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being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this
includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement
the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still
have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power
cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely
local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for
other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.
NOTA BENE:
The following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are
allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer
is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to
benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the
political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.