Radar absorbent material

Radar absorbent material, or RAM, is a class of materials used in Stealth technology. How absorbent a
radar absorbment material is depends upon the frequency of radar used on the particular material. RAM
cannot be said to perfectly absorb radar on any frequency, but they do have greater absorbancy on some
frequencies than others. Different radar absorbent materials will have different frequency ranges that they
absorb best, so there's no one RAM that is suited to absorption of all radar frequencies.
A common misconception is that RAM makes an object invisible to radar. A radar absorbent material can
significantly reduce an object's radar cross section in specific radar frequencies, but it does not result in
"invisibility" on any frequency. Bad weather may contribute to deficiencies in stealth capability; a
particularly disastrous example occurred during the Kosovo war, in which moisture on the surface of F117 Nighthawks allowed long-wavelength radar to track and shoot them down. RAM is only a part of
achieving stealth.

Contents
[hide]

1 History
2 Types of RAM
o 2.1 Iron ball paint
o 2.2 Foam absorber
o 2.3 Jaumann absorber
3 See also
4 References

5 External links

History
The earliest forms of RAM were the materials called Sumpf and Schornsteinfeger, a coating used by
Germans during the World War II for the snorkels of submarines, to lower their reflectivity in the 20centimeter radar band the Allies used. The material had a layered structure and was based on graphite
particles and other semiconductive materials embedded in a rubber matrix. The material's efficiency was
partially reduced by the action of sea water.[1][2]
Germany also pioneered the first aircraft to use RAM, in the form of the Horten Ho 229.[3] It used a
carbon-impregnated plywood that would have made it extremely stealthy to Britain's crude radar of the
time. The same flying wing design can be seen in the US B-2 Spirit, and it is no coincidence. Towards the
end of World War II, the US captured the Ho 229 and sent it to Northrop, who later developed the B-2.
Germany can be said to have been the forefather of RAM technology, and stealth aircraft.

Types of RAM
Iron ball paint
One of the most commonly known types of RAM is iron ball paint. It contains tiny spheres coated with
carbonyl iron or ferrite. Radar waves induce molecular oscillations from the alternating magnetic field in
this paint, which leads to conversion of the radar energy into heat. The heat is then transferred to the
aircraft and dissipated.

The iron particles in the paint are obtained by decomposition of iron pentacarbonyl and may contain
traces of carbon, oxygen and nitrogen. Carbonyl iron is also used as a catalyst and in medicine as an iron
supplement, even though it is toxic in higher doses.
A related type of RAM consists of neoprene polymer sheets with ferrite grains or carbon black particles
(containing about 30% of crystalline graphite) embedded in the polymer matrix. The tiles were used on
early versions of the F-117A Nighthawk, although more recent models use painted RAM. The painting of
the F-117 is done by industrial robots with the plane covered in tiles glued to the fuselage and the
remaining gaps filled with iron ball paint.
The United States Air Force introduced a radar absorbent paint made from both ferrofluidic and nonmagnetic substances. By reducing the reflection of electromagnetic waves, this material helps to reduce
the visibility of RAM painted aircraft on radar.

Foam absorber
Foam absorber is used as lining of anechoic chambers for electromagnetic radiation measurements. This
material typically consists of a fireproofed urethane foam loaded with carbon black, and cut into long
pyramids. The absorber is applied to the chamber walls with the tips of the pyramids pointing inward or
toward the radar. As a radar wave strikes a pyramid, it experiences a gradual transition from free space at
the tip of the pyramid to absorbing foam at the base. Other foam absorbers are available in flat sheets,
using an increasing gradient of carbon loadings in different layers.

Jaumann absorber
A Jaumann absorber or Jaumann layer is a radar absorbent device. When first introduced in 1943, the
Jaumann layer consisted of two equally-spaced reflective surfaces and a conductive ground plane. One
can think of it as a generalized, multi-layered Salisbury screen as the principles are similar.
Being a resonant absorber (i.e. it uses wave interfering to cancel the reflected wave), the Jaumann layer is
dependent upon the /4 spacing between the first reflective surface and the ground plane and between the
two reflective surfaces (a total of /4 + /4 ).
Because the wave can resonate at two frequencies, the Jaumann layer produces two absorption maxima
across a band of wavelengths (if using the two layers configuration). These absorbers must have all of the
layers parallel to each other and the ground plane that they conceal.
More elaborate Jaumann absorbers use series of dielectric surfaces that separate conductive sheets. The
conductivity of those sheets increases with proximity to the ground plane.

See also

Radar cross section

Stealth technology
Salisbury screen
Stealth aircraft

References
1. ^ Hepcke, Gerhard. "The Radar War, 1930-1945" (PDF). Radar World.
2. ^ The History of Radar (English) (HTML). BBC (2003-07-14).

3. ^ Horten Ho 229 (English) (HTML). AllExperts.

External links

Wave absorber - patent 5952953

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_absorbent_material"

Radar cross section

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Radar cross section (RCS) is a description of how an object reflects an incident electromagnetic wave.
For an arbitrary object, the RCS is highly dependent on the radar wavelength and incident direction of the
radio wave. The usual definition or RCS differs by a factor of 4 from the standard physics definition of
differential cross section at 180 degrees. Bistatic radar cross section is defined similarly for other angles.
The RCS is integral to the development of radar stealth technology, particularly in applications involving
aircraft and ballistic missiles. RCS data for current military aircraft are almost all highly classified.

Contents
[hide]

1 Measurement
2 Calculation
3 Reduction
o 3.1 Purpose Shaping
o 3.2 Active Cancellation
o 3.3 RAM
o 3.4 Optimization methods
4 See also
5 References

6 External links

Measurement
Measurement of a target's RCS is performed at a radar reflectivity range or scattering range. The first type
of range is an outdoor range where the target is positioned on the pylon some distance down-range from
the transmitters. Such a range eliminates the need for placing radar absorbers behind the target, however
multi-path effects due to the ground must be mitigated.
An anechoic chamber is also commonly used. In such a room, the target is placed on a rotating pillar in
the center, and the walls, floors and ceiling are covered by stacks of radar absorbing material. These

absorbers prevent corruption of the measurement due to reflections. A compact range is an anechoic
chamber with a reflector to simulate far field conditions.

Calculation
Quantitatively, the RCS is an effective surface area that intercepts the incident wave and that scatters the
energy isotropically in space. For the RCS, is defined in three-dimensions as

Where is the RCS, Pi is the incident power density measured at the target, and Ps is the scattered power
density seen at a distance R away from the target. In electromagnetic analysis this is also commonly
written as

where Ei and Es are the incident and scattered electric field intensities, respectively. In the design phase, it
is often desirable to employ a computer to predict what the RCS will look like before fabricating an
actual object. Many iterations of this prediction process can be performed in a short time at low cost,
whereas use of a measurement range is often time-consuming, expensive and error-prone. The linearity of
Maxwell's equations makes RCS relatively straightforward to calculate with a variety of analytic and
numerical methods, but changing levels of military interest and the need for secrecy have made the field
challenging, none the less. The field of solving Maxwell's equations through numerical algorithms is
called computational electromagnetics, and many effective analysis methods have been applied to the
RCS prediction problem. RCS prediction software are often run on large supercomputers and employ
high-resolution CAD models of real radar targets. High frequency approximations such as geometric
optics, Physical Optics, the geometric theory of diffraction, the uniform theory of diffraction and the
physical theory of diffraction are used when the wavelength is much shorter than the target feature size.
Statistical models include chi-square, rice, and the log-normal target models. These models are used to
predict likely values of the RCS given an average value, and are useful when running radar Monte Carlo
simulations. Purely numerical methods such as the boundary element method (method of moments), finite
difference time domain method (FDTD) and finite element methods are limited by computer performance
to longer wavelengths or smaller features. Though, for simple cases, the wavelength ranges of these two
types of method overlap considerably, for difficult shapes and materials or very high accuracy they are
combined in various sorts of hybrid methods.

Reduction
RCS reduction is chiefly important in stealth technology. With smaller RCS, aircraft and other military
vehicles may better evade radar detection, whether it be from land-based installations or other vehicles.

Purpose Shaping
Purpose shaping is an RCS reduction technique in which the shape of the targets reflecting surfaces is
designed such that they reflect energy away from the source. The aim is usually to create a cone-ofsilence about the aircrafts direction of flight. Note that due to the energy reflection, this RCS reduction
method is defeated by using Passive (multistatic) radars.

Purpose-shaping techniques can be seen in the design of surface faceting on the F-117A Nighthawk
stealth fighter. This aircraft, designed in the late 1970s though only revealed to the public in 1988, uses a
multitude of flat surfaces to reflect incident radar energy away from the source. Yue suggests that limited
available computing power for the design phase kept the number of surfaces to a minimum. The B-2
Spirit stealth bomber benefited from increased computing power, enabling its contoured shapes and
further reduction in RCS. The F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter continue the trend in purpose
shaping and promise to have even smaller monostatic RCS.

Active Cancellation
In active cancellation techniques, the target aircraft generates a radar signal equal in intensity but opposite
in phase to the predicted reflection of an incident radar signal (similarly to noise canceling ear phones).
This creates destructive interference between the reflected and generated signals, resulting in reduced
RCS. To incorporate active cancellation techniques, the precise characteristics of the waveform and angle
of arrival of the illuminating radar signal must be known, since they define the nature of generated energy
required for cancellation. Except against simple or low frequency radar systems, the implementation of
active cancellation techniques is extremely difficult due to the complex processing requirements and the
difficulty of predicting the exact nature of the reflected radar signal over a broad aspect of an aircraft,
missile or other target.

RAM
The third RCS reduction technique for aircraft and missiles is the use of radar absorbing material (RAM)
either in the original construction or as an addition to highly reflective surfaces. There are at least three
types of RAM: resonant, non-resonant magnetic and non-resonant large volume. Resonant but somewhat
lossy materials are applied to the reflecting surfaces of the target. The thickness of the material
corresponds to one-quarter wavelength of the expected illuminating radar-wave. The incident radar
energy is reflected from the outside and inside surfaces of the RAM to create a destructive interference
pattern. This results in the cancellation of the reflected energy. Deviation from the expected frequency
will cause losses in radar absorbence, so this type of RAM is only useful against radar with a single,
common, and unchanging frequency. Non-resonant magnetic RAM uses ferrite particles suspended in
epoxy or paint to reduce the reflectivity of the surface to incident radar waves. Because the non-resonant
RAM dissipates incident radar energy over a larger surface area, it usually results in an increase in surface
temperature, thus reducing RCS at the expense of an increase in infrared signature. A major advantage of
non-resonant RAM is that it can be effective over a broad range of frequencies, whereas resonant RAM is
limited to a narrow range of design frequencies. Large volume RAM is usually resistive carbon loading
added to fiberglass hexagonal cell aircraft structures or other non-conducting components. Fins of
resistive materials can also be added. Thin resistive sheets spaced by foam or aerogel may be suitable for
space craft.
Thin coatings made of only dielectrics and conductors have very limited absorbing bandwidth, so
magnetic materials are used when weight and cost permit, either in resonant RAM or as non-resonant
RAM.

Optimization methods
Thin non-resonant or broad resonance coatings can be modeled with a Leontovich impedance boundary
condition. This is the ratio of the tangential electric field to the tangential magnetic field on the surface,
and ignores fields propagating along the surface within the coating. This is particularly convenient when
using boundary element method calculations. The surface impedance can be calculated and tested
separately. For an isotropic surface the ideal surface impedance is equal to the 377 Ohm impedance of
free space. For non-isotropic (anisotropic) coatings, the optimal coating depends on the shape of the

target and the radar direction, but duality, the symmetry of Maxwell's equations between the electric and
magnetic fields, tells one that optimal coatings have 0 1 = 3772 2, where 0 and 1 are perpendicular
components of the anisotropic surface impedance, aligned with edges and/or the radar direction. A perfect
electric conductor has more back scatter from a leading edge for the linear polarization with the electric
field parallel to the edge and more from a trailing edge with the electric field perpendicular to the edge, so
the high surface impedance should be parallel to leading edges and perpendicular to trailing edges, for the
greatest radar threat direction, with some sort of smooth transition between.
To calculate the radar cross section of such a stealth body, one would typically do one dimensional
reflection calculations to calculate the surface impedance, then two dimensional numerical calculations to
calculate the diffraction coefficients of edges and small three dimensional calculations to calculate the
diffraction coefficients of corners and points. The cross section can then be calculated, using the
diffraction coefficients, with the physical theory of diffraction or other high frequency method, combined
with Physical Optics to include the contributions from illuminated smooth surfaces and Fock calculations
to calculate creeping waves circling around any smooth shadowed parts.
Optimization is in the reverse order. First one does high frequency calculations to optimize the shape and
find the most important features, then small calculations to find the best surface impedances in the
problem areas, then reflection calculations to design coatings. One should avoid large numerical
calculations that run too slowly for numerical optimization or distract workers from the physics, even
when massive computing power is available.

See also

Electromagnetic modeling

References

Shaeffer, Tuley and Knott. Radar Cross Section. SciTech Publishing, 2004. ISBN 1-891121-25-1.
Harrington, Roger F. Time-Harmonic Electromagnetic Fields. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1961. ISBN
070267456.
Balanis, Constantine A. Advanced Engineering Electromagnetics. Wiley, 1989. ISBN 0-47162194-3.
A Hybrid Method Based on Reciprocity for the Computation of Diffraction by Trailing
EdgesDavid R. Ingham, IEEE Trans. Antennas Propagat., 43 No. 11, November 1995, pp. 1173
82.
Revised Integration Methods in a Galerkin BoR Procedure David R. Ingham, Applied
Computational Electromagnetics Society (ACES ) Journal 10 No. 2, July, 1995, pp. 516.
A Hybrid Approach to Trailing Edges and Trailing Ends David R. Ingham, proceedings of the
ACES Symposium, 1993, Monterey.
Time-Domain Extrapolation to the Far Field Based on FDTD Calculations Kane Yee, David
Ingham and Kurt Shlager, IEEE Trans. Antennas Propagat., 39 No. 3, March 1991, pp.410413.
Numerical Calculation of Edge Diffraction, using Reciprocity David Ingham, Proc. Int. Conf.
Antennas Propagat., IV, May 1990, Dallas, pp.15741577.
Time-Domain Extrapolation to the Far Field Based on FDTD CalculationsKane Yee, David
Ingham and Kurt Shlager, invited paper, Proc. URSI Conf., 1989, San Jos .

External links

Indoor Microwave Measurement Facility at System Planning Corporation

lucernhammer RCS Prediction Software by Tripoint Industries, Inc.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_cross_section"

Radar cross-section (RCS) reductions [of stealth]

Radar avoidance technology was first used on a large scale during the Gulf War in 1991. However, F117A Stealth Fighters were used for the first time in combat during the United States invasion of Panama
(aka: Operation Just Cause), in 1989. Since then it has become less effective due to developments in the
algorithms used to process the data received by radars, such as Bayesian particle filter methods. Increased
awareness of stealth vehicles and the technologies behind them is prompting the development of
techniques for detecting stealth vehicles, such as passive radar arrays and low-frequency radars. Many
countries nevertheless continue to develop low-RCS vehicles because low RCS still offers advantages in
detection range reduction as well as increasing the effectiveness of decoys against radar-seeking threats.

Vehicle shape
The possibility of designing aircraft in such a manner as to reduce their radar cross-section was
recognised in the late 1930s, when the first radar tracking systems were employed, and it has been known
since at least the 1960s that aircraft shape makes a very significant difference in how well an aircraft can
be detected by a radar. The Avro Vulcan, a British bomber of the 1960s, had a remarkably small
appearance on radar despite its large size, and occasionally disappeared from radar screens entirely. We
now know that it had a fortuitously stealthy shape apart from the vertical element of the tail. On the other
hand, the Tupolev 95 Russian long range bomber (NATO reporting name 'Bear') appeared especially well
on radar. It is now known that propellers and jet turbine blades produce a bright radar image; the Bear had
four pairs of large (5.6 metre diameter) contra-rotating propellers.
Another important factor is the internal construction. Behind the skin of some aircraft are structures
known as re-entrant triangles. Radar waves penetrating the skin of the aircraft get trapped in these
structures, bouncing off the internal faces and losing energy. This approach was first used on SR-71.
The most efficient way to reflect radar waves back to the transmitting radar is with orthogonal metal
plates, forming a corner reflector consisting of either a dihedral (two plates) or a trihedral (three
orthogonal plates). This configuration occurs in the tail of a conventional aircraft, where the vertical and
horizontal components of the tail are set at right angles. Stealth aircraft such as the F-117 use a different
arrangement, tilting the tail surfaces to reduce corner reflections formed between them. The most radical
approach is to eliminate the tail completely, as in the B-2 Spirit.
In addition to altering the tail, stealth design must bury the engines within the wing or fuselage, or in
some cases where stealth is applied to an existing aircraft, install baffles in the air intakes, so that the
turbine blades are not visible to radar. A stealthy shape must be devoid of complex bumps or protrusions
of any kind; meaning that weapons, fuel tanks, and other stores must not be carried externally. Any
stealthy vehicle becomes un-stealthy when a door or hatch is opened.
Planform alignment is also often used in stealth designs. Planform alignment involves using a small
number of surface orientations in the shape of the structure. For example, on the F-22A Raptor, the
leading edges of the wing and the tail surfaces are set at the same angle. Careful inspection shows that
many small structures, such as the air intake bypass doors and the air refueling aperture, also use the same
angles. The effect of planform alignment is to return a radar signal in a very specific direction away from
the radar emitter rather than returning a diffuse signal detectable at many angles.
Stealth airframes sometimes display distinctive serrations on some exposed edges, such as the engine
ports. The YF-23 has such serrations on the exhaust ports. This is another example in the use of re-entrant
triangles and planform alignment, this time on the external airframe.

Shaping requirements have strong negative influence on the aircraft's aerodynamic properties. The F-117
has poor aerodynamics, is inherently unstable, and cannot be flown without computer assistance. Some
modern anti-stealth radars target the trail of turbulent air behind it instead, much like civilian wind shear
detecting radars do.
Shaping does not offer stealth advantages against low-frequency radar. If the radar wavelength is roughly
twice the size of the target, a half-wave resonance effect can still generate a significant return. However,
low-frequency radar is limited by lack of available frequencies which are heavily used by other systems,
lack of accuracy given the long wavelength, and by the radar's size, making it difficult to transport. A
long-wave radar may detect a target and roughly locate it, but not identify it, and the location information
lacks sufficient weapon targeting accuracy. Noise poses another problem, but that can be efficiently
addressed using modern computer technology; Chinese "Nantsin" radar and many older Soviet-made
long-range radars were modified this way. It has been said that "there's nothing invisible in the radar
frequency range below 2 GHz". [1]
Ships have also adopted similar techniques. The Visby corvette was the first stealth ship to enter service,
though the earlier Arleigh Burke class destroyer incorporated some signature-reduction features [2].
Other examples are the French La Fayette class frigate, the USS San Antonio amphibious transport dock,
and most modern warship designs.

Non-metallic airframe
Dielectric composites are relatively transparent to radar, whereas electrically conductive materials such as
metals and carbon fibers reflect electromagnetic energy incident on the material's surface. Composites
used may contain ferrites to optimize the dielectric and magnetic properties of the material for its
application.

Radar absorbing paint

Radar absorbing paint or radar absorbent material (RAM), is used especially on the edges of metal
surfaces. The RAM coating, known also as iron ball paint, contains tiny spheres coated with carbonyl iron
ferrite. Radar waves induce alternating magnetic field in this material, which leads to conversion of their
energy into heat. Early versions of F-117A planes were covered with neoprene-like tiles with ferrite
grains embedded in the polymer matrix, current models have RAM paint applied directly. The paint must
be applied by robots because of issues relating to solvent toxicity and tight tolerances on layer thickness.
In a similar vein, it is known that coating the cockpit canopy with a thin film transparent conductor
(vapor-deposited gold or indium tin oxide) helps to reduce the aircraft's radar profile because radar waves
would normally enter the cockpit, bounce off something random (the inside of the cockpit has a complex
shape), and possibly return to the radar but the conductive coating creates a controlled shape that
deflects the incoming radar waves away from the radar. The coating is thin enough that it has no adverse
effect on the pilot's vision.

Salisbury screen
The Salisbury screen is maybe the first ever anti-radar or, to be more precise, anti-reflective concept; the
so called RAM (radar absorbent material). It was first described in 1952 and was applied in ship radar
cross section reduction (RCS). There have been many design refinements over the years especially
because of the increasing interest for stealth planes, but the principles remain the same.

The most easy to understand salisbury screen design consists of a ground plane which is the metallic
surface that needs to be concealled, a lossless dielectric of a given thickness (a quarter of the wavelength
that will be absorbed) and a thin lossy screen.
The principle is this:
1. The incident wave (which we will consider to be made up by parallel beams) is split into two
(equal in intensity) waves that have the same wavelength ()
2. The first wave is reflected by the exterior surface (the thin lossy screen) while the second beem
travels through the dielectric, and it is reflected by the ground plane (which is the most inner
layer of the sailsbury screen)
3. The reflected waves interfere and cancel each others electric fields (radar is an electromagnetic
beam-microwave and IR)
To explain the phenomenon, we need to look at the interference theory. Two waves that are coherent
interact, they combine to form a single output wave and if their peaks coincide, the output intensity is the
sum of the two intensities. However, if the two waves are completely out of phase the two intensities
cancel each other out (that only happens when the two waves are offset by one half a wavelength).
The second wave (in step 2.) travels twice (once from and once to the exterior thin lossy screen) the
distance equal to one quarter a wavelenth, for a total distance of one half a wavelength. Thus the two
waves cancel each other.
The incidence angle the waves that are canceled do not come from the same exact incident wave.
However, they are all similar thus they are coherent and interfere.
There are a few disadvantages inherent to this model (some of which have been solved). One would be
the fact that salisbury screens work well only for a very narrow portion of the radar spectrum thus making
it very vulnerable to multiple radar protected areas. Another problem is the thickness of the screen itself,
the radar wavelenghts are between 10 cm and 1 mm, thus for a longer wavelength, the thickness gets up
to 2.5 centimeters which is quite difficult to cope with (in the aerospace applications), reaserches are
being made for ultrathin salisbury screens involving Sievenpiper HIGP(high impedance ground plane)
(source:Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Microwave Opt Technol Lett) which shows remarkable improvements to
the thickness of the screen.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salisbury_screen"
Categories: Materials | Military technology | Radar

Stealth aircraft

USAF stealth bomber Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit.

A stealth aircraft is an aircraft which has been designed to absorb and deflect radar (via stealth
technology); these are not completely "invisible" to radar, they are simply harder to detect than
conventional technology. In general the goal is to allow a stealth aircraft to execute its attack while still
outside the ability of the opposing system's detection. Stealth aircraft were most notably used during the
Gulf War (1991). Although stealth technology has since become less effective, the United States, Russia,
China, India, and several other nations continue to develop stealth aircraft.

Contents
[hide]

1 Benefits of stealth aircraft designs

2 Drawbacks of stealth aircraft designs
3 How stealth aircraft could potentially be detected
4 Use of stealth aircraft
5 List of stealth aircraft
o 5.1 Manned
o 5.2 Unmanned (full stealth)
o

5.3 Fictional

Benefits of stealth aircraft designs

A smaller number of stealth aircraft may replace a large fleet of conventional attack jets with the
same or increased combat efficiency, possibly resulting in longer term savings in the military
budget.
A stealth aircraft strike capability may deter potentional opponents from taking action and keep
them in constant fear of strikes, since they can never know if the attack planes are already
underway. This may make them more willing to accept a diplomatic solution, although the moral
reasoning behind this is disputed.
Raids on important point targets, while maintaning a cover of plausible denial. Since no-one could
detect the attackers or at least identify them, the stealth operator would simply refuse to comment
and hope to avoid war.
The production and fielding of a stealth combat aircraft design may force an opponent to pursue
the same aim, possibly resulting in significant weakening of the economically inferior party. The
1980s American Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") program served a similar purpose against
the USSR.

Stationing stealth aircraft in a friendly country is a powerful diplomatic gesture. It emphasizes

close relations between the allies and expresses high confidence in their governments and
competence of security services, as stealth planes incorporate high technology and military secrets.
The USA has stationed squadrons of F-117 Nighthawks in Britain.

Drawbacks of stealth aircraft designs

Stealth aircraft are designed with a focus on minimal RCS (radar cross section) rather than
aerodynamic perfection. Highly stealth aircraft (the F-117 and B-2) are aerodynamically unstable
on all three axis and require constant flight corrections from the fly-by-wire system to stay airborne.
Most modern non-stealth fighter aircraft (F-16, Su-27, Rafale) are unstable on one or two axis only.
Stealth aircraft need to have highly redundant fly-by-wire systems for safety, which adds extra cost
and weight to the design. In case of a strong electromagnetic pulse (e.g. atmospheric nuclear
explosion), loss of flight control computers would affect stealth aircraft more seriously, possibly
causing them to crash, but this is highly unlikely due to electronic hardening that is implemented by
the United States Air Force.
Stealth aircaft are seriously handicapped in combat once located by the enemy. Existing fully
stealth designs (namely the F-117 and B-2) lack afterburners, whose hot exhaust would increase the
RCS and infrared footprint of the plane. Stealth aircraft are thus unable to exceed the speed of
sound and flee rapidly. This makes them vulnerable to fighter interceptors, which can reach Mach 2
or higher speeds using afterburners. The peculiar shape of stealth aircraft reduces their agility in a
dogfight, thus they may be destroyed by autocannon fire from a traditional jetfighter, even if their
low RCS and effective infrared shielding prevents a successful missile lock. Neither the F-117 nor
the B-2 Spirit carry any anti-aircraft armament for self-defense.
The high level of computerization and large amount of electronic equipment found inside stealth
aircraft makes them vulnerable to passive detection. The Czech-developed, field-mobile Tamara
system snoops on very weak electromagnetic "leaks" emanating even from the most shielded
aircraft. Tamara detectors provide general range / distance information to active air defence radars,
which would then lock onto targets using highly focused scanning.
Stealth aircraft are high-maintenance equipment. The condition of the aircraft's skin determines
stealth efficiency, either by diverting radar impulses due to specific geometry of the airframe and/or
absorbing electromagnetic waves in a graphite-ferrite microspheres based surface paint layer. The
cockpit windows are shielded with delicate gold and indium foil layers. If the plane's skin is
punctured by a pebble thrown from the runway or heavy rain damages the paint layers, the RCS
could be dramatically increased. Stealth planes are preferably operated from homeland bases, where
air conditioned shelters provide optimal maintenance and storage conditions. Although airframe
maintainability and availability progressed dramatically during the late 1990s, the cost of aircraft
procurement, establishment of high- standard home base facilities, and the complex, long range
sorties conducted from the homeland against overseas targets still places a serious economic burden
on stealth aircraft operators.
Stealth aircraft are still vulnerable to detection immediately before, during and after using their
weaponry. Since stealth payload (reduced RCS bombs and cruise missiles) are not yet generally
available, all armament must be carried internally to avoid increasing the radar cross section. As

soon as the bomb bay doors are opened, the plane's RCS will be multiplied and even older
generation radar systems will be able to locate them. Stealth aircraft pilots receive special training
to minimize weapon dispatch intervals to 15-25 seconds. In case of 4th and 5th generation "reduced
RCS" (semi-stealth) fighter-bomber designs, air-to-ground armament is mainly carried on external
pylons, accepting the higher risk of detection. The internal weapon bays are reserved for various
anti-aircraft missiles.
Since fully stealth aircraft carry all armament internally, the available military payload is limited.
The F-117 carried only two laser-guided bombs onboard, requiring highly reliable intelligence for a
successful attack. Outside the scope of traditional war, it may be desirable to inject special-ops
troops on the ground, who would infiltrate the enemy territory and identify / illuminate the highvalue point target for a successful laser-guided bomb raid by stealth aircraft.
The B-2 Spirit carries a large bomb load, but it has relatively slow (transonic) speed, resulting in
18 to 24 hour long missions when it flies half-way around the globe to attack overseas targets.
Therefore advance planning and receiving intelligence in a timely manner is of paramount
importance for a successful sortie. In case mobile targets will be attacked, the Spirit will need to
rely on satellite data or forward placed observers to guarantee a successful engagement. In July
1999 two days prior to the Royal International Air Tattoo at RAF Fairford UK, a single B2A Spirit
penetrated UK airspace at 01.30 hours. Passing overhead reporting point Whisky Delta 2 at approx.
250 feet it was travelling at just above stalling speed and was completely silent. The anterior half of
the aircraft structure was covered in a green-white condensation cloud.
Stealth aircraft are an air traffic hazard unless flying in restricted training airspaces or fitted by
externally mounted radar reflectors and light beacons to avoid collisions. Due to the great size of
continental USA and general availability of sparsely populated areas this is not a significant training
problem in practice.
Stealth aircraft have a limited operational envelope. While the B-2 Spirit can put ordinance on any
square foot of the planet within 12 hours it is operationally crippled by the following factors: Its
exorbitant replacement cost exceeds the GDP of some countries, resulting in a challenging
risk/benefit analysis when considering its deployment. It is still vulnerable to the mark 1 eyeball,
making its deployment dependent on weather and time of day. Long range missions and the
avoidance of radar facilities make its approach and departure vectors more predictable. While the
aircraft may be stealthy, the ordinance delivered will more than adequately advertise its existence.

How stealth aircraft could potentially be detected

B-2 Spirit stealth bomber side view.

A number of methods to detect stealth aircraft at long range have been developed. Both Australia and
Russia have announced that they have developed processing techniques that allow them to detect the
turbulence of aircraft at reasonably long ranges (possibly negating the stealth technology).
Passive (multistatic) radar and bistatic radar systems are believed to detect stealth aircraft better than
conventional monostatic radars, since stealth technology reflects energy away from the transmitter's line
of sight, effectively increasing the radar cross section (RCS) in other directions, which the passive radars
monitor. In addition, it has been suggested that use of low frequency broadcast TV and FM radio signals
as the illuminating source produces a much higher RCS than high frequency monostatic radars as the long
wavelengths cause whole structural portions of the targets to resonate. Target detection, even at very low

signal-to-noise ratios is theoretically possible. Target tracking, in three-dimensional position and velocity
should be more accurate with a multistatic system than with a monostatic system, using either
triangulation or hyperbolic (or both) target location strategies. Wide usage of such broadcast signals (esp.
in inhabited regions) means a continuous and reliable coverage and source of energy, that cannot easily be
neutralized by an attacker. Researchers at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign with support of
DARPA, have shown that it is possible to build a synthetic aperture radar image of an aircraft target using
passive multistatic radar, possibly detailed enough to enable Automatic Target Recognition (ATR).
Roke Manor Research in the United Kingdom announced an experimental system that uses the signals
broadcast from cellular telephone towers to track aircraft, although it is not clear if this method is actually
practical or offers any significant counter-stealth advantage. A general feature of these systems is that
they use a large number of low-accuracy radar systems (or signal sources) combined with heavy
computer processing to generate tracking information. For this reason they tend to be useful only in the
early warning role, and have limited applicability to guidance radars for missile systems, and are rarely
portable. The problem of successfully countering stealth aircraft on the battlefield remains essentially
unsolved.
Stealth aircraft could also be passively detected from their electromagnetic emissions (terrain-following
radar, radio communications, missile guidance communications etc.) if they broadcast such emissions.
Stealth aircraft typically attempt to minimize these emissions (using low probability of intercept radars,
satellite communications etc.).
To this date, the only systems that have been shown to successfully detect stealth aircraft are very old, and
use long wave radar systems that have a low resolution. The shooting down of an F-117 over Yugoslavia
was attributed to the tracking of the vortices produced by the poor aerodynamic shape of stealth aircraft.
It was also reported that the F-117 was downed due to the use of an "electro-optical" (TV) tracking
system used in conjunction with the missile battery. The aircraft may be hard to detect using radar, but it
is still visible to the naked eye.
An F-117 was also detected by a British ship during the first Gulf War, in this case because the
wavelength of the radar was twice the length of the aircraft. This caused the entire aircraft to act as a
dipole, leading to a very strong radar return.[citation needed]
The Dutch company Thales Nederland, the former company Holland Signaal, developed a Stealth
detection radar called SMART-L. So far the company has been unable to test it on a Stealth vehicle. The
only chance was an airshow in Leeuwarden (the Netherlands) where an USAF B-2 would attend, but at
the last moment the Boeing aircraft was withdrawn from the show. So, instead of testing the radar on a B2, they used tennis balls instead. Four Dutch and three German frigates are equipped with this type of
radar.

Use of stealth aircraft

To date, stealth aircraft have been used in several low- and moderate-intensity conflicts, including
Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In each case they were
employed to strike high-value targets which were either out of range of conventional aircraft in the theater
or which were too heavily defended for conventional aircraft to strike without a high risk of loss. In
addition, because the stealth aircraft aren't going to be dodging surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft
artillery over the target they can aim more carefully and thus are more likely to hit the target and not
cause as much collateral damage. In many cases they were used to hit the high value targets early in the
campaign (or even before it), before other aircraft had the opportunity to degrade the opposing air defense
to the point where other aircraft had a good chance of reaching those critical targets.
Stealth aircraft in future low- and moderate-intensity conflicts are likely to have similar roles. However,
given the increasing prevalence of excellent Russian-built surface-to-air missile systems on the open
market (such as the SA-10, SA-12 and SA-20 (S-300P/V/PMU) and SA-15 (9K331/332)), stealth aircraft
are likely to be very important in a high-intensity conflict in order to gain and maintain air supremacy,
especially to the United States who is likely to face these types of systems. It is possible to cover one's
airspace with so many air defences with such long range and capability that conventional aircraft would
find it very difficult "clearing the way" for deeper strikes. For example, China license-builds all of the
previously mentioned SAM systems in quantity and would be able to heavily defend important strategic
and tactical targets in the event of some kind of conflict. Even if anti-radiation weapons are used in an
attempt to destroy the SAM radars of such systems, or stand-off weapons are launched against them,
these modern surface-to-air missile batteries are capable of shooting down weapons fired against them.
The surprise of a stealth attack, and the ability to penetrate the air defences and survive, may become the
only reasonable way of making a safe corridor through which conventional bombers and other aircraft
can enter the enemy's airspace. Once stealth attacks from the smaller stealth force have neutralised the
most serious of the SAM systems, the larger conventional or simply less-stealthy force should be able to
suppress the remaining systems and gain air superiority.

List of stealth aircraft

Manned
Fully stealth designs:

Have Blue - Lockheed (developed into F-117)

Tacit Blue - Northrop (technology demonstrator reconnaissance plane)
F-117 Nighthawk - Lockheed - fighter-bomber (in service)
B-2 Spirit - Northrop-Grumman - strategic bomber (in service)
A-12 Avenger II - McDonnell-Douglas / General Dynamics (cancelled)
MBB Lampyridae - West German stealth fighter prototype (cancelled during wind tunnel tests in
1988)
Bird of Prey - Boeing (technology demonstrator)
Reduced RCS designs:

Horten Ho 229 - a German design of 1944, and perhaps the first basic stealth design
Northrop YB-49 - like the Ho 229, this USAF bomber's stealthy characteristics were not the result
of intentional design
De Havilland Mosquito - British light bomber and ground attack plane of wooden construction,
low RCS against early radars.
Antonov An-2 - Wooden propellor and canvas wings give it a minimal radar signature.
SR-71 Blackbird - Lockheed Advanced Development Projects High-speed reconnaissance aircraft.
RCS equal to or better than the B-1B

Eurofighter - EADS (in service)

F-22 Raptor - Lockheed-Martin / Boeing (in service)
YF-23 Black Widow II - Northrop / MDD (prototype built, lost competition to YF-22, almost full
stealth, may resurrect as a fast bomber)
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - Lockheed-Martin (under development)
Dassault Rafale - French air force and naval fighter bomber
Medium Combat Aircraft - Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (under development) Indian Air Force
stealthy 5th generation combat aircraft optimised for strike missions.
MiG Project 1.44 "Flatpack" - Mikoyan-Gurevich (prototype), possibly full stealth with plasma
shield
J-10 - Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (projected twin engine design for stealth missions)
T-50 / PAK-FA - Sukhoi (under development, Russian-Indian counterpart of US F-22 Raptor,
possibly plasma shielded)
F-16 C/D and E/F - from Block 30 has got reduced RCS to about 1 m2
F/A-18 C/D and E/F - both have reduced RCS, believed be to similar to F-16C's, but F/A-18 E/F
is believed to have more advanced technology, but the aircraft is larger so the aircraft might (and
might not) have the same RCS as F/A-18C/D
MiG-29 SMT - has got similar to F-16C/D reduced RCS

Unmanned (full stealth)

Boeing X-45 - Boeing - based on the manned Boeing Bird of Prey demonstrator (technology
demonstrator)
RQ-3 Dark Star - Lockheed / Skunk Works (cancelled)
Dassault AVE-D Petit Duc - Dassault Aviation (tactical UAV)
Dassault nEUROn - Dassault / Saab / EAB / Alenia / EADS CASA / RUAG / Thales (technology
demonstrator)
Future and current work into UAVs and UCAVs feature great focus into stealth technology.

Fictional

Mikoyan MiG-31 Firefox

F-19 Ghostrider Testors
Mikoyan MiG-37 Testors
F/A-37 Talon Stealth
Blackbird X-Men
General Galaxy YF-21 Macross Plus

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