Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S.
PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599,
644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199,
202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291,
293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742,
1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538,
543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a
public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to
compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this
Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings
of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would
not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without
keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these

proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light
of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to
time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court
of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some
members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of
a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the
Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,

through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and
moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien
por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o
cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han
visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para
una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de
practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a
que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion
del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this
bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was
but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot
and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where
the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of
the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of
Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion
of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of
a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the
Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4,ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the
Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations
is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the
rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that
the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law.
ed. 1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on
the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir.,
98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law.
ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence
having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the
said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in
our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and
the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a
national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the
supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor
Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered
the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA
SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO, respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for certiorari, injunction
and damages on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at
the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating
Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating
class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo
Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat
and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but
three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of
the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the abovenamed committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with thehonor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had
been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of
suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had
been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Ligat (second placer in the disputed ranking in
Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his
closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of
1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers
in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave
abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat from 80% to
85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a much
lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other than periodical tests were given,
ratings in which were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division
Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among
the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that
the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and
discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the
matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his
grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that
petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final
list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the
respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said
court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be
shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled,
the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor
students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the case
instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.

In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to
dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the
special civil action of certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These
allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely
contending for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Ligat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and
III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place
(grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).
Patricia Ligat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Ligat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is
the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English
teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service
Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia
Ligat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place" was erased and changed to "Second
Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of,
together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule.
This violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents
that is submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only 'passed the buck to each
other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the
Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and
give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather
than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is
hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this
appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the grounds discussed by the court a quo in the
appealed order above-quoted (1) that the petition does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said
grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for
honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for
certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be necessary.
To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.'
(Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing
of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in
this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights
and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before the
tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies
impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand
for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties or with dictation on the other; for
in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate from another
power. ... The character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or
legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it
may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern
Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of
Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment
and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all cases. The
term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating
between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that
department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction so far as
it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court,
officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act
is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power
conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of
questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial
power or authority to carry out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in
hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have
jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and
protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial
power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and
determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action
between the parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which
does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point out. What is
a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the importance
of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of
power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and
judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It
is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must
be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect
to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As
to what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.'
(Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.)
[Emphasis supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are
judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection
with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the
discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but it is
sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may
be their public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following
statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is
often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will
be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to
assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that
they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they
constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs.
Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for determination was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges
of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that
matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:

For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate
oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school
days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice
Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect the audience's
preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of
referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success
by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and
that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the
appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation
questioning the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of
the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol.
1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a
remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there
was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle
is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared
winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If
fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual
judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still,
We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule
65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by
precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5 where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in complete
disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied the petition
for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated.
Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach
to the petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular portion or portions thereof have
been disregarded by the respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution)
the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:
While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the respondent court for recovery
of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy
thereof is attached to the petition.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court and of the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of default is attached to its petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing pleadings is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent court to approve either the original
or the amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is attached to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School
in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the
committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such
decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his petition with
the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named
school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers as the Service
Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate
which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule
65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146137

June 08, 2005

HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO, in her capacity as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, Province of Romblon, petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINO T. TANDOG, in his capacity as the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, Romblon, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 31 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 21 November 2000 in CAG.R. SP No. 46952, which affirmed in toto Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 973602 dated 12 August 1997. The said CSC Resolution
affirmed the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon, finding petitioner Haydee Casimiro guilty of dishonesty and ordering
her dismissal 3from the service.
The relevant antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August
1983, she was appointed Municipal Assessor.
On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities
in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and
the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas
San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.
Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 133 dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under
preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer the
charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,4 petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax
declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax
declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor.
On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,5 respondent Mayor extended petitioners preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days
effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities.
On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 186 was issued by respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of
Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar7 alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 covering
parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain Marcelo Molina, petitioners brother-in-law, without the necessary
documents. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax Declarations.
For his part, Teodulo Matillano claimed8 that he never executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 0236 in
favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioners brother.
In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter9 dated 29 October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida
San Sebastian Cesar, she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. As to the complaint of Teodulo Matillano, she alleged
that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of her brother, Ulysses
Cawaling.
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November
1996, submitted its report10 recommending petitioners separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross
dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances.
Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.
Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 1 11 dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner, thus:
Upon unanimous recommendations of the fact finding committee Chairmained (sic) by Municipal Administrator Nelson M. Andres, finding you (Haydee
C. Casimero) guilty of Dishonesty and Malperformance of duty as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made as integral part hereof, you are hereby ordered separated from service as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, effective upon
request hereof.
Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed12 respondent Mayors order of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration13 was
filed, but the same was denied.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently affirmed the CSC decision. 15 Her motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Petitioner now comes to us raising the lone issue16 of whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was
terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon. An underpinning query is: Was petitioner afforded an impartial and fair
treatment? She specifically points to bias and partiality on the members of the fact-finding committee. She avers that Lorna Tandog Vilasenor, a member
of the fact-finding committee, is the sister of respondent Mayor. She further alludes that while the committee chairman, Nelson M. Andres, was
appointed by the respondent Mayor to the position of Administrative Officer II only on 01 August 1996, no sooner was he given the chairmanship of the
Committee. Further the affiants-complainants were not presented for cross examination.
We find the present petition bereft of merit.
The first clause of Section 1 of Article III of the Bill of Rights states that:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process, however, a distinction must be made between matters
of procedure and matters of substance.

In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced."17
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.18 In administrative
proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.19 "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.20
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.21
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered
questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present
her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision,
which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even brought the matter to
this Court for final adjudication.
Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.22 Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial
proof is required.23 Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof.24 Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as
well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. 25 Thus, in the case at bar, there must be
convincing proof to show that the members of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In addition to palpable
error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias. 26 The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her
allegations. In effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails. 27
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the complainants were never presented for cross examination.
In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to
due process in its strict judicial sense.28
Nothing on record shows that she asked for cross examination. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that she has been deprived of due process merely
because no cross examination took place. Again, it is well to note that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present
case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for reconsideration of the recommendation of the
committee dated 22 November 1996. The essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 29
The Court finds far little basis to petitioners protestations that she was deprived of due process of law and that the investigation conducted was far from
impartial and fair.
As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner means is that the assailed decision was not supported by competent and
credible evidence.30
The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 31
Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the
imposition of any disciplinary action upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his
position.32
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove petitioners dismissal.
Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner:
1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillanos tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of petitioners brother Ulysses
Cawaling; and
2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of complainant Noraida San Sebastian Cesars parent in favor of petitioners brother-inlaw, Marcelo Molina.
On these points, we quote, with approval, the findings of the Court of Appeals for being supported by evidence on record.
Going first to the alleged irregularity accompanying the issuance of tax declarations in favor of petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling, the formers
asseverations that she had nothing to do with the processing of the subject tax declarations is simply unacceptable. As municipal assessor, one of
petitioners duties was to keep a correct record of all transfers, leases and mortgages of real property (par. [4] f, Sec. 159, Article VI, Chapter 3, Title II,
Book II of the Local Government Code) within her jurisdiction. Thus, even if petitioner had no hand in the processing of her brothers tax declaration, she
should have seen to it that the records pertaining thereto are in order. Furthermore, the annotation on her brothers tax declaration that the same
property is also declared in the name of another person and that all of them are paying the realty taxes thereon should have cautioned petitioner to take
the necessary steps to set records right. Under par. [4] h, (ibid.) the municipal assessors, in such a situation, are suppose to cancel assessments, in
case several assessments have been made for the same property, except the one properly made, but if any assessee or his representative shall object
to the cancellation of the assessment made in his name, such assessment shall not be cancelled but the fact shall be noted on the tax declaration and
assessment rolls and other property books of records. Preference, however, shall be given to the assessment of the person who has the best title to the
property, or in default thereof, of the person who has possession of the property (id.). On this score alone, petitioner is already liable for gross neglect of
duty, which is also penalized by dismissal at the first offense (Sec. 22 [b], Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rule [supra]).
Secondly, petitioners vacillation on whether it was Teodulo Matillano or Leticia Barrientos Berbano who executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her
brother Ulysses Cawaling further weakens her defense. Petitioner, in her written answer, claimed that both Teodulo Matillano and Ulysses Cawaling
have deeds of absolute sale over the same parcel of land (vide par. [4], Annex "G," supra). In the course of investigation, however, petitioner claimed
before the investigating body that Teodulo Matillano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother (vide, p. 8, Annex "N," supra). Thereafter
petitioner claimed that it was a certain Leticia Barrientos Berbano who executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of her brother (vide, Annex
"J," supra). . . .
With respect to the irregularity involving the tax declarations of petitioners brother-in-law, Marcelo Molina, no better evidence can be presented to
support petitioners dismissal for dishonesty than the questioned tax declarations themselves (vide, pp. 87 & 88, ibid.). Both tax declarations indicated
that the declarations therein where subscribed to under oath by the declarant before herein petitioner on August 15, 1996, in effect canceling Antipaz
San Sebastians tax declaration on even date. However, the same tax declarations indicate that the taxes due thereon (i.e., land tax, transfer tax &
capital gain tax) were paid only in October of the same year or two months after the tax declarations have already been issued in favor of petitioners
brother-in-law. Under Article 224 [b] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, no tax declaration shall be cancelled and a
new one issued in lieu thereof unless the transfer tax has first been paid.

The issuance of new tax declarations in favor of petitioners brother and brother-in-law effectively cancels the tax declarations of the complainants.
Article 299[c] of the Rules of Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, provides that:
"In addition to the notice of transfer, the previous property owner shall likewise surrendered to the provincial, city, or municipal assessor concerned, the
tax declaration covering the subject property in order that the same maybe cancelled from the assessment records of the LGU. x x x."
Thus, the tax declaration of complainants Noraida San Sebastian and Teodulo Matillano must first be surrendered before herein petitioner could
effectively cancel their respective tax declarations and issue new ones in favor of her brother and brother-in-law. Unfortunately, herein petitioner failed to
present the complainants cancelled tax declarations. She did not even allege that the same had been surrendered to her for cancellation.33
In addition, petitioner admitted using the deed of sale allegedly executed by Lilia Barrientos in favor of Cawaling in transferring the Tax Declaration in the
name of her brother Ulysses Cawaling. However, glaring in the record is the admission by the petitioner in her petition 34 and memorandum35 that the
property was still under litigation, as both Matillano and Barrientos continue to take their claims over it. Clearly, therefore, she had no right, or reason, to
pre-empt judgment on who is the lots rightful owner who can legally dispose the same. Prudence dictates that, under the situation, she should have
refrained from taking any course of action pending the courts final determination of this matter.
In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloza,36 dishonesty was understood to imply a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity." Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that petitioners acts
displayed want of honesty.
IN ALL, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of acts of dishonesty. Her acts of cancelling the tax declarations of Antipas
San Sebastian and Teodulo Matillano in favor of her close relatives without complying with the requirements set under the law constitute grave acts of
dishonesty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 May 2000 and its subsequent Resolution dated 21
November 2000, dismissing petitioner from service, are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9223. June 30, 1956.]
EDUARDO BRILLANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LEONARDO CASTRO, doing business under the name and style of ALMACAS POLICE PROTECTIVE
BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by Judge E. Soriano dated February 12, 1955, granting the motion to dismiss filed by
the Defendant Leonardo Castro and dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff Eduardo Brillantes. For a statement of the facts of the case we adopt that made by the
trial court which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It appears that on December 1, 1953, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant before the Wage Administration Service for the recovery of alleged unpaid
salary and overtime pay, the said case bearing No. C-1046; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on February 15, 1954; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe Plaintiff and
the Defendantentered into an ARBITRATION AGREEMENT whereby they agreed 1. That they submit their case to the Wage Administration Service for
investigation; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office may render on the case and that they
recognize said decision to be final and conclusive; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat in accordance with the said agreement, the parties, assisted by their respective
counsel, adduced evidence before the Wage Administrative Service; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a decision containing its
findings and the following dispositive parts WHEREFORE, considering the evidence presented, the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but
the Respondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant the amount of fifty pesos and eighty-eight centavos (P50.88) corresponding to his salary for services rendered in
the month of November, 1953 and to deposit the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat no appeal was taken from the said
decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant with this Court over the same subject- matter and cause of action
litigated between them before, and decided by, the Wage Administration Service. (pp. 22-23, Record on Appeal.)
In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observations and conclusions which we quote with favor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is evident that the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service was pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of
Labor to delegate any or all of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally or
through duly authorized representative Republic Act No. 602, The Minimum Wage Law, section 12(e). Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that Any
person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court by filing in such court within
fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of Labor be modified or set aside in whole or
in part cralaw The Jurisdiction of the Wage Administration Service to render the aforesaid decision, as well as the remedy of the aggrieved party against such a
decision, is impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et als., G.R. No. L- 6409, wherein it was
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThe point raised by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Respondent. Secretary of Labor thatPetitioners remedy is to appeal to the
President of the Philippines is not well taken. Section 7 of the law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expressly authorized any person aggrieved by an order of the
Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court. In view of the failure of the herein Plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy marked out by
said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602 within the time therein specified, the aforesaid decision of the Wage Administration Service became final and conclusive, not
only by clear implication but also by express agreement of the parties That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office (WAS) may render on the
case, and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive. To permit the herein Plaintiff to institute the present case before this Court, after the same
had been finally and conclusively decided by the Wage Administration Service, is therefore to allow him to go back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the
provisions of Republic Act No. 602; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to encourage duplication of work, if not conflicting judgments, by authorizing a party first to file his
case with the Wage Administration Service and thereafter, in case of an adverse decision, to refile the same case with the Court of First Instance. This could not have
been the legislators intention in the enactment of Republic Act No. 602. (pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal.)
Attorney Manuel Y. Macias counsel for Appellant in his brief concedes that the decision rendered by the hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to
Section 7, above quoted, of the Minimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the
administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the Wage Administrative Service. He, however, contends that the right to go to the
Supreme Court for review of said order granted by Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive, because according to him, under said Section 7 the review by
this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and that the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted. This is not entirely correct. The findings
of fact made by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence. So that Plaintiff could well have
appealed from the decision of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on question of fact, if he was prepared and in a position to show that the findings of fact of the WAS
were not supported by substantial evidence. Then counsel for Appellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant cannot accept the findings of fact in the decision of the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service because they are not merely contrary to the
facts but a scandalous distortion of them with no other end in view but to favor Appellee, the Respondent employer. The Hearing Officer, to promote this end,
callously ignored Appellants evidence. His so-called decision is a mockery of justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair minded citizen can have any respect. (p.
5, Appellants Brief.)

And of Judge Soriano who dismissed Plaintiffs complaint, the same counsel comments thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court a quo refused to perform the functions of a trial court and rendered the foregoing ruling without any evidence having been first presented pro or con. It
decided an Issue in favor of one party and against the other upon the mere representations of the favored party and refused absolutely to hear the other. The court a
quos act in so doing is a plain violation of the right to due process p. 8, Appellants Brief.)
The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is an officer of the court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative
official authorized to render decisions and especially to a Judge of the Court of First Instance. If Plaintiff-Appellant and his counsel were dissatisfied with the findings
of the hearing officer of the WAS; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryif they believed that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the evidence, they should
have appealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were really convinced that said hearing officer of the WAS deliberately distorted the facts to favor the
employer, they should have prepared charges of partiality and malfeasance and lodged the same with the proper authorities for investigation. Now is neither the
time nor the occasion to air said grievance, assuming for the moment that it is real and well founded. And as to the reference to the trial court, said court merely
acted upon the motion to dismiss. It considered the complaint and the motion to dismiss. That was enough. There was no need for the presentation of any evidence.
So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhich cannot be said of the comment and observations of counsel above
reproduced. Said counsel is hereby admonished to use more temperate and respectful language and observe more proper conduct in the future.
We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by prior judgment. There is no question that the
complaint filed by Plaintiff-Appellant with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a right; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the
WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings,
and conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. Not only this, but the parties before the commencement of the proceedings signed an
agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever decision the WAS may render on the same, and that they recognized the
decision to be final and conclusive. After signing that agreement or pledge, Plaintiff- Appellant may not now be heard to say that the decision rendered by the WAS
has no legal effect on him. Besides, even assuming that despite the agreement the decision did not automatically become final, still Plaintiffs failure to appeal
therefrom to the Supreme Court as provided by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act 602) rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action
between the same parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues.
In the case of Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 314, we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw a judgment rendered cralaw by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon
the same cause of action so long as it remains unreserved; or in the language of Mr. Justice Field in the opinion just cited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.
And in the case of Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494, 502-503, we equally held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only upon the questions actually contested and determined, but upon all matters which
might have been litigated and decided in that suit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand this is undoubtedly true of all matters properly belonging to the subject of the
controversy and within the scope of the issues cralaw . (citing 34 C.J., pp. 909-911.)
The authorities above cited on res adjudicata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. Are they applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage
Administration Service (WAS)? The answer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. This rule has been
recognized as applying to the decisions of road or highway commissioners, commissioners of motor transportation, boards of audit, county boards, tax
commissioners, boards, or officers, the federal trade commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewers commissioners, land commissioners or
officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy court commissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmens compensation acts, and other like
officers and boards. However, a particular decision or determination may not be conclusive, as where it was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative,
executive, or ministerial, determination, or the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the officer or board cralaw . (50 C.J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690, pp. 148-149).
cralaw There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and
boards. In this connection, it has been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen
is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 164, p.
910). (Italics Supplied).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 76142-43 December 27, 1993

VDA FISH BROKER and/or VENERANDO ALONZO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUPERTO BULA and VIRGILIO SALAC, respondents.
Jose Edward L. Navarro for petitioners.
Arellano, Malonzo & Capoyoc Law Offices for private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The ruling of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that "[t]he resolution of a corollary issue in a case does not constitute res
judicata to a subsequent case involving the same question of a employer-employee relationship," 1 is disputed by the petitioner and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
Petitioner VDA Fish Broker (VDA), a duly licensed fish broker, owned, operated and represented herein by petitioner Venerando D. Alonzo, is in the
business of selling fish. It engaged the services of private respondents Ruperto Bula and Virgilio Salac, among others, as batilyos "to arrange the fish in
the baera . . . (including) emptying or filling the baera or pulling or dragging the baeras in or out of the designated area." 2
On 14 May 1982, a complaint for non-payment of service incentive leave pay, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth month pay, legal holiday
and premium pay for rest day and holiday was filed against VDA, and Venerando and Corazon Alonzo by Samahan ng Nagkakaisang BatilyoNFL represented by its local president and herein respondent Ruperto Bula. Respondent Virgilio Salac also signed the complaint, subsequently
docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82.

On 26 May 1983, Labor Arbiter Porfirio E. Villanueva dismissed the case for lack of merit. He ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship
between VDA and the batilyos as the latter did their tasks
. . . in their own way so that they could earn more, as a matter of fact, a batilyo could earn from P60.00 to P150.00 a day for two to
four hours work. They are paid by the results according to the number of baeras they have completed. Fish brokers have no
control and supervision over thebatilyos. After completing their job for two or four hours they could abandon the fish brokers and
transfer to another fish broker. They don't observe any regular working hours nor (do) the accomplish any time record . . . . 3
The Labor Arbiter discarded the alleged written agreement of 20 March 1975 between Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Batilyo-NFL and the Fish Brokers
Association of the Philippines which recognize the existence of direct employer-employee relationship between fish brokers and batilyos because it did
not appear that VDA was a signatory therein. No appeal was taken from this decision.
Claiming that they were terminated from the service by VDA on or about 1 January 1984, Salac and Bula filed separate complaints against VDA and/or
Venerando Alonzo for illegal dismissal and for recovery of moral and exemplary damages docketed as Case Nos. NLRC-NCR-1-153-84 and NLRCNCR-1-169-84.
On 28 August 1984, Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez dismissed the complaints on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the opposing parties. He took note of the earlier decision in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 but nonetheless made his own finding that Salac
and Bula
. . . are independent contractors and they are, as such, laborers or employees of the respondents (VDA). They undertake to do a
piece of work for their own account, under their own responsibility and with minimum interference on the part of the respondents . . .
. They offer their services to the other fish brokers, dealers, catchers and the general public and are only paid only when they render
service. They are without any employer. 4
This decision was appealed to the NLRC. On 8 August 1986, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, directed VDA and Alonzo to reinstate
Salac and Bula to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay their back wages from 1 January 1984 until actual
reinstatement.
On 17 October 1986, this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order was filed seeking reversal of
the decision of the NLRC primarily on the ground that a previous case ruling that no employment relationship existed between the private parties
constituted a bar to the present suit. On 27 October 1986, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from taking further action on
the assailed decision. 5
In its comment, the OSG subscribed to the res judicata theory of petitioner. Consequently, the NLRC had to file its own comment sustaining its assailed
decision. Private respondents did not submit any comment.
We have several times applied the concept of res judicata to administrative decisions. In San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 6 through Mme. Justice Irene R.
Cortes, we made the following pronouncement:
. . . . It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
of res judicata (Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 [1956], Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72). The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined
by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers (Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503).
Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon whom judicial powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever any board, tribunal
or person is by law vested with authority to judicially determine a question . . . such determination, when it has become final, is as
conclusive between the same parties litigating for the same cause as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general
jurisdiction (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, supra at 76).
The NLRC however claims that res judicata cannot be applied here because the causes of action and issues in the two cases are different. For a while it
is true that the earlier case, Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82, pertains to non-payment of service incentive leave pay, emergency cost of living
allowance, thirteenth month pay, legal holiday and premium pay for rest day and holiday, and the later case, Case Nos. NLRC-NCR-1-153-84 and
NLRC-NCR-1-169-84, is for illegal dismissal and for moral and exemplary damages, nonetheless, we find that the issue of employer-employee
relationship is crucial in the determination of the rights of the parties in both cases. Moreover, it is erroneous to suggest that res judicata applies only
where there are similar cases of action. InNabus v. Court of Appeals, 7 we stated:
The principle of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case
where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are
present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes as absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the
claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose. But where between the first case wherein judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, but there is no identity of cause
of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as those matters actually and directly controverted and determined,
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed conclusiveness of the judgment (Viray, etc. vs. Marinas, etc., et
al. 49 SCRA 44 [1973]).
American jurisprudence on the matter, 8 although merely persuasive, is even more categorical:
An administrative determination may also operate by way of collateral estoppel (or res judicata in a limited sense) in a subsequent
proceeding in regard to the parties to a prior proceeding and as to matters actually and legally determined therein (Farm Invest. Co.
v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo 110, 61 P 258 . . . .). Where the underlying issue in the two proceedings is the same, the adjudication of the
issue in the first proceeding is determinative of the same issue in the second (United States v. Willard Tablet Co. [CA 7 Ind] 141 F2d
141, 152 ALR 1194 [where remedies sought by government in two proceedings were different, the first before the Federal Trade
Commission and the second before a court, the identical issue of falsity of labeling was involved in each]. See also Federal Trade
Com. v. Morton Salt Co. 334 US 37, 92 L ed 1196, 68 S Ct 822, 1 ALR 2d 269). An issue of fact litigated and determined by an
administrative decision, and essential to the decision, is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action, even though a
different claim is involved (See People v. Western Airlines, Inc. 42 Cal 2d 621, 268 P2d 723, app dismd 348 US 859, 99 L ed 677,
75 S Ct 87. In an action at law, a party is estopped to deny the truth of a finding which was essential to the administrative
determination, and may not offer evidence to show that the determination was not justified as matter of law Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Bissell, 220 Mich 352, 190 NW 283, 28 ALR 874. As to matters of fact within the scope of the authority of the
officers of the Land Department of the United States, their findings must be taken as conclusive in the absence of fraud and
mistake, upon the principle of estoppel by former adjudication Whitehill v. Victoria Land & Cattle Co. 18 NM 520, 139 P 184).
It is undisputed that the factual issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship has been determined with finality in the earlier case of Case
No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82, hence, that same finding should have been deemed conclusive in Case Nos. NLRC-NCR-1-153-84 and NLRC-NCR-1-16984. Were we to ignore the principle of res judicata, an absurd situation would arise where the same administrative agency would have diametrically
opposed conclusions based on apparently similar circumstances. The effect may even be more farcical in the sense that private respondents are given

dual or conditional status, i.e., they are employees for the purpose of reinstatement, but independent contractors for purposes of entitlement to service
incentive leave pay, etc.
This is the dilemma the principle of res judicata seeks to avoid. Both private parties have already submitted the question of the existence of employeremployee relationship before the Labor Arbiter in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 which, incidentally, private respondents have allowed to become final
by not appealing from it; consequently, they are precluded from disputing the same findings a second time. We thus rule that the administrative finding
on the merit of the absence of employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82, absent
any showing of change in the circumstances of the parties, or that the decision in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 has been reversed or vacated, is
conclusive upon Case Nos. NLRC-NCR-1-153-84 and NLRC-NCR-1-169-84 should have been dismissed.
Petitioner also disputes the ruling of the NLRC sustaining private respondents' argument that "since the complainants (herein private respondents)
are bona fide members of Samahang Nagkakaisang Batilyos-NFL, certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees in VDA RC3 Fish Broker per Order of 10 August 1982 in Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82, the issue of their status as employees of
respondent (herein petitioner) is rendered moot and academic." 9 Petitioner argues that no inference of employer-employee relation may be deduced
from this alleged circumstance because no such relationship actually existed, and neither was there any order to that effect presented at the hearing.
This is not wholly correct for photocopies of such copies were in the records and attached as annexes to two of private respondents' pleadings submitted
for the consideration of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 10 But the determination in Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82 (for certification election) cannot be
considered more conclusive as to the existence of employer-employee relationship that the decision in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 (for money
claims).
In the decision of the Labor Arbiter, which was set aside by the assailed NLRC decision, it was stated:
We note that the Order in Case NCR-LRD-183-82 relied upon the complainants was issued on August 10, 1982, while the Decision
in Case NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 relied upon by respondents was promulgated on May 20, 1983. The later pronouncement should
prevail, according to which there is no employer-employee relationship between respondents and individual complainants. 11
We have checked their records and found correct the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the Order in Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82 was issued on 10
August 1982, while the Order in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 was promulgated on 20 May 1983. Yet the NLRC, without showing why or how,
casually concluded that Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82 is "the later
case" which "put to rest the latter's (herein private respondents') status as employees." 12 NLRC justified its disregard of the findings of the Labor Arbiter
in Case No. NLRC-NCR-5-3832-82 on the basis that the matter of employer-employee relation was allegedly only a corollary issue therein.
We do not subscribe to this observation considering that the certification order in Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82 was a poor basis for concluding the
existence of employer-employee relation not only because there was no categorical statement thereon but also because there was no finding of facts on
which a determination of employment relation could be based.
As regards the decision of the Labor Arbiter to ignore the earlier Order in Case No. NCR-LRD-M-4-143-82, the general rule is that, as between prior
conflicting judgments involving the same parties or their privies, the last in
point of time is controlling (Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co. 55 Cal App 2d 720 . . . .). In such case, it is the later, and not the earlier, judgment is
operative as res judicata (California Bank v. Traeger, 215 Cal 346 . . . .). The rule is where in two successive actions between the same parties
inconsistent judgments are rendered, the judgment in the second action is controlling in a third action between the parties. 13
While the foregoing may already be sufficient to warrant reversal of the assailed decision and to grant the writ prayed for in the petition, a discussion on
the application of the ruling in RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v.NLRC 14 is in order to correct any misimpression thereon.
The statement in RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v. NLRC that "the continuity of employment is not the determining factor, but rather, whether the
work of the laborer is part of the regular business or occupation of the employer," 15 citing Art. 281 (now 280) of the Labor Code and Philippine Fishing
Boat Officers and Engineers Union v. CIR,16 does not mean that the essential elements of employer-employee relationship are done away with. The
statement simply means that where the elements are present, the existence of employer-employee relationship is not affected by the fact that the work is
seasonal or intermittent or in the meantime suspended. Otherwise, agents and independent contractors, e.g., playing bands in bars, would be
comprehended whenever their services are said to be necessary to the business of one who engages or hires them. Moreover, in view of the unreversed
finding of the Arbiter that the control requirement was wanting in this case, there is no occasion to apply the ruling in RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation
v. NLRC.
There obviously being grave abuse of discretion, the assailed decision of respondent NLRC must be set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari is granted and the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission of
8 August 1986 is SET ASIDE. The decision of Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez dated 28 August 1984 in Case Nos. NLRC-NCR-1-153-84 and NLRCNCR-1-169-84 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The restraining order we issued on 27 October 1986 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162784

June 22, 2007

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in
San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the
successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the
only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent
portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San
Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong
PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke
55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang
Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na
si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca
Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking
ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at
PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said
document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark 5 above her name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first
page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null
and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same
lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz HerreraMercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the lots in question are portions of the
lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of
the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz
was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area
of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee
is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but
resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in question; he has
been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee; and
protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question. 9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. 10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision
dated January 23, 1987.11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said
transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued
in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's
Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's
declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera
alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory. 14 They also
contended that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera
paid for the property with the use of her own money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they
had been paying taxes thereon.16

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated
June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real
property within its jurisdiction."18The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President
awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The
Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to
private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of
merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that
Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a
waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a
perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her
daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for submission
to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she
intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make
it appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August 22,
1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in court by the
surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots
and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of
whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED
FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER
DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to
the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and
rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To
be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are
usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced
in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial powerthat which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial
power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." 22 This function applies to the actions,
discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 23 However, administrative
agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3)
branchesthe legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal
conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government committed an act that
falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 26 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the
Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and
decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on
August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). 28 We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to
controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. 29 The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy. 30
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it considered the application for the purchase of lots.
Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective application and
inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private
respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done arbitrarily.

The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA. 31 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is
concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then
applying to purchase the same before it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document
commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue
of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera
without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she
has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her
estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute
them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the
seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties
Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either
by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law
and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially
paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. 38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person" 39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation
to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the
award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein
null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a
testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire
upon the death of the instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated
August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-54424. August 31, 1989.]
NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER ILDEFONSO G. AGBUYA and JUANITO COLLADO, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE TO LABOR RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS. The Court stated in Razon
v. Inciong that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in
nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." Said pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential
dictum that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative
powers.
2. ID.; EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP; APPLICATION FOR CLEARANCE TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT; A SHIELD AGAINST
ARBITRARY DISMISSALS. The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a creation of the Department of Labor to
carry out the Labor Code provisions on security of tenure and termination of employment. The proceeding subsequent to the filing of
an application for clearance to terminate employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code. The fact that said rule allowed a procedure for the approval of the clearance with or without the opposition of the
employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious and summary nature of the proceeding. The clearance
requirement was therefore necessary only as an expeditious shield against arbitrary dismissals without the knowledge and
supervision of the Department of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance implied that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec. 2).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRITTEN CLEARANCE FROM THE DEPT. OF LABOR ABOLISHED AT THE ENACTMENT OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
130. The requirement of a written clearance from the Department prior to termination was abolished by the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981. Dismissal proceedings are now confined within the establishments. The NLRC or the labor arbiter steps
in only if the said decision is contested by the employee.
4. ID.; ID.; LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AS GROUND FOR DISMISSAL; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOT REQUIRED. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an employees misconduct is not required when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is
sufficient if the employer has "some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain
the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein
rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEPARATION PAY DISALLOWED. We are aware of Collados almost six years of service to the petitioner as well as
the hardships resulting from the loss of his job. Compassion dictates us to grant him separation pay as financial assistance but we
are bound by the ruling of the Court en banc in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC that henceforth separation pay
shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.

DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. (NALCO for brevity) is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It is engaged in the business of logging, lumber manufacturing and wood processing with field offices at Nasipit, Agusan
del Norte.
Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner as a security guard on September 9, 1970. He was assigned as 1st
Sergeant of the NALCO Security Force at Nasipit. In the course of Collados employment or on August 20, 1976, four (4) crates of
lawanit boards containing 1,000 panels were stolen from petitioners premises, particularly the crating section of the Philippine
Wallboard Corporation, a NALCO affiliate.
Collado was implicated in the theft and was thereafter placed under preventive suspension. On September 8, 1976, NALCO filed a
petition (application) for clearance to dismiss Collado with the Regional Office No. X of the Department of Labor in Cagayan de Oro
City. 1 On September 15, 1976, Collado filed an opposition to said application for clearance to dismiss. The case was set for hearing
the following day, September 16, but Collado, despite notice, failed to appear. Hence, NALCO was allowed to present evidence exparte.
On October 12, 1976, the application for clearance to dismiss was approved in an order issued by Regional Office No. X Officer-inCharge Roy V. Seneres. 2 The order was based on the investigation report of the head of the Agusan Provincial Labor Office. Collado
filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the false findings or
adduce evidence in his favor. He further denied participation in the theft. 3
On December 7, 1976, the said Officer-in-Charge, through a subordinate, certified the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter for
compulsory arbitration. 4 Notice and summons were issued. NALCO and Collado were then required to submit their respective
position papers under pain of a default judgment. 5 After a perusal of the records, Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya
returned the case to the Regional Director of Regional Office No. X in Cagayan de Oro City for whatever appropriate action he may
deem fit. A portion of the order dated February 25, 1977 of said Executive Labor Arbiter reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From all indications, we find that the Motion for Reconsideration should be treated as an appeal to (sic) the Order of Roy V.
Seneres, dated 12 October 1976, and as such it should be elevated to the Secretary of Labor. Besides, we also fear that if we take
cognizance of this case, perhaps, we might reverse the order of the Regional Director which, to our thinking, would only create a
disturbance to the harmonious relation existing between our two offices. . . ." 6
Consequently, the case was elevated to the Secretary of Labor. On June 7, 1978, Acting Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued
an order affirming the order of Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres thereby granting petitioners application for clearance to dismiss
Collado. 7
Instead of resorting to this Court on a petition for certiorari, 8 on October 9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the Butuan
District Labor Office, Butuan City, for unjust dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits. 9 Without going to specifics,
Collado averred therein that his termination from employment "was unfounded, unjust and illegal, based as it was on uncorroborated
and malicious suspicion, insinuation and hearsay, and characterized by harassment."cralaw virtua1aw library
NALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that in view of Acting Secretary Inciongs aforesaid order, Collado did not
have any sufficient cause of action and therefore his complaint was a nuisance. 10 In its position paper, NALCO added that because
Acting Secretary Inciongs order had become final and executory, the issue of illegal dismissal had also become res judicata. 11
The case having been certified for compulsory arbitration, on January 29, 1979, Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya
rendered a decision ordering NALCO to reinstate Collado to his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights
"provided he has the necessary papers required of the service as security guard. 12
In his decision, the said labor arbiter stated that while NALCO complied with the requirements of law when it obtained a clearance to
terminate, he could not discount the possibility that NALCO "knew or at least suspected that there was something wrong with the
manner in which the investigation was conducted" by the head of the Butuan District Labor Office whose report was the basis of the
approval of the clearance application. 13 He conceded that NALCO acted in good faith in terminating Collados employment and that
it was NALCOs prerogative to terminate such employment to protect its business interests. However, he was constrained to arrive at
said conclusion ordering the reinstatement of Collado because of the order of the Nasipit municipal judge in Criminal Case No. 2236
finding that there was nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witness to establish the probable guilt of Collado who should
therefore be dropped from the complaint for qualified theft. He also took into consideration the certification of the Agusan del Norte
provincial fiscal showing that Collado had also been dropped from the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1127.
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). NALCO asked for the reversal and revocation of the
decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter while Collado prayed for a modification of the appealed decision to include backwages and
benefits in addition to reinstatement.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
On May 30, 1980, the NLRC First Division 14 rendered a decision modifying the Executive Labor Arbiters decision by ordering
Collados reinstatement to his former position with two (2) years backwages without qualification and loss of seniority rights. 15 It
agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter with respect to the dropping of Collado from the criminal
cases but it ruled that the rights of Collado to backwages were not precluded by the findings that his termination was effected in
good faith. On the issue of res judicata, the NLRC said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We cannot subscribe to the arguments of the respondent-appellant that the order of the OIC of Region X which was subsequently
approved by then Acting Secretary Amado G. Inciong has become the law of the case. Res judicata cannot be validly invoked in this
case because the granting of the application for clearance which although admittedly was secured with all the formalities required by
law, did not resolve the case on its merits. Records show that on September 16, 1976 the application to terminate was scheduled for
investigation before the Provincial Labor Office. Petitioner Collado who was then the respondent in this case failed to appear although
he was properly notified of the scheduled investigation. On September 22, 1976, the Head of the Agusan Provincial Office submitted
its investigation report recommending the approval of the application to terminate Juanito Collado without affording him another
chance to be heard and defend his side. It is very clear that the investigation conducted by the Provincial Labor Office was hastily
done and vitiated with infirmities. What it should have done is to give the respondent (Collado) another chance to defend his case
considering the gravity of the offense imputed against him which if proved would cause him his only means of livelihood." 16
NALCO filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
restraining order, seeking to annul the NLRC decision and to prohibit its execution. It imputed to the NLRC lack or excess of
jurisdiction and grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in overturning the final decision of the Acting
Secretary of Labor thereby denigrating the time-honored doctrine of bar by former judgment or res judicata. It assailed Collados
reinstatement as improper inasmuch as the employer-employee relations of the parties had been legally severed by the approval of
the clearance to dismiss.
This Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 17 Upon receipt of the dismissal resolution, NALCO filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration based on the following grounds: (a) it has a valid and meritorious cause of action due to the NLRCs violation of the

principle of res judicata; (b) the occurrence of a supervening event consisting of the remand of the records of the approved
clearance to dismiss for execution and/or appropriate action, 49 days after the promulgation of the herein questioned NLRC decision;
(c) the NLRC not only disregarded the final and executory decision of the Acting Secretary of Labor but also the pronouncements of
this Court on the curative effects of appeals in labor cases wherein the issue of denial of procedural due process had been raised;
and (d) should the NLRC decision become final, a confusing situation of two diametrically opposed decisions on the same issue of
dismissal, would arise.
Understandably, Collado opposed the motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the Solicitor General, appearing for public
respondents, filed a manifestation and motion recommending that the urgent motion for reconsideration be granted. He stated
therein that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion because: (a) all the elements of res judicata are present in this case: (b) the
merits of Collados dismissal had been litigated in the first case and Collado was therefore estopped from attacking the final decision
of the Acting Secretary of Labor either in the original action or in a new and subsequent action; (c) not only the "formal aspect" in
the application for clearance to terminate was involved in the first case as the merits thereof were fully taken into consideration; and
(d) to allow a distinction between the two cases would result in splitting a cause of action which would ultimately breed multiplicity of
suits.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
On the strength of the Solicitor Generals manifestation and motion, the Court reconsidered the dismissal resolution and gave due
course to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. 18
The two principal issues presented to this Court for adjudication are the applicability of the principle of res judicata and the legality of
Collados reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
On the first issue, we hold that this is one of the cases wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru Justice Vicente Abad Santos in
Razon v. Inciong 19 applies. The Court stated therein that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that
such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." Said
pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. 20
The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a creation of the Department of Labor to carry out the Labor Code
provisions on security of tenure and termination of employment. The proceeding subsequent to the filing of an application for
clearance to terminate employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
The fact that said rule allowed a procedure for the approval of the clearance with or without the opposition of the employee
concerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious and summary nature of the proceeding. The clearance requirement was
therefore necessary only as an expeditious shield against arbitrary dismissals without the knowledge and supervision of the
Department of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance implied that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec. 2).
But even while said clearance was a requirement, employees who faced dismissal still contested said applications not only through
oppositions thereto but by filing separate complaints for illegal dismissal. Usually, the investigation on the application and the
hearing on the complaint for illegal dismissal were conducted simultaneously. What makes the present case unusual is that the
employee filed the complaint for illegal dismissal only after the Acting Secretary of Labor had affirmed the approval of the application
to terminate his employment. Nonetheless, we are unprepared to rule that such action of the Acting Secretary of Labor barred
Collado from filing the complaint for illegal dismissal. If ever, the most that can be attributed against Collado is laches for his failure
to question seasonably the Acting Secretary of Labors affirmance of the approval of the clearance to terminate. However, to count
such laches against Collado would be prejudicial to his rights as a laborer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Be that as it may, the possibility that there would be two conflicting decisions on the issue of Collados dismissal may now be
considered academic. The requirement of a written clearance from the Department prior to termination was abolished by the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981. Dismissal proceedings are now confined within the establishments. The NLRC or the
labor arbiter steps in only if the said decision is contested by the employee. 21
On the legality of Collados dismissal, we hold that the NLRC abused its discretion in directing his reinstatement with two (2) years
backwages. The relation between petitioner and Collado is now strained by the latters violation of the trust and confidence reposed
on him as a member of the security force, a position impressed with a high degree of trust. 22 Proof beyond reasonable doubt of an
employees misconduct is not required when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is sufficient if the employer has "some
basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the
employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. 23
In this case, petitioner supported its application for clearance to terminate Collados employment with sworn statements implicating
him in the theft. 24 Such sworn statements are sufficient to warrant the dismissal. On the other hand, the dropping of the qualified
theft charges against Collado is not binding upon a labor tribunal. 25 The sensitivity of Collados job as a security guard vis-a-vis the
cause of his dismissal cost him his right to be rehired to the same position. Reinstatement is not proper where termination of
employment was due to breach of trust and confidence. 26
We are aware of Collados almost six years of service to the petitioner as well as the hardships resulting from the loss of his job.
Compassion dictates us to grant him separation pay as financial assistance but we are bound by the ruling of the Court en banc in
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC 27 that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby reversed and set aside. Juanito Collados dismissal from employment is hereby
declared valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant
City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the
order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case
No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or
other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner
[private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the
Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit
proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence
to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of
any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and
580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting
City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL
AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended
Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its
legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or
other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner
[private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the
Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the
Order is a patent nullity. 6
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of factfinding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for
supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure
areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a
legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into
evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating
mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the
production of documents under a subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in
judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted
sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal
aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To
hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency
in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function
should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself
makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The
seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a
specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial
or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized,
however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one
procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications"
referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the
subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or
not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint.17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized

purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence
so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not
unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing
that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take
steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for
enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City
Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from
respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary
proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein
may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant
cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly
result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is
not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in
the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding
charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus
be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege
against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More
tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by
Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force
and effect of statutes 32cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for
adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well
within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.