EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,
all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A
BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC.
15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them." While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NONIMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT
BAR. all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court
held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the

end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. 'A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
Page |
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
1
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
(190 SCRA 673 684 [1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second place, even
if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring
the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the
general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198,
203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under
our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is
emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S. 502,
523, 78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-147
[1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
(Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster

Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs.

Auditor General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968];
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
[1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623
[1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on
this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The
first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government. As worded, the
new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse
of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary." In Daza vs.
Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng vs.
Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA
844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203
SCRA 767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even
if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving
it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION,
DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners (and
all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or
violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao Sugar Central
Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and

Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda.
de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA
462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991];
Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is
settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the Page |
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
2
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground
of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted,
wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos
to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which
was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are
all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in
this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for

themselves and others who are equally concerned about the

preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on
the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of
soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per
annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance
of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic
life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity,
(g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of
the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed

their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,

photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen
(16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of
the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no
more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of
virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire
land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered
is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will
be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade,
if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury
and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minors' generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors
and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.

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3

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto

attached as Annex 'B'.

the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the

defendant's abuse of discretion.

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing

TLA's, to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the

aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only
was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of Page |
the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
4
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the

TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income
and wealth' and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources
(sic).' (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic).' (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.' (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right
to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law
other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3)

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda
after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment
in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law
and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation, per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed
to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in
the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' recourse is not to file an

action in court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a

bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class
suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the
said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed,
We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for
the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the
said order read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
Page |
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
5
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in
its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of
public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of 'Separation of
Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts'
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their

continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn

obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the

correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Without
such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy
of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental
cost implications relative to their utilization; development and
conservation of our natural resources."

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV,

Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for
the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
Page |
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
6
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under

E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect

and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political

Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of
this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept
of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
Page |
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
7
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.

A cause of action is defined as:

". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of
the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,
19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid
down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure
to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find
the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as
well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said
to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that
the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and

particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this
Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of
the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of
contracts' abhored (sic) by the fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . ."

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by

executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."

contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,

in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
" 'Under our form of government the use of property and the
Page |
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
8
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.' "
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the
non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment

clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law
has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation
of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature
and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,

Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. A
constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It
has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in
other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered.
2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND
CONTRACT. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law
or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.
It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.
Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER
THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. In case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than nonself-executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani
A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE
NOT PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING
PROVISIONS. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art.
XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is

not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.
Page |
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING
IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING IN ANOTHER.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of
Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELFEXECUTING. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL RESOURCES
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the

equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional

shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE
IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A STATE ACTION, SUBJECT
TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government
are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a " public function", (2) when
the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor
as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3)
when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share
in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction
of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION
ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE
AND GOVERNMENT. When the Constitution addresses the
State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three
(3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.
It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS
ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated
nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be imply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS
WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS BEFORE
ACCEPTANCE OF BID. The argument of respondents that
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no

Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the

highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us,
while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not
yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not
have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to
accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of
the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS Page |
of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

10

13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE

OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE CORRESPONDING
DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE
BID PRICE BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. Since petitioner has already matched the bid
price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures
but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid
of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE
THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. While it is no business of
the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set
itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is
its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted
by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. Indeed, the Court
will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of
a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when
the Constitution is involved.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e.,
in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but
requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC.
The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to
provide management expertise and/or an international

marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen

the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the
Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares
and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other
Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee
on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained." 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as
Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court
En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case

was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation Page |
of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
11
independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of
the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part
of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do
not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is
more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. lexlib
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC
is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in
the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the

bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus
the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have

been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all Page |
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
12
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of

discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did
abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail
as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws

for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of

policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature
to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. 13

MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of
the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not
qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos
as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT.
What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove
the word "QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO.
No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as
against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done.
For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (italics supplied
by respondents).
MR RODRIGO.
It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes. 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the

constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute

squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first
and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of
family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building, 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites
provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of
family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and
the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A
reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines
for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they
are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res
ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference Page |
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos
13
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to
the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World
War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American
forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their
final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became
the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation
and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the
hotel was the site of a failed coup d'etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the

Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own

historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as
used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60%
of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.

Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO.
The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents,
will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipinocontrolled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus

MR. FOZ.
Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo
to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO.
"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the
words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following:
"CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."

MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

xxx xxx xxx

MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we
have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE.
The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino.
What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD.
At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE.
Is that the intention?
MR MONSOD.
Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE.
I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD.
We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO.

MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.

MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ.
Thank you. 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy.
That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant
of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further
clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43
"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino"
bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO
FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions. . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall
be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to
the common good, because of credible competence and

Page |
14

efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and

preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are
incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the
common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions,
when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" and
a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the
qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here
is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate
the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not selfexecutory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision
by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions
of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation
have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement
laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts
provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable
laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress.
If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps
the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is
confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again
is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the
MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC
a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is sosignificantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident
that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
"state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although

entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the

State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
Page |
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
15
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make
the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with
the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders
and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in
the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a
basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the
block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we
cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated
nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy
may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person

therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of

its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the
sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails
to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception
of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner
had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it
did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent
GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched
the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions
and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the
bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It
is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so
must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the
intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the
Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the
Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function
to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the
executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation
economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared
criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic

progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary

injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale of
the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain
statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that
injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system
can be a major obstacle to doing business here."
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
Page |
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred
16
to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or
implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how
buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over nonmaterial values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler nonmaterial values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all,
there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw
itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.
49
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines
being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing
in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose.
Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to
such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while
laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just
any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake
of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic
relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a
hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest
state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role
as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history
and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51 cda
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark this
Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For,
indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino
psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it
is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's
soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What
advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel and all
that it stands for is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of

national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is

entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much
dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting
the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED
||| (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03,
1997)

Page |
17

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 171947-48. December 18, 2008.]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, 1 DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
petitioners, vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA.
VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN
R. OPOSA, respondents.

Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint
stated, stemmed from:
. . . [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of
omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear
and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
Page |
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which
18
reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily
liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skindiving, and other forms of contact recreation. 3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the
continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the
Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: EHSADa
(1) Respondents' constitutional right to life, health, and a
balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

DECISION
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
VELASCO, JR., J p:
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of
climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights
on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other
critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of
garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no
longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of
cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard. dctai

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No.
6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by

the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory
command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance,
our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human
activities. To most of these agencies and their official
complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the
high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be
the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad
commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud
historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many
decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation
activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly
because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled
to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the
RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners
be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht
Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato
T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,
Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated
that water samples collected from different beaches around the
Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml
when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as
a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational
activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100
ml. 4 IaHCAD
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about
the MWSS' efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay

through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its
evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted
on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis
Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.

facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and

sewage coming from septic tanks.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate

Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 in favor
of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, Page |
to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal
19
fishing.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the

people through education the importance of preserving and
protecting the environment.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it
fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant
DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of
action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain
adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under
its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its
wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the
proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila
Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay
of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only
of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes
from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an
adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. TACEDI
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock
its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget
solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila
Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other
nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These
nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end
up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other nonbiodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations
of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper

SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and
PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of
Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National
Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition
for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of
December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for
consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA,
and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that
the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152)
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not
a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision 6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied
petitioners' appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,
stressing that the trial court's decision did not require petitioners
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing
laws. 7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance
of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting
arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE
COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152
REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO
REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED
IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO
THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS
AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL SECATH

II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA
BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT
CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of
PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And
second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its

Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to
cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of
the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDA's duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being Page |
a statutory imposition. The MMDA's duty in this regard is spelled
20
out in Sec. 3 (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the
MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the
MMDA's waste disposal services to include: AHCaES

Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus
under the premises.

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation

and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects
for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis
added.)

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled

by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. 8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It connotes an
act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions
admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10 Mandamus
is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
one way or the other.

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the

Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which
prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary
landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating
requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs.
36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining the MMDA and local
government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law
on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for
solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the
use of controlled dumps. SHIETa

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA's duty to take measures and

maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems
necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that
the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,
including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which
entail the exercise of discretion.

The MMDA's duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be

noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the
power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience. 13 A
discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise
judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to
perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be
dismissed for want of legal basis.

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on
oral arguments.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory

command is clear and that petitioners' duty to comply with and
act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the
exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the
MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to
choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token,
respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste
disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA's ministerial duty to
attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners' obligation to perform
their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to
carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in
Social Justice Society v. Atienza 11 wherein the Court directed

A perusal of other petitioners' respective charters or like enabling

statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the
primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water
quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the
Act's Sec. 19 (k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water
pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,

causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution,

and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies,
to prevent and abate such pollution".
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National
Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope
covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275
provides: DEcSaI
Sec. 19. Lead Agency. The [DENR] shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act . . . unless otherwise provided herein. As
such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twentyfour (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That
the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish
annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework
within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status
report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the
framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management
area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to
2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water
Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again, like the
MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks
assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary
manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in
partnership with various government agencies and nongovernment organizations, has completed, as of December 2005,
the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated
budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration,
and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the
implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod
the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under
existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, 18 is vested with
jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the
cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal
and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as
may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the
cities and towns comprising the System; . . .

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and
control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum
standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and
shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can
direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities
and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275,
the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
Page |
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the
21
setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage
disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation
to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide
sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
ATICcS
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), 20 is designated as the
agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural
and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge
of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to
ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters
are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 21
Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating
with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters. 22 More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22 (c) of RA
9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control
of water pollution for the development, management, and
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the
national government, is tasked under EO 292 23 to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in
accordance with national development objectives and approved
government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3
(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to "flood
control and sewerage management which include the formulation
and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects
for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into
between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the
agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila.
For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the
implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of
the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and
encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros
(drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent
laws. ACTESI
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5 (p) of PD 601, or the
Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or
the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing
marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It
shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with

the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution

Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the
effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall,
under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump . . . harmful substances from or out of any
ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made
structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon
the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure
to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any
ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from
the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom
in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which
the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit . . . material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable
water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or
floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on
December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to
"perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters
and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the
PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime
Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and
PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine
pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were
authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations. 25 ISDHcT
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to
establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized
national port system in support of trade and national
development." 26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the
PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its
powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives,
without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of
Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such
police authority shall include the following:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the
port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port
of watercraft. 27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and
a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the

Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of

adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the
reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports.
Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary
to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from
vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the
vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial
Page |
waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have
22
jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and
maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of
jurisdiction. 29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003
that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in
public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of
solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping,
burying of biodegradable or non-biodegradable materials in
flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as
enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management
facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.
aEHIDT
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds". The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with
the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and
remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or
eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the
concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of
such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination
with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD
1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and
regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that
affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or
municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned
agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the
establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment
system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage
or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be
employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72 30 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation
of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1 31 of Chapter XVII of its
implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by

private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the

requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of
sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies
are issued their environmental sanitation permit. IDScTE
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects
on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. 32
Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the
DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management,
conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other
hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental
concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on
waste management principles. 33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is
tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of
1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country's
development objectives. 34
One of the country's development objectives is enshrined in RA
9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses
that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival
of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also
provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to
streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control,
and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of
water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of
appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for
the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national
program of water quality management that recognizes that issues
related to this management cannot be separated from concerns
about water sources and ecological protection, water supply,
public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive
management program for water pollution focusing on pollution
prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate
budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the
country's development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in
themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the
obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law.
We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup
of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in
general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in
General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall

take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of

such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations. It shall be the responsibility
of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on
the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart
provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17
of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational. IaDTES
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in
or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the
same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and
beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup
operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately
undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other
government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment,
removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said
operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have
caused such pollution under proper administrative determination .
. . . Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the
Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where
said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment
Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as
it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the
DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of
cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup
in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be
read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62 (g) and (h), which defines
the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills", as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing
the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to prespill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous
substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions
and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152
merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake
containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They
maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to
"water pollution incidents", which are situations that presuppose
the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations.
Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62

Page |
23

(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to

pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a
specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil
or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62 (h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously
read Sec. 62 (g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the
containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills
only. Contrary to petitioners' posture, respondents assert that Sec.
62 (g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20.
Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62 (g), PD 1152 may
have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the dayto-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other
sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay.
Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62 (g), far from being
a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope
of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water
pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20
of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners' parochial view on environmental
issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective
mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of
the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are
correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152
is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations"
embodied in Sec. 62 (g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting
definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the
chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in
any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its
best usage". This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures
as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards". In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident. ACcTDS
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as
couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific
situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to
clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work
for the polluters' account. Petitioners' assertion, that they have to
perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is
a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not
undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is
quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17
of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties
of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution
incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA
9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the
happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the
CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD
1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote:
"PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of

environmental protection and management. This is better served

by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than
limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35
Granting arguendo that petitioners' position thus described vis-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have
overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the
Page |
line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such
24
impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty
who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions
"water pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in
the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining
lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay.
Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to
"any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies",
which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes
the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the
contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the
water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless
and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as
beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government
agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost
impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila
Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if
any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.
Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove,
or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of
setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake
cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20
of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation. IDaEHC
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an
aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then
that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays,
and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila
Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile,
cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum
standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It
thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitionerdepartment-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what
other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus": 36
the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In
India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce
directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River
from industrial and municipal pollution. 37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and
other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the MeycuayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the

Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and
garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river
systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would
be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized
structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then
practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water
would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much. 38
cSTHaE
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these
illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code, 39
which prohibits the building of structures within a given length
along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject
to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other
industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the
Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions,
some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the
pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that noncomplying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable
period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and
infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their
sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, noncomplying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need
for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we
cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the
garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are
embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the
garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report: IcTCHD
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila
the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate
are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the
earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for
drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a
large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding
areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous

contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated
into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay. 40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should
now more than ever be established as prescribed by the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular Page |
note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and
25
possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid
Waste. No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor
any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including
LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste,
be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that
no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace
period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has
come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly
complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet
been set up. EaDATc
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48
of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads,
canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps,
open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies
which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge
sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the
Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA
9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater
pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and
unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or
solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes
the introduction by human or machine of substances to the
aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and
other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products
of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other]
radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other humanmade structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court
wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned
executive departments and agencies to immediately act and
discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed,
time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for
the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as
defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices
and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground,
and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not
yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived
in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be,
could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their
minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the
State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation
and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over.

Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and
buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government
agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates;
they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners'
hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a
specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2)
that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty. TacESD
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically
transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16,
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written
in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception
of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to
clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944
and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in
view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the
case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain
its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the
primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR
as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at
the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies
to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of
action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, 42 the DILG, in exercising the

President's power of general supervision and its duty to

promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD
1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of
the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the Page |
NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas26
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay;
and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations.
If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require noncomplying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or
septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions. SaHTCE
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed
to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate
waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, 44 the LWUA, through the local water
districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the
BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the
Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP
Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD
979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed
to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA
is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other shipgenerated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs
and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in
Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and
other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-

Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways

and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services
in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the MeycauayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers,
connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into
the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and
maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a
period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and
like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and
filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275
(the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8
of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of
cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550,
and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to
inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in
the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. aSEHDA
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in
the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to
cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with
the country's development objective to attain economic growth in
a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival
of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,
DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus", shall, from finality of this Decision,
each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, December 18, 2008)

Page |
27

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 171947-48. February 15, 2011.]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, 1 DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
petitioners, vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA.
VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN
R. OPOSA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R.
Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and
preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944
and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in
view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the
case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain
its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.
In particular:
(1)Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the
primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR
as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at
the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies
to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of
action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
EcIaTA

(2)Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the

Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the
President's power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD
1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
Page |
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of
28
the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay;
and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations.
If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require noncomplying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or
septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3)As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to
provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate
waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4)Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water
districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5)Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is
ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay.
It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing,
using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in
the Manila Bay.
(6)The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP
Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD
979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed
to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7)Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA
is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other shipgenerated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators. aSIATD
(8)The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs
and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in
Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other

encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and

other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services
in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the MeycauayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers,
connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into
the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and
maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a
period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and
like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and
filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the
Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9)The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8
of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of
cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10)Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and
Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to
inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in
the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11)The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in
the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to
cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with
the country's development objective to attain economic growth in
a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival
of our marine waters.
(12)The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,
DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision,
each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. cHSIDa
SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for
reconsideration and the Decision became final in January 2009.

The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory
December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly
progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in
accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform Page |
their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over
29
the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the
President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an
exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution,
because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the
adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever
questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18,
2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like
submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final
decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule
39 reads:
Section 47.Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties of their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters
"actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."
Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final
judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by
Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
cases:
Sec. 7.Judgment. If warranted, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring
respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is
fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted
resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports
detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the
court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate
government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The
petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the
execution of the judgment. EDISTc

Sec. 8.Return of the writ. The periodic reports submitted by

the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be
contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of
the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court
by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been
fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered
in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of
continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until
petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court's
orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until
full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak
of, We shall now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila
Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee. 2 An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports
has shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive
reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not
have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation
and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have
been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies' timeframe
for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a
change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5)
some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with
the Court's directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain
directives have to be issued by the Court to address the said
concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee, the Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1)The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), as lead agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall
quality of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or
before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses
of persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and
hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011. DEaCSA
(2)On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in
Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns
in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major
river systems such as but not limited to the Pasig-MarikinaSan Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paraaque-Zapote,
Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna
De Bay and other minor rivers and waterways within their
jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay

and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater

treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local
government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30,
2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take
appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-complying
Page |
factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said
30
law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or
installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic
tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the
DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective
compliance reports which will contain the names and addresses or
offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the
concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or
the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that
will contain measures intended to ensure compliance of all noncomplying factories, commercial establishments, and private
homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities
in Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater
facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water,
Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3)The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do
not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the
same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their
plans and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment
facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for
said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have
its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as
sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of
December 31, 2010.
(4)The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit
on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install,
operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said
cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which
shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020. TEDAHI
(5)The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where
marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it
has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the
fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall
contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within
the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and
improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to
assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the
completion period for said undertakings.

The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30,

2011 the baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution
loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and
livestock sources.
(6)The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its
quarterly reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the
status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its
report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA
ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its
compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the
MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its
concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the
names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August
2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA
ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the
corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the
volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships,
the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.

operations are illegal after February 21, 2006, 3 pursuant to Secs.

36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open
and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December
31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary,
as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management
Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of
all open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan.
Page |
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity
as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not
the following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA
9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to
wit:
National Capital Region
1.Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2.Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3.Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan

(7)The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall

submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on
the measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend
the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before
June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and
activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of
Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of
1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009
and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine
pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution
of violators.

4.Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan

5.Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6.Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7.Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic
Zone
Region IV-A
8.Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9.Brgy. Sto. Nio, San Pablo City, Laguna
10.Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna

(8)The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)

shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names
and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of
December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built along
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (ParaaqueZapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before
June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal
of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as
the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully
implemented not later than December 31, 2015. HIcTDE
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a
sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the
standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of
the location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose

11.Morong, Rizal
12.Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal
(ISWIMS)
13.Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17)
LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on
the average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in
all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December
31, 2010 vis- -vis the average amount of garbage disposed
monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the
last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the
apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003,
RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period. HcSDIE
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the
names and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective
areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses,
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along the

31

Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay

(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and
other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the
aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of
said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the
completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented
not later than December 31, 2012.
(9)The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on
or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of
septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on
Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies
to procure a license to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall
develop a toxic and hazardous waste management system by June
30, 2011 which will implement segregation of
hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with
municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of
action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal
facilities and the completion dates of compliance.
(10)The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the
Court on or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects
on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated
into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 20112012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan
of action to ensure compliance of all the schools under its
supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned
subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented
by June 30, 2012.
(11)All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports
electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other
key performance indicators that they have identified. aICHEc
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
||| (MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, February 15, 2011)

Page |
32

October 23, 2009

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9729
AN ACT
MAINSTREAMING CLIMATE CHANGE INTO
GOVERNMENT POLICY FORMULATIONS,
ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK STRATEGY
AND PROGRAM ON CLIMATECHANGE,
CREATING FOR THIS PURPOSE
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as
the "Climate Change Act of 2009". DCScaT
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the
policy of the State to afford full protection and the
advancement of the right of the people to a healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. In this
light, the State has adopted the Philippine Agenda 21
framework which espouses sustainable development, to
fulfill human needs while maintaining the quality of the
natural environment for current and future generations.
Towards this end, the State adopts the principle of
protecting the climate system for the benefit of humankind,
on the basis of climate justice or common but differentiated
responsibilities and the Precautionary Principle to guide
decision-making in climate risk management. As a party to
the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, the State adopts the ultimate objective of
the Convention which is the stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system which should be achieved within a time
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner. As a party to the Hyogo Framework
for Action, the State likewise adopts the strategic goals in
order to build national and local resilience to climate changerelated disasters.
Recognizing the vulnerability of the Philippine
archipelago and its local communities, particularly the poor,
women, and children, to potential dangerous consequences
of climate change such as rising seas, changing landscapes,
increasing frequency and/or severity of droughts, fires,
floods and storms, climate-related illnesses and diseases,
damage to ecosystems, biodiversity loss that affect the
country's environment, culture, and economy, the State shall
cooperate with the global community in the resolution
of climate change issues, including disaster risk reduction. It
shall be the policy of the State to enjoin the participation of
national and local governments, businesses, nongovernment
organizations, local communities and the public to prevent
and reduce the adverse impacts of climate change and, at the
same time, maximize the benefits of climate change. It shall
also be the policy of the State to incorporate a gendersensitive, pro-children and pro-poor perspective in
all climate change and renewable energy efforts, plans and
programs. In view thereof, the State shall strengthen,
integrate, consolidate and institutionalize government
initiatives to achieve coordination in the implementation of
plans and programs to address climate change in the context
of sustainable development.

Further recognizing that climate change and

disaster risk reduction are closely interrelated and effective
disaster risk reduction will enhance climate change adaptive
capacity, the State shall integrate disaster risk reduction
into climate change programs and initiatives.
Cognizant of the need to ensure that national and
sub-national government policies, plans, programs and
projects are founded upon sound environmental
considerations and the principle of sustainable development,
it is hereby declared the policy of the State to systematically
integrate the concept of climate change in various phases of
policy formulation, development plans, poverty reduction
strategies and other development tools and techniques by all
agencies and instrumentalities of the government. cCSHET
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes
of this Act, the following shall have the corresponding
meanings:
(a) "Adaptation" refers to the adjustment in natural
or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits
beneficial opportunities.
(b) "Adaptive capacity" refers to the ability of
ecological, social or economic systems to adjust
to climate change including climate variability and extremes,
to moderate or offset potential damages and to take
advantage of associated opportunities with changes
in climate or to cope with the consequences thereof.
(c) "Anthropogenic causes" refer to causes resulting
from human activities or produced by human beings.
(d) "Climate Change" refers to
a change in climate that can be identified by changes in the
mean and/or variability of its properties and that persists for
an extended period typically decades or longer, whether due
to natural variability or as a result of human activity.
(e) "Climate Variability" refers to the variations in
the average state and in other statistics of the climate on all
temporal and spatial scales beyond that of individual weather
events.
(f) "Climate Risk" refers to the product
of climate and related hazards working over the vulnerability
of human and natural ecosystems.
(g) "Disaster" refers to a serious disruption of the
functioning of a community or a society involving
widespread human, material, economic or environmental
losses and impacts which exceed the ability of the affected
community or society to cope using its own resources.
(h) "Disaster risk reduction" refers to the concept
and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic
efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters,
including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of
land and the environment, and improved preparedness for
adverse events.
(i) "Gender mainstreaming" refers to the strategy
for making women's as well as men's concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and
programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres so
that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not
perpetuated. It is the process of assessing the implications for
women and men of any planned action, including legislation,
policies, or programs in all areas and at all levels. AcHaTE

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(j) "Global Warming" refers to the increase in the

average temperature of the Earth's near-surface air and
oceans that is associated with the increased concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
(k) "Greenhouse effect" refers to the process by
which the absorption of infrared radiation by the atmosphere
warms the Earth.
(l) "Greenhouse gases (GHG)" refers to
constituents of the atmosphere that contribute to the
greenhouse effect including, but not limited to, carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride.
(m) "Mainstreaming" refers to the integration of
policies and measures that address climate change into
development planning and sectoral decision-making.
(n) "Mitigation" in the context of climate change,
refers to human intervention to address anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all GHG,
including ozone-depleting substances and their substitutes.
(o) "Mitigation potential" shall refer to the scale of
GHG reductions that could be made, relative to emission
baselines, for a given level of carbon price (expressed in cost
per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions avoided or
reduced).
(p) "Sea level rise" refers to an increase in sea level
which may be influenced by factors like global warming
through expansion of sea water as the oceans warm and
melting of ice over land and local factors such as land
subsidence.
(q) "vulnerability" refers to the degree to which a
system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse
effects of climate change, including climate variability and
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character,
magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which
a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.
SECTION 4. Creation of
the Climate Change Commission. There is hereby
established a Climate Change Commission, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission. EDACSa
The Commission shall be an independent and
autonomous body and shall have the same status as that of a
national government agency. It shall be attached to the
Office of the President.
The Commission shall be the sole policy-making
body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate,
monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the
government relating to climate change pursuant to the
provisions of this Act.
The Commission shall be organized within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
SECTION 5. Composition of the Commission.
The Commission shall be composed of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines who shall serve as the
Chairperson, and three (3) Commissioners to be appointed
by the President, one of whom shall serve as the Vice
Chairperson of the Commission.
The Commission shall have an advisory board
composed of the following:
(a) Secretary of the Department of Agriculture;
(b) Secretary of the Department of Energy;
(c) Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources;
(d) Secretary of the Department of Education;

(e) Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(f) Secretary of the Department of Health;
(g) Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government;
(h) Secretary of the Department of National
Defense, in his capacity as Chair of the National Disaster
Coordinating Council; EcAISC
(i) Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways;
(j) Secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology;
(k) Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development;
(l) Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry;
(m) Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications;
(n) Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, in his capacity as Chair of the
Philippine Council for Sustainable Development;
(o) Director-General of the National Security
Council;
(p) Chairperson of the National Commission on the
Role of Filipino Women;
(q) President of the League of Provinces;
(r) President of the League of Cities;
(s) President of the League of Municipalities;
(t) President of the Liga ng mga Barangay;
(u) Representative from the academe;
(v) Representative from the business sector; and
(w) Representative from nongovernmental
organizations.
At least one (1) of the sectoral representatives shall
come from the disaster risk reduction community.
The representatives shall be appointed by the
President from a list of nominees submitted by their
respective groups. They shall serve for a term of six (6) years
without reappointment unless their representation is
withdrawn by the sector they represent. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. CAETcH
Only the ex officio members of the advisory board
shall appoint a qualified representative who shall hold a rank
of no less than an Undersecretary.
SECTION 6. Meetings of the Commission. The
Commission shall meet once every three (3) months, or as
often as may be deemed necessary by the Chairperson. The
Chairperson may likewise call upon other government
agencies for the proper implementation of this Act.
SECTION 7. Qualifications, Tenure, Compensation
of Commissioners. The Commissioners must be Filipino
citizens, residents of the Philippines, at least thirty (30) years
of age at the time of appointment, with at least ten (10) years
of experience on climate change and of proven honesty and
integrity. The Commissioners shall be experts
in climate change by virtue of their educational background,
training and experience: Provided, That at least one (1)
Commissioner shall be female: Provided, further, That in no
case shall the Commissioners come from the same
sector: Provided, finally, That in no case shall any of the
Commissioners appoint representatives to act on their behalf.

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The Commissioners shall hold office for a period of

six (6) years, and may be subjected to
reappointment: Provided, That no person shall serve for
more than two (2) consecutive terms: Provided, further, That
in case of a vacancy, the new appointee shall fully meet the
qualifications of a Commissioner and shall hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term only: Provided,
finally, That in no case shall a Commissioner be designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
The Vice Chairperson and the Commissioners shall
have the rank and privileges of a Department Secretary and
Undersecretary, respectively. They shall be entitled to
corresponding compensation and other emoluments and shall
be subject to the same disqualifications.
SECTION 8. Climate Change Office. There is
hereby created a Climate Change Office that shall assist the
Commission. It shall be headed by a Vice Chairperson of the
Commission who shall act as the Executive Director of the
Office. The Commission shall have the authority to
determine the number of staff and create corresponding
positions necessary to facilitate the proper implementation of
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations.
The officers and employees of the Commission shall be
appointed by the Executive Director. SIcEHD
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the
Commission. The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) Ensure the mainstreaming of climate change, in
synergy with disaster risk reduction, into the national,
sectoral and local development plans and programs;
(b) Coordinate and
synchronize climate change programs of national
government agencies;
(c) Formulate a Framework Strategy
on Climate Change to serve as the basis for a program
for climate change planning, research and development,
extension, and monitoring of activities on climate change;
(d) Exercise policy coordination to ensure the
attainment of goals set in the framework strategy and
program on climate change;
(e) Recommend legislation, policies, strategies,
programs on and appropriations
for climate change adaptation and mitigation and other
related activities;
(f) Recommend key development investments
in climate-sensitive sectors such as water resources,
agriculture, forestry, coastal and marine resources, health,
and infrastructure to ensure the achievement of national
sustainable development goals;
(g) Create an enabling environment for the design
of relevant and appropriate risk-sharing and risk-transfer
instruments;
(h) Create an enabling environment that shall
promote broader multi-stakeholder participation and
integrate climate change mitigation and adaptation;
(i) Formulate strategies on mitigating GHG and
other anthropogenic causes of climate change;
(j) Coordinate and establish a close partnership
with the National Disaster Coordinating Council in order to
increase efficiency and effectiveness in reducing the people's
vulnerability to climate-related disasters;

(k) In coordination with the Department of Foreign

Affairs, represent the Philippines in
the climate change negotiations; IEHDAT
(l) Formulate and update guidelines for determining
vulnerability to climate change impacts and adaptation
assessments and facilitate the provision of technical
assistance for their implementation and monitoring;
(m) Coordinate with local government units
(LGUs) and private entities to address vulnerability
to climate change impacts of regions, provinces, cities and
municipalities;
(n) Facilitate capacity building for local adaptation
planning, implementation and monitoring
of climate change initiatives in vulnerable communities and
areas;
(o) Promote and provide technical and financial
support to local research and development programs and
projects in vulnerable communities and areas; and
(p) Oversee the dissemination of information
on climate change, local vulnerabilities and risks, relevant
laws and protocols and adaptation and mitigation measures.
SECTION 10. Panel of Technical Experts. The
Commission shall constitute a national panel of technical
experts consisting of practitioners in disciplines that are
related to climate change, including disaster risk reduction.
The Panel shall provide technical advice to the
Commission in climate science, technologies, and best
practices for risk assessment and enhancement of adaptive
capacity of vulnerable human settlements to potential
impacts of climate change.
The Commission shall set the qualifications and
compensation for the technical experts. It shall provide
resources for the operations and activities of the Panel.
SECTION 11. Framework Strategy and Program
on Climate Change. The Commission shall, within six (6)
months from the effectivity of this Act, formulate a
Framework Strategy on Climate Change. The Framework
shall serve as the basis for a program
for climate change planning, research and development,
extension, and monitoring of activities to protect vulnerable
communities from the adverse effects
of climate change. TAacCE
The Framework shall be formulated based
on climate change vulnerabilities, specific adaptation needs,
and mitigation potential, and in accordance with the
international agreements.
The Framework shall be reviewed every three (3)
years, or as may be deemed necessary.
SECTION 12. Components of the Framework
Strategy and Program on Climate Change. The
Framework shall include, but not limited to, the following
components:
(a) National priorities;
(b) Impact, vulnerability and adaptation
assessments;
(c) Policy formulation;
(d) Compliance with international commitments;
(e) Research and development;
(f) Database development and management;
(g) Academic programs, capability building and
mainstreaming;

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(h) Advocacy and information dissemination;

(i) Monitoring and evaluation; and
(j) Gender mainstreaming.
SECTION 13. National Climate Change Action
Plan. The Commission shall formulate a
National Climate Change Action Plan in accordance with the
Framework within one (1) year after the formulation of the
latter.
The National Climate Change Action Plan shall
include, but not limited to, the following components:
(a) Assessment of the national impact
of climate change; ASDTEa
(b) The identification of the most vulnerable
communities/areas, including ecosystems to the impacts
of climate change, variability and extremes;
(c) The identification of differential impacts
of climate change on men, women and children;
(d) The assessment and management of risk and
vulnerability;
(e) The identification of GHG mitigation potentials;
and
(f) The identification of options, prioritization of
appropriate adaptation measures for joint projects of national
and local governments.
SECTION 14. Local Climate Change Action
Plan. The LGUs shall be the frontline agencies in the
formulation, planning and implementation
of climate changeaction plans in their respective areas,
consistent with the provisions of the Local Government
Code, the Framework, and the
National Climate Change Action Plan.
Barangays shall be directly involved with
municipal and city governments in
prioritizing climate change issues and in identifying and
implementing best practices and other solutions. Municipal
and city governments shall
consider climate change adaptation, as one of their regular
functions. Provincial governments shall provide technical
assistance, enforcement and information management in
support of municipal and city climate change action plans.
Inter-local government unit collaboration shall be maximized
in the conduct of climate-related activities.
LGUs shall regularly update their respective action
plans to reflect changing social, economic, and
environmental conditions and emerging issues. The LGUs
shall furnish the Commission with copies of their action
plans and all subsequent amendments, modifications and
revisions thereof, within one (1) month from their adoption.
The LGUs shall mobilize and allocate necessary personnel,
resources and logistics to effectively implement their
respective action plans.
The local chief executive shall appoint the person
responsible for the formulation and implementation of the
local action plan. cHSIAC
It shall be the responsibility of the national
government to extend technical and financial assistance to
LGUs for the accomplishment of their
Local Climate ChangeAction Plans.
The LGU is hereby expressly authorized to
appropriate and use the amount from its Internal Revenue
Allotment necessary to implement said local plan effectively,

any provision in the Local Government Code to the contrary

notwithstanding.
SECTION 15. Role of Government Agencies. To
ensure the effective implementation of the framework
strategy and program on climate change, concerned agencies
shall perform the following functions:
(a) The Department of Education (DepED) shall
integrate climate change into the primary and secondary
education curricula and/or subjects, such as, but not limited
to, science, biology, sibika, history, including textbooks,
primers and other educational materials,
basic climate change principles and concepts;
(b) The Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and Local Government Academy shall
facilitate the development and provision of a training
program for LGUs in climate change. The training program
shall include socioeconomic, geophysical, policy, and other
content necessary to address the prevailing and forecasted
conditions and risks of particular LGUs. It shall likewise
focus on women and children, especially in the rural areas,
since they are the most vulnerable;
(c) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) shall oversee the establishment and
maintenance of a climate change information management
system and network, including on climate change risks,
activities and investments, in collaboration with other
concerned national government agencies, institutions and
LGUs;
(d) The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) shall
review international agreements related
to climate change and make the necessary recommendation
for ratification and compliance by the government on matters
pertaining thereto;
(e) The Philippine Information Agency (PIA) shall
disseminate information on climate change, local
vulnerabilities and risk, relevant laws and protocols and
adaptation and mitigation measures; and TCEaDI
(f) Government financial institutions, shall, any
provision in their respective charters to the contrary
notwithstanding, provide preferential financial packages
forclimate change-related projects. In consultation with the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), they shall, within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity of this Act, issue and
promulgate the implementing guidelines therefor.
The Commission shall evaluate, recommend the
approval of loans and monitor the use of said funds of LGUs.
SECTION 16. Coordination with Various
Sectors. In the development and implementation of the
National Climate Change Action Plan, and the local action
plans, the Commission shall coordinate with the
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), civic organizations,
academe, people's organizations, the private and corporate
sectors and other concerned stakeholder groups.
SECTION 17. Authority to Receive Donations
and/or Grants. The Commission is hereby authorized to
accept grants, contributions, donations, endowments,
bequests, or gifts in cash, or in kind from local and foreign
sources in support of the development and implementation
of climate change programs and plans: Provided,That in case
of donations from foreign governments, acceptance thereof
shall be subject to prior clearance and approval of the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the

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Secretary of Foreign Affairs: Provided, further, That such

donations shall not be used to fund personal services
expenditures and other operating expenses of the
Commission.
The proceeds shall be used to finance:
(a) Research, development, demonstration and
promotion of technologies;
(b) Conduct of assessment of vulnerabilities
to climate change impacts, resource inventory, and
adaptation capability building; DAcaIE
(c) Advocacy, networking and communication
activities in the conduct of information campaign; and
(d) Conduct of such other activities reasonably
necessary to carry out the objectives of this Act, as may be
defined by the Commission.
SECTION 18. Funding Allocation
for Climate Change. All relevant government agencies
and LGUs shall allocate from their annual appropriations
adequate funds for the formulation, development and
implementation, including training, capacity building and
direct intervention, of their
respective climate change programs and plans. It shall also
include public awareness campaigns on the effects
of climate change and energy-saving solutions to mitigate
these effects, and initiatives, through educational and training
programs and micro-credit schemes, especially for women in
rural areas. In subsequent budget proposals, the concerned
offices and units shall appropriate funds for program/project
development and implementation including continuing
training and education in climate change.
SECTION 19. Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to monitor the implementation of this
Act. The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five (5)
Senators and five (5) Representatives to be appointed by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respectively. The Oversight Committee
shall be co-chaired by a Senator and a Representative to be
designated by the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, respectively. Its funding
requirement shall be charged against the appropriations of
Congress.
SECTION 20. Annual Report. The Commission
shall submit to the President and to both Houses of Congress,
not later than March 30 of every year following the
effectivity of this Act, or upon the request of the
Congressional Oversight Committee, a report giving a
detailed account of the status of the implementation of this
Act, a progress report on the implementation of the
National Climate Change Action Plan and recommend
legislation, where applicable and necessary. LGUs shall
submit annual progress reports on the implementation of
their respective local action plan to the Commission within
the first quarter of the following year.
SECTION 21. Appropriations. The sum of Fifty
million pesos (Php50,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated as
initial operating fund in addition to the unutilized fund of the
Presidential Task Force on Climate Change and the Office of
the Presidential Adviser on Global Warming

and Climate Change. The sum shall be sourced from the

President's contingent fund. DHITSc
Thereafter, the amount necessary to effectively
carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.
SECTION 22. Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Within ninety (90) days after the approval of
this Act, the Commission shall, upon consultation with
government agencies, LGUs, private sector, NGOs and civil
society, promulgate the implementing rules and regulations
of this Act: Provided, That failure to issue rules and
regulations shall not in any manner affect the executory
nature of the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 23. Transitory Provisions. Upon the
organization of the Commission, the Presidential Task Force
on Climate Change created under Administrative Order No.
171 and the Inter-Agency Committee
on Climate Change created by virtue of Administrative Order
No. 220, shall be abolished: Provided, That their powers and
functions shall be absorbed by the Commission: Provided,
further, That the officers and employees thereof shall
continue in a holdover capacity until such time as the new
officers and employees of the Commission shall have been
duly appointed pursuant to the provisions of this Act. All
qualified regular or permanent employees who may be
transferred to the Commission shall not suffer any loss in
seniority or rank or decrease in emoluments. Any employee
who cannot be absorbed by the Commission shall be entitled
to a separation pay under existing retirement laws.
SECTION 24. Separability Clause. If for any
reason any section or provision of this Act is declared as
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions
hereof shall not be affected thereby.
SECTION 25. Repealing Clause. All laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations, and other issuances or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 26. Effectivity. This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: October 23, 2009 TICaEc
||| (Climate Change Act of 2009, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9729
[2009])

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