A.M. No.

1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be
known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise
of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters
in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'.
...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as
the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which
power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,

disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to
itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to
be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession
and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty
that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in
the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March
1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in
his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal
home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May
1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had
been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of
the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his
wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the
beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former."
(Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made
a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had
taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent
but that she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where
she was living although she had no means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and
stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings
which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent
presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12,
1982, p. 9).

2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and
Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at No. 1
Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45
Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17,
May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household
appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of
income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU Hospital,
respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20,
June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent and complainant
took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and
'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving
respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and
'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and
complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and
'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against
respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one
year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult
relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she
suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or
caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No. 45
Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house
where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom
respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as
assistance in her medical expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for

lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being
investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in
Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa
Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at
No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was between Priscilla's
brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45
Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to
intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984).
(Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez
Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they
(complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences being
one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice,
because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45 Sisa
St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house
where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in
Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed
happened.

8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1

Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or
three houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against
respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and suspended
for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained
by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent
had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's
suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is
admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in
spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents
involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was
confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with
complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by
avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby
causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty.
Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely
reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that
respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with
the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of
the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only

required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or
similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6396

Present:

versus -

ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,

Respondent,

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 25, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court.
Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting
their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R.

Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8
and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The charge in the complaint is
summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva
Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps.
Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of
origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that
respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since
a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent
retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals?
You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised
at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy
sent to the party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should
have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been
frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant
replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify
you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily
declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to
say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office,
banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it
was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking
place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his
finger at complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga
ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my
client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but

still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and
as he passed by complainants window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of
your mother, you woman!)[5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her
office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command
full respect from her staff.[6]

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by
an Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidencewas filed by complainant on 25
September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit his
answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18 June 2003.
Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847,
entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the
incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the
records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records
on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead,
he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet
been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the
court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on
said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestationstating that the reason for his non-

appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was
not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on
19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and
humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and
warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with
more severely.[14] The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil
Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present
the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have
gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals
furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy
of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there
being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right
to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of
court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also
unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to
wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect
on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers

conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers
are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably,
fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach
at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the
prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant
also
alleged
in
her Complaint-Affidavit that
respondents
uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same
to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case

against respondent pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such
allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This
is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot
be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren.
This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of
professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42800 April 7, 1976
LIM SE and BENITO LIM, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MANUEL A. ARGEL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XXXV; JUANA SAN PEDRO-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO
SAN PEDRO, GENARO BULOTANO, and THE SHERIFF of the City of Baguio and/or his
Deputy/Deputies or DEPUTY ESTEBAN S. PAR, respondents.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:p

Atty. Homobono A. Adaza in his "motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction" in this
case recklessly and sweepingly contended that its issuance "has no legal nor factual basis" and was
"unjust and constitutes a serious miscarriage of justice".
To determine whether in employing such vicious abusive and disrespectful language, he committed
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae, it is necessary to summarize briefly the
allegations of the verified petition consisting of 209 pages. Those averments underpinned the
issuance of the writ and were not traversed by movants-respondents in their motion.
Lim Se and Benito Lim alleged that from 1965 to 1970 Lim Se leased from Venancia Chiombon
through her attorney-in-fact, Francisco San Pedro, the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the
Venancia Building located at 72 Session Road, corner Calderon Street, Baguio City. When that lease
expired in 1970, Lim Se leased the same premises from the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. for the
period from January, 1971 to June, 1973. It was also alleged in the petition that in Civil Case No.
2143 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, an interpleader action instituted by Lim Se and the other
tenants of the Venancia Building against Francisco San Pedro and the estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr.
(which is the owner of the lot and which claimed to have become the owner of the Venancia Building),
it was settled in the court's order of March 16, 1972 that the lessees would pay the rentals to the said
estate and not to San Pedro.
On December 23, 1974 Lim Se and his son Benito Lim leased from the Estate of Florencio Reyes,
Sr., through its special administrator, Florencio Reyes Jr., the same premises for a period ending on
March 31, 1971. The rental up to April, 1975 had been paid. Benito Lim operated in the premises the
New Life Cafe & Restaurant.
Meanwhile, Genaro Bulotano who claimed to have purchased on December 19, 1970 the Venancia
Building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo (and who in turn allegedly bought it from Venancia
Chiombon filed in May, 1971 an action 'in the Court of First Instance of Cavite City against Lim Se the
Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr., Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Remedios Sarmiento for the recovery
of rentals and damages from the said defendants in connection with their occupancy of the Venancia
Building (Civil Case No. N-1647).
Without awaiting the outcome of the Cavite case, Genaro Bulotano in May, 1975 filed in the Caloocan
City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco
San Pedro an action to recover possession of Door No. 72 f the Venancia Building, its mezzanine
floor and basement, the premises leased by Lim Se and Benito Lim (as already stated above), and
rentals and damages amounting to P94,800 (Civil Case No. C-3547).
Note that the action, which is a real action to recover real property located in Baguio City, was filed in
Caloocan City instead of in Baguio City (Sec. 2(a), Rule 4, Rules of Court). The only circumstance
that might justify the laying of the venue in Caloocan City was that the defendants were supposedly
residents of Malabon Rizal. (In Civil Case No. 2143 Francisco San Pedro was alleged to be a resident
of 61 Calderon Street, Baguio City).
In Civil Case No. C-3547 defendants Juana San Pedro and Francisco San Pedro in June, 1975 (or
about a month after the main action was brought) filed against Lim Se and Benito Lim an unverified

third party complaint (which in reality was an ejectment suit), praying that they be ordered to vacate
the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building and to pay rentals amounting to
P71,200. That third-party complaint or ejectment action was based on the termination in 1970 of the
1965 lease contract between Lim Se and Francisco San Pedro. However, it was stipulated in that
lease contract that "in case of suit arising out of this contract, venue thereof shall be the City of
Baguio".
Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a motion to dismiss the third-party, complaint on the ground of improper
venue, lis pendens and lack of jurisdiction over the res. Defendants San Pedro opposed the motion.
The lower court denied it.
Lim Se and Benito Lim in their answer to the third-party or ejectment complaint reiterated the grounds
raised in their motion to dismiss.
Juana S. Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro filed an urgent motion for summary judgment. They
attached thereto Bulotano's affidavit, stating that on December 19, 1970 he bought the Venancia
Building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo for P27,000. In the deed of sale, it was stated that the
building was constructed on two lots registered in the name of Florencio Reyes but which were under
litigation in Civil Case No. 2043 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio entitled "Pedro Carantes, et
al. vs. City of Baguio, Florencio Reyes, et al."
Juana and Francisco also annexed to their urgent motion for summary judgment an agreement dated
January 12, 1971 between Bulotano and Francisco San Pedro wherein it was stipulated that San
Pedro would deliver to Bulotano the possession of the portions of the Venancia Building occupied by
Lim Se, Jose T. Zabala and Remedios Sarmiento.
The lower court in its summary judgment dated November 27, 1975 ordered Lim Se and Benito Lim
to vacate Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building and its mezzanine and basement of the amount of
damages due form Lim Se and Benito Lim.
Juana and Francisco filed a motion for execution dated December 11, 1975 on the grounds that the
appeal of Lim Se and Benito Lim would be frivolous and dilatory, that they had been withholding
possession of the premises in litigation for the last five years without paying rentals, and that the
appeals of Lim Se's co-tenants, Jose Zabala and Remedios Sarmiento, were dismissed by the Court
of Appeals.
Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a "motion for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance" dated
January 2, 1976 together with an affidavit of merits. They called the lower court's attention to the fact
that the lots on which the Venancia Building was constructed were registered in the name of
Florencio Reyes, that they had leased up toMarch 31, 1977 from the administrator of the estate of
Florencio Reyes the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building, and that they
had paid the rentals up to April, 1975.
They also called the lower court's attention to the fact in July, 1975 the special administrator of the
intestate estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. filed Civil Case No. 2817 in the Court of San Pedro, Genaro
Bulotano, Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, Ricardo Gonzales, Lim Se, Amando Masangkay, Del Rosario

Bros. Marketing Corporation, and Remigio T. Sature a complaint to settle once and for all the
question as to the ownership and possession of the Venancia Building.
In that complaint it was alleged that Florencio Reyes, Sr. became the owner of the Venancia Building
in 1962 upon the expiration of the lease contract between Reyes and Venancia Chiombon,
represented by her son, Francisco San Pedro. It was stipulated in that lease contract that the lessor
would become the owner of the building.
It was further alleged that Venancia Chiombon and her son, Francisco San Pedro, executed a
simulated and fraudulent sale of the Venancia Building to Juana San Pedro-Ocampo in order to
prevent the building from becoming the lessor's property. In turn, Juana S. Ocampo executed a
simulated sale of the building to Genaro Bulotano. Florencio Reyes, Jr. alleged that the two sales
were void because in 1962 the building in question was already the property of Florencio Reyes, Sr.
The lower court in its summary judgment relied on its decisions in Civil Cases Nos. C-1702 and C1805 (Judge Serafin Salvador of Branch XIV ejecting Remedios Sarmiento and Jose T. Zabala from
the Venancia Building at the instance of Venancia Chiombon Lim Se and Benito Lim reminded the
lower court that in Civil Case No. C-1702 his wife, Li Hua was sought to be ejected also from the
Venancia Building but Judge Salvador dismiss the case as to her. The motion of Venancia Chiombon
to revive the case against Li Hua was denied by Judge Salvador in his order of March 14, 1972.
Lim Se and Benito Lim also called the lower court's attention to the order dated March 20, 1973 of the
City Court of Baguio in Civil Case No. 2631, an unlawful detainer action filed by the Estate of
Florencio Reyes, Sr. against Venancia Chiombon and Genaro Bulotano regarding the Venancia
Building. The City Court in dismissing the action held that it was necessary to determine first the
ownership of the Venancia Building in a proper action in the Court of First Instance before the
question of possession Could be resolved.
The lower court or the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City in its order of January 13, 1976 denied
the motion of Lim Se and Benito Lim for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance.
In its ex parte order of January 29, 1976 the lower court declared its summary judgment final and
executory. It found that Lim Se and Benito Lim should have perfected their appeal on or before
January 26, 1976. As no appeal was perfected, the lower court ordered that a writ of possession
should be issued against Lim Se and Benito Lim.
On January 30, 1976 the Branch Clerk of Court of the lower court issued a "writ of possession"
instead of the usual writ of execution. In that writ of possession the City Sheriff of Baguio was ordered
to take possession of the premises occupied b Lim Se and Benito Lim, to eject them and anybody
claiming under them, and to deliver the possession to Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San
Pedro.
At around ten-thirty in the morning of February 2, Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par addressed an
ultimatum to Lim Se and Benito Lim, ejecting them from Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building and
giving them "two (2) hours to bring out all your properties from the premises in question", with the
warning that if they failed to leave the premises, they would be ousted therefrom.

Par executed the writ of possession "in a most cruel and oppressive manner" according to Lim Se
and Benito Lim. (They had stayed in the premises for more than ten years):
That even before the issuance of said Order of January 29, 1976 was made known to
petitioners' counsel, Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par of the Office of the Provincial Sheriff
in Baguio sought the enforcement of the same against petitioners in a most cruel and
oppressive manner.
Instead of giving petitioners the usual period of at least five (5) days within which to
vacate the premises peacefully, said deputy sheriff gave petitioners only two (2) hours
to do so; an impossible demand, since the premises involved constitute petitioners'
business establishment a restaurant New Life Cafe & Restaurant as well as their
residence, so all of petitioners' possessions and properties within the premises cannot
be moved out in two (2) short hours.
And when petitioners failed to comply with said impossible demand, Deputy Sheriff
Esteban S. Parwith the aid of able-bodied men physically threw out of the premises into
the streets some of petitioners' personal properties forced petitioner Benito Lim,
his eight-month pregnant wife, and one year old son, out of the premises into the street,
together with the petitioners' other family members and padlocked the premises with
most of petitioners' properties still inside the same (Par. 32, Petition).
The petitioners further alleged that the "Writ of possession" was consummated even before their
counsel had received a copy of the order of execution.
The petitioners underscored that the lower court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering summary judgment in an ejectment case, where the venue was improperly
laid, and in ordering execution pending appeal. They prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower
court from further hearing the ejectment case and to order the sheriff to restore to them the
possession of the premises in question. They asked for the annulment of all proceedings in the lower
court.
The respondents were directed to answer the petition. A temporary restraining order was issued.
After the petitioners had filed a bond in the sum of ten thousand pesos, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued, directing the City Sheriff of Baguio to place petitioners in
possession of the premises from which they had been uncremoniouly ousted.
Respondent Bulotano filed his separate answer through his lawyer of record, Atty. Ulysses P. Ortillo.
The respondents (presumably including Bulotano also) filed an answer through Atty. Igmidio G. Baclit,
the same lawyer of Francisco San Pedro in the interpleader case, Civil Case No. 2143.
On March 16, 1976 Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza and the law office of Adaza, Amante & Tiu, through Atty.
Adaza, filed the aforementioned motion for the lifting of the mandatory injunction. The said lawyers,
who never appeared in the lower court, apparently acted independently of Bulotano's counsel and of
Francisco San Pedro's lawyer who, as already stated, filed an answer for all the respondents.

Atty. Adaza set his motion for hearing on March 22. That circumstance shows his unfamiliarity with
appellate court practice. A motion filed in this Court or in the Court of Appeals is usually not set for
hearing. Oral argument is not required in support of a motion unless expressly directed by the
Appellate Court. The adverse party may file objections within five 15) days from service of the motion,
upon the expiration of which the motion is deemed submitted for ruling (Sec. 2, Rule 49 and sec. 1,
Rule 56, Rules of Court).
Atty. Adaza, in making it appear that all the respondents had moved for the lifting of the injunction,
gave the impression that respondent Judge had participated in that motion. That is another instance
showing his inexperience and unawareness of the practice in certiorari and prohibition cases. Trial
judges who are made respondents in those special civil actions are only formal or nominal parties.
Therefore, a judge in his official capacity should not be made to appear as a party seeking a reversal
of an Appellate Court's unfavorable action on his order or decision (Hon. Alcasid vs. Samson, 102
Phil. 735-6; Taroma vs. Sayo, L-37296, October 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 508, 514).
As noted at the beginning of this resolution, it was brashly and irresponsibly contended in the oftmentioned motion that the injunction lacked factual and legal basis and constituted a serious
miscarriage of justice.
The allegations of the verified petition, which the movants carelessly ignored, show the flagrant falsity
of those contentions. The petitioners made out a strong prima facie case for the ex parte issuance of
a mandatory injunction.
Note that the lower court sitting in Caloocan City ejected them from the premises which they had
been occupying for more than ten years and which were located outside the court's territorial
jurisdiction. The ejectment was made in spite of their objections to the venue of the action. The
ejection was made at the instance of Francisco San Pedro and Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, brother
and sister. Juana, as alleged owner of the Venancia Building, had already sold it to Genaro Bulotano.
Francisco was the alleged attorney-in-fact of his mother Venancia Chiombon who sold the said
building to her daughter, Juana. Genaro Bulotano did not care to file the ejectment suit in Baguio City.
He was a defendant in Civil Case No. 2817, a pending litigation which was intended to settle the
controverted ownership of the Venancia Building.
The lower court ignored the allegations of the petitioners that the ownership of the Venancia Building
was involved in Civil Case No. 2817; that the estate of Florencio Reyes claimed to be the owner of
the building; that the City Court of Baguio refused to entertain an ejectment suit against Chiombon
because of the necessity of adjudicating first the ownership of the building, and that the petitioners
had leased the disputed premises up to March, 1977.
The ejectment was made by summer judgment. The petitioners were dispossed of the premises by
means of a writ of possession and not by the usual writ of execution, No basis for the issuance of the
writ of possession was shown. And the ejectment was allegedly effected in a ruthless manner.
Thus, the verified petition reveals that the lower court acted without jurisdiction (as far as the venue of
the action was concerned) and that the strong arm of the law was used oppressively against the
petitioners by means of the writ of possession.

An unbiased lawyer, upon a judicious consideration of the allegations of the verified petition, would
not rashly jump to the erroneous conclusion that the mandatory injunction was bereft of any factual
and legal basis and was a serious miscarriage of justice.
Movants-respondents invoke section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which directs that generally a
preliminary injunction should be issued upon notice and hearing. They also invoke paragraph 17 (15)
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by tile American and Philippine Bar Associations and b tile
Secretary of Justice in his Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946 (42 0. G, 1803).
Those canons were adopted "for the guidance of and observance by all judges under the
administrative supervision of the Department of Justice (now this Court), including, municipal judges
and justices of the peace Obviously, they do not apply to this court, a collegiate court. Nor does
section j of the Rule 58 apply to this Court. It applies to trial judges. The purpose is to prevent them
from restoring to the arbitrary, corrupt and abusive exercise of the power to issue injunctions.
Atty. Adaza also cites the rule that injunction operates upon unperformed acts but not those already
consummated. That ruling refers to preventive injunctions, not to mandatory injunctions which require
the performance of a particular act (Sec. 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court), such as the mandatory
injunction in forcible entry cases (Arts. 539 and 1674, Civil Code; Sec. 3, Rule 70, Rules of Court).
In an ejectment suit, where the petitioners had been ejected by the trial court, this Court in a certiorari
action issued ex parte a writ of mandatory injunction to restore them to the possession of the houses
from which they had been ousted Leduna vs. Hon. Enriquez, 108 Phil. 141.,147. See M. E. R. & L.
Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose, 22 Phil. 433).
It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of the mandatory injunction as "unjust and a
miscarriage of justice" and as devoid of factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He
treated a resolution of this Court as if it were a pleading of an adversary which he could assail in
unrestrained and abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it
obvious derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or
contempt facie curiae (Sec. 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 728; De
Joya vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907,916; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113; Sison
vs. Sandejas, 105 Phil. 1279).
We hold Atty. Adaza guilty of direct contempt. However, considering his manifest inexperience in
appellate court practice, instead of punishing him with imprisonment or fine, he is hereby severely
reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the said act would be more drastically dealt with.
A copy of this resolution should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for
disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him,
by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to
the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their
grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request
answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the
Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law,
Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated
by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate
with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in
the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of

74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75%
as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was
done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by
the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who reevaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline
for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International
Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662

turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in
the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook
bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with
this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang
declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in
that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the
basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on
the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and
4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not
know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point
that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as
reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with
respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation
to me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I
did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating

myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman
of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last
bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about
7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I
had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade
to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it
was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I reexamined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the
result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the
code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known,
... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached
thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from
item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof,
and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59;
rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P.
Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and
in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name
only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to
state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review,
and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such
revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet
been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official
liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at
my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not
appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit
to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I
submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my
aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass
the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus
was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular.
At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge
of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the
examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review
and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to
my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that
that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent
and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would
make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any
personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He

requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he
thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention
to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades
I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address
such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items.
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of
the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent
acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from
the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest
that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary
nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's

representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said
examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but
that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the
paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I reevaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one
subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned reevaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those
five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners
shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given
to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of
the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be
shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them
checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring
those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner,
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made
the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained
a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said
subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that
the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter
being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for reevaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion
marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving
to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February,
1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment
I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number
that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to
the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-aLanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for
a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which
I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of
the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said
number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number
"27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list,

as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List
as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh.
7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents
in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting
in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of
being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of
whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks.
While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the
basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo
and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside
and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible
review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the
two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with
a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after reevaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of
73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I

could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It
turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after reevaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn
statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one
(1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or recheck some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there
was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very
highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only
10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo
and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure"
cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers
of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make
the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian
thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in
the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on
another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondentexaminer Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondentexaminer Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they"
has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects,
but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in
Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo
likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed,
respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent
Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called
the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law,
from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter reevaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46,
rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law
that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing
the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is

Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted
the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi,
p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or
decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the reevaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was
only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to
change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with
Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondentexaminer Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had

with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent
Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that
particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo
re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of
66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto
Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or
a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that
he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it
was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary
to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners'
decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers
and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of
the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately
enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only
66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee
failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark
and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The
averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him
by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative
data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to
the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70%
to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as

against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration.
Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety
candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter
shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why
he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO
FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for reevaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these
two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the

Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the
date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613
(Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in
the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook
of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50
bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.;
Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the
Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly reevaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner
in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.:
Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political
Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These
are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points

Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation

Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even
at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4)
subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5%
in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in
the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was
71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has

obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission
of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant,
whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with
the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly
adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the
rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec.
2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the

disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it,
the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the
Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to
take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally
to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he
had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding
from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied
for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony,
was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against
him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which
should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS,
102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the
very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim
himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear
his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as
early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet
he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of
his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others,
of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack

of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro,
the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel
G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks
without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and
WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the reevaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on
the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law.
With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said

'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete
I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of
April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march
19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72,
rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..."
(Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find
their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondentsexaminers that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to
exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in

his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the
integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo
to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc.
a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April
5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or
less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the
amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank
deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was
used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister
in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00)
is not reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister
did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed
upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised
to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 date of instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch
20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued
at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was
the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in
his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his
listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956
VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent
Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter
and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter,
as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13,
1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show
cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the
investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol.
VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it
is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property
... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they
are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of
the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies
at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of
waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his prelaw at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19
years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator
Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was
the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a
copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to
the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly
addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of
the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and
is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he
does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the
Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications
with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XICorps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.