.
The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx clearly show that the payment of surety bond will not suffice to
reinstate the license of the corporation in view of several cases of violations of recruitment pending before the POEA
against said corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of Agreement was entered
into by the parties.
Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor, when he knowingly failed to provide
the complainant with accurate and complete information due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and
to return the money received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-102 16 adopting and
approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents lack of candor when he knowingly failed to provide complainant with the accurate
and complete information due her, Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and Restitution of the money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court the
Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case No. 4515. 17

18
Report and
In a Resolution12 dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Investigating Commissioners
19 dated January 28,
Recommendation
with
the
IBP
Committee
on
Bar
Discipline.
In
IBP
Resolution
No.
XVII-2006-83
investigation, report and recommendation.
2006, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondents motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction to
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held several hearings, consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the
the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings, the complainant presented her evidence. For his Rules of Court.
part, the respondent, instead of presenting his defense before the CBD in open court, opted to present a position paper
20
which was allowed by the Order dated April 20, 2004 13 of Commissioner San Juan. However, in lieu of said position After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for Reinvestigation was filed
by
the
respondent
on
September
12,
2006.
14
paper, the respondent submitted a Memorandum after the complainant had filed her formal offer of evidence.
Eventually, on October 12, 2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation. 15 Said the Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days from notice, if they
Commissioner in her report:
were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. 21

There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties was executed on 9 [August] 1992. In
said Memorandum, no mention was made of the assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her
husband. The conditions stated therein was that the amount to be contributed by the complainant shall be used for the
reinstatement of the license of the ISRC. No mention was made regarding the assignment of shares in favor of the
complainant and her husband. Respondent presented a Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the
complainant and her husband worth P500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there is a super
imposed date of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public, which raises doubt
as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of Assignment was executed when the complainant started her
investigation regarding the true condition of the corporation. Anent the reinstatement of the license of the company

In our Resolution22 dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondents motion for reinvestigation in view of
respondent subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27, 2006. In the same resolution, the Court
noted (1) the said respondents compliance and manifestation of December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned
November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainants Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she was willing
to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; (3)
respondents Comment on Complainants Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainants Manifestation
dated January 10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondents challenge as to complainants personality to file this complaint. In his

Motion for Reconsideration23 of the IBP Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation of October 12, testimony of the complainant32 on this score is more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the
2004, respondent contends that complainant, not being a party-in-interest in the agreement between respondent and written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the respondents explanations with respect to the P500,000.00 in question
Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the instant complaint.
had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that the P500,000.00 was given to him initially for the
purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President and that he used the same to pay loans or to "reimburse
Respondents argument lacks merit.
borrowed money" spent for the said purpose. However, respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a
24
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for disbarment, suspension or hurry to start the business operation of ISRC, the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified complaint of which he executed a Deed of Assignment in complainants favor, which respondent claimed he could validly do
without the approval of ISRCs Board of Directors. His subsequent Memorandum 33 submitted to the IBP contained
any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro v. Meneses III, 25 as reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin,26 that:
new allegations that aside from the P500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his personal shares of ISRC stocks, an
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B additional P500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation and because of this failure of
of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the deposits required by the POEA
by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC up to the present.
any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly evident right at the outset when he
the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and operation of ISRC with the complainants husband, knowing
before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Emphasis fully well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or authority from the corporations Board of Directors.
The unilateral execution by respondent of the Deed of Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We
ours)
agree with the observation of Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all mentioned in the MOA,
was executed by the respondent after the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true condition of the
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 27 viz:
corporation. The so-called "guarantee check" appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.
[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would be appointed treasurer and her
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied with the said undertaking as per the
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the Certification34 dated October 13, 1995 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The respondent could not
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct justify his non-compliance with the terms of the MOA by citing ISRCs inability to comply with other governmental
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged requirements for the reinstatement of its license for various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same to
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the complainant and her husband.
the proper administration of justice. (Word in brackets ours)
Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRCs affairs that the reinstatement
Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a party to the subject of the corporations recruitment license would require not only a favorable action by the Office of the President on
transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because she is mentioned as the treasurer ISRCs appeal and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRCs clearance or exoneration in its other cases for
of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement; 28 as well as one of the assignees in the Deed of Assignment of shares of recruitment violations pending with the POEA. 35 The respondent could not pass the blame to the complainant because
ISRC stocks which respondent alleged to have executed; 29 and as the payee in the bank check issued by the of his belated excuse that complainant failed to infuse an additional amount of P500,000.00. This new defense is
clearly an afterthought and not supported by evidence.
respondent for the amount of P500,000.00.30
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as well
as his attorneys oath.

The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the latter a sum of money in the amount of P500,000.00. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following :
We rule in the affirmative.

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of P500,000.00 to the respondent to
be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs recruitment license as well as to start the business operation of the Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
corporation. The respondent, however, claims that complainant misinterpreted their agreement because the Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
P500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of his personal shares of ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of the Integrated Bar.
Assignment.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
We are constrained to give credence to the complainants contention. The due execution and authenticity of the whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed. Moreover, the terms thereof are clear and
explicit that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the
Juma, would pay the amount of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of which would be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. 36 A lawyer must conduct himself with great
license, while the other P250,000.00 was for the start of the operation of the corporation and to liquidate pending propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. 37 For, as officers of the courts and
government and other obligations, if any.31 Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares mentioned. The keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to

behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 38 Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses
upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with
others.39 Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity,
if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 40
Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for issuing a worthless check.
In Sanchez v. Somoso,41 the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a bank account
which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he took
when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in high
esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, 42 we held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the
effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large.
Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to guarantee the reimbursement of the
P500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an adverse decision in ISRCs appeal with the Office of the
President. We note, however, that said check was issued on March 30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to
had already been favorably acted upon on March 30, 1993. Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued only
after the complainant demanded the return of their P500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In any event, respondents act of
issuing a guarantee check for P500,000.00, when he was presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his
bank account against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct for which
he should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement of the license, but there is no
showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent failed to give any credible accounting or explanation as
to the disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose
all the existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRCs recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her husband
to part with the aforesaid sum of money. He also admittedly issued a check drawn against a closed account, which
evinced his lack of intention to return the money to the complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus
proper for the Court to order its restitution as recommended by the IBP.
We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years by the IBP Board of
Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondents first administrative offense. It is settled that the
appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. 43 Accordingly, for employing deceit and misrepresentation in his personal
dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
and one (1) month from the practice of law is sufficient to be meted out to respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH
from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and
ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7494. June 27, 2008.]
WILSON CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a Complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva PaitaMoya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same
without paying the rentals due.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998, respondent entered into a Contract of Lease 2 with Greenville Realty
and Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager, involving a
residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of
P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year. CDaSAE
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would no longer renew the
same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she
would be paying the monthly rental during the extension period. Complainant approved such request but increased the
rental rate to P8,650.00 per month for the period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30 June 2000.
Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October 2000 without paying her rentals from July to October 2000.
She also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September and October 2000. The Statement of Account as
of 15 October 2004 3 shows that respondent's total accountability is P71,007.88. AcSHCD
Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment
unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant's repeated written demands for
payment of her obligations despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.
In her Answer, 4 respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated the
apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because she was given notice by
the complainant to vacate the premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which never
happened until presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask that complainant to account for her deposit for the
apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know complainant's address or contact number. For the same
reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment unit. HCISED
After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, the parties were given time to submit their
respective Position Papers per Order 5 dated 17 February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his Position
Paper. 6 Respondent, despite the extension given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and Recommendation, 7
recommending the imposition of the penalty of three-month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit: DAESTI
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be held guilty of having violated the
aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three (3)

months suspension from the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-585 8 dated 15 December 2006, amending
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus: IECcaA
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be dismissed
and respondent must face the consequences of her actions. SDAaTC
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy the
apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October 1998 to 30 September 1999, paying a monthly rental of
P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease contract 9 on 30 September 1999, the same was renewed, but on a monthto-month basis at an increased rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement, respondent was able to stay at the
leased premises until October 2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills during the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is
able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to settle. SHCaDA
Annex "D" 10 of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September 2000 signed by complainant and addressed to respondent
demanding that she settle her unpaid rentals for the period of three months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September
2000. The letter appears to have been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex "H" of the same Complaint is
another letter dated 30 August 2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier demand for respondent to settle her unpaid
rentals, as well as her unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was sent through registered mail and received
by one Nonie Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of both letters of demand in her Answer to the
Complaint. Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them. Section 11,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than those
as to the amount of unliquidated damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. HAaDTI
Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where it is
the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant
(respondent herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of
showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. 11
Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of
payment. 12 In Monfort v. Aguinaldo, 13 the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best
evidence. A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In the instant
case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to produce receipts or any
other proof of payment of the rentals due for the period of 1 July to 20 September 2000. IAETSC
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and electric bills
constitute "just debts", which could be any of the following: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. 14
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they became
due. Respondent should have complied with just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical
standards to preserve the court's integrity, since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on
her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the complainant's knowledge
and consent. Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills
constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01
thereof, which explicitly state: HcDSaT
"CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. TEAcCD
"Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent's defense that she does not know where to find the complainant or his office is specious and does not
inspire belief considering that she had been occupying the apartment unit and paying the rents due (except for the
period complained of) for almost two years. How she could have dealt with complainant and GRDC for two years
without at all knowing their office address and contact numbers totally escapes this Court. This is only a desperate

attempt to justify what is clearly an unjustifiable act. TEHDIA

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 15 In so
doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients.
As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the
Court. 16 DaTICE
The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 17 It demands a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
18 In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice. 19
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the
penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. 20 The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, 21 for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one year's suspension from the practice of law, 22 or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the
obligation. 23 HCacTI
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent's gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves
the respondent's deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which would have been
a more serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month
from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely. IEHDAT
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the court
administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008.]
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth
C. Diaz-Catu 2 and Antonio Pastor 3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5th District of Manila 4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court. DHETIS
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of
this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, 6 claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of
the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case
for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against
her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required
the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7 SEHDIC
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he
represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713: 8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2)
Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . . (emphasis supplied) AIHTEa
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened
while in said service." DHcEAa
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not
covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT
SECTION 7 (B) (2) OF RA 6713,
GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b)
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: HDAaIS
(1)
Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2)
Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3)
Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of
which he is an official; and
(4)
Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending

the interest of the Government.

(c)
Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus. 13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang
barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. jurcda
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words,
they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In
fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16 AHSEaD
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned. 17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence
him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer
of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied) cCHETI
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to

do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of
this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: IAEcCT
CANON 7.
A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
AcHSEa
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. 18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession. 19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20
and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is
sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance. SCaITA
SO ORDERED.