Petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 14 for Annulment of Mortgage,

Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-21064 and T21065 and Deed of Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The
complaint alleged that the assailed mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings were null and void
since the written consent of petitioners, as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not
secured. Respondent bank denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage,
petitioners in fact gave their consent.

I.
Bernabe vs. Alejo (EDZ)
Jan. 21, 2002
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina
died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in
behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes
estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. The RTC dismissed the
case, citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had
barred the action. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend a scheduled
trial. Upon motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that they have been continuously pursuing
negotiations with respondent bank to purchase back the property and have gained positive
results. Respondent bank countered that from the time the complaint was filed, a period of three
years had elapsed but petitioners failed to prosecute their case, showing lack of interest in the
early resolution thereof. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

Issue: W/N the appeal is proper.

HELD:
YES.
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.

instead of filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court

Held: Petition is denied

Petitioners erred in filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant or
upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.

Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested
prior to its enactment.

Upon the order of dismissal, petitioners counsel filed a timely motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the trial court. Considering that an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute has
the effect of an adjudication on the merits, petitioners counsel should have filed a notice of
appeal with the appellate court within the reglementary period.[5] Instead of filing a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper recourse was an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41, which provides:

Petition Denied.
B.
Ko vs PNB (LEO)
Facts:

Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.

the passageway which violated the right of way of the private respondents and caused irreparable
damage and injury to the rights of the private respondents.

(a)
Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners denied liability on grounds that persons who executed deed of assignment are neither
owners nor possessors of Lot 1034 thus deed of assignment was null and void. RTC granted a
permanent right of way in favor of the private respondents measuring 2.7 meters wide and 21
The rule is clear. In order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro forma notice meters long, upon payment of the proper indemnification in the amount of P28,350.00; but which
of appeal. Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal within the remaining two days of the denied the private respondents prayer for damages. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied by
appeal period, petitioners counsel instead filed the instant petition. The rules of procedure,
RTC.
however, do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide
order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be trifled with lightly or
overlooked by mere expedience of invoking substantial justice. In Balindong v. Court of
Appeals[6] we stated:
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed notice of appeal on Aug. 15,2000. However RTC denied due course
to the Appeal in Aug 17,2000. RTC held from records that MR of petitioners was filed out of time
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for
more so the notice of appeal. Petitioners filed petition for certiorari with CA. Oct 27,2000. CA
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
issued a Resolution dismissing petition on two grounds: first, the verification and the non-forum
not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.
shopping certification is signed by petitioners counsel which is proscribed by law; and second,
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
the petitioners failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to petition for certiorari.
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply
Hence this petition.
with the rules. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. The
ISSUE: WON CA abused its discretion when it issued resolution (oct. 27,2000) based solely
enforcement of procedural rules is not antithetical to the substantive
rights of the litigants. The policy of the courts is to give effect to both
on technical considerations, as well as affirming null and void order( Aug 17, 2000)
procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just
denying due course to the petitioners notice of appeal even as it was filed in reglamentary
and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
period?
C.
SPS DELOS SANTOS V. VDA DE MANGUBAT OCT 10, 2007 (SAM)
2. WON CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued order of July 3, 2001 denying
petitioners motion for recon NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAD MERITORIOUS
Respondents are registered owners of Lot 1033 in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria Bulacan with an area of GROUNDS AND WAS TIMELY FILED.
793 sqm. Located at east of the Lot 1033 is Lot 1034 where petitioners house is erected in name
of Elena San Jose. Respondens filed with RTC Bulacan a Complaint for damages with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners alleging that respondents cannot reach the public HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED. CA Resolutions October 27, 2000 and July 31, 2001 are
road without passing upon a portion of Lot no. 1034 being the shortest passage way, owners of SET ASIDE and the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, is directed to GIVE DUE COURSE to the Notice of
Lo 1034 executed a duly notarized Deed of Assignment of Right of Way conveying a strip of Lot Appeal filed by the petitioners on August 14, 2000. The temporary restraining order issued by the
No. 1034 in favor of the private respondents to be used as a permanent right of way, third: the Court during the pendency of herein petition is LIFTED.
petitioners, without any authority over the strip of land, deliberately placed sand and gravel along
FACTS:

In 2005, pending resolution of herein petition, the Court amended the Rules of Court on the cases, the Court held that when the Rules of Procedure are rigid and strict in application, resulting
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to
appeal period in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[17] to wit:
suspend them. The Court finds that the present case is one of the instances where the rigid
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair application of the rule on filing a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 certiorari may be suspended to give way to the application of the new rule enunciated in
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from Neypes.
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Third, the present Petition for Certiorari filed with this Court is an improper remedy in
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from bringing the instant case before this Court. The proper remedy to obtain reversal of the CAs
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the October 27, 2000 and July 3, 2001, Resolutions is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new of the Rules of Court.
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3.
While the Court may treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule
45 to serve the higher interest of justice, such liberal application of the rules finds no application if
the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without any
This fresh period rule served as the beacon of light that guided the Court in the reason therefor.
resolution of the present petition. However, there are existing procedural rules that would have
blocked the outright application of Neypes to the present case.
Herein petition for certiorari was filed on the 60th day from date of receipt of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration,[29] well beyond the 15-day period within which to file the petition for
review under Rule 45. However, considering that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well-recognized that the Supreme Court is empowered to
suspend its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than to promote
the ends of justice.

First, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari filed before it by the petitioners was
based on the grounds that the verification and non-forum shopping certification were signed by
petitioners counsel; and that petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying due course to the appeal before resorting to a petition for certiorari. SC Circular 28-91
amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, specifically provided that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal Taking into account the fact that private respondent is entitled to the fresh period rule, in the
party seeking relief and failure to do so shall be a cause for the dismissal of the petition. This rule interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
is now embodied in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
compliance may be relaxed.

In the present case, the issue whether the RTC committed an error in awarding a right of way Thus, setting aside technicalities, the Court will proceed to determine the merits of herein petition.
in favor of private respondents, together with the other issues mentioned in the petition for
certiorari filed with the CA, are proper subjects of appeal. The fact that litigants have been The Court elucidated in Neypes that in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules of Court and to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, it is practical
given a fresh period of appeal, constrains the Court to give due course to the petition.
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Thus, the Court held that petitioners Neypes seasonably filed their notice of
Second, the general rule is that before certiorari under Rule 65 can be availed of, a motion for appeal within the fresh period of 15 days counted from the date of receipt of notice denying their
reconsideration must first be filed. However, this rule admits of exceptions. In a plethora of motion for reconsideration.[38]

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order
that courts may be able to administer justice.[39] Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[40]

company's titles, and hence, are neither covered by Pres. Dec. No. 1670. In its order dated
January 20, 1981, the trial court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court order on
January 30, 1981. The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal from
the dismissal of their complaint, petitioners filed by registered mail a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal. However, they did not file their appeal
bond until February 2, 1981 for which reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-day
period for perfecting appeal having expired. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari
but their petition was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was due to
denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the fresh "excusable negligence". Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.
period rule should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in
the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were
issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and
final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later
rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.

HELD: Petition is denied. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on the
timeliness of filing the appeal bond, a requirement for perfecting an appeal which had been
dispensed with by Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court. Although this new procedural rule may
be given retroactive effect, the extent of its retroactive application is, however, limited to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of its approval and does not extend to actions which had
already become final and executor . Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rules
of Court required the filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2000 or 12 days from receipt of the judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. In the case at bar,
Order denying their motion for reconsideration on August 3, 2000. Hence, following the fresh although the notice of appeal and the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal
period rule, the notice of appeal filed by petitioners may now be considered as having been filed were filed within the reglementary period, the appeal bond was filed two days late, or after the
period for perfecting an appeal had lapsed. Inasmuch as the appeal was not perfected on time,
well within the fresh period of 15 days.
the decision of the trial court became final and executory on January 31, 1981. The trial judge
committed no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court: SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal.
Borre vs Ca (JEHAN)
Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time
herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed. There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly held that perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. As
Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence
justifying the failure to file the appeal bond on time, the period within which to perfect an appeal
cannot be extended to accommodate the appellant. Petitioners' mistake in believing that the
Office of the Clerk of Court would be closed on Saturdays does not constitute "excusable
negligence" which would justify a liberal application of the pertinent rules on the perfection of an
appeal. Petitioners' counsel, a practitioner in the Metro Manila area, should have known or
exerted effort to inquire about office hours in courts on Saturdays instead of assuming that
Saturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much less a grave one at that, as
alleged, was committed by respondent Judge in dismissing petitioners' appeal.

BORRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Manotok Services,
Inc. to recover rentals paid by them alleging that the land leased to them by the company was
actually public land, forming part of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did not
belong to the company. On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on November 11, 1980 on the ground that the company's ownership of the property
was recognized by the State with the passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670. On December 13, 1980,
petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that respondent company's titles covered lots which
were portions of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and therefore should not have
been included in those titles because these portions are public property which cannot be
appropriated and titled by private persons like the respondent company. The trial court denied the
motion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was received by petitioners on January 12,
1981. A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the ground that a
subsequent survey showed that the lots occupied by petitioners are not covered by respondent

Republic vs. CA (MARCO)

March 18, 2003

Corona, J.

LA rendered a Decision declaring (June 3, 1995) that petitioners were illegally dismissed and
ordering respondents to reinstate them without loss of seniority rights, and to pay them their
backwages, salary differential, 13th month pay differential.

FACTS:
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, the
government embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT) projects. One
of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and the founding site of
the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros,
Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a
historical landmark. To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the
National Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). The RTC
dismissed the complaint for expropriation on the ground of lack of cause of action. Petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Judge Christopher Lock for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal by respondents, the NLRC reversed the Arbiters judgment, holding that petitioners are
contractual employees and that respondents merely allowed their contracts to lapse. MR was
denied.
Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was GRANTED reinstating the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, only full-time
teachers who have rendered (3) years of consecutive service shall be considered permanent.
Respondents filed an MR but it was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari which was
dismissed for lack of merit. Their MR was denied with finality July 19, 2000.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed (October 4) with the LA a motion for execution of his Decision as
modified by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines
before the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.

LA computed the petitioners monetary awards reckoned from the time of their illegal dismissal in
June 1994 up to October 29, 1999. Respondents interposed an appeal to the NLRC contending
that the computation should only be up to June 20, 1995.

HELD: NO. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter
No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC effective
September 1, 2000. The recent rule no longer provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned
from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day
period shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

NLRC modified the LAs computation and ruled that the monetary awards due to petitioners
should be computed up to June 20. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but
was dismissed outright for their failure to attach to their petition copies of the pleadings filed with
the LA. On MR, they erroneously indicated the case number. Their error was compounded by
stating a wrong Division.

The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It
does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

On realizing their mistake, petitioners then filed with the Seventh Division a Motion to Transfer
The Case to it which was denied on the ground that the motion is non-existent since it does
not bear the correct case number.
Petitioners filed an MR, but it was denied.
ISSUE: WON CA err in holding that affixing a wrong docket number on a motion renders it
non-existent?

Petition Granted.

HELD:
The CA (7th Division) is correct when it ruled that petitioners MR is non-existent. Petitioners
counsel placed a wrong case number in their motion, indicating (Special 16th Division). If a
pleading bears an erroneous docket number and thus could not be attached to the correct case,
the said pleading is, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. The CA Division has neither the
duty nor the obligation to correct the error or to transfer the case. The duty to correct the
mistake falls solely on the party litigant whose fault caused the anomaly.

Magallanes v Sun Yat Sen Elementary School (NEMO)

G.R. No. 160876 | January 18, 2008
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioners were all employed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary School in Surigao City. However, SC opts for liberality in the application of the rules to the instant case in light of the
Respondents terminated (May 22, 1994) the services of petitioners. Thus, they filed (August 3) following considerations. First, the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed
with the NLRC, complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal, etc.
where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or
where the interests of justice so require. Second, this Court is not a slave of technical rules, shorn

of judicial discretion in rendering justice, it is guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. Thus, if the application of the rules
would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within this Courts power to
suspend the rules or except a particular case from its application.

This case involving a labor dispute has dragged on for over a decade now. The Labor Code was
promulgated to promote the welfare and well-being of the working man.

SC sustains petitioners contention that the NLRC, in modifying the award of the CA, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial agencies
have neither business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of
the appellate courts. Under the PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS, any
alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for lack
of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Resolutions are REVERSED. The Order
of the NLRC is SET ASIDE. The Order of the LA is REINSTATED.

II. JURISDICTION
E) BASIC PRINCIPLES

Jurisdiction conferred by law not by agreement of the parties

[G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003] (KEN)
SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and
ELIADA GALDIANO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA
VALDEZ, Respondents.

Facts:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the
Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
o The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed
the Decision of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon
o The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the land of the
Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also

awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel
and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano
The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property
in Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
Atty. Manuel D. Cab (Cab) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion,
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel (Atuel) as administrator of the Cab Property
Valdez (Valdez) arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the
nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to
Valdez
o Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of Improved Agricultural Land under
which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property for P300.00
per year for two years
Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel (Spouses Atuel) and the Spouses
George and Eliada Galdiano (Spouses Galdiano) to occupy a 2,000-square meter
portion of the Cab Property
The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the
town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential
Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded that
Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the
same
MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as
a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated
o pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969
was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion (PD 27 Land) of the Cab
Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot
occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdezs emancipation
patent
o Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez
is a civil law lessee, not a tenant
o DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an
investigation regarding the petition
Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez (Spouses Valdez) filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession with Damages with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
against the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
o alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and
through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-described
property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less.
o Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be
ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez possession of the
Subject Lot
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no
cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is
the administrator of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
claimed that upon Cabs instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab

Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab
Property and also pointed out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject
Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation
patent issued to Valdez is null and void
o Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already
been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision in favor of the
respondents, segregating the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less,
from the land of the complainants
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The
DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator
o Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and
maintain the possessory rights of the complainants
o Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in determining the
amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals
o Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation
patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision
should be respected because it enjoys the presumption of
regularity.
o Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the Court of Appeals denied
On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses
Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat
Hence, the instant petition

The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for
recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction
of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction
The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred
on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Zamora v CA (POX)
March 19, 1990
GR No 78206
Topic:
Decision
RTC:

Placed the properties in question under receivership (1985)

CA:
Ruled that the petitioners are suing as stockholders and NOT as members of the
association, hence SEC has
jurisdiction.
SC:

Petition is denied. Affirmed CA decision.

Facts:
1.

Issue: W/N the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in
recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano
Held:

Jurisdiction conferred by law and not by agreement of parties

Yes. Decision of the CA is reversed.

Ratio:
2.

We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
because of the DARABs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy

Sometime in 1966 the petitioners and private respondents formed an unregistered

partnership called the Medina Peoples Cockpit Association. They purchased a lot thru
the contribution of the members and constructed a building thereon. In 1976, a
corporation called Medina Recreation Center was created where, Felomino Delgado
(private respondent) along with other relatives was the incorporators. Subsequently, the
properties of the association was transferred to the corporation which prompted the
petitioners to file a case against the respondents (defendant) claiming irregularities in
the transfer. Initially the case was filed with the SEC (1979) but was eventually
withdrawn by the petitioners, thereafter a case was filed with the CFI of Misamis
Oriental in 1980.
In the case with the RTC, petitioners (plaintiff) are claiming that they are suing as
stockholders of the said corporation. In there reply, the respondents (defendant) was
questioning the capacity (legal standing) of the petitioners and further moved for the

3.

Issue:

dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed an amended complaint,
deleting their claim that they are suing as stockholders of the corporation but as
Facts:
members of the association. This was granted by the court.
In June 1985, after the decision of the CFI, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari,
Dela Cruz, is a member of the Armed Forces assigned to Intelligence and Operations. He
prohibition and preliminary injunction with the SC. This was granted.
received a mission order to apprehend persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting
operations. He caught the operators in flagrante delicto, but they resisted arrest. A scuffle ensued
Who has jurisdiction over the subject matter?
and Dela Cruz shot Cabito. He was then charged with homicide in the CFI.

Held:
1.

While the case was pending, PD 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated vesting jurisdiction over
crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or Constabulary in the performance of their
duties with the courts-martial.

SEC has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to
hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or law while jurisdiction over the person is acquired by his voluntary
submission to the authority of the court. The SC ruled that though petitioners has the
right to amend the complaint filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, they were estopped
from alleging that they were NOT suing a stockholders of the corporation based on the
claim they initially filed with SEC. Based on that complaint with SEC, they stated that
(1) they were suing as STOCKHOLDERS of the said corporation requiring the
corporation, among other things to provide (a) Annual/periodic financial report, (b)
Statements of Assets and Liabilities, etc. (2) that there was a Deed of Transfer in
Exchange of Shares of Stocks on Feb 1977 and (3) records also showed that
petitioners received stock and cash dividends from the corporation (though petitioners
claimed that they later tried to return these). In addition, there is no question that the
claim of the petitioners against the respondents is under the concept of intra-corporate
dispute, where the petitioners is claiming irregularities against the respondents (as
officers of the said corporation) regarding the transfer of their properties to the
corporation. This is covered under Sec 5 of PD 902A.

Claiming that he was charged for a crime committed in the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz
filed a motion to transfer the case to the military officials.
Issue:
Whether the courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Criminal Case.
Held:
The court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, otherwise the
proceedings are void. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action.

By virtue of General Order no. 59, which was the governing law at the time, military tribunals
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel in the
performance if their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the
performance of their official duty. Provided that for the purposes of determining whether an
offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the
Note: The SC stated that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the
stage of the proceedings, for such jurisdiction is conferred only by law and CANNOT be acquired President.
thru waiver by, any act or omission of the parties. This may be alleged for the first time on, on
appeal or considered by the Court motu propio.
Even as no certificate issued by the Secretary or National Defense was presented in court, the
record contains a copy of the Mission Order signed by a Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela Cruz to
verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the
prosecution likewise shows that Cabito was shot while petitioner was executing his Mission Order.
Thus the respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case.

2.
Dela Cruz v Moya (GIL)
Dela Cruz v. Moya
G.R. L-65192 April 27, 1998

complaint. 3 Accordingly, the present case being one for forcible entry, it should normally come
under the jurisdiction of the municipal court, before which it was in fact filed. There was a
complication, however, as in their respective primary pleadings, the parties both injected the issue
of ownership to support their adversary claims to the possession of the property. This issue of
ownership, in view of the respondent court, had removed the case from the jurisdiction of the
municipal court. .

3.
Ching v Malaya (BRENT)
Facts:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks a reversal of the decision of
the respondent court nullifying the judgment of the municipal court in a forcible entry case on the It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
ground of lack of jurisdiction. .
oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This has to be so, for "were the principle
otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actions
The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents had depend upon the defendant in all cases. Accordingly, we have repeatedly held:
forced their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to
vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the petitioners' case The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced during
that they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The the trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the
private respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property question of who had the prior physical possession.
belonged to them by right of inheritance. At any rate, they had argued, as the basic question was
one of ownership and not of mere possession, the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is
dismiss the complaint..
declared in a great number of cases that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on
appeal will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone.

The municipal court, ** affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered
judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. It also required them
to pay the petitioners back and current rentals at P 1,000.00 a month until actual surrender of the
premises, as well as a P 3,000.00 attorney's fee plus the costs of the suit. 1 On appeal, this
decision was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that the municipal court had no
competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership.

There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears during the trial that, by the nature
of the evidence presented, the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue
of ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and the action should
be dismissed.
After examining the facts of this present case, the Court finds that it does not come under
the exception to the rule. .

Issue:W/N Petition should be granted.

Ruling: Yes,

The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and
registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The basis of
the registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by Felix Carpio, the former owner, who had
acquired it from Brigido Alvarado, Cesar Alvarado's supposed father. The record does not show
that such registration has been challenged since the issuance in 1978 of the said certificate of
title, which in the absence of evidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is no
encumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendis annotated in the
certificate. Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world unless annulled
for cause in proper cases. .

The petitioners, disagreeing, then came to us. At the outset, we reject the private respondents'
submission that this petition is improper because the questions involved are merely factual. Of
course they are not. What we have to decide here is whether or not, in the light of the records of
the case, and particularly the adverse assertions of ownership over the property in issue, the
municipal court had the authority to try and decide the same in the first instance. This may be
raised on certiorari. .
As the original complaint was filed on January 6, 1979, the question before us should be
examined under the provisions of R.A. No. 296, as amended, which was the law then in force.
That law allowed the municipal court to receive evidence upon the question of ownership in
ejectment cases, but only whenever it was necessary to do so for the purpose of determining the
character and extent of possession and damages for detention. .

It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a complaint in the court of first instance of
Laguna against the petitioners and several others for the annulment of the deed of sale invoked
by the petitioners. However, that fact alone could not divest the municipal court of
jurisdiction to continue trying the question of possession, more so since the question of
ownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed of
There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action- and sale being challenged in that action was different from the contract involved in the exception just
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it-is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his cited. .

In the instant case, the private respondents were not a party to the contract of sale invoked by Answer: Yes.
the petitioners. It was being challenged by respondent Cesar Alvarado only as an alleged heir of
Brigido Alvarado, who had transferred it to Felix Carpio, who in turn had sold it to the petitioners. . Law: RA 4363 states that in the case of libel, the case against damages should be filed either:
1. In the place where the article was published or
Without preempting any decision in that annulment case, we make the observation that even if
2. Or where any of the offended parties actually reside or where the public officer
the private respondents should succeed therein, he would not thereby necessarily acquire full
ownership of the property in question. Assuming the validity of the holographic will be invoked, he
holds office
would be entitled to only an indefinite portion of the testator's estate as long as no partition thereof
shall have been effected. For this reason alone, the respondent's claim of ownership over the Application: In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint failed to state where it was
particular house and lots in question could be dismissed as untimely and untenable. .
published. Hence, respondents can only file the case in Manila, where they hold office.
Finally, the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the property
in question did not, as claimed, have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction.
As permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff in an ejectment case may
introduce such evidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession and the
amount of damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. The petitioners
were only trying to prove their right to possession and damages by establishing their right of
ownership. .

It is basic principle that the jurisdiction of the court shall be determined by the allegation of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 5,
1981, is set aside and that of the municipal court dated July 5, 1979, is reinstated, with costs
against the private respondents. This decision is immediately executory. .

4.

TIME V REYES (EDWARD)

JOSE AGRAVANTE, and JUAN AGRAVANTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA PATRIARCA,

substituted by Rosita Ordoez, and HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Respondents.

Time, Inc v Judge Reyes, Mayor Antonio Villegas, Juan Ponce Enrile
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Hence, the petition is with merit and ruled in favor of Times.

[G.R. No. 48324. March 14, 1990.] (NADZ)

TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the parties

Times Inc, a magazine based in New York, New York published an article narrating the
corruption in the Philippines, mainly on the mayor of Manila.
Due to this, Mayor Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile, undersecretary of Finance, filed a
libel case against the magazine in Rizal.
The complaint lodged did not allege that the article was printed and first published in the
province of Rizal.
Time Magazine filed motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction of the court in Rizal
Due to this, the judge a quo issued a deferment on the motion to dismiss until after the
trial of the case on the merits.
Petitioner filed an MR but was denied by the court, hence this appeal.

Issue: WON, the courts in Rizal has no jurisdiction on the case at bar.
Held:

For failure to state the place of publication, the respondents were left with no other option but to
file in Manila which they did not do.

FACTS:
- Juana Patriarca Pea (petitioner here are the heirs) filed an action to quiet title with CFI of
CamSur with damages against Jose Agravante and Juan Agravante. Answer was in due
course filed by the defendants.
- The case was set for pre-trial but before it could be held, a fire broke out in the capitol, hence,
the records were burned.
- The record of said case was reconstituted and the case was once more scheduled for pretrial. The defendants counsel moved for cancellation of this setting.
- The Court reset the pre-trial but again, the defendants attorney, pleading illness, sought to
have this second pre-trial setting cancelled. This motion was denied by the Presiding Judge
who promulgated the following Order, notice of which was served on defendants counsel. It
was denied, being not in accordance with the rules of lack of notice to the adverse party, for
lack of setting of the date of hearing, and for the reason that the medical certificate attached
thereto is only a xerox copy of an alleged medical certificate indicating that if rest is what is

10

only needed by Atty. Pacamarra, from that date to the date of the next hearing of the case, he
has sufficient period to rest, and therefore, the motion is not meritorious.
Pretrial pushed through despite the absence of the defendants and counsel and the court
declared them in default and allowed the plaintiff (Juana) to present evidence ex parte.
When Juana died, her heirs (the petitioners herein) presented a motion advising of her
demise and praying that they be substituted in her stead in the action this was granted by
the court on account of lack of objection to the motion.
Defendants moved for MR for these 3 orders (cancellation of pre-trial, pre-trial, and the
substitution by the heirs as plaintiff).
MR denied, hence, this petition for certiorari. They contended that pre-trial setting was void
since notice thereof had not been given to the defendants personally, only their counsel
having been notified; that when the Trial Court authorized the plaintiff to present evidence ex
parte, she had already been dead for some time and therefore the court failed to acquire
jurisdiction of her person; and that they had no opportunity to object to the motion for plaintiffs
substitution by her heirs.

ISSUE: WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over Patriarca.

HELD: YES.
Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the court by the filing of complaint.
Subsequent death will not affect jurisdiction, all that is entailed is the substitution of the heirs for
the deceased in accordance with Rule 3, Sec 17. In this case, theres no showing that Agravantes
had any ground to oppose the substitution or that they had suffered any prejudice of any sort by
reason of the substitution.

Navale v CA (KEVIN)

damages.
Petioners filed a petition for certiorari with the rtc questioning the order of default and writ of
demolition saying that they had never been summoned to answer the complaint. They contend
that summonses were never validly served on them and they did not appear voluntarily in the
action as to be covered by sec 23 rule 14 of the rules of court in what is equivalent to service.
Issue : w/o mtcc acquired jurisdiction over the pet
Held. Yes, jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the defendant without service of summons.
However, sec 23 of the rules of court provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service. In this case, the recordshows that summonses were duly
served on petitioners but that they, not only refused to receive the same, but that they also
declined to give their names.
Granting that there was an invalid service of summons, still they which is not the case here, still
the mtcc acquired the jurisdiction over the petitioners through their voluntary appearance thereat.
5.
Platinum Tours Incorporated v Panlilio (SEFF)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court
of Appeals
FACTS:
-

FACTS:
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry and damages with the municipal trial court in
cdo. With prayer for the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction and for the return of the
possession of a portion of the Bagting Estate i Carmen, cdo over which they claimed absolute
ownership but which had been allegedly occupied by petitioners with force and violence.
Moreover, the latter constructed a house against private respondent's will.

Mtc in cities granted the petition and issued writ. Petitioner however ignored the writ prompting
p.r. To file a motion to have petitioners in contempt. The mtcc then issued an order directing
petitioners to comply with the writ of injuction and for p.r. Not to demolish the fomer!s houses
pending a decision on merits.

Petitioner were declared in default for failure to appear and to present their own evidence. Mtcc
then rendered judgment based on respondents evidence and ruled that p.r. Are the rightful
possessors of the land and ordered petitioners to immediately vacatethe premises and to pay the

11

Petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president
Nelida G. Galvez (Galvez). Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets
which PATC bought from it. On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC
and. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03 with legal
interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit.
Writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo
Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Galvez was levied
upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio (Panlilio) filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case
No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a
chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1
million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at
P5 million.

Ratio: Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In
general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the
- TC denied the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.
and that the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) the
- Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is
Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action.
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
- TC declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
- Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary
Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his
attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his
365. The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive
- In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this
power of legal processes exerted over his person.
time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not
and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the
Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on
correctness of its decisions.
condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 941634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order, allowing the
- In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil
consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of
Case No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact
preliminary attachment.
that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the
- Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the order of Judge
consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the
Diokno but its motion was denied.
jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA assailing, among others, the July 23,
- Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.
Civil Case No. 94-1634.
Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in
CA: annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return
the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of
Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and
such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction
decide it as a separate case.
is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case,
- Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to
- Instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno
another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the CA.
decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared
the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would
Petitioners contention:
have had one petition less in its docket.
Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365.
- All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with
It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two
Civil Case No. 96-365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to
cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil
resolve the same with dispatch.
Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
ISSUE: WON Makati RTC Branch 62 has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case 96-365
6.
Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (EDZ)
HELD: NO.
Aug. 20, 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.
TC: denied Panlilios motion for intervention

12

FACTS:
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for damages against private respondent
Francisco Tesorero before the RTC. In lieu of an answer, private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiffs claim has
been extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder of
indispensable parties; and (d) venue was improperly laid. Of these four (4) grounds, the last
mentioned is most material in this case at bar. The trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint
on the ground of improper venue, reasoning that the plaintiff being a private corporation
undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiffs principal place of business as alleged in the
complaint and which for purposes of venue is considered as its residence. The CA dismissed the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case was properly dismissed because of improper venue.
HELD: NO. Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred
by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent
of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be
waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may
render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of
the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.

Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented before us. He is a complete
stranger to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations
that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose
benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We
are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by
petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in
Davao City should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there is
no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such
representation by petitioner.

iSSUE:/ HELD:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original complaint? YES.
RATIO:
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of
RPC provides that is the CFI that is specifically designated to try a libel case.

Petition Granted.
NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN (LEO)
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutin the plaintiff's cause of action.
Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates
to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
FACTS:

Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Petitioners
Inquirer and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answers
alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also alleged
that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint failed to state the resdience of
complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue
Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and admission of the amended
complaint now alleging that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati"
and that " This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati."
RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the defect in the original
complaint has already been cured in the Amended complaint which can still be properly
admitted purusuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was
not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal.
2 petitions for certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP and Umali)
but CA dismissed the petition. The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus,
the appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI and
Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.
Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the libelous article was printed and first
published; or (2) where the complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where the
complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since the original lcomplaint stated only the
business adress of Lucio Tan and not his actual residence or the place of printing and first
publication, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.

Jurisdiction is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case
while venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation
between the court and the subject matter, venue establishes a relation between the plaintiff and
the defendant, or the petitioner and the respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot
be conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In this case, the additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of printing and
first publication referred only to the question of venue and not jurisidiction. They would neither
confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over

13

the case. Tan's failure to allege these allegations gave the court, the power upon motion by a 410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
party, to dismiss on the ground that the venue was not properly laid.
upon the Court.
The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where originally it had
none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. Venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. Assuming that the venue was improperly
laid, the issue would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may be
waived. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the
case. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint by
questioning the propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss.

The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint. All complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates
to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is SUN INSURANCE V ASUNCION (JEHAN)
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion
7.
FACTS:
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., (SAM)
Petitioners , vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the Court is asked to resolve the issue whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case
when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun
STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREWLUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
Insurance Office, Ltd (SIOL) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
Respondents
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent declared in default for failure to file
the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, on March 28, 1984,
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case
FACTS:
No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J.
Originally, this was a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
prayer for a temporary restraining order. In the present case the damages were not specifically compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation
and costs of their suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
stated in the prayer but was alleged in the body of the complaint which assessed
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint. Only the amount of
P210.00 was paid by private respondent as a docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to
raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was
then presiding over the case.Upon the order of the Supreme Court, Civil Case Q-41177, together
with twenty-two other cases, regarding docket fees were re-raffled and said Civil Case was
temporarily assigned to Judge Antonio P. Solano. In January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a
cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed
ISSUE: WON THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE WHEN by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated. The case was then
assigned to Judge Maximiano Asuncion.In compliance to the order of the court, respondent filed
THECORRECT AND PROPER DOCKET FEE HAS NOT BEEN PAID.
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" alleging actual and compensatory damages and
attorney's fees of about P44,601,623.70.The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on
HELD:
Private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 and this was subsequently paid by the
No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
respondents. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning
the order of Judge Asuncion. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages, amounting the total claim
78.75 million as damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of the docket fee paid was
only 410.00. With leave of court the petitioner then amended the complaint with the inclusion of
additional co-plaintiffs and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of
the complaint thereby reducing the amount of damages to 10 million pesos only.

14

to P64,601,623.70. The private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.The
Court of Appeals granted the writ of preliminary attachment to the respondent but requiring the
court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent. Petitioners alleged that
although the respondent paid the amount of 182,824.90 as docket fee, the docket fee that should
be paid by respondent is P257,810.49.

objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
It can easily be discerned that petitioners complaint involves title to, or possession of, real
property. However, they failed to allege therein the assessed value of the subject property.
Instead, what they stated is the market value of the land at P15,000.00.

ISSUE/S:
whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing
fee paid was not sufficient.

The assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be
alleged by the claimant. What determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the
reliefs prayed for. Petitioners complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering
that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its
assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is
P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary Petition Denied.
period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Proton Pilipinas Corp v. Banque Nationale de Paris (NEMO)
Barangay Piapi vs. Talip (MARCO)
Sept. 7, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

GR 151242 June 15, 2005

Facts:

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful,
continuous and open possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2
hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur. The same land was subdivided into lots
consisting of 100 square meters each, where the individual petitioners built their houses. On the
remaining portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose gym and health center.
Respondent fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in his name. In 1998, he paid real estate taxes and subsequently, he threatened to build a
barb-wire fence around the land. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged
that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed value of the property is
P41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August
20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. The trial
court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners directly filed with
this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial courts Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as
amended, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
HELD: NO. The nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein
respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its copetitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and
Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee.
BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements, under the terms of the
trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them
in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would
deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles
are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of
title.
Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.
Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp. But
These guarantors refused to pay. Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998 before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay (1)
US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest.
The defendants-herein petitioners filed on October 12, 1998 a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring

15

jurisdiction over the case. As additional ground, petitioners raised prematurity of the complaint, It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
BNP not having priorly sent any demand letter.
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
By Order of August 3, 1999, the Makati RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and so hold fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
that the docket fees were properly paid. It is the Office of the Clerk of Court of this station that applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive
computes the correct docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, which counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
they did. Even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
just dismiss the case. The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
docket fees, thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside from being without any legal basis.
period.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Dismiss, but it was Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
denied by the trial court. Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and mandamus to payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified
the Court of Appeals which also denied it.
in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
Contention of the petitioners
of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94,23 petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct fee.
docket fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should
be included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Additionally, petitioners point out that the clerk of court,
in converting BNP's claims from US dollars to Philippine pesos, applied the wrong exchange rate.
Furthermore, petitioners submit that pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 7,25 the complaint
should have been dismissed for failure to specify the amount of interest in the prayer which
provides that :To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
In the instant case before the court, it appears that Respondent did not, however, pay the filing
fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on
September 7, 1998. And this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular
No. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time.
Issue: whether or not the non-payment of corresponding docket fee would automatically
result to the automatic dismissal of the case.
Held: No. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The July 25, 2001 Decision and the December
18, 2001 Resolution of the Court Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees that
should be paid by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this Court, and direct
respondent to pay the same within fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ordered to proceed with the
case with utmost dispatch.
Spouses de Leon vs. CA, 287 SCRA 94 (KEN)
FACTS:
- Private respondents Elayda filed a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of
two parcels of land against petitioners De Leon before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case because of non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees.
- On October 21, 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but required the private
respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land
in litigation as stated in the complaint. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
private respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals.
- On February 26, 1992, a decision was rendered by the respondent court annulling the orders of
the trial court and holding an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.
- Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

16

- On October 21, 1991, the trial court 5 denied petitioners' motion to dismiss but required private
respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land
in litigation as stated in the complaint.
- Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1992, rendered a decision 6 annulling the orders of the
trial court. The appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the
value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution dated March
25, 1992 of the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N in assessing the docket fees to be paid for filing of an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, should be used as basis.

5.

HELD:
The value of the case cannot be estimated, the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount
of P400.00 as fixed by Section 7 (b) (1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the
Court of Appeals correctly adjudged that since the action of respondents against petitioners is
solely for annulment or rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action
should not be confused and equated with the value of the property. Although eventually the result
may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is
controlling. In view thereof, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Issue:

2.

January 28, 2008

Jurisdiction > NON payment of docket fees

Decision
CA:
Dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners. Lifted the preliminary injunction issued to
enjoin the RTC
in hearing the civil case filed by the respondent.
Petition is denied. Affirmed CA decision.

Facts:
4.

Tokio is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance of business. Valdez

(respondent) on the other hand was a former unit manger of Tokio. On October 1998,
respondent filed a civil case against the petitioners (including Tokio) alleging that the
latter violated the Unit Management Contract refusing among other things, paying the

17

RTC has jurisdiction. It is an established rule that courts gained jurisdiction over any
case ONLY upon payment of docket fees. Though there is an exemption. If the court,
upon its examination determines that litigant in indeed indigent, the rule on non
payment of the docket fees is relaxed. Exemption to this is cited under Sec 21, rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied
that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees
and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him.
The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment
is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

GR No 150107-108

SC:

Did the lower court obtained jurisdiction?

Held:

Tokio v Valdez (POX)

Topic:

respondent commissions and bonuses. Respondent is claiming actual, moral and

exemplary damages against the petitioners. The RTC granted the motion filed by the
respondent stating that he is a an indigent plaintiff and was allowed by court, with lien
on any favourable judgement due to him, to file the complaint. The petitioners filed a
reply and a motion for the court to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction (for NON
payment of docket fees) but this was denied. Motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was also dismissed by the RTC. The petitioner went to the CA seeking for
the issuance of writ or preliminary injunction in regard to the order of the RTC. In turn,
CA issued the injunction.
The respondent filed with the CA an action to have his deposition taken by the court
citing the reason that he was already old (75 yrs old) and sickly. Petitioners filed an
action to declare the respondent in contempt for violating the restraining order issued by
the CA.

3.

In determining if a person qualifies as an Indigent Litigant, Sec 19 of Rule 41 Revised

Rule of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - INDIGENT LITIGANT
(A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT
EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN
EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET
VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they
own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

The test in determining whether the subject matter of an action of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation is by ascertaining the principal action or remedy sought. The annulment of
shares and dissolution of the corporation are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a
sum of money. If in the end a sum of money or real property would be recovered it would simply
be a consequence of such action. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of the
principal relief sought, such actions are cognizable exclusively by the RTC.
The Court holds that Lu's complaint is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence the correct
docket fees were paid
8.
Sps. Go v. Tong (BRENT)

Note: Rule 19 provides that only the litigant alone is required to make such attestation that he is GR 151942 Nov 27, 2003
indeed indigent. NO affidavits from family members are required.
General rule: docket fees to be paid upon filing of the initiatory pleadings.
Lu Ym v. Lu (GIL)
Exception: if there is a cogent reason determined by the judge, the docket fees could be paid in a
staggered manner within a reasonable period. Discretion of a trial judge granting staggered
payments will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that there is grave abuse.
G.R. 153690
Feburary 15, 2011
Facts:
The consolidated cases stem from a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue,
Receivership and Dissolution, filed by Lu against Lu Ym for 600,000 shares issued to the latter for
a price 1/18th of their real value as being inequitable, in breach of the fiduciary duty to
stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders rights, and with unjust enrichment. On
appeal the appellate court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case of Lu
for failure to pay the correct docket fee as the action was not one incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Lu Ym claimed that the complaint had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of 600,000
shares of stock of LLDC, the real value of which was based on underlying real estate values of
about Php 1,087,055,105, thus Lu did not pay the correct fees having only paid the amount for an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It bears noting that Lu is not claiming ownership over the shares. The mention of the values is
merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the inequitable price at which the transfer
was effected. The complaint is one for declaration of nullity of share issuance. The main relief is
to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000 shares.

Rule 65 Petition for Certio assailing the decision of the CA wherein it affirmed the Order of the
RTC. The Order granted that the docket fees can be paid in a staggered basis by private
respondent Tong. CA also denied M.R. by petitioners
Facts:
Juana Tan Go purchased a cashiers check from FEBTC in the amount of 500k, payable to
Johnson Y. Tong. The Check had the words Final Payment/Quitclaim after Tongs name to
insure that Tong would honor his commitment that he would no longer ask for further payments
for his interest in the informal business partnership which he and she had earlier dissolved.
After the check was delivered to Tong, the words were already erased, hence, it was not
honored. Tong then wrote FEBTC informing that the words where accidentally erased without
being initialled by the bank or the purchaser. He requested that check be replaced with another
payable to Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim with the same amount. (FEBTC did not
honor Tongs request).
Since the request was not granted, Tong filed a case against FEBTC and the petitioner spouses
at the RTC of Manila. The case was for for sum of money, damages, and attorneys fees.

18

Petitioner spouses and FEBTC answered and alleged that the erasure of the words final
payment/quitclaim on the cashiers check were intentional on the part of Tong. They stated that
Tong wanted to collect more from the spouses, hence, the non-issuance of the replacement
check was justified. (During pendency of the Tongs case against the spouses, George, son of the
petitioners, filed a criminal case for falsification of check against Tong. The case was, however,
dismissed).

Lastly, regarding the order which allowed the payment in staggered basis, the CA justified the
order pursuant to the Sun Insurance Office Ltd. case. The case permitted the payment of the
prescribed docket fee within a reasonable period but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or regular period.
Not satisfied, the petitioners filed that current rule 65 Certiorari with the SC.

Subsequently, Tong filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint and to admit ISSUE:
attached supplemental complaint. The supplemental alleged that the petitioners used George to
file the criminal complaint against him, hence, incurring more damages. He then prayed for an W/N the Order which allowed Tong to pay the docket fees in a staggered basis was correct. (SC:
increase in the payment of the damages previously asked to be recovered.
YES)
RTC of Manila admitted the supplemental noting that the petitioners had the opportunity to HELD:
comment, after being furnished but did not do so.
Re: Staggered Payments
Petitioners and FEBTC commented and opposed such. They also moved for the reconsideration
of the admission of the supplemental (MRs were denied).
Initially, the petitioners argued that the circumstances in the present case does not meet the
requirements set forth by the Sun Insurance Case. Then, they now argue that the said case does
Petitioners filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court the amount not apply since there was no under-assessment of the docket fee in the current case.
of P500k representing the amount of the check, subject to the condition that it shall remain
deposited until the disposition of the case.
In that case, it was clarified that: x x x. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
In answering the supplemental, petitioners mentioned that:
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
1) They were not a party to the criminal complaint (it was only George), hence, the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
incident should not be pleaded as a supplement to the original complaint;
or reglementary period.
2) Tong cannot prosecute the supplemental and shold be dismissed, unless the
corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims in the amount Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
of P55,057,075.00 are paid for.
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the
During pendency, Tongs counsel manifested to allow the release of the 500k. RTC granted the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
manifestation.
While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in 4 years, he was
The RTC also issued an order allowing Tong to pay the docket fees in a staggered manner allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a years time. This period was not shown as
(deposit of 25k and 20k every month until fully paid). The RTC judge justified that it was in unreasonable. Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the
the interest of justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court considered government of the required docket fee. The RTC judge's absolution by the CA was sustained.
the business climate and the peso crunch prevailing).
The Sun Insurance Office Ltd. case permits the payment of the prescribed docket fee within a
The petitioners filed an M.R. regarding the order. However, the M.R. was denied.
reasonable period but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular period. Since the
prescriptive period to file the complaint subject of the present petition which is an action upon an
They then went to the CA with a petition for certio stating that the RTC judge committed grave injury to the right of private respondent, is four years and the scheme of payment of the docket
abuse of discretion in issuing the order. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC judge. It justified fees in the amount ofP252,503.50 given by the RTC called for an implementation thereof within
that the petitioners failed to assail the order to release the money deposited within the prescribed one year, as in fact private respondent manifested in his Rejoinder that he had fully paid the said
period (they only assailed it a year after the order was issued).
amount on December 12, 2000, then the assailed Orders of November 17, 1999 and April 11,
2000 cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Further, the CA said that the 500k belonged to Tong, hence, he is entitled to the release.

19

To be sure, for certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed must 9.
be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal
hostility; and such exercise must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive LEE V MTC OF LEGASPI (EDWARD)
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. These conditions are
absolutely wanting in the present case.
Lee v MTC of Legaspi City
Re: Rule 65 Certio?

1.

Such a petition under Rule 65 may be filed when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2.

On the other hand, a Rule 45 may be filed when A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari.

4.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically states that in all cases, the CAs decisions, final orders
or resolutions -- regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved -- may be appealed
to this Court through a petition for review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process
involving the original case.

3.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Spouses Lam filed an ejectment case against Jose Lee since the lease contract already
expired. This was filed in the CFI of Legaspi, Albay and was Case 2487.
Jose Lee denied the allegations and stated that the spouses are not the proper parties
to sue since the property was decided in another case to be that of Felix Lim.
Lim thus intervened in Civil Case 2687 and questioned the right of the Lam spouses to
collect.
It also turned out that Lim filed case 6696 questioning the possession and ownership of
the spouses.
He also filed Case 6767 in CFI of Albay for reconveyance.
He also moved to dismiss the civil case 2687 stating that since the pleadings
questioned ownership, the jurisdiction should be with the CFI of Albay and not the MTC
of Albay.
RMTC ruled that MTC had jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the ruling.

A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent suit based on the specific grounds provided Issue: WON, MTC had jurisdiction.
therein. As a general rule, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45.
Held:
In the present case, petitioners are appealing a final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, Answer: Yes, MTC had jurisdiction.
when their remedy should be based on Rule 45. When an error of judgment of the CA is brought
up to this Court for review, the action is properly designated as a petition for review and not a Law: RA 5967, sec3 state that the city courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the CFI if the
special civil action. Thus, while the instant Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules case on ejectment raises the question of ownership.
of Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45.
But even if there is concurrence of jurisdiction, once one of the courts has already obtained the
Re: 500k release improper?
jurisdiction, then it exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other courts until appeal. It cannot
The release was proper since there was a prior understanding between the parties that petitioners be ousted.
would deposit P500k, which private respondent could withdraw if he so desired. In their
Manifestation of Deposit, they even referred to the earlier hearing during which the deposit had It is also basic principle that the jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of
been agreed upon. This Manifestation shows that the deposit was indeed made pursuant to their commencement of action.
earlier agreement.
Application: In the case at bar, the MTC of Albay has already obtained jurisdiction in case 2487
long before the subsequent cases were filed. It thus cannot be ousted jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Tong was entitled to the deposit, because it represented the amount indicated on
the check that undeniably belonged to him. In all the pleadings they filed, petitioners never
G.R. No. L-38579 September 9, 1982 (NADZ)
denied that the amount of P500k properly belonged to him. This was also included in the
Manifestation made by the petitioners wherein they stated that the money deposited to the court
covered the amount in the Cashier's check that was payable to Tong.

20

JULIET T. DIOQUINO, assisted by mother, NATIVIDAD TULLAO Petitioner, v. THE HON.

NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR. and MARIO VERGEL DE DIOS, Respondents.
TOPIC: Adherence to Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction cannot be ousted
FACTS:
Judge Pedro A. Revilla of the Court of First Instance of Rizal ruled that the crime of simple
seduction is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court. He, therefore, dismissed the
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction which sought to
enjoin the Municipal Court of Paraaque from proceeding with the trial.
ISSUE:
1. Who between Municipal Court and CFI has jurisdiction in the crime of simple seduction.
2. WON the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will operate to oust jurisdiction
already attached
RULING:
1. CFI has the original jurisdiction order of the CFI is set aside and the municipal judge of
Paraaque, Metro Manila is directed to forward the records of the criminal case to the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for proper proceedings.
2. No.

of a court depends upon the state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction
once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of
events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. ) Guys, this is the one
related to our topic, however, I cant connect it directly due to insufficiency of facts mentioned in
the case
Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines
Facts:
The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) is a commercial banking corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at Rosario Street, Manila. Ramos et.
al are the majority and controlling stockholders of Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM). Pursuant to a
resolution from the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, the operation of for various violations
of the banking laws and implementing regulations. Because the financial situation of the OBM had
caused mounting concern in the Central Bank, petitioner Ramos and the OBM management met
with respondent Central Bank on the necessity and urgency of rehabilitating the OBM through the
extension of necessary financial assistance.

In lieu thereof, the Monetary Board issued another resolution dated April, 1967 demanding the
stockholders to mortgage their properties or assign the same to the Central Bank and to execute
a voting trust agreement whereby they will pass the management to Philippine National Bank in
order to stave of liquidation. Hence, Ramos et. al executed the voting trust agreement prepared
The penalty imposed by Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of ample seduction is by Central Bank with petitioners as cestuis que trust and Central Banks Superintendent of Banks
arresto mayor, the duration of which is from one month and one day to six months this falls
as the Trustee. Petitioners likewise conveyed by way of mortgage to the Central Bank all their
under the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts. However, persons guilty of
private properties and holdings to secure the obligations of the OBM to the Central Bank.
seduction shall also be sentenced to indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring Accordingly, new directors and officers were elected and installed and they took over the
unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and to give support to such offspring (Article
management and control of the Overseas bank..
345 of the RPC) are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal
Courts they pertain to CFI (Section 44 [a] and [e], Republic Act No. 296).
However, after 8 months, the Central Bank did not make any positive action to reorganize and
It has been held that laws conferring jurisdiction on the inferior courts over demands below certain resume OBMs normal operations. Instead, Central Bank issued a resolution excluding OBM from
clearing with it and authorizing the nominee board of directors to suspend operations. Worse,
amounts do not preclude a determination of said demands in the superior court, where they are
connected with larger claims or with a type of demand solely within the jurisdiction of the superior Central Bank Monetary Board issued a resolution ordering the liquidation the bank. Hence this
court. It would be absurd to have the principal case of seduction tried and decided by the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Municipal Court and the resulting acknowledgment and support of the offspring by the Court of
preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Central Bank of the Philippines from enforcing and
First Instance. The duplication would entail unnecessary waste of time and effort for the parties
implementing the Monetary Board Resolutions. Petitioners charged that the OBM became
and for the courts, to the detriment of an orderly administration of justice,"
financially distressed because of this suspension and the deprivation by the Central Bank of all
the usual credit facilities and accommodations accorded to the other banks. Central Bank
Jurisdiction over a simple seduction case lies with the Court of First Instance and not with the
contended that to assail Resolution of the Monetary Board ordering the liquidation of the
inferior court, notwithstanding the fact alleged in the private respondent's answer that the
Overseas Bank, an action must be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Bank itself,
complainant gave birth to a child some eighteen months after the alleged commission of sexual
intercourse in the simple seduction (People v. Buissan 105 SCRA 547. Moreover, the jurisdiction and not by petitioning stockholders

21

strategy and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after Chua have
repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his failure to give chuas share of the
several harvests.

Issue: Whether or not the CB had agreed to rehabilitate, normalize and stabilize OBM and
whether or not the Central Bank resolutions were adopted in abuse of discretion.

LC: JOP Managula rendered judgment directing Abbain to vacate the premises and place Chua in
possession of the plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings that
If jurisdiction was already acquired ito delve into the validity of Resolutions 1263 and 1290 (and
sometime before WWII, Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225 to Subing Chua the
this the Central Bank admits), there is no cogent reason why, after such jurisdiction had been
coconut plantation; that after the sale, Abbain became the tenant of Chua, the harvests of the
acquired, the Court should be deprived thereof by the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1333,
land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son,
particularly because the latter, in relation to the antecedent facts, appears to be no more than a
Tongham Chua, and Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the tenant on the
deliberate effort to evade the jurisdiction of this Court, and have the case thrown back to the Court land.
of First Instance. The Central Bank, by promising to rehabilitate the bank, is estopped from
- Abbain filed a petition in the CFI of Sulu against Tongham Chua and Judge Managula, seeking
closing it down. The conduct of the Central Bank reveals a calculated attempt to evade
relief from the judgment of the JOTP Court anr/or annulment of its decision with preliminary
rehabilitating OBM despite its promises. Hence, respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is
injunction. He averred that the JOTP Court did not have jurisdiction over the civil case and that
directed to comply with it obligations under the voting trust agreement, and to desist from taking
said case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR).
action in violation thereof.
Held:

CFI of Sulu: petition dismissed without cause

The Central Bank made express representations to petitioners herein that it would support the
OBM, and avoid its liquidation if the petitioners would execute (a) the voting trust agreement
turning over the management of OBM to the Central Bank or its nominees, and (b) mortgage or
assign their properties to the Central Bank to cover the overdraft balance of OBM. The petitioners
having complied with these conditions and parted with value to the profit of the CB (which thus
acquired additional security for its own advances), the Central Bank may not now renege on its
representations and liquidate the OBM, to the detriment of its stockholders, depositors and other
creditors, under the rule of promissory estoppel.

Petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship
between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the CAR, and that upon
the allegations of the complaint, the case is "clearly one of ejectment."

ISSUE: WON the JOTP Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by Chua
HELD: NO

10.
ABBAIN V. CHUA 22 SCRA 748 (Sanchez; February 26, 1968) (SEFF)
NATURE: Direct appeal to the SC
FACTS
- Tongham Chua commenced suit for forcible entry and illegal detainer against Hatib Abbain with
the Justice of the Peace (JOP) Court of Bongao, Sulu. Chua's averred that he is the owner of a 4hectare land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees located in Maraning,
Bongao, Sulu; that this land was donated to him by his father, Subing Chua, in 1952 and from that
date he has assumed ownership thereof, taken possession of the land and paid the
corresponding taxes yearly; that from 1952-1958, Abbain has been his tenant and the two divided
the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on 50- 50 basis; that in 1957, Abbain by means of force,

Ratio. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head. In Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted with approval the following from
Freeman on Judgments: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without
redress."
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in
Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even
when no appeal has been taken."
Reasoning. The provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 1199 (approved August 30, 1954), known as the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, read:

22

"SEC. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by
the landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the
relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act,
shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be
authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations anddisputes."

The judgment of the JOTP Court is not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on its face. It may
be attacked directly or collaterally. Here, the attack is direct. Abbain sought to annul the judgment.
Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed, appellant could bring, as he brought, such
an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of that judgment. In varying language, the
Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a
judgment is held to be a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped of' or wholly
Sec. 7, RA 1267, creating the First Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as disregarded as the circumstances require.
amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on September 9, 1955, provides:
Disposition: The decision of the JOTP Court of Sulu is annulled.
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO VS ZAPANTA (ARGEL)
controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the
varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties 133 SCRA 820
works the land."
- Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 long after RAs 1199, 1267 and 1409 were
incorporated in our statute books. Chua's complaint positively averred that Hatib Abbain is his
tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due
to his non-compliance of agreement of his giving my share of the several harvests he made." The
JOTP Court itself found that Abbain continued to be the tenant of Chua after the latter became
owner of the plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Abbain
refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest."

FACTS:

On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed
by two distinct applicants before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the
Registration Court, for short). One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for
registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 square meters. The other
applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin Avendao", and the land they were applying for registration was a
parcel (hereinafter called the DISPUTED PROPERTY) containing 9,826 square meters surveyed
in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo (ANTIPOLO, for short). Both parcels were situated in
- If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were approved by the Registration Court on
February 26, 1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend
JOTP Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint should have
the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.
been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial,
when it became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The judge had no On May 22, 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 41353, also of the Court of First
power to determine the case. Because Chua's suit comes within the coverage of Sec. 21, R.A. Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig (the CASE BELOW, for short) against named "Heirs of
1199 - that "cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder," shall be under the Joaquin Avendao", and their assignees (hereinafter called the AVENDAO HEIRS) praying for
"original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their Answer,
take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes", and the broad sweep of Section 7, RA 1267, pleaded a special defense of res judicata, After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special
which lodged with the CAR "original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, decide, defense, the CASE BELOW was dismissed. ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the then Court of
Appeals.
and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Land Registration Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
agricultural land where one of the parties works the land."
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the CAR over cases of this nature. Such
exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts
ownership over the land, "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the CAR, "cases
in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for cultivation by the landlord."

HELD:
At the time the application for registration was filed on August 8, 1977, the DISPUTED
PROPERTY was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it was outside the
commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration.

The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void.

23

Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of
public property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private
ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a
bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.

Motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.

Filed an appeal in appellate court with motion for 30 days extension to file an appeal that was
favorably granted.

* * * the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders the

judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights
can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all
acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering, further,
that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in
contemplation of law, and hence, can never become executory, it follows that
such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata. 7
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAO HEIRS must also be held to be null and
void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Perforce, they must
be ordered cancelled.
Estoesta vs. CA (LEO)

Petitioners, thru counsel, filed a motion to set aside the Order and to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the appeal was not perfected on time and the decision dated August 15, 1978 had
become final and executory.
Appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court upholding the validity of the sale. Motion
for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.
Issue: W/N the lntermediate Appellate Court acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
despite the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Held:
Petition is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals sought to be implemented in Civil Case
No. 19319 being null and void, it cannot therefore, be legally executed.

Private respondent filed his notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal only on August 7, 1979, hence, clearly the appeal was not perfected within the
October 7, 1974 spouses Simeon Estoesta Sr. and Lucia Estoesta, filed an action for the reglementary period. All these notwithstanding petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal was
annulment of the sale of a house and lot located at 54-A Legaspi Street, Project 4, Quezon City, denied by the trial court and when reiterated in the Court of Appeals, it was not acted upon, even
more particularly described as Lot No. 14-a, Block No. 461 now Lot No. 28, Block No. 61, made when said Appellate Court promulgated it decision adverse to petitioners.
by petitioners' daughter Trinidad Estoesta in favor of private respondent Luis Villamor.
Well-settled is the rule that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the reglementary
period allowed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. If no appeal is perfected on
Payments of the monthly amortizations to the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation time, the decision becomes final and executory by operation of law after the lapse of the
(PHHC) were made by petitioners through their daughter Trinidad Estoesta; that for convenience reglementary period of appeal.
and in order to facilitate transactions with the PHHC, petitioners acceded to Trinidad Estoesta's
request that the house and lot be transferred in her name so the former executed a document Being final and executory the decision in question can no longer be altered, modified, or reversed
transferring their rights to the latter; that because of the simulated Transfer of Rights, upon full by the trial court or by the appellate court.
payment of the value of the house and lot, PHHC executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Trinidad
Estoesta; that Trinidad Estoesta obtained TCT No. 145066 on September 19, 1969 from the Judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction has no binding force and effect.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
SUAREZ v. CA 1990 (SAM)
Facts:

Trinidad Estoesta executed on August 5, 1974 another Deed of Sale in favor of private
FACTS:
respondent Luis Villamor.
Respondent Manigbas used to be a security guard of the DRobe Security Agency of which
Court renders judgment in against defendants Trinidad Estoesta with cancellation and
petitioner, Capt. Rodolfo Suarez, was the general manager. He was assigned to the Security
reconveyance of Title in favor of petitioners.
Bank and Trust Agency branch at Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. During his tour of duty with
the said bank, he alleged that his employer pulled him out of his assignment and later dismissed

24

answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining Respondent. Upon the premises, Petitioner, cannot now be allowed
Respondent found another employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency. While he was belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they
with his second employer, petitioner Suarez signed and sent a letter to the Philippine Association had submitted themselves voluntarily.
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, (PADPAO), an association of security agencies,
which reported misdemeanors committed by several of its guards, including the Respondent. 2. COURT ruled that the letter sent is not really a privileged communication. In the case of Lu Chu
Remarks included where, respondent used to leave post every weekend without any reliever nor Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669, the Court said that "the fact that a communication is privileged
does not mean that it is not actionable, the privileged character simply does away with the
permission from the Agency
presumption of malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case." And the evidence
plaintiff was dismissed by the RP Guardian Security Agency and was unemployed for six (6) necessary to prove malice on the part of the writer of a privileged communication is not strictly
months until re-hired by the said agency but on temporary basis. Plaintiff claimed that the letter of documentary for it may be either extrinsic, internal, and circumstantial, like any other fact
defendant Suarez to the PADPAO exposed him to public ridicule, inconvenience, humiliation necessary to make out plaintiffs case (U.S. v. Caete, 38 Phil. 253).
and contempt which resulted in his being blacklisted by security agencies giving him
As aptly put by the respondent Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph The said letter accused the appellee
difficulty in finding employment and causing him mental torture and anguish.
of "padding payroll Used to leave his post every weekend and without a reliever nor
permission from the agency. Misrepresentation on the submission of Daily Time Record." These
charges, however, were not duly substantiated by any proof contrary to the PADPAO guidelines
Petitioner Suarez denied that respondent was similarly relieved or dismissed from employment.
that the report on security guards been based on "actual facts and not on imaginary or personal
He claimed that after his relief of his assignment with the Security Bank and Trust Company
considerations." Besides, the letter was written almost three months after appellees employment
branch at Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the respondent refused to accept re-assignment.
with the DRobe Security Agency of which the appellant was the general manager had already
cause damage to the Respondent. RTC ruled in favor of respondent awarding moral damages of
been terminated. In fact, appellees termination caused him to file a labor case against the
10K exemplary 3k, actual damages 1K. CA affirmed with modification eliminating actual damages.
DRobe Security Agency with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment resulted in the payment
Hence, this petition.
of his back wages. appellant was guided and motivated by revenge in writing and sending the
ISSUE: 1. WON RTC had no jurisdiction over case considering total money claims of derogatory letter to the PADPAO which, in the guise of an official communication was designed to
damage appellees name as well as compromise his future employment with any security agency
respondent is only 10k? NO
associated with the PADPAO. this would result in the blacklisting of appellee by prospective
employers. In fact, appellees employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency hangs on
2. WON letter sent to PADPAO covered by rule on privileged communication? NO
a balance. As a consequence, he was dismissed; although he was re-hired after six months this
HELD:
was on a temporary basis pending the outcome of the present case. These significant facts
evidently betray the conduct of appellant who shall be denied the benefits of qualified
Court ruled that petitioners contentions are devoid of merit. While though it is clear from the
privilege and justify the imposition of personal liability to the appellee.
complaint filed that the total amount claimed by respondent Manigbas is P10,000 and that under
BP 129, the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.
the demand, exclusive of interest and cost, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), petitioner is estopped from invoking this rule TIJAM V SIBONGHANOY (JEHAN)
since he never questioned this flaw until this case was appealed to the CA from the adverse
decision of the trial court. It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
him. This dismissal was contested by him before the National Labor Relations Commission.

total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. The only
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a
exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.
counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the
plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of
While petitioner could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed

25

decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI
Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for
recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands
not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case
to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court
is in issue.

FACTS:
Respondents, all Muslim Filipinos, returned to Manila from their pilgrimage to the Holy City of
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on board a Philippines Airlines (PAL) flight. Respondents claimed that they
were unable to retrieve their checked-in luggages. Respondents filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City against PAL for breach of contract resulting in
damages due to negligence in the custody of the missing luggages. PAL filed its answer invoking,
among its defenses, the limitations under the Warsaw Convention. Before the case could be
ISSUE: whether or not Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI heard on pre-trial, PAL, claiming to have suffered serious business losses due to the Asian
Cebu for the first time upon appeal.
economic crisis, followed by a massive strike by its employees, filed a petition for the approval of
a rehabilitation plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC issued an order granting the prayer for an appointment
held : SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after
of a rehabilitation receiver, and it constituted a three-man panel to oversee PALs rehabilitation.
almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
The trial court issued an order denying the motion for suspension of the proceedings on the
jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
ground that the claim of respondents was only yet to be established. PAL went to the Court of
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition for the failure of PAL to serve a
or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
copy of the petition on respondents. On the thesis that there was no other plain, speedy and
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could adequate remedy available to it, PAL went to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari.
or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser ISSUE: Whether or not proceedings before the trial court should have been suspended
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
after the court was informed that a rehabilitation receiver was appointed over the petitioner
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
by the SEC.
jurisdiction, when adverse.
HELD: YES. While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its
inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the
motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden
- Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary
the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition,
actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari.
"with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular
Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement
judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or
on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.
summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at Verily, the claim of private respondents against petitioner PAL is a money claim for the missing
bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the
luggages, a financial demand, that the law requires to be suspended pending the rehabilitation
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court
proceedings. In B.F. Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has ratiocinated: The real
when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of justification is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively
four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder
answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in or prevent the rescue of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only
court.
add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and
resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
Petition Granted.
11.
PAL vs. Kurangking (MARCO)
Sept. 24, 2002
Vitug, J.

xxx
12.

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On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance
with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.

Ouano vs PGTT International Investment Corporation (ARGEL)

FACTS:
PGTT filed a complaint agaisnt Ouano for Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Property
and Damages against Jovenal Ouano. As owner, it alleged that it was deprived of its use when
Ouano uprooted the concrete monuments of the lot and planted corn therein. It also claimed to
suffer damages amounting to P100,000 when Ouano refused to vacate despite their demand.
Ouano filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is the MTC that has jurisdiction as the
assessed value of the lot is only P2,910. PGTT opposed and said that jurisdictiction is determined
by the market value instead and that the RTC has jurisdiction since the market value of the lot is
P49, 760 and the damages claimed amounted to P100,000. RTC ruled in favor of PGTT.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security
Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.
PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into
Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.

Agan Jr. V. PIATCO (KEN)

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not honor
(PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded (as) null and
void.

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the BuildOperate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over this case?
Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said
terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
HELD:
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The
Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing
The jurisdiction over the subject mater of the claim is determined by the assessed value and not
from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not
the market value since the action involves ownership and possession of real property. BP # 129 exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
provides that MTC has jurisdiction over cases on real property where the assessed value of the development facility to MIAA.
property or interest therein exclusive of damages does not exceed P20,000 or P50,000 in civil
actions in Metro Manila. the RTC on the other hand has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
P20,000 or P50,000 in civil actions in Metro Manila. Thus, the amount of damages claimed should Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
not be added in the computation as the law explicitly excludes from the determination of ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other
jurisdictional amount the demand for " interest, damages of whatever kind, atorney's fees, services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
litigation expenses, and cost. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the real property. However, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 provides that in cases where the On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition
for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
various agreements.

GR. 155001
FACTS:

Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve. Moreover,
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court at the first instance is a violation
of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the this Court with respect to a special civil action for prohibition and hence, following the rule on
implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which hierarchy of courts, resort must first be had before the trial courts.
approved the project.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of Hiearchy of Courts was violated?

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Ruling:
NO.
After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is of the view that
the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions. The facts necessary to
resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence, need not be determined by a trial
court.
The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the
cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.19
It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the
relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are
of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of the
country's premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution
are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the
Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the
nature of the controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for
the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

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