Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313

September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual.
As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being
the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in
those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug
(complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said,"
the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor
daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to
respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf
to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give,
plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual
relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her
shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her,
giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant,
to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim
that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the
birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the
contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant
nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00
cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part
of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore,
he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as
well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage
had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her
weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for
himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon
7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer
who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate
Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he
and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to
study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued
until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated
checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to
rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent
prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document
and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and

understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement

proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he
assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was anex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that
she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted,
she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition
for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give
her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to
meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant
begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States
would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him
that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to
relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual

versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that
respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for
the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for
Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing
that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning
in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a

criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary

sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy
his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises
of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former
lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with
her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that
time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free
legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or
physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.29Respondent's
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of
her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which
the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid
does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if
not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that
she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the

better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were
not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over
her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support
case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It
is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her
head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if
she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which
the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she
knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return
the amount ofP58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were
two postdated checks amounting toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her.
Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but
only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in
his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he
cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of
either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only
on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the
assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to
state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that

he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs
that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this
case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC. July 10, 2003]

URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION & DISMISSAL OF JUDGE EMILIO

B. LEGASPI, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 22,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified letter complaint[1] dated April 24, 2000, Rolando R. Mijares charged Judge Emilio B.
Legaspi, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence, Falsification and Corruption. Complainant alleged that Judge Legaspi failed to
resolve more than 200 cases submitted for decision assigned to him within the reglementary period
of ninety days while he was detailed as Presiding Judge of the RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch
10; that he rendered judgment in favor of a multi-millionaire Chinese businessman in consideration
of five hundred thousand to one million pesos and a Mercedes Benz vehicle; and that in Civil Case
No. 2639, entitled Ernesto L. Villavert, Plaintiffs versus Nenita Mijares, et al., Defendants, he
erroneously entertained an appeal and reversed the order of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose,
Antique which denied[2] the execution of the judgment by compromise therein.
In his Comment,[3] Judge Legaspi claimed that Mijares was ill-motivated when he instituted this
complaint because of the adverse decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 2639[4] against him and his
wife. He denied the allegation that he failed to resolve 195 cases submitted for decision, explaining
that while he was detailed in Antique, only eight cases were assigned to him since the other cases
were ordered re-raffled among the RTC judges of Kalibo, Aklan who had lesser caseloads, per this
Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 98-6-201-RTC.[5] He decided the said eight cases within the ninetyday period counted from the time the last pleading was filed.[6] When he returned to the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 22, there were sixty-eight cases assigned to his court which had accumulated during
his detail in Antique. As a result thereof, he was temporarily relieved of his trial work by this Court in
order to concentrate in deciding said cases, which he was able to resolve within the 90-day
period.[7] He was, however, unable to decide two cases because he was assigned Judge of RTC,
Kabankalan City, Branch 61. Nevertheless, he resolved these two cases within ten days from
receipt of this Courts Resolution ordering him to do so.[8]
He vehemently denied having received money and a Mercedes Benz vehicle from a Chinese
businessman in exchange for a favorable judgment. He asserted that his two lawyer sons and a
daughter who is a U.S.-based registered nurse gave the vehicle to him as a birthday present. He
declared that he lived a comfortable life even before he joined the judiciary. His wife is a wellaccomplished private medical practitioner in Antique, his other daughter is a doctor of medicine,
while his other son is a law graduate.
In his Reply, complainant emphasized Judge Legaspis error in entertaining the appeal of the
MTCs Order which denied the Motion for Execution of the Judgment by Compromise, in violation of
the settled principle that an interlocutory order is not appealable. He also alleged that Judge Legaspi
employed coercion on his court personnel so that the certification and the monthly reports would
reflect that no case was left undecided within the 90-day period.
Furthermore, complainant questioned the sound discretion of this Court in ordering the re-raffle
of the cases left unresolved by Judge Legaspi in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 22, while he was

detailed presiding Judge of RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 10. He assailed the act of this Court
in tolerating Judge Legaspis ineptitude and insinuated that there must be someone up there
protecting and coddling Judge Legaspi.[9]
On February 19, 2001, the Urgent Appeal/Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and
complainant was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for wasting
the time of the judiciary.[10]
Complainant filed his explanation stating that his intention in filing the complaint was not to
waste the time of the Court but as part of his crusade to clean up the judiciary. He reiterated his
belief that this Court will not tolerate fraud, dishonesty and corrupt practices.
On August 29, 2001, the February 19, 2001 Resolution was recalled in view of the gravity and
seriousness of the charges. The case was referred to Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.[11]
On February 6, 2002, Justice Magtolis submitted her report recommending that Judge Legaspi
be exonerated of the charges against him for lack of a showing of malice or bad faith.[12] The case
was thereafter referred to the OCA for evaluation. The OCA recommended that the Urgent
Appeal/Petition for Immediate Suspension and Dismissal filed against Judge Legaspi be dismissed
for lack of merit, but that complainant Rolando R. Mijares be found guilty of indirect contempt and
fined in the amount of P1,000.00.
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken.
The records show that there were seventy-eight cases assigned to Judge Legaspi, all of which
were resolved by him, according to the Reports of Compliance and the Certifications issued by the
respective Branch Clerks of Courts. Anent the raffle of some of the cases of Judge Legaspi to other
judges of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court in the exercise of its administrative supervision over lower courts,
may order their re-raffle considering that they have accumulated in Judge Legaspis court while he
was detailed at the RTC of Aklan.
With regard the charge of falsification, the record is bereft of any evidence to conclusively show
that Judge Legaspi falsified his Reports of Compliance with the Resolutions of this Court. The
Certifications issued by the respective clerks of court corroborate said Reports.
Anent the charge of corruption, Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that
complaints against judges must be supported by the affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the acts therein alleged and must also be accompanied by copies of pertinent
documents to substantiate the allegations. In the case at bar, except for complainants bare
allegations, surmises, suspicions and rhetorics, no competent evidence was presented to prove that
Judge Legaspi committed corruption.
Regarding the charge of ignorance of the law, the settled doctrine is that judges are not
administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when
acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.[13] A judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.[14] To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[15] For a judge to be held
administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the error must be gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.[16] Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.[17] It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of
self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.[18]

While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate
the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate
to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote
the orderly administration of justice.[19]
In the instant case, any perceived error which Judge Legaspi may have committed in
entertaining the appeal of the order of the Municipal Trial Court, denying the motion for execution in
Civil Case No. 872, can only be deemed an error in judgment which is more properly the subject of
an appeal or petition for certiorari, as the case may be, and not this administrative charge against
respondent judge.
Finally, we agree with the Court Administrator that complainant was guilty of indirect contempt
of court. Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:
x
x

xxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
This Court may motu proprio initiate proceedings for indirect contempt. Inherent in courts is the
power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.[20]
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al.,[21] we held that the use of
language tending to degrade the administration of justice constitutes indirect contempt.
In the case at bar, complainant made the following insinuation:
Apparently, petitioner was in quandary why Judge Legaspi was given premium of being sittingpretty, despite of his glaring ineptitude, instead of choking himself of the High Tribunals wrath of
hell, while those who failed to resolve their few cases within 90-days period their salaries were
suspended? Isnt equal justice the equivalent of pantay-pantay lahat, or are some, with big
connections, or padrino, more equal than others? Or, maybe because, Judge Legaspi have
someone up there to protect and coddle him?[22]
The foregoing statements constitute contemptuous conduct. Complainants imputation that this
Court protects one of its own is malicious and offends the dignity of the Judiciary. His explanation
that he made those statements merely as part of a crusade to clean up the judiciary is
unavailing. Indeed, this can be done even without making malicious imputations on the Court. For
this, complainant must be sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint against Judge Emilio B. Legaspi for
gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, falsification and corruption, is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Complainant Rolando R. Mijares is found guilty of indirect contempt and is FINED in the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without
any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who
ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED
TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated
July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of
hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period
to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the
same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by
this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based
on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier
than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965.
Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it
"without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep.
vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file
a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and
with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother,
"Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the
Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO
MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in
the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things,
is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER.
Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with
emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President,
said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly
and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of
this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties.
We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not

performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent
rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such
abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as
to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing
more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have

been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons
may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable
duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the
fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held
that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket;
it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often
merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought
to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall
be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of
the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has
been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his

objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration
of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In
re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions
as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the
courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has
as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him

"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and selfrespect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of
mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide
comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed
at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely

impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error,
of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court
and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of
an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar
may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.)
585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a
judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to
enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in
the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained.
In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel,
lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as
the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint
against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but
the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence
and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to
the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings,
deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from
fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that
an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy,
111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for
any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an

inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and
such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person
making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the
right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them,
the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when
the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations
more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism,
but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of
this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a
license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as
well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if
the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to
the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under
our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best
interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does
not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the
law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of

a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of
the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful
and
vigilant
that
the
widow
got
no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to
the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by
the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of
the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting
him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally
because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of
an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the
public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could
ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent

such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his
other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a
citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which
reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To
that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer
of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised
no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain
the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at
his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held
that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until
the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of
the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold
judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of
his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by
the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City
Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference
to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it
was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called
to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,

"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them
with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner,
and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case
at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting
terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For
this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due
to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge,
2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa.
14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty
to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official
acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved
such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered,
even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional

misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and
his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in

contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then
and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven,
so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by
this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks
the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court

has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question.
That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that
in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated
that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect.
Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question
the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the
holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A
complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the
question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this
was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that
them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by
courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the

decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in
the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy
disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is
altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in
courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not
subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested
in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw
the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of
attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,

not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object
of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as
a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of
an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to

attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere

suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that
it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]
Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of
their clients should not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members
of the bar.
The Case
Before us is a Sworn Complaint[1] filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of
this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and
of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to
suspend him as follows:
x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil
Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated his
oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
[r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.[2]
The Facts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one
Zonggi Xu,[3] a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu investedP300,000 on a
Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan,
another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that the
latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile,
making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by
respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor
Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on
October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his
counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint[4] for estafa against him before

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5] On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of
Arrest[6] against Pan.
Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest.[7] He also filed with the
RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for
the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute
the civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil
case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to
reach a settlement.
In his Comment[8] dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in
impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to
conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He
alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities
the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had
resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pans Motion for an Opportunity to Submit
Counter-Affidavits and Evidence,[9] of the appeal[10] to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to
Defer/Suspend Proceedings.[11]
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in
filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the
irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants
connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.[12] Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002
Resolution.[13]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report and Recommendation,[14] Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was
assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had
been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had
filed against respondents client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that the reason x x x
was x x x the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages.
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to
obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no
need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business
transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the
prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his
client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and
complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioners
recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.[15] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the collection of a
sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been
filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints[16] alleged the following:
27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and
failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due
process by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a
Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly
informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that
there was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan,
knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;
28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion
to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to
the arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived
with the latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in
the manner contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing
plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.][17]
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper
remedies strengthen complainants allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against
the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salangas resolution, they
should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to

the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of
Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed
without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent
should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had
no justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of
the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that
respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the
inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.[18]
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A
great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with
trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct
and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession,[19] but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery.[20] Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly,
they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render
service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.[21]
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This
esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character,
brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty.[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the
practice of law, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA,

Adm. Case No. 6290

Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

- versus -

PANGANIBAN,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2004

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of

respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to
obtain a false marriage contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove
that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two
are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio
III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric
Tenorio,[7] another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination
to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The
respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the
alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against
her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang
bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she
declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980
as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon
City.[8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the dissemination
of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are
the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so
to besmirch respondents good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade
and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of
Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had
already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the
words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get
even with her. She terminated complainants employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their passports
and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they
initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted
the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to
the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply to
respondents Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also
agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct
testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice
of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the name
of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group
identification card[13] signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents husband even appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor
allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the

complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her
signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments in her
law office.[14]

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in
Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied
for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage
contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The
erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were
merely an oversight.[15]

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that
this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal
practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3)
and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729
20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the
provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of
interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent
be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law
for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with
modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed
by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated.
In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we
held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to
avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as

a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer
for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She
admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant
misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent assisted
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification
card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the signature of the respondent as
Chairperson of the Group.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,

and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney in this Court
and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 2003]
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.
GALANIDA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution
of 8 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the
Decision[3] of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision
dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No.
RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) illegally dismissed
Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and
exemplary damages, and other amounts totalingP1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11
January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment
was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as one of the conditions of employment
the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you
to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining
smooth and uninterrupted service to the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as follows:
a) January, 1978 to March, 1982
Tagbilaran City Branch
b) April, 1982 to May, 1984
Lapulapu City Branch
c) June, 1984
Mandaue City Branch

d) July, 1984 to April, 1986

Tagbilaran City Branch
e) May, 1986 to May, 1987
Dumaguete City Branch
f) June, 1987 to August, 1987
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989
Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994
Jakosalem Regional Branch,
Cebu City (Rollo, p. 47)
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent
as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been
stationed inCebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred
to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the
anguish that would result if he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the
Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June
1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent as follows:
There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers mentioned, only you have
refused the new assignment citing difficulty of working away from your family as if the other officers
concerned do not suffer the same predicament. To exempt you from the officer transfer would result in
favoritism in your favor and discrimination as against the other officers concerned.
In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance with
the Banks order of priority of rotating its accountants places of assignments, you are well aware that
Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994,
reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your
objection on the ground of your length of service is without merit.

xxx
As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod
City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII of the Banks Employee Discipline Policy and
Procedure [which] provides:
XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by management. The employee
shall be required to comply with the order of transfer and reassignment, if the penalty is not
termination of employment.
In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no
disciplinary action should be meted against you for your having refused to follow instructions
concerning the foregoing transfer and reassignment. xxx[4]
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that (w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal be Suspension or
Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7.[5] In
the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr. Olveda is managements discriminatory act
of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management
prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new officers who
happen to enjoy favorable connection with management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer of
Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for more than a year
only to Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance, is management implying that Melinda
Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced
accountant or any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of management an
obvious display of favoritism? xxx[6]
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication[7] (Memo) dated 8 September
1994 from Allied Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida
that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the
dismissal
were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application
for additional vacation leave. The salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment
to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable reason and constituted violations of
Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxx

In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective
September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as forfeited in
accordance with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which provides as follows:
04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the
President or his authorized representative as officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not be
eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his employment with the Bank or to termination pay.
It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without prejudice to whatever legal
remedies which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)[8]
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative
in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas
refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision
in Dosch v. NLRC,[9] thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employers exclusive
right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs.
NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers exclusive right
and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select
or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the relations between
capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital
nor labor shall act oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for
said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family.[10] (Underscoring supplied by the Labor
Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida
would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor
Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name from the list of

accountants transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks letter dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr.
Regidor Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank
transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch within the first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free from
blame. Since another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision of 23
December 1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied Banking
Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand
Pesos (P324,000.00) representing the following awards:
a)

Separation pay for P272,000.00;

b)

Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;

c)

13th month pay for 1994 P16,000.00;

d)

Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC
agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified, considering the family considerations
mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the bank
wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran
branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer several junior
accountants in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment by assigning
her to Cebu even though she had worked for the bank for less than two years.
The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC stated that
Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to send a
termination notice, as required by law for a valid termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank
would issue a notice of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor
practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal protection of the
laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion
of which states:
In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both parties to
order reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994

quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for complainant-appellee are from
the City Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 is hereby
MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral
and exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to
pay to herein complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:
a)

P336,000.00, representing separation pay

b)

P833,600.00, representing backwages

c)

P 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994 13th month pay

d)

P 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident Fund Contribution

e)

P 50,000.00 representing moral damages

f)

P 20,000.00 representing exemplary damages

===========
P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient
basis that they acted in excess of their corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December
1998.[13]
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC
before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14] the Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer
orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to
the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that
Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice
of termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there
was no such notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public respondent
NLRC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. [15]
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8
August 2000.[16]
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to the Supreme
Court. Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation or execution of the questioned Decision
and Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution; (4) make permanent the restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order
Galanida to pay the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO
WARRANT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK
AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT
RECOVER ANY MONETARY AWARD.[17]
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer orders
constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the
Labor Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for
Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquoted the Courts ruling
in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch
vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for
said refusal, such as that of being away from the family.[18]
The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held inDosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence on which
Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C.
Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers memorandum dated August 18, 1975,
appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted that at this
time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the
Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: I would,
therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in
that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines. From this evidence, We cannot discern
even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.[19]
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee
cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family does not appear anywhere in
the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in
the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the
work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter
who gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of
lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision.[20] A counsel should not
cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but
substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even
underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of
the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright
attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the
rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.[21]
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly
when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are recognized
exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)

when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone
beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or
when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22] After a scrutiny of the records, we find
that some of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers
prerogatives.[23] The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and
according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank
or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial
to the displaced employee.[25]
The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from one branch to
another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the
country.[26] Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also enables bank employees to gain
the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,[27] requires the rotation of these
personnel. The Manual directs that the duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping
records should be rotated and that such rotation should be irregular, unannounced and long enough
to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations.[28]
Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of periodically transferring personnel to different
branches. As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a
condition of Galanidas employment. Galanida consented to this condition when he signed the Notice of
Personnel Action.[29]
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida and was
in bad faith when it ordered his transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994[30]showed that at least 14
accounting officers and personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other
branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second
in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The person
first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already
transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other transferees joined
Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu was not
in any way related to Galanidas transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the
Tabunok branch. The employer has the prerogative, based on its assessment of the employees

qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to
ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.[31]
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing
that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Banks letter
of 13 June 1994 assured Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the
transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olvedaexplained this further in the
affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainants salary, benefits and other
privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch officers is premised on the role/functions that they will
assume in the management and operations of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper discharge of the
functions of the accounting section of the branch, review of documentation/proper accounting and
control of transaction. As such, the accounting functions in the branch can be assumed by any of the
following officers with the rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office is lateral in
nature and carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits and other privileges. The
assignment/transfer is for the officer to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the
position/rank of the officer to be replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing
Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization[32] and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor
Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took part in
forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground of
parental obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would suffer if assigned away from his
family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case of Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
v. NLRC,[33] we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or underhanded
purpose i.e., to defeat an employees right to self-organization, to rid himself of an undesirable
worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot be
gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can
be ascribed to the employer, the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal
inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer. What then?

This was the very same situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that
case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was directed to
transfer to the companys branch office at Laoag City. In refusing the transfer, the employee averred
that she had established Baguio City as her permanent residence and that such transfer will involve
additional expenses on her part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for
her as she will be kept away from her family which might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling for the
employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as valid as long as
there is no bad faith on the part of the employer. We held then:
Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers
decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the
part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail.
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.[34] Dosch, however, is not
applicable to the present case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a promotion. We
upheld the refusal because no law compels an employee to accept a promotion, and because the
position Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.[35] This left as the only
basis for the charge of insubordination a letter from Dosch in which the Court found not even the
slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36]
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be likened to a
transfer from one city to another within the country,[37] which is the situation in the present case. The
distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the
distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a
reasonable distance in PT&T v. Laplana.[38]
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an
employer.[39] Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules or orders
that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared illegal
or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their
peril.[40] For Galanidas continued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the bank
dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code.[41]Galanida is thus
not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and
giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he
so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence
presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of
all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required
Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his refusal to comply with
the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard.[42] An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in which
Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave Galanida an opportunity to
respond to the charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the
written notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the Court of
Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, Notice of
termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President
or his authorized representative.[43] The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send
any notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading Transfer and Reassignment, was
not the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Banks
decision to dismiss him. The statement, please be informed that the Bank has terminated your
services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to]
as forfeited xxx[44] is plainly worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed the findings
of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to
Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and then to
the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report for work despite
the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.[45] The Memo also refuted Galanidas charges
of discrimination and demotion, and concluded that he had violated Article XII of the banks Employee
Discipline Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a notice of
termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given
to it but by its body and contents.[46] Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as
a notice of termination. We quote from the Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:

1.
On March 13, 1994[47] Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration Branch
a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex H;
xxx
5.
On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of said
letter is attached to the Petition as Annex N;
6.
Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged
illegal dismissal. A copy of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex
O; xxx [48](Emphasis supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a Letter of
Termination. Further, Galanida amended his complaint for constructive dismissal[49] to one for illegal
dismissal[50] after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to mean that
Allied Bank had terminated his services.
The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal rules which required the banks President or his
authorized representative to confirm the notice of termination. The banks Vice-President for
Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the movement of personnel within Allied Bank,
can certainly represent the bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the Memo stated that
Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8
September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or
more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of
termination must be served on the employee.[51] Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1
September 1994 because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks decision to
dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the
Memo. For this reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of P10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts award
nominal damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person that another has violated.[52] The law
entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank should
have exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding
the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1)
The awards of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack
of basis;

2)
Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October
1994; and
3)

Awarding nominal damages to private respondent for P10,000.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to Potenciano L.
Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful
in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6323

April 13, 2007

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by
Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paraaque.3
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.4 The case was dismissed for improper venue.5
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. 6 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was
dismissed for failure to prosecute.7 Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the
order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her
appeal.8 The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise
denied. 9
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
27410where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.11 It was dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata and prescription.12
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to
protect and prosecute the interests of his client.13 He denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in
her certificate of non-forum shopping,14 disclosed the two previous cases involving the same cause of
action which had been filed and dismissed.15 Respondent further claims he could not refuse his clients
request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction.16
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.17

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in
repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter.18 It opined that respondent
should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. 19 Under Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20 The CBD
recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in
the future would be dealt with more severely.21
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however,
modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.22
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.1a\^/phi1.net
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When
they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred
trust to uphold the laws of the land. 23 As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes."24 Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same."25
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect
of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent
appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to
the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract.
As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his
199926 arguments and assertions in the 200427complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and tried
to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12
which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice.28 Lawyers have
the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes
an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action

for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the
courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.29
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the
violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006,30 the penalty can
no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the disbarment of her estranged
husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment[2] to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13 January 2004[4] of
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as
follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong
namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power
of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros
Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the
name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J.
Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real
property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondents full knowledge
since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had
been in possession of the subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent
title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon verification with the DENR,
Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660,
490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the
respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap;
Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by Ledesma de
Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath
before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan
dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto
L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.

Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her
knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were
deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to
Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties
which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and
possession of complainants natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of
Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and
unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in
betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
xxx xxx

xxx

In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of the properties
and considering that the properties were applied for free patent titling during their marital union prior
to its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof and as such was also complaining
against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as forested zone in
Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and
parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of
Lands allegedly made a public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru
Free Patent Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or natural born Filipinos
muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an American citizen; complainant and her
family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over said questioned properties for the
reason that respondent had already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted
as owner thereof; and could easily align his right to the property which had been identified in the public
survey as Heirs of Vicente Paras, otherwise the questioned properties allegedly according to the Yaps
will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal property of him
and the complainant as well as those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a
public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps
for all of them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent;
none of them being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant
of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the properties was
hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and
prevent the properties from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He

allegedly applied for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of
the properties in the concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the
government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less American citizen Aurora
Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a
complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before the
DENR for the cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any
action in any civil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of
ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not complainant or
her family were qualified to become grantee of a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural
land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters
were within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution
and to them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that
he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession, respondent alleged that he
will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal
properties including the herein questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988
possession of all these properties, real and personal were until now with the complainant and her
biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondents Comment, therein refuting respondents
claims that he was used as a dummy since complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free
Patents in their names. Complainant further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be
an officer of the court because of his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the
subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession
thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[6] noting the filing of the last
pleading and setting the instant case for hearing. Several hearings[7] were conducted wherein
complainant presented all her witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting
documents[8], which were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent. Likewise, respondent
presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and made a
recommendation, as follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent
over lands owned by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact

that the same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on
his fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for the suspension of
Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months from receipt
hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member
be furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
Report of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the latters recommended penalty by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however,
that the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession[11] as the bar should always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[12] To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession.[13]
In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish the attorney.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those
specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or
unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an
attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.
x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the
courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the
Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties
in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to complainants
sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he
alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone when the mother of the
respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the Parases [17]. Moreover,
respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties
when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said
lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants
family, as evidenced no less by respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as natural born citizens, this
Court holds that the instant case is not the proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as
correctly held by the Investigating Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint
for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other

action which the parties may make against each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must
be remembered that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondents failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C.
No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was previously meted
with suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wifes
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice
of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondents prior misdemeanors
for which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law,
his deplorable behavior in the present case which grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the
imposition of a much graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be
entered in the record of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY.

ADM. CASE No. 7006

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER

SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 9, 2007
X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the
crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount
of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P.
Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion
was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent
appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article
regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail
out, reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on
bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for LuisPlaza who
stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a
judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution
is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser,
described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and
administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial
arrogance. he said.[3]

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the
writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September
20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of
the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for
homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear
reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of
respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that
he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference,
stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies,
Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in
the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the
phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his
refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.[6] The Courts Order datedSeptember 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of
truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21,
2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed
indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.[7]

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the
indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the
proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain
and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his
media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the
interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00
a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between
8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan
a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the
people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to
Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to
answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondents actions and statements are
detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the
court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing
to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12,
2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts
stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled
hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent
denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that
right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of
indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the
latters instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional
right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons
of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer
the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the

maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with
more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]

The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003,
duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING:
Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamayng panahon ang samad sa
imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna
karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your
mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga
Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant
of the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna
mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao
nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro
gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarmentniining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado
gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,

pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining
iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of
the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that
when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses
his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should
also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO
:
Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini,
nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyangorder sa Korte wala
siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this
Order was given in open court, and in Gods mercy, he did not state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO

Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug
miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Then he came back
and said, BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)

xxx

BAGABUYO

. . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his
gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING :

So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO :
abogado. . . .

Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO :
Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang
trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang
ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not
for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at
that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO :
Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may
iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya
kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP,
intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may
imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due process of
law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order
to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant
of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read
the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir,
ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not
accord me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING:
So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this
problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all
the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO
: Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga
Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . .Apan unsa man
intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who

are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard
that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.[11]

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec.
28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the same
Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that
the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court,
the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts
of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of
suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August
18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the
court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002,
which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave
violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied
with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated
in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or
an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must
at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance
to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a

consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his
grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was
studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica[19] held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according

to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions
which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for
the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the
Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148991. January 21, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision[1] dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-179698. The trial court found Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao
(appellant) guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape and imposed on him the death
penalty.
The Charge
The Information charging appellant with the crime of serious illegal detention with rape reads:
That on or about January 1, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual and without authority of law, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally detain (sic)
ROWENA RIANZARES Y MIRANDA by then and there taking and locking her inside his room located at
1932 Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, this City, and preventing her from going out of said room for a period of
three (3) hours, more or less, thereby depriving her of her liberty and during the said period of time, said
accused by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking a knife, threatening to kill her
should she resist and choking her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on 14 February 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty.[3]
The Trial
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) complainant Rowena Rianzares (Rowena); (2) Dr.
Mirasol Pangan of the U.P. Philippine General Hospital Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, who
examined the complainant; (3) Eldee Eusebio; and (4) Dante Magat.
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecutions version of the incident in the Peoples Brief as
follows:

On December 31, 1999, about 7 oclock in the evening, appellant and his companions (names not on
record) were having a drinking spree outside the house of Jun Rianzares xxx. (p. 5, TSN, May 22, 2000).
About 2 oclock in the morning of the following day or right after the New Years eve celebration, Jun
Rianzares left their house to see a friend. His wife, Rowena Rianzares, was left behind sleeping inside the
room of their house with their daughter [six (6) years old] and son [three (3) years old] (pp. 3-4, ibid.).
After a while, Rowena Rianzares heard a knock at the door of their room. Consequently, she rose from
the bed and partially opened the door to look [at] who was knocking. It was appellant. Appellant tried to
push open the door, telling Rowena Rianzares that her husband was asking for money to buy liquor.
Rowena Rianzares got suspicious because her husband had money at that time and he would not ask
money from her. Rowena Rianzares thus closed the door (pp. 3-5, ibid.)
Thereafter, Rowena Rianzares went back to sleep. A few minutes later, she heard appellant upstairs
repeatedly shouting that her husband was very mad because he did not have money to buy liquor.
When she heard appellant say that her husband was allegedly mad, she opened the door of their room
and went out. She went inside appellants room which was located in front of their room to confront
him. She told appellant: Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo may pera naman siya? Immediately
thereafter, appellant rushed to her back and placed his left arm around her neck with his right hand
holding a kitchen knife, about twelve (12) inches long (pp. 5-6 and 12, ibid.).
Rowena Rianzares got surprised and, consequently, pushed appellants left arm. In the process, Rowena
Rianzares got off balance and fell down xxx the stairway screaming. She asked for help shouting her
husbands name (p. 11, ibid.)
Appellant immediately went after Rowena Rianzares and upon catching up with her, appellant held her
hair and left arm. He then dragged her upstairs towards his (appellants) room (pp. 5-6, ibid.)
Inside the room, appellant asked Rowena Rianzares to undress while pointing the knife he was holding
at her right rear side of the body. He threatened to kill Rowena Rianzares if she did not undress herself.
Out of fear, she was forced to undress herself.
Then, appellant kissed the different parts of her body. Rowena Rianzares struggled and resisted. She
grappled for possession of the knife and succeeded in holding its bladed portion causing her injury on
the right palm. She persisted in grappling for possession of the knife but failed. In the process, she
sustained a further injury on her left arm. Instead of relenting, appellant pulled her and slapped the back
of her head. Thereafter, appellant dragged and forced her to lie down on the lower portion of the
double [deck] bed located inside appellants room (pp. 6-13, ibid.).
While Rowena Rianzares was xxx lying down xxx with her legs spread apart, appellant placed himself on
top of her. He placed his left foot under Rowena Rianzares left leg and his right foot on Rowena
Rianzares right leg. While in that position, appellant forced his private organ into Rowena Rianzares
private part. Rowena Rianzares continued to shout for help but appellant poked the knife at the left side
of her body. While appellant was raping her, he pointed the knife at Rowena Rianzares private part and

told her that he wanted to get [a] thrill out of it because he could not get a full erection since he was
under the influence of shabu. Rowena Rianzares pleaded [with] appellant to stop and assured him
that she would help him get out xxx but appellant remained unmoved (pp. 13-17, ibid.).
About ten (10) minutes after Rowena Rianzares was dragged by appellant to his room, somebody
knocked at appellants door and shouted: Bernie ano ba ang ginagawa mo dyan? Appellant answered
back: Umalis kayo kundi papatayin ko ito. (pp. 18-19, ibid.).
Eldee Eusebio, a neighbor of spouses Jun and Rowena Rianzares at Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, Manila (p.
7, TSN, May 30, 2000), testified that on January 1, 2000, about 2:15 in the morning, he went to the
house of hisKuya Jose Jun Rianzares because he was summoned by the latter (p. 4, TSN, May 30,
2000). When he was about to enter the house, Eldee Eusebio heard Rowena Rianzares shout.
Immediately, Eldee Eusebio kicked the entrance gate of the house to open it. He then hurriedly went
upstairs and saw Rowena Rianzares using her feet in trying to prevent the door of appellants room from
closing. After the door was closed, he immediately knocked at the door. Appellant, however, shouted,
telling him to leave and nobody should go up; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares (pp. 4-5, ibid.).
Consequently, Eldee Eusebio went outside the house to look for Jun Rianzares because he did not see
him inside the house. When he found Jun Rianzares, he told him that there was a problem in his house
(p. 5, ibid.).
About thirty (30) minutes later, Rowena Rianzares husband arrived. Jun Rianzares knocked at
appellants door and asked appellant what was he doing to his wife. Appellant pounded the floor, using
the handle of the knife and shouted. He asked Jun Rianzares to leave him alone; otherwise, he would kill
his wife (pp. 18-19, May 22, 2000).
Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, together with her husband, Dante
Magat, arrived. She and her relatives negotiated for Rowena Rianzares release. However, appellant told
them to leave; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares. While they were negotiating for Rowena
Rianzares release, appellant was still on top of her (Rowena Rianzares) (pp. 19-20, ibid.).
After more than an hour of failed negotiations by Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, the policemen took
over (pp. 2-4, TSN, July 11, 2000).
The policemen (names not on record) forcibly opened the door and immediately, thereafter, they got
hold of appellant. Before they could get hold of appellant, however, he (appellant tried to stab Rowena
Rianzares but the latter was able to evade the thrust. Instead, she was hit on her left arm. Then a certain
Colonel Castro pulled Rowena Rianzares and immediately covered her with a blanket (p. 20, TSN, May
22, 2000).
xxx
Dr. Mirasol Pangan testified that she was the one who physically examined Rowena Rianzares. She
testified that she examined Rowena Rianzares body from head to foot. She found the following injuries
on her body:

1.

one (1) hematoma on the right neck;

2.

two (2) abrasions at the left lower hip approximately 0.5cm.;

3.

one (1) abrasion at the left forearm;

4.

one (1) abrasion hematoma-circular at the left lower arm;

5.
multiple abrasion hematoma at the volar aspect of the second, fourth digits of right hand and
under the nose;
6.

one (1) hematoma at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measures 6 x1 cm.;

7.

one (1) stab wound at the left forearm; and

8.

one (1) hematoma measuring two cm. at the right labia minora of the genitalia.[4]

Version of the Defense

Appellant Leonardo Nuguid was the sole witness for the defense. The Public Attorney summarized the
defenses version of what transpired, as follows:
Leonardo Nuguid testified that he knew the victim because he worked in the latters Manila K-9 college
as their dog trainer. He had been working with the Rianzares [spouses] for five (5) years. (TSN,
September 11, 2000, pp. 1-4)
On December 31, 1999 at about 10:30 p.m., Rowena Rianzares entered his room. He asked her what she
wanted but Rowena did not answer and instead she kissed him on the lips. He had sex with Rowena and
the latters husband arrived. Jun called up for Rowena but the latter told her husband that she was in
the accused-appellants room talking with the latter. Jun left at around 11:00 pm and Rowena stayed in
his room until the police called by her husband arrived. He told Rowena to go out of the room but the
latter refused to do so. The police kept on convincing them to go out of the room but Rowena told them
that they were just talking and they would go out soon. The police kicked the door open and he was
arrested. He was brought to the police station wherein he was mauled and was forced to confess that
he raped Rowena. The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was the middle of 1998 when
they went to Bulacan. Rowena told her then that she saw in him what was lacking in her husband.
Rowenas husband was an alcoholic and a drug user. He does not know why she filed [t]his serious illegal
detention with rape [charge] against him. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-15)
He testified that he had worked with Rianzares from 1995-2000. There was a time he had an argument
with Jun so he was asked to leave the Rianzares house. (TSN, September 11,2000, pp. 15-16)
The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was when they went to Bulacan to get rice from
Rowenas parents. Prior to January 1, 2000, he had several sexual intercourse (sic) with Rowena.
Rowena gave him several lovenotes but he lost them all. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 15-16)

On January 1, 2000, he did not notice that Rowena was bleeding when she emerged from the room. He
was holding a knife when the police arrested him because he was forced to fight back at the police who
were mauling him inside his room. He had a kitchen knife inside his room because Rowenas husband
told him to bring the kitchen knife inside him (sic) room so that he could easily open the box of
firecrackers in case anybody came to buy. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 24-30)[5]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court considered the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses to be
straightforward and credible. The physical injuries Rowena suffered, confirmed by the examining
physician and observed by the trial court, corroborated her version of the events.
On the other hand, the trial court found dubious appellants story that he and Rowena were
sweethearts. The trial court held that:
The accuseds sweetheart defense is of doubtful nature and undeserving of credence. Firstly, the
accuseds version of the incident is unnatural and contrary to common human experience. If it was true
that the complainant was in the accuseds room on the second floor at 11:00 p.m., when her husband
called her from the ground floor, she would surely had quickly gotten out of the room, instead of coolly
telling her husband that she was with the accused in the latters room. Secondly, the accuseds
declaration is contradicted not only by the straightforward, convincing and believable testimonies of the
complainant and prosecution witnesses Eusebio and Magat, but also by the physical evidence of the
injuries sustained by the complainant on the occasion of the commission of the crime, Exhibits F and
F-1 .[6]
The trial court ruled that the acts of the appellant in locking up Rowena against her will in his room for
three hours, threatening to kill her and then sexually assaulting her, constituted the crime of serious
illegal detention with rape. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision of 16 May 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao, is hereby convicted of the crime of serious illegal
detention with rape under Article 267 of the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of
death by lethal injection and accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is also sentenced to pay the complainant, Rowena Rianzares y
Miranda, moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this automatic review.
The Issues
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE
WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]
Appellant, arguing through the Public Attorney, alleged that the trial court erred in rejecting his
sweetheart defense, which was not unlikely since he spent most of his time with Rowena. In the
alternative, appellant claims he is liable only for simple rape because the prosecution failed to show that
his primary purpose was to detain Rowena, thus:
xxx It is undeniable that the accused-appellants primary purpose was to have carnal knowledge of
Rowena Rianzares. The accused-appellant immediately ordered Rowena Rianzares to undress and raped
her. As a matter of fact, even at the time the police forcibly opened the door, Rowena and the accusedappellant were still both naked and the accused-appellant was still positioned on top of Rowena.[9]
The Solicitor General agreed that appellant is only liable for simple rape under Article 335[10] of the
Revised Penal Code because: (1) it necessarily follows from the Courts ruling in People v. Lactao[11] that
there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape;[12] and (2) appellant did not release Rowena
after the rape only because her husband and the police were outside appellants room.
In the Reply Brief, the Public Attorney raised as an additional ground for reversal the presiding judges
alleged lack of impartiality in deciding the case.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court shall first discuss the Solicitor Generals contention that there is no complex crime of serious
illegal detention with rape. In People v. Lactao, the Court ruled as follows:
It may be worth to mention at the outset that there is no complex crime of rape with serious illegal
detention. If the purpose is to deprive the offended party of liberty, the crime committed is illegal
detention. And, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended party is raped, a separate
crime of rape is committed; in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. However, if the
objective of the offender is to rape the victim only, and in the process, the latter had to be illegally
detained, only the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape.
Hence, in People v. Ching Suy Sionga, Sionga was found guilty of two independent crimes, i.e., serious
illegal detention and acts of lasciviousness, because the two acts did not come within the purview of Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code which applies to complex crimes, for certainly, one cannot be considered
as a means to commit the other. xxx[13] (underscoring supplied)
The decision in Lactao, promulgated on 29 October 1993, explained the rules on the treatment of
serious illegal detention and rape at that time. Prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659) on 31 December 1993,[14] when the person kidnapped or illegally detained was raped, two
independent crimes of kidnapping and rape were committed.
RA 7659, however, amended the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on serious
illegal detention and kidnapping to read:

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Under this provision, when the person kidnapped or illegally detained is raped, the offense committed is
the special complex crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping with rape, punishable with the
maximum penalty of death.[15] The last paragraph of Article 267 applies only to instances where the
person illegally detained or kidnapped is raped. It does not provide for acomplex crime of rape with
serious illegal detention. As the Court ruled in Lactao, there is no complex crime of illegal detention
with rape under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is also no complex crime of kidnapping with
attempted rape under Article 48 because there is no single act which results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies. Neither is illegal detention a necessary means for committing rape.[16]
Nonetheless, the Court concurs with the Public Attorney and the Solicitor General that the crime
committed in this case is not serious illegal detention with rape. Rather, appellant is guilty of rape
qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code[17] are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[18]
The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victims liberty. The prosecution must prove
actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the
appellant.[19] The accused must have acted purposely or knowingly to restrain the victim because what
constitutes the offense is taking coupled with intent to restrain.[20]
We agree with the Public Attorney that the facts in the present case indicate that appellants principal
objective was not to deprive Rowena of her liberty. We quote from the findings of the trial court:
xxx Caught by surprise, the complainant struggled to free herself from the hold of the accused and ran
down the stairway, but in her haste she stumbled and fell down. The accused followed her down; held
her hair and left hand and dragged her upstairs to his room, while she shouted for help. Once inside the
room, the accused forced the complainant to undressed (sic) and then he kissed all the parts of her
body. The complainant tried to resist and in the process, she sustained a wound in her left arm and a
knife wound in her right palm, Exhibit F. The accused forced the complainant to lie on a bed and
placed himself on top of her and at the same time position his knees between her legs and forced them
to separate. After which he proceeded to rape her, and while doing so, he remarked to
her, Weng (complainants nickname), pasensiya ka na. Nakabato kasi ako.(Please forgive me because I
am high on drug[s]). He further told her that he would insert the knife he was holding in her vagina to
enhance his excitement. xxx Finally, at around 5:00 a.m., the police officer forced open the door and

barged inside the room, and subdued the dumbfounded accused who was then on top of the
complainant.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
From this narration, it is clear that appellants real aim was to have carnal knowledge of
Rowena. Appellant took Rowena no further than to his room - which was only across the hall from
Rowenas room - where he immediately forced her to undress. In fact, appellant was so intent on raping
her that he was still naked and on top of her when the police broke into the room.[22] Taken together,
these circumstances engender doubt that the intention of appellant was to detain Rowena. The
detention was merely incidental to the real objective of appellant.
It is true that appellant kept Rowena inside his room for more than an hour while the police tried to
negotiate with him. However, this does not constitute illegal detention in light of the fact that appellant
was on top of Rowena raping her even while he was shouting at the police and other people
outside. This is borne out by Rowenas testimony:
Q: Could you tell us what was the position of the accused when the policemen forcibly opened the
door?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: For how long [did] the accused stayed (sic) on top of you?
A: Almost two hours from the very start.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant maintained this position until the police barged into the room and subdued him.[24] Given
these facts, appellant is not liable for the crime of serious illegal detention with rape.
However, appellant is still liable for the crime of rape. When the information charges a complex crime
and the evidence fails to support one of the component offenses, the defendant is still liable for the
other offense supported by the evidence.[25] Thus, in People v. Oliva,[26] the Court found Carlito Oliva
guilty of statutory rape even if the information charged him of kidnapping with rape.
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed 1)
a)

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxx.
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court held that appellant, with the use of a knife, succeeded in raping Rowena in the early
hours of 1 January 2000. The trial court found the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution
witnesses straightforward, convincing and believable and supported by the evidence of the injuries
sustained by Rowena.[27]
The weighing of the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the trial court since it is in the best position
to discharge that function.[28] The trial judge has the advantage of personally observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not available to an appellate court.[29] Absent compelling
reasons, we will not disturb on appeal the trial courts findings on the credibility of a witness.
The Public Attorney argues that Judge Laguio was biased against appellant, and that it was clear from
the judges remarks that he had already concluded that appellant was lying before appellant had
finished presenting his evidence, to wit:
PROS GURAY:
Q: You mean to tell the court that the husband on December 31, 1999 in the evening he left the house?
A: After we have a drinking spree he left the house.
xxx
THE COURT:
Q: What time was that?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Was it past 11:00?
A: I cannot remember the time.
Q: You do not know what time the husband left the house?
A: I cannot remember.
xxx
Q: But you said that it was around 10:30 when Rowena entered your room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how did you know the time? [Y]ou h[a]ve a wristwatch?
A: In my room there was a wall clock.
Q: So you know that the husband of Rowena went out or left the house before 10:30?

A: Yes, sir. Before he left we were drinking together.

Q: Yes. And you said that it was after the two of you drank together that he left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you, went up in the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many minutes after you entered your room did Rowena entered (sic) your room?
A: 10:30 ho.
Q: Ilang minuto ang nakaraan pagpasok mo sa kuwarto mo na pinasok ka ni Rowena. Huwag ka ng
magmamaangmaangan eh. Nagtatanga-tangahan ka pa eh. O Ilang minuto ang lumipas? Hindi ka
naman mukhang tanga eh. Mukha ka ngang intelihensiya eh.
A: Hindi ko na ho alam eh.
Q: Kaya nga huwag ka ng magtangatangahan. Pagkapasok mo sa kuwarto ilang minuto ang lumipas
bago pumasok sa kuwarto mo si Rowena
A: 10 minutes, sir.
Q: That means that you knew that the husband of Rowena left the house before 10:30 p.m.?
A: (Witness cannot answer)
THE COURT:
Make it on record that the witness cannot answer. Alam mo yung mga taong nagsisinungaling ganyan
hindi makasagot pag nakokorner. People who tell a lie they cannot usually answer when they are
cornered. I dont think there is a need to further cross-examine this witness.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from these admittedly deplorable comments, the Court finds no other indications of partiality or
bias in the records of the case. The subject remarks were made after appellant was subjected to
extensive direct and cross-examination.[31] The examination of appellant was no more rigorous than that
of Rowenas, in which Judge Laguio also frequently intervened by posing clarificatory questions. The
trial court did not prohibit appellant from presenting additional evidence or witnesses, although
appellant chose not to do so. At the request of appellants counsel, Judge Laguio ordered a continuance
for the defense to continue its presentation of evidence after appellants testimony.[32]
Further, contradictions and inconsistencies marred appellants testimony. Appellant initially stated that
at 1:00 oclock in the morning on 1 January 2000 he was helping in the house doing household chores
like cleaning the plates and cleaning the house.[33] This conflicts with his narration that Rowena entered
his room at 10:30 oclock in the evening on 31 December 1999 andstayed with him until the police

arrived and kicked his door open.[34] Appellant also stated that he had never gone out with Rowena in
the 5 years that he had worked for her husband.[35]However, appellant later testified that he
accompanied Rowena to her parents house in Bulacan in 1998, where they had sexual intercourse for
the first time.[36] Likewise, appellant originally claimed that he and Rowena had two sexual encounters in
1998 - once in Bulacan and 3 weeks afterwards in the house of Rowena and her husband.[37] He changed
this later to many times, more than 20 times, and then to about 50 times in 1998. [38] Finally, appellant
failed in four instances to answer the questions propounded to him during cross-examination.[39]
We stress that this does not excuse the assailed remarks of Judge Laguio. More circumspect conduct is
expected from a judge of our courts. It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to
appear impartial.[40] In the future, Judge Laguio should adhere more closely to the rule that a judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.[41]
Nevertheless, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
assailed Decision insofar as it found appellant to have raped Rowena. The testimony of Rowena,
corroborated by the results of the medical examination and the testimonies of other witnesses,
establish beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) appellant forcibly succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Rowena on 1 January 2000; and (2) that appellant committed the crime with the use of a deadly
weapon, a knife.
In contrast to appellants erratic testimony, Rowena was candid and steadfast in her claim that appellant
raped her, thus:
Q: And what did you [do] after the accused uttered Ate Weng galit na sa iyo si Kuya Jun?
A: I opened the door and went out of our room and I asked Bernie Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo
may pera naman siya.
THE COURT:
Q: At that time where was the accused?
A: When I talked to him he was inside his room and all of the (sic) sudden he was at my back.
THE COURT:
Continue.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: And what did [he] do after that?
A: He placed his left arm around my neck and his right hand which was holding a knife (stop) and I saw
his right hand holding a knife.

Q: And how did you react when the accused placed his left hand [on] your neck and you saw him
holding a knife?
A: I was surprised. (Nagulat po ako.)
Q: And what did you do?
A: And at the same time I pushed the left area of the accused and in the process I fell to the stairway
all the way down.
Q: And what did the accused do after you fell down?
A: He immediately went down as he held my hair and my left arm and he dragged me upstairs.
Q: And to what place upstairs did the accused drag you?
A: To his room.
Q: By the way, how far is his room [from] your room?
A: The room of the accused is in front of my room.
xxx
Q: When he succeeded in dragging you inside his room what happened next?
A: He asked me to undress.
Q: And did you oblige?
A: He poked the knife he was holding at me and he threatened me. He threatened to kill me.
THE COURT:
Q: So what did you do?
A: I undressed.
Q: While he was poking his knife at you and threatening to kill you. What exactly [were] the words
uttered by him?
A: Sige, maghubad ka. Kung hindi papatayin kita.
Q: And what was he doing with his knife while he was uttering those words?
A: He was poking his knife at the right rear side of my body.
Q: And how did you feel at that time?
A: I was very frightened. And I was trembling.

Q: Now, you said that he was poking a knife at your back. Did you sustain injuries?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you still have scars up to the present?
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
May I be allowed, Your Honor to (interrupted)
THE COURT:
We will have a lady staff to look [at] the scars. xxx (At this instance the court interpreter, Ma. Elena
Arcenal, accompanied the complainant inside the chambers of the presiding judge to take a look at the
scars sustained by the complainant xxx)
xxx
THE COURT:
Later the court interpreter informed the court that the complainant [had] 2 scars, one is on the middle
right side of her body and the other one is on the upper left side of her back.
PROS. GURAY:
Upper right side.
THE COURT:
Yes, upper right side.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Now, by the way when you fell on the stairs and you were grabbed by the accused did you shout?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you shout?
A: I shouted Jun, tulungan mo ako.
xxx
Q: xxx Now after you removed your dress what did the accused [do]?
A: He kissed all the parts of my body.
Q: And what did you do after that?

A: I struggled and resisted.

Q: What did the accused do?
A: I grappled with him for the possession of the knife he was holding.
Q: Were you able to grab possession of the knife?
A: I was able to hold it but in the course of our grappling my left arm sustained (stop) the handle of the
knife forcefully hit the left portion of my arm. (Witness showing to the court slight visible scar)
THE COURT:
Will the defense and the prosecution confirm the observation of the court?
ATTY. GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. GURAY:
It is very apparent.
xxx
Q: You also mentioned that you also sustained injury on your right hand. What cause[d] the injury on
your right hand?
A: Because I was able to get hold of the bladed portion of the knife and it sliced my right palm.
Q: By the way, will you please describe to the court the knife that was used by the accused in
threatening or intimidating you?
A: The bladed portion of the knife is about 12 inches more or less and the handle is about 6 inches
more or less.
xxx
Q: So when you were not successful in grappling the knife from the accused what did the accused do
next?
A: He pulled my hair and slapped the back of my head.
Q: And what else did he do?
A: He dragged me and forced me to lie down on the double bed.
xxx

Q: And after he dragged you to the lower bed what else did you do?
A: Yung pong paa ko eh ginanoon niya po sa paa nya. Kinross niya po.
THE COURT:
Q: You mean doon sa pagitan ng ano mo!
A: Yuong d[a]lawa ko pong paa ginanyan nya po yung paa ko.
Q: Sige i-demonstrate mo.
A: Inangkla po.
Q: Kaya nga pinagitan nya yong sa paa niya sa side mo?
A: Hindi po. Ganito po. Yung paa niya ginanyan po niya.
Q: Kaya nga. Di nakabuka yung paa mo.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Di ba nakabukhang ganyan?
THE COURT:
Oo.
PROS. GURAY:
Tapos yung paa niya nakaganoon.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
Pareho.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
I do that myself so I know. (Atty. Garcia laughs)
ATTY. GARCIA:
Very incriminating. (laughs)
THE COURT:

Witness demonstrating by opening her legs and then pointing out that the accused placed his left foot
under the left leg of the complainant and then locked it by raising his left leg of the accused and the
same thing was done on her right leg.
THE COURT:
Q: So you were unable to move both your legs when the accused did that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that juncture at that time you did not have anymore underwear?
A: I did not have anymore underwear.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
xxx
Q: Now what did the accused do next after placing his two legs in between your legs?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said he raped you, you mean his private parts were forced into your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you do when the accused inserted his penis into your private part?
A: I continued struggling and resisting but he poked the knife he was holding at the left side of my
body. And I was so frightened.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: He did everything to me. He kissed me, he inserted his fingers in my sex organ. Everything.
THE COURT:
Q: After he satisfied his lust on you what did the accused do?
A: He did not allowed (sic) me to leave the room.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: What else did he do with that knife to you?
A: While he was in the act of raping me the accused at one time pointed the knife he was holding at
my private part and he said that he would insert it in my private part to get [a] thrill out of it because he

was high on shabu. Because he could not have a complete or full erection because he was under the
influence of shabu (Bato).
THE COURT:
Q: But despite the fact that he was not able to have a complete or full erection he succeeded in
penetrating you with his sex organ?
A: Yes, sir.[42]
Rowenas account of her resistance and struggle with appellant was consistent with the results of the
physical examination. Dr. Mirasol Pangan, the examining physician, testified on the gynecologic
emergency sheet[43] of Rowena dated 1 January 2000 and discussed the findings, as follows:
Q: Could you tell us your findings on the victim?
A: Theres the hematoma at the right neck, two abrasions at the left lower lip approximately 0.5cm.
Theres abrasion at the left for[e]arm, an abrasion hematoma circular at the left lower arm, multiple
abrasions at the volar aspect of the second ... fourth digits of right hand, under the nose, hematoma at
the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measured 6x1 cm. Theres a stab wound at the left
forearm. In the examination of the genitalia, theres the two cms. hematoma at the right la[b]ia minora.
Q: How about the organ of the victim, did you ... (interrupted)
A: Yes, the last part I read was the genitalia, that referred to the organ of the victim, the right la[b]ia
minora have two cms. abrasions hematoma. In reference to the vagina, the cervix, the uterus and the
ovary which have no significant findings.
xxx
Q: You have a note here at the lower portion of the report Sexual and Physical abuse on the victim,
was this your conclusion based on the physical examination?
A: Based on the areas involved, the findings that we have, the arm and the trunk aside from the
findings on the genital organ.
xxx
Q: Could normal intercourse cause such injuries to the organ of the victim without use of violence?
A: No, sir.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:

Q: xxx you stated, Doctor that the kind of injuries in the genitalia of the victim could not have been
caused by a normal sexual intercourse. [M]y question is, could it be the result of forceful and
unwelcome penetration by a firm penis?
A: Yes, sir, it could be caused.
Q: It could be caused by a forceful thrust of a human finger?
A: Yes, sir, it could also be caused.[44]
Appellants claim that he and Rowena had consensual sex was contradicted not only by Rowena but also
by neighbor Eldee Eusebio, who testified that: (1) he heard Rowena scream for help; (2) he saw her
trying to sandwich her feet against the door to keep the door to appellants room from closing; and (3)
appellant shouted papatayin niya lahat ng tao sa loob when he knocked on the door.[45] Together with
the physical injuries sustained by Rowena - which appellant said he did not even notice[46] - these
statements belie appellants assertion of consensual sex.
The sweetheart defense employed by appellant also deserves scant consideration. Aside from being
inherently weak, it was uncorroborated by any evidence other than the self-serving testimony of
appellant. Appellant admitted that he had no notes, letters, gifts or any other item to show for an affair
that had allegedly been ongoing since 1998.[47]
The Information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the rape
and the prosecution proved that appellant used such a weapon. Under Article 266-B, the use of a deadly
weapon qualifies the rape and the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since reclusion perpetua to death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
applies. Article 63 provides:
1.
When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2.
When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3.
When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4.
When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according
to the result of such compensation.
In rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the
penalty to death.[48] In the present case, appellant raped Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.[49] However, the Information did not

specifically allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Gallego,[50] the Court ruled that
where the information did not allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, dwelling could not raise
the penalty to death. The Court held:
xxx The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating
circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly
exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties evidence. This, the accused can do only if he is
appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it.
The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the
inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be
appreciated against him.[51]
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require the complaint or information to state the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an offense.[52] When the law or rules specify certain
circumstances that can aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the offense a
greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proved to
justify the imposition of the increased penalty.[53]
Further, the circumstance of dwelling could not be considered in the present case even if it were
properly alleged in the Information. Where the offender resided in the same house as the victim when
the offense was committed, dwelling could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance.[54] It is
undisputed in this case that appellant was a live-in dog trainer and that he stayed in the Rianzares
house in a room across Rowenas room. Therefore, the penalty imposable on appellant is reclusion
perpetua.
A word on the examination of Rowena. A rape victim is physically, socially, psychologically and
emotionally scarred, resulting in trauma which may last a lifetime.[55] It was thus highly inconsiderate for
the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time Rowena was reliving her
harrowing experience.[56] Courts are looked up to by people with high respect and are regarded as places
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.[57] Levity has no
place in the courtroom during the examination of a victim of rape, and particularly not at her expense.
The trial court awarded moral and nominal damages but failed to award indemnity ex delicto. An award
of indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of guilt in rape cases.[58] We thus award P50,000 to
Rowena as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral damages is
reduced to P50,000. The award of nominal damages is deleted for lack of legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case No. 00-179698, is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO is adjudged guilty
of RAPE, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Rowena Rianzares
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal
charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio
broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter[1] requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order
"to assure the public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our
history."[2] The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant
petition,[3] submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land,
members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio
and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose
of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of
the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the
part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against the Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada."[4]

Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to
vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case
for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras
in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely.
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibit the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a
matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the
orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television
or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4,
the Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise
from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision
in part pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might
be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own
performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court
to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no
greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news

media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and
decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of
the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial
means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No
video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court
hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth.[5] Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence,
and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of
the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial
and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times,
that would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.[6]
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence[7] tells us that the right of the accused must
be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts
free from improper influence,[8] and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention[9] and where the

conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence[10] but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate,
with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded
that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."[11] Even while it
may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and
through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways
and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is
not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.[12] It might be farcical to build around
them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.[13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to
justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice
can create.[14]The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched
for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.[16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the
judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process[17] which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in
its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be
allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society,
its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process."[18]
This Court, in the instance[19] already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas,[20] the United States Supreme
Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights
of an accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the
moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole

community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along
with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn
facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of
the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be
demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with
anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the
mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby
impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on
the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task
requires his undivided attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form
of mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable
close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him - sometimes the
difference between life and death - dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public
surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a
city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage could
have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always
surround the judicial process.[21]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own concern on
the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television
and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure
a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very
credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial
could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and
radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for
publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on
account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media
coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.

En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the matter. Just
to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991,
the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23 rd October resolution,
it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of
the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining
news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly
implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,[23] the trial
judge closed the courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The
judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically
open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law
that required trial judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony
of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police officers charged with burglary sought to
overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage
had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes
Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological
advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of
cameras and recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the
accused."[26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television
and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they
do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's
focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events
has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has
thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to
yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the
business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in
the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be
propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense
which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is
submitted before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the
known test truth in a courtroom.[28]

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high
to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, and Quisumbing, JJ., joins the dissenting opinion of Puno, J.
Puno, and Panganiban, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Melo, J., joins the dissents.
Mendoza, J., concur in the majority opinion of Vitug, J., and join the separate opinion of Kapunan, J.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

CESAR
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

L.

LANTORIA, complainant,

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against
respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi
allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with
respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of
Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent
Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm
located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and
supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were
assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was
the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in
default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant
Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:
Butuan
23 April 1974
Atty.
928
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:

City

Ireneo
Rizal

Bunye
Avenue

xxx xxx xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3
defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said
decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
Major
Executive Director 5

CESAR
Inf

L
PC

LANTORIA
(ret)

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this
wise:
June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received, which is
about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been
too much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby
provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas
has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa
(sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over
there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am
not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge
Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration,
then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the
better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily
and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to
you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Brotherly yours,

(SGD.)
Counsel

IRINEO

BUNYI6

L.

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March
1974, the contents of which read as follows:
928
March 4, 1974

Rizal

Ave.,

Sta.

Cruz,

Manila

Dear Major Lantoria,

This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge
Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign
them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and information and that
you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from
him if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs
them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According
to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City,
during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) L. BUNYI 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative
case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March,
23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because
to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the
preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint,
admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if
ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his
several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who
considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas
one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza,
both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the
early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft
or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the

under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to
manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely
non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in
the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their
standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at
the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter
mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia
(Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to
the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last
paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report
to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi
appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that
at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the
investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the
ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer interested to
prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of
the complaint against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are
elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the
letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove his
charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi
(dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed
prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters
indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of
the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said
letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as
respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared
the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and
unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the

independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial
determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court
the corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future
he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the
canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed
until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was
as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next
hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of
America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the
Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent
Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that
although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift
or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered
his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the
draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the
instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the
respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for
an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative
complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on
respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary
action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia
regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact
prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless
amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at
the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal
relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should
be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a
pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge
special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional
duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper
foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity
for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court
where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of
the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976
RICARDA
GABRIEL
vs.
ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.

DE

BUMANGLAG, complainant,

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of gross immoral
conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent
filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the Court's Resolutions of
November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974 and October 30, 1974.
On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21, 1975 from then
Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate action" on
the therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he "promulgate(s)
a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be
allowed to become an active member of the New Society".
The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of the
President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of
September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser penalty
of two-year suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices Castro and
Makasiar) and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack
of merit respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and December 12,
1973"; and further resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
he should not be subjected to further disciplinary action for making false statements and
misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he has been allegedly deprived of due process of
law contrary to the facts of record as stated in the Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law
and of the Constitution in asking the President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing
upon him two-year suspension from the practice of law".
In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same day, then
Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent's letter of the same date to the President
stating that "(T)he undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake by making said

letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that I may be
challenging the decision which is already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of
protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the President to disregard his first
letter.
Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately" withdrawn his
letter asking for the President's intervention and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that the
Chief Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this Honorable Supreme
Court" and "with folded hands begs and asks an apology from the members of this Honorable Court,
with the full assurance that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the future."
Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Resolution of November 7,
1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a
decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his
misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe
action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.
A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to file his
petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were only denied by the
Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion to state in People vs.
Catolico * and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of
the time-honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court,
upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the
signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions
approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and
members of the Court to the prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than
decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended
him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the
future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muoz-Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.