Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PART I
A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
1. ISIP v PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Isip (and his wife Marietta) were convicted of
Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City. Marites, however, died during
the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The spouses were
engaged in the buying and selling of pledged and unredeemed
jewelry pawned by gambling habitus. However, in their dealings
with Complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose, they failed to account for the
jewelries given to them to be sold on commission. Also, certain
checks theyve issued in favor of Jose bounced. Procedurally,
petitioner contends that the RTC of Cavite has no jurisdiction over
the case since the elements of the crime did not occur there.
Instead, he argues that the case should have been filed in Manila
where their supposed transactions took place.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Cavite has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: YES. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases,
unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.
Complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by
the case took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was
on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it
has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner's
task to prove otherwise, since he claims that the transaction was
entered into in Manila. He who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.
Here, petitioner failed to prove that the transaction happened in
Manila. He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in
Manila, convenience suggests that the transaction was entered
there. The Court wasnt persuaded. The fact that Cavite is a bit far
from Manila doesnt necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or
did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from
going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell
so that he can earn a living. It is not improbable or impossible them
to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite if that is the
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Also, the fact that the checks issued were drawn against accounts
with banks in Manila or Makati doesnt mean that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite City.
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
RULING
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the
RTC sitting as a SAC. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
Here, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be
stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was
held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate
of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
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B. JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS
1. MONDEJAR v BUBAN
FACTS:
Mondejar seeks to hold Judge Buban of the Tacloban City MTCC
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, partiality,
serious irregularity and grave misconduct, in relation to a BP 22 case
against Mondejar. Judge Buban allegedly issued a hold departure
order against her, in violation of SC Circular No. 39-97, which says
that hold departure orders may only be issued in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. She also claims that said
order was issued without giving her an opportunity to be heard.
The judge responded, stating that he was only made aware of said
order when he instructed his staff to secure a copy from the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Tacloban. After which, he immediately
issued an order setting aside and lifting the hold departure order.
As regards the supposed due process, he sent a notice of hearing to
her and her counsel, but neither appeared.
That a certain Lita Payunan consulted with Dr. Portigo\ that she had rectum myoma
and had to undergo an operation. Even after surgery she still experienced difficulty in
urinating and defecating. On her 2nd operation, she woke to find that her anus and
vagina were closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.\ she found out
she had cancer.\ they spent P150,000 for wrong diagnosis\
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D. JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN
1. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On
January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the
amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19,
1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. Commission on Audit sent a
report to Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which then issued a
resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violating
the Auditing Code of the Philippines against respondent Amante.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMBVisayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing
Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 alleging that
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances
of P71,095.00. The OSP filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of
P.D. No. 1445,
Amante countered by saying amongst others that Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent
Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of
salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only
in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of
the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the
offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a)
of the said two provisions states:
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2. SERRANA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Serana was a senior student and a government scholar of UP-Cebu.
She was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term. She discussed with President Estrada
the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
With her siblings and relatives, Serana registered with the SEC the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the
projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.
President Estrada gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information,
was
the
Office
of
the
President.
While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try a government scholar
and a student regent, along with her brother (a private individual),
of swindling government funds? YES
Ratio:
1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Petitioner
UP
student
regent
is
public
officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27;
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their counter-affidavits, the Esquivels allege that Eduardo was
actually a fugitive with a warrant of arrest for malversation and they
just confiscated his gun for illegal possession.
In June 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution
recommending that both Esquivels be indicted for less serious
physical injuries and grave threats. As to the charges against other
petitioners, they were dismissed. Then Ombudsman Desierto
approved this. So, the separate informations were filed against the
Esquivels in the Sandiganbayan.
Accused filed an MR but this was denied. Esquivels were
arraigned, pleaded not guilty. With the denial of their MR, they
elevate the matter to the SC alleging GADLEJ in the issuance of the
resolution of the deputy ombudsman.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in
Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they
are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases
against both Mayor Esquivel and Eboy Esquivel.
HELD/RATIO: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Esquivels are
wrong!
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay
vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Layus
vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is
not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it
is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied)
are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher" that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government
Code,
Mayor
Esquivel
has
a
salary
grade
of
27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary
grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as
over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.
E. JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v LIWAG
FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaintaffidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M.
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking
officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaintaffidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses
imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found
the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance
and thus required the respondents therein to file their counteraffidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents
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agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled
by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they
are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that
is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled
rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or
be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first
complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the
Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence,
it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to
the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of
justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed
successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and
defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as
to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet
another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility
that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would
come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.
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ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also
made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,
where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the
grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP
under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in
form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with
the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view,
the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite
relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman
and reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from
outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it
with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention.
This court consistently refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of the public service.
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in
the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. The basis for this rule was provided in the case of
Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman where the Court held as follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion
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on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint
outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman
does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of
a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint
devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary
investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to
dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the
Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their
counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.
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F. REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
1. ANTONINO v DESIERTO
FACTS
2. (relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and
pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will
not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. A contrary rule would
encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of
cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
3.
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction
of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1)
The accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former;
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(2)
The said public officer commits the prohibited
acts during the performance of his or her official duties, or
in relation to his or her public functions;
(3)
That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party;
(4)
Such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5)
That the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.
3.
4.
HELD:
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should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse
in order to preclude delay in the disposition of the case.
Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent was
nonetheless admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties in the future.
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In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that
the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors.
In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared
that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is
recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor.
An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal
action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers
have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with
the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this
function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a
complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor
and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City
Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the
other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative
of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records
show that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The CA in its Decision
stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand.
The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence
of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable
cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within
the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor
found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in
his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein
petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice
resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The DOJ in a Resolution had already directed that
Dela Pea be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted
homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on
August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier
Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
that the complaint of Dela Pea should be threshed out in the
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ISSUE: w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without
discretion by resolving the appeal without giving the SOLGEN a
chance to be heard.
HELD: CA abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when
the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the
People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to
file his comment.
Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA or
this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring
or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should
be considered void for being violative of due process.
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PART II
A. COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT or INFORMATION
1. PEOPLE v DIMAANO
FACTS:
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano, with 2
counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape in the complaints
which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of
Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age,
against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-150
th
That on or about the 29 day of December 1995, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-151
st
That on or about the 1 day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless
did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other
than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely
arrival of the complainants mother. CONTRARY TO LAW.
The trial court found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications as to the
award of damages. In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the
Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), the case was CERTIFIED to
the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for attempted rape was sufficient?
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
We affirm the trial court's conviction for the crimes of rape.
However, we acquit Edgardo for the crime of attempted rape for
failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of
attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
2. SASOT v PEOPLE
Facts:
NBA Propeties Inc. is a foreign corporation which owns trademarks
and names of certain basketball teams registered with the Bureau of
Trademarks and Patents and Technology Transfer. On the basis of its
complaint filed, the NBI conducted an investigation on possible
unfair competition under RPC Art 189 against petitioner for the
unauthorized use of the trademarks and names owned by NBA
Props. Inc.
In its report, the NBI discovered that petitioner is engaged in the
manufacture , printing, sale and distribution of counterfeit NBA
garment products and recommended prosecution of petitioner for
unfair competition.
In the meantime, a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) was drawn by
Welts, President of NBA Prop. Inc. which authorized the Ortega law
firm to file cases in their behalf in the Phils. Accompanying it is the
complaint-affidavit made by Welts. The SPA and complaint-affidavit
were notarized abroad which were authenticated by the Philippine
Consul.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Welts and the report of the
NBI, an Information was filed against the accused with the following
accusatory portion:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on
dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE
SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale
Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully,
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unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell
various garment products bearing the appearance of
"NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the
public to believe that the goods offered by them are
those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the
NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the
"NBA".
Petitioner now filed a motion to Quash Information on the basis that
the facts charged does not constitute an offense and that the court
has no jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the
accused. This was denied by RTC and now under a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is sufficient and the denial of the
motion to quash information should be sustained.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner harps on the insufficiency of the charge based
on the following circumstances: formal defects such that
complainant has not personally sworn before the investigating
prosecutor; complainants lack capacity to sue such that there was
no board resolution authorizing Welts(president) to institute the
action; and other exculpatory defenses against the crime.
However, under Rule 112 Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it
states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting
documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath,
or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed
before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be
noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form,
which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on
the merits.
In this case, the basis of the information is Welts complaint affidavit
which though subscribed abroad before a foreign notary public, it
bears the authentication of the Phil. Consul. Although what was
initially presented was just presented was a photocopy, there was
an offer to produce the original which was in the hands of another
prosecutor. Moreover, there are other basis such as the report of
the NBI and the Ortega law firms letter asking NBIs assistance and
the affidavit of a consulting service commissioned by the
prosecution to conduct investigation.
(Only if sir asks)
With regard to other defects, Section 3, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the
grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
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the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded
to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the
court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
The first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of
the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with. Applying Rule 110Section
6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
Further, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information.
Granting that alleged alteration/tampering of information took place
and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting
aside of the early decision. The alleged tampering/alteration
allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
(2) On the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v.
Escano, Jr., upon which both trial courts justified their claim of
jurisdiction was already superseded by a later resolution where the
RTC is exclusively designated try and decide cases of Kidnapping For
Ransom, Robbery In Band, Robbery Committed Against A Banking Or
Financial Institution, Violation Of The Dangerous Drugs Act, and
Violation Of The Anti-Carnapping Act, and other heinous crimes
penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659 committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. This issue is further settled
inPeople v. Velasco where it is stated that *A+ll drug-related cases,
regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable
pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, still fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
(3) The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact
that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage. Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to
all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
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Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal
liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus,
new preliminary investigation is not in order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused
to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the
second Information in the instant case constituted substituted
Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary
investigation. - NO
RULING:
There is no substitution of information there being no change in the
nature of the offense charged.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of
petitioners claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive
them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of
the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary
investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as
alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted
benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct
violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury
to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a
substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is
founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of
entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay
day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the
prosecution and defense remain the same.
A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been
upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability
of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no
modification
in
the
nature
of
the
charged
offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
AMENDED INFORMATION
1. BONIFACIO v RTC
FACTS:
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x x x x (emphasis and underscoring
in the original; italics supplied)
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618).
Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured
party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the
offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means
of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts
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a)
Only
one
motion
for
reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof with the Office of
the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with
corresponding leave of court in cases where
the information has already been filed in
court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall
not
bar
the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the
finding of probable cause in the resolution
subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili
borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3)
checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks
bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment
for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili
on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the
offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period
citing
Ingco
v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the
withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22"
against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that
do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which
governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
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petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his
petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it
was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial
to
require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of
Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that
under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance
with
Act
No.
3326.
Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg.
22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of
judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law,
"institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
HELD:
YES. Ayco should be held administratively liable.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however,
or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may
be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to
the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
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